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BRK30173
about me.
Tom Janetscheck
Principal Cloud Security Architect with Devoteam Alegri
Focused on Cloud Security, IaaS, Azure Identity, and Governance
Community Lead of Azure Meetup Saarbrücken
Co-founder and co-organizer of Azure Saturday
Tech blogger and book author
@azureandbeyond
https://blog.azureandbeyond.com
Federal criminal agency – 2018 cybercrime situation report
87.000 cases of cybercrime
in 2018
60.000.000 € amount of damage
with an immense dark figure
Estimated amount of damage
according to Bitcom:
100.000.000.000 (!) € per year
Source: BKA - 2018 Cybercrime situation report
Attack services are cheap
Ransomware:
https://aka.ms/CISOWorkshop
Zero-days:
Breaching services on
a per job basis:
Exploit kits:
Loads (compromised device):
Spearphishing services:
Compromised accounts:
Denial of Service:
Highest average price
Exploit kits:
Price: $1,400
per month
Attack services are cheap
Ransomware:
Price: $66 upfront or
30% of the profit
(affiliate model)
https://aka.ms/CISOWorkshop
Zero-days:
Price: $5,000 to $350,000
Breaching services on
a per job basis:
Price range: $250 or
much more
Loads (compromised device):
Price: PC - $0.13 to $0.89
Mobile - $0.82 to $2.78
Spearphishing services:
Price: $100 to $1,000 per
successful account take over
Compromised accounts:
https://aka.ms/CyberHygiene
Denial of Service:
Price: $766.67 per month
DDoS Attacks – value for money
Source: Kaspersky Lab Research Report 02/2018
Price per month Average cost (SMB) Average cost (enterprise)
$766.67
$120,000.00
$2,000,000.00
DDoS attack - value for money
Top 3 Attacks
lllllllll
lllllllll
200,000
5B
44M
650,000
Password Spray
Password123
Password123
Password123
Password123
Password123
Password123
Password123
Password123
Password123
Password123
Password123
Password123
Password123
Password123
Password123
Password123
Password123
Password123
Password123
Password123
Josi@contoso.com
Chance@wingtiptoys.com
Rami@fabrikam.com
TomH@cohowinery.com
AnitaM@cohovineyard.com
EitokuK@cpandl.com
Ramanujan@Adatum.com
Maria@Treyresearch.net
LC@adverture-works.com
EW@alpineskihouse.com
info@blueyonderairlines.com
AiliS@fourthcoffee.com
MM39@litwareinc.com
Margie@margiestravel.com
Ling-Pi997@proseware.com
PabloP@fineartschool.net
GiseleD@tailspintoys.com
Luly@worldwideimporters.com
Bjorn@woodgrovebank.com
NK@lucernepublishing.com
Demo
Identity perimeter
Key requirement for moving to a Zero Trust Model
Evolution of security perimeters
Office 365
User
Role
Group
Device
Config
Location
Last Sign-in
Conditional
access risk
Health/Integrity
Client
Config
Last seen
High
Medium
Low
Firewall
Intrusion
Detection/Prevention
Forward/Reverse
Proxy
Source: IP Address/Port
Destination: IP Address/Port
Signatures
Analytics
Allow List
Authentication
Intranet Resources
Actions:
• Allow
• Allow Restricted
• Require MFA
• Block
• Force Remediation
Actions:
• Allow
• Block
Device
User
Role: Sales Account Representative
Group: London Users
Device: Windows
Config: Corp Proxy
Location: London, UK
Last Sign-in: 5 hrs ago
Office resource
Conditional
access risk
Health: Device compromised
Client: Browser
Config: Anonymous
Last seen: Asia
High
Medium
Low
Anonymous IP
Unfamiliar sign-in location for this user
Malicious activity detected on device
Device
Sensitivity: Medium
Block access
Force threat
remediation
https://channel9.msdn.com/events/Ignite/
Microsoft-Ignite-Orlando-2017/BRK3016
Identity protection
Identity protection is essential!
Implement multi-
factor authentication
Adhere to the
principle of least
privilege
Establish privileged
identity/access
management
(PIM/PAM)
Enable
conditional
access policies
Use passphrases
rather than (complex)
passwords
or go password-less
uuuuuuu
uu$$$$$$$$$$$uu
uu$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$uu
u$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$u
u$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$u
u$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$u
u$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$u
u$$$$$$" "$$$" "$$$$$$u
"$$$$" u$u $$$$"
$$$u u$u u$$$
$$$u u$$$u u$$$
"$$$$uu$$$ $$$uu$$$$"
"$$$$$$$" "$$$$$$$"
u$$$$$$$u$$$$$$$u
u$"$"$"$"$"$"$u
uuu $$u$ $ $ $ $u$$ uuu
u$$$$ $$$$$u$u$u$$$ u$$$$
$$$$$uu "$$$$$$$$$" uu$$$$$$
u$$$$$$$$$$$uu """"" uuuu$$$$$$$$$$
$$$$"""$$$$$$$$$$uuu uu$$$$$$$$$"""$$$"
""" ""$$$$$$$$$$$uu ""$"""
uuuu ""$$$$$$$$$$uuu
u$$$uuu$$$$$$$$$uu ""$$$$$$$$$$$uuu$$$
$$$$$$$$$$"""" ""$$$$$$$$$$$"
"$$$$$" ""$$$$""
$$$" $$$$"
88 88 88
88 88 88
88 88 88
88,dPPYba, ,adPPYYba, ,adPPYba, 88 ,d8 ,adPPYba, ,adPPYb,88
88P' "8a "" `Y8 a8" "" 88 ,a8" a8P_____88 a8" `Y88
88 88 ,adPPPPP88 8b 8888[ 8PP""""""" 8b 88
88 88 88, ,88 "8a, ,aa 88`"Yba, "8b, ,aa "8a, ,d88
88 88 `"8bbdP"Y8 `"Ybbd8"' 88 `Y8a `"Ybbd8"' `"8bbdP"Y8
Get Token request returned http
error: 400 and server response:
{"error":"invalid_grant
,"error_description":"AADSTS50126:
Error validating credentials due to
invalid username or password.[...]}
Get Token request returned http error:
400 and server response:
{"error":"interaction_required","error_desc
ription":"AADSTS50076: Due to a
configuration change made by your
administrator, or because you moved to a
new location, you must use multi-
factor authentication to access [...]}
Identity protection is essential!
oooo$$$$$$$$$$$$oooo
oo$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$o
oo$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$o o$ $$ o$
o $ oo o$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$o $$ $$ $$o$
oo $ $ "$ o$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$o $$$o$$o$
"$$$$$$o$ o$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$o $$$$$$$$
$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$$ """$$$
"$$$""""$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ "$$$
$$$ o$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ "$$$o
o$$" $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ $$$o
$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$" "$$$$$$ooooo$$$$o
o$$$oooo$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ o$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
$$$$$$$$"$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$""""""""
"""" $$$$ "$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$" o$$$
"$$$o """$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$"$$" $$$
$$$o "$$""$$$$$$"""" o$$$
$$$$o oo o$$$"
"$$$$o o$$$$$$o"$$$$o o$$$$
"$$$$$oo ""$$$$o$$$$$o o$$$$""
""$$$$$oooo "$$$o$$$$$$$$$"""
""$$$$$$$oo $$$$$$$$$$
""""$$$$$$$$$$$
$$$$$$$$$$$$
$$$$$$$$$$"
"$$$""""
Demo
Thank you!
Microsoft Ignite The Tour 2020 - BRK30173 - Identity is the new control plane

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Microsoft Ignite The Tour 2020 - BRK30173 - Identity is the new control plane

  • 1.
  • 3. about me. Tom Janetscheck Principal Cloud Security Architect with Devoteam Alegri Focused on Cloud Security, IaaS, Azure Identity, and Governance Community Lead of Azure Meetup Saarbrücken Co-founder and co-organizer of Azure Saturday Tech blogger and book author @azureandbeyond https://blog.azureandbeyond.com
  • 4. Federal criminal agency – 2018 cybercrime situation report 87.000 cases of cybercrime in 2018 60.000.000 € amount of damage with an immense dark figure Estimated amount of damage according to Bitcom: 100.000.000.000 (!) € per year Source: BKA - 2018 Cybercrime situation report
  • 5. Attack services are cheap Ransomware: https://aka.ms/CISOWorkshop Zero-days: Breaching services on a per job basis: Exploit kits: Loads (compromised device): Spearphishing services: Compromised accounts: Denial of Service: Highest average price
  • 6. Exploit kits: Price: $1,400 per month Attack services are cheap Ransomware: Price: $66 upfront or 30% of the profit (affiliate model) https://aka.ms/CISOWorkshop Zero-days: Price: $5,000 to $350,000 Breaching services on a per job basis: Price range: $250 or much more Loads (compromised device): Price: PC - $0.13 to $0.89 Mobile - $0.82 to $2.78 Spearphishing services: Price: $100 to $1,000 per successful account take over Compromised accounts: https://aka.ms/CyberHygiene Denial of Service: Price: $766.67 per month
  • 7. DDoS Attacks – value for money Source: Kaspersky Lab Research Report 02/2018 Price per month Average cost (SMB) Average cost (enterprise) $766.67 $120,000.00 $2,000,000.00 DDoS attack - value for money
  • 10. Demo
  • 11. Identity perimeter Key requirement for moving to a Zero Trust Model
  • 12. Evolution of security perimeters
  • 14. User Role Group Device Config Location Last Sign-in Conditional access risk Health/Integrity Client Config Last seen High Medium Low Firewall Intrusion Detection/Prevention Forward/Reverse Proxy Source: IP Address/Port Destination: IP Address/Port Signatures Analytics Allow List Authentication Intranet Resources Actions: • Allow • Allow Restricted • Require MFA • Block • Force Remediation Actions: • Allow • Block Device
  • 15. User Role: Sales Account Representative Group: London Users Device: Windows Config: Corp Proxy Location: London, UK Last Sign-in: 5 hrs ago Office resource Conditional access risk Health: Device compromised Client: Browser Config: Anonymous Last seen: Asia High Medium Low Anonymous IP Unfamiliar sign-in location for this user Malicious activity detected on device Device Sensitivity: Medium Block access Force threat remediation https://channel9.msdn.com/events/Ignite/ Microsoft-Ignite-Orlando-2017/BRK3016
  • 17. Identity protection is essential! Implement multi- factor authentication Adhere to the principle of least privilege Establish privileged identity/access management (PIM/PAM) Enable conditional access policies Use passphrases rather than (complex) passwords or go password-less uuuuuuu uu$$$$$$$$$$$uu uu$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$uu u$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$u u$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$u u$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$u u$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$u u$$$$$$" "$$$" "$$$$$$u "$$$$" u$u $$$$" $$$u u$u u$$$ $$$u u$$$u u$$$ "$$$$uu$$$ $$$uu$$$$" "$$$$$$$" "$$$$$$$" u$$$$$$$u$$$$$$$u u$"$"$"$"$"$"$u uuu $$u$ $ $ $ $u$$ uuu u$$$$ $$$$$u$u$u$$$ u$$$$ $$$$$uu "$$$$$$$$$" uu$$$$$$ u$$$$$$$$$$$uu """"" uuuu$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$"""$$$$$$$$$$uuu uu$$$$$$$$$"""$$$" """ ""$$$$$$$$$$$uu ""$""" uuuu ""$$$$$$$$$$uuu u$$$uuu$$$$$$$$$uu ""$$$$$$$$$$$uuu$$$ $$$$$$$$$$"""" ""$$$$$$$$$$$" "$$$$$" ""$$$$"" $$$" $$$$" 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88,dPPYba, ,adPPYYba, ,adPPYba, 88 ,d8 ,adPPYba, ,adPPYb,88 88P' "8a "" `Y8 a8" "" 88 ,a8" a8P_____88 a8" `Y88 88 88 ,adPPPPP88 8b 8888[ 8PP""""""" 8b 88 88 88 88, ,88 "8a, ,aa 88`"Yba, "8b, ,aa "8a, ,d88 88 88 `"8bbdP"Y8 `"Ybbd8"' 88 `Y8a `"Ybbd8"' `"8bbdP"Y8 Get Token request returned http error: 400 and server response: {"error":"invalid_grant ,"error_description":"AADSTS50126: Error validating credentials due to invalid username or password.[...]} Get Token request returned http error: 400 and server response: {"error":"interaction_required","error_desc ription":"AADSTS50076: Due to a configuration change made by your administrator, or because you moved to a new location, you must use multi- factor authentication to access [...]}
  • 18. Identity protection is essential! oooo$$$$$$$$$$$$oooo oo$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$o oo$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$o o$ $$ o$ o $ oo o$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$o $$ $$ $$o$ oo $ $ "$ o$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$o $$$o$$o$ "$$$$$$o$ o$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$o $$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$$ """$$$ "$$$""""$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ "$$$ $$$ o$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ "$$$o o$$" $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ $$$o $$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$" "$$$$$$ooooo$$$$o o$$$oooo$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ o$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$"$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$"""""""" """" $$$$ "$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$" o$$$ "$$$o """$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$"$$" $$$ $$$o "$$""$$$$$$"""" o$$$ $$$$o oo o$$$" "$$$$o o$$$$$$o"$$$$o o$$$$ "$$$$$oo ""$$$$o$$$$$o o$$$$"" ""$$$$$oooo "$$$o$$$$$$$$$""" ""$$$$$$$oo $$$$$$$$$$ """"$$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$" "$$$""""
  • 19. Demo

Editor's Notes

  1. In January 2020, there was a DDoS attack conducted against a fintech service provider in Germany, resulting in a huge amount of people not being able to use online banking for some hours/days.
  2. 8
  3. Key Takeaway: Defender need to transition to using an identity security perimeter as our primary defense strategy CLICK 1 The first thing to note is that the network security perimeters we built still work against the attacks they were designed to repel. This is quickly confirmed by anyone exposes an unpatched operating system or application to the direct internet without a firewall. CLICK 2 Unfortunately attackers have also developed a new generation of techniques that include phishing and credential theft. These techniques allow attackers to reliably penetrate the network security perimeter and navigate around behind it. CLICK 3 Additionally, newer technologies to increase productivity are causing data to move outside the corporate network onto managed and unmanaged devices, cloud services (both sanctioned/managed and unauthorized/Shadow IT applications). The trustworthiness of these devices and services are not defined by which IP subnet they are hosted on, so we need to manage the identities of these users, devices, services, and data. CLICK 4 Both of these trends diminish the effectiveness of the network as the sole security perimeter. We now need to establish an identity based perimeter so we can draw a line (of consistent security controls) between our assets and the threats to them.
  4. Key Takeaway: This is a comparison of the visibility and control you get with classic network perimeters vs a modern identity perimeter (based on Azure Active Directory Conditional Access) A network perimeter is composed of several functions (often combined into the same appliance) that uses data available from the network traffic to make a decision on whether to allow or block a connection. While this provides security visibility and control against some attacks, it has several significant limitations including: Scope is limited to resources hosted on a controlled network such as an intranet/extranet Visibility is limited to what is available on the network, which is often encrypted and frequently lacks important context on application function, user identity, data sensitivity, and other factors. Control is limited to allow and block, which doesn’t allow for managing the user experience and providing self service corrections, exception management, etc. CLICK 1 In contrast, an identity perimeter is aware of the user, device, and a number of attributes about each of them including the user's role, whether they logged on with MFA, when and where the device was last seen, the security health of the device, and more. The conditional access engine uses this information to calculate the relative risk of the operation as high, medium or low. The actions available include allow and block as well as Allow Restricted – Users may be allowed to authenticate, but only granted limited access (e.g. a user would be granted only online access to document in SharePoint online vs. being allowed to download) Require MFA - For authentication attempts with a medium risk (such as authentications from an unexpected time/geography), conditional access can require additional proof of identity before granting access (where this wouldn’t happen within their normal time/geography) Force Remediation – For high risk scenarios such as a known compromised password or computer, conditional access can force the issue to be remediated (e.g. force the user to change a password that has been leaked, requiring defender to remediate the device Network based perimeters provided needed controls for legacy workloads and PaaS components where the workload is under the control of the IT department (e.g. web applications), but protecting data and protecting newer asset types like Software as a Service (SaaS) requires and identity perimeter to provide the needed visibility and control.
  5. Key Takeaway: This is an example of conditional access enforcing policy on an authentication attempt In this example, a user is logging in with a device and attempting to access an internal file in Office 365 with a medium sensitivity CLICK 1 The user provides valid credentials and the user/device information checks out (so far), so the conditional risk level would be low. CLICK 2 As other factors are considered in the authentication decision, conditional access finds risk factors that would set risk to Medium An anonymous IP as the connection is coming in over the Tor network The device was last seen in an unfamiliar sign in location High Defender ATP has indicated that this device has been compromised Because of this, the conditional access engine blocks the authentication attempt and forces threat remediation (through Defender ATP)
  6. az login -u john@azureandbeyond.com -p Secur1tyR0ck --allow-no-subscriptions -> wrong password az login -u john@azureandbeyond.com -p Secur1tyR0cks --allow-no-subscriptions -> MFA challenge Show AAD Sign In Logs after password spray Tor browser – login Ben, John, Tim Show Azure AD Identity Protection Show passwordless signin with YubiKey Show Azure AD PIM