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Learning Objectives
After reading this chapter, you should be
able to:
• Explain how Tolman’s concept of latent learn-
ing sparked a need for theoretical accounts
that went beyond basic classical and operant
conditioning models.
• Describe the beginning of the cognitive revo-
lution and the importance of George Miller’s
memory studies.
• Explain how the computer has been used as
a metaphor for the way the mind processes
information.
• Describe how the cognitive counterrevolution
was different from the behavioral revolution
before it.
• List and define some of the foundational
concepts of cognitive approaches.
• Characterize George Kelly’s personal construct
theory and his view of humans as scientists.
Cognitive and Cognitive-Behavioral
Approaches to Personality 6

Chapter Outline
Introduction
6.1 Metacognition: Thinking About Your
Thinking
6.2 Major Historical Figures and Theories
• Edward Tolman and Latent Learning
• Chomsky and the Role of Language in
Cognition
• George Miller: The Cognitive Revolution
• Von Neumann and McCulloch: A Conceptual
Leap From Computers to the Mind
• Describe the contributions of the social learning theorists
Julian Rotter, Albert Bandura, and Walter Mischel and
their contributions to such concepts as reward value, behavioral
expectancies, self-efficacy, self-regulation, self-verification,
and motivated reasoning.
• Describe the process of modeling in both human and animal
models.
• Compare and contrast the cognitive theories of Albert Ellis,
Aaron Beck, and Marsha Linehan.
• Name and briefly describe some of the more commonly
employed assessment tools used in the cognitive perspective.
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CHAPTER 6
Introduction
“There are no facts, only interpretations.” F. Nietzche
It’s December 14, 2012, at approximately 9:30 a.m. It’s an
otherwise normal day
at Sandy Hook Elementary School in the small town of
Newtown, Connecticut.
Then, 20-year-old Adam Lanza arrives on the scene carrying an
arsenal of high-
capacity weapons, and he proceeds to gun down 20 helpless
children and 6 adults
and terrorize many more. Authorities would later discover that
Lanza had also
shot and killed his mother prior to coming to the school.
Unfortunately, the mas-
sacre was not an isolated incident in American history, but it
was the second dead-
liest school shooting in American history. Some claim that this
incident points to
the disturbed nature of some individuals. Others point to the
need for stricter gun
control to limit access to high-capacity weapons. Still others
suggest that violence
in the media or video games were to blame. What was your take
on these events?
If the goal were to predict your behavioral response to this
event, could we do
so simply by understanding the environment in which you were
brought up in
and currently live, or would we also need to understand how
you cognitively pro-
cessed the event? Is it even possible to study and comprehend
all of the factors

that influence your interpretation and response? Given the
considerable interpre-
tive variability of the above example, let us consider something
far less complex:
a physical stimulus.
The simple, visual example shown in Figure 6.1 illustrates
variability in how peo-
ple interpret the world. Perceptually, you might detect a chalice,
where the white
Introduction
6.3 Areas of Specialization Within
Cognitive Psychology and Their
Relation to Personality
• Information Processing
• Pattern Recognition
• Schema
6.4 Cognitive and Social-Cognitive
Approaches to Personality
• George Kelly and Personal Construct
Theory
• Julian Rotter’s Model of Behavioral
Expectancy and Reward Value
• Bandura’s Social Learning Theory
• Walter Mischel’s Self-Regulatory
Theory
6.5* Cognitive-Behavioral Approaches
to Personality
• Ellis’s Rational-Emotive Therapy

• Beck’s Cognitive Theory and Therapy
• Linehan’s Cognitive-Behavioral Model
6.6 Assessment Strategies and Tools
From the Cognitive Perspective
• Kelly’s Repertory Grid
• Beck Depression Inventory (BDI)
• Other Depression Inventories
• Anxiety Inventories
• Implicit Association Test
• Possible Selves and Self-Schemas
• Cultural Influences and Differences
Summary
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CHAPTER 6Introduction
image is the figure and the dark portions are the (back)ground.
However, you
might instead detect two faces looking at each other, where the
dark image is now
the figure and white is the (back)ground. Research indicates
that your previous
experiences and how you formed conceptual categories can
influence what you
see by, for example, priming you for certain perceptual
categories (e.g., Ashby &
Maddox, 2005). More importantly, perceptions are also
influenced by your beliefs,
biases, and both conscious and nonconscious goals (e.g., Tamir,
Ford, & Ryan,
2013). Even very simple behaviors like pointing and grasping at

objects, which
require us to “code” information in our environments, can be
influenced by our
intentions (i.e., our planned actions; e.g., Wykowska, Schubo,
& Hommel, 2009),
suggesting that even basic and seemingly automated behaviors
are not passive.
This suggests that decidedly internal events are important to
understanding how
we interact with our environments, which brings us to a crucial
question: To what
extent does your ability to think and experience emotions define
your character?
The cognitive movement emerged following the heyday of the
behavioral move-
ment. Like the behavioral perspective, the cognitive perspective
also emphasized
scientific rigor and tight experimental methodologies. However,
the constructs of
interest were now internal processes, with the primary impetus
for this perspec-
tive being the constructs that had been overlooked by
behaviorists (i.e., working
on the assumption that there is more to human personality and
functioning than
mere behavior). Thus, the unique and subjective perspective of
the individual is
here emphasized, and it is acknowledged that there may be an
infinite number of
possible perspectives on any one event.
In this chapter we will discuss the nature of cognition and its
influence on person-
ality. We will see how a cognitive revolution in psychology
created a new frame-

work for looking at human behavior and personality. The
cognitive perspective
has proven very useful for theorists, researchers, and clinicians
and has led to dif-
ferent models that have been applied to personality theory and
clinical treatment.
Figure 6.1: Figure-ground perception
Do you perceive faces or a vase? What you perceive in
this image is influenced by previous experience, beliefs,
biases, and both conscious and nonconscious goals.
Source: Science Source/Photo Researchers
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CHAPTER 66.1 Metacognition: Thinking About Your Thinking
6.1 Metacognition: Thinking About Your Thinking
Cognitive theories focus on how our thought processes impact
our personalities. There is an important concept related to this
called metacognition. This term literally means thinking about
our thinking, and while the term is not used widely by the
primary theorists in this
model, thinking about our thinking is exactly what they are
asking us to do. Unless we can take a
step back and analyze our thinking processes from almost a
third person perspective, we cannot
change faulty cognition. As you will read in the following
pages, analyzing and challenging our
faulty thinking systems is at the heart of cognitive theories.

We all view the world through the filter of our personal and
cultural experiences. This is human
nature. What speaks to us as true is often determined by our
cultural experience or our personal
frame of reference. People who practice metacognition
constantly assess how their experiences
and perspectives are affecting how they process information.
Metacognition means that they
understand themselves and know the dynamics at play within
their own psyche. Most people
simply assume that if they think that something is right (or
wrong), it is just that.
Akin to the idea of metacognition is the concept of critical
thinking. You have probably heard the
term before, but definitions vary. Stephen Brookfield’s (1987)
approach aligns with the underlying
concepts of cognitive psychology and metacognition. He
contends that critical thinking is a process.
Although his definition includes emotional as well as rational
components, and clearly acknowl-
edges the importance of culture and context, it contains the
following common characteristics:
1. Identifying and challenging assumptions.
2. Challenging the importance of context.
3. Trying to imagine and explore alternatives.
4. Reflective skepticism. (pp. 7–9)
Brookfield (1987) defines reflective skepticism as the act of
constantly questioning the status quo.
Just because something has been believed for years does not
necessarily mean that it is true. Just
because someone of perceived importance (like professors, for
example) says something is right,
that does not prove that it is right. As was discussed in the

introduction, reality is subjective, and
what we “think” we know is not always objectively accurate.
Can you see the parallels with the cognitive model? We should
make it a habit to challenge
assumptions (including our own) and to understand the cultural
implications that underlie our
interactions with others. For example, Ellis says that while it
would be nice to be loved by all
around us, it is not a catastrophe if we are not. We create the
catastrophe by failing to question
our assumptions; in this case, the assumption that we should be
loved by everyone. Understand-
ing the cultural contexts helps us to also recognize that often,
someone not liking us is not even
about us—it is about them.
It is helpful to examine thinking through the construct of
cognitive development theory, because
thinking about our thinking requires higher level thinking skills
and logic. Many cognitive theorists
believe that concrete logic is not possible until at least age six
or seven and that only in the highest
levels of cognitive development can critical thinking take place.
Jean Piaget, a noted psychologist
and developmental theorist, postulates the following stages of
development:
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CHAPTER 6 6.2 Major Historical Figures and Theories
1. Sensorimotor Stage: Birth to age 2 (approximately). Children
begin with no thinking

structures (called schema) and develop them through
exploration of their senses and
experimentation on the environment. Significant cognitive
development occurs, but
children in the sensorimotor stage are incapable of logical
thought.
2. Pre-operational Stage: Ages 2 to 7 (approximately). Children
rapidly develop language
skills and more sophisticated cognitive structures but are still
pre-logical. They are not
capable of conservation (the ability to understand that substance
does not change
although it changes shape or form). They are also incapable of
de-centering (the ability
to see things from another’s perspective). Conservation and de-
centering are prerequi-
site to logical thinking.
3. Concrete Operational Stage: Ages 7 to adolescence. Children
begin to grasp conservation
and de-centering. They begin to question: How does Santa
really get to all those houses
in one night? They can now reason logically but only on a
concrete level, not hypotheti-
cally or abstractly. They solve problems logically but
haphazardly.
4. Formal Operations Stage: Adolescence and above. The person
is now capable of sophisti-
cated logical thought. He or she can think in the abstract, can
think hypothetically and can
solve problems using the logic of combinations (Dworetzky &
Davis, 1989).
Piaget’s stages ended with Formal Operations, but Riegel

(1973) has postulated a fifth stage called
Dialectical Reasoning. This is a stage beyond logic where
metacognition and critical thinking can
take place. It is the ability to perceive the frequent paradoxes in
life (to see the dialectic) and to
question and analyze the assumptions that underlie the logic.
Dialectical thinkers “readily recog-
nize, accept, and even enjoy conflict and contradictions in
values and possible courses of action
because sorting out these conflicts forces them to grow
intellectually” (Dworetzky & Davis, 1989,
p. 360).
6.2 Major Historical Figures and Theories
Cognitive science, which emerged in the 1950s, was a
revolutionary development in the field of psychology. In 1977,
Mahoney used the term cognitive revolution in describing this
shift in the field of psychology—a shift that was partly driven
by dramatic advances in computer
science. The cognitive revolution reflected the notion that
consciousness is the ultimate product
of evolution. Consciousness is what allows us to reflect upon
ourselves and to wonder about the
nature, the origin, and the purpose of our existence. This
capacity for reflective thinking is con-
sidered the “essence of the self” (Corr, 2006, p. 563)—small
wonder that Descartes should have
accepted as proof of his existence the fact that he could think,
summarized in his immortal phrase,
“I think, therefore I am.”
The goal of cognitive approaches to psychology is to understand
how we think—that is, the goal is
to explain topics such as how we process information, how we
remember, how we perceive, how

we solve problems, and how we process language. This was a
radical departure from behaviorism,
which emphasized empiricism and insisted that psychology
should concern itself with the observ-
able, objective aspects of human behavior. Recall that it was
behaviorism’s avoidance of specula-
tion about the mind and mental processes that had fueled its
break from what was then main-
stream psychology. Now a new cognitive science was again
suggesting that psychology should
be concerned with some of the old challenges of psychology
that behaviorism had set aside. The
cognitive sciences were concerned with what occurs in the
mind. And this presented a strong chal-
lenge to the supremacy of behaviorism.
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Edward Tolman and Latent Learning
Ironically, the roots of the cognitive perspective can be traced
to learning theory, where a num-
ber of findings began to emerge from behavioral research that
undermined some of the domi-
nant beliefs within that tradition. One of the first was Edward
Tolman’s (1949, 1955) work that
introduced the concept of latent learning. Latent learning is a
special form of learning that is not
immediately evident or behaviorally observable. Moreover,
latent learning occurs in the absence
of any reinforcement of either the behavior or any associative
learning (which means any learn-
ing process in which a new response becomes associated with a

particular stimulus due to their
occurring at the same time).
In a classic demonstration of latent learning in animals, Tolman
(Tolman & Honzick, 1930) assigned
hungry rats to one of three experimental conditions that varied
with respect to the delivery of
food (a reinforcer). In one condition, the rats were given food
only when they reached the end of
a maze, and this resulted in improved maze running with each
attempt. In the second condition,
the rats were not reinforced with food after running the maze,
and consistent with traditional
learning principles, they failed to demonstrate learning of the
maze. A third condition also initially
received no food for maze running, and predictably they too
failed to learn the maze—at least as
indicated by their behavior. However, after a series of
unreinforced trials, the rats were then rein-
forced for their maze running. This resulted in a dramatic
improvement (learning), and the rate of
learning indicated that they were in fact learning the maze in
the earlier trials, despite the lack of
reinforcement. The acquisition of maze running was so
proficient that they even outperformed
the rats in the first condition who had been reinforced
throughout the task. Tolman concluded
that rats in all three conditions were learning the maze and were
forming internal cognitive maps
(i.e., mental representations) of the maze. However, they simply
failed to demonstrate the behav-
ior until such a time as they were reinforced, which is why
those in the third condition could do as
well and even outperform the rats in the first. In this respect,
Tolman reasoned that the rats’
behavior did not reflect their internal mental processes, they did

not demonstrate learning until a
later time, and they appeared to learn even in the absence of a
reinforcer (reflecting the features
of latent learning). Tolman’s findings were soon replicated both
in animals (e.g., Karn & Porter,
1946) and in humans (e.g., Postman & Tuma, 1954; Stevenson,
1954).
Tolman’s work sparked an inter-
est in understanding the role of
human thought in the process of
learning, but his was not the only
research to challenge one of the
most basic assumptions of learning
theory, and cognitive psychologists
now looked at topics like percep-
tion, attention, thinking, memory,
and language (Neisser, 1967).
Beyond the Text: Classic Writings
In this breakthrough paper, Tolman introduces the idea of
cognitive maps in animal and human models. Read it at
http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Tolman/Maps/maps.htm
Reference: Tolman, E. C. (1948). Cognitive maps in rats and
men. The Psychological Review, 55(4), 189–208.
Lec81110_06_c06_163-194.indd 168 5/21/15 12:39 PM
http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Tolman/Maps/maps.htm
Chomsky and the Role of Language in Cognition

A second, and somewhat independent, line of research that
further sparked the cognitive move-
ment was that of linguist Noam Chomsky (1972, 2000) who
noted that humans appear to have
a preparedness (a readiness) to learn and develop speech. Thus,
much in the way that fish have
a preparedness for swimming, monkeys for climbing, and birds
for flying, humans have a readi-
ness to acquire and use language. Chomsky believed that
language and mental processes develop
hand-in-hand, and that language can be used to access mental
constructs. Chomsky firmly
believed that the prevailing behavioral model, with its exclusive
use of learning theory, was unable
to explain the complexities of
language. Instead, he believed
that understanding thought pro-
cesses, which occur between the
stimulus and the response, is
necessary if one is to understand
language—a point with which
Skinner strongly disagreed (Skin-
ner, 1957; Chomsky, 1959).
Philosopher and cognitive psy-
chologist Jerry Fodor expanded
these ideas by suggesting that
beliefs and desires, which are
decidedly mental events, are
explained through what he
called the language of thought.
Fodor suggests that mental rep-
resentations are more than mere
explanatory tools; rather, they
reflect what has been codified in
the brain (e.g., Fodor & Pylyshyn,

1988). In Fodor’s model, con-
ceptual thinking is essentially an
internally represented language,
but it is not equivalent to lan-
guage. Rather, it exists in a for-
mat that reflects how the mind represents concepts using
symbols, which are organized as mental
sentences that follow the grammatical principles of language.
Much of Fodor’s theory was based
on the idea of computer intelligence, in which symbols are
manipulated by a computer following
basic algorithms to reflect psychological processes (e.g., Newell
& Simon, 1976).
Can cognition be shown to exist separate from behavior?
In a thought experiment (known as the Knowledge Argu-
ment) originally proposed by Frank Jackson (1982; see also
Jackson, 1986), the premise is that Mary is a brilliant neuro-
physiologist who studies vision, but must investigate the
world from a black and white room, with her only access
to the outside world being a black and white TV. She learns
everything there is to know about color, but she never expe-
riences color directly. The question posed is whether she
will learn anything once released from the room. Essen-
tially, Jackson uses this to illustrate that physicalism, which
is the thesis that everything is physical, and that everything
is necessitated by the physical, is false. For a summary of
the philosophical argument and counterviews, see http://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-knowledge/.
Reference: Nida-Rümelin, M. (2010). Qualia: The knowl-
edge argument. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
E. N. Zalta (Ed.). Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu

/archives/sum2010/entries/qualia-knowledge/.
Lec81110_06_c06_163-194.indd 169 5/21/15 12:39 PM
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-knowledge/
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-knowledge/
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/qualia-
knowledge/
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/qualia-
knowledge/
George Miller: The Cognitive Revolution
Miller’s work focused largely on human memory. In a thought-
provoking and widely cited article,
Miller (1956) suggested that immediate memory is limited to
seven items, plus or minus two
items. That is, most people are able to keep in mind (be
immediately conscious of or think about)
approximately seven distinct items. However, he soon
discovered that these seven items did not
have to be single units such as seven letters, but could be
groupings of letters or other items,
which he labeled chunks. Because information could be grouped
in different ways by different
individuals, and because this chunking predicted how people
perceived the physical world, it
began to establish the supremacy of thought over the outside
world (and observable behavior).
In Miller’s work, there is an emerging
cognitive perspective that concerns
itself with how mental processes may
be structured and information pro-

cessed. What occurs in the human
mind no longer needed to be studied
using highly subjective speculation, but
could now be brought into the realm of
the scientific method.
Miller had a significant impact on the
field when he looked to computer pro-
grams as a form of simulated thought
processes. He believed that the com-
puter made an excellent metaphor for
how the brain processes information.
He thought that the computer could
provide cognitive psychology with an
enormously powerful tool for simu-
lating mental processes. After all, the
computer suggests an easy analogy
for human cognitive processes. In this
analogy, the computer’s hardware is equivalent to the brain, and
its software to the mind and
its mental processes. Carrying the analogy further, input
corresponds to stimuli, and output to
responses.
Von Neumann and McCulloch: A Conceptual Leap From
Computers
to the Mind
The development of computer science was crucial in the
cognitive revolution. Mathematicians
such as John von Neumann and Claude Shannon reasoned that
symbols such as numbers could be
substituted for letters and that mathematical computations could
be used to express relationships
among these symbols. This notion was developed into programs
in which information is repre-

sented by a 0 or a 1 (binary representation) and where that
information can be manipulated and
analyzed using rules of logic and algebraic equations (Corr,
2006; Newell & Simon, 1972). Simon
and a young graduate student, Allen Newell, took up the
challenge of developing a computer that
could reason.
iStockphoto/Thinkstock Hemera/Thinkstock
Since the 1950s, theoreticians and researchers have
considered the computer as a metaphor for the inner
working of the mind. Thus, computer chips would be akin
to neurons in both their complexity as individual units and
their interconnectedness.
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CHAPTER 6 6.3 Areas of Specialization in Cognitive
Psychology and Their Relation to Personality
As researchers began to model the association between
computers and thought, the term and
subdiscipline of artificial intelligence (AI) emerged, which
further positioned cognitive psychology
as the natural successor to behaviorism (e.g., Casti, 1987;
Sharples, Hogg, Hutchinson, Torrance, &
Young, 1989). This line of investigation has examined some of
the more rudimentary cognitive pro-
cesses, such as basic perception (or “bottom-up” processing;
e.g., Achler, 2012), as well as meta-
analytic (“top-down”) views of intelligence (e.g., Hutter, 2012).
Researchers have also attempted
to replicate with computers such human experiences as emotions

and social skills, which involve
the challenge of predicting and reacting to the emotions and
motivations of others (e.g., Minsky,
2006). Currently, the Human Brain Project (Chapter 4) hopes to
provide solutions to the many
mysteries of consciousness and brain disorders.
6.3 Areas of Specialization in Cognitive Psychology
and Their Relation to Personality
Cognitive psychologists believe that not all inferences or
hypotheses need be based only on direct observation. The
scientific method, they insist, can make inferences about unseen
events and states, and this parallels practices in other
disciplines of science. For example,
when physicists speculate about particles like quarks and
neutrinos, or when evolutionary theo-
rists describe long-extinct life forms on the basis of fossil
records, they are discussing concepts to
which there is no direct access. For their part, cognitive
psychologists make inferences about the
inner workings of the mind (Hunt, 2007).
Within cognitive psychology, several areas of focused research
have developed over the years,
such as information processing, pattern recognition, and
schema. Each of these areas will be
explored here.
Information Processing
Emerging from the use of the computer as a potential model for
how the mind works was an ever-
expanding field termed information processing. In everyday
usage, the term information may be
thought of as an ordered sequence of symbols that has a
meaning that can be transmitted and

understood. Data, on the other hand, consist of unorganized
symbols that are without meaning
in their current form. Think of the difference between a random
list of names and phone numbers
(raw data) and these names ordered alphabetically
(information). Information processing is what
happens when data are manipulated and transformed into
information. Information has a rela-
tional connection that distinguishes it from raw data and makes
it useful (Ackoff, 1989).
Computers and the brain share some complex information-
processing operations. In comput-
ing science, these are mathematical operations often in the form
of algorithms. In humans, our
information-processing processes are often not as certain as are
algorithms. Instead, they tend
to be more “rule of thumb” and are referred to as heuristics.
These include processes for which
we have a high degree of awareness, as well as those for which
we have limited awareness. As an
illustration, consider the availability heuristic, which is the
tendency to assume that some events
occur with greater frequency than they do in reality because
those events are readily available to
us. For example, because every airline crash receives so much
media attention, it fosters the idea
(and perhaps subsequently the fear) for some that air travel is
unsafe, though it is statistically far
safer than traveling by car.
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CHAPTER 66.3 Areas of Specialization in Cognitive

Researchers have established that although there are some
common heuristics and biases that are
expressed by everyone (e.g., the availability heuristic, the
representative heuristic, etc.; see Kahne-
man & Tversky, 1973; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; for a more
recent review, see Kahneman &
Tversky, 2000), individual differences can also dictate a
preference for some heuristics and biases.
For example, mood states appear to influence heuristics, such
that positive mood states increase
reliance on heuristics, resulting in an increased tendency to
make false racial identifications of
members of stereotyped groups (Park & Banaji, 2000).
Moreover, researchers have shown that
personality differences, such as sociability, can influence
heuristics (such as the representative-
ness heuristic), but only under specific conditions, such as when
sociability is relevant (e.g., judg-
ment problems dealing with rejection and abandonment; Moore,
Smith, & Gonzales, 1997). These
and other findings suggest that there is a complex interaction
between the use of heuristics, the
situational context, and longstanding personality differences;
with each of these factors contribut-
ing to the prediction of outcomes (e.g., Marszal-Wiśniewska &
Zajusz, 2010).
Information processing is cognitive psychology’s attempt to
describe what actually occurs in
the mind. When researchers and theorists investigate human
information processing, they are
exploring the internal workings of the mind. But since we
cannot observe information processing
directly, the models cognitive psychology presents are derived

by inference. For example, when
you see a threatening dog, neural receptors in your eyes
immediately send information to the
part of your brain responsible for pattern recognition. And when
a scary dog template is found in
your limbic system, there is an immediate fight-flight (and
recall from Chapter 4 that freeze has
also been added to this automatic response) decision implicit in
the signals that are sent to your
muscles. In this information-processing model, information
signifies various serially ordered men-
tal representations that result in some mental or physical change
or action (J. R. Anderson, 1990).
Of course, the above-noted example is a more universal
response, as most individuals would
respond in the same way to a threatening dog; the influence of
personality is illustrated when
more idiosyncratic responses emerge. For example, your
response to a particular type of human
face that you find attractive, but that is not considered
classically “handsome” or “beautiful,”
reflects your particular taste.
Pattern Recognition
One cognitive model suggests that infor-
mation processing involves recognizing
patterns. This model maintains that we
identify stimuli by matching them to a
model, pattern, or prototype that cor-
responds to the stimuli. For example,
Anderson (1990) hypothesizes that
the brain stores patterns, called tem-
plates, and that the perceptual system
compares these stored templates with
incoming information to find a corre-

spondence. Recall Ekman’s research on
emotions, where he found that certain
facial expressions seem to reflect feelings
that are universally recognized. Ander-
son’s template hypothesis explains this
by suggesting that our neural networks
iStock/Thinkstock
If a house is filled with pictures in which everyone in
the family looks happy, can that lead to a more positive
recollection and outlook on your family life? In this
respect, mental representations can overshadow reality.
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CHAPTER 66.3 Areas of Specialization in Cognitive
store various patterns of facial configurations, each of which
has a specific emotion attached to it.
An angry face will match our stored representations of other
angry faces. And other representa-
tions will tell us whether to smile, run for our lives, stay and
fight, or ignore.
In the cognitive perspective, representation involves the use of
symbols to depict or signify
objects, events, or occurrences. Cognitive psychologists
describe how external events are encoded
(transformed) and represented in the mind; they investigate how
these are recorded in our neural
networks so that they can be recalled as language, visual
images, feelings, symbols, and thoughts

(Hunt, 2007).
Research suggests that personality patterns can likewise
influence this specific cognitive process.
For example, borderline personality disorder (BPD) is
characterized by profound difficulties with
emotion regulation, the consequence of which is affective
instability. Because such difficulties are
most pronounced in social contexts, it has been hypothesized
and supported in the literature that
individuals with BPD have impaired facial emotion recognition
(typically with a negativity or anger
bias), which then undermines the interpersonal interaction
(Domes, Schulze, & Herpertz, 2009).
Despite establishing the problems that individuals with BPD
have with facial emotion recogni-
tion, what is unclear is whether these deficits affect all basic
emotions, are valence-specific, or
if individual emotions are implicated. Using a sample of 33
inpatients with BPD and 32 matched
healthy controls, patients with BPD were less accurate than
control participants in emotion recog-
nition, and this was especially true for negative emotions (there
was little to no impairment with
favorable faces; Unoka, Fogd, Füzy, & Csukly, 2011).
Individuals with BPD also had difficulties with
basic attributions, such that they over-attributed
disgust/surprise to facial expressions, but under-
attributed fear to the facial expressions relative to controls.
Schema
Memory is in large part about the self. That is, much of our
memory is autobiographical; it con-
sists of our constantly evolving narrative about ourselves
(Singer, 1995). In one study, Bartlett told

non-Western folktales to Westerners and found that the subjects
inadvertently filled in the blanks
according to their cultural expectations, omitting details that
did not make sense to the Western
mind. Bartlett termed this organized mass of experience-based
memory schemata or schema.
Schema have since become fundamental to cognitive
psychology. The term is used extensively in
Jean Piaget’s (1926) developmental theory. Schema refer to
mental structures that are organized
patterns of thought (see also earlier discussion of templates). In
terms of personality theory, we
can have self-schema (concept we have about ourselves;
discussed in Chapter 9) and person-
schema (notions we have about other people). Notions of self-
and person-schema were later
adopted by cognitive personality theorists who used them to
explain and treat depression and
personality disorders. Schema became the cornerstone of
cognitive models designed to explain
how thoughts and beliefs (schemata) influence personality and
are involved in the development
of mental disorders such as depression.
Research indicates that personality impacts person-schemas
(e.g., Srivastava, 2010; Wood, Harms,
& Vazire, 2010), and this not only influences how we
cognitively perceive ourselves, but also how
we perceive others (Kammrath, 2011). For example, individuals
high in trait narcissism (which is,
in fact, an indicator of low self-esteem) are more likely to
perceive others as uninteresting (Beck,
Freeman, & Davis, 2004). Individuals characterized as highly
agreeable are likely to perceive oth-
ers as more agreeable, while those scoring low on agreeableness

are more likely to see others
as hostile (Dodge & Crick, 1990; Graziano, Bruce, Sheese, &
Tobin, 2007). The assumption is that
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CHAPTER 6
the schemas that are easily accessible because they are applied
to one’s own behavior are the
same schemas that are readily available to characterize the
behavior of others (Higgins, 1996).
Moreover, with these schemas being activated, it primes
individuals to be attentive to situational/
environmental cues that are relevant to the activated schemas
(e.g., Mischel & Shoda, 2008). As
an example, if an individual manifests the trait of dominance,
they are likely to notice when others
are making a grab for power in an interpersonal interaction, or
when power is given up.
6.4 Cognitive and Social-Cognitive Approaches to Personality
As we noted earlier, the development of systems of
psychotherapy, psychopathology, and personality theory often
occurred simultaneously. These theories emerged from two prin-
cipal sources. Some theories grew out of clinical practice; most
of these are based on new
treatment models that led to advances in personality theory. A
second source of personality theo-
ries is more academic: It consists of theories that grew out of
research, rather than clinical prac-
tice. Theories from both of these sources, academic research
and clinical science, often show a

great deal of cross-fertilization—that is, they build on each
other’s ideas.
In the next section we review the founding theorists in the
cognitive perspective, including the work
of George Kelly, Julian Rotter, Albert Bandura, and Walter
Mischel. We will also present the work
of Albert Ellis and Aaron Beck, who in a parallel fashion
founded cognitive therapy. Each presents a
somewhat different perspective on how cognition organizes the
way we think, act, and feel.
George Kelly and Personal Construct Theory
Perhaps as a function of his upbringing on a farm in Kansas,
George Kelly adopted the perspective
that everyone, even those with less formal education, acts as
scientists do. Specifically, they try
to explain the present and predict the future, and like scientists,
Kelly (1955) argued that every-
one develops and modifies theories to accomplish the goals of
explanation and prediction. Kelly
referred to these theories as personal constructs. Kelly believed
that people’s lives represented
their “experiments,” and the utility of their personal constructs
(theories) was determined by how
well they accomplished the goals of explaining the present and
predicting the future. As a simple
illustration, if your life experiences (experiments) have resulted
in the belief that people will take
advantage of you if you give them the opportunity, this
represents a personal construct. This
might also lead to other constructs such as don’t trust anyone,
or don’t let anyone get too close to
hurt you. Presumably, these personal constructs have been used
to explain what has happened to
you, they provide a framework for interpreting the world around

you, and they allow you to antici-
pate what might happen next (predict the future). New
information, by way of new experiences,
may strengthen these constructs or it may weaken them (as
might be the case if you happen upon
some relationships that are especially warm and supportive).
In his landmark book, The Psychology of Personal Constructs,
Kelly (1955) put forth a fundamental
principle and 11 corollaries. The fundamental principle
essentially states that how a person per-
ceives the world is affected by how he or she expects
(anticipates) things will occur. In other
words, our expectations are the basis for our psychological
reality; it’s not just what’s out there in
the world, but rather what we think is out there and what we
expect to be out there. The 11 corol-
laries that can be derived from the fundamental postulate are
identified and briefly described in
Table 6.1 (see Kelly, 1955).
6.4 Cognitive and Social-Cognitive Approaches to Personality
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CHAPTER 6 6.4 Cognitive and Social-Cognitive Approaches to
Personality
Table 6.1: Kelly’s personal construct corollaries
Construction
corollary
People anticipate events by construing similarities to past

events. That is, we expect
things to happen as they did before (based on past experience).
Experience
corollary
Personal construct systems will vary as a function of construing
new events. This
means that as we experience the world, how we perceive that
world necessarily
changes and adapts to maximize predictability.
Dichotomy
corollary
Construct systems are composed of dichotomous constructs, and
there are a finite
number of said constructs. Constructs have two poles that
define each other (e.g.,
nice-mean, threatening-safe, outgoing-inwardly focused, etc.)
and there is a limited
number of ways we can interpret the world (i.e., constructs are
not infinite in their
number).
Organization
corollary
A construct system orders its specific constructs in a hierarchy.
More simply stated,
some constructs are more important and central than others.
Range corollary Any construct has a limited range of events to
which it can be applied. As an
illustration, a construct such as “good-bad” would likely have a
very wide range of use.

Modulation
corollary
Variability in the construct system is a direct function of the
permeability
(changeability) of the constructs, and some constructs are more
changeable than
others. Kelly was specifically referring to changes in the
construct’s range of use,
rather than the actual content of the construct.
Choice corollary Individuals are free to choose any constructs
for their construct system, but once
chosen, those constructs limit how the individual perceives and
interprets the world.
Individuality
corollary
Because we all differ in our experiences, our constructs and
construct systems will
necessarily be unique to us.
Commonality
corollary
Whenever two people interpret experiences in the same way,
their construct
systems should be similar.
Fragmentation
corollary
Due to the considerable variability within each person’s
construct system, it is

possible and, in fact, quite likely that different constructs
within one system are
incompatible with each other.
Sociality
corollary
A person can better get along with someone else by adopting
that person’s construct
system, even if the constructs are quite different.
Kelly hypothesized that individuals will experience anxiety
when their construct system fails to
explain or predict events. He argues that the natural response
for the individual is to modify their
construct system until events can be explained, and at that
point, anxiety should be reduced.
Kelly also defined a number of other emotional responses in
terms of personal constructs. For
example, Kelly suggested that guilt is experienced when one is
engaging in behavior or experienc-
ing thoughts that are incongruent with one’s superordinate (core
or central) constructs.
Perhaps one of the more interesting concepts introduced by
Kelly was that of cognitive com-
plexity. Kelly argued that individuals are healthiest when they
have numerous superordinate con-
structs that can be used to interpret the world around them. In
contrast, he considered those
with very few superordinate constructs as highly vulnerable; the
rationale being that if events
ever undermined those few (or one) superordinate constructs,
the individual would have no other
theories to adopt, and this would significantly undermine
personality functioning. In fact, Kelly

characterized psychological disorders as any time an individual
uses a personal construct that has
been repeatedly invalidated by life’s experiments. Presumably
this would be more likely to occur
Based on Kelly, G. (1955). The psychology of personal
constructs. New York: Norton.
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Personality
for those having fewer superordinate constructs to turn to, even
in the face of a failure to predict
and explain. In a study examining cognitive complexity and
traits, researchers demonstrated that
cognitive complexity (flexibility) is, predictably, most related
to the trait of openness to new expe-
rience (Tetlock, Peterson, & Berry, 1993).
Julian Rotter’s Model of Behavioral Expectancy and Reward
Value
Julian Rotter was one of the earlier contributors to the cognitive
movement as he elaborated on
the basic behavioral paradigm, and he was among the first to
introduce social learning theory. Like
behaviorists, Rotter still focused on predicting behavioral
outcomes. However, his theory empha-
sized two decidedly cognitive events as the most important
predictors of behavior. In the book
Social Learning and Clinical Psychology (1954), Rotter
suggests that behavior could be predicted
by knowing behavioral expectancy and reward value.

He defined behavioral expectancy as the individual’s
expectation that the contingencies—the
outcomes—for behavior are in place. That is, rather than
focusing on whether or not one is rein-
forced or punished for a behavior, Rotter shifted the focus to
whether the individual expects to be
reinforced or punished (i.e., the subjective assessment). The
second factor, reward (or reinforce-
ment) value, emphasizes the fact that we all subjectively value
rewards in different ways, and this
variability is critical to predicting behavior. Thus, if you highly
value earning an “A” in personality
psychology and expect to receive the “A” if you study, then
Rotter’s theory predicts that you will
study. However, if you either don’t value a high grade or don’t
believe that your efforts will be
rewarded, then the theory predicts that you will be less likely to
study.
It is also important to note that Rotter didn’t actually use the
term behavior, but instead empha-
sized behavior potential. Behavior potential was defined as the
probability of engaging in a spe-
cific behavior in a given situation. Obviously, in a given
situation, there are many behaviors that
one can engage in, and for each of these, there is a behavior
potential. Rotter hypothesized that
people will manifest the behavior with the highest potential.
Based on these concepts, Rotter
developed a simple formula to predict behavior. Specifically, he
stated that Behavior Potential (BP)
is a function of both Expectancy (E) and Reinforcement Value
(RV).
BP 5 f(E & RV)

Of course, because the factors of expectancy and reinforcement
value are derived in part from the
situation, in addition to the individual’s subjective appraisal of
each factor, social learning theory
is thus an interaction model, considering both the individual and
the situation. Several researchers
would expand on this model, but this was an important first
step.
One additional significant con-
tribution from Rotter was his
differentiation of internal versus
external locus of control. Rotter
(1966) stated that those with an
internal locus of control believe
that they have control over most
aspects of their life (e.g., ability
and effort), whereas those with
an external locus of control are
influenced by factors outside
one’s personal control (e.g., chance/luck, task difficulty). The
internal-external locus of control
distinction will be discussed extensively in Chapter 8.
In an award-winning 1990 address, Rotter reviews the his-
tory of the concept of locus of control.
Reference: Rotter, J. B. (1990). Internal versus external con-
trol of reinforcement: A case history of a variable. American
Psychologist, 45(4), 489–493.
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Personality
Bandura’s Social Learning Theory
One of the more influential theorists who integrated theoretical
contributions from the cognitive
perspective to the field of personality is Albert Bandura.
Bandura (1986; see also Bandura, Ross,
& Ross, 1961) developed a hybrid social-cognitive theory that
combines aspects of the behavioral
and cognitive approaches. The cognitive influence is seen in
Bandura’s emphasis on emotions
in determining behavior, as well as in the importance he places
on our ability to symbolize and
anticipate the consequences of our actions; both of these
represent decidedly cognitive events.
The behaviorist influence is also apparent in his discussion of
the consequences of our actions.
Modeling
Drawing on the work of Miller and Dollard (1941), Bandura
hypothesized that individuals learn in
a variety of ways, and of those, modeling is fundamentally
important. Modeling is learning that
occurs as a function of observing behaviors performed by
others. Through imitation, we learn all
sorts of important behaviors. For example, Bandura explains
that we learn new behaviors when we
see them performed by someone else;
we learn to inhibit deviant behaviors
when we see others punished for similar
behaviors (or perhaps we learn to engage

in deviant behaviors when we see others
rewarded for them). We also learn what
classes of behaviors and beliefs are likely
to be rewarded in our culture.
Note how Bandura’s explanations for
the effects of imitation are drawn from
behaviorist notions of reinforcement. It
is the consequences—and more impor-
tantly, the anticipated consequences—
of a model’s behavior that determines
whether or not the model will be cop-
ied. But note, too, that concepts such as
anticipation describe a fundamentally
cognitive activity: To anticipate is to sym-
bolize and to think. And symbols are a central aspect of
Bandura’s theory. In fact, Bandura’s theory
also asserts that a model need not be a real-life person
performing some act, but is perhaps even
more likely to be symbolic in our advanced technological
societies. Symbolic models include written
or verbal instructions, abstract graphical representations, film
and book characters, and any other
set of stimuli that can be represented and emulated (note the
overlap here with our earlier discus-
sion of representations).
Bandura proposed that the modeling process involves several
steps. The first two steps implicate
memory functioning, whereas the latter two steps involve
planned behaviors.
• Attention: In order for learning to occur, the individual or
animal must first notice and
attend to the defining features of the behavior that is to be
modeled.

• Retention: In order for the behavior to be reproduced, the
defining features of modeled
behavior have to be encoded, retained, and recalled.
Monkey Business Images/Thinkstock
How much do we learn from watching others get in
trouble (or be rewarded)?
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Personality
• Reproduction: To reproduce a behavior, responses must be
organized to match the model.
The process of organizing typically improves with practice and
can move from an intentional
act, to one requiring minimal attention (i.e., a more automated
behavioral sequence).
• Motivation: Incentive(s) or motive(s) are typically needed to
reproduce the behavior.
Some of the strongest experimental data on the effects of
modeling that is more readily appli-
cable to our daily life can be seen in the literature examining
the impact of exposure to violent
media (primarily television) images (for a review, see Friedrich-
Cofer & Huston, 1986). Most note-
worthy, a study by Huesmann and colleagues (1984) found that
earlier viewing of aggression on
television predicted later aggression, even after initial levels of

aggression and age were statisti-
cally controlled. Moreover, the effects were strongest when the
participants (boys) reported that
they could identify with the violent television characters (note
the consistency with the earlier
research, cited in this chapter, regarding self-schemas). In
addition, research has shown that the
effect of violent media images affects both immediate and long-
term aggressive behavior (Bush-
man & Huesmann, 2006). As a result, even the most recent
reviews of the literature have con-
cluded that television violence does result in increased
aggressive behavior, and the magnitude
of this effect appears to have increased since 1975 (Bushman &
Anderson, 2001). Of course, as
technology has changed, so too have the media channels through
which we can be exposed to
violent images, and researchers have shifted their focus to such
areas as violent video games (van
Schie & Wiegman, 1997).
Importantly, not all of the published studies have concluded that
violent video game exposure
necessarily results in more aggression or violent outcomes (e.g.,
Williams & Skoric, 2005); in fact,
there is considerable division in the empirical literature on what
we really know about this phe-
nomenon (Kutner & Olson, 2008). As noted in the opening of
the chapter, considerable debate
erupted over the causal antecedents of the Newtown shooting,
with the violence portrayed in
the media being one of the alleged contributing factors. The
uncertainty over the role of media
violence was perhaps highlighted most clearly when the
Supreme Court of the United States ruled
that video games have First Amendment protection and that

minors’ use of violent video games
could not be regulated by the government (Brown v.
Entertainment Merchants Association, 2011).
The Supreme Court’s decision was based at least in part on the
high court’s conclusion that the
scientific evidence was “unpersuasive,” as it was lacking in
scientific scrutiny, and this paralleled
recent similar conclusions by government reviews in both
Australia and Sweden (Swedish Media
Council, 2011). However, a recent publication does provide an
effective summary on the points
of agreement in the empirical literature, and they are: (1) Video
game violence is an important
area for ongoing research; (2) violence is determined by
multiple factors, (3) results tend to be
stronger when the outcome measures are aggression and
measured in the lab, and minimal when
the outcome behavior is violence and measured outside the lab;
and (4) in order to fully under-
stand whether, and to what extent, media violence impacts
aggressive behavior, there is a need
to consider evidence from multiple sources, including survey
research, experimental studies, and
longitudinal/prospective research (Ferguson, 2013).
Self-Efficacy
Another important construct developed by Bandura (1997) is the
construct of self-efficacy (or
mastery/competency), defined simply as the belief that you have
the ability to succeed—or, more
literally, the opinion you have of your personal effectiveness in
a given situation. For example,
those with high levels of self-efficacy are more likely to stop
smoking because they believe that
they can. In a sense, self-efficacy is something of a self-

fulfilling prophecy: People with high self-
efficacy expect to be successful, they tend to engage in
activities where they are successful, and,
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Personality
as a result, their activities bolster their notions of self-efficacy.
High self-efficacy provides a sharp
contrast to the concept of learned helplessness (as discussed in
Chapter 5). Individuals character-
ized by learned helplessness believe that they have no control
over outcomes; hence, they have
very low notions of self-efficacy. It should also be noted that
self-efficacy beliefs can be domain
specific. That is, one might have highly elevated self-efficacy
beliefs with respect to their work, but
very low self-efficacy beliefs with respect to relationships. Not
surprisingly, some research sug-
gests that domain-specific, self-efficacy beliefs, such as those
in the social domain, are related to
specific personality traits, such as agreeableness (Caprara,
Alessandri, & Eisenberg, 2012).
The context specificity of self-efficacy beliefs is not only
important to predicting behavioral out-
comes in different contexts, but it also highlights the fact that
we can cognitively create and dif-
ferentiate contexts simply by how we perceive them. Social
cognitive theory is focused on our
expectations about the future, and Bandura believed that our
self-efficacy perceptions are central

to our expectations. Although there are many ways in which
self-efficacy beliefs can influence
our behavior, one of the most profound is in its relation to
effort and persistence, which in turn
also influences performance (e.g., Sitzmann & Ely, 2011). That
is, if we believe we are competent
enough to succeed, this predicts sustained effortful behavior,
whereas if we doubt our abilities,
then we are less likely to try (e.g., Bandura, 1997).
Reciprocal Determinism
Bandura’s (1986) theory suggests that in order to predict
behavior it is important to understand
the person (i.e., their internal cognitive processes), his or her
behavior, and the environmental
context or setting in which the behavior occurs. Bandura also
suggested that each of these three
factors is both caused by and causes the others—hence, the
concept of reciprocal determinism
(or reciprocal causality). In this respect, by accounting for both
internal processes of the individual
and environmental context, social cognitive theory
demonstrated a considerable advance over
the psychodynamic and behavioral perspectives that predated
the cognitive movement.
XiXinXing/Thinkstock Eyecandy Images/Thinkstock
How do our beliefs about domain-specific self-efficacy affect
our success in certain domains?
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Personality
Walter Mischel’s Self-Regulatory Theory
Walter Mischel’s training within a cognitive framework was
established early on, as he studied
under both George Kelly and Julian Rotter. Mischel made a
number of important contributions
to the field of personality psychology, and among them were his
ideas on self-regulation. Self-
regulation is the process of identifying a goal or set of goals
and, in pursuing these goals, using
both internal (e.g., thoughts and affect) and external (e.g.,
responses of anything or anyone in the
environment) feedback to maximize goal attainment. In an early
classic experiment with implica-
tions for self-regulation, Mischel tested school children in the
late 1960s who were asked to regu-
late their impulses for an immediate desired reward (e.g., a
single marshmallow) in order to gain
a greater reward (e.g., two marshmallows) at a later point in
time. Although this research can be
considered within the framework of delayed gratification or
even the trait of impulsiveness, it can
likewise be conceived of as an early experiment in the ability to
self-regulate to a specific goal. In
this current example, the goal might be to maximize the number
of marshmallows they could eat
(although for some children, the goal may have been to
minimize the time they would have to wait
for the marshmallows!). The children who were most effective
at self-regulation (also referred to
as self-control) were also found to be more successful later in
life, resulting in higher scores on
standardized tests, higher educational attainment, lower
incidence of drug use, and more stable

marriages (Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989).
Mischel and colleagues also demonstrated that some
intervention strategies (e.g., blocking the
desired stimulus from sight or imagining the reward to be
something less desirable) could be used
to help the children self-regulate more effectively, thereby
indicating that these were: (1) mutable
processes and (2) a direct function of the individual and the
situation. That is, some individuals
could regulate their behavior more easily than others, and some
could modify their behavior more
easily than others. More recently, Mischel and colleagues
demonstrated that individuals who can
more effectively self-regulate may be better at taking a broader
(“big picture”) perspective on
matters and finding meaning in their experiences (Kross,
Ayduk, & Mischel, 2005). Thus, Mischel
saw humans as actively involved in the construction of their
own psychological world, rather than
being passive and instinct-driven in responding to their
environments (Mischel, 1976).
Like Bandura and other social learning theorists, Mischel
emphasized goal setting, and self-
regulation to one’s goals, as central to predicting human
behavior. Within the context of goal
setting, a number of factors are implicated, including perceived
competencies (as per Ban-
dura), subjective appraisals of reward value and expected
reinforcement (as per Rotter), and
even basic cognitive abilities, such as encoding strategies. The
goal-driven behavior is likewise
affected by feedback or corrective information. For example, if
a student is not progressing to
a desired or expected level toward a goal, such as doing better

in a history class, the student’s
behavior can be adjusted. This can be done in one of two ways.
The student could increase
effort or efficiency by studying more, going to speak with the
professor regularly, or taking
more notes in class. Adjustments can also be made via the
student’s goals. For example, the
student can maintain the same effort and efficiency but lower
expectations for the outcome
(i.e., accept a lesser grade as a measure of success).
Building on the self-regulatory framework here described,
researchers have studied how a desire
for a particular outcome can impact the cognitive processes and
goal pursuit. For example, Kunda
(1990) suggests that when we make inferences and reason
regarding our environment, this does
not occur in a vacuum. Instead, we reason within the context of
specific desired outcomes (such
as getting a higher grade), and as a result we may be motivated
to perceive events in specific ways,
referred to as motivated reasoning.
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Personality
In a comprehensive review of the literature, Kunda (1990)
highlighted the concept of motivated
reasoning as showing that (e.g., Kruglanski & Freund, 1983;
Kunda, 1987; Pyszczynski & Green-
berg, 1987; Sorrentino & Higgins, 1986) people utilize
cognitive processes and mental representa-

tions to reach desired conclusions and that their motivation
plays a critical role in determining the
specific cognitive processes they employ (Kunda, 1990). Thus,
in essence, we are biased in how
we utilize cognitive processes when navigating toward desired
outcomes (Kunda, 1990). As an
illustration, consider how you might evaluate an interaction
with an acquaintance whom you want
to date. As you use cognitive processes to evaluate your social
interactions with this person, you
are motivated to notice and favorably interpret some cues (e.g.,
smiles, eye contact, responding
to your text), as well as being motivated to possibly ignore or
minimize other cues (e.g., lack of eye
contact with you or failure to return your text).
At an even more basic level, recent research has shown that our
internal motivations can impact
our visual perception—that is, our motivations can affect what
we see and how we see it. Con-
sider the research by Balcetis and Dunning (2006) in which they
examined visual perception and
how it is influenced by motivated states. The researchers
informed participants that they would
be assigned to one of two experimental conditions based on
randomly generated information on
a computer. For example, in study 1, participants were engaged
in what was ostensibly a taste-
testing task, and they would either have to consume and
evaluate a glass of freshly squeezed orange
juice (desirable) or a chunky, gelatinous substance referred to
as an “organic veggie smoothie”
(undesirable); both beverages were placed in front of
participants and they were encouraged to
smell them. They were then instructed to look at the computer
screen and told that they would

see either a “13,” which was assigned to the OJ, or the letter
“B,” which was assigned to the veggie
smoothie, and that whatever symbol they saw would determine
the beverage they would drink.
An ambiguous figure (see Figure 6.2) was then presented for
400 ms and then the computer
“crashed.” Participants were then asked by the experimenter if
they happened to notice anything
on the screen prior to the “crash.” Participants overwhelmingly
(i.e., 82%) reported seeing the
symbol that was randomly assigned to the desirable outcome
(i.e., 13, rather than B). Similar
findings were reported in four additional experiments, leading
the researchers to conclude that
motivation clearly affects visual information processing.
Figure 6.2: The ambiguous “B–13” figure
Research suggests that whether you see a “B” or a “13” depends
on if a desirable outcome is associated with seeing one of the
two figures.
Source: From Balcetis, E., & Dunning, D. (2006). See what you
want to see: Motivational influences on
visual perception. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
91(4), 612–625. doi:10.1037/0022-
3514.91.4.612. Copyright . 2006 by the American Psychological
Association.
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CHAPTER 6 6.5 Cognitive-Behavioral Approaches to
Personality

Researchers have also linked personality to other aspects of
reasoning. For example, trait extra-
version is associated with the increased incidence of reasoning
errors on valid syllogisms, despite
expressing greater confidence in their erroneous decisions
(Papageorgiou et al., 2012). However,
other research suggests that this same trait can result in more
effective reasoning, provided the
reasoning task is related to the trait of extraversion (Fumero,
Santamaría, & Johnson-Laird, 2011).
Finally, research has also been able to link several personality
traits, such as extraversion and neu-
roticism, to moral reasoning (Athota, O’Connor, & Jackson,
2010).
Person-by-Situation Debate
Although this will be elaborated in greater detail in Chapter 8,
which focuses on personality traits,
it is here noted that Mischel was squarely at the center of one of
the biggest controversies in psy-
chology. Researchers such as Mischel critiqued personality
researchers (specifically those studying
traits) for over-emphasizing the person when trying to predict
behavior. Mischel believed situ-
ational factors to be at least as important in determining
behavior as trait factors.
To support his point, Mischel had collected considerable data
on the behavior of schoolchildren in
different situations and concluded that there was minimal cross-
situational consistency, thereby
speaking to the explanatory power of situations rather than
traits. In 1968, Mischel published
his classic book Personality and Assessment, which critiqued

traits on two major grounds. First,
Mischel argued that traits only accounted for approximately 9%
of human behavior (i.e., aver-
age correlations of approximately .30), with these figures being
derived in part on his studies of
schoolchildren in different contexts. His second critique
suggested that traits were mere labels,
and therefore limited in their utility. Although the field of
personality did respond to these chal-
lenges, Mischel was instrumental in moving the field to a more
interaction-based approach to
understanding and predicting behavior.
6.5 Cognitive-Behavioral Approaches to Personality
There is considerable overlap in current cognitive and
cognitive-behavioral models of per-sonality (see Figure 6.3).
Still, one way to differentiate between the two approaches is to
look at the way they were influenced by various other
disciplines. Whereas cognitive theory
was highly influenced by computer models, as well as by
linguistics and anthropology, cognitive-
behavioral models emerged out of the behavioral tradition. As a
result, cognitive-behavioral theo-
rists have a somewhat different orientation, which is evident in
their use of behavioral concepts
and therapies. It is interesting to note that there are elements of
a cognitive approach in the much
earlier work of some psychoanalytic theorists, such as Karen
Horney, Otto Rank, and Alfred Adler,
all of whom influenced Aaron Beck, whose work is discussed in
this section (Sperry, 1999). Some
of the theoretical work that underlies personality theory, which
emerged from the cognitive-
behavioral tradition within clinical psychology, is here
reviewed.

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Personality
Ellis’s Rational-Emotive Therapy
Albert Ellis is generally recognized as having launched the
cognitive revolution in psychother-
apy. His Rational-Emotive Therapy (RET) [(later changed to
Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy
(REBT)] was one of the earliest applications of the cognitive
model to psychotherapy. It emerged
in the mid-1950s (Ellis & Harper, 1961) and was at the
forefront of the cognitive revolution. Ellis
claims that REBT “had an implicit theory of personality” (Ellis,
1974, p. 309). A later text, published
shortly after his death in 2007, at age 90, presented a more
formal theory of personality (Ellis,
Abrams, & Abrams, 2009).
Ellis’s basic tenet is that irrational thinking (a decidedly
cognitive event) is the central cause of
human suffering. His theory is partly derived from the work of
Alfred Adler (1923), who believed
that humans constantly evaluate and give meaning to events in
their lives. Ellis acknowledges the
influence of Karen Horney (1950), who talked about the
“tyranny of shoulds” (as in “I should have
done that,” “I should act like this,” etc.). He also was
influenced by the work of Julian Rotter (1954),
who emphasized the cognitive aspects of learning and
personality theory (Arnkoff & Glass, 1992).
More specifically, Ellis believed that it is not the actions of

others, the defeats we experience, the
problems of the external world, or other events that cause
suffering, but the way we think about
or interpret these events.
The fundamental component of personality disorders, explained
Ellis, is “irrationality.” Irra-
tional beliefs are what lead to emotional, cognitive, and
behavioral disturbances (Ellis et al.,
2009). Ellis (1974) developed the ABC theory to explain how
beliefs (either rational or irratio-
nal) lead to emotional and behavioral outcomes. In this theory,
A 5 Activating Experience;
Figure 6.3: The influence of different disciplines on the
cognitive and
cognitive-behavioral models
Anthropology
Cognitive-Behavioral
Linguistics
Computer
Science
Cognitive
Behavioral
This figure illustrates the somewhat distinct
fields influencing the emergence of the
cognitive and cognitive-behavioral models.
Lec81110_06_c06_163-194.indd 183 5/21/15 12:39 PM

Personality
B 5 Belief System; and C5Consequence (i.e., emotional
consequence). Whereas many people
might directly attribute an event or experience to a particular
outcome or consequence—that
is, A S C—according to Ellis’s ABC theory, point B, our belief
system, determines our emotional
outcome (C) to our experiences (A)—that is, A S B S C. How
we think about an experience
determines our emotional reaction to it. For example, if your car
is stolen in a big city you’ve never
been to before (A), then the way you think about it (B) will
determine your emotional state (C).
You can, for example, believe that cities are dangerous places
and that perhaps there are criminals
who have targeted you for a crime. This would obviously lead to
a more anxious and paranoid
emotional state. You can believe that car theft happens
everywhere, in towns big and small, and
that you simply were unlucky in this instance. Such thinking
about the event will likely lead to far
less anxiety, and perhaps none at all.
If we apply the ABCs of REBT to personality development, we
can arrive at a basic understanding
of how personality patterns develop. Based on variations in
biologically based emotional response
tendencies, individuals are going to be shaped by the
conditioning patterns present in their social-
cultural environment. Those who are sensitive to rejection
might begin to interpret minor rejec-

tions as too awful to bear and develop a conditioned response
pattern of avoiding situations in
which they might be rejected. This behavior pattern will
continue to be shaped by the individual’s
beliefs and may become firmly entrenched. As a result, the
individual might later be described as
having a shy, withdrawn, avoidant personality.
Beck’s Cognitive Theory and Therapy
Aaron Beck, though psychoanalytically trained, was interested
in developing a treatment approach
that would be brief, in contrast with the traditional
psychoanalytic approaches that were sometimes
astonishingly lengthy, often lasting many years (Beck, 1967).
Like Ellis, Beck became disenchanted
with the analytic model and began to use aspects of cognitive
science’s information-processing
model. One construct that proved especially useful in the
development of his theory was that of the
schema—the individual’s internal representations (private
thoughts, beliefs, and emotions).
Beck was intrigued by evidence suggesting that depressed
patients’ views of the world are dis-
torted by negative thinking and misattributions about
themselves and the world. Accordingly,
Beck began to use the rules of evidence and logical argument to
change the depressed patient’s
cognitive distortions (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979). He
too believed that the way we perceive
and how we interpret situations shape our emotions and
behaviors. If the therapist can change
these perceptions and make the patient think more rationally,
personality disorders might well
be resolved. The therapeutic approach Beck developed describes
specific cognitive distortions

that characterize various neurotic conditions, and it outlines
how the general principles of cog-
nitive therapy can be used to treat these conditions, as well as
to treat depression (Beck et al.,
1979). Importantly, just as the social learning theorists tried to
explain and predict the behavior of
most individuals, practitioners like Ellis and Beck were using
similar cognitive frameworks to effect
changes in those with problematic thinking.
A Cognitive Model of Depression
Beck’s interest in the clinical phenomenon of depression
culminated in the publication of the book
Cognitive Therapy of Depression (Beck et al., 1979), which
many consider a major development in
the treatment of depression, and he later addressed personality
disorders, developing his cogni-
tive theory of personality (Beck & Freeman, 1990; Beck,
Freeman, & Davis, 2004).
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Personality
There is evidence that personality factors play a role in the
development of depression (Klein,
Kupfer, & Shea, 1993). The cognitive model of depression
suggests that there may be important
links among overlapping cognitive schema (thoughts and
beliefs), and as maladaptive thoughts
become well rehearsed and automated, the problems are more
likely to manifest in the form of

personality. Moreover, the relationship between personality and
depression may be reciprocal.
Thus, just as irrational beliefs (schema) are at the root of
personality disorders, so too can certain
personality features, such as high emotionality (neuroticism),
make one more vulnerable to the
effects of loss or personal failure, either of which can
precipitate depression (see Figure 6.4).
Similarly, a highly confrontational and demanding individual
may have trouble maintaining attach-
ments and may have to deal with the emotional consequences of
poor relationships.
Figure 6.4: The highly interdependent nature of mood and
personality
Neuroticism can result in
one overreacting to aversive
outcomes, which can lead to
a negative mood state. If this
occurs with sufficient frequency,
then more durable aversive
mood states (e.g., depression)
may occur.
Interdependence
of personality
and mood
High
neuroticism
Sad mood
state

Overreact to
most outcomes
(catastrophes)
Durable and
more intense
sad mood
(depression)
Beck et al. (1979) present a compelling information-processing
model that identifies predisposing
factors for depression. The theory proposes that negative
concepts about the self, the external
world, and the future result from our early experiences. These
negative concepts are encoded in
schema that we may be unaware of but can be activated by
situations similar to the experiences
that first led to the negative schema. For example, if you had a
parent who left the home while
you were young, you might be more likely to detect
abandonment cues, such as someone show-
ing decreased interest, and this leads you to interpret even
benign information consistent with a
schema based on abandonment. Thus, the theory describes
cognitive distortions associated with
depression as primitive rather than mature ways of thinking (see
Table 6.2).
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Personality

Table 6.2: Application of the information-processing model to
the
thinking of the depressed individual
Arbitrary inference (a response set) the process of drawing a
specific conclusion in the absence of
evidence to support that conclusion, or when the evidence is
contrary to the conclusion.
Selective abstraction (a stimulus set) focusing on a detail
(fragment) taken out of context, ignoring
other, more salient, features of the situation, and
conceptualizing the whole experience on the basis
of the fragment.
Overgeneralization (a response set) the pattern of drawing a
general rule or conclusion on the basis
of one or more isolated incidents and applying the concept
across the board to related and unrelated
situations.
Magnification and minimization (a response set) errors made in
evaluating the significance or
magnitude of an event. These errors are seen as being so gross
as to constitute a distortion.
Personalization (a response set) the tendency to relate external
events to oneself when there is no
basis for drawing such a conclusion.
Absolutistic, dichotomous thinking (a response set) the
tendency to place all experiences in one or
two opposite categories; for example, flawless or defective,
immaculate or filthy, saint or sinner. In
describing himself, the patient selects the extreme negative
categorization.

Source: From Beck, A. T., Rush, A. J., Shaw, B. F., & Emery,
G. (1979). Cognitive therapy of depression. New York: Guilford
Press, p. 14.
Reprinted by permission of Guilford Publications.
Beck’s success in therapy, even relative to pharmacologic
interventions (e.g., Hollon et al., 2005),
and the popularity of his approach led to the expansion of
descriptions of clinical syndromes and
a widening of the populations to whom it could be applied—
among others, individuals suffering
from anxiety, pain, substance abuse, and eventually even those
with personality disorders. The
latter is an especially compelling area because of the prevalence
of personality disorders and the
difficulty of effectively treating them. Cognitive therapy not
only suggests how disorders might be
treated, but also emphasizes the importance of empirical support
for the approach.
Applying Cognitive-Behavior Therapy (CBT) to Personality
Theory
Beck described how an information-processing model can use
personality schema to character-
ize how those with different personalities organize their belief
systems (Beck & Freeman, 1990;
Beck, Freeman, & Davis, 2004). Personality schemas are
anchored in the individual’s behaviors,
thoughts, and affect. As with the previously mentioned social
learning model, Beck believed that
education, training, modeling, reinforcement contingencies, and
cultural influences also influence
personality development. Beck’s theory also takes into
consideration how evolutionary history has

influenced how we think, perceive the world, and behave (Beck
& Freeman, 1990). Beck assumes
that both animal and human behaviors are programmed in the
sense that they are based on
an interaction of genetically determined structures and
experiences. Thus, individuals may have
various personality types that are genetically determined: Some
people are predisposed to attack
when threatened, others might freeze, and yet others go out of
their way to avoid danger. Each of
these patterns may have a certain adaptive survival value (Beck
& Emery, 1985).
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Personality
Confirmation Bias
Early experiences, especially those of a traumatic nature, also
have an important influence on
the development of our schema. Later, these schemata may be
reinforced by confirmatory bias,
meaning that information that matches the schema strengthens it
and that which fails to match
it is ignored or rejected. For example, those whose cognitive
schema is “I am bad” may well view
anger directed at them as confirmation of their badness. But
someone whose schema is “I am
good” may view other people’s anger as evidence of that
person’s irrationality.
In an interesting series of studies that demonstrate this

confirmation bias in people’s self-schemas,
Swann and colleagues demonstrated that depressed individuals
seek out feedback that confirms
their unfavorable self-assessments (see Swann, Chang-
Schneider, & McClarty, 2007). In addition,
the depressed participants also were the least likely to seek out
favorable feedback. These find-
ings are in keeping with a wide range of studies showing that
those with positive self-schemas
choose partners who appraised them favorably and validate their
self-views, whereas those with
negative self-views tend to choose partner interactions that
conform to self-verification (i.e.,
those who view them unfavorably) rather than self-enhancement
(see Swann, Stein-Seroussi, &
Giesler, 1992). In fact, with respect to relationships, individuals
with negative self-schemas tend
to feel more committed to those who likewise thought
negatively of them (De La Ronde & Swann,
1998; for a review, see Swann et al., 2007).
Strategies
Strategies may be likened to personality traits or patterns of
behavior, in that they “may be
regarded as forms of programmed behavior that are designed to
serve biological goals” (Beck
& Freeman, 1990, p. 25). Strategies are not necessarily
conscious, nor are all of them adaptive.
In fact, some can be highly maladaptive, depending on the
circumstances in which they are
expressed. For example, Beck notes that strategies such as
competitiveness and avoidance of
unpleasant outcomes are often adaptive. However, if you always
avoid minor unpleasantness,
such as might be associated with a visit to your doctor or

dentist, your strategy may, in the end,
be fatally maladaptive.
Various personality disorders are associated with primitive
strategies that characterize how
individuals adapt. For example, those with antisocial
personality disorder use a predatory strat-
egy; those with a dependent personality adopt a help-eliciting
strategy; and those with a com-
pulsive personality use a ritualistic (i.e., relying on behavioral
habits to reduce anxiety) style
(Pretzer & Beck, 1996). As we shall see in Chapter 10, the
disorders of personality explicitly
involve perceptions and interpretations of the self and others as
relevant to all diagnostic cri-
teria for personality disorders.
Beck’s Use of Schema
Beck’s theory of personality is based on an information-
processing model (Pretzer & Beck, 1996).
Individuals process data about themselves based on their beliefs
and other elements of their
cognitive organization (memory, perception, and the like). The
manner in which information is
interpreted shapes an individual’s response pattern. Therefore,
cognitive structures determine
how information affects behavior.
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Personality

One of the most important elements of Beck’s theoretical model
is his emphasis on schema (inter-
nal representations in the form of thoughts, feelings, and
beliefs). Schema may include infor-
mation about relationships, such as attitudes toward self and
others, as well as more objective
concrete or abstract categories. They can be narrow or wide in
scope, flexible or rigid, overtly
emotionally charged, or less obvious in their emotional content.
Research suggests that self-related schemas are automated (as
was the case for the above-noted
self-verification strivings) and often implicit, rather than
explicit (see Greenwald et al., 2002). For
example, it appears that cognitive representations of your self-
concept can be associated with fac-
tors central to defining your personality, such as traits and self-
esteem, and the speed with which
you make those associations can indicate how central they are
to your self-concept. Indeed, one of
the more recent directions in the psychological literature is to
consider implicit self-esteem (which
is based on automatic, self-evaluative processes) to be as, if not
more, important than explicit self-
esteem (e.g., Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Koole, Dijksterhuis, &
van Knippenberg, 2001); tests like
the Implicit Association Test (IAT) are one of the preferred
approaches for assessing such implicit
schemas (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000; also see the discussion
on the IAT in the assessment sec-
tion of this chapter).
An essential aspect of this theoretical model concerns how
impulses are controlled or inhibited.
Impulses may be thought of as “wants” that might be
encouraged or inhibited by beliefs. Beliefs

are the “should” and “should nots” that color our schema. At
times, they may exert a counterforce
on our impulses and wishes (I wish to punch someone who hurts
me, but I do not do so because
of my belief that it is wrong to act in violence). At other times,
they may encourage our impulses
(I feel like having an ice cream cone, and I will have one
because I believe I deserve one after all
these hours of hard studying).
In a sense, the internal control system represents how
individuals communicate with themselves.
Our personality functioning is guided by our schema and by
how our internal communication
system operates to evaluate, assimilate, and encode information.
When we function well, we can
modify schema to respond flexibly to the demands of our
environment, but in cases of personal-
ity dysfunction, maladaptive schemata tend to be inflexible and
self-perpetuating. Schemata are
sometimes maintained through a variety of faulty information-
processing mechanisms. Cognitive
distortions such as dichotomous thinking (using either-or
categories such as “I am good or bad”),
selective abstraction (focusing only on one stimulus and
ignoring other contradictory informa-
tion), and catastrophic thinking (expecting, for example, a
future event to be unbearable) are but
a few of these (Pretzer, 2004).
An important aspect of Beck’s work has been his efforts to
provide an evidence base for cognitive
psychotherapy. Other researchers, like Marsha Linehan, also
extended Beck’s work.
Linehan’s Cognitive-Behavioral Model

Many theoretical developments that have contributed to the
development of personality theory
have resulted from the need for new therapeutic approaches for
severe personality disorders. This
was the case with Marsha Linehan, who developed a cognitive-
behavioral model of personality,
referred to as Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT), based on her
work with individuals suffering
from severe personality disorders. Linehan’s (1993) model of
personality is biosocial: It maintains
that both genetic predispositions for emotional problems
(biology) and the social environment
are responsible for the creation of personality disorder. Thus,
for Linehan, personality exists in a
relational context and is fluid, changing largely as a function of
our perspective.
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CHAPTER 6 6.6 Assessment Strategies and Tools From the
Cognitive Perspective
Linehan’s model is primarily a treatment model; unlike Freud’s
model, it is not intended as a grand
theory of personality. However, by developing a treatment
model that has shown robust empirical
support, she has demonstrated that DBT methods are also
effective as an explanatory framework
for personality (i.e., they can help explain why a patient is
having problems, as well as providing a
direct method to change those problems).
One important distinction between DBT and Beck’s CBT is that
Linehan emphasizes mindfulness

in order to become aware of automatic thoughts so as to then
allow such thoughts to pass. In
contrast, Beck makes patients aware of automatic thoughts, but
the goal of CBT is to actively inter-
rupt those thoughts and replace them with more adaptive
thoughts. Another important contribu-
tion of this model is that it blends theoretical elements that
include biological, relational, cogni-
tive, behavioral, and systemic components. Linehan (1993)
believes that attempting to categorize
behavior into the various modes traditionally used by cognitive-
behaviorists—motoric, cognitive-
verbal, and physiological—is artificial, such that when both
covert and overt behaviors are con-
sidered, all of the categories are implicated. For example, she
describes how motor behavior,
expressed by actions of our skeletal muscular system, can be
overt and covert. She also explains
how activities such as problem solving, thinking, perceiving,
speaking, reading, and writing are
cognitive-verbal behaviors that have parallel motoric and
physiological events. At a physiological
level, there are the many activities related to functioning of the
nervous system and of glands
and smooth muscles. The results of most of these physiological
activities are usually covert (e.g.,
heartbeat) but can also be overt (e.g., blushing and crying).
Thus, Linehan sees each of the tradi-
tional behavioral categories as one piece of a larger, unified set
of experiences.
6.6 Assessment Strategies and Tools From
the Cognitive Perspective
Cognitive theorists have a strong foundation in empiricism and
therefore value objective assessment instruments. Assessment of

personality based on a cognitive model relies on the assumption
that various personality configurations share identifiable types
of schemata
(Beck & Freeman, 1990; Young, 1994). Most assessment tools
are self-administered scales that
are then scored by a clinician. A sampling of the instruments
commonly employed will be here
reviewed.
Kelly’s Repertory Grid
Kelly’s (1955) theoretical work resulted in the development of
the Repertory Grid, a method for
accessing the personal constructs of individuals. Kelly adopted
a very straightforward method
for assessing constructs by focusing on how we perceive the
important people in our lives. After
generating a list of important individuals (e.g., mother and
father figures, siblings, current and
ex-boyfriends/girlfriends, employer—15 in all), the respondent
is asked to compare three indi-
viduals at a time and note how two of the three are similar on a
construct yet different from the
third individual on that same construct. For example, when
comparing your father, ex-boyfriend/
girlfriend, and employer, one might conclude that your father
and ex-boyfriend both have a good
sense of humor, while your employer does not (e.g.. “funny –
not funny”). The respondent would
then continue to make all possible three-person comparisons,
generating new constructs for each.
The resulting list of constructs could then be analyzed (Kelly
did so mathematically) to identify
common/recurrent themes, with those representing core or
superordinate constructs.
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Beck Depression Inventory (BDI)
Beck (Beck et al., 1979) developed one of the most widely used
instruments to assess depression:
the Beck Depression Inventory, which was revised most
recently in 1996 (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown,
1996). This 21-item inventory was devel-
oped to identify the cognitive features of
depression, emphasizing such concepts
as self-reported withdrawal, sense of
failure, sadness, guilt, self-dislike, indeci-
siveness, and the like. The items include
four-response choices ordered in terms
of severity, and respondents focus on the
most recent two weeks of time in order
to match the DSM-IV criteria for major
depression. The total scale score results
in labels of minimal depression to severe
depression, with norms collected on 500
outpatients and a college student sam-
ple. The BDI-II has strong psychometric
properties, thereby making it a popular
inventory.
Other Depression Inventories
Although the BDI is one of the most commonly used measures,
a number of other self-report
depression inventories are used widely in research and clinical
practice to assess the cognitive
manifestations of depression.

The Center for Epidemiological Studies in Depression
When assessing the construct of depression in the general
population, the Center for Epide-
miological Studies in Depression scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977)
is one of the better normed and
more effective self-report measures when assessing less severe
forms of depression. The CES-D
is a 20-item inventory with Likert ratings on how frequently a
particular experience has occurred
within the past week. Although it is primarily intended for use
in the general population, there are
geriatric norms, and it adopts a clinical cutoff score of 16.
The Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression
The Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression is like the BDI in
that it is used to capture depression
scores that fall more within the clinical range. Item
endorsements denote symptom severity, with
scores of 20 and higher denoting moderate, severe, or very
severe depression (Hedlung & Vieweg,
1979). Other versions of the scale have also been developed.
Anxiety Inventories
The construct of anxiety is also commonly assessed and is a
central component of clinical and
personality research. Two of the more commonly used scales are
here reviewed.
Aman Khan/iStockphoto/Thinkstock
This person appears depressed behaviorally. The
challenge is capturing that affective state in an objective
manner and quantifying it.

Lec81110_06_c06_163-194.indd 190 5/21/15 12:39 PM
The Beck Anxiety Inventory
The Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck & Steer, 1990) is a 21-
item symptom listing that requires
respondents to endorse the extent to which they experience each
symptom, ranging from “not at
all” to “severely,” and it is intended for those aged 17–80 years
of age. Items reflect two general
factors, one measuring somatic symptoms (e.g., sweating,
numbness, tingling, etc.) and one mea-
suring cognitive features of anxiety. Scores range from 0 to 63,
though scores above 23 typically
denote severe anxiety.
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch,
& Lushene, 1970) was first published
in 1970 but was then revised in 1983 (Spielberger, Gorssuch,
Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983). The
inventory assesses state anxiety as well as trait anxiety in
adults. Responses are based on a 4-point
Likert scale, and scores range from 20 to 80, with higher scores
indicating greater anxiety. The psy-
chometric properties of the STAI have been shown to be
adequate (Rule & Traver, 1983).
Implicit Association Test

The Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, &
Schwartz, 1998) is computer-based task
that asks respondents to categorize concepts with a particular
attribute. For example, one might be
asked to categorize the concepts of “white” and “black” with
favorable (e.g., “sunshine,” “happy,”
etc.) and unfavorable (e.g., “war,” “vomit,” etc.) attributes. The
typical design requires respondents
to match both concepts to both sets of attributes and records
reaction times to assess the extent
to which some associations are more natural (i.e., more easily
made and therefore more readily
associated from a cognitive standpoint) relative to others.
Because this assessment is thought to
access more automatic associations, it is considered better than
self-report measures that can
be more affected by demand characteristics (see Nosek,
Greenwald, & Banaji, 2005). Of course,
debate continues on the constructs assessed with the IAT, with
some research suggesting that it
assesses knowledge of associations, rather than whether one
actually has a particular association.
You can take the Implicit Association Test at the link below to
find out more about any implicit
biases you might have: https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/.
Possible Selves and Self-Schemas
The assessment of possible selves is to assess a number of
possible (hypothetical) selves that an
individual might have at any time in his or her life. These can
include multiple manifestations of an
“ideal self,” future possible selves (which includes the ideal
self), as well as current and past pos-
sible selves. Possible selves can also be assessed for their
valence (positive or negative).

Two distinct approaches for measuring possible selves have
been forwarded in the empirical lit-
erature. An open-ended version is primarily intended for use
with child and adolescent samples,
whereas with adult samples, a closed-ended approach is
preferred. In the latter, the focus often
involves identifying the number of positive and negative
possible selves as well as the affective
ratings associated with these possible selves (Markus & Nurius,
1986).
A second instrument, the Brief Core Schema Scales (BCSS),
provides a self-reported assessment
of schemata concerning self and others but specifically targets
those experiencing psychosis. The
Lec81110_06_c06_163-194.indd 191 5/21/15 12:39 PM
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/
CHAPTER 6Summary
BCSS assesses four dimensions of self and other evaluation:
negative-self, positive-self, negative-
other, positive-other. In the initial validation of the instrument,
individuals experiencing psychosis
and in cognitive therapy were compared to students. The BCSS
appears to have reasonably good
psychometric properties (Fowler et al., 2006).
Cultural Influences and Differences
There is little research at this time that looks at the applicability
of the cognitive model to other
cultures. Even though the cognitive model does not pay much

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