1) While counterinsurgency operations in Meghalaya have hurt some insurgent groups, new threats have emerged, preventing enduring success.
2) A trader was kidnapped and killed by A'chik Matgrik Elite Force militants despite his family paying a ransom.
3) A police sub-inspector was killed in an exchange of fire with Garo militants near the Bangladesh border, where AMEF and ULFA-I militants were present.
4) Meghalaya has become the second most violent state in India's northeast, after Assam, with 69 insurgency-related fatalities in 2014, though it has a much smaller population than Assam. Counterinsurgency operations have led to some
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Afghan Taliban appointed a new leader after confirming the death of Mullah Omar. The leadership change introduces a new set of challenges for the Taliban, which had already factionalized, and for al Qaeda. Mullah Omar had led the Taliban since its inception and had received a pledge of allegiance from al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri.
2. Freshly trained Yemeni troops supported by an Emirati brigade and Saudi special forces have led an offensive that has driven back the al Houthi movement in Yemen. The recent victories against the al Houthis may be setting the stage for successful political talks to reach a negotiated solution in the country.
3. The Iranian regime reframed its rhetorical stance on military site inspections into a more mollified assurance to domestic audiences that Iran will not reveal any military or national security-related secrets as a result of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA. The Critical Threats Project of the American Enterprise Institute has set up these pages to help clarify the hyper-complex language of sanctions relief and to provide additional information about some of the entities that will be freed of international restrictions.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Yemen’s al Houthi movement declared plans to form a new central government overseen by its “Revolutionary Committee.” The al Houthis, who receive Iranian support, announced the new government after political negotiations collapsed. Nearly all political factions in Yemen rejected the al Houthis’ plan, and the Gulf Cooperation Council called it a “coup.” The political crisis is ongoing, and regional factions appear to be taking actions to distance themselves from the central government and the al Houthis.
2. Iran asserted the regime’s missiles are non-negotiable and that it will install new centrifuges if the P5+1 nuclear negotiating team returns to its previous position. Iranian officials continue to push for sanctions relief as a non-negotiable condition for a nuclear deal.
3. There appears to be increasing cooperation between Pakistani and Afghan forces in the fight against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The head of the TTP’s Jamatul Ahrar splinter group, Omar Khalid Khorasani, was severely injured in fighting with Afghan security forces in Nangarhar province.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Afghan Taliban appointed a new leader after confirming the death of Mullah Omar. The leadership change introduces a new set of challenges for the Taliban, which had already factionalized, and for al Qaeda. Mullah Omar had led the Taliban since its inception and had received a pledge of allegiance from al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri.
2. Freshly trained Yemeni troops supported by an Emirati brigade and Saudi special forces have led an offensive that has driven back the al Houthi movement in Yemen. The recent victories against the al Houthis may be setting the stage for successful political talks to reach a negotiated solution in the country.
3. The Iranian regime reframed its rhetorical stance on military site inspections into a more mollified assurance to domestic audiences that Iran will not reveal any military or national security-related secrets as a result of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA. The Critical Threats Project of the American Enterprise Institute has set up these pages to help clarify the hyper-complex language of sanctions relief and to provide additional information about some of the entities that will be freed of international restrictions.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Yemen’s al Houthi movement declared plans to form a new central government overseen by its “Revolutionary Committee.” The al Houthis, who receive Iranian support, announced the new government after political negotiations collapsed. Nearly all political factions in Yemen rejected the al Houthis’ plan, and the Gulf Cooperation Council called it a “coup.” The political crisis is ongoing, and regional factions appear to be taking actions to distance themselves from the central government and the al Houthis.
2. Iran asserted the regime’s missiles are non-negotiable and that it will install new centrifuges if the P5+1 nuclear negotiating team returns to its previous position. Iranian officials continue to push for sanctions relief as a non-negotiable condition for a nuclear deal.
3. There appears to be increasing cooperation between Pakistani and Afghan forces in the fight against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The head of the TTP’s Jamatul Ahrar splinter group, Omar Khalid Khorasani, was severely injured in fighting with Afghan security forces in Nangarhar province.
The most potent threat to Pakistan’s internal security in the late Nineteen Eighties and early Nineties was posed by militia from the Mohajir community. Originally formed as the Mohajir Quomi Movement (MQM), it is now split into two factions. The faction led by the founder Altaf Hussain was renamed Muttahida Quomi Mahaz and is commonly referred to as MQM (A).
The most potent threat to Pakistan’s internal security in the late Nineteen Eighties and early Nineties was posed by militia from the Mohajir community. Originally formed as the Mohajir Quomi Movement (MQM), it is now split into two factions. The faction led by the founder Altaf Hussain was renamed Muttahida Quomi Mahaz and is commonly referred to as MQM (A).
Pakistan General Elections 2013: A Post-MortemGarima Goswami
Pakistan – a nation that has experienced three military coups, been ruled by generals for half its life and frequent political drama will mark 2013 as a decisive year in its political history. Three prominent leaders, of 2013, took to the streets of Pakistan propagating their ideas of conviction and change, to a nation stricken by USA drone attacks, Taliban – a fundamental Islamic militia – and political unrest. Yet, the significance of elections amongst the electorate was evident from the fact that the voter turnout excelled by all means.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The takeover of four eastern Libyan oil ports by a militia coalition may ignite armed conflict between Libya’s rival governments. The Libyan National Army (LNA), a militia coalition led by General Khalifa Haftar, seized four oil ports in eastern Libya from militias allied with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) on September 11. The seizure scuttled the GNA’s efforts to resume oil exports from eastern Libya, undermining a major effort to secure legitimacy for the fragile unity government. The LNA’s advance threatens the interests of western Libyan militias aligned with the GNA. These militias fought against the LNA in central Libya in the past and may resume hostilities in response to LNA aggression in the oil crescent. Libyan actors will prioritize the unresolved civil war over the fight against the Islamist State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and other Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Libya.
2. Escalating economic protests in Tunisia may incite a government crackdown and draw limited security resources away from counter-terrorism operations. Protests broke out in Fernana, northwestern Tunisia on September 7 after a café worker named Wisam Nisrah set himself on fire. Nisrah’s self-immolation and the subsequent protests mirror the event s that sparked Tunisia’s Arab Spring uprising in December 2010. Similar protests began in Ben Guerdane, eastern Tunisia on September 5. Growing protests could destabilize Tunisia’s new unity government. Civil unrest strains limited security resources and provides opportunities for Salafi-jihadi groups, including al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s Tunisian affiliate and the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), to conduct attacks.
3. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called for Muslims to continue the fight against the U.S. and to reject ISIS’s ideology in a video commemorating the fifteenth anniversary of the September 11 attacks. Zawahiri emphasized al Qaeda’s role as a defender of the oppressed. He urged black Americans to turn to shari’a and al Qaeda for justice. Zawahiri also emphasized al Qaeda’s power as a unifying “message” rather than a physical group, like ISIS, that imposes its will on Muslim populations. Zawahiri’s address continues a series of statements intended to reinforce al Qaeda’s position as the leader of the global Salafi-jihadi movement.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Hostilities are escalating in Yemen after Saudi-led coalition airstrikes killed civilians in Sana’a, which scuttled a planned humanitarian ceasefire and provoked a response from al Houthi-Saleh forces. Coalition airstrikes killed approximately 155 civilians and wounded more than 500 others at the funeral for an al Houthi-Saleh military commander on October 8. Al Houthi-Saleh forces fired ballistic missiles toward Taif city, Saudi Arabia and Ma’rib governorate, Yemen in retaliation. Al Houthi-Saleh forces may have also fired two missiles toward a U.S. Navy destroyer north of the Bab al Mandab Strait on October 9, six days after an al Houthi-Saleh missile struck an Emirati ship in the same region.
2. Al Qaeda is exploiting the current counterterrorism focus on the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) to build up a resilient Salafi-jihadi base in Libya. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) emir Abdelmalek Droukdel gave an audio speech, titled “Benghazi and the Battle of Patience,” in which he frames jihad as the alternative to foreign invasion and destruction in Benghazi. AQIM, along with al Qaeda-linked groups currently operating in Libya, seeks to exploit conflict between secular forces and Islamist militants in Benghazi to position itself as a defender of the Libyan people and establish strong relationships with local armed groups. International attention remains focused on the U.S.-backed counter-ISIS campaign in Sirte.
3. ISIS may attempt to resume an offensive campaign against the Algerian state. The pro-ISIS Amaq News Agency claimed on October 9 that ISIS Wilayat al Jaza’ir (Algeria) conducted an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on an Algerian army convoy near Tamalous in northeastern Algeria. This is ISIS’s first claimed attack in Algeria since August 2016. Counterterrorism operations have limited ISIS’s ability to attack in Algeria, but the return of Algerian fighters from Syria and Libya may allow the group to increase the frequency and impact of its attacks in the country.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. ISIS forces in Sirte, Libya, violently put down local resistance to its presence and consolidated control over the city and its environs. Ferjani tribesmen rose up against ISIS following the death of a prominent sheikh. ISIS responded by killing over 37 people. It now has control of the city.
2. Anti-al Houthi forces, including Saudi and Emirati troops, continue to roll back the al Houthis’ gains in Yemen, but al Houthi leadership is describing their forces’ withdrawals as tactical. The al Houthis will probably respond with a counteroffensive.
3. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei continued to hold back from fully endorsing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA, calling the deal “still unsettled” as neither the Iranian Parliament nor the U.S. Congress “has adopted it yet.”
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Yemen’s al Houthi movement declared plans to form a new central government overseen by its “Revolutionary Committee.” The al Houthis, who receive Iranian support, announced the new government after political negotiations collapsed. Nearly all political factions in Yemen rejected the al Houthis’ plan, and the Gulf Cooperation Council called it a “coup.” The political crisis is ongoing, and regional factions appear to be taking actions to distance themselves from the central government and the al Houthis.
2. Iran asserted the regime’s missiles are non-negotiable and that it will install new centrifuges if the P5+1 nuclear negotiating team returns to its previous position. Iranian officials continue to push for sanctions relief as a non-negotiable condition for a nuclear deal.
3. There appears to be increasing cooperation between Pakistani and Afghan forces in the fight against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The head of the TTP’s Jamatul Ahrar splinter group, Omar Khalid Khorasani, was severely injured in fighting with Afghan security forces in Nangarhar province.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A pro-Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) group may be growing stronger in Somalia, but its ability to compete with al Shabaab remains limited. The U.S. Department of State designated Abdul Qadir Mumin, a pro-ISIS cleric, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist on August 31. Al Shabaab militants reportedly attacked Mumin’s forces in Bay region, Somalia on September 4. Mumin is an al Shabaab defector, and al Shabaab has eliminated pro-ISIS members from within its ranks. It is also possible that the attack indicates that Mumin’s group has grown stronger and that al Shabaab considers it a threat. ISIS may seek to develop networks in Somalia now that its African hub in Sirte, Libya is under pressure by U.S.-backed militias. ISIS is unlikely to dedicate significant resources to the Horn of Africa at this time, however.
2. The UN-brokered political process in Libya may be breaking down. The collapse of the UN-backed Libyan government, the Government of National Accord (GNA), could have an impact on U.S. counter-terrorism operations against ISIS in Libya. The UN convened an emergency meeting in Tunis on September 5 to address rising tensions between eastern and western factions. The U.S. extended its airstrike mission in Libya for an additional month at the request of the GNA. Rising challenges to the GNA’s legitimacy threatened to undermine future operations against ISIS or other Salafi-jihadi groups in Libya.
3. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance’s September 2 announcement of a new missile in Yemen may be in response to increasing military threats from Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s coalition. The missile, the Borkan-1, is a modified Scud missile. The capability may have been transferred through the Iranian network. A political resolution to Yemen’s civil war remains unlikely despite both sides’ willingness to participate in a U.S.-backed peace plan. Yemeni factions expressed conditional support for U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s plan, but unresolved disagreements over representation in the transitional government will likely continue to hinder talks. Saudi Arabia may pursue talks to de-escalate conflict in the Saudi-Yemeni border region but will continue to support efforts by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government to oust the al Houthi-Saleh alliance from Yemen’s capital, Sana’a.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab is on the offensive against African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali National Army (SNA) troops. It seized ten towns in Lower Shabelle region following the withdrawal of AMISOM troops from the locations. AMISOM forces are stretched thin, and even coordinating with the SNA, are insufficient to secure Somalia’s territory.
2. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is resurging in northern Mali. It claimed the July 2 ambush near Timbuktu, Mali, that killed at least five UN peacekeepers and injured nine others. Further, there is evidence showing that the AQIM-linked Ansar al Din, a Tuareg Islamist group in Mali, is expanding its connections to other militants groups in the country.
3. The Iranian regime will continue to integrate the resistance economy doctrine—a plan spearheaded by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to make the Iranian economy strong and resistant to Western sanctions and global financial crises—into its national economic planning as it weighs the implications of a potential nuclear deal.
secterian violence and banned militant organizations in pakistanm_qasami
this is what i think will be a brief introduction of those who want to know about the secterian violence and militant groups .. i think this is benificial for the students fo IR sociology as will
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Competition over Libya’s oil wealth risks reigniting armed conflict between rival governments and distracting from the unfinished counter-ISIS fight. Rival militias clashed over contested oil ports in central Libya as efforts resumed to export oil. Some of these competing militias, backed by the UN-brokered unity government and U.S. airstrikes, are also fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in the central Libyan city of Sirte. They may prioritize the fight for control of Libya’s oil wealth over the counter-ISIS fight. Continued conflict would strengthen ISIS and other Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Libya, including al Qaeda.
2. Southern Yemeni officials and powerbrokers renewed a call for a unified voice to represent the region in what may be a fissure between them and the internationally recognized government of Yemen under President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. President Hadi does not have a strong constituency and has relied on southern leaders for support for his government, currently based in Aden. Southern Yemenis frequently cite political and economic marginalization by the central Yemeni government as a grievance. Calls for secession from the Yemeni state have been growing since late 2007. The frontline of Yemen’s civil war runs generally along the former boundary between North and South Yemen, re-dividing the country.
3. Ongoing civil unrest in Tunisia may weaken the country’s new unity government and create opportunities for Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, to strengthen in the country. Popular anti-government demonstrations began spreading after September 5, and Tunisian government concessions briefly held off additional demonstrations. Mass protests resumed in multiple locations, however, and labor strikes are expected to begin within days. The Tunisian government deployed additional security forces to protest sites. Salafi-jihadi militants based in Tunisia and also Libya may be positioned to infiltrate popular demonstrations or conduct attacks in Tunisia if civil unrest grows or protests turn violent.
The most potent threat to Pakistan’s internal security in the late Nineteen Eighties and early Nineties was posed by militia from the Mohajir community. Originally formed as the Mohajir Quomi Movement (MQM), it is now split into two factions. The faction led by the founder Altaf Hussain was renamed Muttahida Quomi Mahaz and is commonly referred to as MQM (A).
The most potent threat to Pakistan’s internal security in the late Nineteen Eighties and early Nineties was posed by militia from the Mohajir community. Originally formed as the Mohajir Quomi Movement (MQM), it is now split into two factions. The faction led by the founder Altaf Hussain was renamed Muttahida Quomi Mahaz and is commonly referred to as MQM (A).
Pakistan General Elections 2013: A Post-MortemGarima Goswami
Pakistan – a nation that has experienced three military coups, been ruled by generals for half its life and frequent political drama will mark 2013 as a decisive year in its political history. Three prominent leaders, of 2013, took to the streets of Pakistan propagating their ideas of conviction and change, to a nation stricken by USA drone attacks, Taliban – a fundamental Islamic militia – and political unrest. Yet, the significance of elections amongst the electorate was evident from the fact that the voter turnout excelled by all means.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The takeover of four eastern Libyan oil ports by a militia coalition may ignite armed conflict between Libya’s rival governments. The Libyan National Army (LNA), a militia coalition led by General Khalifa Haftar, seized four oil ports in eastern Libya from militias allied with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) on September 11. The seizure scuttled the GNA’s efforts to resume oil exports from eastern Libya, undermining a major effort to secure legitimacy for the fragile unity government. The LNA’s advance threatens the interests of western Libyan militias aligned with the GNA. These militias fought against the LNA in central Libya in the past and may resume hostilities in response to LNA aggression in the oil crescent. Libyan actors will prioritize the unresolved civil war over the fight against the Islamist State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and other Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Libya.
2. Escalating economic protests in Tunisia may incite a government crackdown and draw limited security resources away from counter-terrorism operations. Protests broke out in Fernana, northwestern Tunisia on September 7 after a café worker named Wisam Nisrah set himself on fire. Nisrah’s self-immolation and the subsequent protests mirror the event s that sparked Tunisia’s Arab Spring uprising in December 2010. Similar protests began in Ben Guerdane, eastern Tunisia on September 5. Growing protests could destabilize Tunisia’s new unity government. Civil unrest strains limited security resources and provides opportunities for Salafi-jihadi groups, including al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s Tunisian affiliate and the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), to conduct attacks.
3. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called for Muslims to continue the fight against the U.S. and to reject ISIS’s ideology in a video commemorating the fifteenth anniversary of the September 11 attacks. Zawahiri emphasized al Qaeda’s role as a defender of the oppressed. He urged black Americans to turn to shari’a and al Qaeda for justice. Zawahiri also emphasized al Qaeda’s power as a unifying “message” rather than a physical group, like ISIS, that imposes its will on Muslim populations. Zawahiri’s address continues a series of statements intended to reinforce al Qaeda’s position as the leader of the global Salafi-jihadi movement.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Hostilities are escalating in Yemen after Saudi-led coalition airstrikes killed civilians in Sana’a, which scuttled a planned humanitarian ceasefire and provoked a response from al Houthi-Saleh forces. Coalition airstrikes killed approximately 155 civilians and wounded more than 500 others at the funeral for an al Houthi-Saleh military commander on October 8. Al Houthi-Saleh forces fired ballistic missiles toward Taif city, Saudi Arabia and Ma’rib governorate, Yemen in retaliation. Al Houthi-Saleh forces may have also fired two missiles toward a U.S. Navy destroyer north of the Bab al Mandab Strait on October 9, six days after an al Houthi-Saleh missile struck an Emirati ship in the same region.
2. Al Qaeda is exploiting the current counterterrorism focus on the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) to build up a resilient Salafi-jihadi base in Libya. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) emir Abdelmalek Droukdel gave an audio speech, titled “Benghazi and the Battle of Patience,” in which he frames jihad as the alternative to foreign invasion and destruction in Benghazi. AQIM, along with al Qaeda-linked groups currently operating in Libya, seeks to exploit conflict between secular forces and Islamist militants in Benghazi to position itself as a defender of the Libyan people and establish strong relationships with local armed groups. International attention remains focused on the U.S.-backed counter-ISIS campaign in Sirte.
3. ISIS may attempt to resume an offensive campaign against the Algerian state. The pro-ISIS Amaq News Agency claimed on October 9 that ISIS Wilayat al Jaza’ir (Algeria) conducted an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on an Algerian army convoy near Tamalous in northeastern Algeria. This is ISIS’s first claimed attack in Algeria since August 2016. Counterterrorism operations have limited ISIS’s ability to attack in Algeria, but the return of Algerian fighters from Syria and Libya may allow the group to increase the frequency and impact of its attacks in the country.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. ISIS forces in Sirte, Libya, violently put down local resistance to its presence and consolidated control over the city and its environs. Ferjani tribesmen rose up against ISIS following the death of a prominent sheikh. ISIS responded by killing over 37 people. It now has control of the city.
2. Anti-al Houthi forces, including Saudi and Emirati troops, continue to roll back the al Houthis’ gains in Yemen, but al Houthi leadership is describing their forces’ withdrawals as tactical. The al Houthis will probably respond with a counteroffensive.
3. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei continued to hold back from fully endorsing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA, calling the deal “still unsettled” as neither the Iranian Parliament nor the U.S. Congress “has adopted it yet.”
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Yemen’s al Houthi movement declared plans to form a new central government overseen by its “Revolutionary Committee.” The al Houthis, who receive Iranian support, announced the new government after political negotiations collapsed. Nearly all political factions in Yemen rejected the al Houthis’ plan, and the Gulf Cooperation Council called it a “coup.” The political crisis is ongoing, and regional factions appear to be taking actions to distance themselves from the central government and the al Houthis.
2. Iran asserted the regime’s missiles are non-negotiable and that it will install new centrifuges if the P5+1 nuclear negotiating team returns to its previous position. Iranian officials continue to push for sanctions relief as a non-negotiable condition for a nuclear deal.
3. There appears to be increasing cooperation between Pakistani and Afghan forces in the fight against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The head of the TTP’s Jamatul Ahrar splinter group, Omar Khalid Khorasani, was severely injured in fighting with Afghan security forces in Nangarhar province.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A pro-Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) group may be growing stronger in Somalia, but its ability to compete with al Shabaab remains limited. The U.S. Department of State designated Abdul Qadir Mumin, a pro-ISIS cleric, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist on August 31. Al Shabaab militants reportedly attacked Mumin’s forces in Bay region, Somalia on September 4. Mumin is an al Shabaab defector, and al Shabaab has eliminated pro-ISIS members from within its ranks. It is also possible that the attack indicates that Mumin’s group has grown stronger and that al Shabaab considers it a threat. ISIS may seek to develop networks in Somalia now that its African hub in Sirte, Libya is under pressure by U.S.-backed militias. ISIS is unlikely to dedicate significant resources to the Horn of Africa at this time, however.
2. The UN-brokered political process in Libya may be breaking down. The collapse of the UN-backed Libyan government, the Government of National Accord (GNA), could have an impact on U.S. counter-terrorism operations against ISIS in Libya. The UN convened an emergency meeting in Tunis on September 5 to address rising tensions between eastern and western factions. The U.S. extended its airstrike mission in Libya for an additional month at the request of the GNA. Rising challenges to the GNA’s legitimacy threatened to undermine future operations against ISIS or other Salafi-jihadi groups in Libya.
3. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance’s September 2 announcement of a new missile in Yemen may be in response to increasing military threats from Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s coalition. The missile, the Borkan-1, is a modified Scud missile. The capability may have been transferred through the Iranian network. A political resolution to Yemen’s civil war remains unlikely despite both sides’ willingness to participate in a U.S.-backed peace plan. Yemeni factions expressed conditional support for U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s plan, but unresolved disagreements over representation in the transitional government will likely continue to hinder talks. Saudi Arabia may pursue talks to de-escalate conflict in the Saudi-Yemeni border region but will continue to support efforts by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government to oust the al Houthi-Saleh alliance from Yemen’s capital, Sana’a.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab is on the offensive against African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali National Army (SNA) troops. It seized ten towns in Lower Shabelle region following the withdrawal of AMISOM troops from the locations. AMISOM forces are stretched thin, and even coordinating with the SNA, are insufficient to secure Somalia’s territory.
2. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is resurging in northern Mali. It claimed the July 2 ambush near Timbuktu, Mali, that killed at least five UN peacekeepers and injured nine others. Further, there is evidence showing that the AQIM-linked Ansar al Din, a Tuareg Islamist group in Mali, is expanding its connections to other militants groups in the country.
3. The Iranian regime will continue to integrate the resistance economy doctrine—a plan spearheaded by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to make the Iranian economy strong and resistant to Western sanctions and global financial crises—into its national economic planning as it weighs the implications of a potential nuclear deal.
secterian violence and banned militant organizations in pakistanm_qasami
this is what i think will be a brief introduction of those who want to know about the secterian violence and militant groups .. i think this is benificial for the students fo IR sociology as will
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Competition over Libya’s oil wealth risks reigniting armed conflict between rival governments and distracting from the unfinished counter-ISIS fight. Rival militias clashed over contested oil ports in central Libya as efforts resumed to export oil. Some of these competing militias, backed by the UN-brokered unity government and U.S. airstrikes, are also fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in the central Libyan city of Sirte. They may prioritize the fight for control of Libya’s oil wealth over the counter-ISIS fight. Continued conflict would strengthen ISIS and other Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Libya, including al Qaeda.
2. Southern Yemeni officials and powerbrokers renewed a call for a unified voice to represent the region in what may be a fissure between them and the internationally recognized government of Yemen under President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. President Hadi does not have a strong constituency and has relied on southern leaders for support for his government, currently based in Aden. Southern Yemenis frequently cite political and economic marginalization by the central Yemeni government as a grievance. Calls for secession from the Yemeni state have been growing since late 2007. The frontline of Yemen’s civil war runs generally along the former boundary between North and South Yemen, re-dividing the country.
3. Ongoing civil unrest in Tunisia may weaken the country’s new unity government and create opportunities for Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, to strengthen in the country. Popular anti-government demonstrations began spreading after September 5, and Tunisian government concessions briefly held off additional demonstrations. Mass protests resumed in multiple locations, however, and labor strikes are expected to begin within days. The Tunisian government deployed additional security forces to protest sites. Salafi-jihadi militants based in Tunisia and also Libya may be positioned to infiltrate popular demonstrations or conduct attacks in Tunisia if civil unrest grows or protests turn violent.
NAPM Final report state repession in uttar pradesh (31st dec, 2019)
Meghalaya
1. Meghalaya: Mutating Threats
M. A. Athul
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management
Like a multi headed hydra, the insurgency in Meghalaya is just refusing to die, despite several successes against
rebel formations. The ongoing counterinsurgency Operation Hill Storm has hurt insurgent formations, but the
emergence of new threats has ensured that enduring successes remain elusive.
A trader identified as Bharat Singh Sekhawat, who was abducted on October 15, 2014, from Samanda village in
East Garo Hills District by A'chik Matgrik Elite Force (AMEF) was killed by the militants on October 21. His
body was exhumed on October 24. His family had paid INR 1.6 million to the abductors as ransom, despite
which he was killed.
On October 23, 2014, Meghalaya Police Sub-InspectorPramoth Sangma, who was leading his team against a
suspected Garo militant hideout close to the international border in the Purakhasia area of West Garo Hills, was
killed in an exchange of fire. The operation against the militants began in the evening of October 22, after the
West Garo Hills Police received intelligence reports about the presence of a camp in the Songmagre village of
the Purakhasia area. It was later stated that AMEF and ULFA-I militants were present in the area.
Meghalaya, a State that remained relatively peaceful while insurgency was peaking across India's Northeast, has
now emerged as the second most violent province in the region, after Assam. According to the South Asia
Terrorism Portal (SATP) data base, there have been a total of 69 insurgency-related fatalities in 2014 (till
November 9), including 20 civilians, four Security Force (SF) personnel,and 45 terrorists. These numbers
acquire greater significance in view of the fact that Meghalaya has a population of just over 2.65 million (2012
data). Assam, the worst affected State in the Northeast,accounted for a total of 206 fatalities (98 civilians , 5 SF
personneland 103 militants) in 2014 (nearly three times the fatalities in Manipur), and had a population of 30.94
million in 2012 (nearly twelve time Manipur's population).
Meanwhile, Operation Hill Storm, which was launched on July 11, 2014, has so far led to the killing of just 11
militants, though another25 have been arrested and some 13 militant camps have been detected and neutralised
by SFs. According to SATP data, in the month of October and the first week of November, there were twelve
incidents of arrest in which 23 persons were detained.
The pressure created by the counterinsurgency (CI) operations has also led to a spike in surrenders by militants.
The surrenders,especially by Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA) militants have happened at a time when
intelligence reports indicated that the GNLA “commander-in-chief” Sohan D. Shira had taken shelter in
Bangladesh. A Government source stated that,with Shira taking shelter in Bangladesh, the cadres were left to
fend for themselves, and were demoralized, leading them to surrenderbefore the Police. Between October 6 and
October 24, in 12 incidents of surrender, 34 militants of various groups [18 GNLA; 8 A'chik Songna
An'pachakgipa Kotok (ASAK, earlier known as Garo National Liberation Army-Faction); 1 Hynniewtrep
National Liberation Council (HNLC); 5 A'chik Matgrik Elite Force (AMEF); and two United Achik Liberation
Army (UALA)] have surrendered before the SFs. Some of the significant incidents of surrender include:
October 22: Five AMEF militants surrendered before the Police with three pistols,three magazines, 13 rounds of
ammunition and a hand grenade, at a remote location in the South Garo Hills District. They were later arrested
for the killing of a trader identified as Bharat Singh Shikawat.
October 20: Five GNLA militants surrendered before North Garo Hills District Superintendent of Police (SP)
F.K. Marak at Bajengdoba Police Station in East Garo Hills District, after having deserted their command post
in the West Khasi Hills. The militants informed authorities that they became disillusioned with the outfit’s
ideology and leaders and, togetherwith several other cadres,fled their camp in the West Khasi Hills three
months earlier. The militants surrendered with a US made automatic carbine rifle with two magazines and a
hundred rounds of ammunition, two 7.65 pistols with two magazines and nine rounds of ammunition, and a
wireless handset.
October 6: Six GNLA militants, including the organisation's Dadenggre ‘area Commander’ Manan Ch. Sangma
aka Kimpret, surrendered before the Police at Tura in the West Garo Hills, with an AK-56 along with two
magazines, 82 live AK rounds,two 7.56 pistols with 2 magazines, 12 rounds of 7.65 pistol ammunition, and one
2. grenade. All of the surrendered cadres were recruited by the outfit between the years 2010-11, with most of
them having received training in the Durama Hill Range.
Meanwhile, on September 24, a tripartite agreement was signed between the Government of India (GoI) and the
Meghalaya State Government, on the one hand,and the Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC) and the
Breakaway faction of ANVC (ANVC-B), on the other. According to the agreement, both ANVC and ANVC-B
will be disbanded by the end of November 2014, and their cadres will surrenderarms and ammunition to the
authorities. Further, a sum of INR one billion will be disbursed as a package over the next five years for
development of the Garo Hills area and steps would be taken to strengthen the Garo Hills Autonomous District
Council (GHADC).
Despite recent SF successes and the inking of the Peace Agreement with both factions of the ANVC, an
environment of peace and security is still a distant dream in Meghalaya. According to partial data compiled by
South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), just between September 27 and November 6, 2014, there have been at
least thirteen reported incidents of abduction in which 18 people were taken hostage.Of these,two persons were
released and anotherwas rescued by SFs, while one was killed. The whereabouts of the remaining 14 are not
available in open media sources. According to SATP data, there have been a total of at least 48 incidents of
abductions in 2014 (till November 9), in which 62 civilians were abducted,of which 24 persons were rescued or
released. Information about the other 38 is not available. 2013 saw 17 incidents of abduction,in which 36
people were abducted,of whom two were rescued or released, and another two were killed. There is no
information available regarding the 32 others.According to data available at SATP, the month of October has
already seen 11 incidents of abductions,the highest in a month this year.
The emergence of new militant groups and factions in the State is the principal factor causing lawlessness in
Meghalaya. In 2013 alone, a plethora of militant groups cropped up,including the United Achik Liberation
Army (UALA), A’chik Matgrik Liberation Front (AMLF), Achik National Liberation Army (ANLA), Achik
Tiger Force (ATF), Achik National Liberation Central Army (ANLCA), and Achik Youth Liberation Front
(AYLF). In 2014, another two insurgent groups surfaced: a group of senior GNLA leaders, led by former
'finance secretary' Reding T. Sangma broke away from the outfit's 'military chief' Sohan D. Shira and formed
their own organization, the A'chik Songna An'pachakgipa Kotok (ASAK), earlier known as Garo National
Liberation Army-Faction (GNLA-F); later, a section of militants from ASAK, in turn led by its 'finance
secretary' Jack Marak, abandoned ASAK with three AK rifles and eight pistols, to form the A'chik Matgrik Elite
Force (AMEF).
Although CI operations have blunted the major violent groups,such as GNLA and ULFA-I, and the peace
settlement has brought ANVC and ANVC-B violence to an end, moderately well equipped and trained
breakaway militant groups continue to constitute a security threat. Significantly, the insurgency in Meghalaya is
moving in the same general direction of such movements in the North East, with little or no ideological
underpinnings and no popular support.Almost all militant groups are no more than criminal undertakings,
aimed at making quick money through abduction and extortion. On October 16, 2014, the Meghalaya Police
described AMEF as a group of 'hardcore criminals', originally from GNLA, who created a splinter groups with
the sole aim of making quick money through criminal activities.
Significantly, an October 9, 2014, report indicates that there have been at least 20 cases of militants being
lynched by villagers’ in the five Garo Hills Districts over the preceding eight months. The lynching occurred
mostly in remote villages where there is virtually no Police presence.
With an unfenced border with Bangladesh being used by various militant groups,including NSCN-IM and
NDFB, to sneak in and out of Bangladesh, as well as for smuggling weapons and ferrying improvised explosive
devices (IEDs), and with no effective presence of the structures ofGovernance across much of the 'remote' Garo
Hills areas, the culture of violence refuses to ebb away. The Union Ministry of Home Affairs [UMHA] has
already raised concerns at the State Government’s “tardy” approach to completing fencing of the Bangladesh
border. Around 70 kilometres of the 443 kilometre border are yet to be fenced. On June 11, 2014, Meghalaya
Chief Minister Mukul Sangma stated that illegal arms were entering the State from countries such as
Bangladesh, Myanmar and China. Again, on June 24, 2014, Meghalaya Director General of Police P.J.P.
Hanaman reiterated that Bangladesh, Myanmar and States like Nagaland were weapons suppliers for
Meghalaya-based militants. Nevertheless,the State Government has done little to accelerate processes,such as
the construction ofthe fence along the international border, that could immediately improve the situation.
3. The neglect of vast regions of the State deemed 'remote', and the virtual abandonment of the populations there to
extremist depredations,remain the core issue in the persistence of militancy in Meghalaya. The State's
vulnerabilities to destabilizing influences from the neighbourhood have also never been adequately addressed,
despite the availability significant options.Despite the lack of political will, nevertheless,SF operations have
created dramatic opportunities for consolidation. It remains to be seen whether the Government can discoverthe
will and the focus to exploit these to establish a more permanent peace in the State.
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/sair13/13_19.htm#assessment2