MatchMove Business Model EvolutionIt was January 2014, and Shai

MatchMove: Business Model Evolution
It was January 2014, and Shailash Naik, CEO of MatchMove
Global Pte Ltd was rather pleased to have closed 2013 with yet
another feather in the cap for his company. MatchMove, an
online entertainment service provider, had just been ranked 25th
out of the 500 fastest-growing technology companies in the
2013 Deloitte Technology Fast 500 Asia Pacific rankings, a
yearly publication that was well regarded in the technology and
gaming industry.
When MatchMove was founded in early 2009, Naik and his
COO, Leow Hsueh Huah (HH), had been in a rush to carry out
their vision for the company. From their time working with a
videogame company in the US, they had talked to various
companies with large Internet audiences, and had identified a
gap in the Asian market for a company-specific platform that
incorporated casual gaming, social networking and e-commerce
capabilities. MatchMove wanted to be this platform. Finally, in
late 2009, MatchMove signed up its first large client, global
technology company Yahoo!, to provide such services for
Yahoo! Southeast Asia. This early deal enabled MatchMove to
build a depth of capability on its cloud-based platform. The
company also contracted with game developers to create its own
store of quality games that it could offer to its clients.
In essence, MatchMove was set up to provide a service as a B2B
game/entertainment platform. Its key value proposition was to
become an intermediary, and more, between game companies
with “high (gaming) content” profiles, but which traditionally
had low web traffic. In addition, it was targeting companies like
Yahoo! and Microsoft that had large consumer portals and high
traffic–but were perhaps lacking in certain types of content, and
hence losing users to websites like Facebook and iTunes which
served as communities of social networks and also possessed
platforms for gaming. By having a large or dedicated social
networking community and strong content profile, these

companies could keep users on their websites for longer, which
translated into greater revenue generation. Aside from creating
a closed e-commerce system to accept payments for services on
its clients’ websites, MatchMove envisioned creating an open
payments portal for all users for multiple merchants. It just did
not have a concrete idea of what that strategy would look like
yet.
By 2012, MatchMove had revamped its back-end system to meet
the demands of a growing number of clients. The company had
also ventured into various other opportunities, such as
gamification, which were related to its core business. However,
Naik wanted to accomplish even more. He was eager to create
the next technological disruption to existing commerce, finance
and other sectors, and capture new opportunities coming up in
the market. Naik’s mantra was to “fail fast”, and to take risks.
He saw far greater potential in the product that was beyond its
initial value proposition, and just needed to decide where to
take it from its current position, and what business model would
best accomplish those goals.
Changes in the Gaming Industry
In 2012, the global video games market, worth US$66.3 billion,
was estimated to grow at a compound annual growth rate of
6.7% to reach US$86.1 billion in 2016 (refer to Exhibit 1 for
the Video Game Market Revenues Worldwide, by Segment,
2012–2016).1 Although the segment that dominated this
category was traditional video console gaming, the share of this
type of gaming was falling, with social games and
smartphone/tablet games on the ascent.2 This represented a
significant technological disruption that conventional publishers
and studios were unprepared for, and unskilled to handle.
Coupled with this trend was the falling cost of mobile and
social game development, which opened the door to many new
and often inexperienced, but creative, developers. This lowered
the risk of developing new games, and enabled faster game
distribution through established social networking channels—
thus leading to expedited profits and attracting more attention

from investors into the industry.3
This case was written by Professor Ted Tschang and Adina
Wong at the Singapore Management University. The case was
prepared solely to provide material for class discussion. The
authors do not intend to illustrate either effective or ineffec tive
handling of a managerial situation. The authors may have
disguised certain names and other identifying information to
protect confidentiality.
Copyright © 2016, Singapore Management University
Exhibit 1 The Video Game Market Revenues Worldwide, by
Segment
Social and casual gaming was a big part of the trend. In a report
on online social gaming by Datamonitor, digital online games
were defined as those that “utilizes a player’s social graph to
provide an enhanced game experience, facilitates and
encourages communication about the game outside of the game,
and has a minimal barrier to entry (one click away).”4
The rising popularity of social-networking sites such as
Facebook (as well as online casual game websites like Popcap)
had established the foundation for consumers to experience and
consume this new genre of games, and to have new, more social,
gaming experiences, thereby illustrating the increased
importance of social games.
Besides, social games, other than being a new revenue stream
for social-networking sites (in addition to advertising), also
attracted users to register and to remain on social-networking
sites for a longer period of time.5 Well-known social media
games included Farmville (developed by Zynga) on Facebook,
and Angry Birds on the iPhone smartphone.6 Social games
typically earned revenues through a ‘freemium’ model, where
players were given free access to the basic features of a game,
but had to pay to access more features and higher levels in the
game.7 Unlike the players of traditional console games—who
were typically younger males with dedicated leisure time to

play a game—players of the more casual social games had a
different profile, being mostly older, and female.8
Gaming in Asia
In the beginning of 2013, Asia was the region with the largest
number of video gamers online at 477 million (39%), and also
the largest revenue share globally at US$25.1 billion
(36%).9 PriceWaterhouseCoopers’s 2011 Global Entertainment
and Media Outlook 2010–2014 recognised that although earlier
low-tech phones had prevented the ‘monetisation’ of social
media games, this would now change with the introduction of
3G wireless mobile infrastructure and widespread uptake of
smart-phones in the region,
The growth of smartphones is driving social gaming in Asia.
Mobile now provides an environment that allows games to be
developed to the standard of regular console and online games,
and this has already led to an explosion in casual gaming. [In
2011], the region is already home to more wireless phone
subscribers than the rest of the world combined, and currently
accounts for 63 per cent of global wireless gaming spend.10
However, the report also recognised challenges to the online
gaming business in the region,
The partnership between game developers, platform owners, and
brands is important, and ideally should be a natural process by
now. However, in the real world this is not happening as there
are constraints and limitations to how branded content can be
integrated into the production of games. Each Asian market,
from Japan to China, from Korea to the Philippines, has a lively
social gaming scene, but with specific characteristics and
different tastes that need to be catered to.11
Gestating an Idea
Cryptologic
It was in this environment that Naik made his foray into the
Asian online gaming industry and built up his company to
capitalise on what he saw was a huge but untapped market
potential. Naik had begun his career in technology, working as a
project manager to deliver Oracle and SAP technology solutions

to multinational companies that were clients of
PricewaterhouseCoopers and Ernst & Young consulting
services. From there, he started to understand business needs
from a technology perspective, and how business worked at the
back-end to drive frontend processes. His next move was in a
strategy and operations role as Managing Director, Strategy and
Operations, Asia Pacific for Cisco Systems, a US-based
multinational technology firm.
In 2007, a US-based, NASDAQ-listed gaming company,
Cryptologic, had approached Naik to be their CEO. Cryptologic
was trying to move into this new “space” even as they
maintained an existing organisational structure and business
model—one that was based on publishing games and built up
through acquisitions of studios. Cryptologic’s plan was to be a
business-to-consumer (B2C) company for online gamers,
providing a platform for users to play game content that it
owned exclusively. In this role, Naik went around Asia
acquiring gaming studios and platforms to build up
Cryptologic’s proprietary online gaming platform. He acquired
five studios for the company and started to understand the
online gaming business in more depth. He understood that the
challenge facing game developers was ‘high content, low
traffic’, or being able to attract enough players to play their
games. Typically, a player’s awareness of a game spread via
word-of-mouth, but also through paid marketing campaigns.
From B2C to B2B
In working for Cryptologic, Naik and HH, his CFO at
Cryptologic, became keenly aware of a few converging trends
and started to explore options that could capitalise on these
opportunities, after realising that the Cryptologic organisation
structure (which focused on the end consumer), could not
accommodate their interest in creating a new business model
and value proposition for other businesses as clients.
Naik and his team had conducted business dialogues and carried
out market research for six months. Based on concurrent
conversations with search engine companies, as well as

telecommunications companies that had high user traffic on
their websites, Naik came to an interesting observation,
The problem was that users were now changing their style
[manner of playing games]. Instead of going to a website and
consuming news and games and meeting their friends
individually, they now wanted it all in one space—and were all
converging on spaces like Facebook and so on. Meanwhile, the
big brands and the telcos were saying—hang on, these are our
users, and we’d better offer them something else we’ll lose
them.
At the same time, Naik and HH recognised that there was
another trend in the market. A common practice was for game
developers to launch their games on social networking platforms
such as Facebook, where Facebook would share revenues earned
from game players with the game developer. However, over
time, the margin that Facebook was taking from this revenue
stream became higher and higher, with less revenue coming
back to the game developer. Major game developers such as
Zynga then started to use Facebook more as a source, and not
the ultimate destination for users. Where previously Facebook
would host Zynga’s games, now Facebook users who wanted to
play a Zynga game would be redirected to a Zynga website to
play the game there. This was pushing the game developers to
create their own gaming platforms—but with correspondingly
weaker “traffic” than the larger portals and social media giants.
With this combination of insights, Naik started developing the
concept of a business-to-business (B2B) business model of his
own, to work with large multinationals to help them solve their
problem of ‘high traffic, low content’. He had further
conversations with companies such as Yahoo! and Microsoft,
which were keen to attract more users to their websites and keep
them there for a longer time, earning additional revenues
through casual games and online purchases on their sites.
Naik confessed that he had conceived a grand plan from the
beginning,
These large multinational companies all had the following pain

points—How do I keep users on my website? How do I get
quality content? And how do I do all this without additional
headcount? We discovered this while investing in the smaller
companies and so decided to combine this into a new service
combining the whole package—social gaming, social
networking and e-commerce. We had a core vision about all
three as a package, because we knew that if we didn’t do so, we
wouldn’t be able to get scale. And only once we get scale,
would the business be sustainable. The whole world thought we
were crazy.
Naik also realised that unless they were able to offer all three
arms to a client, it would be easy for a big client to say “I can
do the games, or one of the other pieces, myself.”
Naik and HH then put together a presentation to show their
potential clients how their business model was well thought out
and would address all the pain points. This all-in-one value
proposition approach turned out to be of great value to their
clients—all of whom immediately asked, “how do I sign up?”–
giving Naik and his team the confidence that there was indeed a
market opportunity there.
In 2009, in the midst of the global financial crisis, Naik and HH
left their well-paying jobs with Cryptologic to start a company
of their own.12 They had done all their due diligence, and the
timing was too compelling for this new business model.
MatchMove
MatchMove is to online entertainment and e-commerce what
software providers SAP and Oracle are to enterprise software.
—Shailesh Naik, CEO, MatchMove Pte Ltd 13
In February 2009, MatchMove Pte Ltd was incorporated in
Singapore, with Naik as the CEO, and HH as the COO. “Finding
people to work for us was the hardest in the beginning”, Naik
said. “Not everyone wants to work for start-ups. It was hard to
get Singaporeans to apply for our job openings, so we had to
head-hunt for people in China.”14 Eventually they overcame
this problem and by June 2013, MatchMove had 46 employees
in Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, China and

the US.15
The MatchMove Proposition
MatchMove helps online businesses increase revenue, user
engagement and loyalty through the strategic use of its
sophisticated games, social networking and site gamification
and e-payments platform.
—MatchMove website16
MatchMove would provide an entertainment platform as a
service to clients, and would offer a selection of games and
apps which their clients could host on their own portals for their
own customers. They would become a ‘curator’ of sorts,
choosing and testing the best games from various game
developers, and also providing the technology platform. In
Naik’s words, it would provide “infrastructure for companies
that are keen to offer games on their sites but do not want to do
it on their own”.17 The closed social network platform allowed
users to perform actions such as to click ‘like’ on content and
comment on one another’s activities on the portal. Building its
library of Internet- and subsequently mobile-enabled games,
MatchMove targeted the telecommunications, media and
technology (TMT) segment. Naik said,
We initially targeted the big Western multinationals, knowing
that their management in Asia would probably be frustrated
with the lack of local products, and at the same time see the
opportunity slipping away.
Many of these were Asian offices of US multinationals, which
lacked the resources to customise the US-based content from
their US headquarters in a way that was appealing to Asian
users. Naik was very clear from the beginning on how
MatchMove should position itself,
We don’t acquire [game] content generation [capabilities].
We’ve always invested in distribution and the platform. So we
want to be like a B2B iTunes, where games can come from
anywhere. So it’s this ecosystem where we want to be the
platform, and we will integrate payments with the platform. We
will be the central cog in the wheel that brings everyone

together. We will invest in infrastructure, support, and platform,
because that’s what really captures the value (refer to Exhibit
2 for a concept diagram of MatchMove’s business).
In short, MatchMove aimed to offer content management
(games), transaction management (e-commerce), and the
technology platform as a one-stop package to customers in Asia.
Naik and his team realised that there were fundamental
differences between games in the US and in Asia. For instance,
Western games were heavily invested in character intellectual
property like Batman or Superman, whereas Asian games tended
to be a variation of popular fictional or historical content, like
the ‘Monkey King’ myth or the ‘Three Kingdoms’ novel. Asian
characters, even villains, could look cute. They recognised that
their value proposition had to focus on the Asian games market,
with Asian-made games for the Asian arms of Web portals and
other sites, for their Asian clients. There would of course be
crossover games (games that crossed over cultures) later, but
addressing the regional consumer taste was at the core of their
differentiated offering.
Naik recalled how ground-breaking this business model and its
value proposition was to the industry, or for that matter, in all
the industry verticals that their business model spanned,
In 2009, Digital Capital (a private equity investor in the digital
entertainment space), named MatchMove twice in a report
together with Facebook, Uniclip, Trimedia, and Popcap. This
put us on the global map. People were viewing the industry in
those days as verticals—developers, publishers, portals,
aggregators … We came in saying that we are disrupting the
business model—we are working right across all these verticals
… we’ve got the whole suite.
MatchMove was essentially operating a two-sided market
business model–servicing the game developers on the one hand,
and the portals and other Web companies on the other. Game

developers would benefit by working with MatchMove as they
could gain information on the volume of customers accessing
their games, and MatchMove provided transparency on
payments due to them. MatchMove looked for more and bigger
clients for developers to distribute games to, and sought to
create a two-way cycle where building trust with more of the
popular game developers enabled them to attract larger clients
as well. Whilst Apple’s iTunes store took 30% of margins from
games, MatchMove was willing to take as low as a five percent
margin from game developers that it had an exclusive
relationship with.
The Remaining Pieces of the Puzzle
By September 2009, the private equity market had started
recovering from the post-financial crisis doldrums, and amidst
the flurry of deals being sealed in the industry, MatchMove
managed to raise US$1.6 million (S$2 million)18 of funds from
Singapore-based private equity firm Vickers Venture Partners to
kick-start their first project with Yahoo! Southeast Asia.19 As
of June 2013, the company had managed to raise an additional
US$5.5 million (SGD$7 million) of funding from private equity
firms in the US, Europe and China. Ultimately, MatchMove had
to seek other potential investors and game developers in order
to secure funding. This was a time-consuming back-and-forth
process that required a lot of trust building.
From the start, MatchMove had decided to put its platform
entirely in the ‘Cloud’20. This made it easy for the company to
update all its clients with new software and
services.21 Importantly, the cloud-based platform enabled the
company to perform software updates quickly for overseas
clients, and to serve their gamer customers faster.22 This was
important as many of MatchMove’s potential customers were in
countries outside of Singapore, and games, especially at that
time, required fast server response times.
Getting the First Client
Yahoo!
Yahoo! Asia was using their US offices’ US-designed games,

and “failing miserably here”, said Naik. Based on his
experience with Cryptologic, Naik knew this to be a weak point.
MatchMove specifically targeted Yahoo!-Asia and another IT
giant with a significant consumer portal at the same time, and
eventually partnered with Yahoo! in September 2009.23 In his
earlier meetings with Yahoo! executives, Naik understood that
Yahoo! Asia, being at its core an Internet search portal, had no
resources to curate a stable of Asian-specific games on its
website. Yahoo! had earlier acquired a game company to
develop games exclusively for its website, but their games had
become increasingly obsolete as they could not keep up with
evolving technologies such as Flash, and upcoming content
trends such as social gaming.
Naik gave Yahoo! a proposed solution to their problems.
MatchMove would be responsible for the technology transition
of existing and new games to new technology platforms. It
would also make it possible for Yahoo! to avoid paying the
upfront costs for new game development; instead MatchMove
handled the payments to the game developers on their end. They
achieved this by standardising the terms offered to all game
developers who worked with them. By handling the negotiations
and accounting on behalf of Yahoo! for the hundreds of
different game developers that were on the Yahoo! Platform,
MatchMove acted as a consolidator and complemented Yahoo!
in areas that Yahoo! did not have the bandwidth to accomplish.
In this way, MatchMove could work out a consistent revenue
sharing scheme with game developers and publishers. The deal
made a total of 143 titles available for purchase on Yahoo!’s
online store, making Yahoo! one of the top sites in Southeast
Asia offering the most popular casual game
titles.24 Additionally, a payment gateway provided on the
platform enabled MatchMove’s clients to collect payments from
their end users via payment services such as PayPal, Visa and
MasterCard, and also Mobile payments and pre-paid cards
which were more popular and accessible to young Asians.25
Naik explained how MatchMove tested games for quality,

although ultimately a ‘good’ game was measured by how much
user traffic it could generate,
We have a few people who test the game from end to end,
running through all the episodes. It should not be totally
predictable, and there should be enough of an element of
surprise and engagement to keep you coming back … good
workmanship, design, sound, lots of episodes … The real test
though is when you put it out in the market.
MatchMove’s coverage mirrored Yahoo! Southeast Asia’s
countries of focus—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam— which were amongst the
fastest growing nations in the world in terms of Internet
penetration.26 Yahoo! became an important proof of concept to
build out MatchMove’s sophisticated product architecture. The
‘Yahoo!-grade’ project involved building a multiple-country,
multi-language and even multi-currency platform that included
standards of performance and customer service that made it
easier to acquire a future customer base.
Pricing for MatchMove’s platform was on a subscription basis,
and customers paid between US$7,921 (SGD$10,000) to
US$39,605 (SGD$50,000) per month to use it, saving
themselves millions of dollars in having to build up the
capability on their own.27
Building In Speed and Flexibility
After a few months spent building up its customer base, Naik
decided to be more focused on MatchMove’s strengths, and the
competition never really got a foothold,
We had competitors at two places when we first arrived—
Yahoo! and Starhub were talking to two other companies (one
European and the other a US billion dollar concern)— which did
not offer the whole package. And they said they would offer
this in three months, but we said that we would do it in two
weeks, then two days, then five minutes.
Starhub28told us during final talks why they were choosing us
even though we weren’t established, we weren’t known— we
didn’t even have a company. They said—’you’re offering me

local games … (and) a faster time to market’.
Once we identified those two factors as key selection criteria
for B2B customers, we worked harder and faster on improving
our capabilities in those areas. We had to build the e-commerce
function as a necessary aspect to get the flow of money for their
customers to pay. If you were a customer on Yahoo! Asia,
which was in six countries, you had the option to pay for games
on a local website through a local payment provider.
AppKungfu’s Origins
The realisation that speed and scalability (across clients) were
their competitive advantages eventually led Naik and HH to
revamp MatchMove’s platform.
When we went in to design our overall ecosystem, we made sure
that our deployment got faster and faster. My architects and
product designers were constantly looking to improve our speed
to market … so competitors could never catch up in the key
areas where we believed our clients told us we had a
competitive advantage. So when our competitors needed three
months to deploy a solution, we were able to do it in weeks.
From there, we started to improve the technology to be able to
deploy a large scale solution in just days. Global competitors
from the US and Europe stopped competing with us and pulled
out whenever they heard we were in the running. We had started
to accelerate away from the competition by focusing on our key
differentiators...not as we saw them, but as our clients saw
them.
By late 2010, MatchMove had so much demand for its services
that Naik knew that its platform would not be scalable. For
every project MatchMove took on, they had to have engineers’
onsite at the client’s office to integrate MatchMo ve’s backend
system with the clients—and each integration project took six to
eight weeks. The decision was thus made to revamp
MatchMove’s platform, to make it modular and enable clients to
self-service to set up their websites, which also changed the
range of customers that MatchMove targeted. Naik explained,
Once we saw the emerging pipeline, we thought here was an

opportunity to scale this big time. And so we stepped back to
revamp the whole platform, and renamed it AppKungfu–
offering it to just anyone who wanted it, not just our target
enterprise customers. You could be a young girl in Taiwan who
was selling t-shirts online, and now wanted to add games and
social networking. We already had the core technology, and we
wanted to offer a ‘freemium’ model, so anyone who wanted to
use it at a basic level could do so. In 2010 we started to rewrite,
and in 2011, we had a product that could be used both ‘B2C’
and ‘B2B’.
In the beginning of 2012, MatchMove unveiled AppKungfu,
which was a patent-pending system of application programming
interfaces (API).29 Customers could ‘self-service’ and choose
to enhance their websites with social networking features such
as sharing and achievements tracking.30 As Nate Wang, VP of
Marketing at MatchMove described,
Imagine playing with Lego blocks. You no longer have to take
the entire castle. You can now take the right tower and add it to
your own castle. If that’s not enough, you can break it down
into the individual bricks and customise it any way you like.31
With this new API-based platform, ‘what would normally take
two years [to implement] is often done in less than two
weeks’.32 The result of the AppKungfu platform was that it
enabled standard websites to be converted, sometimes within
mere hours, to a full Internet and mobile experience.33
AppKungfu also incorporated new and powerful features for
MatchMove’s customers. The use of APIs allowed customers to
collected data on users’ activities and preferences on their
websites, so that they could target customers and cross-sell
relevant products with this information.34
In line with the ‘freemium’ business model, MatchMove made
the basic platform free for customers on a self-service basis.
Customers paid a monthly subscription fee for licencing and
value-added services such as single-sign on capability, and
intellectual property rights. Naik described the change that
AppKungfu brought to MatchMove’s way of doing business,

At that point, we were not limited anymore, and could start
targeting geographically rather than sector wise … we added
French, Spanish, Arabic [language versions of the platform] and
so on … Over time, we made more and more self-service … if a
customer was really big and serious, we would give them more
customised attention.
On the developer side, starting with ten game developers and
300 game titles when they first started working with Yahoo!,
MatchMove’s stable of games grew to 50 developers and 3000
titles about a year later. This was largely because of its API-
based platform that made it easier for software developers to
integrate into the MatchMove platform from anywhere in the
world.
Further Moves
The Move into Gamification
In 2012, MatchMove developed the opportunity in what Naik
called an ‘adjacent space’—gamification. As the MatchMove
website explained to potential corporate clients,
Gamification ensures that users fall in love with performing the
actions that you want.35
Gamification was part of the next wave of technology-related
trends gaining popularity in the market after casual games and
social networking. In essence, ‘gamification’ was the
application of the mechanics of games to non-game scenarios, to
make an activity more fun and engaging.36 An example was
getting high scores on a leaderboard for sales numbers
achieved. MatchMove saw a way to link this to the clients
already using their platform for gaming and social networking,
and apply gamification to internal enterprise issues like
corporate employee training and increasing employee
commitment through participation in games. Naik shared how
MatchMove developed this new revenue stream,
Gamification was at that time a new term. So we looked at it
and realised that actually, we know how to do this stuff. It
required the underlying social networking platform, so we had
two engineers work on it for three months, and we came up with

the gamification product. We created a prototype, pushed it out
to a few customers. They loved it … Almost all our clients are
going onto it.
In addition, MatchMove also provided monitoring and
implementation tools through AppKungfu that enabled
companies to perform the back end analytics and evaluate if
gamification had promoted the desired improvement in internal
metrics, such as productivity or reduced absenteeism.
Failing Fast
MatchMove also experimented with projects that did not
succeed as well. Up until 2012, it had at least three to four
failures. For instance, it attempted to go into branded hardware,
but the supplier failed to deliver because the Android37 boom
in the 2010’s took up all the suppliers’ production capacity. In
2010, the company tried to launch a kid-friendly Internet
browser with a Korean partner, a project that did not take off
because of language difficulties. Naik noted, “We fail fast. If a
project does not gain traction in three months and lift-off in six,
we move on”.
However, Naik was also selective about the new ventures that
the company took on, as with its growing reputation,
MatchMove received an increasing number of offers for
partnerships. He explained,
The core seeds were the same, but we continued to grow each
one. Gamification was just an extension; it was highly
opportunistic. How the business model evolves is that we look
at what’s in front of us, what’s nearby, what’s around the
corner–and then try to determine whether it fits in with our
grand plan of entertainment, social networks, and e-commerce.
… Rarely have we said ‘this is really cool, sooner or later
people will catch on, let’s just throw it out there.’ Whenever we
are after something, we always go and talk to potential channel
partners, customers. …
It was for the same reason that MatchMove said ‘no’ to
American Idol, FOX and other clients which approached them
for television-related ventures that integrated video streaming

and new technologies onto their websites. Those were perceived
to be a poor fit with MatchMove’s core value proposition.
The Next Move
By the time MatchMove found its way into 25th place in the
Deloitte Technology Fast 500 Asia Pacific rankings, the
company had become one of the fastest growing technology
firms in South-East Asia and had a three-year revenue growth
rate of 902 percent, with revenue for the 2012 financial year at
just under US$8 million (SGD$10 million).38 Naik took stock
of the company’s progress so far,
We have 150 enterprise customers across the world; they in turn
have about 300 million users. We have hundreds of social APIs.
We offered content and social plug-ins and e-commerce. We
offer “your own branded social entertainment site [set up] in
one week, across multiple devices, across nine languages.” We
now have hundreds of payment providers across many countries.
So far, MatchMove had been building its business as a full
service games service provider that included a financial services
component. Naik knew that he wanted this offering to be
stretched to incorporate other services for adjacent markets with
similar purposes, but was yet unclear on the direction. However,
Naik’s research had revealed e-commerce to be the next big
opportunity. He explained,
In Asia 80% of transactions are cash-based. Only 20% goes
through cards. This is the whale we were looking for (refer
to Exhibit 3 for data on payment values and types used for
online purchases in Asia and other regions). We always had the
vision that one day we were going to offer an e-commerce
(payment) capability that would work not only on our customer
(enterprise) side, but be an open wallet. The basic criteria was
to allow anyone in Asia to shop online anywhere. That’s what
the vision was.
By January 2014, MatchMove had already built up the seeds of
its next business model evolution. It had developed a robust and
complete API-based platform for both B2B and B2C that hosted

games and social networking capabilities, which could be
extended to gamification. The rollout of its platform in the
region had also enabled it to build an e-commerce platform
where it could help its clients collect payments in local
currencies domestically in ten countries in Asia, scaling beyond
the six countries it had started with when Yahoo! Southeast
Asia had on-boarded as their first client.
Naik thought that with the depth of the e-commerce payment
capability that MatchMove had, it could do more than just
service its existing stable of customers. He envisioned an open
network that could tap on the current trend of the ‘unbanked’
and ‘uncarded’. Could he do this alone, or should he look for a
partner? How would this idea work, in reality? He knew that
MatchMove would need to evolve its business model to tap on
this next big opportunity.
se
PSY320 – Language Development
in Young Children
Project Outline
Due: 11:59 p.m. EST, Sunday of Unit 5
Points: 100
Overview:

For this assignment, you will be composing an outline for your
final research project.
Identify each section of the paper and include at least three
sentences for each
section explaining what you plan to discuss. Be sure to review
the grading rubric
below.
Instructions:
The following information must be included in the Project
Outline:
• Introduction
• Body of the paper, which should cover at least the following:
o Description and definition of overall characteristics of
delay/disorder, its causes, and how it manifests itself in
behavior, cognition, speech, and language.
o Assessment tools.
o Interventions and instructional strategies.
o Treatment options.
o Evaluation and treatment alternatives.
o Specific recommendations to parents and teachers for

learning modifications in the classroom and at home.
• Conclusion
• Sixth edition APA Style citations and formatting:
o Typed, double spaced, 12 point Times New Roman font
o Cover page and (if necessary) Reference page
Useful Resources:
• The Purdue OWL: Sample outlines. (n.d.). The Purdue Online
Writing Lab.
• Writing an outline. (n.d.). Austin Community College.
Be sure to read the criteria, by which your project will be
evaluated, before you write,
and again after you write.
https://owl.english.purdue.edu/media/pdf/20081113013048_544.
pdf
http://www.austincc.edu/tmthomas/sample%20outline%201.htm
Evaluation Rubric for Project Outline Assignment

CRITERIA Deficient Satisfactory Proficient
0 – 13 Points 14 – 17 Points 18 – 20 Points
Introduction
Purpose and
significance of the
research topic and
all major points of
the project are
missing, vague, or
do not connect.
Purpose and
significance of the
research topic and all
major points of the
project are somewhat
explained; intentions
are unclear.

The purpose,
significance, and all
major points of the
research project are
clearly stated.
0 - 27 Points 28 - 35 Points 36 - 40 Points
Body
Required information
is lacking in detail,
missing, or
disconnected.
Required information
is provided but is
somewhat unclear;
lacking information
and specific detail.
Body includes all
requirements that are

relevant, accurate,
and discussed in
clear detail.
0 - 13 Points 14 – 17 Points 18 - 20 Points
Conclusion
Conclusion does not
summarize main
points and intentions
of the research project.
Conclusion
summarizes all main
points and intentions
but is somewhat
unclear or
disconnected.
Conclusion
summarizes all main
points and intentions of

the research project
clearly.
APA, Grammar and
Mechanics
Does not meet APA
format. Has significant
grammatical and
mechanical errors.
Some APA,
grammatical, and/or
mechanical errors.
Minimal to none APA,
grammatical, and/or
mechanical errors.

MatchMove Business Model EvolutionIt was January 2014, and Shai

More Related Content

Similar to MatchMove Business Model EvolutionIt was January 2014, and Shai

More from AbramMartino96

Recently uploaded

MatchMove Business Model EvolutionIt was January 2014, and Shai