Michalis Hadjipantelis-Dissertation (PP5500)

BRUNEL UNIVERSITY
Department of Politics, History and Law
PP5500: Dissertation
The Arab-Israeli 1973 ‘’Yom Kippur War’’:
A political analysis of the origins and an intelligence and
military assessment of the course of the War.
Name: Michalis Hadjipantelis
Student ID: 1437717
Academic year: 2015-2016
Dissertation Supervisor: Professor Matthew Hughes
This dissertation is submitted for the degree of MA/MSc of Brunel University – 2015. This dissertation
is entirely my own work and all material from other sources, published or unpublished, has been
duly acknowledged and cited

2
Abstract
The ‘’Yom Kippur War’’ is the last official Arab-Israeli war in history. On October 6th
1973, Syria
and Egypt launched an attack against Israeli Defense Forces where they found them unbalanced and
surprised. This happened on the holiest day in the Jewish calendar, Yom Kippur. The Arab efforts
initially were successful due to the Israeli surprise and the good execution of their plans. However,
during the course of the war the Israelis regrouped and in combination of various factors they
managed to reverse the Arab success and to finally win the war. The aim of this dissertation is to
examine, through an analysis, the major factors that led the Arabs to wage war against Israel, the
factors that led the Israelis be surprised, the factors that led to the Arab’s initial success as well as
the factors that enabled the Israelis to seize the battle back. The Yom Kippur War can be set an
example for military and political decision makers because includes a plethora of military and
political intrigues.

3
Acknowledgements
This paper was made possible by the support and encouragement of many people. I would like to
thank my supervisor Professor Matthew Hughes whose advice and support was of utmost
importance in the design and implementation of this paper. His assistance during the research
process enabled me to find my field research and maintain it. I am extremely grateful for his
generosity and patience.
I would like also to thank Dr. Kristian Gustafson for his support on completing the
submission process of the dissertation, and all the faculty members of the Department of Politics,
History and Law at Brunel University for their continued help to complete the dissertation and on
their continued provision of all the necessary facilities.

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Table of Contents
1.0 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................................. 5
1.1 LITERATURE REVIEW .............................................................................................................................................................. 7
2.0 WHY WAR WAS INEVITABLE? ...................................................................................................................... 11
2.1 DIFFERENCES IN MOODS AND DIFFERENCES IN APPROACHES TO SETTLE CONFLICT ................................................ 11
2.2 ANWAR AL SADAT TAKES OVER EGYPTIAN PRESIDENCY. SADAT FLIRTS WITH THE WEST. SUPERPOWERS’
POSITION ON THE ARAB ISRAELI CONFLICT ............................................................................................................................ 13
2.3 DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT DURING SADAT’S PRESIDENCY ..................... 14
3.0 WHY AND HOW WERE THE ISRAELIS SURPRISED? .............................................................................. 17
3.1 OUTDATED NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPT ..................................................................................................................... 18
3.1.1 Confidence in Israel’s military capabilities. Ensuing belief in No-Attack First by Arab States .... 18
3.1.2 Confidence in Israel’s Strategic Depth of Terrain ............................................................................................ 20
3.3 RESISTANT TO CHANGING THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPT ................................................................................... 21
3.4 THE RIGIDITY OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPT – THE CONCEPT WAS SYNONYMOUS TO A UNIVERSAL
RULE ................................................................................................................................................................................................ 23
3.5 THE NATIONAL SECURITY SCHEMA WAS INCOMPLETE .................................................................................................. 25
3.5.1 Arab Concept .................................................................................................................................................................... 26
3.5.2 Arab augmented military capability and the Arab effort to conceal it .................................................. 27
4.0 WHY AND HOW WERE THE ARABS INITIALLY SUCCESSFUL? ........................................................... 29
4. 1 WAR PREPARATIONS. EFFORTS TO CREATE ADVANTAGES OVER THE ISRAELIS ....................................................... 29
4. 2 MISTAKES THAT WERE EXPLOITED BY THE ARABS DUE TO THE ISRAELI SURPRISE ................................................. 31
4.2.1 THE STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE AND ITS EXPLOITATION BY ARABS ON BOTH FRONTS ............................................. 32
4.2.2 Southern front ................................................................................................................................................................. 33
4.2.3 Northern front ................................................................................................................................................................. 34
4.3 THE TACTICAL ADVANTAGE AND ITS EXPLOITATION BY ARABS ................................................................................... 35
4.3.1 Southern front ................................................................................................................................................................. 35
4.3.2 Northern Front ................................................................................................................................................................ 39
5.0 WHY AND HOW THE ISRAELIS SEIZED THE BATTLE BACK? ............................................................. 41
5.1 STRATEGIC ADVANTAGES EXPLOITED BY ISRAELIS .......................................................................................................... 41
5.1.1 Northern Front ................................................................................................................................................................ 41
5.1.2 Southern front ................................................................................................................................................................. 43
5.2 TACTICAL ADVANTAGES EXPLOITED BY ISRAELIS ............................................................................................................ 44
5.2.1 Northern Front ................................................................................................................................................................ 44
5.2.2 Southern Front ................................................................................................................................................................ 46
5.3 MISTAKES THAT WERE EXPLOITED BY ISRAELIS DUE TO THE EGYPTIAN DECISIONS AND ACTIONS ...................... 47
6.0 CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................................................... 50
7.0 BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................................................. 53

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1.0 Introduction
The topic of this dissertation will focus on the assessment of intelligence and military aspects of the
Yom Kippur War along with the identification of the political reasons that led to the war. The Yom
Kippur War was the most recent ‘’official’’ war in the history of the Middle East but it became well
known because it broke out on the Day of Atonement (Yom Kippur) in 1973, which is the holiest
day in the Jewish calendar. The Yom Kippur War also named October War started with a surprise
Arab attack on Israel on Saturday 6th
, October 1973. Egyptian and Syrian military forces exploited
the situation by attacking Israel because they knew that the Israeli army and people would
participate in the religious celebrations linked with Yom Kippur. It is significant to study this
conflict because it provides useful insights into key aspects of military history such as the causes of
the war, the military doctrine differences between the Arabs and the Israelis, the strategies and
tactics used by both sides, and how these changed during the conflict, as well as the role of the
international community prior and during the war.
The main structure of the dissertation will consist of four chapters, each analyzing different
political, military or intelligence aspects of the Yom Kippur War. In the first chapter the ‘Why war
was inevitable’’, will be discussed extending back to the late 60s providing useful information in
understanding the circumstances and the events that led to the war. The second chapter examines
the reasons that enabled Arabs to surprise Israel. In the third chapter, the main reasons that led the
Arabs' to the initial success are examined. The fourth and last chapter presents the reaction of the
Israelis against the Arabs and the reasons that led them to the victory. In the conclusion, insights,
which will be derived from the analysis, will be discussed. The four chapters will address the
following questions:
a) Why was war inevitable? The war was inevitable due to the Israeli unwillingness to agree
a political solution with the other Arab states, the political and economical pressure that derived

6
from the internal political sector of Egypt and Syria as well as the failure of the international
community and especially the superpowers (Soviet Union and USA) to bring peace in the Middle
East.
b) Why and how were the Israelis surprised? The answer to the question ‘’why and how
Israelis were surprised’’ will highlight the main important errors made on behalf of the Israelis. The
Israelis, by creating an overconfident view of themselves, miscalculated the Arab’s capabilities.
This overconfident view led them to a number of mistakes, which enabled the Arabs to surprise
them.
c) Why and how were the Arab’s initially successful? The Arab success was a result of
coordination between the military forces of Egypt and Syria. The factors that contributed to the
Arab success will be examined.
d) Why and how did the Israelis seize the battle back? An assessment of the Israeli military
efforts, to gain the control over the war situation and overturn the outcome in their favor, will be
examined.
Through the analysis of the military and intelligence assessment, the dissertation will
attempt to provide an insight on the following: self-perception of rivals in terms of military
strength, strategic and tactical ways of handling crisis situations and ways reverse the outcome in a
crisis, for instance war. Through the analysis of the political aspects of the origins of the war, the
dissertation aims to claim that war can be used as a tool to provide political gains and get nations
out of impasses.

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1.1 Literature review
Having dealt with the key research questions of the thesis, it is now useful to turn to the
existing literature to see what sources this dissertation will use and where it might be able to fill any
gaps. In the current available historiography, priority is given mainly to the presentation of the war
events and the blaming game in each side. In fact the blame game was useful, because by studying
the various views of the other authors enables the researcher to form an integrated view. The target
of this dissertation is not to compare the various views of the other historiographers. This
dissertation uses many of these contradictory views as a tool, in order to answer the above questions
properly and with evidence.
At the political aspect on the cause of the war, it is generally observed that political
responsible, was the Israeli leadership and especially Golda Meir. Chaim Herzog agrees with
Borchgrave’s opinion that Golda Meir lost her last chance for peace when she rejected Moshe
Dayan’s suggested solution early in 1971 1
. Ahron Bregman in turn, denigrates Meir for
intransigence and lack of flexibility and demonstrates that Meir failed to materialize the previous
military successes into peace2
. Golda Meir refused the charges and blamed for the diplomatic
failure Egypt, for refusing to reach a peace agreement with Israel3
. All the above views depict the
political blame game by various parties.
There are several authors who have written on the subject of the intelligence failure and the
strategic surprise of the Yom Kippur War. Nadav Safran states that the intelligence failure was the
result of consisted structural, conceptual and attitudinal flaws on behalf of the Israelis that allowed
1
Chaim Herzog, The War Of Atonement (Greenhill Books 2003), p.18
2
Bregman, Ahron. Israel's wars: a history since 1947. Routledge, 2010, p.104.
3
Meir, Golda. ‘’My life.’’ GP Putnam's Sons, (1975), pp.289-290

8
the Arabs to gain strategic surprise.4
. Uri Bar Joseph in turn credits AMAN director Eli Zeira for the
intelligence failure because he ignored the clear signals that the war was imminent after receiving
important warnings from CIA, King Hussein of Jordan and by the Soviet evacuation that monitored
by AMAN just before the War broke out 5
. Golda Meir and Bren Adan also blame the intelligence
services for the failure to predict the Arab surprise. In her memoirs ‘’My Life’’, Meir wrote ‘‘our
intelligence people thought that it was most unlikely that the war would break out, but nonetheless
we decided to treat the matter seriously’’6
. Bren Adan ‘’On the Banks of the Suez’’ states ‘’My
colleagues and I were certainly surprised…For the past ten days, the Director of Military
Intelligence had struck to this evaluation, offering reasonable explanations about the buildup of
forces’’7
.
The Arab success was also the focus of the discussions. According to Meir ‘’the fate of
small countries always rests with the superpowers, and they always have their own interests to
guard’’8
. Thus Golda Meir blames United States for not providing the adequate guard at least at the
first stages of the war. Henry Kissinger in turn criticized Golda Meir for taking the initiative not to
launch a pre-emptive strike instead of asking the approval of such attack by the United States when
they realized the morning of 6th
October that the war was imminent, and he believes that if the
Israelis launched a preemptive attack, the Arab success could not exist9
. Edgar O’ Balance in ‘’No
Victor, No Vanquished’’, highlights the Israeli low state of preparedness which was the result of the
mood of triumphalism and blames the Israeli unpreparedness for being the cause of the Arab
4
Safran, Nadav. "Trial by Ordeal: The Yom Kippur War, October 1973." International Security (1977): 167.
5
Uri Bar-Joseph, “Israel’s 1973 Intelligence Failure,” in P.R. Kumaraswamy (ed.), Revisiting the October
War (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p.11–35.
6
Meir, Golda. ‘’My life.’’ GP Putnam's Sons, (1975), p.357
7
Adan, Avraham. "On the Banks of the Suez." Jerusalem: Edanim Publishers (1980), p.3
8
ibid, p.369
9
Kissinger, Henry. Years of upheaval. Simon and Schuster, (2011), p.477

9
success. He wrote ‘’ Lulled into a sense of superiority, the Israelis had not thought it conceivable
the Arabs would be capable of mounting an offensive against them’’ 10
.
The Arab mistakes that led the Israelis to establish their victory was the focus of discussions
between the Egyptian command. El Shazli in ‘’The Crossing of the Suez’’ one of the few translated
in English memoirs of Arab Generals of the Yom Kippur War, emphasizes in the political rivalries
within the Egyptian administration and how this affected to the policy making of the political
leadership of Egypt. In the specific book, Shazli denigrates President Sadat for his decision to
launch an attack on the Sinai Passes on the 14th
of October11
. He also sets him responsible for the
destruction of the Egyptian Army due to his orders, which left the Egyptian 3rd Army
unprotected12
. On the contrary, General El-Gamasy adopts a more faithful approach to his superior.
In his memoirs ‘’The October War’’, El-Gamasy justifies the offensive of 14th
of October as part of
the official plan despite the destruction inflicted to the Egyptian forces. The only criticisms against
Egypt’s command decisions were firstly the fact that the Egyptian forces should not halt after the
successful crossing of the canal and keep advancing until reaching the Sinai passes, and secondly,
the State of the Egyptian 3rd Army was not as bad as reported and the 3rd Army should keep
fighting 13
. In his turn, Anwar al-Sadat considers in his biography that the main reason of the Israeli
later success was due to the United States assistance by satellites and the resupplies of war logistics.
He believes that if the United States did not provide information by all the available means, the
Israelis would not launch a counterattack to save the dismal situation of their forces in the Sinai14
.
There is a limited availability in English literature regarding the Yom Kippur War. Apart from the
biographies of distinguished politicians and military generals that were involved in the war, the
majority of the authors regarding the Yom Kippur War used information from Hebrew and Arabic
sources. It should be mentioned that only few resources were translated from Arabic to English,
10
O'ballance, Edgar. No victor, no vanquished. San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978,p.162
11
El Shazly, Saad. The crossing of the Suez. Amer Mideast Research, 2003, pp. 250-251
12
ibid, p.281
13
Muḥammad ʻAbd al-Ghanī Jamasī, The October War (American University in Cairo Press 1993, p. 219
14
Sadat, Anwar. In search of identity: An autobiography. New York: Harper & Row, 1978, p.259

10
thus limiting our research regarding the Arab perspective of the war.

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2.0 Why war was inevitable?
This chapter will look at the political failures that led to the Yom Kippur War and argue that the
political unwillingness, mainly on behalf of the Israelis, as well as the political pressure exercised
on President Sadat by the Egyptian public were the main factors that forced Egypt and Syria to
wage war against Israel. The chapter looks to establish that Sadat, in a bid for finding a solution to
the Arab-Israeli conflict flirted with the West, but the West failed to take the initiative. Finally, this
chapter would like to establish that Sadat tried to find a diplomatic solution but his efforts were to
no avail. The chapter will be discussed in the following order: Firstly, the differences in moods and
approaches to settle conflict between Israelis and Arabs will be examined. Secondly, the failure of
Sadat’s flirt with the West and the West’s failure to take the advantage of the situation at hand.
Thirdly, the failure of the diplomatic efforts to accomplish peace in the Middle East will be
examined.
2.1 Differences in moods and differences in approaches to settle conflict
The aftermath of the Six Day War found Israel in the euphoria of victory. The Israelis were
confident in both their acquisition of territories and in their armed forces. On the former, Israel had
captured about half of the Golan Heights from the Syrians and both the entire Sinai Peninsula and
the entire West Bank from the Egyptians and Jordanians respectively. The advantages offered by
the gained territories provided an effective defense against future Arab aggression and provided
strategic depth of terrain that ensured Israel’s security. On the latter, the Israelis had, once again,
won a major war relying totally on both the effectiveness and efficiency of their armed forces. Most
importantly, the Israelis demonstrated that they had the political will and the implementation means
to initiate strategic strikes that could ultimately alter the balances in the region15
. The press
celebrated and praised the performance of the military. The world’s interest in Israel grew and the
15
Brams, Steven J. & Jeffrey M. Togman. Camp David: Was the agreement fair?, 1998,p.243

12
country’s economy, being in a dismal shape before the war, flourished as a result of the arrival of
both tourists and donations and the commercial exploitation of oil wells in the Sinai 16
.
By contrast, the aftermath of the Six Day War found Egypt and the Arabs in the misery of
defeat. Arab pride was tremendously wounded and confidence in the armed forces was very low. In
fact, at least in the case of Egypt, it seemed that the great shame, brought over by the Six-day War,
was felt by large number of people and groups. People felt that the only way to shake off the shame
was to wage war 17
.
However, the pressure was not only political but also financial, as the situation was draining
the economy of Egypt badly18
. The 1967 defeat resulted in a loss of revenue for Egypt that was
previously generated by the oil producing facilities in the Sinai Peninsula and from the fees charged
to the shipping industry for using the Suez Canal. It was also a time of increased military
expenditure as Egypt tried to rebuild its armed forces by making up weapons and enhancing its
defense capability, which was seriously exposed to both the Israeli Defense Forces and Air Force19
.
Unlike the other Arab petro-states, Egypt’s economy was based heavily on the incomes from the
Suez Canal. The closure of the Canal led Egypt in an economic dire straight in a time of military
expenditure.
Both Prime Minister Levi Eskhol of Israel and his successor, Golda Meir, were
unmistakably hawkish regarding the occupied territories. Both maintained the same principles: ‘’no
return to the old international borders, and no withdrawal without direct negotiations with the Arabs
16
Oren, Michael B. Six days of war: June 1967 and the making of the modern Middle East. Presidio Press,
2003, p.309
17
Parker, Richard Bordeaux. The October War: A Retrospective. University Press of Florida, 2001, p.101.
18
Al-Sayyid, M. K., & Countries, D. (2003). Politics and Economic Growth in Egypt (1950–2000). Cairo
University, Cairo, p.11
19
ibid

13
and a peace treaty’’20
. By contrast, the Arab nations, including Egypt, Syria and Jordan, stated
during the 1967 Khartoum Summit, that there would be “no peace, no recognition and no
negotiation with Israel”. Effectively, the Arabs were rejecting any peaceful solution with Israel. 21
2.2 Anwar Al Sadat takes over Egyptian presidency. Sadat flirts with the West.
Superpowers’ Position on the Arab Israeli Conflict
On 28 September 1970, President Nasser died and President Anwar Al Sadat came to power.
President Sadat stated that his primary objective was to recover all Arab territory lost to Israel in
1967 and to achieve a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict 22
. With reference to foreign
policy, President Sadat’s strategy was very different than the one followed by his predecessor,
President Nasser. The long-term objective in Sadat’s foreign policy was the transition from the
Eastern sphere of influence to the Western23
. Following the 1967 defeat, Nasser was relying on the
Soviets to represent the Egyptian interests in Washington. On the contrary, Sadat mistrusted the
Kremlin and wanted to draw Egypt closer to the United States. According to George Gawrych,
Sadat sought to develop a meaningful dialogue with the United States, by using backdoor channels.
Sadat realized that the Soviet Union would not want to involve themselves in a new conflict
between the Arabs and the Israelis so as not to put themselves in a hostile situation with the USA.
In July of 1972 Sadat expelled the Soviets from Egypt on the grounds that they were leaking
information on the Egyptian plans to cross the Suez Canal. However, Washington failed to take
advantage of the situation. In the order of priorities amongst the United States foreign policy,
Middle East lacked behind the Vietnam War24
. Thus the United States primary focus was on how to
20
Siniver, Asaf. The Yom Kippur War: Politics, Legacy, Diplomacy. Oxford University Press, USA, 2013,
p.31
21
ibid.p33
22
Kumaraswamy, P. R. Historical dictionary of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Rowman & Littlefield, 2015,
introduction.
23
Kissinger, Henry. Years of upheaval. Simon and Schuster, 2011, p.205.
24
Gawrych, George W. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory, 1996, p.10

14
find a solution with the Soviets and the communist China in order to end the Vietnam War. As a
result, Sadat was forced to return to the Soviets, and the Soviet assistance resumed again in greater
quantities and quality than before25
. Sadat managed to convince the Soviet Union for more
assistance by sending a letter to Brezhnev describing the demands of Egypt in exchange for
allowing the Soviet presence in the country. Sadat’s justification of the expulsion was that the
Soviet Union enjoyed a privileged position in Egypt. The Soviet Union’s position was comparable
with the position the British High Commissioner enjoyed during the days of the British occupation.
However, unlike the British, the Soviets made nothing to contribute to Egypt’s plans. Furthermore,
Sadat wanted to put Soviet Union in its natural position as a friendly country, no more, no less26
.
2.3 Diplomatic Efforts to Resolve the Arab-Israeli Conflict during Sadat’s Presidency
At a diplomatic level, Israeli Minister of Defense General Dayan suggested an interim
solution to the conflict between Israel and Egypt. According to Dayan’s suggestions, Israel would
withdraw a short distance from the Suez Canal into the Sinai Peninsula, in order to enable the
Egyptians to reopen and operate the Canal. In return, the Israelis required demilitarization on the
East Bank of the Canal as this could serve as a buffer zone between the Israeli and the Egyptian
armies27
. However, Golda Meir rejected the plan. On the Egyptian side, in February 1971, President
Sadat announced his proposal for a partial settlement with Israel in an interview to Arnaud de
Borchgrave, an editor of Newsweek 28
. The partial settlement suggested by Sadat was similar to
Dayan’s. Nonetheless, the two plans diverged on two issues. On the one hand, on the degree of
Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai and on the other hand on the nature of the Egyptian security forces
that would be allowed to cross the east bank. In light of these declarations, Sadat added that if the
25
ibid
26
27
Dayan, Moshe. Moshe Dayan: story of my life. Da Capo Press, 1992, p.63.
28

15
settlements were acceptable by Israel, he would be ready to recognize Israel and to live in peace
with them. Despite the efforts, the two parts never found the formula to solve their disputes.
In February 1971, Dr. Gunnar Jarring, the United Nations representative, appointed to
implement Resolution 242 in accordance with the suggestions of both sides. Nevertheless, he
produced a proposal of his own which was very close to the Egyptian demands, thus the Israelis
rejected it29
. During the following months the negotiations for a partial settlement continued but no
progress was made.
The last attempt for a political solution by Sadat was when he sent Hafiz Ismail in a meeting
with Kissinger in Paris February 1973, but the meeting failed to produce any result. Kissinger
informed Ismail that the United States regrettably could do nothing as Egypt was the defeated party
and Israel maintained her superiority30
. The failure of the last attempt for a peaceful solution in the
Middle East placed not only a political but also an economical pressure on Egypt to wage war. In
the following section will describe the political failures of the years which ultimately led put
political and economical pressure on Egypt to seek a military solution to the problem.
Despite Sadat’s willingness to explore a political solution to the Arab-Israeli Conflict -
Sadat even agreed to try U.S Secretary of State Rogers’ plan drafted in December 1969 during the
War of Attrition - his efforts were not successful. His failure was a result of a) The Israeli
unwillingness to settle with Egypt. As past wars had shown, Israel could take what it wanted from
Egypt by exercising the military option, b) The United States ignorance to be involved with what
the Americans perceived as a Soviet puppet state. The US did not want to mix with the Soviets over
a “war of influence” over Egypt, c) The Soviet perception of Egypt as a “client state”. The Soviets
29
30

16
believed that all client states policies should be influenced by Soviet military power and Soviet
economic aid. Sadat realized that the war was the only solution to change that situation31
.
As it had been shown on the above chapter, the war was inevitable. After the diplomatic
deadlock, Sadat realized that a limited military victory over Israel would be the only solution to
force the Israelis to negotiate peace. The political and economical pressure and the need for peace
left him with no other choice but to go to war. From the past defeats from the Israelis, the Arabs, in
order to ensure victory over the Israelis, they decided to use the element of strategic surprise. The
element of surprise will be analyzed in the chapter that follows.
31
Edgar O’Balance, No Victor, No Vanquished: the Yom Kippur War (San Rafael CA: Presidio Press, 1978),
p.4

17
3.0 Why and how were the Israelis surprised?
This chapter will look at the intelligence failures and argue that the most important reason that
led the Arabs to surprise Israel was the failure of the Israeli intelligence to collect and interpret
information and signals respectively and therefore predict on time that the war was imminent. The
analysis will try to establish that the failure was a result of an outdated, resistant to change, very
rigid and incomplete national security concept.
Each country has specific ways of looking at its national security issues. Drawing a parallel
from social psychology, each nation possesses “schemas”, mental models, used every day to
navigate through complex national security situations. ‘’ A schema is a cognitive structure that
represents organized knowledge about a given concept or type of stimulus. A schema contains both
the attributes of the concept and the relationship among the attributes’’.32
Schemas are helpful
because they enable people, and by extension nations, to function in a cognitively efficient way. As
certain kinds of situations or data become familiar, it is easier to rely on a tried and true model of
how to react than to rethink the situation anew. For instance, someone who drives in a highly
congested route to work every day may always drive the same route, because he is feeling more
comfortable driving the same way. It does not mean that is the easiest or the shortest way to his
work but overall it may reduce stress to have this taken-for-granted strategy to go to his work.
Schemas give us an approach to repeated situations and free up our minds for other more complex
and highly varying activities.
The chapter will be discussed in the following order: Firstly, the analysis will focus on the
failure of the Israelis to update their concept accordingly due to a series of miscalculations.
Secondly, the reasons that made concept was resistant to change will be examined. Thirdly, why the
32
Crocker, Jennifer, Susan T. Fiske, and Shelley E. Taylor. "Schematic bases of belief change." Attitudinal
judgment. Springer New York, 1984. pp.184-186

18
concept proved very rigid will be discussed. Lastly, my analysis will try to establish why the Israeli
military concept was incomplete.
3.1 Outdated National Security Concept
As it is often the case with concepts and schemas, they are usually derived from
experiences.33
This was the case with Israel’s National Security Concept. Israel’s National Security
Concept was derived from the experiences that the state of Israel had during its previous
interactions with the surrounding Arab States. And is in the case of any other schema, the Israeli
National Security Concept may have initially seemed efficient but it soon became outdated. Israel
seemed to have settled in the confidence of her superior military capabilities and in the confidence
in her strategic depth of terrain that she enjoyed.
3.1.1 Confidence in Israel’s military capabilities. Ensuing belief in No-Attack First by Arab States
After the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the military concepts of the Israelis concentrated on
preparing for the next war as if it were to be the seventh day had the Six-Day War been extended.
The prevailing military dogma conducted by the Israelis to deter wars was based on the perceived
qualitative superiority of its armed forces.34
In case of a new war, the Israeli defense forces ought to
repeat their performance of 1967, which was based on pre-emptive strikes, destroying the enemy air
and letting the Israeli air force attack the enemy land forces with close-air-support missions. Thus,
in carrying out its military strategy, the Israeli forces greatly emphasized planes and armor. The
Israeli Intelligence Services estimated that if the Arabs did not commit to a notable air power
capable of intercepting the Israeli Air Force, the Arabs would not dare to launch an offensive
33
Ancona, Deborah, et al. Managing for the future: organizational behavior & processes. South-Western
College, 1996.
34
Kumaraswamy, P. R. Revisiting the Yom Kippur War. Vol. 5. Psychology Press, 2000, p.4

19
against Israeli positions on the East Bank of the Suez Canal.35
On any potential ground offensive by
Egypt, the Israelis saw the Israeli presence and the development of the Bar-Lev line along the
Eastern Bank of the Suez Canal, as sufficient deterrence against Arab miscalculations. 36
Prior to the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the Israelis had no reasons to negotiate with the
Arabs to establish peace in Middle East, because whatever they wanted they knew they could earn
by launching another attack, like what happened in the past. Due to their own superiority in terms of
military power, the Israelis presumed that what was good for them was also good for their Arab
enemies. The dominant player always sets the strategy. So if the Israeli strategy was favoring the
maintenance of peace, paradoxically meant that the Arabs had no reasons to worry about the Israeli
intentions. According to Handel ‘’ if the enemy thinks we underrate his strength and thus develop
aggressive intention against him, he might choose to take pre-emptive action, thus surprising us
before we surprising him’’37
. This view demonstrates the way that the Israelis were evaluating the
Arab intentions.
The Israeli government was consistently calmed by the estimates of its intelligence services,
which repeatedly assured the political leadership and government that the chances of the Arab
countries initiating a war with Israel were low. The belief was based on the underlying assumption
that the Arabs would never wage a war that they could not win. Thus the state was unable to pre-
empt a non-existing threat, let alone seek to convince the United States to guarantee its security 38
.
35
Shaleṿ, Aryeh. Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and
Distraction. Sussex Academic Press, 2010, p.34
36
Kumaraswamy, P. R. Historical dictionary of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Rowman & Littlefield, 2015, p.114
37
Handel, Michael I. "The Yom Kippur War and the inevitability of surprise." International Studies
Quarterly 21.3 (1977), p.478.
38
Meir, Golda. My life. GP Putnam's Sons, 1975, p.354.

20
3.1.2 Confidence in Israel’s Strategic Depth of Terrain
Israel gained a lot of advantages in the aftermath of the Six Day War. Prior to 1967 Israel
was living in a precarious military situation because it lacked strategic depth in terrain. The natural
borders of Israel meant danger. Over the years, the Syrian troops on the Golan Heights looked down
on the Israeli villages in the Jordan Valley and harassed them with fire. In divided Jerusalem, on
many occasions Jordanian forces opened fire in the middle of the city and killed civilians.
Furthermore, an advance by Jordanian troops of less than a kilometer from areas along the main
road would have cut the main artery to the capital Tel Aviv. The Gaza Strip was under Egyptian
occupation and was like a dagger poised against main centers of the population in southern Israel
and along the coastline. Israel was surrounded by enemies and the General Staff of Israel
concluded that whenever there was a confrontation with its Arab neighbors Israel ought to take the
initiative because if the Arabs were permitted to take the initiative the attack could cut the country
in two and this meant disaster. This happened in 1967, when it became evident that the war was
approaching, the Israeli forces launched a pre-emptive strike against their Arab enemies. The lack
of strategic options had left the Israeli forces with no alternative but to take initiative on 5 June
1967 39
.
The territories taken by Israel in the Six Day War extended its border four times, and for the
first time in its history afforded a strategic option. Egyptian forces control over the Israeli
population were now removed, and a desert barrier approximately 250 kilometers now separated
Israel from the Suez Canal. Also the Suez Canal was in itself a natural barrier, where the Egyptians
had to deploy special equipment to cross it and to attack Israeli cities they had to rush a long
distance across the Sinai desert. The cities that would suffer by hostilities in case of a new conflict
would no longer be Israeli, but the Egyptians along the Suez Canal. A similar concessional situation
was obtained in the Jordan and Syrian fronts. The city of Jerusalem was no longer within the range
39

21
of the Jordanian artillery, and unrestrained of Jordanian troops. The distance needed to be covered
by the Israeli forces to prevent the Jordanian troops from cutting the country in two was only 10
miles, whilst the counter-attacking Jordanian Army had to cross the Jordan River (natural obstacle)
and then fight its way across the Judean desert. In the Judean Desert the Israeli forces enjoyed
advantages with the mountainous terrain, which could easily be defended for a distance
approximately 70 kilometers. On the Syrian front, although the Israeli line did not extend a lot, the
Israeli forces chased the Syrian Army from Golan Heights and made life easier for the Israeli
villages in Northern Galilee.40
Counting all these terrain advantages, the Israelis assumed that the
possibility of a strategic surprise on behalf of the Arabs was negligible. The time needed to cover
the distance of the conquered territories, was long enough to give the opportunity to the Israeli
reserves to prevent and repel a possible Arab attack.
3.3 Resistant to changing the National Security Concept
Resistance to change usually does not come from a failure to come up with the right
blueprint for future practices. It often comes from people’s reluctance to give up their comfortable,
and often safe, old approaches.
Israel’s AMAN (Military Intelligence Service), was entrenched in the concept that Israel
would never be attacked without the Arabs prior securing that they would actually be in a position
to win the war and was therefore unwilling to assess and read any information that suggested a
different approach. On many occasions, advance warnings went unheeded and some lower echelons
of AMAN who suggested different interpretation to the concept, were either silenced or sidelined.
40
Chaim Herzog, The War Of Atonement (Greenhill Books 2003), pp.4-5.

22
Thus a lot of information was not analyzed or was analyzed but not understood. Generally, any
information that did not fit with the concept was featured as irrelevant or unimportant41
.
Furthermore, an Egyptian double agent Arshraf Marwan spread confusion within the
echelons of the Israeli intelligence services. In April 1973 Arshraf Marwan warned Mossad that
Egypt and Syria would launch a surprise attack against Israel on 15th
of May. The particular military
deployment was monitored by the Israeli intelligence service and caused a partial military
mobilization by Israel whose cost was about 11 million dollars42
. Since then, the Israeli government
wanted to avoid any similar situation of wasting such amounts of state finances in false alerts. The
false deployments and the ensuing, natural dislike by the government affected Mossad’s evaluations
and changed the lens of evaluating the reports in favor of minimizing the alerts. Arshraf Marwan,
assured Mossad that Egypt would not attack Israel unless they obtained advanced fighter-bombers
and Scuds. However, when President Sadat changed his policy and rejected buying fighter-bombers
Marwan, did not inform Israel about Sadat’s new intentions. Therefore Mossad did not change their
view about their projections that Egypt would attack only if advanced fighter-bombers were
obtained in advance.43
From that point onwards, reports were strictly aligned to the framework of the ‘’Concept’’.
In some cases, when employees of Mossad had an opposing opinion with the doctrine they were
sent off. Thus, the employees fearing to see the events as they were, they were reporting to the
leadership reports about what they wanted to read, not the seriousness of the situation44
. Therefore,
the Israeli intelligence services, after the April incident exhibited a “groupthink phenomenon”. A
41
Kumaraswamy, P. R. Revisiting the Yom Kippur War. Vol. 5. Psychology Press, 2000, p.4
42
43
Bregman, Ahron. Israel's wars: a history since 1947. Routledge, 2010, pp.73-74
44
Handel, M. (1977). The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise. International Studies
Quarterly, 21(3), p.494

23
groupthink phenomenon occurs when members fail to disagree, to bring fears and doubts or to bring
up information that contradicts consensus decision-making.
3.4 The Rigidity of the National Security Concept – The Concept was synonymous to a
Universal Rule
Concepts encourage us to react to types of situations in certain ways. Because it is difficult
to collect additional, thorough data at each situation, the rules embodied in our mental models save
time. And for Israel, the universal rule that was that the “Arabs would not attack if they do not
possess a high probability of success. And they would only have a high probability of success if
they have a competitive air force”.
The rigidity and universality of this rule was showcased in 1972. Despite Israel having no
concrete information about Sadat’s objectives, some information was gained from a change in the
position of the Egyptian government. The change concluded that in its fight against Israel, Egypt
would fight with the current available military means. AMAN focused on decrypting the Egyptian
war plan, and thus in April 1972 a 40-page detailed report revealed the estimates of the war plans of
Egypt. Maps were drafted showing the numbers and formations of a possible concentration of the
Egyptian Army along the Suez Canal. However, within this report the Israeli intelligence services
demonstrated that, militarily, the necessary condition was that Egypt would not initiate a war
against Israel unless it received advanced fighter squadrons enabling Egypt to attack the Israeli
hinterland and unless it received surface-to-surface missiles which could be used for deterring Israel
from attacking strategic targets. As for Syria, it was wider known that she was unable to launch a
war against Israel alone, and the only way to attack Israel was only in contribution with other Arab

24
countries especially Egypt. This meant that, according to the Israeli estimates, Egypt would not be
in a position to achieve air superiority before 1975 and Syria would not fight Israel alone45
.
There were numerous other incidences that the rigidity of the universal rule did not allow
the Israelis to make the right projections and therefore draw the right conclusion. AMAN became
almost dogmatic and all this information was marked as irrelevant as the universal rule took
precedence above everything else. More specifically: a) In total, 50 aircraft from Libya and Iraq
reinforced the Egyptians in 197346
. Nonetheless, DMI Zeira, the head of Israeli Intelligence did not
consider that these reinforcements changed the balance of military capabilities between Egypt and
Israel.47
b) The establishment of the Scud brigade by the Egyptians. AMAN disregarded this threat
under the guise of the Soviet commanding officers.48
c) The first concrete information Israel
received about the coming war came from Human Intelligence (Humint). President al-Sadat and
President Assad agreed to launch a two-front war against Israel before the end of 1973. The Syrian
president was forced to make this decision when Soviet advisers promised him that the Syrian
Army would occupy the Golan Heights in three days. Again, no verbal or written estimate of the
report given for this information.49
d) The personal warnings of King Hussein of Jordan to Golda
Meir about Syria and Egypt’s intentions in late September 1973. However, Meir failed to act on
this warning again because DMI Zeira’s explanation again was calming. 50
e) When the families of
the Soviet advisers evacuated Egypt on 4 October 1973 AMAN’s Major General Eli Zeira
suggested the following possible explanations for the move: a sudden crisis erupted the ties between
the Soviet Union and their Arab clients Syria and Egypt, Moscow feared an Israeli pre-emptive
45
Richard B Parker, The October War (University Press of Florida 2001), pp.87-90
46
El Shazly, Saad. The crossing of the Suez. Amer Mideast Research, 2003, p.277.
47
Bar-Joseph, Uri. Watchman Fell Asleep, The: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and Its Sources. SUNY Press,
2012, p.68.
48
49
2012, p.83.
50
Kumaraswamy, P. R. Revisiting the Yom Kippur War. Vol. 5. Psychology Press, 2000, p.5.

25
attack or the Soviets knew the plans of Egypt and Syria to attack Israel and wanted to protect their
citizens. Despite the consideration of these moves as extraordinary DMI Zeira did not argue clearly
that a war was approaching.51
f) On September 27th
1973, a mobilization by the Egyptian army was
featured by AMAN as a move to honor the death anniversary of President Nasser. Herzog refers
that ‘’in many cases the intelligent material went into details of various developments about to
occur. But these, did in fact occur, they were ignored.52
g) Syrian preparations of hospitals, shelters
and fuel facilities on disregarded by AMAN as bluff.53
h) Air Combat between Syrian air Force and
Israeli Air Force on September 13th, disregarded by AMAN as an incident which increased Israel’s
deterrent posture improving again that at least the Syrian Air Force standards could not been
compare with the Israeli ones.54
i) Reports from the frontline or from other intelligence services
(CIA), concluded that the Arabs will finally take the initiative by launching a war against Israel.
Under the fear of the cost of a general mobilization, and its consequences if the war did not happen,
DMI Zeira, the Chief of the Israeli Intelligence services failed to convince the Israeli political
leadership that the war was approaching 55
.
3.5 The National Security Schema was Incomplete
Israel’s National security concept was formulated in line with Israel’s ongoing experiences,
but it seemed to have missed some important features. As it is often the case with schemas, the
schemas included some implicit causal reasoning about why something was done. Lacking
complete information, the schema had faulty causal reasoning and encoded a stereotypical bias that
left an entire nation embarrassed. Two pieces of information were missing from the Israeli
Intelligence Agencies. The first was the different concept the Arab’s had about a conflict with
51
Dorrington, James. "The ‘Concept’, AMAN and the Israeli Intelligence Failure to Predict the Yom Kippur
War." By Neil Wilson, Editor in Chief: 105.
52
Herzog, Chaim. The war of atonement: the inside story of the Yom Kippur war. Greenhill, 2009, p.45
53
54
2012, p.83.
55

26
Israel.56
The second was the augmented military capability that the Arab’s acquired after their
defeat in the Six-Day war in 1967.
3.5.1 Arab Concept
The Arab concept about a potential Arab-Israeli conflict was quite different from the one
that Israel had. The Arab concept did not include an all-out win on Israel at least on behalf of Egypt.
The Arabs had no intent to defeat Israel in an all out war but focused on implementing a limited
objective campaign instead. Their campaign and their objective were to recapture the territory lost
during the Six Day War. Unlike Israel, the neighboring Arab states had a lot of margin for a total
defeat in war. If the Arab forces were defeated the Arab states would not cease to exist. On the
contrary, if the Israeli army got defeated the state of Israel would probably cease to exist. Therefore,
the Arabs’ waging and loosing a war would not be a disastrous proposition unless their political
goals were not met57
.
The Israelis were completely ignorant about the radical changes occurring in the Arab
military doctrine. For instance, Egyptians and Syrians changed their approach on how to control the
skies and instead of searching ways to possess a competitive air force, able to mess with the Israeli
Air Force; they searched into finding ways on how to neutralize the Israeli Air Force by land and
not by air. Hence, the Arabs instead of purchasing warplanes to balance the power between them
and the Israeli Air Force, they purchased the up-to-date soviet anti-aircraft systems, which proved to
be more lethal against the Israeli air attacks58
. The deployment of the Egyptian anti-aircraft
56
Safran, Nadav. "Trial by Ordeal: The Yom Kippur War, October 1973." International Security (1977), pp.
134-135.
57
Handel, Michael I. "The Yom Kippur War and the inevitability of surprise." International Studies
Quarterly 21.3 (1977), p.489
58
Shazly, S. (1980). The crossing of the Suez. San Francisco: American Mideast Research, p.19

27
umbrella made no sense to the Israeli Intelligence officers. They considered that the surface-to-air
missiles were a defensive weapon par excellence and therefore constituted no threat 59
.
3.5.2 Arab augmented military capability and the Arab effort to conceal it
The outcome of the Six Day War acted as a catalyst in the Arab world and marked the
beginning of raising a complete re-evaluation of the military posture, especially by the Egyptians,
who conducted research and drew conclusions from every aspect of their defeat and put the
proposals for asking the Soviet Union for further support60
.
The Arabs learned their lessons well from the defeat in 1967, when their forces made a poor
appearance, and the quality in their equipment and personnel training rose dramatically. Egyptians
created an anti-aircraft umbrella using their newly purchased, and the new anti-tank weapons that
the Soviets equipped the Arabs. Both pieces of equipment forced the Israelis to suffer heavy
casualties, later during the war 61
.
While, the standards were rising, they were looking for methods to confuse the Israelis about
their real capabilities with various tactics. By spreading rumors that their armed forces had
inadequate maintenance or no spare parts for their anti-aircraft sites, while they successfully
concealed the additional equipment received by their armed forces, contributed to a large extend in
making the Israelis wrong estimations and achieve their objective62
.
Underestimation was also observed in estimating the Arab capabilities to cross the Canal. As
President Sadat wrote in his autobiography, when they asked foreign countries to manufacture and
59
60
Anwar Sadat and Raphael Israeli, The Public Diary Of President Sadat (Brill 1978), p.143.
61
Gawrych, G. (2000). The albatross of decisive victory. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, p.20
62
Handel, M. (1977). The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise. International Studies
Quarterly, 21(3), p.473

28
to equip Egypt with high-pressure water pumps they laughed and replied ‘’ could any fire in the
world require such waterpower?’’63
. It was apparent that the international community did not make
the link between the use of the pumps and the crossing of the canal.
In the above chapter, the reasons that led the Israelis to surprise were examined. As it is
demonstrated, the Israeli concept proved to be very rigid, outdated, incomplete and resistant to
change. As a result, the Israelis did not estimate that the war was imminent and the Israeli frontlines
were found unmanned and unbalanced. The strategic surprise on behalf of Arabs was an important
contributing factor for their initial success. On the following chapter, the reasons that led the Arabs
to their initial success will be discussed.
63
Sadat, A. (1978). In search of identity. New York: Harper & Row, p.251

29
4.0 Why and how were the Arabs initially successful?
This chapter will focus at the Arab’s initial success over the Israeli Military. It will argue that the
Arab’s initial success was due to the Israeli surprise as well as the Arab’s success to exploit both
strategic and tactical advantages against the Israelis. The reasons that led the Arabs to an initial
success will be discussed in this order: The chapter begins with an introductory analysis of the
actions taken by Egypt and the Arabs prior to the war to create an advantage over the otherwise
almighty Israelis. This section would like to establish that the Arabs made an effort to be well
prepared when facing the Israelis in battle. The Arabs were prepared both in a purely military way
by augmenting their arms and in a strategic way by designing deception before the impending
attack. Further, an analysis of the Israelis mistakes, which contributed to the Arab’s initial success,
will be presented. Moreover, the analysis will focus on each front separately (Southern and
Northern) and the ways the Arabs exploited the strategic and tactical advantages that helped them
succeed during the first days of the war.
4. 1 War preparations. Efforts to create advantages over the Israelis
Before going to war, Sadat needed more support. Therefore he started to tighten his relations
with the leaders of the other Arab countries whose the long-time goal was the total conquer of
Israel. Amongst them were the Kuwaiti Abdullah Mubarak al-Sabah, the Saudi Arabian King
Faisal, the Lebanese Hamid Franjieh, and the Morrocan King Hassan II.64
In order to achieve
economic and military support by the Arab nations, Sadat began the ‘’theoretical war’’ against
Israel. Before promising military and economic aid, the other Arab nations asked to see the
Egyptian war plan. Thus, Sadat ordered General Shazly to provide a fake plan (Operation Granite
64

30
Two) to the other Arab leaders to convince them to support his war preparations65
. Under these
conditions, Syria agreed to join the Egyptians as a front-line state. Thus Sadat could achieve a
strategic advantage, as the Syrians would open a second front in the north of Israel.
The spectacular victory of the Israeli Defense Forces during the Six Day War (1967)
changed the entire strategic doctrine of the Arab countries that surrounded Israel. Between the years
1967 – 1973 the Arab countries studied the behavior and performance of Israel during the Six Day
War and they proceeded to establishing radical changes in their military, in order to bridge the
quality gap between themselves and Israel. The years before the Yom Kippur war broke out, the
quality of the Arab arsenal was dramatically increased due to the effective training by the Soviets
and the up-to-date modern Soviet military equipment, especially in tanks and anti-aircraft systems66
.
These weapons, once the war broke out allowed Arabs to make an initially successful onslaught.
The main obstacle that faced the Egyptian war planners was the vulnerability of their
military to Israeli Air Force deep penetration raids. The war planners emphasized gaining the ability
to attack Israeli hinterland. Thus in early 1973, Hawker Hunters and Mirage Vs aircrafts started to
arrive in Egypt from Iraq and Libya. On the eve of the war, the Egyptian air force numbered 30
Hawker Hunters from Libya as well as 20 Mirage Vs from Iraq, the aid that the other Arab
countries offered Sadat 67
.
The attacking capabilities of the Arabs increased too. To make it feasible, the Arabs had to
launch an attack on Israel positions and make an onslaught within the occupied by Israel areas.
Again, in this area, the Egyptians and Syrians did not only enjoy the support of the Soviet Union,
but also the support from other Arab countries. Other Arab countries sent personnel and aircrafts to
65
El Shazly, Saad. The crossing of the Suez. Amer Mideast Research, 2003, p.36
66
ibid p.112
67
Rabinovich, Abraham. The Yom Kippur War: the epic encounter that transformed the Middle East.
Schocken, 2007, p.464.

31
increase the attacking capabilities of Syria and Egypt. In addition, in March 1973 and following
intense diplomatic pressure for the arrangement not to go through, Egypt was equipped by the
Soviet Union with a brigade of surface-to-surface Scud missiles, which could strike Israel beyond
the frontline. These missiles arrived in Egypt with the Soviet instructors in late July 1973, and in
August 1973 the Egyptian forces started to train with them.68
Finally, it is important to mention that Egyptians put a heavy emphasis on creating the
element of surprise. Israelis had a complete intelligence failure with reference to predicting the
attack. However, the Egyptians made a conscious effort to deceive. Shazly analyzed the system the
Egyptians came up with to maintain confidentiality. The system allowed only a few key members to
possess knowledge of the entire plan. Information about the impending attack was brought down to
division commanders only 3 days before the attack and to platoon commanders hours before the
attack. 69
4. 2 Mistakes that were exploited by the Arabs due to the Israeli surprise
One of the main factors that contributed to the Arab success was the loss of valuable time on
behalf of the Israelis to mobilize their reserves, few hours before the hostilities begun. When early
in the morning of October 6th
DMI Zeira concluded that the war was imminent, the Israeli Chief of
Staff David Elazar wanted to carry out a general mobilization despite the shortness of the time and
suggested a preemptive strike70
. When he met the Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan, Dayan
disagreed with his proposal and suggested a partial mobilization. This disagreement was brought to
Golda Meir, who ordered a general mobilization but refused the suggestion of David Elazar for a
pre-emptive strike because this movement would lead the international community - including the
68
69
70
Herzog, Chaim. The war of atonement: the inside story of the Yom Kippur war. Greenhill, 2009, p. 53

32
United States - to accuse Israel for being the actual aggressor.71
This entire situation caused a delay
of 4 hours and the call-up process began a 9:00 a.m. instead of 5:00 a.m.
Another factor that contributed to the Arab’s initial success was the ‘’unofficial restriction’’
by the international community, especially by the United States, on the Israelis to pre-empt. The
years before the war broke out, Kissinger expressed his personal view, that the United States ability
to help Israel in any war, would be impaired if the aggressor was Israel. However, during the crisis
of the military escalation on behalf of the Arabs, the subject of pre-emptive strike had never been
discussed, not because the United States did not want to deviate from this view, but due to the
Israeli stubbornness that the war was not imminent. Kissinger wondered, ‘’how could it have been,
since Israel had repeatedly told us that there was no danger of war’’ and blames Golda Meir for her
‘’initiative not to pre-empt without the United States advice’’72
. In turn, the Israeli General Bren
Adan doubts about the effectiveness of a pre-emptive strike. He demonstrates that the Arabs were
‘’certainly alerted and prepared for that possibility, thus they deployed a highly sophisticated anti-
aircraft umbrella beyond their lines’’73
.
4.2.1 The strategic advantage and its exploitation by Arabs on both fronts
When the war begun, the Arabs gained tremendous strategic advantages. The most
important advantage was the split of the Israeli Defense Forces, which forced them to fight on two
fronts. According to Adan, the simultaneously attack on the Golan Heights and the Sinai ‘’ caused a
further split, at least in the initial phase, between the reserves and the small regular army, because
the reserves were not mobilized early enough’’74
.
71
Meir, Golda. "My Life’’, An Autobiography." (1976), p.359
72
Kissinger, Henry. Years of upheaval. Simon and Schuster, 2011, 477
73
Avraham Adan, On The Banks Of The Suez (Presidio Press 1980), p. 80
74
ibid p.79

33
Another strategic advantage was the boosting of the Egyptian and Syrian morale, when other
Arab states, offered them military support, which contributed to the initial success. The Arabic
support ensured the common aim between other Arab states to destroy Israel. Three Mig-21
squadrons, one Mig-17 and two armored brigades were sent by Iraq. When the war broke out,
Morocco sent a tank regiment and Jordan another two armored brigades. The Iraqi aircrafts
contributed no little in the successful airstrikes, at the opening of the war 75
.
4.2.2 Southern front
A strategic advantage on behalf of the Egyptians could be considered the massive
availability of forces. About 25-30 thousands troops crossed the canal only on the first wave of the
Egyptian attack. This came in contrast with the Israeli unmanned fortifications that it proved a non-
serious defense to deter the massive Egyptian advance. The Israeli defending forces were only 436
and some tanks were outnumbered and outgunned. The Israeli reserve force was not deployed in its
prepared positions and thus did not provide the necessary firepower; neither filled the gaps between
the strongpoints of the Bar Lev line76
. As a result, the Egyptian losses, were only 200 instead of
Egyptian estimation of 10 thousands. The low rate of casualties enabled the Egyptian Army to
reinforce its troops at the frontline preparations for defensive warfare against Israeli counter
attacks77
.
The reinforcement of the Arab’s success came also from the Israeli erroneous impressions
from the magnitude of the suffering of their losses and the misconception about the effectiveness of
their armored counter attacks. The night of October 6th
, the Israeli Divisional Command ordered to
keep the counterattacks on. As a result, the Israeli tanks were sent as piece meal into the Egyptian
75
El Shazly, Saad. The crossing of the Suez. Amer Mideast Research, 2003, p.277.
76
Gawrych, George W. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory. 1996, p.29
77
Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep (State University of New York Press (2005),pp.204-210

34
anti-tank forces. By the dawn of October 7th
, the Israeli General Medler, reported to the General
Head Quarters that he lost two thirds of his tank force. From 270 tanks, which he started, he had
only 90 78
.
4.2.3 Northern front
Regarding the northern front, one of the reasons that led the Syrians to a relatively
successful onslaught, was the inadequate Israeli Defense Force. When the attack begun, the Israeli
forces numbered only 177 tanks and 5000 infantry troops, ordered to resist the attackers. The
objectives of the Israeli efforts were to slow down the Syrian troops until the Israeli reserves reach
the front, prevent any major disaster and keep as many positions they could 79
.
The Syrians had the same advantage as the Egyptians regarding the massive number of
troops. The Syrian strategy was as a first phase the advance of the masses towards Israeli
fortifications and overwhelming them. The plan was to sweep the Golan Heights and charge across
the Jordan River bridges, preventing the Israeli mobilization of the reserves to bear effectively on
the battle. During the first phase of the attack, the Syrians, having a massive number of troops,
formatted a large number of reserves beyond their frontline 80
. The Syrian strategic advantage in
numbers, gave the upper hand to the army to make sacrifices of troops in order to step forward. The
Israelis developed a series of defensive obstacles (the anti-tank ditch in combination with the
narrow passes) to harden a possible Syrian attack. Due to the slow Israeli reaction and the
incapability to replenish its losses at the first hours of the war, bit-by-bit the Syrians managed to
break the resistance of the Israeli exhausted forces81
. Another example of the advantage of the
advantage of the massive numbers of troops by Syrians was the situation of the south sector of
78
Safran, N. (1977). Trial by Ordeal: The Yom Kippur War, October 1973. International Security, p.p., 145-
146.
79
Safran, N. (1977). Trial by Ordeal: The Yom Kippur War, October 1973. International Security, p.p., 145-
146.
80
81
Herzog, Chaim. The war of atonement: the inside story of the Yom Kippur war. Greenhill, 2009, p.p. 78-79

35
Kuneitra. It was a much larger area to be covered by approximately 80 tanks and the infantry units
were spread in more strongpoints. The Syrian shorter-range-fire disadvantage in comparing with the
Israeli tanks was overcome because of the massive Syrian advancing forces. Although the Israelis
had impressive kill ratio, the Syrians little by little advanced and pushed the Israeli tanks to
withdrawal. Furthermore, without the necessary infantry support, the Israeli tanks became more
vulnerable in the Syrian antitank units that were operating under the cover of darkness.
The attrition caused by the exhaustion of the defending Israeli forces due to the massive
advancing of Syrian troops provided them another strategic advantage on the Golan Heights. Before
the war, the Israeli High command expected a Syrian breakthrough from the northern sector of
Kuneitra, in case of war.
4.3 The tactical advantage and its exploitation by Arabs
The impassive Israeli attitude towards the Egyptians’ preparations and the failure to apply
countermeasures, favored the Egyptian tactic in its struggle to overpass physical obstacles. On the
Suez Canal, to wage a war against Israel, the Egyptians had to cross and face the Israelis on the East
Bank. In terms of crossing preparations, the Egyptians spent a lot of time on training in similar
terrain and crossings. Even though the Israelis monitored the crossing preparations of the Egyptians,
they did not take any countermeasures, believing that the Egyptians were trying to deceive them
about their war intentions. General Bren Adan wrote ‘‘we observed them practicing river crossings
opposite Balah Island and breaching barriers with water jets, as they dropped amphibious
equipment into the water to move armored vehicles, tanks, and other vehicles to the island…. the
fact that the Egyptians were training in the Israeli presence was showing that they had no serious

36
intentions to attack Israel’’ 82
. Taking into account Adan’s narration, the Israelis considered the
situation as a bluff.
Knowing that the Soviets wanted to gain economical and political benefits in Egypt, the
Egyptians requested and received PMP pontoon bridges, as well as GSP and PT-S ferries 83
.
Additionally, to breach the embankment of the Bar-Lev line, the Egyptian army acquired water
pumps from Britain and Germany to wash the sand away84
. This equipment was used for the water-
crossing operation, which supported the initial Egyptian success.
Furthermore, taking advantage of the absence of the Israeli Air Force above the frontline,
the Egyptians succeeded in crossing the Suez Canal. It is should be noted that the Israeli Air Force
was busy hunting down the Egyptian helicopters loaded with commandos. These units were sent to
various points behind the Israeli lines in order to cut off the Israeli Defense Forces that were
defending the Bar Lev line. Furthermore the Egyptian Air Force turned the focus of the Israeli Air
Force in air battles above the Israeli cities and delayed them to react against the Egyptian crossing
forces to implement their mission. Thus, gave to the Egyptians the opportunity to advance without
any Israeli Air Force intervention 85
.
The proper preparations and training on behalf of the Egyptians gave them the advantage to
execute their military plan successfully. According to the Egyptian General Shazly, the crossing of
the canal was the harshest test of the Egyptian planning. ‘’No equipment, no planning of bridgehead
tactics, no covering fire from the west bank, could stave off disaster if the crossing went wrong’’86
.
Once the war broke out, the crossing of Suez Canal proved designed in the greatest detail and
82
Avraham Adan, On The Banks Of The Suez (Presidio Press 1980), pp.74-75
83
O’balance, Edgar, No Victor, and No Vanquished. "The Yom Kippur War." (1978).
84
85
Safran, Nadav. "Trial by Ordeal: The Yom Kippur War, October 1973." International Security (1977),
p.145.
86
Saad Shazly, The Crossing Of The Suez (American Mideast Research 1980), p.63

37
should be considered one of the best-orchestrated obstacle crossings in history. The Egyptians
engineers threw ten bridges over the canal; three bridges in the sector of El Qantara, three bridges in
the sector of Ismailia-Deversoir and four others in Geneifa-Suez. On the first two days of the war,
all the units of the infantry divisions crossed the Canal and on the night 7 October the armored
brigades attached to the infantry divisions crossed too. Within 36 hours the entire 2nd and 3rd
Egyptian Armies, crossed the Canal and created a bridgehead to a depth of 4-5 miles.
Becoming wiser from their past military failures, specifically their total destruction on the
Six Day War, the Arabs worked methodically and systematically to overcome their past
weaknesses, to avoid any similar catastrophic defeat and to improve the sectors that contributed to
military failures.
Knowing their vulnerability to the Israeli Air Force, the Egyptians equipped themselves with
modern anti-aircraft systems in order to confront the Israeli Air Force. To prevent penetration raids
from the Israeli Air Force, the Egyptians built up the world’s densest system of SAM-2, SAM-3,
SAM-6 missiles to protect the cities and to cover and the Suez Canal. The first hours of the war, the
SAM missile umbrella that deployed by the Egyptians enabled the Egyptian land forces to move on
with the crossing87
.
The conversion of their previous armor inferiority to anti-tank superiority was the second
weakness identified by the Egyptians. In order to bridge the gap of the quality of the armored
forces, between them and the Israelis, in early 1973 President Sadat equipped his army with light
anti-tank weapons such as Rocket-Propelled-Grenades (RPG7), recoilless rifles and anti-tank guns,
while their most lethal anti-tank weapon in their arsenal was the AT-3 ‘Sagger’ wire-guided
87

38
missile88
. The effectiveness of these weapons had an important contribution to the success against
the first Israeli reaction. When the first moves of the Israelis to throw the Egyptians back to the
canal begun, the anti-tank infantry units not only repelled the Israeli counter-offensive, but also
caused heavy casualties to Israelis 89
.
Moreover, the Israeli ignorance of basic principles of the war, worked in favor of the
Egyptians. The Israelis fought without close infantry support and inadequate artillery support and
the anti-tank units. Thus, Egyptian Army easily destroyed the Israeli tanks. The 190th Armored
division had gone like a sheep to slaughter and Arieh Sharon spent the day ineffectively by
maneuvering and by little fighting90
. Moshe Dayan featured that day in his memoirs ‘’Story of my
life’’ as total failure91
. On the contrary, the Egyptian General Shazly wrote ‘’it was late afternoon as
I drove back to Center Ten, cheered by what I had seen….’92
.
It can be clearly said that October 8th
, Israel was faced with its worst defeat in its history.
That day two Israelis reserve-armored divisions were committed in the Sinai to launch a major
counter-attack on the Egyptian positions. The Israeli 190th Armored brigade badly mauled by the
entrenched infantry and its commander Asaf Yagouri was taken as prisoner of war. At 15:00 hours
the Egyptian launched an attack on Arieh Sharon’s forces on the Hamutal area and thirty minutes
later after destroying the Israeli forces Hamutal fell and the Israeli forces started retreating. The
reports from the division commanders made it clear, that the Israeli forces could not afford another
similar day of fighting. The victory of the Egyptians until October 8th
was the result of the
exploitation of strategic and tactical advantages 93
.
88
El Shazly, Saad. The crossing of the Suez. Amer Mideast Research, 2003.
89
p.146.
90
91
Dayan, Moshe. "Story of My Life, 1976, p.503
92
El Shazly, Saad. The crossing of the Suez. Amer Mideast Research, 2003
93

39
4.3.2 Northern Front
Similar to the Egyptians, the effectiveness of the Syrian anti-tank units contributed to their
initial success over the Israelis. The Syrian anti-tank units engaged the Israeli tanks with RPGs and
Saggers and caused Israelis heavy casualties. Despite the desperate efforts on behalf of the Israelis
to repel these attacks with infantry patrols, the difficulty to restore their casualties forced the Israeli
retreating and the Syrian advancing 94
.
The anti-aircraft umbrella that the Syrians deployed behind their lines deterred the Israeli
Air Force in providing close air support to the ground forces95
. In the same way with the Egyptians,
the Syrians knew that when the war begins the Israeli Air Force could play a catalyst role in the
course of the battle and they planned accordingly. The missile system that deployed covered an area
stretching 8km into the Occupied Golan Heights, giving the advantage of the initiations to the
Syrians because the Israeli Air Force had no freedom of movement. When the time for the Israeli
Air Force came to turn its efforts exclusively against the Syrians, the cost of its massive
intervention of the Israeli Air Force was 30 planes that downed by the Syrian anti-aircraft
missiles96
.
Additionally, obtaining superior night equipment on the Syrian tanks helped the Syrian
forces to penetrate the Israeli lines. The infrared lights that equipped the Syrian tanks, made them
invisible under the darkness97
. Unlike the Syrians, the Israeli forces did not have the advantage of
such optical equipment and they spotted the enemy tanks with inferior ways either by the noise or
by artillery flares that lit up the area. When the Syrian tanks rushed towards the Israeli forces during
the night in many occasions the tank battles were fought in distances of few yards. The advantage of
94
p.148.
95
96
97
Herzog, Chaim. The war of atonement: the inside story of the Yom Kippur war. Greenhill, 2009, p. 107

40
the darkness contributed also to the loss of the extreme range advantage that the Israelis enjoyed, as
the Syrians could reach the Israeli lines so close under the cover of the darkness.
In summary, the Arab’s initial success was mainly due to the element of surprise, which
found the Israelis unbalanced and unmanned. This was complemented by the exploitation of both
strategic and tactical advantages. Both the surprise and the exploitation were made feasible only
because Arabs worked meticulously on their battle plan and their capabilities months prior to the
attack. Eventually, the Arabs were surprised by the Israeli counterattack, a reaction that eventually
reversed the outcome of the war. How the Israelis regrouped and focused their military forces and
strengths respectively will be discussed in the next chapter.

41
5.0 Why and how the Israelis seized the battle back?
The current chapter will look at the Israeli efforts to recover from the initial Arab success. It will
argue how the Israelis managed to seize the battle back, the exploitation of the strategic and
tactical advantages derived after the Arab initial success, as well as the exploitation of Arab errors
that offered the opportunity to the Israelis to recover. The discussion will begin with the strategic
advantages that emerged, then the tactical advantages that favored the Israelis and lastly the
exploitation of the mistakes made by the Arabs.
5.1 Strategic advantages exploited by Israelis
The reason of the Israeli success in turning the tide on the Golan Heights in their favor,
was the speedier than expected reaction of the reserves. The reserves were supposed to reach the
front within 48 hours from the first call up. Nevertheless, they reached the Golan Heights earlier
than expected.98
A part of the Syrian grand strategy was based on preventing the Israeli reserves
from reaching the front lines. Towards this end the Syrians failed abysmally. Despite the
successful advance the first hours of the attack, the Syrians did not manage to cut the routes that
the reserves would use to reach the frontline.
98
Safran, Nadav. "Trial by Ordeal: The Yom Kippur War, October 1973." International Security
(1977), p.153

42
Moreover, the reserves that reached the front, balanced the Israeli strategic disadvantage in
numbers 99
. In restoring the losses and the wounded, the Israeli replenishment capacity proved
greater than the Syrians. Thus, the strategic initiative gradually started turning into Israeli hands,
and the Israeli reserves started launching counterattacks100
.
Furthermore, armored reserves and artillery attached on the Israeli fighting forces
contributed to the initial Israeli counterattacks. On October 8th
, after a day of intense fighting, the
Israeli forces were covered by effective artillery fire for the first time since the war started. The
effectiveness of the newly arrived forces made the Syrians suffer heavy losses, which resulted in
evacuating damaged tanks and leaving behind their wounded. The result of the intense fighting
was obvious the following morning. The picture of the battlefield in Valley of Tears was
terrifying because of the Syrian heavy losses (about 600 tanks and armored vehicles and thousands
killed). On the contrary, the Israeli losses were only about 80 tanks, as a result of the effective fire
of the reinforcements101
.
Amongst other factors that contributed to the Israeli success to recover, was the capability
from the Israeli Air Force to attack strategic targets. On October 9th
, the Israeli Air Force struck
strategic targets within the Syrian territory, including the Syrian Defense Ministry and the Air
Force Headquarters 102
. On October 10th
, economic targets such as oil refineries, power stations
and ammunition refineries were bombed. These raids hurried the surrender of the Syrians and
sealed the Israeli success of the war on the northern front. Meanwhile on the same day, the Israelis
bypassed the 1967 lines and started advancing into Syria.
99
Dayan, Moshe. Moshe Dayan: story of my life. Da Capo Press, 1992, p.488
100
Safran, Nadav. "Trial by Ordeal: The Yom Kippur War, October 1973." International
Security (1977), p.154
101
Herzog, Chaim. "The War of Atonement: The Inside Story of the Yom Kippur War, 1973."
(1998), p.113.
102
Bregman, Ahron. Israel's wars: a history since 1947. Routledge, 2010, 87.

43
The most important reason that determined the outcome of the war in Sinai was the
strategic advantage on the part of the Israelis of having the United States backing. In terms of
resupplies, the United States support to Israelis proved greater than the Soviet one to the Arabs.
This support helped the Israelis to return to the battle more reinforced. When the war broke out,
after the heavy air losses of the Israelis on October 7th
and the tremendous armor losses on
October 8th
, the pressure to the United States government by Golda Meir for an urgent resupply
package was fruitful. According to Kissinger, the United States offered ‘’ a large replacement
package worth $500 million that included sixteen F-4 Phantoms, thirty A-4 Skyhawks, 125 tanks
(including 65 M-60s), three Hawk Missile battalions and a whole range of other things’’103
. On the
contrary, the Soviet support to the Arabs proved inadequate enough to cover the Arab supply
needs. Again Kissinger refers ‘’but this support was as yet far short of what the Soviets were
capable of doing. After the war, all Arab leaders complained to me that the Soviet airlift was
grudging and the sealift was slow, as if to rub in the Arab’s dependency’’104
. Moreover, the
United States provided important support into the Israeli operations, by offering valuable
information through satellite photographs and by the use of spy warplanes. According to Sadat
when the Egyptians transferred several hundred tanks to the east side of the canal, in order to
launch a major attack on October 14th
, the United States satellites reported that movement to the
Israelis and they formed their forces accordingly 105
.
The clever strategy used by the Israelis, after the repelling of the Egyptian attack on
October 14th
, forced President Sadat to surrender. The Israelis instead of launching face-to-face
103
104
ibid, p.507
105
Sadat, Anwar. In search of identity: An autobiography. New York: Harper & Row, 1978, p.
259

44
attacks on the Egyptian 2nd
and 3rd
Armies, -it could cause attrition and raise Israeli casualties-
chose to encircle them by crossing into the west bank of the Suez Canal and cut their resupplies
off.106
The hostilities ended by the infringement of the United Nations Security Council’s
Resolution 338 for ceasefire by the Israelis. This event concluded the Israeli efforts in encircling
the Egyptian Army and leading the Israelis to the total recover and success107
.
5.2 Tactical advantages exploited by Israelis
The first tactical advantage that the Israelis exploited was when the Israeli Air Force
started to contribute more actively on the ground operations. Despite the losses of the previous day
(October 7th
where some 30 aircrafts lost due to the Syrian SAMs), the dawn of October 8th
the
Israeli Air Force started raising its aggression on the ground and inflicting heavy losses to the
Syrians. Safran noted ‘’the attacks began at first daylight with strong air support. It was slow
grinding work against strong Syrian armor and artillery, but Israeli aggressiveness and superior
tank gunnery were having their effect’’108
.
In addition, the Israeli Air Force aggressiveness rose when a shift of elements of the anti-
aircraft umbrella occurred from the Golan front to the Syrian capital. The strategic strikes on the
General Head Quarters in Syria, forced the Syrian leadership to move elements of the anti-aircraft
umbrella from the Golan Heights to the cities 109
. As a result the Israeli Air Force dared to launch
more air raids against to what remained of the Syrian anti-aircraft umbrella and the anti-aircraft
106
Avraham Adan, On The Banks Of The Suez (Presidio Press 1980), pp.241-242
107
Kumaraswamy, P. R. Historical dictionary of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Rowman &
Littlefield, 2015.
108
109

45
threat almost eliminated. With the elimination of the anti-aircraft umbrella, the Israeli Air Force
took the advantage to provide better Close Air Support. The Israeli Ambassador to the United
States Dinitz reported to Kissinger: ‘We have now almost complete control of the air situation in
spite of the SA-6 deployed’.110
Kissinger regarded the Syrian anti-aircraft missiles as a major
obstacle for the Israeli Air Force raid.
Better organization and coordination, amongst the Israeli forces reinforced their
superiority. This superiority was substantiated when the Israeli forces repelled the final Syrian
counterattack. On the 0ctober 9th
in the morning, the Syrians launched a ferocious assault along
the frontline and the day ended with a Pyrrhic victory on behalf of the Israelis. In the northern
sector, the Israeli 7th Armored Brigade suffered heavy losses and almost overran. However, on the
nick of time, reserves arrived and supported them to launch a counter-attack on a broad front.
Similarly the 188th Armored brigade of Israel, which was almost totally destroyed, was supported
by reserves and airpower. This counter-attack forced the Syrians to halt and to start a tactical
withdrawal from the Golan Heights, while the bombardments and the attacks by the Israeli air and
land forces increased the rate of Syrian casualties dramatically111
.
Lastly, the lack of coordination between the other Arab forces that committed to contribute
to the Syrian efforts was unable to limit the Israeli success. While Israelis were advancing, Syrian,
Iraqi and Jordanian forces, tried desperately to counterattack the Israeli forces. However, their
attacks were uncoordinated and ineffective. Consequently, these attacks made no sense in the
outcome of the war on the Golan Heights 112
.
110
111
Herzog, Chaim. "The War of Atonement: The Inside Story of the Yom Kippur War, 1973."
(1998), p.113.
112
Andre Deutch, Insight On The Middle East War (Angus and Robertson 1974), p.123

46

5.2.2 Southern Front
The strategy of the Israelis to encircle the Egyptian forces and cut off their supplies was a
result of a series of successful events. Important part of this strategy was the ideal choice of the
place to concentrate their attack efforts. The area of Deversoir was chosen because the Israelis had
a tactical advantage of the terrain’s topography in favor of them. Firstly, Great Bitter Lake would
protect the one flank of the crossing by keeping away the Egyptians. Secondly, it was more
conducive to a maneuver battle than El-Qantara because there was only one sweet-water canal and
a strip of agriculture development to be crossed. Lastly, there was a low concentration of Egyptian
forces in that area. It was the border between the two Egyptian Armies (2nd
and 3rd
) where the
Israeli forces would face less resistance. As a consequence of the third reason, the Egyptian Force
could be split into two 113
. It should be mentioned that detecting the gap between the two Egyptian
armies, was the result of the United States efforts in helping the Israeli force. According to the
Egyptian General Gamasy, a United States spy plane provided the necessary information to the
Israelis.114
Furthermore, the Israeli’s crossing equipment and their capability to hide from the
Egyptians and transfer a monster roller bridge up to the point of the crossing, contributed to the
efforts made by the Israelis to cross the canal. On their way to Suez Canal, the Israelis found stiff
resistance by the Egyptians on the area of Chinese farm on October 15th
and the progress of the
Israelis to establish a corridor to the canal became extremely slow. The battle lasted three days and
caused heavy casualties to the Israelis. Nevertheless the Israeli Forces drew the Egyptian attention
long enough until the Israelis brought their equipment to the canal undetected. The Egyptian
113
O'ballance, Edgar. No victor, no vanquished. San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978,p.76.
114
Muḥammad ʻAbd al-Ghanī Jamasī. The October War: Memoirs of Field Marshal El-Gamasy
of Egypt. American University in Cairo Press, 1993, p.276

47
attempts to restore their defenses in their initial dispositions were pushed back by the Israeli
counterattacks, thus the Chinese farm fell.115
By then the Israelis widened the corridor three miles
and the procedure of the Israeli forces to cross the canal begun.
The success of the Israeli General Danni Matt’s forces against Egyptian missile sites
reduced the effectiveness of the Egyptian umbrella and gave more freedom to the Israeli Air
Force. The first Israeli crossed the canal on pontoons on October 16th
. Once crossed the canal,
Matt’s forces wiped out and destroyed many armored personnel carriers and even seized four
Egyptian bridges but most importantly they launched counterattack on SAM’s sites.116
These
attacks had resulted in enabling a more active role on behalf of the Israeli Air Force and created a
crisis among the Egyptian Generals in Cairo. All the Egyptian efforts to destroy Matt’s forces
were uncoordinated and desperate, thus General Matt established and secured a bridgehead to the
point that the Israelis expected to make their cross117
.
5.3 Mistakes that were exploited by Israelis due to the Egyptian decisions and
actions
An important reason that contributed to the Israeli plan to recover was the unutilized
strategic advantage of the two-front-war on behalf of Egypt. As it had been highlighted on chapter
‘’why and how Arab’s initial success?’’, one of the most important advantages of the Arab initial
success was the split of the Israeli Defense Forces into two fronts. Despite the total success in
repelling the Israeli attack on October 8th
the unwillingness to risk casualties by launching an
attack outside of the anti-aircraft umbrella, unwittingly offered the Israelis the demanding time to
115
Adan, Avraham. On the Banks of the Suez: An Israeli General's Personal Account of the
Yom Kippur War. Gower Publishing Company, Limited, 1980,p.p.245-307.
116
117
Herzog, Chaim. The war of atonement: the inside story of the Yom Kippur war. Greenhill,
2009, p.225.

48
concentrate a large amount of reserve forces. 118
While the Israelis were holding a more heavily
defensive strategy and the reserves were been brought to the front, the Egyptians were not tempted
to deviate from their original plans and to seize the opportunity to take the advantage of the
situation. Instead of advancing towards the Sinai Passes, the Egyptians once they crossed the canal
they focused on their preparations to build a comprehensive and strong defense line, thus gave
time to the Israeli forces to regroup and to be reinforced by reserves 119
.
Exogenous factors that influenced Sadat’s strategy led him to make fatal wrong decisions
and unexpectedly facilitated the Israeli war efforts to seize the battle back. The Israeli onslaught
in Syria from October 9th
and then, forced the Syrians and the other Arab leaders who joined them,
to put political pressure to president Sadat. The political pressure sought to convince Sadat to
launch a major counter attack on the Israeli forces, in order to turn the attention of the Israelis and
remedy the pressure on the Golan Heights. 120
As a result, Sadat gave in to the external political
pressure and took the wrong decision -as it proved- to launch a major attack on the Israeli
defensive positions at the Sinai Passes. The most important error, beyond Sadat’s decision to
launch an attack to Sinai Passes, was the ignorance of the fact that the Israelis built a strong,
comprehensive and heavily defensive line on the Sinai Passes enabling them to halt an amass
advance of the Egyptian Forces. In addition the Egyptian anti-aircraft range was not extended up
to this point. Thus the Egyptian troops were exposed to the Israeli Air Force threat. The Israeli
superiority on the quality of the tanks and the extreme range of their guns quickly influenced the
course of the battle. The capability of the Israeli Air Force to destroy anything that moved out of
the Egyptian anti-aircraft umbrella, affirmed that Sadat’s decision was hasty and not estimating
118
El Shazly, Saad. The crossing of the Suez. Amer Mideast Research, 2003, pp.305-316.
119
Muḥammad ʻAbd al-Ghanī Jamasī. The October War: Memoirs of Field Marshal El-Gamasy
of Egypt. American University in Cairo Press, 1993, p.187
120

49
properly the possible consequences. At the end of the battle, Egyptians lost a significant amount of
tanks (250 Egyptian against less than 30 Israeli losses) and casualties (about 1000) thus the
balance started tilting in favor of Israelis.
Furthermore, Sadat’s stubbornness to refuse to withdraw notable force from the East Bank
of the Suez Canal to the West Bank when the Israeli crossed the Canal, led the Israelis to establish
a bridgehead on the West Bank. Back in Cairo, a serious command crisis was created when the
Israeli General Matt crossed the canal121
. Given the command of President Sadat for the Egyptian
Armies to hold their positions gained until 8 October, General Shazli had been sent from Cairo to
assume command of the Second Army on 18 October122
. Once he return back to Cairo, for a
meeting with other Egyptian generals and Sadat, Shazli characterized the military situation as
critical and suggested a withdraw of four armored brigades from the east bank to the west bank in
order to prevent the Egyptian forces to encircle by the Israelis. When the meeting concluded Sadat
decided to no withdraw which left the rear of the Egyptian Armies uncovered and made it even
easier for the Israelis to encircle them.
The examination of strategic advantages that emerged during the course of war, the tactical
advantages that favored the Israelis and the exploitation of the Arab mistakes discussed above,
unfolds the strategic scheme used by both rivals and their counter reactions to each other attacks.
Also the strategic way that the Israelis reverse the outcome of the war, offers an insight on how to
manage and handle crisis in similar situations.
121
122

50
6.0 Conclusion
The examination of the political, military and intelligence aspects of the Yom Kippur War, given
in this study, provided a better understanding on how the two rivals (Arabs and Israelis),
confronted the various situations that emerged from the course of the war.
The element of surprise in Yom Kippur War is a good example in terms of military
strategy. History has a way of repeating itself and the element of surprise was used in the past in
the Operation Barbarossa by Hitler against the Soviets, Pearl Harbor by the Japanese against the
United States and in this case in the Yom Kippur War. In the chapter ‘’why and how were Israelis
surprised’’, the assessment of the element of surprise teaches the leadership to be vigilant, never
underestimate its opponent’s capabilities and be flexible in handling and dealing with emerging
crises situations to avoid costly errors. An example is the mistakes made by the Israeli leadership
and intelligence, which led them to their initial defeat. The Israelis made wrong assumptions
according to the mistaken position presented by intelligence, the misreading of the real picture of
the period before the war, the belief that the Egyptians would not declare war against them and
that Syria without Egypt would not be able to fight a war. They based those assumptions on their
easy victory in the Six Day War and they did not change this way of thinking to the changing
circumstances of the following years123
. Until the Yom Kippur War, the Israeli intelligence stated
that there was a low probability for the war to occur. The main strategic mistake of the Israelis was
the misreading of the seriousness of the threat, which proved to be extremely damaging to Israel.
The chapter ‘’why and how were the Arabs initially successful’’ presents the
methodicalness, coordination and cooperation which lead led to the successful implementation of
plans. The years before the war broke out, the Arabs made the ideal preparations in order to bridge
123

Michalis Hadjipantelis-Dissertation (PP5500)

Michalis Hadjipantelis-Dissertation (PP5500)

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