This document provides an analysis of China's attitudes towards the 2008 and 2012 Olympic Games through the lens of Chinese soft power and humiliation discourse. It examines China's approach to the 2008 Beijing Olympics torch relay and opening ceremony, as well as the criticism of Chinese swimmer Ye Shiwen's performance at the 2012 London Olympics. The document uses these case studies to explore how China drew upon concepts of soft power and humiliation to shape its relationship with the Olympics and further its goals of promoting nationalism and national unity.

1. China and the Olympic Games: an analysis of
Chinese soft power and humiliation discourse in the
2008 and 2012 Olympic Games
Thomas Earnshaw
102116971
Advisor: Dr. Michael Barr
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Bachelor of Arts in Politics
School of Geography, Politics and Sociology
April 2013

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Abstract
How can we categorise China’s attitudes towards the Olympic
Games and what can be learned from observing these attitudes?
This paper looks at China’s approach to the Olympic Games by
focusing on the 2008 Beijing Games and the 2012 London
Games. It looks at the discourse produced by organs of the
Chinese state and how such discourse drew upon the positive
thinking of Chinese soft power and negative thinking found
within humiliation discourse, with the intention of rousing
nationalism in order to create a greater national identity and
sense of national unity. By stimulating such attitudes the
Chinese Communist Party used the 2008 and 2012 Olympic
Games as part of its efforts to unite the Chinese people against
foreign powers so as to act as a form of legitimacy for the
party, and thus, to continue such CCP rule in China.

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Table of Contents
List of Abbreviations .................................................................................................................4
Chapter 1: Introduction..............................................................................................................5
Chapter 2: Historical narrative.................................................................................................11
Soft power ............................................................................................................................11
The Century of Humiliation .................................................................................................14
Chapter 3: The 2008 Beijing Olympics torch relay .................................................................18
Soft power and the torch relay .............................................................................................19
Domestic and diasporic Chinese ..........................................................................................21
Chapter 4: The 2008 Beijing Olympics opening ceremony.....................................................25
Soft power and the opening ceremony.................................................................................25
Media realities......................................................................................................................29
Chapter 5: Ye Shiwen and the curse of success.......................................................................32
Reaction to Nature magazine ...............................................................................................33
Media realities......................................................................................................................36
Chapter 6: Conclusion..............................................................................................................39
Bibliography.............................................................................................................................42

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List of Abbreviations
Abbreviation Term
BOCOG Beijing Organising Committee for the
Olympic Games
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CDA Critical Discourse Analysis
CRS Congressional Research Service
FIFA Fédération Internationale de Football
Association (International Federation of
Association Football)
IOC International Olympic Committee
LED Light-emitting diode
NBC National Broadcasting Company
UN United Nations
US United States
USA United States of America
PRC People’s Republic of China

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Sport, after all, is almost everywhere a vehicle for nationalism.1
―Dominic Zeigler
Chapter 1: Introduction
The relationship between sport and nationalism is abstract yet fascinating. There is a common
belief that sport is one of the most effective ways through which nationalism can be
expressed. This has been evident in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), with existing
literature on the topic providing evidence to support this. Daniel Bell’s work on Chinese
nationalism and sport looks at the effect of the FIFA World Cup within China. He found that
Germany’s victory over South Korea in the 2002 World Cup quarter-finals had the Chinese
crowd in his presence bursting into applause. One of his associates explained that this
reaction was a consequence of South Korean exploitation of Chinese workers, whereas Bell
himself believes it is related to China’s “younger brother” upstaging his elder on the global
stage.2 Bell’s experiences during the 2006 World Cup conjured similar outcomes. He talks of
the lao Beijing (old-time Beijingers) rejoicing at South Korea’s early exit from the
tournament and the unusually heavy police presence during Japan’s games due to government
fear of anti-Japanese riots spiralling out of control.3
Bell’s studies on the relationship between sport and nationalism within China are built
upon by William Callahan in China: The Pessoptimist Nation. In China Callahan pays
attention to China’s rise in the twentieth century and early twenty-first century, culminating
in the 2008 Beijing Olympics opening ceremony. The ceremony presented a unique
visualisation of China to the world, with nationalism and moments of national pride being at
the forefront of the show, which can be seen in the narration of the show. The narrator spoke
1 Dominic Ziegler, ‘China, Olympic victim?’, The Economist (http://www.economist.com/node/21560569,
accessed 12/11/12).
2 Daniel A. Bell, China’s New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society (New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 2008): 92.
3 Bell, China’s New Confucianism, 93.

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of the “glories of China’s 5,000 years of civilisation, presenting achievements ranging from
classical calligraphy to Confucian harmony, and Peking opera to China’s great four
inventions: paper, printing, gunpowder, and the magnetic compass”.4 Furthermore Callahan
gives prominence to the opening ceremony’s tribute to Ming dynasty Admiral Zheng He,
who made seven voyages to destinations in the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, the
Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea. The voyages had an intrinsic message of peace to them which
was reflected in the names of ships such as “Pure Harmony”, “Lasting Tranquillity”, and
“Kind Repose”.5 Callahan believes there to be reasoning related to peace and harmony behind
the inclusion of Zheng in the show, as “open doors lead to prosperity, and the inner harmony
of Confucian values leads to the external peace of mutually beneficial foreign relations; now
that China is once again open and harmonious, nothing can stop its “peaceful rise””.6
Callahan’s analysis of the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony links the event to
China’s experiences of national humiliation at the hands of Western imperialism, which is
described in the literature as the Century of Humiliation. The Century of Humiliation is
recognised to a period of time ranging from the beginning of the First Opium War in 1839 to
the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) victory in the Chinese civil war and subsequent
establishment of the PRC in 1949. This period in China’s history saw its effective territorial
control shrink by a third, its millennia-old imperial system collapse, and the country
subjugated to internal uprisings, invasion by imperial powers, and civil war.7
Callahan describes the Century of Humiliation as China’s tale of going from “being at
the center of the world to being the Sick Man of Asia after the Opium War (1840), only to
rise again with the Communist Revolution (1949) [sic]”, and that the attachment to this
4 William A. Callahan, China:The Pessoptimist Nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010): 2.
5 Foster Stockwell, Westerners in China:A History of Exploration and Trade, Ancient Times Through Present
(USA: McFarland & Company Inc., 2003): 30.
6 Callahan, China, 3.
7 Alison Adcock Kaufman, ‘The “Century of Humiliation,” Then and Now: Chinese Perceptions of the
International Order’, Pacific Focus 30 (1) (2010): 2.

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period in China’s history arrives from “not just…celebrating the glories of Chinese
civilization” but also a desire to “commemorate China’s weakness”.8 Humiliation discourse
is, as Kaufman writes, “narrative [that] may be used to strengthen popular anti-foreign
sentiment and to justify belligerent actions on the international stage, all in the name of
“never forgetting” the shame of the past”.9
Regarding the Beijing Olympics as a whole, Callahan notes historian Xu Guoqi’s
words on the political significance that accompanied the event and how it links to humiliation
discourse. Xu writes:
“For both Chinese and Westerns, the Beijing Olympics present a great
opportunity to carry out their respective political goals. While it is clear that
Beijing wants to use the Games to convey its best face to the world, it is not
surprising that many external groups or organisations would like to use the
Games to shame and humiliate China to achieve their own political
agendas.”10
Such discourse from scholars presents the Century of Humiliation as relevant to fulfilling
China’s desires and goals with events such as the Olympic Games being perfect opportunities
to do so.
Alongside links to humiliation discourse Callahan recognises how the Olympic
Games are a method through which China can continue to expand upon its soft power
credentials. The father of soft power theory, Joseph Nye, describes soft power as the ability to
co-opt rather than coerce; “A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics
because other countries – admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of
prosperity and openness – want to follow it”.11 The ability to establish soft power effectively
“tends to be associated with intangible assets such as an attractive personality, culture,
political values and institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral
8 William A Callahan, ‘National Insecurities: Humiliation, Salvation, and Chinese Nationalism’, Alternatives 29
(2004): 202.
9 Kaufman, ‘The “Century of Humiliation”’, 3.
10 Callahan, China, 10.
11 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (United States: PublicAffairs. 2004): 5.

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authority”.12 Callahan’s work in China provides evidence of such a link between soft power
and China’s approach to the Olympic Games, with the 2008 Beijing Olympics opening
ceremony acting as an opportunity for China to present itself as an attractive and positive
country with a desirable culture.
Bell and Callahan’s work on Chinese nationalism and sport offers a substantial
foundation on which to form a paper on nationalism and the Olympics in the PRC. Furthering
study in this field is appropriate because of the emphasis, funding, and support that the
Chinese state has dedicated to sport in the twenty-first century and in particular in the build-
up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the post-Beijing Olympics world. The relationship
between China’s policy towards the Olympic Games, a desire to increase its soft power, and
the continuation of humiliation discourse forms a structure off of which to build upon.
This paper will observe elements of China’s relationship with the 2008 Beijing
Olympics and the 2012 London Olympics. In doing so it will establish the extent to which the
presence of Chinese soft power and the application of humiliation discourse impacted its
relationship with the two events and the motivations behind drawing upon these two
concepts. Particular events during these two Olympic Games will present case studies
through which this question can be answered.
The first case study focuses on the international leg of the 2008 Beijing Olympics
torch relay. On its journey the torch encountered a substantial amount of criticism and
hostility that was grounded in objections to China’s human rights record and absence of a
free press. This culminated in the torch relay being attacked on its international route in
places such as London, San Francisco, and Paris. The attack on the torch whilst in Paris was
received with resentment and hostility by the CCP and the Chinese people, resulting in a
boycott of the French supermarket Carrefour and more extreme measures such as the
12 Nye, Soft Power, 6.

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defacing of the French national flag with swastikas.13 Zeigler noted that “Many Chinese saw
this as a concerted campaign to spoil China’s hosting of the games, a moment of great nation
pride”.14 Emphasis on the importance and relevant of national pride and the offence caused
by not violating this was an example of how drawing upon humiliation discourse was a
natural reaction from China in regards to Western criticisms of the nation. This provides a
base off of which to expand and explore the relationship between humiliation discourse and
the international leg of the 2008 Beijing Olympics torch relay in China.
The second case study focuses upon the 2008 Beijing Olympics opening ceremony.
Academic work from the likes of Callahan links the event to both soft power and humiliation
discourse. Callahan makes note of Jing Zhang’s description of the opening ceremony of the
Beijing Games. Zhang describes it as a show to present to the world “the rich and beautiful
history of [Chinese] culture”; how the opening ceremony was an opportunity for China to
expand upon its soft power credentials through promoting its cultural positives to the world.15
This paper will approach the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony in a similar approach
whereby the relationship between soft power and the event in question will be explored.
The third event will shift the focus on to the 2012 London Olympics and swimmer Ye
Shiwen. Ye Shiwen’s gold medal victories would have been moments for China to celebrate
and treasure yet these celebrations with cut short by doubt placed upon her performance in
the 400m individual medley by crowds from the West, who disputed the legitimacy of her
victory instead suggesting that she may have been using performance enhancing drugs. This
was a moment of national humiliation for China as Ye was an extension and representative of
the Chinese state, therefore making attacks on her as attacks on China. The state-owned
13 Reuters, ‘Protestors hold a French national flag during a demonstration against Carrefour supermarkets and
French goods on a street in Wuhan, Hubei province April 19, 2008. Chinese official media have sought to
temper nationalist calls to boycott foreign businesses accused ofbacking Tibetan independence,urging angry
citizens to focus on economic development’, Reuters
(http://www.reuters.com/news/pictures/searchpopup?picId=3943345, accessed 12/11/12).
14 Ziegler, ‘China, Olympic victim?’
15 Callahan, China: The Pessoptimist Nation,6.

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newspaper Global Times attacked those who disputed Ye’s victory, stating that “it shows that
the unfriendliness of the west to China is spreading”, whilst China’s state-controlled news
agency Xinhua wrote that “[the West] cannot accept China’s rise. That’s why they criticize
Chinese athletes”. 16 This provides a basis on which to explore the criticisms and doubts of
Ye Shiwen’s performance in the 400m individual medley and whether attitudes related to
humiliation discourse existed, and if so, why such attitudes existed.
I plan to approach these case studies in two ways, the first being through critical
discourse analysis (CDA). According to van Dijk CDA is a “type of discourse analytical
research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are
enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context.”17 This
approach will be used when analysing documents from the Chinese state, state officials, and
state-controlled media outlets that address either of the three cases studies. This approach will
assess how such discourse produced media realities within China and the purpose behind the
creation of such media realities in the hope of understanding the attitudes and motives of the
CCP in relation to the 2008 and 2012 Olympic Games.
The second approach is theoretical in that it is literature-based research. Literature-
based research acts as a foundation through which relevant literature and other documents
being analysed through CDA can be cross-referenced and evaluated. This process
incorporates the collection of literature relevant to the three case studies and from this,
analysing and evaluating their relevance to the over purpose of this paper.
16 Tania Branigan, ‘London 2012: Ye Shewin reaction ‘shows western hostility to China’, The Guardian
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/sport/2012/aug/01/ye-shiwen-western-hostility-china, accessed 08/11/12); Adam
Minter, ‘Are Chinese Olympians Competing Against Colonialism?’, Bloomberg
(http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-08/are-chinese-olympians-competing-against-colonialism-.html,
accessed 12/11/12).
17 Teun A. van Dijk, ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’, in Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E.
Hamilton (Eds) The Handbook of Discourse Analysis (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2003): 352.

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Chapter 2: Historical narrative
In order to properly address the objectives of this paper, an overview of China’s relationship
with soft power and the Century of Humiliation is necessary.
Soft power
Contemporary Chinese soft power is described by journalist Joshua Kurlantzick. He talks of
China’s ability to influence through persuasion rather than coercion through various means
such as culture, diplomacy, participation in multinational organisations, businesses’ actions
abroad, and the gravitational pull of a nation’s economic strength.18 Kurlantzick believes that
in the context of Asia today, Chinese soft power implies all elements outside of the security
realm, which includes investment and aid.19 This account of soft power has been observed
overseas by the United States of America (USA). A Congressional Research Service (CRS)
report from 2008 acknowledges “China’s growing use of “soft power” in Southeast Asia –
non-military inducements including culture, diplomacy, foreign aid, trade, and investment –
and how this has presented new challenges to U.S. foreign policy”.20 The report emphasises
China’s soft power growth through highlighting its diplomacy efforts, stating that “China’s
diplomatic engagement, compared to the perceived waning or limited attention by the United
States, has earned the country greater respect in the region”.21
Michael Barr critically analyses the language within the CRS report to display soft
power as a malleable term, one that is broadly constructed but finely applied. This is evident
with the US choosing to include evidence documenting Beijing’s status as the new
18 Joshua Kurlantzick, ‘China’s Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power’,
(http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/pb56_tellis_pakistan_final.pdf, accessed 1st April 2013).
19 Kurlantzick, ‘China’s Charm’.
20 Thomas Lum, Wayne Morrison, and Bruce Vaughn, ‘China’s “Soft Power” in Southeast Asia’,
(http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34310.pdf, accessed 14th February 2013).
21 Lum, ‘China’s “Soft Power” in Southeast Asia’.

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“economic patron” of Southeast Asia.22 The malleable nature of soft power sees Barr
expanding the definition to include the likes of education, which was seen in the abolition of
compulsory education tuition fees.23 Barr’s inclusion of education as a form of soft power is
entirely appropriate as the movement towards state-subsidised education represents the state
placing higher importance upon education rather than capital ability. The policy exists to
make the Chinese model a more attractive one.
Likewise education as a form of soft power is seen in the rise of Confucius Institutes
since 2004. The aims of Confucius Institutes are to promote the Chinese language overseas,
increase China’s international influence, and improve attitudes toward China.24 By spreading
Chinese culture throughout the world there is hope that prejudicial and stereotypical attitudes
towards China will be lifted and that China will be seen as an attractive destination. The
strength of such policy is evident due to the concern seen from France, where politicians are
worried that their language is losing its global appeal as a result of growing Chinese
influence.25
Moreover the PRC has further developed multi-media and audio-visual teaching
materials such as ‘Chengo Chinese’ and ‘Great Wall Chinese’, with Chengo Chinese internet
teaching having been used by 15,000 middle school students in the United States (2005
figures).26 Elizabeth Economy provides a definition of Chinese soft power in which this can
be placed. She writes that “People often conflate soft power with investment and economic
22 Michael Barr, Who’s Afraid of China? The Challenge of Chinese Soft Power (London: Zed Books Ltd,
2011):18.
23 Barr, Who’s Afraid of China?,112.
24 Daniel A. Bell, China’s New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society (New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 2008): 26.
25 Howard W. French, ‘AnotherChinese Export Is All the Rage: China’s Language’, The New York Times
(http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/11/international/asia/11china.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, accessed 14th
February 2013).
26 ‘Eight Measures to Boost Overseas Chinese Teaching: Official’, China Education and Research Network
(http://www.edu.cn/20050617/3141151.shtml, accessed 14th February 2013).

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development, but I define it as culture, education, and diplomacy”.27 Once again this is an
example of how the Chinese soft power is a malleable term that can be specifically applied.
Because of the constant flux in what is constituted as soft power there is reason for the
Olympics Games to be placed in what qualifies as a form of soft power. The Olympics
Games are an opportunity for nations to represent achievements through the romanticism of
sport. The host nation receives a greater platform to present an enticing image of themselves
through methods that are separate to competing for medals. The main opportunity to do this is
through the opening ceremony because of its global advertising capabilities. Rose
paraphrases Williamson, stating that “one of the most influential ideological forms in
contemporary capitalist societies is advertising” because advertisements are ubiquitous and
therefore appear autonomous.28 On the topic of the effects of advertisements on people as a
whole, Robert Goldman writes that:
“Ads saturate our lives…yet, because ads are so pervasive and our reading of
them so routine, we tend to take for granted the deep social assumptions
embedded in advertisements: we do not ordinarily recognise them as a sphere
of ideology.”29
The 2008 Beijing Olympics opening ceremony was a time where this form of soft
power was deployed by China, seen in the many features of the show such as the four great
inventions in China’s historical culture; the magnetic compass, gunpowder, paper, and
printing. China’s desire to use the opening ceremony as a form of soft power is seen in the
focus that was given to positive and successful elements of Chinese culture, which in turn
assisted in presenting a friendlier and welcoming appeal to the country. This desire to present
a friendlier image of China is rooted in a longing to overcome stereotypical views of China
27 Esther Pan, ‘China’s Soft Power Initiative’, Council on Foreign Affairs (http://www.cfr.org/china/chinas-soft-
power-initiative/p10715, accessed 14th February 2013).
28 Gillian Rose, Visual Methodologies:An Introduction to Researching with Visual Materials (London, SAGE
Productions Ltd, 2012): 107.
29 Rose, Visual Methodologies,107.

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that are rooted in the historical relations between China and other nations. This leads nicely
onto the topic of the Century of Humiliation.
The Century of Humiliation
The Century of Humiliation is a period in China’s history ranging from the First Opium War
in 1839 to the establishment of the PRC in 1949. This period is a time in China’s history
where it was subjugated to expansionism from imperial powers. In order to understand the
humiliation discourse and its relevance to contemporary Chinese nationalism, an account of
the major events in this time frame is required. The Opium Wars are a sufficient starting
point to do just this.
The First Opium War (1839 – 42) saw successful efforts from British imperial forces
to allow the importation of Indian-grown opium to China. The war resulted in the Treaty of
Nanjing which provided for the opening of five ports – Guangzhou, Xiamen, Fuzhou,
Ningbo, and Shanghai – to British trade and residence, the cession of Hong Kong to Britain,
the abolition of Cohong, equality in official correspondence, and the agreement on a fixed
tariff.30 In addition to this China was forced to pay reparations of $21,000,000 to cover the
costs of the war and the value of confiscated opium.31 This was followed up by further
unequal treaties in the form of the Treaty of the Brogue and two American and French
agreements that established extraterritoriality, meaning that Westerners were exempt from
Chinese law, leaving the Chinese elite looking weak to their people.32 This enabled the
British Empire to increase its worldwide economic worth and maintain its international
hegemony at the expense of China’s dignity and reputation.
30 J. A. G. Roberts, A History of China (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011): 166.
31 Roberts, A History of China,166.
32 June Grasso, Jay Corrin, and Michael Kort, Modernization and Revolution in China:From the Opium Wars to
World Power (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004): 39 – 40.

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The Second Opium War (1857 – 60) brought Anglo-French forces against the Qing
Dynasty. It resulted in an Anglo-French victory, with the war itself bringing about the
destruction of The Summer Palace (Yuan Ming Yuan) by Anglo-French troops. In the
aftermath of the war the Qing Dynasty was obligated to sign the Treaty of Tianjin and the
subsequent Beijing Conventions. They established new treaty ports granting Western citizens
extra-territoriality, the creation of foreign military bases on Chinese territory, and further
reparations.33 Moreover, Russia, who hadn’t fought in the war, managed to gain 400,000
square miles of Chinese territory as a result of the weak position China found itself in.34
China effectively became a semi-colonised country.
These experiences of humiliation and victimisation at the hands of Western
imperialism gave China a historical narrative that has been developed into humiliation
discourse, which in turn has influenced the mentality of the Chinese people and consequently
aided the development of Chinese national identity. Humiliation discourse has been
manipulated by the Chinese state to create a narrative in which the national identity views the
West as the enemy of China. Stuart Hall provides academic support for the notion that
discourse can be used to develop how people think, which in this case applies to humiliation
discourse and the formulation of national identity. Hall writes that narratives infuse identity
with unity, meaning and purpose, with identities being “the names we give to the different
ways we are positioned by, and position ourselves in, the narratives of the past”.35
Evidence of the Chinese state doing this can be found in the ‘civilisation/barbarism
distinction’. Callahan’s work on the development of a national humiliation discourse has
shown evidence of such a distinction within China. Callahan writes that “Whenever we
33 Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdomand the End of the Western
World (London: Allen Lane, 2009): 87.
34 Grasso et al., Modernization and Revolution in China,43.
35 Peter Hays Gries, China’s New Nationalism:Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (London: University of
California Press, 2004): 46.

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declare something civilised, we are simultaneously declaring something else barbaric”, which
in this case, is China’s historical adversaries36. Mongolian rule during the Yuan dynasty was
protested using the slogan “Expel the Northern Barbarians and Restore China”, which was
similarly seen in a military banner used during the Boxer Uprising (1900) that exclaimed
“Support the Qing, Exterminate the Westerners”, showing how the notion of barbarism was
extended to include Europeans and Americans.37 The use of vocabulary such as ‘exterminate’
links concepts of the organised destruction of something that you oppose and therefore do not
associate with elements of positivity.
Furthermore the late 1990s saw Deng Xiaoping telling party members to “develop
both the material civilisation of economic prosperity and the spiritual civilisation of political
loyalty to the party-state against foreign barbaric forces”.38 There have been vibrant efforts
within China to form an “us” vs. “them” identity that has been born out of humiliation
discourse in the form of the civilisation/barbarism distinction. Paul Cohen writes that Chinese
historians do this through drawing on the past “to serve the political, ideological, rhetorical,
and/or emotional needs of the present”.39
An example of such policy can be seen in the national curriculum. The curriculum,
devised by the party state, teaches students of the PRC’s essential need to defend itself
against a hostile world. Instead of a comprehensive historical account of Chinese history,
tragedies that have caused instability in the PRC – the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural
Revolution, and the Tiananmen Square massacre – are excluded, with humiliation discourse
being at the heart of the syllabus. Negative events such as invasion, massacres of Chinese
people, military occupations, unequal treaties, and economic extractions are used to teach the
36 William A. Callahan, China:The Pessoptimist Nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010): 21.
37 Callahan, China, 23.
38 Callahan, China, 24.
39 Gries, China’sNew Nationalism:Pride, Politics,and Diplomacy, 46.

17. Page | 17
next generation of Chinese about the blame that can be placed upon the shoulders of outsiders
regarding China’s history.40 The CCP has taken the efforts it thinks are needed in order to
produce a discourse within China that reinforces elements of China’s humiliation.
This showcases the relevant of humiliation discourse to China’s attitudes and policy
on the Olympic Games. In the particular case of athletics, Sang Ye writes:
“For China, athletics has little to do with sport per se. It is not concerned with
either physical health or personal wellbeing. For the Chinese, athletic
competitions are a struggle between political systems. They are a heady opiate
administered to salve dreams of national glory.”41
In this chapter of Ye’s book China Candid, he transcribes an interview with an anonymous
member of the Chinese national team. The anonymous athlete talks of how international
competitions are not just competitions for the Chinese; the message in China is that “The
Motherland and the People are waiting for you to fight a victorious war. You must achieve
glory for the nation!”42 In addition to this the athlete talks of a second message distributed by
the state; “The state invests ten billion Yuan annually; you shame the nation if you lose”.43
Glimpses like this into the goings on inside the Chinese state that show how humiliation
discourse is being applied to influence China’s sporting system and athletes. This is only one
instance of how humiliation discourse applies to this debate; this paper will explain and
analyse other of humiliation discourse within the chosen case studies.
40 Callahan, China, 14.
41 Sang Ye, China Candid:The People on the People’s Republic (California: California University Press Ltd,
2006): 166.
42 Ye, China Candid,169.
43 Ye, China Candid,171.

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Chapter 3: The 2008 Beijing Olympics torch relay
The 2008 Beijing Olympics torch relay was announced by the Beijing Organising Committee
for the Olympic Games (BOCOG) on 26th April 2007. The relay was set to last for 130 days,
to cover 137,000 kilometres, and to visit principal points on the ancient Silk Road as it
travelled through five continents.44 The global nature of the torch relay was more than just a
way to spread the Olympic spirit throughout the world; it was an opportunity to harness the
event to expand upon Chinese soft power. The torch was sent around the world with a
message of harmony from the CCP. Chinese leadership the event as part of “China’s long-
sought chance to take centre stage and reclaim its status as a global economic and political
powerhouse”; it was a perfect opportunity to increase its soft power and return to a position
of power in international relations that was accepted and welcomed by the world.45
Whilst on its international journey the torch encountered dissent and protests from
activists and members of the public who supported Tibetan independence and human rights
and who therefore condemned China’s policy in regards to both these issues. Politicians also
used the torch relay to voice their opposition with the likes of Hillary Clinton calling for
President Bush to boycott the event, 40 French MPs from a cross-party platform
demonstrating against the torch as it passed the French parliament, and the Mayor of Paris
cancelling a ceremony to receive the torch because Chinese officials objected to a banner
hung from its city hall.46 Incidents such as these received a hostile and negative reaction from
the Chinese state and people alike.
44 ‘BEIJING 2008: BOCOG ANNOUNCES OLYMPIC TORCH RELAY ROUTE’, Olympic News – Official
Source of Olympic News
(http://web.archive.org/web/20070429032528/http://www.olympic.org/uk/news/olympic_news/full_story_uk.as
p?id=2147, accessed 8th March 2013).
45 Susan Leong, ‘Franchise nation: The future of the nation?’, Continuum:Journal of Media and Cultural
Studies 23 (6) (2009): 863.
46 Katrin Bennhold and Elisabeth Rosenthal, ‘Olympic Torch Goes Out, Briefly, in Paris’, The New York Times
(http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/08/world/europe/08torch.html?pagewanted=all, assessed 8th March 2013);

19. Page | 19
This chapter analyses the impact of the international leg of the torch relay in
expanding Chinese soft power and consequently producing a harmonious image of the
country, even in the light of the attacks on and criticisms of the torch relay itself. Attention
then shifts to the reaction of domestic and diasporic Chinese to criticisms of the torch relay
and how the Chinese state media’s created a media reality to associate the reactions of its
domestic and diasporic population with China’s experiences of national humiliation at the
hands of Western imperialism. An argument is presented that finds the CCP attitudes towards
the torch relay to be fundamentally rooted in soft power and experiences of national
humiliation in order to produce a greater sense national identity and unity.
Soft power and the torchrelay
The CCP manipulated the torch relay by associating its message of a Journey of Harmony
with the depoliticised event that is the Olympics Games. The most recent version of the
Olympic Charter states that “The goal of Olympism is to place sport at the service of the
harmonious development of man, with a view to promoting a peaceful society concerned with
the preservation of human dignity”.47 The association meant that the torch relay could be
used as a conduit of soft power due to the close association with Olympic values. Associating
the neutrality of Olympism and the torch relay to China’s Journey of Harmony branded
criticisms of the relay as criticism of the Olympic message and spirit.
Language used by state newspaper the People’s Daily produced a narrative of global
Chinese populism by describing the Journey of Harmony as one that was welcomed
throughout the world;
Charles Bremner, ‘French revolution takes aim at Beijing’, Irish Independent (http://www.independent.ie/world-
news/europe/french-revolution-takes-aim-at-beijing-26436000.html, accessed 8th March 2013).
47 David Rowe, ‘The bid, the lead-up, the event, and the legacy: global cultural politics and hosting the
Olympics’, The British Journal of Sociology 63 (2) (2012): 288.

20. Page | 20
“Under the authorization of the International Olympic Committee, the Beijing
Olympic torch relay is taking its journey of harmony throughout the world,
sharing the passion and glory of the Olympics with the world, and has
received warm welcome from the people en route [sic].”48
By citing the authorisation received from the IOC, the explicit use of the message of a
Journey of Harmony, and the positive reception the torch relay received, the People’s Daily
labelled the torch relay as a success of China’s newfound internationalism and expanding soft
power. The article goes on to mention the praise China gained for its engineering of the torch
relay, with examples of many onlookers waving Chinese flags or putting flag stickers on their
face to cheer on the event in spite of the anti-Chinese being used.49 By referring to the
acceptance that the torch relay received during its international legs the desire and success
that China had to increase its global position and admiration was reiterated. The same article
quotes Olympic champion and politician Guy Drut as saying “The Olympic sacred fire is a
symbol of peace, tolerance…and should not be affected by anybody in any way”.50 By
linking of the Olympic message with its own, those who were hostile towards the torch relay
were portrayed in a negative light as attacks on the torch were attacks on Olympism as well
as China.
This message of positivity was seen in further People’s Daily dialogue. The
newspaper gave focus to pro-China messages from foreign government officials and
politicians. Regarding the attacks on the torch during its Western leg the newspaper quoted
former leader of the Australian Liberal Party, Shane Stone, as saying that viewing China
through a Western prism is a mistake.51 A reality was established that represented the
growing respect that foreigners have for China’s culture and in turn how soft power efforts
48 ‘Olympic torch relay in Paris concludes’, People’s Daily
(http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90779/90867/6388235.html, accessed 7th March 2013).
49 ‘Olympic torch relay in Paris concludes’.
50 ‘Olympic torch relay in Paris concludes’.
51 ‘Shane: Boycotts, disrupting Olympic torch relay counterproductive’, People’s Daily
(http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6391248.html, accessed 7th March 2013).

21. Page | 21
were gaining success; Chinese culture and values were not being labelled as subservient to
those within the West.
State-controlled media reports such as these had a purpose to solely portray China’s
success in developing a new image for itself. The torch relay was an event through which
China could advance its efforts in portraying itself as a powerful and peaceful nation; it was a
route through which soft power could be harnessed. The portrayal of positive relations with
international organisations such as the IOC as well as the likes of foreign officials was a
policy through which the CCP made efforts to increased positivity within the Chinese masses
in the hope of establishing a greater national identity and unity in order to guarantee a greater
lifespan for CCP rule.
The CCP’s desire to establish greater national unity through the torch relay contained
not only positive connotations in the form of soft power but also negative connotations
through media documenting of the reaction from domestic and diasporic Chinese citizens to
the attacks on the Olympic torch.
Domestic and diasporic Chinese
As discussed, a media reality existed within China that positively portrayed the torch relay by
celebrating it as an instance of soft power success. But this was not the only media reality to
exist in regards to the event. A second media reality existed that was based upon informing
the Chinese people of China’s victimhood in the event and how this victimhood was an
experience of humiliation for China.52 Media realities are where the agency of the individuals
is structured by another.53 In the case of China, the agency of the citizen is structured by the
Chinese state through the framing of discourse. Such policy was visible in regards to the
52 Le Han, ‘“Lucky Cloud” Over the World: The Journalistic Discourse of National Humiliation beyond China
in the Beijing Olympics Global Torch Relay’, Critical Studies in Media Communication 28 (4) (2011): 279.
53 William A. Gamson, David Croteau, William Hoynes,and Theodore Sasson ‘Media Images and the Social
Construction of Reality’, Annual Review of Sociology 18 (1992): 384.

22. Page | 22
torch relay. The state media focused upon the negative reaction of Chinese netizens – citizens
with digitally based community links – where disgust at foreign attacks and criticisms was
highlighted. The People’s Daily quoted an individual posting on the bulletin board system of
the Powerapple website who commented in reaction to the boycott of the French supermarket
Carrefour:
“What can we do? A French handbag or China’s dignity? French cosmetics or
China’s reputation? At this time, as a Chinese person, how should you
choose…Allow them to split up our country and insult our people?”54
Here the CCP’s success in structuring the agency of ordinary people was visible. By
focusing such a reality the Chinese state represented a system of structure and agency in
which it portrayed attitudes towards the torch relay to be derived from humiliation discourse
in the form of the “us” vs. “them” distinction, and in turn hoped to use such a reality to
increase its influence upon more of the Chinese citizenry.
An ordinary citizen named Sanny Zhao wrote that “The Chinese nation has never
been so united. On May 1st, let’s empty all the Carrefours in China! [sic]” showing the
success in the state’s desire to establish a great national identity through creating media
realities for ordinary people shape their logic from.55
In regards to China’s diasporic population, an historical account of attitudes towards it
is needed. Historically China’s attitudes towards its diaspora have been negative because of
the perceived threat they held against the nation. In contemporary China attitudes have
flipped. The state now regards its overseas population as a necessary and advantageous asset
54 ‘Chinese netizen discussion of“boycott on French goods”’, People’s Daily
(http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90780/91342/6392966.html, accessed 6th March 2013).
55 ‘Chinese netizen discussion of“boycott on French goods’.

23. Page | 23
in China’s economic development and national security; they have come from being branded
“class enemies” to “patriots”.56
Han and Rui talk separately of how this constructed national reality was rooted in a
sense of overseas support and how it gave the impression of a unified China. Han talks of the
“imagery of seas of red flags, banners of supportive words…voices of loyalty to the
motherland regardless of one’s background and current nationality…” which in turn is
supported by news reports of more than 10,000 Chinese Australians staging a pro-Beijing
rally during the Olympic torch’s Australian leg.57 Rui’s account of the construction of a
media reality in Chinese groups supports Han’s claim, with a Beijing Evening News report
from 10th April 2008 entitled ‘Fifty Thousand Chinese in America Guard the Torch’ giving
an impression of Chinese from all across America rallying together through a desire to
protect the torch in its moment of victimhood, what with the torch being a symbolic extension
of China’s nationhood and pride.58
The state-media focused on the reaction of Chinese diaspora to the attacks on the
torch relay because of the CCP’s desire to strengthen national identity and unity that was seen
in the focus on domestic Chinese. By representing the diasporic population as vehement
supporters of China in the aftermath to the attacks, the state media created a media reality in
which a stronger image of a united China could be found. It related to and strengthened
nationalism born out of humiliation discourse that wished to re-establish China’s presence in
the international political elite.
Ultimately the torch relay was an occasion through which the Chinese state wished to
further explore its soft power, which it portrayed itself to have successfully done through
56 Leong, ‘Franchise nations’,860.
57 Han, ‘“Lucky Cloud” Over the World’, 285 – 86; ‘Pro-Beijing crowds drown out torch protesters’, NBC
(http://www.nbcnews.com/id/24268336/, accessed 7th March 2013).
58 Feng Rui, ‘The Construction of a Medial Reality in Reporting the Beijing Olympic Torch Relay’, 1580.

24. Page | 24
creating a media reality based on positive referencing, seen in the PRC’s constructive
relationships with the IOC and foreign officials. This media reality existed in order to unite
the Chinese people through the positive notion of soft power, but a second media reality that
presented the hostile reaction to criticisms of the torch relay from domestic and diasporic
Chinese contradicts this whilst having the same desirable outcome. Its desire to create a
unified people was born out of a more traditional sense of “us” vs. “them”, of civilisation vs.
barbarism, whereby the Chinese people are unified through the negativity provided by the
criticisms of foreigners.

25. Page | 25
Chapter 4: The 2008 Beijing Olympics opening ceremony
Chen et al. write that “Sports media events and especially Olympic Games can be occasions
to improve the image of a country. They can help to achieve political goals and gain
influence in international contexts”.59 The opening ceremony of the 2008 Beijing Games was
an occasion which was seized by the Chinese state to do just this. Just like with the torch
relay the theme of the opening ceremony was harmony and inclusivity, which included
showcasing to the world the contemporary and historical achievements of China in the hope
that the country would be seen as a nation of ambition, admiration, and friendship. In regards
to soft power it was an occasion which was used by the Chinese state as an attempt to create
international awareness and recognition towards China being a friend to the world and not an
alien nation from the east.
In showing how the opening ceremony was utilised as a form of soft power this
chapter will look at components of the ceremony itself and how these portrayed an image of
China that was approachable and friendly. Focus will then shift to the Chinese state media
and how newspapers articles in the aftermath of the opening ceremony created a media reality
within China. This media reality portrayed a wholly positive international reaction to the
display of Chinese soft power in the opening ceremony in order to construct a sense of
Chinese nationalism in order to unify the Chinese people and prolong the life of CCP rule.
Soft power and the opening ceremony
The opening ceremony gave its global audience a welcoming reception to both the Beijing
Olympics and China as a whole. This was part of the CCP’s efforts to transform stereotypical
Orientalist views held towards China because “in the opinion of many Chinese people the
international perception of China, largely based on West media coverage, is often
59 Chwen Chwen Chen, Cinzia Colapinto and Qing Luo, ‘The 2008 Beijing Olympics opening ceremony: visual
insights into China’s soft power’, Visual Studies 27 (2) (2012): 188.

26. Page | 26
unfavourable”.60 This policy feature was established in the aftermath of the failed 1993 bid
for the 2000 Olympic Games where members of the Chinese Olympic Committee, the Mayor
of Beijing and the Chinese government began a campaign to emphasise the ‘Beijing
Advantages Yet to be Recognised’ by Western culture.61 The visibility of this in the 2008
Beijing Olympics opening ceremony represented Chinese soft power in action as it was a
show that broadcasted China’s historical achievements and modern day advantages to the
entire world. The CCP’s efforts to link Orientalism, the West, and soft power highlighted the
desire to increase China’s soft power through removing the shackles of national humiliation
and thus increase China’s influence within the world, as well as global respect for China.
The creation of new image requires a change in attitude from both yourself towards
others and others towards you. China’s desire to construct a new image was rooted in
motivations to improve its image and desirability which if fundamentally rooted in liberation
from past humiliation. In order to achieve this desire a need to export more harmonious
attitudes from China was pivotal, which provides reason for why the concept of harmony was
central to the message of the Beijing Games. This was a desire held by more than just the
Chinese state. The People’s World quoted Juan Zyi, an undergraduate student at New York
City College, as saying:
“I’m proud when watching the opening ceremony. People’ don’t understand
China’s history or how we are now. I think this will show people that we are a
powerful country, but also that no one has to fear China [because we are also]
a friendly country.”62
The global nature of the opening ceremony meant that it was an ideal occasion
through which to act upon these soft power desires. It was an event for China to focus on
60 Chen et al., ‘The 2008 Beijing Olympics opening ceremony’, 189.
61 Sandra Collins, ‘Mediated Modernities and Mythologies in the Opening Ceremonies of 1964 Tokyo, 1988
Seoul and 2008 Beijing Olympic Games’, The International Journal of the History of Sport 29 (16) (2012):
2254.
62 Dan Margolis, ‘Beijing Olympics showcase harmony concept’, People’s World
(http://www.peoplesworld.org/beijing-olympics-showcase-harmony-concept/, accessed 12th March 2013).

27. Page | 27
communicating a carefully constructed image of China to the world. The Olympics are,
according to Susan Brownell, “the world’s largest single event for the production of national
culture for international consumption”.63
China harnessed the opening ceremony as an extension of soft power through
focusing on China’s contemporary and historical cultural achievements and demonstrating
them through the country’s technological capabilities. One instance where this technique was
vividly noticeable was in the last shot in the section on Chinese calligraphy. In this shot a
folding parchment corresponded to the unfolding of a giant electronic parchment on the floor
of the Bird’s Nest stadium. This painting in the middle of the giant LED display “unified
ancient tradition, modernity and globalisation”.64 The giant LED display demonstrated the
grandeur of Chinese civilisation and in doing so also demonstrated how western civilisation
had been constituted in the East. 65 The use of technology created in the West, in the form of
light-emitting diodes, to glorify Chinese civilisation, in the form of calligraphy, presented an
image that showed a new belief in the compatibility of Chinese and Western culture. It was
an announcement that the civilisation of the West was not superior to that of the East but that
it was equal to it.66 Chinese Ambassador to the United Kingdom Fu Ying emphasised this
concept in the build-up to the Beijing Olympics, where she spoke of how “China should not
be expected to become a carbon copy of a Western society”.67 Chinese culture is different but
equal to the West in its merits. A desire for mutual respect existed in this discourse; a desire
that embodied being viewed as equals in the eyes of the West.
63 Chen et al., ‘The 2008 Beijing Olympics opening ceremony’, 188; 189.
64 Leonardo V. Boccia, ‘Aesthetic Convergences: Comparing Spectacular Key Audible and Visuals of Athens
and Beijing Olympic Opening Ceremonies’, The International Journal ofthe History of Sport 29 (16) (2012):
2268 – 2269.
65 Collins, ‘Mediated Modernities and Mythologies’, 2255.
66 Collins, ‘Mediated Modernities and Mythologies’, 2255.
67 Fu Ying, ‘Bringing out the Best in Us’, Beijing Review 51 (42) (2008): 46.

28. Page | 28
This campaign for cultural awareness and equality was evident in China’s Olympic
theme of harmony. The theme of harmony embodies a message of positivity which meant
that periods in China’s history that could recall events related to Chinese national humiliation
at the hands of Western powers were avoided to prevent causing offence. These Western
powers were largely the countries that China had to impress if it wanted to increase its global
standing. This meant ignoring the Qing Dynasty, a time when Western powers made inroads
on the disintegrating empire, and the 20th century when civil war, Japanese invasion and
Chairman Mao’s authoritarianism in campaigns such as The Great Leap Forward drove China
into deep poverty.68
Through linking China’s successes to a contemporary relevance in a globalised world,
the opening ceremony made groundwork in establishing China as a nation that was more
desirable to the outside world. With self-promotion forming the basis of the spectacle it acted
as a visible extension of soft power; in showing that it possessed a friendly, harmonious, and
welcoming culture, China was yearning for admiration and respect from the international
community.
The harmonious nature of the opening ceremony showed confidence and maturity that
had long been absent from the PRC’s efforts to integrate into international politics. Dong
Jinxia wrote that the opening ceremony and the Beijing Olympic Games in general proved
that “The Chinese people have become more friendly and supportive not just to home athletes
but also to foreign athletes…the Chinese have become more tolerant as they become more
confident. Nationalism and globalization coexist in today’s China”.69 The Chinese people are
a more tolerant people and because of this are willing to reduce the emphasis placed upon
68 ‘FACTBOX’: Beijing Olympics opening ceremony’, Reuters (http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/08/08/us-
olympicsceremony-factbox-idUSPEK31086920080808, accessed 12th March 2013).
69 Dong Jinxia, ‘The Beijing Games, National Identity and Modernization in China’, The International Journal
of the History of Sport 27 (2010): 2811.

29. Page | 29
humiliation discourse in the realm of international relations. The opening ceremony made
inroads in helping to transform China into a business that the international community found
was worth investing in.
Media realities
The use of soft power in the opening ceremony was embedded within society through the
state media and state-friendly media. Media realities were produced that corresponded with
China’s Olympic message of harmony but that focused on what the show implied about
China’s future. Newspapers such as Xinhua and China Daily produced a high quantity of
material in the aftermath to the opening ceremony, some of which contained accounts and
quotations from foreign officials praising the show and what they believed it meant for the
future of China.
An article from Xinhua dated 8th August 2008 reported on the opening ceremony,
describing it as an example of China welcoming the world and the outside world praising
China for its societal evolution and this policy of inclusiveness. It quoted the San Jose
Mercury News as saying “For decades China walled itself off, but this month it has invited in
the world. These Games…are designed to introduce China as a world superpower was its
greeting card”.70 It further quoted the American newspaper as saying “In the ensuing 15 years
[since it lost the 1993 bid for the 2000 Games], the ancient culture has fast-forwarded,
condensing the 20th century into a few years and plunging headfirst into the 21st”.71 Articles
from Xinhua dated 9th August 2008 and China Daily dated 10th August 2008 presented a
broad overview of the positive coverage and reception of the opening ceremony from inside
some of the most respected and powerful nations in the world. Both accounted for the same
New York Times article which wrote:
70 ‘Paper: China welcomes the world with Olympics’, Xinhua (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-
08/09/content_9079664.htm, accessed 12th March 2013).
71 ‘Paper: China welcomes the world with Olympics’.

30. Page | 30
“An ecstatic China, an ancient nation so determined to be a modern power,
finally got its Olympic moment on Friday night…the 2008 Beijing Olympics
began with an opening ceremony of soaring firework, lavish spectacles and a
celebration of Chinese culture and international good will.”72
By selectively choosing quotes such as the above the CCP created a media reality that
presented a positive global consensus to the Chinese people, which in turn helped legitimised
and verified China’s goals for the opening ceremony. By creating further awareness of the
acceptance and inclusion that China received from the international community the state
media was taking efforts to unify the Chinese people through a positive sense of nationalism.
China welcomed the world to the opening ceremony of the Beijing Games with hope
that the consequences of this would be a world that admired and welcomed the Chinese way
of life, and in doing so, establish a greater stage for the country through which Chinese soft
power could be expanded even more so. Indeed, Alex Mobley quotes historian Xu Quoqi as
saying that:
“Sports, and the Olympics in particular, show how well nationalism and
internationalism come together in China: Chinese participation and interest in
modern sport and largely motivated by nationalism, but by importing sports
from the West and taking part in world competitions, China has also engaged
the world community.”73
The opening ceremony was a conduit through which this soft power could be
transmitted, with the state media creating a reality that presented an international positive
reaction to the event. Again, by focusing on the international positive reaction to the opening
ceremony the CCP was taking measures that were rooted in desires to extend its own
lifespan. Callahan writes that China is a “fragile superpower” that is “overdue for a major
72 ‘Opening ceremony draws worldwide attention’, China Daily (http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2008-
08/10/content_6921207.htm, accessed 12th March 2013); ‘Roundup: Beijing Olympics opening ceremony hits
headlines of world media’, Xinhua (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-08/09/content_9065756.htm,
accessed 12th March 2013).
73 Alex M. Mobley, ‘Sharing the dream: The opening ceremonies of Beijing’, Journal of Sport and Social Issues
32 (4) (2008): 330.

31. Page | 31
political crisis”, adding weight to the reasoning behind why the CCP would use such methods
to unify the Chinese people through nationalism and sport.74
74 William A. Callahan, China:The Pessoptimist Nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010): 27; 28.

32. Page | 32
Chapter 5: Ye Shiwen and the curse of success
In the 2012 London Olympics Chinese athlete Ye Shiwen won gold in both the women’s
200m individual medley and the 400m individual medley, setting a new world record in the
latter. These Olympic victories were a representation of Chinese glory and success. For
China, Olympic glories act as a form of soft power through which national humiliation and
victimhood can be disregarded, overcome, and replaced with a positive association of
harmony. Olympic glory is the objective for all Chinese athletes and is widely celebrated in
China. This attitude is born out of the estimated ten billion Yuan of capital investment that
the Chinese state devotes to Olympic sports annually, with this investment existing because
of the Chinese state’s desire to use the sporting event to resolve the struggles between the
Chinese and Western political systems. In this sense Ye’s Olympic victories personified
Chinese soft power particularly well due to the domination in the pool by American athletes;
since the establishment of the modern Olympic Games in 1896 the USA has won 520
swimming medals which are 342 more than its closest competitor Australia.75
In the aftermath to Ye’s performance in the 400m individual medley US swimming
coach and executive director of the World Swimming Coaches Association John Leonard
raised concerns about her performance. He described Ye’s performance as “impossible” and
“unbelievable”, comparing it to that of Irish swimmer Michelle Smith who won gold in the
same event at the 1996 Atlanta Olympics but was disqualified for tampering with a urine
sample, rousing suspicions of the use of performance enhancing drugs. 76 Further suspicion
was raised from other US-based sources such as The New Yorker, which contained an Evan
75 Justin Peters, ‘The USA Crushed Every Other Country in the Medal Count. Why Is America So Awesome at
the Olympics?, Slate
(http://www.slate.com/blogs/five_ring_circus/2012/08/12/_2012_olympics_medal_count_why_did_the_usa_wi
n_more_medals_than_any_other_country_.html,accessed 22nd March 2013).
76 Jeremy Wilson, ‘Olympics: 16-year-old Ye Shiwen’s swim ‘impossible’, says coach John Leonard’,
Telegraph (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/olympics/news/9440248/Ye-Shiwen-16-year-olds-Olympic-swim-
impossible-says-coach-John-Leonard.html, accessed 22nd March 2013).

33. Page | 33
Osnos article ‘The Ceremony and the Swimmer: China Watches the Olympics’ in which he
discusses doping in reference to Ye Shiwen’s performance and China’s history of doping in
sports during the 1990s.77
When it was revealed that Ye had passed all Olympic drugs tests concerns with her
performance did not fade. Writing for the People’s Daily on 3rd August 2012, Wu Liming
spoke of how this persistence from certain Western media was a continuation of their
arrogance and prejudice against Chinese athletes; that they cannot come to terms with the
“new reality” in which China is a global force.78 This chapter will show how the reactions
from the Chinese state media to the criticisms of Ye Shiwen were born out of humiliation
discourse with these criticisms being portrayed as attacks on China’s soft power ambitions
through the creation of media realities that endorsed an ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ distinction.
Reaction to Nature magazine
On 1st August 2012 the scientific journal Nature published an article which discussed the
doubts and suspicions that accompany great Olympic performances. The article, written by
Ewen Callaway, was born out of the furore that surrounded Ye Shiwen’s 400m medley
performance. It promoted a question entitled ‘Doesn’t a clean drug test during competition
rule out the possibility of doping?’ – a reference to Ye’s doping tests coming back clean –
which was answered with a resounding no.79 The article produced substantial controversy and
came under heavy criticism from readers and scholars alike, which in turn lead to an apology
from the author.
77 Evan Osnos,‘The Ceremony and the Swimmer: China Watches the Olympics’, The New Yorker
(http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/evanosnos/2012/07/china-opening-ceremonies-and-swimmer-ye-
shiwen.html, accessed 22nd March 2013).
78 Wu Liming, ‘Time to tear off arrogance, prejudice against China’, People’s Daily
(http://english.people.com.cn/90779/7897599.html, accessed 20th March 2013).
79 Ewen Callaway, ‘Why great Olympic feats raise suspicions’, Nature (http://www.nature.com/news/why-
great-olympic-feats-raise-suspicions-1.11109, accessed 20th March 2013).

34. Page | 34
The apology itself was well received but it did not quell the antagonistic and hostile
agenda that followed from China’s state media, who focused their efforts into presenting a
reality where such attitudes existed due to fears that an increasingly growing China would
hinder US hegemony. This was seen in the dialogue of Yu Jincui, writer for the People’s
Daily;
“The West has long viewed China with prejudice…With the country
continuing to rise, China is bound to face more suspicions and more sceptical
voices…The West feels uncomfortable in the face of a rising China.”80
The China Daily wrote with a similar agenda, discussing how the accusations against Ye
Shiwen indicated how “Westerners think they are physically superior to the people from the
East, Chinese in particular. That’s why they refuse to accept a Chinese swimmer performing
such a feat”.81 Furthermore China Daily quoted Cheng Li, a Chinese studies expert at the
Brookings Institution as saying that there was a mixed attitude of racism and jealousy in the
Western media’s response to Ye Shiwen’s feat that was born out of feeling threatened by
China.82
Through linking the negative overtones of Western prejudice towards China with the
positive image of a rising China the state media linked the criticisms of Ye’s performance to
China’s historical experiences of national humiliation at the hands of Western expansionism.
Emphasis on associating the West with feelings of negativity through the use of humiliation
discourse and racism produced a generalised reality in which China existed in contrasted to
the West; it was ‘us’ vs. ‘them’.
80 Yu Jincui, ‘Apology doesn’t hide West’s deep suspicions’, People’s Daily
(http://english.people.com.cn/90883/7903700.html, accessed 20th March 2013).
81 ‘Against the Olympic spirit’, China Daily (http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/sports/2012-
08/08/content_15651809.htm, accessed 20th March 2013).
82 ‘Nature apologizes to Ye Shiwen’, China Daily (http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/2012olympics/2012-
08/07/content_15649680.htm, 20th March 2013).

35. Page | 35
Moreover these articles present the criticisms of Ye as progenies of an agenda against
China that can be found within the American media. Scholar Lai Jiang takes note of this by
highlighting the cherry-picked data that forms the argument behind Callaway’s Nature
article.83 This claim was further seen in the discourse of Chinese state media and scholars
alike. An editorial from the Global Times wrote that “If Ye were an American, the tone
would be different in Western media”, linking it to the likes of Michael Phelps having never
been questioned “most probably because he is American”.84
Similarly in response to Callaway’s article in Nature, Zhong et al. responded with an
article of their own that highlighted a global reality regarding young swimmers that the
feature had failed to recognise. They noted how Australian swimmer Ian Thorpe reduced his
400m freestyle time by five seconds between the ages of fifteen and sixteen; how UK
swimmer Adrian Moorhouse reduced his 200m breaststroke time by four seconds aged
seventeen; and how the seven other finalists in the 2012 London Olympics women’s 400m
individual medley also recorded personal bests.85 In addition to this there were no criticisms
of US swimmers Katie Ledecky, aged fifteen, and Missy Franklin, aged seventeen. Ledecky
won gold in the 800m freestyle whilst Franklin won four gold medals in the pool at the 2012
London Olympics, setting new world records in two of these events.
By presenting such information both academics and the CCP present empirical
evidence to the Chinese citizenry that support their claims of Western prejudice in what was
written about Ye Shiwen.
83 Callaway, ‘Why great Olympic feats raise suspicions’.
84 Alexis Lai, ‘China says West being ‘petty’ over Ye doping allegations’, CNN
(http://edition.cnn.com/2012/08/01/world/asia/china-ye-shiwen-west-petty, accessed 22nd March 2013).
85 Weimin Zhong,Hao Wu, and Linheng Li, ‘Olympics: Some facts about Ye Shiwen’s swim’, Nature 488
(2012): 459.

36. Page | 36
Media realities
A discourse existed within China regarding the controversy over Ye that was partly
fuelled by China’s ever-growing soft power particularly since the 2008 Beijing Olympic
Games and its message of harmony. But the likes of China Daily, Global Times, and the
People’s Daily expanded upon this notion through the creation of a media reality that linked
the positive nature of China’s growing soft power to negative, American-led criticisms born
out of worry over their own hegemony, but more importantly, out of chauvinistic attitudes
towards China.
This media reality existed to structure the agency of the Chinese people in such a way
that established a greater sense of nationalism and unity. The public reaction to another
controversial medal upset for China represents such CCP policy in action. Chin Yibing –
favourite for the gold medal on the rings – came second to Brazilian Arthur Nabarrete
Zanetti, yet there was a consensus outside and within China that Zanetti stumbled in his
dismount and should therefore have received a lower score and been placed in the silver
medal position. Chinese netizens rallied to criticise the UK for this controversial decision,
with a tweet from a Sina Weibo user reading: “So far, the UK has given to us three things: the
Opium War, the burning of the Summer Palace and the London Olympics”.86 Here the
consequences of the CCP’s relentless use of humiliation discourse to invoke feelings of
national humiliation are evident, with the citizen’s attempts to link moments where China has
experienced Olympic hardships at the hands of Westerners to incidents of national
humiliation at the hands of Westerners, such as the burning of the Summer Palace in the
Second Opium War.
86 Adam Minter, ‘Are Chinese Olympians Competing Against Colonialism?’, Bloomberg
(http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-08/are-chinese-olympians-competing-against-colonialism-.html,
accessed 20th March 2013).

37. Page | 37
At first glance this may be the reality we are presented with, but contemporary
literature presents an alternative reality. In recent years reports have been published that
question the legitimacy of such online comments. In many instances, instead of these
comments coming from ordinary citizens they are manufactured by the CCP to act as a
further extension of its discourse. The people behind these comments are technically ordinary
citizens, but they belong to the 50 Cent Party model. They are private citizens paid by the
CCP to pretend to be ordinary netizens when in fact they act as an additional mouthpiece for
the CCP line.87 Independent Chinese blogger Li Ming describes how the policy impacts Sina
Weibo users in particular:
“On the main hot topics, three days into the debate, only the propaganda
remains online [creating a] false general opinion. That is the major success of
Chinese propaganda.”88
Therefore doubt over the extent to which citizens have taken on board the CCP line
should exist. Moreover it provides additional evidence of the extent to which the CCP used
whatever power it had to structure the agency and debate in regards to the criticisms of Ye
Shiwen.
In order to strengthen its message the CCP focused its efforts on link humiliation
discourse to hostility between China and the West in order to draw upon fundamental
characteristics of ethnocentrism. Van Ginneken quotes Sumner on the concept:
“Ethnocentrism is the technical name for this view of things in which one’s
own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with
reference to it…Each group nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself
superior, exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt on outsiders. Each
87 Sarah Cook, ‘China’s growing army of paid internet commentators’, Freedom House
(http://blog.freedomhouse.org/weblog/2011/10/chinas-growing-army-of-paid-internet-commentators.html,
accessed 11th April 2013).
88 Pascale Trouillaud, ‘China’s web spin doctors spread Beijing’s message’, The Sydney Morning Herald
(http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-technology/chinas-web-spin-doctors-spread-beijings-message-
20110512-1ek4j.html, accessed 11th April 2013).

38. Page | 38
group thinks its own folkways the only right ones, and if it observes that other
groups have other folkways, these excite its scorn.”89
With ethnocentrism comes a sense of pride in the people from ones culture and with
that, hostility to those who offend these people. Regarding the case of Ye Shiwen, the
concept was manipulated by the state in order to produce a reality in which this collective
mentality could flourish. By using the predominantly American furore surrounding Ye
Shiwen as a foundation off of which to produce elements of humiliation discourse the state
was making efforts to entrench this mentality within society more successfully.
Callahan describes China as a fragile super power with an unstable identity that is
born out of a particular combination of victimisation and civilisation, in which China is a
“benevolent force in an immoral and hostile world”.90 With the case of Ye Shiwen the state
portrayed Chinese success to have been attacked by Westerners with a negative agenda
rooted in attacking and demonising China. The motivation behind these desires lied in efforts
to unite the people through broadcasting negative connotations of China from the West in
order to increase nationalism and national unity. This was so that the people were allied with
the state against foreigners and were therefore prevented from against the state, thus
extending the life of CCP rule in the People’s Republic of China.
89 Jaap van Ginneken, Understanding Global News: A Critical Introduction (London: SAGE Publications Ltd,
1998): 212.
90 William A. Callahan, China:The Pessoptimist Nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010): 27.

39. Page | 39
Chapter 6: Conclusion
This paper set out to present an insight into the relationship between China, soft power, and
the Century of Humiliation in regards to case studies from the 2008 Beijing Olympics and
2012 London Olympics. Through focusing on three case studies –the international leg of the
2008 Beijing Olympics torch relay, the 2008 Beijing Olympics opening ceremony, and
criticisms of the performance of Chinese athlete Ye Shiwen at the 2012 London Olympics –
this paper has produced a discussion that has resulted in a decisive judgement.
The first verdict from this paper looks at the Chinese state’s categorical use of the
2008 and 2012 Olympic Games as a tool through which Chinese soft power could be
expanded and broadcast throughout the world. This policy is rooted in the belief that
international sporting competitions are a breeding ground for nationalism. The international
leg of the 2008 Beijing Olympics torch relay was manipulated by the CCP in order to achieve
its soft power goals. By attaching a message of harmony to the torch as it traversed the world,
China was making clear efforts to present itself to the world as a nation that embodies
camaraderie and friendship.
This message of harmony was replicated in the 2008 Beijing Olympics opening
ceremony where China constructed a show in which an account of Chinese history was given
that only have a positive impression to the world; the majority of events from the 20th century
were absent. The opening ceremony built upon the torch relay by openly linking the
compatibility of Eastern and Western culture and values, seen through the use of LED
technology to represent Chinese achievements. In regards to Ye Shiwen, the achievements of
the athlete in the pool represented a form of Olympic glory and in that, an extension of China
glory.

40. Page | 40
But the more important outcome from this paper looks at the power of media realities
and the motives behind the Chinese Communist Party’s dedication to them in regards to the
three case studies.
There was a correlation between the creation of positive media realities and
associations to the acceptance and growth of Chinese soft power through the world. Such
media realities were created in order to stress the importance of a unified China; that dissent
towards the Chinese state would be unequivocally against the interests of China in
international relations. This was evident in the media reality produced in regards to the
international leg of the Beijing Olympics torch relay. The media reality was based upon the
acceptance and welcoming of the torch as it progressed on its worldwide journey, with events
such as spectators painting Chinese flags on their face as well as waving China’s flag being
cited. This was to produce a positive sense of unity within China through visualising how the
country was becoming more accepted within the world and especially in the West.
The same can be said for the 2008 Beijing Olympics opening ceremony. The media
reality created here was based upon the international praise of the ceremony itself, which
acted as a subsidiary method of portraying the success of the CCP in producing a new image
for China that was being welcomed by those who previously held prejudice views towards
the country. Both these events were affirmations of the good the Chinese people did by
supporting their country and not standing against it by objecting to CCP rule.
Such positive media realities were not applicable to the entire process of maintaining
a country of obedience through nationalism tendencies. Negative media realities were created
which embodied elements of China’s national humiliation and humiliation discourse. Such
media realities were present within the international leg of the Beijing Olympics torch relay
and the reaction to criticisms of athlete Ye Shiwen.

41. Page | 41
In regards to the torch relay, focus was on the acknowledgement of domestic and
diasporic Chinese and their reactions to the criticisms of the torch relay. By focusing on the
citizen the state was making a conscious effort to provide a point of reference which other
citizens could unite through. The CCP’s desire to create this feeling of “we-ness” within its
citizenry drew upon broadly classifying the situation as “us”. vs. “them”. This was evident in
the reaction to criticisms of Ye Shiwen which made efforts to unify the Chinese people based
on thoughts of ethnocentrism. Foreigners from the West were portrayed with a collective
attitude that was inherently prejudice towards China, which in itself drew upon elements of
past incidents of humiliation at the hands of Western imperialism.
The hypocrisy that exists within the two discourses used by the Chinese state in the
2008 and 2012 Olympic Games should find difficulty in working successfully, but it does,
and that is because they both possess the same goal. The positivity entrenched in the media
realities related to soft power and the negativity entrenched in the media realities related to
humiliation discourse both exist in order to secure the future of CCP rule in the PRC. China is
overdue a political crisis, as the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 indicated. Naturally the
CCP wants to avert similar crises at all costs, which makes events such as the 2008 and 2012
Olympic Games unmissable opportunities to quell any moods and spirits that could threaten
their governance of China. By using the overwhelming power that comes with being a single-
party state, the CCP was able to harness soft power and humiliation discourse in order to
structure the debate within the Chinese masses so that a prolonged sense of nationalism and
national unity would exist, therefore directing attention away from matters concerning its
own rule and securing the immediate future of CCP rule in the People’s Republic of China.

42. Page | 42
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