This document summarizes a working paper about political reforms in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. It discusses the history of FATA's governance under British colonial rule and its continuation after independence. It notes the high levels of militancy and presence of al-Qaeda and Taliban in FATA. Recent political reforms aim to introduce mainstream political activities, but their implementation faces issues. The document explores questions around how various stakeholders may react and whether the reforms can help end the current militancy in the region.
DOCUMENTATION OF ATROCITIES IN NORTHERN RAKHINE STATE By U.S. Department of S...MYO AUNG Myanmar
DOCUMENTATION OF ATROCITIES IN NORTHERN RAKHINE STATE By U.S. Department of State
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/286307.pdf
D O C U M E N T A T I O N O F A T R O C I T I E S I N N O R T H E R N R A K H I N E S T A T E
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), with funding support from the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), conducted a survey in spring 2018 of the firsthand experiences of 1,024 Rohingya refugees in Cox’s Bazar District, Bangladesh. The goal of the survey was to document atrocities committed against residents in Burma’s northern Rakhine State during the course of violence in the previous two years.
As far as realpolitik Afghanistan is concerned, with or without a deal, the US military want to stay in what is a priceless Greater Middle East base to deploy hybrid war techniques
***
Nearly two decades after the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan post-9/11, and after an interminable war costing over $ 2 trillion, there’s hardly anything “historic” about a possible peace deal that may be signed in Doha this coming Saturday between Washington and the Taliban.
We should start by stressing three points.
1- The Taliban wanted all US troops out. Washington refused.
2- The possible deal only reduces US troops from 13,000 to 8,600. That’s the same number already deployed before the Trump administration.
3- The reduction will only happen a year and a half from now – assuming what’s being described as a truce holds.
Pakistan: the political, economic, security and trade control context relevant to defence, security and dual use exporters, clarifying what are the main areas of opportunity and risk
DOCUMENTATION OF ATROCITIES IN NORTHERN RAKHINE STATE By U.S. Department of S...MYO AUNG Myanmar
DOCUMENTATION OF ATROCITIES IN NORTHERN RAKHINE STATE By U.S. Department of State
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/286307.pdf
D O C U M E N T A T I O N O F A T R O C I T I E S I N N O R T H E R N R A K H I N E S T A T E
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), with funding support from the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), conducted a survey in spring 2018 of the firsthand experiences of 1,024 Rohingya refugees in Cox’s Bazar District, Bangladesh. The goal of the survey was to document atrocities committed against residents in Burma’s northern Rakhine State during the course of violence in the previous two years.
As far as realpolitik Afghanistan is concerned, with or without a deal, the US military want to stay in what is a priceless Greater Middle East base to deploy hybrid war techniques
***
Nearly two decades after the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan post-9/11, and after an interminable war costing over $ 2 trillion, there’s hardly anything “historic” about a possible peace deal that may be signed in Doha this coming Saturday between Washington and the Taliban.
We should start by stressing three points.
1- The Taliban wanted all US troops out. Washington refused.
2- The possible deal only reduces US troops from 13,000 to 8,600. That’s the same number already deployed before the Trump administration.
3- The reduction will only happen a year and a half from now – assuming what’s being described as a truce holds.
Pakistan: the political, economic, security and trade control context relevant to defence, security and dual use exporters, clarifying what are the main areas of opportunity and risk
CFR Report: The Future of Special Operations, by Linda RobinsonDaniel Ross
"U.S. special operations forces are doing more things in more places than ever before. They are now active in some seventy countries and, since 2001, have seen their combined budget nearly quintuple—a trend that seems likely to continue. As the United States seeks ways to tackle a range of security threats worldwide, shore up the resilience of its friends and allies against terrorist and criminal networks, and minimize need for large-scale military interventions, the importance of special operations forces will grow."
Richard N. Haass
President, Council on Foreign Relations
April 2013
The most frightening and totally ignored political reality is that a group of provincial leaders is independently running the federal government and the provinces without any sign of an Integrated Provincial and National Vision and Plan of Action.
A provincially, administratively and politically weak and handicapped central government and on-their-own provincial governments do not seem to have the much needed will and the resources to forcefully eliminate the political and corporate crime mafias now evidently hiding behind unquestionably fake war against terror which is the biggest global political, diplomatic and military fraud of the past and present century. Pakistan’s problem is not war against terrorism. Pakistan’s problem is now identified criminal political and alleged corporate mafias who are plundering and hollowing Pakistan by hiding and acting from behind the mask of war against terror, the failure of law enforcement agencies to unmask them and recruitment of armed gangs of criminals by a number of, not all, politicians and corporate tycoons as security guards.
THE BOTTOM LINE IS: Stop using the term TERRORISTS and start chasing the CRIMINALS!
Malala mishap and global media scenario in retrospect taliban and pakistanSUN&FZ Associates
Pakistani Talibans had tried to impose their Nizam-e-Adl in Swat and were thrown out of there proving and conveying clearly and forcefully that their kind of Islam was not acceptable and workable in our country. So as Muslims what are we afraid of?
We have a more secular than a secular government. We have a dedicated Secular Media of Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s Secular Pakistan. We have an army ready to fight against any attempt to disturb the way we live in this world and the way we believe in the world after. When the Pakistani Talibans have failed in Swat how can they succeed in other parts of the country where we have law enforcing agencies as well as rangers and army cantonment areas? Do we think that a few isolated barbaric incidents can succeed in terrorizing entire population of Pakistan and make them Taliban Branded Shariah Compliant? Can a country that has a brave teen age girl like Malala who has the courage to defy Taliban and carry on her mission be expected to let so-called Pakistani Taliban impose their “Alien to Islam Shariat in a “RELIGIOUS COUNTRY of TRULY MUSLIMS like Pakistan”?
NARENDRA MODI’S AND XI JINPING’S HISTORIC ROLES AMID THREATS AND CHALLENGESKeshav Prasad Bhattarai
Includes- Contradictions in India and China Relations ,India and China: Living with the Common Threats of Terrorism and Joint Responsibility of Modi and Jinping
Can the United Nations unite Ukraine. Hudson Institute. February 2018DonbassFullAccess
Research paper by Hudson Institute on the possible outcomes of the deployment of the UN peacekeeping forces in Ukraine. Edited by Richard Gowan.
The chances of a peacekeeping force successfully deploying to eastern Ukraine are currently low. But if broader political circumstances created an opening with Moscow for this option, there is sufficient evidence to suggest an international force could manage the basic security, policing and political dimensions of reintegrating the Donbas under Kyiv’s control. It would be a risky and stop-start process, but it may be the best way to end what
is Europe’s deadliest ongoing conflict, and remove one of the main obstacles to normal relations between the West and Moscow.
Hudson Institute is a research organization promoting American leadership and global engagement for a secure, free, and prosperous future.
Founded in 1961 by strategist Herman Kahn, Hudson Institute challenges conventional thinking and helps manage strategic transitions to the future through interdisciplinary studies in defense, international relations, economics, health care, technology, culture, and law.
Understanding Russia and Its Relationship with the Westtnwac
In 1994 at the dawn of the post-Cold War era Marieta Velikova left Surgut, Western Siberia in the Russian Federation bound for Weippe, Idaho as a high school exchange student. She returned to Russia with her first glimpses of life in America that would be followed by graduate and doctoral studies at Mississippi State University starting in 2002. She has lived in the United States ever since and is a proud Nashvillian who travels to Siberia twice a year to visit family.
Professor Velikova has a special perspective on US-Russian relations that she will share at this Global Dialogue session including discussion of President Vladimir Putin — how is he viewed among Russians and why does that differ from the view of the West; the situations in Chechnya, Georgia, Crimea and Ukraine; and the issue of US elections.
Modern Russian–Iranian Relations: Challenges and OpportunitiesRussian Council
This working paper was prepared as part of the Russian International Affairs Council’s (RIAC) project Modern Russian–Iranian Relations. These two nations have great potential for bilateral cooperation, but that potential has not yet been fully realized. Incipient progress in negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme and a prospective easing of the sanctions against Iran open up new possibilities for fostering and strengthening ties between Russia and Iran. This working paper analyses the current state of these two countries’ trade and economic ties; potential areas of cooperation in the Caspian region, Central Asia and the Middle East; and Russia’s future role in resolving the situation with Iran’s nuclear programme. The authors outline several specific areas and recommendations for bilateral dialogue, as well as actions that could bring cooperation to a new and higher level.
CFR Report: The Future of Special Operations, by Linda RobinsonDaniel Ross
"U.S. special operations forces are doing more things in more places than ever before. They are now active in some seventy countries and, since 2001, have seen their combined budget nearly quintuple—a trend that seems likely to continue. As the United States seeks ways to tackle a range of security threats worldwide, shore up the resilience of its friends and allies against terrorist and criminal networks, and minimize need for large-scale military interventions, the importance of special operations forces will grow."
Richard N. Haass
President, Council on Foreign Relations
April 2013
The most frightening and totally ignored political reality is that a group of provincial leaders is independently running the federal government and the provinces without any sign of an Integrated Provincial and National Vision and Plan of Action.
A provincially, administratively and politically weak and handicapped central government and on-their-own provincial governments do not seem to have the much needed will and the resources to forcefully eliminate the political and corporate crime mafias now evidently hiding behind unquestionably fake war against terror which is the biggest global political, diplomatic and military fraud of the past and present century. Pakistan’s problem is not war against terrorism. Pakistan’s problem is now identified criminal political and alleged corporate mafias who are plundering and hollowing Pakistan by hiding and acting from behind the mask of war against terror, the failure of law enforcement agencies to unmask them and recruitment of armed gangs of criminals by a number of, not all, politicians and corporate tycoons as security guards.
THE BOTTOM LINE IS: Stop using the term TERRORISTS and start chasing the CRIMINALS!
Malala mishap and global media scenario in retrospect taliban and pakistanSUN&FZ Associates
Pakistani Talibans had tried to impose their Nizam-e-Adl in Swat and were thrown out of there proving and conveying clearly and forcefully that their kind of Islam was not acceptable and workable in our country. So as Muslims what are we afraid of?
We have a more secular than a secular government. We have a dedicated Secular Media of Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s Secular Pakistan. We have an army ready to fight against any attempt to disturb the way we live in this world and the way we believe in the world after. When the Pakistani Talibans have failed in Swat how can they succeed in other parts of the country where we have law enforcing agencies as well as rangers and army cantonment areas? Do we think that a few isolated barbaric incidents can succeed in terrorizing entire population of Pakistan and make them Taliban Branded Shariah Compliant? Can a country that has a brave teen age girl like Malala who has the courage to defy Taliban and carry on her mission be expected to let so-called Pakistani Taliban impose their “Alien to Islam Shariat in a “RELIGIOUS COUNTRY of TRULY MUSLIMS like Pakistan”?
NARENDRA MODI’S AND XI JINPING’S HISTORIC ROLES AMID THREATS AND CHALLENGESKeshav Prasad Bhattarai
Includes- Contradictions in India and China Relations ,India and China: Living with the Common Threats of Terrorism and Joint Responsibility of Modi and Jinping
Can the United Nations unite Ukraine. Hudson Institute. February 2018DonbassFullAccess
Research paper by Hudson Institute on the possible outcomes of the deployment of the UN peacekeeping forces in Ukraine. Edited by Richard Gowan.
The chances of a peacekeeping force successfully deploying to eastern Ukraine are currently low. But if broader political circumstances created an opening with Moscow for this option, there is sufficient evidence to suggest an international force could manage the basic security, policing and political dimensions of reintegrating the Donbas under Kyiv’s control. It would be a risky and stop-start process, but it may be the best way to end what
is Europe’s deadliest ongoing conflict, and remove one of the main obstacles to normal relations between the West and Moscow.
Hudson Institute is a research organization promoting American leadership and global engagement for a secure, free, and prosperous future.
Founded in 1961 by strategist Herman Kahn, Hudson Institute challenges conventional thinking and helps manage strategic transitions to the future through interdisciplinary studies in defense, international relations, economics, health care, technology, culture, and law.
Understanding Russia and Its Relationship with the Westtnwac
In 1994 at the dawn of the post-Cold War era Marieta Velikova left Surgut, Western Siberia in the Russian Federation bound for Weippe, Idaho as a high school exchange student. She returned to Russia with her first glimpses of life in America that would be followed by graduate and doctoral studies at Mississippi State University starting in 2002. She has lived in the United States ever since and is a proud Nashvillian who travels to Siberia twice a year to visit family.
Professor Velikova has a special perspective on US-Russian relations that she will share at this Global Dialogue session including discussion of President Vladimir Putin — how is he viewed among Russians and why does that differ from the view of the West; the situations in Chechnya, Georgia, Crimea and Ukraine; and the issue of US elections.
Modern Russian–Iranian Relations: Challenges and OpportunitiesRussian Council
This working paper was prepared as part of the Russian International Affairs Council’s (RIAC) project Modern Russian–Iranian Relations. These two nations have great potential for bilateral cooperation, but that potential has not yet been fully realized. Incipient progress in negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme and a prospective easing of the sanctions against Iran open up new possibilities for fostering and strengthening ties between Russia and Iran. This working paper analyses the current state of these two countries’ trade and economic ties; potential areas of cooperation in the Caspian region, Central Asia and the Middle East; and Russia’s future role in resolving the situation with Iran’s nuclear programme. The authors outline several specific areas and recommendations for bilateral dialogue, as well as actions that could bring cooperation to a new and higher level.
National security is a state or condition where our most cherished values and beliefs, our democratic way of life, our institutions of governance and our unity, welfare and well-being as a nation and people are permanently protected and continuously enhanced
End of the Independent Muslim World?
One subject, four articles (1974, 1980, 1988, 2013) and the conclusion of the analysis of different interconnected perspectives in just one sentence…
As a student of international relations I want to share three published and one unpublished articles, two in Urdu and two in English languages, with my friends and connections.
The first article in Urdu was published in Daily the Mashriq on August 1974 in which I had discussed the possibility of an attempt by former Soviet Union for the redrawing of boundaries between Pakistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmania with reference to a book on international politics, Balshaya Sovietskaya Entsaklopedia and Russian geo-politician Mystilawski.
In my second article in Urdu published in Pakistan’s largest circulated weekly magazine Akhbar-e-Jehan in 1980 I had discussed in detail the historical background of former Soviet Union’s attack on Afghanistan, the possibility of attack on post-revolution Iran, the visible geographic hurdles in the way for doing so and the possible consequences of such an act.
In 1988 my article in English published in Daily the Muslim discussed the reasons for former Soviet Union’s retreat from Afghanistan and the possibility of an unending civil war as a consequence of the political vacuum that was clearly anticipated after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan.
The fourth article in English, available at my different blogs, was posted on 17th February 2013 discussing the background of the political landscape in the Muslim world and reasons for social and economic unrest and uncertainty which, in present global scenario, apparently do not appear to be unusual to people in general and media in particular.
If I am asked to sum up the ultimate conclusion of these four articles in one sentence, the sentence will be:
“End of Independent Muslim World Will Be Prevented Only By an Unthinkable, Unimaginable and Unbelievable Miracle”
Tigah Journal now accepting research paper submissions on FATAfatanews
FATA Research Center (FRC) invites social scientists, policy makers, thinkers, researchers and/or students to submit research paper for publication in the fourth issue of its research journal named “TIGAH, A Journal for Peace and Development”.
The abstract/ brief of your proposed / outlined paper can be submitted till 15 October 2013 while submission of complete paper, in accordance with the guidelines, is expected till15 November 2013.
Presentation on War on Terror in FATA, PakistanUroojilyas3
This presentation talks about the history of the war on terror in Federally Administrative Tribal Areas (FATA), Pakistan. This Presentation helps with how to apply Conflict Profiling and do conflict analysis.
Political development in federally administered tribalSalman
The paper titled as Political Development in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA): A step to Minimizing and Radicalization written by Umar Sajjad and was published in Research Journal of Fata Research Center Name as TIGAH Volume 3
The research paper was written by Haroon Rashid a known figure titlled as Will politicians take politics to the Tribal region and published in a Research Journal of Fata Research Center Volume 2.
Mainstreaming Pakistan's Tribal Belt: A Human Rights and Security Imperative ...fatanews
This paper was submitted as a discussion paper to the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.
Prior to attending the Harvard Kennedy School, Ziad Haider served as foreign policy advisor to U.S. Senator Christopher J. Dodd. He spent the summer of 2008 in Lahore, Peshawar, and Islamabad conducting research on Pakistan’s tribal areas while
affiliated with the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan.
This paper analyzes how the colonially derived governance system in Pakistan’s tribal belt has contributed to human rights violations and militancy in the region; describes historic obstacles to and key stakeholders’ views on governance reforms; and proposes critical legal and political reforms to ensure the tribal belt’s long-term security and integration into the Pakistani polity.
At a time when Pakistan’s tribal belt has become the central front in the war on terror, this paper is both timely and valuable in delineating a governance strategy to complement ongoing military and development efforts in this pivotal region that will undoubtedly dominate the next administration’s national security agenda.
Working Group: Reframing a Regional Approach to South Asia: Demilitarization,...Dr. Nyla Ali Khan
Nine scholars of South Asia – Amrita Basu, Shah Mahmud Hanifi, Nyla Ali Khan, David Ludden, Zia Mian, Senzil Nawid, Sahar Shafqat, Kamala Visweswaran, and Chitralekha Zutshi – met at New York University’s Institute of Public Knowledge on March 6, 2009, to discuss the politics of knowledge concerning South Asia as it connects academic and policy work in the US.
https://www.nyu.edu/ipk/files/docs/misc/6152154314a0d91053299c.pdf
Struggle for Rights and Reforms in Pakistan Tribal Areas (Nov 2014 Report)fatanews
Link: http://bit.ly/fatareport | As Printed in the November 2014 Report: FATA Faces FATA Voices.
Shackled for more than one hundred years under an outdated British law, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan has been plagued by instability extending well beyond its colonial-era border with Afghanistan. Excluded from essential provisions of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the tribal areas are administered through a legal and administrative regulation known as the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), originally imposed in 1901. No act of the Parliament of Pakistan applies to FATA unless extended by special orders from the President of Pakistan. Furthermore and despite the continuous struggle of the people there, FATA enjoys no elected representation at local or provincial levels, and until 1996 tribal citizens had no universal voting rights in elections for the National Assembly of Pakistan.
Link: http://bit.ly/fatareport | Reports and Photographs from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan.
Published in November 2014, the report features photos taken by young photographers from FATA, examples of everyday life in Mohmand, Khyber, Kurram and South Waziristan agencies. Images of the iconic Khyber Pass and many towns along the border with Afghanistan lend a real-life dimension to this largely unknown, and often ignored or misrepresented region of Pakistan. In a part of the world where photography is uncommon, these photographs depict subtle interactions of FATA citizens at work, at school and during informal moments throughout the tribal areas.
The report text, entitled "The Struggle for Rights and Reforms in Pakistan's Tribal Areas" describes the history and trajectory of reform demands made by Pakistani citizens, civil society groups and the people of FATA. Also included are quotes from citizens and political leaders, collected to show opinions and visions for the future of FATA. Voices included demonstrate a strong desire for equal rights and equal participation in the context of Pakistan's evolving democracy.
For those who know the tribal areas well, this report may serve as a reminder of the great number of Pakistanis working for a brighter future for FATA. For those previously not aware of the political activities in FATA, the report may provide a new and unique glimpse at the diverse richness of the culture and people in Pakistan's tribal areas.
The 75 photographs were carefully selected from over 1,000 that were submitted for review. All are from young photographers between the ages of 17 and 30, from varied socio-economic backgrounds in FATA. Without their efforts and talent, the report would not have been possible. Many thanks to the photographers--and those featured in their work--for the privilege of sharing these images and the stories they tell.
Photographers: Alimgir Khan, Ammad Ahmed Khan, Azmatullah, Faryal Mohmmand, Faisal Khan, Huma Gul, Irfan Ali, Jebran Yousefzia, Rizwan Bhittani, Rohida, Saba Rehman, Sara Qayum, Seema Gul and Shah Jehan.
Notice to NGOs to Hire Staff from FATA (SAFRON Ministry, 11 Nov 2014)fatanews
After receiving direction from the SAFRON Committee in the National Assembly, the SAFRON Ministry has informed NGOs working in FATA that they should hire the maximum number of employees with FATA domicile and not with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa domicile.
FATA Governance Reforms: Issues and Way Forward (Urdu, CGPA Policy Brief, Oct...fatanews
English version available at: https://www.slideshare.net/fatanews/cgpa-fata-reforms-policy-brief-2014-october --- CGPA policy brief for Pakistan lawmakers to inform debate on legal and political reform for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). A timely report when the Senate considers a constitution amendment bill and MNA discussions are underway.
This FATA Reforms News Summary is a 37-page document containing a selection of opinion and news articles regarding recommendations for further reforms in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The summary document contains articles, legal documents and other resources from June to October 2014.
The reforms priorities in the document include a Constitution amendment bill presented in the Senate of Pakistan to extend the jurisdiction of High Court and Supreme Court to FATA, a resolution put forward in the National Assembly to shift legislative powers for FATA from the President to the parliament, a new policy brief on FATA reforms by the Centre for Governance and Public Accountability (CGPA), a FATA Committee press release urging equal rights for North Waziristan IDPs, a summary and analysis of the recent Peshawar High Court judgment regarding FATA jurisdiction, and others.
CGPA FATA Reforms Launch Invitation (21 Oct 2014)fatanews
A Center for Governance & Public Accountability (CGPA) policy brief for Pakistan lawmakers to inform debate on legal and political reform for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). FATA Governance Reforms: Issues and Way Forward is a timely report as the Senate considers a constitution amendment bill and MNA discussions are underway.
Policy Brief PDF Link: http://bit.ly/cgpafata
FATA Governance Reforms: Issues and Way Forward (CGPA Policy Brief, October 2...fatanews
Urdu version available at: http://www.slideshare.net/fatanews/fata-governance-reforms-issues-and-way-forward-urdu-cgpa-policy-brief-october-2014 --- CGPA policy brief for Pakistan lawmakers to inform debate on legal and political reform for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). A timely report when the Senate considers a constitution amendment bill and MNA discussions are underway.
Peshawar High Court FATA Judgment Analysis (2014)fatanews
Article 1(c) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan defines the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) as part of the Republic’s territories in addition to the four provinces of Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab, Sindh and the Islamabad Capital Territory. Chapter 1 (Articles 8-28) of the Constitution guarantees Fundamental Rights to the citizens in the territories of the Republic. The Fundamental Rights, inter alia, include the security of person, safeguard as to arrest and detention, the right to fair trial, freedom of movement, assembly, association, speech, and equality of citizens. Article 8 of the Constitution provides that any law, custom or usage having the force of law, which is inconsistent or in derogation of the Fundamental Rights is void.
In contrast to the spirit of the Constitution and the Fundamental Rights contained therein, there exists no judicial forum for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights in FATA. Justice in FATA is dispensed through a quasi-judicial system in accordance with the provisions of a colonial law known as the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) 1901. The FCR concentrates all judicial and executive powers in the office of the Political Agent/Deputy Commissioner, a senior civil servant of the federal government. In contravention of due process of law, citizens in FATA have no right to fair trial and have little safeguard against arbitrary arrest and detention.
Because of its geographical proximity to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, , the people of FATA often approach the Peshawar High Court (PHC) for the enforcement of their Fundamental Rights, despite the bar of jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 247(7) of the Constitution. Several petitions relating to FATA were filed in the PHC during 2013 and 2014, related to four broad categories: 1) illegal detentions by political agents in FATA, 2) service matters of the employees working in FATA, 3) contract matters, and 4) Fundamental Rights. In order to address these petitions in accordance with constitutional provisions, the PHC constituted a “larger bench” for the hearings. The Court also appointed seven eminent amicus curiae to assist it on eight specific points.
The Court, after hearing arguments from counsels for the parties and submissions of the amicus curiae, wherein all the previous judgments of the superior courts were exhaustively discussed (see annex for details), considered the matter and passed its judgment on April 7, 2014. The judgment highlights the contradictions in the enforcement of Fundamental Rights and safe administration of justice in FATA. The Court arrived at the conclusion that it has no jurisdiction in areas that constitute FATA except in relation to the terms and conditions of service of the civil servants, development contracts and detentions that violate Section 86-A of the Criminal Procedure Code of Pakistan.
The mandate of the commission is to formulate and propose clear strategic objectives, strategies, policies and action plans and put forward recommendations for the approval of the Governor Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The Commission will also overview the implementation of the reform initiatives and propose “mid-course corrections” as and when required.
Mapping PCNA Investments in FATA (January 2014)fatanews
A report of the Post-crisis Needs Assessment implementation support unit for FATA, this document details the previous and ongoing investments in the tribal areas, particularly focusing on areas of work and reform identified in the PCNA document. Complete PCNA document can be found here: http://www.slideshare.net/fatanews/postcrisis-needs-assessment-pcna-for-fata-and-khyber-pakhtunkhwa
Post-crisis Needs Assessment (PCNA) for FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Septembe...fatanews
As assessment of needs in FATA and KP as part of the World Bank-implemented Multi-donor Trust Fund project. The document includes concrete recommendations for administrative, political and legal reforms for Pakistan's tribal areas.
The FATA Reforms news update below is a 16-page document containing a selection of opinion and news articles regarding recommendations for further reforms in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The summary document contains articles from April to May 2014.
The reforms priorities in the document include the establishing of a new FATA Reforms Commission by recently appointed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Governor Sardar Mehtab Ahmed Khan, the historic April 7, 2014 judgment of the Peshawar High Court regarding FATA jurisdiction and Article 247 of the constitution, and calls for greater transparency in the tribal areas and others.
Details previous elected National Assembly deputies as well as electoral roll data for the May 2013 elections. Briefing courtesy of http://www.slideshare.net/tayyebafridi
Peshawar High Court Judgment on FATA Jurisdiction (April 2014)fatanews
MAY 6, 2014: The Peshawar High Court (PHC) on Monday advised the federal government to submit a reference in the Parliament for suitable amendments to the Constitution with an aim to protect fundamental human rights in the tribal region. The advice was given by a larger bench in a detailed judgment over matters related to illegal detentions and issues of government servants.
The PHC on Monday issued a 46-page judgment related to Fata, in which a larger bench comprising the then PHC chief justice Mian Fasihul Mulk, present Chief Justice Mazhar Alam Miankhel, Justice Yahya Afridi, Justice Qaiser Rasheed and Justice Malik Manzoor Hussain declared that the high court had jurisdiction to hear cases of the employees of provincial and federal governments serving in Fata.
About arrest of people from settled areas by the political administration, the bench declared that the high court could assume its jurisdiction in illegal arrest by the political administration. The bench stated that the arrest would be illegal if political administration did not fulfil procedure under section 86-A of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), before shifting the arrested persons to tribal areas from the settled areas.
The bench declared that the high court had jurisdiction to hear the cases if the incident or any other agreements on business and other matters took place in settled areas between private parties and action was taken by the political authorities.
The bench said the court would decide its jurisdiction in the service maters of those employees who were directly appointed by the political authorities when such cases come to the court for hearing.
However, the bench declared that the high court had no jurisdiction to hear cases related to various matters occurring in Fata and illegal arrests of tribal people there.The judgment said the political agents’ basic duty was to run the administrative affairs of various tribal agencies, but at the same time they also act as judge and sentenced the tribal people under the FCR.
The bench declared that there was no system to control the unlimited powers of the political agents and that was why they were committing serious violations of fundamental human rights and giving decisions on their own free will and under sub-Article 7 of Article 247 of Constitution their divisions are not challenged in the high court.
Therefore, the court declared sub-article 7 of Article 247 of the Constitution inconsistent with articles related to fundamental rights and advised the federal government to submit a reference in the parliament for suitable amendments to the said article.
“We are advising the federal government to submit a reference in the National Assembly and Senate for suitable amendments in sub-article 7 of Article 247 of the Constitution. People of Fata are citizens of Pakistan, but imposing restriction through this article of the Constitution against tribal people to get fundamental rights.
Local Government in FATA: Failures, Challenges, Prospects (FATA Research Cent...fatanews
ISLAMABAD, April 22, 2014: The tribal people demanded immediate extension of local governments system to tribal territories to mainstream the Federally Administered Tribal Areas both politically and socially with rest of the country.
This was the crux of a Study Report titled "Local Government in FATA: Past Failures, Current Challenges and Future Prospects" launched by Islamabad-based think tank - FATA Research Center - at a local hotel here on Tuesday.
The report is prepared after conducting extensive surveys, interviews and round tables conferences with different stakeholders including tribal people, elders, political and legal experts, academia, media men and government officials.
Speaking at a launching ceremony as a chief guest, Federal Minister for State and Frontier Regions (SAFRON) Lt Gen (R) Qadir Baloch, said the findings of the report are manifesting the fact that tribal people are politically aware and demanding participation in affairs of the state through democratically elected bodies.
The minister elaborated that we haven't decided yet about the date of conducting local bodies elections in entire of Pakistan and will introduce the local government system in FATA before its elections.
Local Government Reforms in Pakistan: Context, Content and Causes fatanews
This paper examines the recent decentralization reforms in Pakistan under
General Musharraf. We highlight major aspects of this reform and analyze its
evolution in a historical context to better understand potential causes behind this
current decentralization. Analyzing the evolution of local government reforms in
Pakistan is interesting because each of the three major reform experiments has
been instituted at the behest of a non-representative centre using a ‘top down’
approach. Each of these reform experiments is a complementary change to a
wider constitutional reengineering strategy devised to further centralization of
political power in the hands of the non-representative centre. We argue that the
design of the local government reforms in these contexts becomes endogenous to
the centralization objectives of the non-representative centre. It is hoped that
analyzing the Pakistani experience will help shed light on the positive political
economy question of why non-representative regimes have been willing
proponents of decentralization to the local level.
Impediments to Integrating FATA in Pakistan Mainstream (2009, Muhammad Tayyab...fatanews
This paper aims to analyze the impediments involved in integration of the FATA in the national mainstream of Pakistan with a view to make suitable recommendations. This paper briefly discusses the historical background and provides a short overview of the administrative, judicial, political and socio-economic aspects of the FATA. In assessing the underlying causes of the FATA problem, this paper suggests a significant change to the FATA’s status quo as an essential and effective measure. To understand the FATA conundrum, case studies of handling Pashtuns residing in the region of the NWF by British, Soviets and later by Pakistan have been done. It has provided a better understanding and apt analysis of the current situation. The paper also addresses the concerns of Pakistan on the involvement of foreign hand in destabilizing the situation inside the FATA and other parts of Pakistan. As the credibility of such like information is always difficult to ascertain; therefore, occasional release of related news in the media and comments of senior Pakistani officials and journalist have been used as base facts for drawing relevant conclusion.
The world at large and Pakistanis in particular have to unveil forces working behind the scenes in the FATA. In addition, an effective reform package with a potent media campaign is required to go in to the FATA, thereby not only making the locals aware of the sensitivity of the problem of extremism coupled with terrorism in their society but to make the reminder of Pakistanis also realize that the FATA requires a national effort of integration which cannot be left to only one component of government i.e. Army and other LEAs.
01062024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdfFIRST INDIA
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‘वोटर्स विल मस्ट प्रीवेल’ (मतदाताओं को जीतना होगा) अभियान द्वारा जारी हेल्पलाइन नंबर, 4 जून को सुबह 7 बजे से दोपहर 12 बजे तक मतगणना प्रक्रिया में कहीं भी किसी भी तरह के उल्लंघन की रिपोर्ट करने के लिए खुला रहेगा।
El Puerto de Algeciras continúa un año más como el más eficiente del continente europeo y vuelve a situarse en el “top ten” mundial, según el informe The Container Port Performance Index 2023 (CPPI), elaborado por el Banco Mundial y la consultora S&P Global.
El informe CPPI utiliza dos enfoques metodológicos diferentes para calcular la clasificación del índice: uno administrativo o técnico y otro estadístico, basado en análisis factorial (FA). Según los autores, esta dualidad pretende asegurar una clasificación que refleje con precisión el rendimiento real del puerto, a la vez que sea estadísticamente sólida. En esta edición del informe CPPI 2023, se han empleado los mismos enfoques metodológicos y se ha aplicado un método de agregación de clasificaciones para combinar los resultados de ambos enfoques y obtener una clasificación agregada.
03062024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdfFIRST INDIA
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31052024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdfFIRST INDIA
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An astonishing, first-of-its-kind, report by the NYT assessing damage in Ukraine. Even if the war ends tomorrow, in many places there will be nothing to go back to.
Political Reforms in FATA: Will it End Militancy? (Sayed Wiqar Shah 2012)
1. Heidelberg Papers
in South Asian
and Comparative Politics
Political Reforms in the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas of Pakistan (FATA):
Will it End the Current Militancy?
by
Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah
Working Paper No. 64
January 2012
South Asia Institute
Department of Political Science
Heidelberg University
HEIDELBERG PAPERS IN SOUTH ASIAN AND
2. COMPARATIVE POLITICS
ISSN: 1617-5069
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3. Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah
H E I D E L B E R G P A P E R S I N S O U T H A S I A N A N D C O M P A R A T I V E P O L I T I C S
h t t p : / / h p s a c p . u n i - h d . d e /
W o r k i n g P a p e r N o . 6 4 , J a n u a r y 2 0 1 2 1
Political Reforms in the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas of Pakistan (FATA):
Will it End the Current Militancy?
Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah 1
Keywords: tribal areas of Pakistan, militancy, political reforms, Taliban and al
Qaida, US-Pakistan relations
ABSTRACT:
The resurgence of the Taliban and the al Qaida are interwoven with the
rising tide of militancy in the tribal areas of Pakistan. After the Taliban’s
ouster from Afghanistan, the al Qaida and its supporters regrouped in the
FATA and launched attacks on the US and NATO troops in Afghanistan.
Pakistan, a major ally of the US on war upon terror tried to quell the
insurgents but did not succeed. The cross-border infiltration and attacks on
US troops continued, causing serious doubts about Pakistan’s sincerity in the
suppression of the militancy. The present research focuses on these and other
similar issues including the recent trust deficit between US and Pakistan and
the essential measures for bringing stability to the region thus ensuring safe
withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014.
The Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, popularly known as FATA,
have garnered much attention in the recent times. Termed by the American President
Barrack Obama as the ‗most dangerous place on earth‘, the area stretched between
Pakistan and Afghanistan is known for its peculiar type of tribal society and the
system of governance retained since centuries. The present system of governance
was introduced by the British for the furtherance of their colonial designs in the
South Asia. To thwart the much-feared alleged Russian advances towards India, the
1
Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah is Allama Iqbal Professor at the South Asia Institute, University of
Heidelberg, Germany. He has a D. Phil in History from the University of Oxford; M. Phil and
MA in History and Pashto from the University of Peshawar. His areas of specialization
include Modern South Asia, Afghanistan, Political Leadership in Pakistan, Tribal Areas of
Pashtoonkhwa in Pakistan, Pashto Language and Literature and Gender Studies. He has
authored ten books in English, Pashto and Urdu. The author can be reached at:
drswas@hotmail.com.
4. Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah
H E I D E L B E R G P A P E R S I N S O U T H A S I A N A N D C O M P A R A T I V E P O L I T I C S
h t t p : / / h p s a c p . u n i - h d . d e /
W o r k i n g P a p e r N o . 6 4 , J a n u a r y 2 0 1 2 2
British colonial administration planned their penetration in the Pashtoon dominated
areas, known for inhospitable mountains and passes and wild tribesmen. They faced
a tough resistance in its occupation and were unable to permanently keep it under
their rule. The imperialists heavily relied upon the local support and took various
steps to gain the sympathies of the tribal people to their side. Hence the introduction
of the Maliki system, followed by the introduction of some unpopular reforms
including the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR). Political, judicial, social and other
reforms, introduced in other parts of the country have been denied to the people
living in FATA, reasons counted as the unruly nature of the people. The same
situation continued even after the transferring of the area from British colonial
administration to Pakistan in 1947. This provided a chance to al Qaida and other
similar terrorist organisations to establish their networks in the region disturbing the
peace and tranquillity of the whole world. Despite the presence of about one hundred
thousand Pakistani troops in FATA and the daily increasing drone raids, the militants
are still organising bombing raids inside Pakistan and attacking the US forces and its
NATO allies in Afghanistan.
Although the issue remained unresolved for many years, it came to the spot
light recently when one of the top most US military officials accused Pakistan of
covertly providing all kind of help and logistic support to the Haqqani network of the
Taliban to attack US and NATO troops inside Afghanistan. Pakistan denied the
allegations and vituperation from the US official and cited the highest number of
casualties, both in the civilian and military ranks, which it suffered in combating
terrorism in the region. As a frontline state, according to the Pakistani officials, it
suffered more as compared to any other country in the world. More than thirty
thousand civilians and five thousands security personnel were killed by the terrorists,
a number much higher than the combined US and NATO casualties in Afghanistan.
The Pakistan government showed its anguish and anxiety on the US demand to ‗do
more‘ and showed its incapability in launching another major military operation in
North Waziristan to flush out the al Qaida and the Taliban supporters from the area.
The war of words further escalated the already existing tension between the two
countries and till date the deficit of mutual trust is evident from the statements of
various parliamentarians and officials on both sides.
Although the main purpose of the present research is to focus on the recently
announced political reforms for the FATA, it will analyse the problematic procedure
of its implementation and its repercussions in the tribal region of Pakistan. This
research will explore answers to some key questions involving the implementation of
the political reforms in FATA and the issues of how to stop the further escalation of
the militancy in the region. It will elaborate on the pertinent issues of the complex
relations between the tribesmen and the Pakistani establishment. It will also discuss
the reaction of the tribal maliks and other beneficiaries in this regard. Are they happy
with the extension of political activities in their jurisdiction or considers it as a direct
challenge to their authority? Are they prepare to abandon the monetary gains which
they enjoyed for being the close collaborators of the authorities from both sides of
the Durand Line or will they simply accept it as fait accompli. Will it retain their
status quo in the tribal society or they will lose all authority in the new set up. All
these and the like questions will be investigated in the present research.
It is a known fact that the al Qaida, Taliban and their sympathisers are keeping
a strong hold in the tribal areas of Pakistan. What will be their reaction to the
introduction of political reforms in the tribal areas of Pakistan? Since most of the al
Qaida leaders and other bad guys of the world are disowned by their own
governments they have no other place to go. They will not allow the political parties
either to create awareness among the tribal population or to establish a network of
5. Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah
H E I D E L B E R G P A P E R S I N S O U T H A S I A N A N D C O M P A R A T I V E P O L I T I C S
h t t p : / / h p s a c p . u n i - h d . d e /
W o r k i n g P a p e r N o . 6 4 , J a n u a r y 2 0 1 2 3
the political organisations in the tribal belt. Because of the poverty of the people and
a high rate of illiteracy, this area has been a recruitment base for the militants. The
present research will also find ways and means to improve the life conditions of the
poor tribesmen thus enabling to counter the militants in the best possible way. In the
final part of the present research, after examining the whole issue systematically, the
author will try to explore the possibilities to overcome the ongoing militancy in the
area which is tarnishing the image of the country and people and disturbing the
balance of power in the region thus severely affecting the US relations with Pakistan,
which indirectly is moving towards creating instability in the region and eventually
would prove harmful for the exit of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan.
The FATA covers an estimated area of about 27,220 square kilometres. Its
population, according to the Census Report of 1998, was about three million2
but this
figure has been contested recently by some scholars who put it as more than six
million people.3
For administrative purpose the whole region was divided into seven
autonomous agencies which included the Khyber (1879), Kurram (1892), South
Waziristan (1895), North Waziristan (1895), Mohmand (1951), Bajaur (1973), and
Aurakzai (1973). Malakand, formed as an Agency in 1896, was also initially kept
under the direct control of the Government of India because it was very important in
the imperial strategy as then Chitral, Dir, Bajaur and Swat were considered part of
Malakand. Later on its status was changed and it was placed under the provincial
administrative setup known as the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA).
There are six comparatively smaller tribal pockets joined together with the six settled
districts known as the Frontier Regions and which included F. R. Peshawar, F. R.
Kohat, F. R. Bannu, F. R. Lakki Marwat, F. R. Tank and F. R. Dera Ismail Khan. A
special official-the Political Agent-is the administrative head of the political agency.
The political agent wielded unchecked powers in the agency and in actual practice he
is the most powerful person with unlimited powers assisted by the Assistant Political
agent, Tehsildar and Naib Tehsildar. The political agents are given huge funds and
interestingly these funds are not auditable since the colonial days. He uses it as his
own discretion and a major share of these funds goes to the tribal maliks. The policy
to control the local population was first introduced in Waziristan by Robert Bruce,
the Deputy Commissioner of Derajat Division in 1889-1890. The leading maliks
were selected by him and graded according to the importance of their tribe. They
were given allowances by the government and were required to supply a number of
tribesmen to guard the British interest in the area.4
This corrupt practice was
introduced on the pretext of maintaining peace and tranquillity in the area. The
maliks who enjoys state patronage are called as Lungi (turban) holders and this is
still of the most sought-after designation in the FATA. After the departure of the
British from South Asia, the Pakistan Government endorsed all old treaties and pacts
signed with the tribesmen and ensured that they should enjoy the same facilities
which were granted to them by the British authorities. Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad
Ali Jinnah, the founder of the new state, personally assured the tribesmen and
guaranteed the continuation of the allowances they were receiving in the past. He
also reiterated that ‗Neither my Government nor I have any desire to modify the
existing arrangements except in consultation with you so long as you remain loyal
and faithful to Pakistan‘.5
Although no exact number of the Lungi holders is
2
S. Iftikhar Hussain, Some Major Pukhtoon Tribes Along The Pak-Afghan Border
(Peshawar, Area Study Centre (Russia & Central Asia) University of Peshawar, 2000), p. 7.
3
Rahimullah Yusufzai ‚‗Some More Real Changes‘, The News, Islamabad, 16 August 2011.
4
Lal Baha, N-WFP Administration Under British Rule 1901-1919 (Islamabad, National
Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1978), p.34.
5
‗The Frontier Policy of Pakistan‘, M. A. Jinnah‘s Address to the Tribal Jirga at Government
House, Peshawar , 17 April 1948, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Speeches and
6. Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah
H E I D E L B E R G P A P E R S I N S O U T H A S I A N A N D C O M P A R A T I V E P O L I T I C S
h t t p : / / h p s a c p . u n i - h d . d e /
W o r k i n g P a p e r N o . 6 4 , J a n u a r y 2 0 1 2 4
available a careful estimate put their number as much as 40,000. The number of
Lungi holders varies from agency to agency and in according to the ratio of the
population. According to an authentic source, South Waziristan has 2300 maliks,
further divided in 1700 belonging to Mahsud tribe and 600 from the Ahmadzai
Wazirs; North Waziristan 1600; Orakzai 8,836; Bajaur 7,300; Kurram around 7,000;
Mohmand 9,833 and Khyber Agency 3568.6
It is pertinent to note that in some cases
the maliks are clever enough and are utilising their position to get maximum benefits
from both Afghanistan and Pakistan governments.
The area remained isolated for various of reasons. Its inhabitants are
economically under- developed, the agricultural base is weak due to the nature of the
land, the shortage of irrigation water channels, non availability of dams and lack of
modern techniques and mechanisation tools. It is surrounded by extreme poverty,
with a high proportion of illiteracy and rare industrial enterprises providing
opportunities for employment to the locals. The reasons counted for the miserable
life of tribesmen in FATA includes a big number of maternal and child mortality,
small agricultural holdings, no access to drinking water and few health centres to
care for the patients. The non-availability of electricity and gas connections and poor
communication system, is keeping the tribesmen far behind other communities in the
region. A survey conducted under the FATA Poverty Assessment, has revealed that
‗…landlessness or ownership of just small areas of land; lack of livestock; little or
no food; lack of nutritious food; tattered clothing and no shoes; poor quality or
condition of house; unemployment; high dependency on others for food and income;
women working to supplement household income; ill health and disability; increased
risk of conflict; lack of access to public services; lack of influence and
powerlessness; and belonging to a powerful tribe‘7
are indicators of poverty across
the FATA.
The strategic location of the area is due to its proximity with Afghanistan
which further leads to Russia. The British annexation of the Punjab in 1849 also
provided them an opportunity to become masters of the Frontier region. Apart from
many other considerations the British wanted a secure Frontier and maintenance of
law and order in the newly occupied trans-Indus territories. The imperialists
formulated various policies in this regard including the two famous ‗close border‘
and ‗Forward Policy‘. In the first place the British declared their objective as non-
aggression and non-interference in the tribal affairs. Their major concern was to
guard the border closely and not to annoy the local tribesmen. They made
agreements with the tribes, insisting upon maintaining friendly relations between the
British Indian Government and the Frontier tribes. The tribes‘ sympathies were
gained through a generous grant of subsidies and allowances. But this policy was
abandoned in favour of another aggressive policy popularly known as the Forward
Policy. The main reason according to the proponents of this policy was the Russian
expansion in Central Asia and their rapid advancement towards Afghanistan. To
thwart the Russian designs towards India, drastic steps were taken including the
signing of the Durand Agreement (1893) with the Amir of Afghanistan. This
alarmed the Frontier tribesmen who took it as a direct interference in their affairs and
reacted sharply to these measures. In 1897, the Frontier uprising started and soon
engulfed the whole of the Frontier region from Waziristan to Swat. Immediately the
Government responded by sending more than 70,000 troops who after heavy losses
Statements as Governor General of Pakistan 1947-48 (Islamabad, Ministry of Information &
Broadcasting Directorate of Films & Publications, 1989), p. 239.
6
Dawn, Islamabad, 14 June 2011.
7
Teepu Mahabat Khan, The Tribal Areas of Pakistan A Contemporary Profile (Lahore,
Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2008), p. 131.
7. Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah
H E I D E L B E R G P A P E R S I N S O U T H A S I A N A N D C O M P A R A T I V E P O L I T I C S
h t t p : / / h p s a c p . u n i - h d . d e /
W o r k i n g P a p e r N o . 6 4 , J a n u a r y 2 0 1 2 5
from both sides brought the situation under control.8
From the British annexation of
the Punjab in 1849 to the formation of N-WFP as a separate province in 1901, the
British Indian government undertook more than sixty expeditions in the tribal areas
to enforce its authority in the region.9
A popular notion about the 1897 rising is that
it was a religious struggle led by clergy who regarded the British rule as a root cause
to all evils and who were vigilant since the British entry into the region. Annoyed at
the British penetration into the Frontier region, the demarcation of the Durand Line,
the creation of the various political agencies, and British occupation of the Malakand
and the annexation of Chitral, the indignant tribesmen decided to wage Jihad, a holy
war against the infidels.10
Fatwas (religious decrees) were issued to kill a white man
and ‗secure certain entry into Paradise‘.11
It started in June 1897 in Tochi Valley
(Waziristan) and spread to other tribal areas including Kurram, Orakzai, Khyber,
Mohmand and Malakand. As mentioned earlier, with great difficulty the revolt was
suppressed and by spring 1898 order was restored.12
However, some scholars recently re-interpreted the whole account as not
simply ‗tribal fanaticism‘ or ‗proto-national‘ consciousness but linked it with lineage
relations, religious beliefs, economic and social status which according to Robert
Nichols ‗influenced the nature of individual and clan mobilization at the outbreak of
resistance and the degree of accommodation and compromise that quickly followed
during the repression of the revolt‘.13
The nature of the Frontier rising, its rapid
spread, engulfing the whole tribal areas and population, and the expenses which the
government had to bore, convinced the colonialists that the whole Frontier policy
needs re-evaluation.
The Punjab administration was probably over stretched because of the vast
area of the province and was unable to give proper attention and the area remained
considerably neglected for decades. Lord Curzon, on his assumption the office as the
new Viceroy of India in January 1899, found many anomalies in the Punjab‘s
Government‘s dealing with the Frontier areas. He decided to follow his own way and
despite the strong opposition of Mackworth Young, the Lieutenant – Governor of the
Punjab, announced the formation of a new province on 9th
November 1901.14
The
new province had five settled districts of Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera
8
Baha, N-WFP Administration under British Rule, pp. 4-8.
9
H. C. Wylly, Tribes of Central Asia From the Black Mountain to Waziristan, (Karachi,
Royal Book Company, 2006), pp. 485-488.
10
Olaf Caroe, The Pathans 550 B.C.— A.D. 1957 (London, MacMillan & Co. Ltd, 1964),
p.387.
11
W. K. Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan A Study of Political Developments in Central and
Southern Asia (London, Oxford University Press, 1958), p.191. In 1855, Mr. Temple, then
Secretary of the Chief Commissioner Punjab commented that ‗Now these tribes are savages
— noble savages perhaps — and not without tincture of virtue and generosity, but still
absolutely, barbarians nevertheless….They have nominally a religion, but Muhammadanism,
as under-stood by them, is no better, or perhaps is actually worse, than the creeds of the
wildest race on earth. In their eyes the one great commandment is blood for blood, and fire
and sword for all infidels….They are superstitious and priest-ridden. But the priests are as
ignorant as they are bigoted, and use their influence simply for preaching crusades against
un-believers, and inculcate the doctrine of rapine and bloodshed against the defenceless
people of the plain…‘.Wylly, Tribes of Central Asia, pp. 5-6.
12
Caroe, The Pathans, p. 388.
13
Robert Nichols ‗Interpreting the ‗Fanatic‘: Colonial Justice and the 1897 Tribal Revolt in
the North-west Frontier‘ in Charles H. Kennedy, Kathleen Mc Neil, Carl Ernst, David
Gilmartin (eds.), Pakistan at the Millennium (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2003), pp.
271-272.
14
For more details see Baha, N-WFP Administration under British Rule, pp. 12-31.
8. Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah
H E I D E L B E R G P A P E R S I N S O U T H A S I A N A N D C O M P A R A T I V E P O L I T I C S
h t t p : / / h p s a c p . u n i - h d . d e /
W o r k i n g P a p e r N o . 6 4 , J a n u a r y 2 0 1 2 6
Ismail Khan and five agencies of South Waziristan, North Waziristan, Malakand,
Khyber and Kurram. The head of the new province was a Chief Commissioner and
Agent to the Governor-General, directly responsible to the Government of India. In
1932, the N-WFP was given the status of a full fledged Governor‘s province and like
other Governor‘s provinces of British India the Governor replaced the Chief
Commissioner as the executive head of the province. Under the new Constitution i.e.
the Government of India Act, 1935, new reforms were introduced in India and the
executive authority was transferred to the Chief Ministers while the tribal areas
remained under the Governor who was the direct representative of the Viceroy. The
same situation continued and till date the tribal areas are under the Governor and
outside of the jurisdiction of the Chief Minister N-WFP, renamed recently as
Khyber-Pashtoonkhwa.
Since its separation from Punjab, the areas witnessed some major tribal rising
involving a huge concentration of the Indian troops. Only in Waziristan, between the
two world wars, the tribal uprising and its suppression by the British Government
was regarded by Alan Warren as ‗the most important military events took place in
the Indian Empire‘. According to him, for the British Empire ‗inter-war insurgencies
in Ireland, Palestine and Iraq were arguably of greater political significance, but
from the military point of view the fighting in Waziristan was certainly more
critical‘.15
The popular resistance against the Raj in Waziristan was led by Mirza Ali
Khan (1901-1960) popularly known as the Faqir of Ipi16
. He was a Tori Khel Wazir,
a well known figure in Tochi Valley, settled in a small village Ipi, in the present Mir
Ali Tehsil of North Waziristan. He was anti-British and was involved in small scale
agitations against the government since 1919. In 1936, he launched his movement in
an organised manner against the British authorities who were accused of unduly
interfering in their religion Islam and which was intolerable and declared jihad
15
Alan Warren, Waziristan : The Fair of Ipi and the Indian Army The North-West Frontier
Revolt of 1936-37 (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2000), p. XXV
16
Mirza Ali Khan (also Mirzali Khan) was born in 1901 (in 1897 according to some local
sources) in Kurta, a small village in Tochi Valley. He belonged to a religious family of
Bangal Khel clan of the Madda Khel section of Tori Khel Wazir. After his early education in
his hometown, he moved to Idik and then to Bannu to continue his education. In Bannu he
came into contact with anti-British organisations including the Khilafatists and Swarajists. In
1920‘s his family moved from Spalga to Ipi, a small village in Mir Ali. He performed Haj in
1928. Soon he became an influential religious figure in the area and his simple living earned
him the name of Faqir of Ipi. Although he participated in some small scale anti-British
manoeuvres, his name did not appear amongst the prominent anti-British figures. The spring
of 1936 witnessed turmoil in Bannu which soon engulfed the whole region. The conversion
and subsequent marriage of a Hindu girl Ram Kaur in March 1936 with Noor Ali Shah, a
Muslim resident of Jhandi Khel, Bannu sparked off controversies between the two
communities. According to some accounts Ram Kaur fell in love with Noor Ali Shah and of
her free will converted to Islam, renamed as Noor Jehan (alias Islam Bibi) and married Noor
Ali Shah. Her Hindu relatives, including her mother Mensa Devi protested and lodged reports
accusing Noor Ali Shah of her abduction and forcible conversion. They claimed that Ram
Kaur was under age and forced for both conversion and marriage, therefore, should be given
back to her family. The court eventually decided in their favour; the girl was handed over
back to the family who secretly sent her to Hoshiarpur (India). Noor Ali Shah was arrested
and imprisoned. This decision stirred the local Muslim population and they showed their
indignation on both handing over Islam Bibi to her relatives and imprisonment of Noor Ali
Shah. The Faqir of Ipi took this as a God sent opportunity and organised Pashtoon tribesmen
against the British Indian Government. He contacted other prominent tribal elders and
religious figures and started jihad and continued it even after the creation of Pakistan. He
died on 16 April 1960 and was buried at Gorwek, a remote village in North Waziristan where
he spent most of his time waging the holy war against Empire.
9. Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah
H E I D E L B E R G P A P E R S I N S O U T H A S I A N A N D C O M P A R A T I V E P O L I T I C S
h t t p : / / h p s a c p . u n i - h d . d e /
W o r k i n g P a p e r N o . 6 4 , J a n u a r y 2 0 1 2 7
against the British17
and continued it even after the British withdrawal from South
Asia.
Fazli Wahid (1859-1937), popularly known as the Haji Sahib of Turangzai
spearheaded the anti-British campaign in the Mohmand and the adjacent tribal areas
of Pashtoonkhwa.18
He succeeded in establishing contacts with the anti-British
forces outside the Frontier region. During the First World War he mobilised the
Pashtoon against the British Imperialism but did not succeed in waging a full-
fledged jihad against the colonial power. Hence, most of his activities were confined
to the Mohmand area,19
and therefore, did not attract a large number of people.
PAKISTAN AND THE FATA
After the departure of the British from South Asia in 1947, the tribal areas became
part of Pakistan. The Governor-General of Pakistan assumed responsibility of the
tribal areas. However, the administrative structure of the British Government was
retained by the Pakistani establishment. The authorities decided not to alter the status
of the tribal areas, at least for the time being. Therefore, the people of the tribal areas
were left undisturbed, but at the mercy of the tribal leaders. Despite a demand from
some quarters to merge the tribal areas with the main Pashtoon dominated areas of
the province20
, the Pakistan government was reluctant to change its status. They
decided not to coerce the tribesmen to agree to their conditions and the matter was
left unresolved, although they knew that this kind of arrangement is a temporary one.
The only major step was the withdrawal of troops from the advanced positions in the
tribal territory. In November 1947, the tribesmen on their part affirmed their loyalty
and support to Pakistan through open jirgas organised by Sir George Cunningham,
the Governor of the N-WFP. ‗To many‘, according to Akbar S. Ahmed ‗in an
increasingly different post-independence world, the inherited structure appeared
17
Mohammad Nawaz Khan, Firangi Raj aur Ghairatmand Musalman (Urdu) (Gorwek
Markaz, North Waziristan, 2000), pp. 183-190. For more details see Fazlur Rehman, Battal-i-
Hurriyat Faqir of Ipi (Urdu) (Lahore, Institute of Pakistan Studies, 2004)
1818
Fazli Wahid was born in 1859 in Turangzai, Charsadda (Pashtoonkhwa). After his early
education at his native village, he came to Peshawar and continued his education. He became
a disciple of Najamud Din, the Hadda Maulvi, an anti-British figure in Jalalabad,
Afghanistan. After spending some time with his spiritual guide at Hadda, he went to Deoband
(India) and joined a group of anti-British Muslim scholars including Rashid Ahmad Gangohi
and Mohammad Qasim Nanotawi to perform Haj. On his way back home, he launched a
social reform movement. In this connection he travelled far and wide and tried to convince
the people of the importance of the education. His other targets were prevention of lavish
spending on certain social events including marriages, deaths and other functions. He advised
people to follow Sharia and avoid un-Islamic practices. In this connection he established a
Madrassa near Umarzai, followed by other Madaris in the Peshawar Valley. He extended his
social reform movement also to the tribal areas particularly the Mohmand territory. He
started preaching jihad against the British Empire. This earned him the wrath of the
government. The provincial authorities decided to arrest him but he dodged the police and
sneaked into the tribal territory arriving in Buner in July 1915. He could not stay longer at
Buner because the local chiefs were not sympathetic to his cause. He moved to Mohmand
area, permanently settled there, and continued his jihad against the British till his death in
December 1937. Altaf Qadir, Reform and Resistance in Colonial India: A Survey of Haji
Sahib’s Turangzai’s Movement in the North-West Frontier (Saarbrucken (Germany) VDM
Verlag Dr. Muller GmbH & Co. KG, 2010), pp. 64-68.
19
Allah Bakhsh Yusufi, Sarhad aur Jaddo Jehadi Azadi (Urdu), (Karachi, Nafees Academy,
1989), p. 230.
20
Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah, Ethnicity, Islam and Nationalism: Muslim Politics in the North-
West Frontier Province 1937-47, (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 221.
10. Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah
H E I D E L B E R G P A P E R S I N S O U T H A S I A N A N D C O M P A R A T I V E P O L I T I C S
h t t p : / / h p s a c p . u n i - h d . d e /
W o r k i n g P a p e r N o . 6 4 , J a n u a r y 2 0 1 2 8
alien and out of tune with the times‘.21
The Central Government could not remain
indifferent for a long time. Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah visited the N-WFP in April 1948.
On that occasion he also met tribal representatives and Maliks. In his formal address
to the tribal jirga (assembly of elders) at the Government House, Peshawar, he made
it clear that ‗Pakistan has no desire to unduly interfere with your internal freedom.
On the contrary, Pakistan wants to help you and make you, as far as it lies in our
power, self-reliant and self-sufficient and help in your educational, social and
economic uplift, and not be left as you are dependent on annual doles, as has been
the practice hitherto which meant that at the end of the year you were no better off
than beggars asking for allowances, if possible a little more. We want to put you on
your legs as self-respecting citizens who have the opportunities of fully developing
and producing what is best in you and your land‘.22
However, in the same speech
Jinnah ensured them the continuation of the allowances they were getting during the
British rule and said ‗You have also expressed your desire that the benefits, such as
your allowances and khassadari, that you have had in the past and are receiving,
should continue. Neither my Government nor I have any desire to modify the
existing arrangements except in consultation with you so long as you remain loyal
and faithful to Pakistan‘.23
After the death of M. A. Jinnah in September 1948, the successive Pakistani
regimes did not change the policy regarding the tribal areas and the legacy of the
British Raj continued in practice. No fundamental change was seen in the
government policies and the administrative structure and the political hierarchy
remained unabated. The Government of Pakistan preferred to deal with the tribal
leaders through the political agents rather than to contact the tribesmen directly at the
grass-root level and the old system of allowances continued as before.24
The same situation continued for the next decades. The maliks representing
the local population enjoyed their former status and no political, legislative or
electoral reforms were introduced in FATA. The Political Parties Act of 1962 was
denied to FATA simply because the Pakistani establishment did not want to lose
their grip on the maliks who time and again reiterated their firm support and
confidence in Pakistan. By not allowing the political activities in FATA, they were
probably afraid of the popularity of the Pashtoon nationalist parties, accused of being
sympathetic to the Afghan cause in the tribal areas, and which, of course, was seen
as detrimental to the Pakistani interest in the area. The government sources also
confirmed that FATA was lacking far behind in many ways and no substantial
change was seen in the economic or social conditions of the area till 1972 when the
government decided to give special attention to the neglected sectors including the
FATA and the ‗role of public sector has been greatly increased‘. During 1972-80 a
huge amount of money totaling about 1600 million Pakistani Rupees (PKR), i.e. an
average of about 200 million (PKR) per annum was allocated to the development
projects in FATA.25
Although funds had been allocated to the FATA for
developments, they have ‗only covered a fraction of the backlog of the past neglect
21
Akbar S. Ahmed, Resistance and Control in Pakistan (London, Routledge, 1991), p. 35.
22
Jinnah‘s Address to the Tribal Jirga at Government House, Peshawar, April 17, 1948,
Speeches and Statements, p. 238.
23
Ibid, p. 239.
24
Rashid Ahmed Khan ‗FATA After Independence: 1947-2001‘, in Noor ul Haq, Rashid
Ahmed Khan, Maqsudul Hasan Nuri (edt.), Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan
(Islamabad, Islamabad policy Research Institute, 2005), p. 33.
25
Special Development Plan for Tribal Areas of the North-West Frontier Province
(Islamabad, Government of Pakistan Planning Commission, 1982), p. 3.
11. Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah
H E I D E L B E R G P A P E R S I N S O U T H A S I A N A N D C O M P A R A T I V E P O L I T I C S
h t t p : / / h p s a c p . u n i - h d . d e /
W o r k i n g P a p e r N o . 6 4 , J a n u a r y 2 0 1 2 9
both of pre-independence and post-independence periods‘.26
To improve the social
and economic conditions of the FATA it suggested the merger of the tribal areas into
the settled districts of Pashtoonkhwa as, ‗…tribal areas, adjacent to NWFP are in fact
an economic part of that province and are being treated separately only for political
reasons. Therefore, its development will have to be integrated with the development
of North-West Frontier Province‘.27
AFGHAN CRISIS’ REPERCUSSIONS ON FATA
All of the seven political agencies except the Orakzai are contiguous to each other
and borders with Afghanistan along with the Durand Line. The tribesmen belonging
to Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Kurram, North and South Waziristan moved freely
across the border. They have kinship and matrimonial relations with the Pashtoons
living on the Afghan side of the border. Except few check posts manned by the
Pakistan and Afghanistan officials, the crossing of the border at will is an accepted
norm and continued unchecked since the demarcation of the Durand Line in 1893.
The present crisis in Afghanistan started in April 1978 with the overthrow of
Sardar Daud regime and the proclamation of Afghanistan as the Peoples Democratic
Republic of Afghanistan. The new Soviet-sponsored Socialist regime led by Noor
Mohammad Tarakai announced the modernisation programme aimed at bringing
drastic changes in the primitive Afghan society. However, the new regime faced
resistance mainly from the clergy who mobilised the Afghan population against the
Khalq government. A large number of Afghan refugees crossed the Durand Line and
entered Pakistan. They were treated as ‗welcome guests‘ by the military regime in
Pakistan under General Zia ul Haq, who needed some kind of legitimacy for his rule
after the dismissal of Z. A. Bhutto government in July 1977. He decided to get
maximum benefit out of it and started providing organisational training to the
Afghan refugees, termed as the Mujahideen (holy warriors). The USA through the
CIA, and some countries of Western Europe supported the Zia ul Haq regime by
providing generously both money and weapons in huge quantity to help topple the
Soviet-friendly regime in Afghanistan.28
The resistance against the Afghan
government intensified and coupled with some other major issues including the
factional fighting between pro-Moscow Khalq and Parcham, compelled the Soviet
authorities to intervene directly into the Afghan affairs. On 27th
December 1979, the
Soviet army crossed the Oxus and occupied Afghanistan. With the Soviet occupation
of Afghanistan the whole region including the tribal areas of Pakistan underwent
drastic changes.
With Pakistan becoming the front line state, it had to face the results of the
tussle between the Soviet troops and the Afghan mujahideen first. According to
Rashid Ahmad, ‗The tribal areas became the training and staging ground of Afghan
mujahideen, who also used the areas for the purpose of providing medical aid to the
wounded Afghan fighters. Since war of resistance (jihad) was the top priority,
everything was subservient to its objectives. The administration, local services,
including water, pastures, forestry and land were geared towards serving the
26
Ibid. p. 7.
27
Ibid. p. 8.
28
Hussain Haqqani, Pakistan Between Mosque and Military (Washington, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2005), p. 178. Further details can be seen in the same
source in a chapter entitled ‗Afghan Jihad‘, pp. 159-197.
12. Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah
H E I D E L B E R G P A P E R S I N S O U T H A S I A N A N D C O M P A R A T I V E P O L I T I C S
h t t p : / / h p s a c p . u n i - h d . d e /
W o r k i n g P a p e r N o . 6 4 , J a n u a r y 2 0 1 2 10
objectives of jihad‘.29
The presence of millions of Afghan refugees put a great
pressure on the resources of the tribal areas. It had adversely affected the
environment and resulted in deforestation at many places. He further says that ‗Since
the whole area had become a war zone and Pakistan had opened its borders to allow
Afghan refugees to enter the country and take refuge in Pakistan from the Afghan
side. Similarly, the mujahideen groups would cross the Pak-afghan border at will.
The Durand Line had practically ceased to exist with the free movement of people,
fighters, arms and ammunition across the international border between Pakistan and
Afghanistan. The whole area became heavily armed with heavy weapons supplied by
the United States to the Afghan mujahideen to fight against the Soviet troops. Under
the impact of the ongoing jihad, the local administration, which already exercised
nominal control over the tribal population, was rendered totally ineffective‘.30
After the Russian withdrawal from Afghanistan, the USA and the West lost
their interest in the region. The mercenaries and professionals brought and collected
against the Soviet troops, were abandoned and left in the region, only to pose a
serious threat. The unchecked movement across the Durand Line continued unabated
providing a golden opportunity to the then Afghan rulers to establish more contacts
with the tribesmen on the Pakistani side of the Frontier. During the Taliban regime,
many Pashtoon tribesmen joined the Taliban army to fight with their political
opponents. The Arabs and Egyptians were seen as the back bone of the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan. The Saudi billionaire Osama bin Laden and his associates
became the major financiers of the Taliban government in Afghanistan.
THE POST-9/11 DEVELOPMENTS AND FATA
The unfortunate happenings of 9/11 in the USA, the ouster of the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan and the presence of more than one hundred thousand American and
NATO troops in Afghanistan had a negative impact upon FATA. After the American
invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, many al Qaida leaders, the Taliban and their
supporters which included Saudis, Egyptians, Yemenis, Uzbeks, Chechens and other
militants sneaked into the tribal areas of Pakistan. They found the inaccessible
mountain area as the safe-havens for their future pursuits. Most of them could not
return to their countries of origin because of their ‗unwanted‘ activities, they
considered this area as their last abode.
Pakistan‘s military dictator President Pervez Musharraf decided for
collaboration in the war against terrorism and declared his country‘s support to the
US and its Allies. However, despite deployment of more than a hundred thousand
Pakistani troops in the tribal areas and sharing intelligence on the capture and killing
of al Qaida leaders,31
still a trust deficit can be seen on both sides.
The Pakistan army launched its fist military operation in the tribal areas on
27th
June 2002 and since then is fully involved in its fight against the terrorists. It
used gunship helicopters, heavy artillery and even air force help was sought at
occasions to bomb the militant‘s hideouts. The US is relying heavily upon its drone
29
Rashid, Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, p. 41.
30
Ibid. p. 42.
31
The killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad by US Special Forces on 2 May 2011
sparked off many speculations regarding the US-Pakistan relations. While both can see each
other as indispensible for bringing peace and normalcy in the region and also for routing out
terrorism, some quarters in the US are blaming Pakistan for its covert support for the Taliban,
particularly of Haqqani network, who are attacking the US and NATO forces in Afghanistan.
13. Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah
H E I D E L B E R G P A P E R S I N S O U T H A S I A N A N D C O M P A R A T I V E P O L I T I C S
h t t p : / / h p s a c p . u n i - h d . d e /
W o r k i n g P a p e r N o . 6 4 , J a n u a r y 2 0 1 2 11
technology, introduced recently to target the high-valued militants. In March 2011,
the military authorities stated that most of the people killed in the drone attacks ‗are
hard core elements, a sizeable number of them foreigners‘. They gave the number of
predator strikes as 164 between the years 2007 and 2011 killing more than a
thousand people. According to their estimate, of those killed 793 were locals and 171
foreigners including Arabs, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Chechens, Filipinos and Moroceans‘.32
The prominent al Qaida leaders and its sympathisers killed in the drone attacks
included Baitullah Mahsud (Chief of the Tehrik Taliban Pakistan), Tahir Yuldashev
(Leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan), Abu Zubaydah, Abu Hamza
Rabia, Haitham al-Yemeni and Abu Mustafa Yazid.33
EXTENSION OF POLITICAL PARTIES ORDER TO FATA AND ITS
IMPACT
To curb the rising tide of militancy in the region, the Government of Pakistan
allocated huge funds for various developmental projects in the FATA but is still
facing problems because of the presence of a large number of militants including
hard core al Qaida and its sympathisers in the area which is hindering all such
efforts. Although the US and some Western European countries also announced aid
packages to provide relief to the tribesmen including a US pledge to provide 750
million US dollars to develop the infrastructure and human resources in the FATA to
combat militancy,34
but unless there is peace and tranquillity in the FATA, these
announcements are simply a futile exercise. The Pakistani authorities are cognizant
of the fact that unless major changes are introduced in the FATA, flushing out the
militancy from the area seems nearly impossible. In this connection, some drastic
measures have been introduced recently by the present Pakistan government as they
are optimistic of its success in the tribal areas.
As mentioned earlier, politics of any kind was not permissible in the FATA
and the tribal areas were governed through special regulations.35
The Pakistan
government continued the same practice for decades and recently introduced some
major changes involving the whole tribal population. It generated mixed feelings
among the tribesmen. One such major step is the extension of the Political Parties
32
Briefing of Maj-General Ghayur Mehmood, General Officer Commanding 7 Division at
Miranshah, Dawn, Islamabad, 9 March 2011.
33
The News, Islamabad, 25 October 2010.
34
Naveed Ahmed, Understanding FATA: Attitudes Towards Governance, Religion & Society
in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (np, Appraisal & Motivation Programme,
2008), p.19
35
One such regulation made mainly to deal with the judicial issues was the Frontier Crimes
Regulations (FCR) also termed as a ‗Black Law‘ and ‗Draconian Piece of Legislation‘. It was
enacted in 1872 by the Punjab government and was later on revised slightly in 1887 and
1901. The FCR empowered the authorities to refer both the criminal and civil cases to the
Jirga. The Jirga has been always seen as a institution having the authority of settling disputes
and dispensing justice. The number of Jirga members was not fixed and it varied from case to
case. However, the members were usually to be nominated by the Deputy Commissioners or
the Political Agents. Sections 21 and 40 of the FCR became notorious and much dreaded and
the most misused sections of the FCR because they provided for the blockade of hostile tribes
and also for the punishment of the whole tribe for a crime committed by a member of that
tribe, of course, giving no right to appeal. In a civilised society there is no room for such laws
which provide for detention of an innocent person for the wrong doings of his family
members. The successive Pakistani regimes retained it as the best tool to control and regulate
the tribal affairs. Although the Pakistani authorities have recently assured the tribesmen that
soon they will get rid of the oppressive laws the tribesmen in the FATA, they are still
governed by the FCR which has been denounced by majority in Pakistan considering it as a
bitter legacy of the colonialism.
14. Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah
H E I D E L B E R G P A P E R S I N S O U T H A S I A N A N D C O M P A R A T I V E P O L I T I C S
h t t p : / / h p s a c p . u n i - h d . d e /
W o r k i n g P a p e r N o . 6 4 , J a n u a r y 2 0 1 2 12
Order to the FATA. As argued, the tribal areas are designated as special areas and
are considered as the direct responsibility of the President of Pakistan who in his turn
delegated his authority to the Governor. The Constitution of Pakistan authorises the
President to extend the executive authority of the Federation to the tribal areas. He
can modify and implement laws in the FATA for the sake of peace and good
governance.36
With few modifications the 1956, 1962 and 1973 Constitutions of
Pakistan retained the same. To run the affairs smoothly a federal ministry called
Ministry of State and Frontier Regions (SAFRON) has been formed, which is
answerable principally to the elected representatives of the nation including the
Prime Minister and the Parliament but is ‗virtually irrelevant in policy
implementation or execution in the FATA and acts mainly as a conduit for routing
federal funds‘.37
The real authority rests with the President, and the Governor
Pashtoonkhwa exercises it on the behalf of the President.
The adult franchise granted to other parts of Pakistan since its independence in
1947 was not extended to the FATA obviously for political reasons. Ironically, for
fifty years they were kept away from constitutional packages introduced in other
parts of Pakistan. However, in late 1996 the Government of Pakistan decided to
extend the adult franchise to FATA. Till then the system of limited franchise was en
vogue in the FATA and only the selected notables and maliks enjoyed the right to
vote and common man in the tribal areas had no right of franchise. The elections of
1997 were the first of its kind held in the FATA on the basis of adult franchise
electing 12 members to the National Assembly of Pakistan. ‗The extension of adult
franchise in FATA was a long-standing demand of the people of the Tribal Areas‘,
commented Rashid. ‗But the successive governments of Pakistan had been
postponing this decision due to their policy of appeasement towards the tribal chiefs
(Maliks), who feared the loss of their entrenched privileged positions in the areas in
case method of direct elections was introduced‘. He further stated that ‗No wonder
the decision was hailed as an event of great historic importance, which changed the
entire socio-political structure of tribal society‘.38
As FATA was a federal subject, it
has not been given any representation in the provincial legislature. Despite the
opposition of the maliks and other allowance holders, the tribesmen demanded that
since FATA is part of Pakistan why not to consider them as a part in real senses and
extend all those facilities and rights to FATA which other citizens of Pakistan enjoy
also.
On 14th
August 2009, President Asif Ali Zardari announced the long-awaited
political, judicial and administrative reforms for the FATA by allowing political
activities in the tribal areas.39
He stated that ‗As we celebrate we should also pause
and reflect whether and where we are going. Unfortunately, over the years as
democracy was trampled, an extremist mindset was allowed to grow. I don‘t want to
go into who nurtured the militants and how they were aided. It is all too well
known‘. He also elaborated on how the militants were posing a direct threat to
Pakistan because they want to smash the whole fabric of the society. ‗They want to
impose their political and ideological agenda on the people of Pakistan through force
and coercion. They reject the state, the Constitution, democracy and, indeed, our way
of life‘. He appealed the nation to help the government in crushing the militancy for
the sake of the country, democracy, institutions and way of life.40
Farhatullah Babar,
36
Safdar Mahmood, Constitutional Foundations of Pakistan (Lahore, Jang Publications,
1990), p. 841; Teepu Mahabat Khan, The Tribal Areas of Pakistan, pp. 96-97.
37
Naveed Shinwari, Understanding FATA, p. 57.
38
Rashid Ahmed, Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, p. 44.
39
Syed Irfan Zia ‗Far-reaching FATA reforms unveiled‘, Dawn, Islamabad, 14 August 2009.
40
Ibid.
15. Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah
H E I D E L B E R G P A P E R S I N S O U T H A S I A N A N D C O M P A R A T I V E P O L I T I C S
h t t p : / / h p s a c p . u n i - h d . d e /
W o r k i n g P a p e r N o . 6 4 , J a n u a r y 2 0 1 2 13
the presidential spokesman, regarded this as a gift to the Pakistani nation on its 62nd
Independence Day and stated that the powers of arbitrary arrest and detention
without following the legal procedure have been prohibited. He particularly
mentioned the draconian law FCR ‗under which there was no provision of appeal,
wakeel or daleel (lawyer or reasoning) against the orders of the executive‘ and which
was amended keeping in view the aspirations of the majority people of FATA.41
In
the reform package, announced by the President, the political parties order of 2002
was extended to the FATA and changes to the notorious FCR were introduced.
Under the new package of the tribesmen under trial were now given a right to appeal
and women and children under 16 were excluded from the territorial responsibility
clause of the FCR. Another major break up was bringing the hitherto unchecked
accounts of the political agents for audit to be conducted by the auditor general.
Hailing the extension of PPO 2002 to the FATA and by making major
changes in the FCR, Rashid Ahmed opined that the reforms announced by the
Pakistani president ‗would go a long way in fulfilling the aspirations of the people of
the tribal areas for emancipation and usher in a new era of political and social
development‘. According to him ‗it will further marginalise the militants, who have
already been badly mauled by the military operations in Swat and other districts of
Malakand Division. The reforms would weaken the sway held by the militants over
the tribal areas through a reign of terror and intimidation. The reforms offer a
historic opportunity to the tribal people to become the masters of their own fate
instead of resigning it to the wills and whims of the militants as the case is today‘.42
Civil Society organisations and NGO‘s also supported the government move. The
National Democratic Institute, with Sandra Houston as the country head for Pakistan,
appreciated the announcement and volunteered their services in facilitating the
government for strengthening the democratic institutions in the country.43
Through
group discussions and party meetings the NDI succeeded in developing a consensus
amongst the various groups and political parties including ANP, PPP, PML-N, PML-
Q, JI, JUI-F, PPP-S, PMAP, NP and MQM to one agenda i.e. full support for the
special economic package for the FATA to remove its backwardness and to bring it
at par with other developed areas of Pakistan.44
However, to the utter chagrin of many, despite developing consensus among
the major political parties and some other stake-holders in the FATA, the matter was
delayed for unknown reasons. The tribesmen expressed their abhorrence over the
delay and blamed some45
circles in the government of Pakistan for the lethargic
attitude towards a very important issue. They were convinced that allowing political
parties to extend their organisations in the region ‗will provide the masses
alternatives to the dominance of mullahs, who in the absence of political
representation and leadership control the population through mosque and pulpit. It
would also allow the region to develop a new generation of political leaders and
reduce the impact of the hereditary tribal elders who currently dominate politics in
the FATA‘. They were perturbed that despite a popular desire in the FATA to
integrate the tribal areas fully in Pakistan, the government was putting the matter in
the cold storage and not fulfilling its promises. They lamented that the ‗issue was
again buried beneath judicial, political, economic, energy and security crises jolting
Islamabad, and the government chose inaction over embarking upon drastic changes
41
Dawn, Islamabad, 14 August 2009.
42
Rashid Ahmed Khan, ‗Reforms in FATA‘, The Nation, Lahore, 25 August 2009.
43
Dawn, Islamabad, 21 October 2009.
44
Dawn, Islamabad, 29 March 2011.
45
The tribesmen accused the ‗elements within security establishment‘ for this stalemate.
Dawn, Islamabad, 9 August 2011.
16. Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah
H E I D E L B E R G P A P E R S I N S O U T H A S I A N A N D C O M P A R A T I V E P O L I T I C S
h t t p : / / h p s a c p . u n i - h d . d e /
W o r k i n g P a p e r N o . 6 4 , J a n u a r y 2 0 1 2 14
in the governance of the tribal regions‘. They also complained that ‗though the
package offered a ray of hope for tribesmen mired in conflict and poverty, the
government has not so far hinted at actual implementation, much to the chagrin of
many tribesmen‘.46
Eventually, on 12th
August 2011, in the presence of FATA Parliamentarians,
President Zardari signed two important regulations namely the Extension of the
Political parties Order 2000 to the Tribal Areas and Amendments in the FCR called
the Frontier Crimes (Amendments) Regulation, 2011.47
Under the presidential
regulations the political parties are allowed to operate fully and present their party
manifestos carrying their socio-economic programmes in the tribal areas. The ‗black
law‘ of the colonial era has been amended drastically for the benefit of the general
population of the FATA. In extending the PPO to the FATA, the government
believed that they would counter the rising tide of the militancy and the ‗pernicious
one-sided campaign of militants to impose their ideological agenda on the people‘.48
Noorul Haq Qadri, a FATA parliamentarian from the Khyber Agency, also shared
the same opinion. Commenting on the implementation of the new FATA regulations
he said that the ‗historic decision will also help in containing growing trend of
militancy in the region‘ and would also provide a platform to the educated tribal
youth to participate in the positive political activities.49
According to some political
observers this will also help the political parties to field their own candidates in the
next general elections in Pakistan due in 2013. Moreover, it will help in getting rid of
the many corrupt practices en vogue in the FATA including the horse trading,
synonymous to the FATA parliamentarians. The Governor Pashtoonkhwa also
regarded the FATA reforms as a major positive step in bringing the turbulent tribal
area into the main stream of Pakistan national politics. ‗To the outside world the
FATA is a centre of gravity of militancy‘, he stated, ‗but by implementing the
reforms we will convert the tribal areas into a heavens of peace and prosperity‘, he
remarked.50
The majority of people in Pakistan are optimistic that the new laws
would eliminate terrorism from the tribal areas and are hopeful that by the extension
of the new regulations the FATA would usher in a new era of development and
progress. The tribesmen will be sharing more responsibility and confidence in the
political system of the country, thus help strengthen the ongoing struggle for keeping
democratic institutions and system in high esteem.
CONCLUSION
Hidden away in lofty mountains and inhospitable and inaccessible valleys, the tribal
areas of Pakistan came to the lime light recently. In the aftermath of the American
invasion of Afghanistan, the rising tide of the militancy, the presence of a big
number of al Qaida, Taliban and their supporters in the area, the deployment of more
than one hundred thousand Pakistani troops in tribal territory and use of the latest
technology like the drone attacks on the insurgents are some of the causes of the
attraction of the world attention towards FATA. The area has been virtually turned
into a battle ground in the war upon terrorism and more recently it has become the
main topic of discussion in the daily changing Pakistan-US relations.
46
Manzoor Ali, ‗Forgetting FATA reform‘, Foreign Policy, Washington, 9 June 2011.
47
‗Major Changes made in FCR: FATA People get political rights‘, Dawn, Islamabad, 13
August 2011 and The News International, Islamabad, 13 August 2011.
48
Dawn, Islamabad, 13 August 2011.
49
Dawn, Islamabad, 6 September 2011.
50
Dawn, Islamabad, 1 October 2011.
17. Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah
H E I D E L B E R G P A P E R S I N S O U T H A S I A N A N D C O M P A R A T I V E P O L I T I C S
h t t p : / / h p s a c p . u n i - h d . d e /
W o r k i n g P a p e r N o . 6 4 , J a n u a r y 2 0 1 2 15
In the Colonialist‘s discourse, this area, termed as ‗Yaghistan’ (no man land),
‗Ilaqa Ghair’ (the area under no law), and ‗Qabaili Ilaqa’ (tribal territory), was kept
as a buffer zone between Afghanistan and the settled areas of British India. To
ensure the security of its outposts and also to protect its citizens from the tribal
incursions, the British Indian government adopted various steps towards the
Pashtoon tribesmen. However, to keep the tribes under control and also to guard the
frontiers of British India, punitive expeditions were despatched against the
recalcitrant tribes and military posts were made deep inside the tribal territory. The
tribes resisted the raj and opposed the British presence in the area with full vigour
and all available means. From the British occupation of the Punjab in 1849 till the
partition of India in 1947, more than eighty major expeditions were undertaken to
subdue the Frontier tribes but with little success. The British Indian government
faced formidable resistance in the tribal areas and the locals expressed their weird
stubbornness during all this time.
Pakistan got control of the tribal areas as a successive state after the British
withdrawal from South Asia. Due to its strategic importance and probably for the
smooth running of the lose administration in the area, the Pakistan government
retained the old Maliki system in FATA. The reforms introduced in other parts of the
country, including the Political Parties Act of 1962 (reformulated in 2002 as Political
Parties Order), were denied to the tribal areas of Pakistan for obvious reasons. But
the crisis in Afghanistan changed the whole scenario and the area underwent drastic
changes. The long porous Pak-Afghan border provided an opportunity to the
Afghans in large numbers to cross it at their own will. Through the connivance of the
CIA and the Pakistani establishment, they were trained, organised and sent back to
Afghanistan to topple the Afghan regime. This involved the local tribesmen in the
proxy war and the Afghan affairs to the extent that presently both Pakistan and
Afghan governments failed to convince them to stop their support to jihadis against
the established authorities. Since there was no effective control from either side,
after the heavy bombing of Tora Bora in the winter of 2001-2002, many Taliban and
al Qaida operators crossed the Pak-Afghan border and entered the tribal areas. These
‗unwelcome‘ guests high-jacked the traditional tribal society and introduced a jihadi
mindset in the region. The influential and prominent Pashtoon tribal elders, who
were opposed to the outside interference and the presence of militants in the region,
were killed mysteriously. The whole fabric of the Pashtoon society was disturbed.
The al Qaida took advantage of the prevalent chaos and recruited a large number of
unemployed tribesmen for its future operations. The newly-recruited trained
mercenaries cross the Pak-Afghan border without any hindrance, attack the US and
NATO troops stationed in Afghanistan and are inflicting heavy losses upon them.
The cross-border infiltration continues unabated and resulted in soaring relations
between Pakistan and the USA. The US authorities, although acknowledging in the
same breath the sacrifices rendered by Pakistanis as more than the US itself in the
war upon terror, are demanding to prevent attacks against the US and its Allies in
Afghanistan. The US officials accused the intelligence agencies of Pakistan of
providing the covert support to the insurgents, particularly the Haqqanis. In a recent
statement, released by the State Department, Secretary Hillary Clinton
acknowledged the sacrifices of the Pakistani people in these words: ‗And I think it is
important to remind ourselves that Pakistanis have paid a much greater price in the
war against terrorism and in the violence perpetrated on them over the last 10 years
than, thankfully we have‘, she noted. ‗Nearly 30,000 people have been killed —
civilians and military, scores of bombing attacks all over the country in places from
mosques to markets to universities to police stations‘. While elaborating on the issue
of the alleged covert Pakistani support to the Haqqanis she stated that ‗If you go on
You Tube, you can see Sirajuddin Haqqani with President Reagan at the White
House‘, because the US through the CIA was then providing full support to the
18. Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah
H E I D E L B E R G P A P E R S I N S O U T H A S I A N A N D C O M P A R A T I V E P O L I T I C S
h t t p : / / h p s a c p . u n i - h d . d e /
W o r k i n g P a p e r N o . 6 4 , J a n u a r y 2 0 1 2 16
Afghan jihadis against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. ‗So when I meet for many
hours, as I do, with Pakistani officials, they rightly say ―You‘re the ones who told us
to cooperate with these people. You‘re the ones who funded them. You‘re the ones
who equipped them. You‘re the ones who used to bring down the Soviet Union by
driving them out of Afghanistan. And we are now both in a situation that is highly
complex and difficult to extricate ourselves from‖. That is how they see it‘.51
The
Pakistanis, however, blame the US and are complaining that ‗whenever the US
wants Pakistan to extend war on terror, it makes promises and then forgets after the
objective is achieved‘.52
The US authorities, though, firmly believe that the Haqqanis
have their safe ‗havens‘ in Pakistan and are using these hideouts for attacking US,
NATO and the Afghan troops inside Afghanistan but are convinced that ‗there is no
solution in the region without Pakistan and no stable future in the region without
partnership‘. She emphasized the need that US should enter into negotiations with
the Haqqanis but at the same time should continue to work with Pakistan to destroy
the shelters and safe houses of the Haqqanis in the FATA.53
The extension of the PPO (2002) to the tribal areas and the major
changes/amendments in the centuries old oppressive law, the FCR, are positive steps
in the right direction. However, still there are some other basic issues which need to
be tackled very carefully. To curtail the influence of the al Qaida and the like-
minded, it is imperative to revamp the whole infrastructure of the tribal society. The
first priority should be given to imparting free education, followed by major reforms
in health, developments in the field of agriculture, revival of the industries and
improvement in the communication system of the whole tribal region. Although the
extension of the new regulations is a major breakthrough in the centuries old rotten
tribal system, still it needs more developmental packages. In addition, by imparting
technical and vocational training to the unemployed youth would enable the
Pakistani authorities to grab them back from the militant. Since they have no
resources for subsistence in the area, the tribesmen are always dependent upon the
outside world.54
If the government provides job opportunities in their own areas, they
definitely will not be attracted by the al Qaida and the Taliban and would become
law abiding citizens of the country.
The recent increase in the death of many innocent tribesmen in the drone
attacks increased the anti-American feelings in the area to many folds. The drone
strategy should be revised henceforth with and steps should be taken to deal with the
targets more precisely to avoid further civilian losses and not risking the lives of
many innocent tribesmen furthermore. The blame game between Afghanistan and
Pakistan should be immediately stopped because this is benefitting the militants
enormously. In order to flush out the militants from the tribal areas of Pakistan,
modern techniques of surveillance should be adopted and distinction should be made
between the locals and the foreigners. The authorities on both sides of the Durand
Line should work upon a joint plan to negotiate with the local militants and try to
convince them to renounce militancy and severe their links with the international
terrorists. Once they surrender to the local authorities, they should be integrated in
the newly political system and this would certainly improve the situation and will
bring peace, stability and rule of law to the tribal areas of Pakistan and help them
fully to participate in the future electoral politics of the country ensuring the
strengthening of the democratic institutions in Pakistan.
51
Dawn, Islamabad, 3 October 2011.
52
Mohamamd Jamil, ‗Political reforms in FATA‘, The Frontier Post, Peshawar, 2 May 2011.
53
Dawn, Islamabad, 28 October 2011.
54
Hugh Beattie, Imperial Frontier Tribes and State in Waziristan (Surrey, Curzon Press,
2002), p. 4.
19. Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah
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