Interpersonal Paper Assignment After watching a film .docx

Interpersonal Paper Assignment
After watching a film from the attached list, you will write a 2-
3 page paper (typed, double-spaced, one inch
margins, 12 point font) discussing the communication concepts
found within the movie. Please answer the
following questions in paragraph format.
In addition to the 2-3 pages, include a cover sheet with your
name, class day, and class time.
1. Choose two concepts from the list below.
2. First define and explain in your own words your
understanding of the concepts AND their sub-categories.
3. Next, use specific examples from the movie to further
demonstrate your understanding of the concepts
and their relation to individual characters or relationships.
Chapter 7 Concepts
1. Social Penetration Model
2. Johari Window
a. Open
b. Hidden
c. Blind
d. Unknown
3. Relational Spirals
a. Positive

b. Negative
c. Cyclical
Chapter 8 Concepts
1. Types of Friendships
2. Parenting Styles
Chapter 9 Concepts
1. Stages of Romantic Relationships (include all relevant stages
you saw in the movie)
2. Love Languages
3. Dialectical Perspectives
4. Deception in Romantic Relationships
5. Conflict Expression Styles
Sample format for paper:
I. Introduction
A. Attention- Getter
B. Thesis
C. Preview
II. Body
A. Concept 1
a. Definition
b. Examples
B. Concept 2
a. Definition
b. Examples
III. Conclusion
A. Review
B. Effective Last Statement
Extra Credit (up to 10 points) – Choose another concept listed
on this paper to examine and write a one-page
response that answers the questions listed above. Please label
this section EXTRA CREDIT on a separate page.

MOVIES TO CHOOSE FROM
When Harry Met Sally
Office Space
Remember the Titans
Mr. Holland’s Opus
Steel Magnolias
You’ve Got Mail
Hitch
Dead Poet’s Society
Almost Famous
Crash
Elizabethtown
Fried Green Tomatoes
Good Will Hunting
One Flew over the Cuckoo’s Nest
Knocked Up
Shallow Hal
How To Lose a Guy in Ten Days
Love Actually
Mona Lisa Smile
The Notebook
Garden State
Shawshank Redemption
Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind
Forrest Gump
Little Miss Sunshine
Walk the Line
Chasing Amy
8 Mile
The War
Juno

Fight Club
40 Year Old Virgin
He’s Just Not That into You
The Curious Case of Benjamin Button
Slumdog Millionaire
Journal of Contemporary China, 2016
Vol. 25, no. 100, 628–642
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2015.1132961
Establishing Confucius Institutes: a tool for promoting China’s
soft
power?
Ying Zhoua and Sabrina Lukb
aWuhan university, China; bKunming university of Science and
technology, China
1. Introduction
The rise of China as a global power is undoubtedly one of the
major transformations of the post-Cold
War international system. There are a lot of figures and facts
demonstrating China’s rise to economic
and political power. However, China’s rise has drawn
worldwide attention. Western powers and media
have propagated the ‘China threat’ arguments,1 which claim
that China will overthrow the existing world

order. In response to the ‘China threat’ argument, Chinese
leaders have identified suitable diplomatic
strategies which allay Western concerns to ensure the smooth
rise of China. Since the beginning of this
new century, Chinese foreign policy has gone through a
significant change. Deng Xiaoping’s teaching
of ‘lay low, never take the lead, and bide our time’ has been
replaced by the concepts of ‘peaceful rise’
and ‘harmonious world’ in the Hu–Wen era. These two concepts
show that ‘China will try to avoid mil-
itary conflict with neighboring countries and will respect the
international order in the course of its
rise’.2 Following former President Hu Jintao’s foreign policy
line, the central government adopted a soft
power approach that aims to promote Chinese culture
internationally. Since 2000 the term ‘soft power’,
coined by Joseph Nye, has gained considerable currency in
China’s official and scholarly community.
The concept of soft power is popular in China because it
resonates with the idea of peaceful rise and
harmonious world. It helps ‘fend off the China threat argument,
and to assure the world about the
peaceful nature of a rising China’.3 According to Nye, soft
power refers to ‘the ability to get what you
1herbett yee and ian Storey, eds, The China Threat: Perceptions,
Myths and Reality (london: routledge Curzon press, 2002); rex
li,
‘the China threat: theoretic perspectives and policy
implications’, Journal of Contemporary China 8(22), (1999), p.
445.
2Baohui Zhang, ‘Chinese foreign policy in transition: trends
and implications’, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 2(39),
(2010), pp.
39–68.

3hongyi lai, ‘introduction: the soft power concept and a rising
China’, in hongyi lai and yiyi lu, eds, China’s Soft Power and
International Relations (london and new york: routledge, 2012),
p. 2.
ABSTRACT
Soft power has become China’s new diplomatic tool to spread
its influence
in today’s changing international landscape. The establishment
of Confucius
Institutes (CIs) since 2004 to promote the understanding of
Chinese
language and culture is a striking example of how the
government promotes
soft power through cultural means. Through the macro- and
micro-level
analysis of CIs, this study shows that CIs fail to increase the
soft power of
China because many countries regard CIs as a propaganda tool
and a threat
to academic freedom and the local community. It shows that
China’s soft
power is not so attractive in the eyes of receivers. In fact,
China’s aggressive
cultural initiatives through the establishment of CIs have
triggered another
version of the ‘China threat’.
© 2016 informa uK limited, trading as taylor & francis Group
CONTACT ying Zhou [email protected]
mailto:[email protected]

JourNAL oF CoNTemPorArY CHINA 629
want through attraction rather than coercion or payment’.4
Culture, political values and foreign policies
are identified by Nye as three resources of soft power. In China,
however, the Chinese elites emphasize
‘culture as a source of national power’.5 In particular, cultural
tools have become one of the primary
tools for China to cultivate its soft power. Although China is
experiencing power transition, there is no
sign that the new leaders will overlook this soft power
approach. President Xi Jinping puts forth the
concept of the ‘Chinese dream’ and states clearly that ‘the
concept of the Chinese dream and the path of
peaceful development are consistent with each other’.6 In Xi’s
view, the path of peaceful development
is the one and only way to realize the Chinese dream. The
Chinese government has placed soft power
high on their foreign policy agenda. They believe that soft
power is extremely important for improving
China’s image abroad and dampening the perception of China as
a threat, which in turn lays a good
foundation for China’s peaceful rise in the international
community and contributes to constructing
the Chinese dream.
It has been clearly documented that the Chinese government has
made concerted efforts to adopt
soft power diplomacy through cultural means at both the policy
formation and implementation lev-
els. The soft power initiatives are carried out prominently by
government agencies, which include the
establishment of cultural centers and schools in foreign
countries, implementing international academic
exchanges, transnational expansion of national media, playing
national image films, and organizing

numerous concerts and exhibitions overseas. one of the most
striking examples is the establishment of
Confucius Institutes (hereafter CIs) in foreign countries to
promote learning of Chinese language and cul-
ture to the world. Since their establishment in 2004, CIs have
gained momentum and expanded rapidly.
on the one hand, China’s ever growing prominence on the
international stage has made people around
the world eager to know more about China; ‘Increasingly,
mastery of the Chinese language is seen as
an indispensable tool for understanding China’.7 Hence, it has
sped up the establishment of the CIs. on
the other hand, CIs serve as a diplomatic platform to project
China’s soft power and have attracted a
high level of attention. The concept of CIs has been written into
the ‘resolution’ of the Sixth Plenum of
the 17th CCP Central Committee.8 By the end of 2014, Chinese
party leaders and government officials
had participated in the CIs’ activities hundreds of times and
members of the Standing Committee of
the Political Bureau, which is the most important decision-
making body of China, have stopped by CIs
more than 80 times and guided the work there. President Xi has
paid several visits to CIs over the past
few years, demonstrating that he does not downplay CI
programs. Instead, he goes to great lengths
to manage the CI project so as to promote soft power which has
been rooted in Xi’s concept of the
Chinese dream.9 Hence, it shows that the CIs serve as an
important lens to illustrate China’s pursuit of
soft power. For this reason, the study of CIs is conducive to
providing a better understanding of China’s
soft power and its implications for the rise of China.
over the past decade, the mainstream literature of China’s soft
power by and large focused on the

major tools China has used to cultivate soft power and polish its
image abroad. These tools include policy
discourse (especially ‘peaceful rise’), charm offensive foreign
policy, economic diplomacy and trade,
cultural and public diplomacy, and so on. The establishment of
CIs is one of the frequently explored
empirical cases that are put under the framework of cultural and
public diplomacy in order to examine
the effectiveness of China’s soft power. Some scholars have
argued that China’s soft power is rising in
developing countries due to Beijing’s impressive cultural
initiatives (including the construction of CIs).
4Joseph nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World
Politics (new york: public affairs, 2004), p. x.
5‘how to improve China’s soft power?’, People’s Daily, (11
march 2010), available at: http://english.peopledaily.com.
cn/90001/90776/90785/6916487.htm (accessed 12 november
2011).
6Wang yi, ‘Jianchi hepingfazhan, shixian minzufuxing
zhongguomeng’ [‘adhere to peaceful development and achieve
national rejuve-
nation of Chinese dream’], Xuexi shibao [Study Times], (17
february 2014), available at:
http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2014/0217/
c40531-24378766.htmlm (accessed 23 february 2014).
7hongyi lai, ‘China’s cultural diplomacy: going for soft power’,
in lai and lu, eds, China’s Soft Power and International
Relations, p. 91.
8‘the full text of the third plenary Session of 18th CpC
Congress report’, Xinhuanet, (14 november 2013), available at:
http://news.

xinhuanet.com/house/tj/2013-11-14/c_118121513.htm (accessed
15 november 2013).
9‘Xijinping: kongzixueyuan shuyu zhongguo yeshuyu shijie’
[‘Xijinping: Confucius institute belongs to China as well as to
the world’],
Xinhuanet, (27 September 2014), available at:
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-
09/27/c_1112652079.htm (accessed 27
September 2014).
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90785/6916487.
htm
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90785/6916487.
htm
http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2014/0217/c40531-
24378766.htmlm
http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2014/0217/c40531-
24378766.htmlm
http://news.xinhuanet.com/house/tj/2013-11-
14/c_118121513.htm
http://news.xinhuanet.com/house/tj/2013-11-
14/c_118121513.htm
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-
09/27/c_1112652079.htm
630 Y. ZHou AND S. Luk
They think that China’s improved soft power helps reduce the
‘China threat’ and makes China become
an appealing partner, which is conducive to China’s peaceful
rise. They think that the establishment
of CIs can enhance China’s soft power representation as it has
triggered the ‘Chinese fever’ in some
regions based on various case studies.10 However, many

scholars argue that the establishment of CIs
could not boost China’s soft power. They think that ‘it is a
wrong standard for measuring CIs’ success
from the standpoint of expanding Chinese soft power and it
should be understood as a tool of cultural
diplomacy or public diplomacy with Chinese characteristics’.11
These studies think that CIs have a polit-
ical agenda and serve as the propaganda tool of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) because CIs are
under the auspices of the Party and the state.12 most of the
existing literature argues that CIs’ failure
in promoting China’s soft power is attributed to China’s
unbalanced soft power resources with afflu-
ent traditional culture but disadvantaged political conditions,
especially the non-democratic power.13
They argue that the image of CCP and Chinese authoritarianism,
diplomatic relations with dictators,
domestic problems, emerging Chinese nationalism and China’s
assertiveness in its foreign policy are
impediments to boosting China’s soft power.14
Since the Chinese leadership geared CIs towards national soft
power rhetorically and theoretically,
previous literatures never doubt the connection between CIs and
soft power. They take it for granted
that CIs will increase China’s soft power. They measured CIs’
effectiveness for China’s soft power either
through looking at the increase of CIs worldwide or examining
the responses of targeted foreign audi-
ences. They came to this conclusion without paying careful
attention to the way China carries out the
CI project and China’s motivations behind the establishment of
CIs. or they only partially examined
the micro-level factors (CIs in targeted countries) and barely
considered the macro-level factors (CIs’
distribution, management and operation worldwide). However,

this study is not going to follow this
logic to measure the effectiveness of CIs. Instead, it doubts
whether the connection between CIs and soft
power really exists. The purpose of this study examines whether
China uses CIs to expand its national
soft power. The research questions are as follows. (1) What are
the functions of CIs? (2) What are the
motivations behind the establishment of CIs? (3) How do CIs fit
into the definition of soft power? (4)
What are the implications of CIs for China’s soft power and
foreign policy? In order to answer these
questions, this study will use data collected from multiple
sources. It includes documentation (official
documents, governments publications, annual reports of CIs,
scholarship literatures etc.), participant
observations in CI classrooms, and semi-structured interviews
with directors and faculty members of
CIs. Participant observations mainly took place in the CI of
kogakuin university and the CI of Waseda
university in Tokyo, Japan from may 2010 to march 2012.
Interviews with Hanban officials and CI faculties
were intermittently conducted in China, Japan, the uS and the
uk from June 2010 to June 2014. For
methods, in order to fill the research gap, this article conducts a
comprehensive analysis of CIs at both
the macro level and the micro level. The macro-level analysis
focuses on the geographical distribution
of CIs and on the operation as a whole while the micro-level
focuses on the operation of individual CIs.
Through systematic analysis, this article argues that CIs have
not been a tool for enhancing China’s soft
10Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft
Power is Transforming the World? (new haven, Ct: yale
university press,
2007), pp. 2–5; Sheng Ding and robert a. Saunders, ‘talking up

China: an analysis of China’s rising cultural power and global
pro-
motion of the Chinese language’, East Asia 2(23), (2006), pp.
3–33.
11James f. paradise, ‘China and international harmony: the role
of Confucius institutes in bolstering Beijing’s soft power’,
Asian
Survey 4(49), (2009), pp. 647–669; falk hartig, ‘Confucius
institutes and the rise of China’, Journal of Chinese Political
Sciences
17, (2012), pp. 53–76.
12anne-marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship (new york: roman
& littlefield publishers, inc., 2008); Jocelyn Chey, ‘Chinese soft
power:
cultural diplomacy and the Confucius institutes’, The Sydney
Papers 20(1), (2008), pp. 32–46; Kingsley edney, ‘Soft power
and
Chinese propaganda system’, Journal of Contemporary China
21(78), (2012), pp. 899–914; Don Starr, ‘Chinese language
education
in europe: the Confucius institutes’, European Journal of
Education 44(1), (2009), pp. 65–82.
13ingrid d’hooghe, The Limits of China’s Soft Power in Europe:
Beijing’s Public Diplomacy Puzzle, (the hague: netherlands
institute
of international relations Clingendael, 2010), p. 32; Gill Bates
and yanzhong huang, ‘Sources and limits of Chinese soft
power’,
Survival 2(48), (2006), p. 30.
14mingjiang li, ‘Domestic sources of China’s soft power
approach’, China Security 2(5), (2009), pp. 34–49; also see
mingjiang li, ed.,

Soft Power: China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics
(lanham, mD: lexington Books, 2009).
power. This is because the operation of CIs can hardly fit into
the definition of soft power. Besides, the
economic, political and diplomatic imperatives behind this
project overshadow China’s attractiveness.
The rest of this article is organized into four sections. Section II
is an overview of the establishment
of CIs and examines whether CIs fit into soft power. Section III
provides a comprehensive analysis of
the distribution pattern, management, characteristics and
operation of CIs, discussing the research
findings and implications. Section IV presents the controversies
and concerns over the establishment
of CI. Section V is the conclusion.
2. The establishment of Confucius Institutes and their
incorporation of soft power
In practice, establishing CIs in foreign countries has become
China’s main effort to enhance soft power. CI
is a non-profit public institution that aims to promote Chinese
language and culture. It typically partners
with academic institutions or other organizations through which
it can offer language teaching services
and hold Chinese culture promoting activities. They are
operated under the auspices of the office of
Chinese Language Council International, which is called
Hanban in Chinese and is under the authority
of the ministry of education. Hanban is governed by a leading
group made up of representatives from

12 state ministries and government agencies.15 After
establishing a pilot CI in Tashkent, uzbekistan in
June 2004, the first CI was established on 21 November 2004 in
Seoul, republic of korea and many
more have been established since in all five continents. By the
end of 2014, more than 475 CIs and the
extension form of 851 Confucius Classrooms had been
established or formally contracted in over 120
countries and regions. According to Hanban, there are many
overseas inquiries concerning the setting
up of CIs. In 2013, Hanban published ‘The Development Plan of
Confucius Institutes (2012–2020)’ and
planned to establish 1,000 CIs by 2020. In order to manage this
project well, Hanban established the
CI Headquarters (two names, one organization with Hanban) in
Beijing in 2005 and the CI conference
has been held annually in Beijing since then. All CIs have
certain commonalities, including their pledge
to abide by the ‘Constitution and By Law’ and requirements laid
down by Hanban. However, there are
considerable variations among CIs. For example, the CI at
Waseda university in Japan is research-ori-
ented while the CI in Los Angeles is culture-oriented. each CI
takes advantage of its own uniqueness
to develop rich and diverse educational and cultural activities.
In this way, CIs have gradually formed
their own teaching modes and become an important place for
people to learn Chinese language and
understand Chinese culture. Hanban provides the initiative fund
for each new CI and supports it with
an annual budget. Funds are used to purchase teaching materials
and to pay the salaries of one or two
Chinese instructors who agree to reside in the host institution.
While the Chinese partner supplies the
teaching staff and materials, the host university is responsible
for providing accommodation, infrastruc-

ture and administrative support. Two directors from each
institute co-administer the CI’s activities and
operation. Since the establishment of CIs, the Chinese
government has been heavily financing the CI
programs, dispatching teachers and volunteers to CIs, training
local teachers and supplying learning
materials (see Table 1). This is attributed to Beijing’s
incorporation of soft power and its desire to promote
China’s soft power through the CIs.
The concept of soft power was coined by Joseph Nye, who
refers to ‘the ability to get what you
want through attraction rather than coercion or payment’.16
According to Nye, the tangibility of
the resources and the nature of behavior distinguish soft power
from hard power. As depicted in
Table 2, soft power resources come from a country’s culture,
political values and foreign policy whereas
the spectrum of behavior varies from command to co-opt.17
Command power utilizes the behavior
of coercion, inducement, force, sanctions, payments and bribes
whereas co-opt power relies on the
15those 12 state ministries and government agencies are the
General office of the State Council, the overseas Chinese affairs
office
of the State Council, the State Council information office, the
ministry of education, the ministry of Culture, the ministry of
foreign
affairs, the ministry of finance, the ministry of Commerce, the
State Development and reform Commission, the State language
Committee, the State press and publications administration, and
the State administration of radio, film and television.
16nye, Soft Power, p. x.
17Ibid., p. 2; and see Joseph nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing

Nature of American Power (new york: Basic Books, 1990).
632 Y. ZHou AND S. Luk
behaviors of agenda-setting and attractiveness. The most likely
resources are culture, values, policies
and institutions. The hard power sphere of behavior consists of
coercion and inducement. Coercion
refers to the threat or use of force and enforcement of sanctions
to alter desirable behavior. It is often
referred to as the ‘stick’ analogy. Coercion is an essential
component of foreign policy. Inducement
refers to the use of a ‘carrot’ to bribe and influence desirable
behavior. It is an essential element of hard
power because it requires less expenditure of more costly
resources required to influence behavior by
coercion. Nye’s concept reminded policy makers to pay much
more attention to the use of soft power
and attractive resources of a nation. But there are defects in this
popular buzzword which make it not
persuasive enough. It is difficult to say power is ‘soft’ or
‘hard’, as this is determined by the receivers. For
example, although American popular culture is regarded as a
critical soft power resource, people in
Iraq and North korea might not view it as soft power. Hence,
the uS attraction provides little help for
Washington to do what it wants. In fact, Nye’s analytical
framework ignored the fact that the attraction
is defined differently by the receivers and lies in the particular
social context.
Whether a power source is soft or hard depends on the
perception and feelings of various actors in specific situa-
tions … in international politics, the soft or hard effectiveness

of a certain power resource is a relative perception;
it depends on the feelings of various actors in specific
situations.18
Therefore, soft power in this study not only deals with resources
and behavior but also social context,
which is an important ingredient for measuring Chinese soft
power in the case of CIs.
Since the publication of Nye’s Bound to Lead, the term ‘soft
power’ immediately attracted the attention
of policy advisers and academics in China.19 The discussion of
soft power in China gained more momen-
tum in policy circles when Hu Jintao became Party General
Secretary in 2002. There were several regular
18yongnian Zheng and Chi Zhang, ‘Guojizhengzhi zhong de
ruanliliang yiji dui zhongguo ruanliliang de guancha’ [‘Soft
power in
international politics and observations on China’s soft power’],
Shijiezhengzhi yu jingji [World Politics and Economics] 7,
(2007),
pp. 6–13.
19Joel Wuthnow, ‘the concept of soft power in China’s strategic
discourse’, Issues & Studies 44(2), (2008), pp. 1–28; mingjiang
li, ‘Soft
power in Chinese discourse: popularity and prospects’, in li,
ed., Soft Power, pp. 21–44.
Table 1. Government investment in Cis.
Source: annual final report of Ci (2006–2014), Hanban,
available at: http://www.hanban.edu.cn.
Name of

project/year
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
total Ci &CC 122 226 305 554 691 858 935 1,086 1,326
Dispatched
teachers and
volunteers
2,054 2,977 4,000 4,800 6,099 6,815 11,000 14,400 15,500
presented
teaching
materials
590,000 813,000 1,300,000 4,300,000 400,000 2,720,000
380,000 410,000 600,000
local training
teachers
15,896 16,782 16,512 23,000 10,000 32,319 6,229 5,720 40,000
total ex-
penditure
(currency: in
S1,000)
56,700 74,494 132,717 198,977 137,761 164,103 196,330
278,371 300,265
Table 2. Spectrum of hard power and soft power.
Source: Joseph nye, Soft Power, p. 2.

Scope of hard power Scope of soft power
Spectrum of behavior Coercion inducement agenda setting
attraction
Command Co-opt
most likely resource force payment institution Value
Sanctions Bribes Culture
policy
collective study sessions held for members of the Political
Bureau which touched upon the topic of soft
power and discussed national strategies for promoting Chinese
culture internationally.20 After years of
intellectual debates, discussions in academic community, and
popular media dissemination, the term
was finally incorporated into the highest-level policy document
on 15 october 2007. When delivering
his keynote speech at the CCP’s 17th National Congress, Hu
called for ‘enhancing culture as part of the
soft power of China’.21 President Xi Jinping would surely
follow this soft power line and reinforce it into
a new stage. This is because President Xi believes that ‘China’s
pursuit of soft power not only reduces
the China threat, but also helps the great rejuvenation of the
Chinese nation and the realization of
Chinese dream’.22 When delivering a speech at a group study
session of members of the Political Bureau
of the CCP Central Committee, Xi vowed that ‘efforts are
needed to promote China’s cultural soft power
by disseminating modern Chinese values and showing the charm
of Chinese culture to the world’.23

It is clear that soft power, whether in a top leader’s speeches or
in official reports, is used to describe
Chinese culture. Following this policy direction, Beijing has
incorporated a number of cultural efforts
which include the establishment of CIs into the soft power
strategy. Xu Lin, executive chief of the CI
programming, said that CIs have become Chinese soft power’s
‘brightest brand’.24
3. Findings of the macro- and micro-level analysis of CIs and
its implications
In this section we conduct a comprehensive analysis on CIs. The
macro-level analysis focuses on the
characteristics of general distribution and operations of CIs
worldwide in order to examine the imper-
atives embedded in the CI project while the micro-level analysis
focuses on the programs and activities
of individual CIs to investigate their soft power behaviors.
Findings are illustrated below.
3.1. The macro-level analysis
3.1.1. Reflecting China’s diverse emphases and orientation in
foreign policy.
The distribution pattern of CIs reflects China’s diverse
emphases and orientation in foreign policy due
to its competing international identities of being ‘a major
power, a regional power, an emerging power,
and a developing nation’.25 The official guidelines of China’s
foreign policy state that ‘major powers are
the key, surrounding areas are the first priority, developing
countries are the foundation, and multi-
lateral forums are the important stage’.26 The distribution
pattern of CIs reflects this overall diplomatic
layout. Figure 1 shows the growth of CIs at the regional level;

most CIs are found in the continent of
America (632), which is followed by europe (370), Asia (182)
and oceania (80 CIs concentrated in four
countries). In Africa, the number of CIs has increased rapidly
from six in 2006 to 60 in 2014. The spread
of CIs is the fastest in the uS, followed by some european
countries. As of late 2014, countries having
the most CIs established or with agreements in hand to do so
were advanced great powers like the uS
(542), the united kingdom (134), Australia (60), Italy (45),
Canada (41), Thailand (31), South korea (28),
russia (23), Japan (21), Germany (20) and France (19).
20Weihong Zhang, ‘China’s cultural future: from soft power to
comprehensive national power’, International Journal of
Cultural
Policy 16(4), (2010), pp. 383–402.
21‘the full text of 17th CCp Congress report’, Xinhuanet, (24
october 2007), available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/
newscenter/2007-10/24/content_6938568.htm (accessed 20
october 2012).
22‘Xi Jinping: jianshe shehuizhuyi wenhuaqiangguo, zhuoli
tigao guojia wenhua ruanshili’ [‘Constructing a strong socialism
cultural
power and enhancing national cultural soft power’], Xinhuanet,
(31 December 2013), available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/
politics/2013-12/31/c_118788013.htm (accessed 31 December
2013).
23‘Xi Jinping: China to promote cultural soft power’,
Xinhuanet, (1 January 2014), available at:
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/
china/2014-01/01/c_125941955.htm (accessed 1 January 2014).

24‘2006: kongzixueyuan shi zhongguo ruanshili de zuiliang
pinpai’ [‘2006: Confucius institute is the brightest brand of
China’s soft
power’], Xinhuanet, (1 January 2007), available at:
http://news.xinhuanet.com/overseas/2007-
01/01/content_5556842.htm
(accessed 23 December 2011).
25he Wei, ‘Challenges await China this decade’, People’s
Daily, (6 January 2011), available at:
http://english.peopledaily.com.
cn/90001/90780/91342/7251740.html (accessed 12 January
2012).
26‘the full text of Jiang Zemin’s report at the 16th CCp
Congress’, Xinhuanet, (17 november 2002), available at:
http://news.xinhuanet.
com/ziliao/2002-11/17/content_693542.htm (accessed 12
January 2012).
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-
10/24/content_6938568.htm
…
8 The China Reader
that real power is not the mere possession of instruments of
power (financial, cultural,
political, military, etc.), but it is rather the conversion of those
assets and use of those
instruments to influence other actors or situations. Here, at
present, I find China to
be a “partial power” at best. In the selection that follows,
I inventory a variety of indi-

ces of Chinese capabilities and assess just how strong they
really are on a global basis.
As is explained, I conclude that China is certainly a rising
power and probably the
world’s second leading power on aggregate after the United
States— but I also argue
that, depending on the category, China’s power and influence on
the world stage is
actually closer to that of other “middle powers”— Russia,
Japan, the United Kingdom,
Germany, or even India. Overall it must be quickly said that
China’s aggregate power
exceeds any one of these middle powers, but in individual
categories (soft power, inno-
vation, military technologies, telecommunications, and many
other categories) China
lags behind these other countries, which are setting global
standards in various spheres.
Taken together, the four selections in this section offer readers
a real diversity of
views about China’s status as a rising power. None deny that
China is a rising power.
But all disagree about the residual strengths of China’s existing
power, its potential
development, and its intentions on how to exercise its power in
the world. In these
regards, assessing China is not dissimilar from the three blind
Indians feeling the
elephant.
I. Viewing China’s Rise: Alternative Perspectives
The Eight Differences That Define China*
Martin Jacques

Broadly speaking, there have been two kinds of
Western responses to the rise of China. The first sees
China more or less solely in economic terms. We
might call this the “economic wow factor.” People
are incredulous about the growth figures. They are
in awe of what those growth figures might mean for
China’s position in the world. Any undue concern
about their implications, moreover, is calmed by the
belief that China is steadily becoming more like us,
possessed of the accoutrements— from markets and
stock exchanges to cars and private homes— of a
modern Western society. This response is guilty of
underestimating what the rise of China represents.
It is a victim of tunnel vision and represents a fail-
ure of imagination. Economic change, fundamental
as it may be, can only be part of the picture. This
view, blind as it is to the importance of politics and
culture, rests on an underlying assumption that
China, by virtue of its economic transformation,
will, in effect, become Western. Consciously or
unconsciously, it chimes with Fukuyama’s “end of
history” view: that since 1989 the world has been
converging on Western liberal democracy. The
other response, in contrast, is persistently skepti-
cal about the rise of China, always expecting it to
end in crisis and failure. In the light of Maoism, the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the suppression
of the demonstrators in Tiananmen Square, the
argument runs, it is impossible for China to sustain
its transformation without fundamental political
change: unless it adopts the Western model, it will
fail. The first view holds that China will automati-
cally become Western, the second does not: but
both share the belief that for China to succeed, it

must, in effect, become Western.
* This selection is drawn from Martin Jacques, When China
Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth
of
a New Global Order (London: Penguin Books, revised second
edition, 2012), 561– 583.
<i>The China Reader : Rising Power</i>, edited by David
Shambaugh, Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2016.
ProQuest Ebook Central,
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/cityuhk/detail.action?docI
D=4774190.
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Rising China 9
My view is predicated on a very different
approach. It does not accept that the “Western
way” is the only viable model. In arguing this, it
should be borne in mind that the West has seen
off every major challenge it has faced, culminat-
ing in the defeat after 1989 of its greatest adver-
sary, Soviet Communism. It has a formidable track
record of growth and innovation, which is why it
has proved such a dynamic force over such a long
period of time. Unlike stark either/ or alterna-
tives of the great ideological era between 1917
and 1989, however, the choices are now more
nuanced. The East Asian examples of moderniza-
tion have all drawn from the Western experience,
including China’s post- 1978 transformation. But
to suggest that this is the key to East Asia’s success
or even amounts to the main story is wrong. The
reason for China’s transformation (like those of
the other East Asian countries, commencing with
Japan) has been the way it has succeeded in com-
bining what it has learnt from the West, and also
its East Asian neighbors, with its own history and
culture, thereby tapping and releasing its native
sources of dynamism. We have moved from the
era of either/ or to one characterized by hybridity.
Central is the contention that, far from there
being a single modernity, there will in fact be

many. Until around 1970 modernity was, with
the exception of Japan, an exclusively Western
phenomenon. But over the last half- century
we have witnessed the emergence of quite new
modernities, drawing on those of the West but
ultimately dependent for their success on their
ability to mobilize, build upon and transform
the indigenous. These new modernities are no
less original for their hybridity; indeed, their
originality lies partly in their possession of this
characteristic. Nor will hybridity remain an
exclusively Asian or non- Western condition: in
the face of the growing success of East Asian
societies, the West will be obliged to learn from
and incorporate some of their insights and fea-
tures. In a limited way this is already the case,
with the West, for example, employing some of
the innovations developed by the Japanese sys-
tem of manufacturing— although, given that
these are very much rooted in Japanese cul-
ture, often with somewhat less success. A cen-
tral question concerns which elements of the
Western model are indispensable and which
are optional. Clearly, all successful examples of
economic transformation currently on offer
are based upon a capitalist model of develop-
ment, although their economic institutions and
policies, not to mention their politics and cul-
ture, display very wide variations. However, the
proposition that the inheritance must, as a pre-
condition for success, include Enlightenment
principles such as Western- style rule of law, an
independent judiciary, and a certain kind of rep-
resentative government is by no means proven.
Japan, which is at least as advanced as its coun-

terparts in the West, is not based on the princi-
ples of the Enlightenment, nor does it embrace
Western- style democracy, even though, since
the early 1950s, largely for reasons of political
convenience, it has routinely been seen as doing
so by the West. And even if China moves in the
direction of more representative government
and a more independent judiciary, as it probably
will in the long term, it will surely do so in very
much its own way, based on its own history and
traditions, which will owe little or nothing to
any Western inheritance.
The desire to measure China primarily, some-
times even exclusively, in terms of Western yard-
sticks, while understandable, is flawed. At best it
expresses a relatively innocent narrow- mindedness;
at worst it reflects an overweening Western hubris,
a belief that the Western experience is universal in
all matters of importance. This can easily become
an excuse for not bothering to understand or
respect the wisdom and specificities of other cul-
tures, histories and traditions. The problem, as Paul
A. Cohen has pointed out, is that the Western
mentality— nurtured and shaped by its long- term
ascendancy— far from being imbued with a cos-
mopolitan outlook as one might expect, is in fact
highly parochial, believing in its own univeralism;
or, to put it another way, its own rectitude and eter-
nal relevance.1 If we already have the answers, and
these are universally applicable, then there is little or
nothing to learn from anyone else. While the West
remained relatively unchallenged, as it has been for
the best part of two centuries, the price of such
arrogance has overwhelmingly been paid by oth-
ers, as they were obliged to take heed of Western

demands; but when the West comes under serious
challenge, as it increasingly will from China and oth-
ers, then such a parochial mentality will only serve
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10 The China Reader

to increase its vulnerability, weakening its ability to
learn from others and to change accordingly.
The problem with interpreting and evaluating
China solely or mainly in terms of the Western
lexicon of experience is that, by definition, it
excludes all that is specific to China: in short,
what makes China what it is. The only things
that are seen to matter are those that China shares
with the West. China’s history and culture are
dismissed as a blind alley or merely a preparation
for becoming Western, the hors d’oeuvres before
the Western feast. Such an approach is not only
demeaning to China and other non- Western cul-
tures; it also largely misses the point. By seeing
China in terms of the West, it refuses to recognize
or acknowledge China’s own originality and, fur-
thermore, how China’s difference might change
the nature of the world in which we live. Since
the eighties and nineties, the heyday of the “glo-
balization as Westernization” era, when the Asian
tigers, including China, were widely interpreted
in these terms, there has been a dawning realiza-
tion that such a huge country embodying such a
rich history and civilization cannot be so sum-
marily dismissed. We should not exaggerate— the
Western consensus still sees history as a one- way
ticket to Westernization— but one can detect the
beginnings of a new Western consciousness, albeit
still weak and fragile, which is more humble and
realistic. As China grows increasingly powerful—
while remaining determinedly different— the
West will be forced, however reluctantly, to con-
front the nature and meaning of that difference.
Understanding China will be one of the great

challenges of the twenty- first century.
What then will be the key characteristics of
Chinese modernity? They are eight in all, which
for the deeply superstitious Chinese happens to
be a lucky number. In exploring these character-
istics, we must consider both the internal features
of China’s modernity and, given China’s global
importance, how these might impact upon and
structure its global outlook and relations.
First, China is not really a nation- state in the
traditional sense of the term but a civilization-
state. True, it describes itself as a nation- state, but
China’s acquiescence in the status of nation- state
was a consequence of its growing weakness in the
face of the Western powers from the late nine-
teenth century.
The Chinese reluctantly acknowledged that
China had to adapt to the world rather than insist-
ing, in an increasingly utopian and hopeless mis-
sion, that the rest of the world should adapt to
it. That cannot hide the underlying reality, how-
ever, that China is not a conventional nation- state.
A century might seem a long time, but not for a
society that consciously thinks of itself as several
millennia old. Most of what China is today— its
social relations and customs, its ways of being,
its sense of superiority, its belief in the state, its
commitment to unity— are products of Chinese
civilization rather than its recent incarnation as a
nation- state. On the surface it may seem like a
nation- state, but its geological formation is that of
a civilization- state.

It might be objected that China has changed
so much during the period of its accommoda-
tion to the status of nation- state that these lines
of continuity have been broken and largely erased.
There was the inability of the imperial state (and,
indeed, Confucianism) to modernize, culminating
in its demise in the 1911 Revolution; the failure of
the Nationalist government to modernize China,
unify the country, or defeat the occupying pow-
ers (notably Japan), leading to its overthrow in
the 1949 Revolution; the Maoist period, which
sought to sweep away much of imperial China,
from Confucius and traditional dress to the old
patterns of land tenure and the established social
hierarchies; followed by the reform period, the
rapid decline of agriculture, the rise of industry, and
the growing assertion of capitalist social relations.
Each of these periods represents a major disjunc-
ture in Chinese history. Yet much of what previ-
ously characterized China remains strikingly true
and evident today. The country still has almost
the same borders that it acquired at the maximum
extent of the Qing empire in the late eighteenth
century. The state remains as pivotal in society and
as sacrosanct as it was in imperial times. Confucius,
its great architect, is in the process of experiencing
a revival and his precepts still, in important mea-
sure, inform the way China thinks and behaves.
Although there are important differences between
the Confucian and Communist eras, there are also
strong similarities. This is not to deny that China
has changed in fundamental ways, but rather to
stress that China is also marked by powerful lines
of continuity— that, to use a scientific analogy, its

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Rising China 11
DNA remains intact. This is a country, moreover,
which lives in and with its past to a greater extent
than any other: that past casts a huge shadow over
its present such that, tormented by its failure to

either modernize or unify, the Chinese for long
lived in a state of perpetual regret and anguish.
But as China now finally circumnavigates its way
beyond the “century of humiliation” and success-
fully concludes its 150- year project of modern-
ization, it will increasingly search for inspiration,
nourishment, and parallels in that past. As it once
again becomes the center of the world, it will lux-
uriate in its history and feel that justice has finally
been done, that it is restoring its rightful position
and status in the world.2
When China was down, it was obliged to
live according to the terms set by others. It had
no alternative. That is why it reconciled itself to
being a nation- state, even if it never really believed
this to be the case. It was a compromise borne
of expediency and necessity. But as China arrives
at modernity and emerges as the most powerful
country in the world, it will no longer be bound
by such constraints and will increasingly be in a
position to set its own terms and conditions. It
will feel free to be what it thinks it is and act
according to its history and instincts, which are
those of a civilization- state.
Second, China, in its relationship with East
Asia, is increasingly likely to be influenced by the
legacy of the tributary- state, rather than nation-
state, system. The tributary- state system lasted for
thousands of years and only finally came to an
end at the conclusion of the nineteenth century.
Even then, it was not entirely extinguished but
continued—as a matter of habit and custom, the
product of an enduring history— in a submerged
form beneath the newly dominant Westphalian

system. Up to a point, then, it never completely
disappeared, even when China was a far less impor-
tant actor in East Asia than it had been prior to the
mid nineteenth century. The fact that the tribu-
tary- state system prevailed for so long means that
it is deeply ingrained in the way that both China
and East Asian states think about their relation-
ship. As a consequence, any fundamental change
in the position of China in the region, and there-
fore the nature of relations between China and
its neighboring states, could well see a reversion
to elements of a more tributary- type relationship,
albeit in a new and modernized form. The tribu-
tary system was undermined by the emergence
of the European powers, together with Japan, as
the dominant presence in the region, and by the
remorseless decline of China. The European pow-
ers have long since exited the region; their succes-
sor power, the United States, is now a declining
force; and Japan is rapidly being overshadowed by
China. Meanwhile, China is swiftly resuming its
position as the fulcrum of the East Asian economy.
In other words, the conditions that gave rise to
the dominance of the nation- state system in East
Asia are crumbling, while at the same time we are
witnessing the restoration of a defining feature of
the tributary- state system.
The tributary- state system was characterized
by the enormous inequality that existed between
China on the one hand and its neighboring states
on the other, together with a mutual belief in the
superiority of Chinese culture. John K. Fairbank
suggests in The Chinese World Order that: “If its
belief in Chinese superiority persists, it seems

likely that the country will seek its future role by
looking closely at its own history.”3 Given that
the idea of Chinese superiority remains firmly in
place, China’s growing economic strength, com-
bined with its enormous population, could return
the region to a state of affairs which carries echoes
of the past. China is in the process of becoming
once more the most important market for virtu-
ally every single East Asian country. Nor is the
huge and growing imbalance in power between
China and all the other states, which historically is
entirely familiar, necessarily one that other states
in the region will balk at or seek to resist, with the
possible exception of Japan; indeed, all bar Japan
have largely sought to move closer to China dur-
ing the course of its rise rather than hedge with
the United States against it. This is partly based
on the habit and experience of history and partly
on an accommodation with what these countries
view as an inevitable and irresistible process. The
rise of China and a return to something bearing
some of the features of the tributary- state system
will not necessarily be distinguished by instabil-
ity; on the contrary, the tributary- state system was
highly stable, rooted as it was in China’s domi-
nance and a mainly unchallenged hierarchical
pattern of relationships. It would be quite wrong,
however, to see any return to a tributary- style
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12 The China Reader
relationship as a simple rerun of the past— with,
for example, the presidents and prime ministers
of neighboring states making ritualized trips to
Beijing bearing gifts in recognition of the great-
ness of the Chinese president and the superiority
of the latter- day Celestial Kingdom, Rather it is
likely to be defined by an acceptance that East
Asia is essentially a Chinese- centric order; that it
embodies an implicit hierarchy in which China’s
position of ascendancy is duly acknowledged; and

that there is an implicit recognition and accep-
tance of Chinese superiority.
To what extent will such tributary influences
be confined to East Asia? Could it conceivably
find echoes in other parts of the world? There
is, of course, no tradition of a tributary- state sys-
tem elsewhere: it was only present in East Asia.
That, however, was when the Middle Kingdom
regarded the world as more or less coterminous
with East Asia. If China should approach other
parts of the world with a not too dissimilar mind-
set, and its power is sufficiently overwhelming,
could the same kind of hierarchical system be
repeated elsewhere? Could there even be some-
thing akin to a global tributary system? The most
obvious objection is that the tributary system in
the majority of cases embraced countries like
Korea, Vietnam, and Japan with which China had
a strong cultural affinity. This is not true of any
other part of the world. The sphere to which even
an extremely diluted version of the tribute system
is least likely to extend is the West, by which, in
this context, I mean the United States and Europe.
The only possible long- term candidates, in this
context, might be the weaker countries of south-
ern and eastern Europe. But in the great major-
ity of countries, both Europe and North America
enjoy too much power. It should not be forgotten,
moreover, that it was Europe which forced China,
against its wishes, to forsake the tributary system
in favor of the Westphalian system in the first
place. It is not inconceivable, however, that in the
long run Australia and New Zealand might enter
into some elements of a tributary relationship
with China given their relative proximity to it and

their growing dependence on the Chinese econ-
omy. A tributary dimension might also re- emerge
in China’s relations with Central Asia. It would
not be difficult to imagine echoes of the tributary
system being found in China’s relationship with
Africa, given the enormous imbalance of power
between them; perhaps, though less likely, in Latin
America also, and South Asia, though not India.
In each case, the key features would be China’s
overweening power, the dependency of countries
in a multitude of ways on China, especially trade
and finance, and an implicit acceptance of the vir-
tues, if not the actual superiority, of Chinese civi-
lization. But geographical distance in the case of
Africa and Latin America, for example, will be a
big barrier, while cultural and ethnic difference in
all these instances will prove a major obstacle and
a source of considerable resentment.
Third, there is the distinctively Chinese atti-
tude towards race and ethnicity. The Han Chinese
believe themselves to be a single race, even though
this is clearly not the case. What has shaped
this view is the extraordinarily long history of
Chinese civilization, which has enabled a lengthy
process of melding and fusing of countless dif-
ferent races. The sacrosanct and inviolable nature
of Chinese unity is underpinned by the idea that
the Han Chinese are all of one race, with even
the non- Han Chinese being described in terms
of separate nationalities rather than races. There
is, furthermore, a powerful body of opinion in
China that believes in polygenism and holds that
the origins of the Chinese are discrete and uncon-
nected with that of other branches of humankind.

In other words, the notion of China and Chinese
civilization is bolstered by a widespread belief that
the difference between the Chinese and other
peoples is not simply cultural or historical but
also biological. The non- negotiable nature of the
Chinese state’s attitude towards race is eloquently
illustrated by its approach towards the “lost terri-
tories” and the belief that Hong Kong and Taiwan
are inseparable from China because their popula-
tions are Chinese: any idea that there might be a
distinct Taiwanese identity is summarily dismissed.
The Chinese attitude towards race and what con-
stitutes being Chinese is diametrically opposed
to that of other highly populous nations such as
India, Indonesia, Brazil, and the United States,
which explicitly recognize their multi racial and
multi ethnic character and, in varying degrees, cel-
ebrate that fact.
It would be wrong to describe the Chinese
attitude towards race as an ideological posi-
tion, because it is simply too old and too deeply
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Rising China 13
rooted in Chinese history for that to be the case.
Certainly it went through a profound change in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries, but its antecedents lie deep in the long his-
tory of Chinese civilization. Nor is the attitude
towards race and identity reducible to the Chinese
state or government: rather, it is ingrained in the
Chinese psyche. To give one contemporary illus-
tration: support for the return of Taiwan amongst
the Chinese people is, if anything, even stronger
than it is at a governmental level. Given this, any
democratically elected government— admittedly,
a most unlikely occurrence in the next twenty
years— will almost certainly be more nativist and
essentialist in its attitude towards Chinese identity
than the present Communist government, which,

by virtue of its lack of electoral accountability,
enjoys a greater independence from popular prej-
udices. Nor should we anticipate any significant
change in Chinese attitudes on race and ethnicity.
It is true that they may have been accentuated by
centuries of relative isolation from the rest of the
world and China’s growing integration may, as a
consequence, help to weaken prejudices based on
the ignorance of isolation, but the fundamental
roots of Chinese attitudes will remain untouched.
In fact, rather than being confined to a particu-
lar period of history, China’s isolation is funda-
mental to understanding what I have described as
the Middle Kingdom mentality. China saw itself
as above, beyond, separate from, and superior to
the rest of the world. “Isolation,” in this sense, was
integral to the Chinese world- view, even during
the periods, like the Song dynasty or early Ming,
when China was not isolationist in policy and out-
look. It helps to explain why, for example, China
has had such a different attitude from the major
European states towards those who settled in other
lands. Europeans viewed their settlers and colo-
nizers as an integral part of the national civilizing
mission and as still belonging to the homeland;
the imperial dynasty, on the other hand, viewed
those who departed the Middle Kingdom with
relative and continuing indifference, as if leaving
China was a step down and outside civilization.
This point provides us with a way of understand-
ing the terms on which China’s growing integra-
tion with the rest of the world in the twenty- first
century will take place. China is fast joining the
world but, true to its history, it will also remain
somewhat aloof, ensconced in a hierarchical view

of humanity, its sense of superiority resting on a
combination of cultural and racial hubris.
Fourth, China operates, and will continue to
operate, on a quite different continental- sized
canvas to other nation- states. There are four other
states that might be described as continental in
scale. The United States has a surface area only
marginally smaller than that of China, but with a
population only a quarter of the size. Australia is
a continent in its own right, with a surface area
around 80 percent of China’s, yet its population
is a meager 21 million, less than that of Malaysia
or Taiwan, with the vast majority living around
its coastal perimeter. Brazil has a surface area of
around 90 percent of China’s, but a much smaller
population of 185 million. Perhaps the nearest
parallel to China is India, with a population of
equivalent size, but a surface area only a third of
that of China’s. Thus, although China shares cer-
tain similarities with each of these countries, its
particular combination of population size and sur-
face area is …

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