The document discusses interlocking systems used in Jaipur Metro. It describes the basic components and functions of interlocking systems including point machines, signals, track circuits, route setting and locking. It covers primary safety considerations like safe behavior in normal and faulty conditions through fail-safe design. It also discusses interlocking interfaces, environmental factors, and key functions such as routes, points, signals and their control.
7. CBI SAFETY ISSUE:
NO SYSTEM OPERATION (IN NORMAL OR FAULTY CONDITION) SHALL LEAD TO POTENTIAL HARMFUL
CONDITION.
NORMAL CONDITION
FAULTY CONDITION
Primary Safety
Fail Safe Design
8. PRIMARY SAFETY
SAFE BEHAVIOUR OF INTERLOCKING SYSTEMS IN
NORMAL CONDITION DEPENDS UPON A CORRECT
DEFINITION OF IXL BOOLEAN EQUATION.
9. PERMISSIVE AND RESTRICTIVE CONDITIONS:
FIELD ELEMENT MAY ASSUME TWO CONDITION:
• Restrictive condition does not allow train movement
In case of malfunctioning restrictive condition may be assumed as a safe
condition or the closest to a safe condition.
• Permissive Condition allows trains movement
In the case of malfunctioning, the system restores to restrictive status.
10. DEFINITION OF SAFE AND UNSAFE FAILURE
MODES
Assumption:
– Non permissive actions leads to safe condition
O u t p u t v a l u e
a c t u a t e d
O u t p u t C o n t r o l .
N o n P e r m i s s i v e P e r m i s s i v e
N o n P e r m i s s i v e C o r r e c t U n s a f e F a i l u r e M o d e
P e r m i s s i v e S a f e F a i l u r e m o d e C o r r e c t
11. Control OUT off
Control To Equipment
Output off
Signal’s light Light switched off
Point machine
No power for
moving
12. Indication IN off
Indication From Equipment
Input off
Signal’s light
No indication,
Light off
Point machine
No indication for
point position
Panel pushbutton No indication
15. REACTIVE SAFETY
o SEVERAL TECHNIQUES AVAILABLE
− Data coding on a single processor
− Software Diversity on a single processor
o Redundancy can be added for availability purpose
16. INHERENT SAFETY
INHERENT FAIL-SAFE FAULT FREE
INHERENT FAIL-SAFE NON HAZARDOUS FAULT
ANALYSIS HAS TO BE PERFORMED ON THE PHYSICAL
ELEMENTS
– FAULT TREE ANALYSIS, FAILURE MODES EFFECT ANALYSIS, ...
COMPLEX DEVICES ARE NOT SUITABLE FOR INHERENT FAIL-
SAFETY
– FEW INHERENT FAIL-SAFE PHYSICAL PHENOMENA (GRAVITY)
17. CBI INTERFACES
• SAFETY ALLOCATION OVER CBI INTERFACES
In CBI interface two types of related link
1) Non Safety related Link
2) Safety related link
26. IXL Interface to Other Vital
subsystems
Yard element related subsystems
– Control
– Indication
27. CBI Safety related
communication
Closed Transmission Systems
– CENELEC 50159-1
Open Transmission Systems
– CENELEC 50159-2
Other Subsystem
Transmission
System
Interlocking
28. No specific assumption is made on transmission systems
Both safety related and non safety related equipment can be
connected to the same transmission system
Transmission systems
30. Copper wire transmission
systems
Local or Geographical connection schemes
Various speed (slower in Geographical)
Large equipment availability
31. Optic Fibre Transmission systems
Local or Geographical connection schemes
Unidirectional medium
Highest speed
32. Radio Transmission
systems
Local or Geographical connection
schemes
Various speed
– Slow (GSM/R)
– Fast (Spread Spectrum)
Great flexibility
Coverage
33. Transmission system shall be considered as non trusted
Safe communication has to be guaranteed by
safety protocol
– Detect Errors
– Initiate a safety reaction
Transmission Systems: Safety
Considerations
34. Transmission Systems: types
of Error
Errors on message
– Transmitter identity error
(Masquerade)
– Message type error (Insertion)
– Message data error (Corruption)
Time errors
– Delay Error (Delay, Deletion)
– Sequencing Error (Repetition,
Re-sequencing)
36. CBI operation has to be considered in the appropriate environment
– Electromagnetic Environment (CENELEC EN50121)
– Electrical Environment (CENELEC EN50122 - EN50124)
– Climatic and geographic Environment (CENELEC EN50125
CBI Systems: Environmental
Considerations
38. CBI Systems: Electrical
Environment
Separation between CBI and yard potentials
Operator protection against dangerous voltages
CBI-Yard Galvanic Isolation, O ver-voltage protection,
Earthing, Conductors isolation
39. CBI Systems: Climatic and geographic
Environment
Environmental conditions
– Temperature, Humidity, Pollution, Vibration
Different requirements based upon system location
– Building (with or w/o air conditioning)
– Shelter (with or w/o air conditioning)
– Cubicle
Device selection, Conformal Coating, Mechanical
improvements
40. TRACK CIRCUIT
TRACK CIRCUIT
THE VARIABLE (TCX) STATE OF EACH TRACK CIRCUIT IS MADE OF THE
SUM OF ALL RECEIVERS (TCX_1_DI) OF THIS TRACK CIRCUIT
FOR EACH TRACK CIRCUIT THERE IS ONE ASSOCIATED VARIABLE
(TCX_TMR) FOR A DELAY OF 15 SECONDS. THIS VARIABLE IS USED FOR
RELEASING THE SUB ROUTE AND IN APPROACH LOCKING SECTION.
41. CYCLE
CYCLE
SIMPLE CYCLE CONTROLS 2 SUCCESSIVE ROUTES.
• AFTER A CONTROL OF CYCLE (CYCX = 1) THE CYCLE WILL BE ESTABLISHED
(CYX =1) IF ALL FOLLOWING CONFLICTED CONDITIONS ARE NOT SET.
– CONFLICTED ROUTES LOCKING RELEASED (RLX_Y_R =1)
– CONFLICTED SUBROUTE RELEASED (UX_Y = 1)
– POINTS IN THE CYCLE NOT BLOCKED (MPLX =1)
– MAINTENANCE BLOCK ASSOCIATED TO THE ROUTE OF THE CYCLE NOT
BLOCKED (MBLX = 1)
– ROUTES OF THE CYCLE NOT BLOCKED (RBLX_Y =1)
– CONFLICTED OVERLAP RELEASED (OX_Y = 1)
42. CYCLE
– CONFLICTED CYCLES NOT SET (CYY = 0)
– DESTRUCTION OF THE CYCLE NOT ACTIVATED (CYDX =0)
– DESTRUCTION OF THE ROUTES BELONGING TO THE CYCLE NOT ACTIVATED
(RDCX_Y =0)
AFTER SETTING OF THE CYCLE, THE ROUTES BELONGING TO THE CYCLE WILL BE SET BY
THE OCCUPATION OF THE BERTH TRACK CIRCUIT OF THE ROUTE (CYX_RY_Z = 1). THIS
VARIABLE WILL REMAIN AT 1 UNTIL THE ROUTE IS SET (RLY_Z_S = 1).
THE CYCLE REMAINS SET UNTIL THE DESTRUCTION OF THE CYCLE OR A DESTRUCTION OF
ONE OF THE ROUTE BELONGING TO THE CYCLE.
43. CYCLE
• COMBINED CYCLE CAN CONTROL 2 PREFERABLE SUCCESSIVE ROUTES OR
2 OTHER SUCCESSIVE ROUTES.
THE COMBINED CYCLE HAS 2 PREFERABLE ROUTES, WHEN THE FIRST
OF TWO PREFERABLE ROUTES IS AVAILABLE, THE COMBINED CYCLE
HAS THE SAME BEHAVIOUR LIKE A SIMPLE CYCLE.
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A SIMPLE CYCLE AND THE COMBINED CYCLE
IS THAT THE COMBINED CYCLE HAS THE POSSIBILITY WHEN THE FIRST
PREFERABLE ROUTE IS NOT AVAILABLE TO SET 2 OTHER ROUTES.
44. BASIC INTERLOCKING FUNCTIONS: ROUTE
• ROUTE
DEFINITION OF A ROUTE
A ROUTE IS A SECTION OF TRACK HAVING AN ORIGIN ROUTE SIGNAL AND
A DESTINATION SIGNAL.
DESIGNATION OF A ROUTE
Example
R01_03 with its origin at signal S01 and its destination at signal S03
R03_06 with its origin at signal S03 and its destination at signal S06
45. ROUTE CONTROL
• ROUTE REQUEST
A ROUTE COULD BE CONTROLLED AFTER THE ASCV RECEIVES A
ROUTE REQUEST FROM THE ATS OR VDU
WHEN THE ASCV RECEIVES A ROUTE REQUEST, IT CHECKS THAT ALL
THE SAFETY CONDITIONS ARE SATISFIED. IF THERE ARE, THEN THE
REQUEST IS ACCEPTED AND THE PROCESS TO SET THE ROUTE
COULD START. IF THE SAFETY CONDITIONS ARE NOT SATISFIED, THE
ROUTE REQUEST IS REJECTED.
46. ROUTE CONTROL
• ROUTE REQUEST COULD BE RECEIVED:
ROUTE CONTROL: IN THAT CASE THE TRAIN, BY ITS PASSAGE, WILL RELEASE AUTOMATICALLY
THE CONSIDERED ROUTE;
FLEET ROUTE CONTROL: IN THAT CASE THE ROUTE IS SET FOR SEVERAL TRAINS (I.E: THE TRAIN
WILL NOT RELEASE THE ROUTE AFTER ITS PASSAGE).
CYCLE ROUTE CONTROL: ROUTE CAN BE CALLED BY STRIKE TRACK CIRCUIT BY TRAIN WHEN
CYCLE IS ACTIVATED ALLOW TO CONTROL A SERIES OF ROUTES SEQUENTIALLY IN ORDER TO
PERFORM AUTOMATIC REVERSALS OF TRAINS
47. POINTS
• POINTS
CONTROL OF THE POINT
THE POINTS CAN BE CONTROLLED IN NORMAL OR REVERSE POSITION IF ALL THE
SAFETY CONDITIONS ARE SATISFIED
A POINT CAN BE CONTROLLED BY ROUTE CONTROL OR BY TRAIN DETECTION IN
STRIKE-IN SECTION OR BY THE CONTROLLER WITH INDIVIDUAL OPERATION.
LOCKING OF THE POINT
THE CONDITIONS THAT COULD LOCK A POINT ARE:
• TRACK CIRCUIT.
• ROUTE LOCKING.
• OVERLAP.
48. POINTS
• POINT BLOCKING / UNBLOCKING FACILITIES
THE POINTS CAN BE BLOCKED AND UNBLOCKED BY THE CONTROLLER WITH INDIVIDUAL
OPERATION. POINT CONTROL IS FORBIDDEN WHEN A SAID POINT IS BLOCKED.
POINT DETECTION
THE POINT POSITION IS DETECTED FOR NORMAL OR REVERSE. THAT INFORMATION IS
ACQUIRED BY THE ASCV BY MEAN OF A SAFETY RELAY.
POWERING OF THE POINT
+ WHEN THE CONTROL OF THE POINT HAS BEEN DELIVERED BY THE ASCV, IT WILL BE
POWERED WITH A CONTACTOR RELAY UNTIL THE DETECTION OF THE POSITION
REQUESTED IS OBTAINED. THEN, THE CONTROL INFORMATION IS CANCELLED.
+ IN CASE OF FAILURE OF MOVING OR DETECTION OF THE POINT, THE POSITION
REQUESTED IS NOT OBTAINED. IN THAT CASE THE POINT POWERING IS CUT BY A
TIMER (11S).
49. POINTS
• POINT BLOCKING / UNBLOCKING FACILITIES
THE POINTS CAN BE BLOCKED AND UNBLOCKED BY THE CONTROLLER WITH INDIVIDUAL
OPERATION. POINT CONTROL IS FORBIDDEN WHEN A SAID POINT IS BLOCKED.
POINT DETECTION
THE POINT POSITION IS DETECTED FOR NORMAL OR REVERSE. THAT INFORMATION IS
ACQUIRED BY THE ASCV BY MEAN OF A SAFETY RELAY.
POWERING OF THE POINT
+ WHEN THE CONTROL OF THE POINT HAS BEEN DELIVERED BY THE ASCV, IT WILL BE
POWERED WITH A CONTACTOR RELAY UNTIL THE DETECTION OF THE POSITION
REQUESTED IS OBTAINED. THEN, THE CONTROL INFORMATION IS CANCELLED.
+ IN CASE OF FAILURE OF MOVING OR DETECTION OF THE POINT, THE POSITION
REQUESTED IS NOT OBTAINED. IN THAT CASE THE POINT POWERING IS CUT BY A
TIMER (11S).
50. POINTS
• POINT MANUALAUTHORISATION
WHEN THE ELECTRICAL CONTROL IS DEFECTIVE, THE POINTS ARE MANUALLY CONTROLLED BY
MEANS OF AN OPERATING LEVER ON SITE.
ACCESS TO THIS LEVER IS PERMITTED WHEN THE CONTROLLER HAS GIVEN THE AUTHORISATION.
THE KEY FOR THE ACCESS IS SECURED IN THE IN THE SCR IN A KEY TRANSMITTER.
WHEN THE AUTHORISATION IS GIVEN, THE INTERLOCKING CHECKS THAT NO ROUTE IS APPROACH
LOCKED ON THE POINTS TO BE MANUALLY CONTROLLED AND SAFELY ALLOW THE KEY TO BE
EXTRACTED.
AFTER THE OPERATION OF THE POINT MACHINE, THE KEY IS INSERTED BACK IN THE KEY
TRANSMITTER AND THE CONTROLLER CANCELS THE AUTHORISATION.
51. Subroute
Locking of subroute
The subroutes of a route are locked in sequence
Destination route signal
Origin route signal
Route locks first subroute
First subroute locks second subroute
52. Origin route signal
Route to be released ,First track circuit clear, second track circuit
occupied
Origin route signal
First subroute to be released ,Second track clear, third track circuit
occupied
53. TRAFFIC DIRECTION
• TRAFFIC DIRECTION
TRAFFIC DIRECTION IS REQUIRED BY ATC IN ORDER TO GIVE THE TRAIN
THE AUTHORISATION FOR “DIRECTION OF TRAVEL “.
BUT, IT IS SET AND UNSET BY THE INTERLOCKING ONLY.
EACH SUBROUTE IS ASSOCIATED WITH A TRAFFIC DIRECTION.
54. TRAFFIC DIRECTION
THE TRACK CIRCUIT IS POSITIONED ON THE TRACK FROM RECEIVER TO TRANSMITTER IN
THE NORMAL DIRECTION OF RUNNING
FOR EACH OPPOSITE DIRECTION OF RUNNING, THE RECEIVER AND THE TRANSMITTER OF
THE TRACK CIRCUIT ARE TO BE INTERCHANGED.
THE INTERLOCKING SENDS THE NON VITAL DOT INFORMATION TO THE SDTC FOR EACH
TRACK, FOR THE REVERSE RUNNING.
THE STATE OF THISINFORMATION DOT UP OR DN REMAINS SET UNTIL THE OPPOSITE DOT IS
SET ( CONTROL OF A NEW DIRECTION ).
55. SIGNAL CONTROL
SIGNAL CONTROL
ROUTE INDICATOR
• WHEN THE ROUTE IS SET AND LOCKED, AND THE POINTS ARE DETECTED, THE ROUTE
INDICATOR WILL BE LIT. (RIX_Y=1)
MAIN SIGNAL
• GREEN ASPECT
– AFTER THE ROUTE IS ESTABLISHED, IF ALL FOLLOWING CONDITIONS ARE PRESENT,
THE SIGNAL IS PROCESSED TO GREEN ASPECT.
STICK CONTROL OR ROUTE REPLACEMENT (RRX_Y=1)
ROUTE LOCKING SET (RLX_Y=1)
ALL THE POINTS OF THE ROUTE INCLUDING THE FOULING POINTS ARE DETECTED
NORMAL / REVERSE (DPN/DPR=1)
56. SIGNAL CONTROL
THE MANUAL AUTHORISATION OF ALL THE POINTS LOCATED ON THE WAY OF THE SIGNAL IS
NOT GIVEN(MAGP=0)
THE MANUAL AUTHORISATION KEYS OF ALL THE POINTS LOCATED ON THE WAY OF THE SIGNAL
ARE NOT TAKEN OUT(PMCK=1)
OPPOSITE TRAFFIC DIRECTION NOT SET (TD=0)
OPPOSITE SIGNAL NOT OPEN (VOS=1)
SIGNAL BLOCKING NOT ACTIVATED (SBL=1)
ALL THE TRACK CIRCUIT IN THE ROUTE ARE CLEAR (TC=1)
OVERLAP IS ESTABLISHED (IF AVAILABLE) (OL=1)
ROUTE INDICATOR LIT (IF AVAILABLE) (LDRI=1)
57. SIGNAL CONTROL
• VIOLET ASPECT
– AFTER THE ROUTE IS ESTABLISHED, IF ALL FOLLOWING CONDITIONS ARE PRESENT, THE SIGNAL
IS PROCESSED TO VIOLET ASPECT.
NOT GREEN ASPECT PRESENT (LDS_G=0)
STICK CONTROL OR ROUTE REPLACEMENT (RRX_Y=1)
ROUTE LOCKING SET (RLX_Y=1)
ALL THE POINTS OF THE ROUTE INCLUDING THE FOULING POINTS ARE DETECTED NORMAL /
REVERSE (DPN/DPR=1)
THE MANUAL AUTHORISATION OF ALL THE POINTS LOCATED ON THE WAY OF THE SIGNAL IS
NOT GIVEN(MAGP=0)
THE MANUAL AUTHORISATION KEYS OF ALL THE POINTS LOCATED ON THE WAY OF THE SIGNAL
ARE NOT TAKEN OUT(PMCK=1)
OPPOSITE TRAFFIC DIRECTION NOT SET (TD=0
58. SIGNAL CONTROL
OPPOSITE SIGNAL NOT OPEN (VOSX_Y=1)
SIGNAL BLOCKING NOT ACTIVATED (SBL=1)
FIRST TRACK CIRCUIT OF THE ROUTE CLEAR (TC=1)
59. Control Tables
CONTROL TABLE
– GENERALITIES
Control Table is a formal tabulation of signal, point and
other controls associated with an electrical or electronic
signalling system CBI, showing the interlocking and other
dependencies between those controls.
60. Control Tables
–Table 2 - Track Circuits-
This table is made to determine the number of the receivers
for each track circuit and if there is a DOT associated with it.
–Table 3 - Cycle Control-
This table is made to determine all the conflicting conditions to
set the cycle.
–Table 4- Maintenance Block-
This table is made to determine which routes and
cycles are associated to the maintenance block
61. Control Tables
–Table 5 -Control Route by individually control.
This table is made to determine all the conflicting conditions to
set the route.
–Table 6 -Control Route by Fleet Mode-
This table is made to determine all the conflicting conditions to
set the route in Fleet Mode.
–Table 7.1 -Control Route by Cycle -
This table is made to determine all conditions to call the route
when the cycle is set.
–Table 7.2- Route Blocking-
This table is made to determine which cycles are associated
to the routes to be blocked.
62. Control Tables
–Table 7.3 –Virtual Route-
This table is made to determine the conflicting routes for the
routes received from the adjacent CBI.
–Table 8-Direction Of Travel “DOT” -
This table is made to determine all the routes which control the
DOT.
–Table 9 -Manual Authorisation Point-
This table is made to determine the conditions required to remove
the key from the key transmitter when the Point Manual
Authorisation controlled.
–Table 10 -Point Locking-
This table is made to determine all the conflicting conditions to
move the points from Normal to Reverse and Reverse to Normal
63. Control Tables
–Table 11.1-Traffic Direction out of turnback zone-
This table is made to determine all the conditions to set and
release the Traffic Direction in non-turnback zones.
–Table 11.2-Traffic Direction in turnback zone-
This table is made to determine all the conditions to set and
release the Traffic Direction in turnback zones.
–Table 12 -Sub Route Locked-
This table is made to determine all the Sub Routes which are
locked by the routes.
–Table 13 -Sub Released-
This table is made to determine all the conditions to release the
Sub Route.
64. Control Tables
–Table 14.1 -Overlap Calling / Releasing-
This table is made to determine all the conditions to lock and
release the Overlap.
–Table 14.2 -Overlap Establishment-
This table is made to determine all the conditions for overlap
establishment.
–Table 15.1 -Main Signal Proceed Aspect.
This table is made to determine all the conditions to clear the
Main Signal to the proceed aspect.
–Table 15.1 –Shunt Signal Proceed Aspect.
This table is made to determine all the conditions to clear the
Shunt Signal to the proceed aspect.
65. Control Tables
–Table 16-Route Released -
This table is made to determine all the conditions to release the
route.
–Table 17-Route Indicator-
This table is made to determine all the conditions to lit the
Route Indicator.
–Table 18 –Access Authorisation.
This table is made to determine all the conditions to authorise a
route from signalling zone to the non-signalling area.
–Table 19-Particulars Information sent to ATS -
This table is made to determine some particular status variables
to be transmitted by ASCV to ATS.
66. Control Tables
– Table 20.1 & 20.2 – Transmissions CBI CBI
This table is made to determine the variables to be
transmitted from one ASCV to the adjacent ASCV.
67. Control Tables
– Table 21.1 & 21.2 – Reception from other CBI.
This table is made to determine the variables to be received
from the other ASCV.
– Table 22 – Current and Adjacent CBI Informations
This table is made to determine some particular information to
generate the Boolean Equation File.
– Table 23 – Buffer Stop
This table is made to specify the Buffer Stop signals in the CBI
controlled area.
68. PURPOSE
INTERLOCKING IS A SAFETY MECHANISM THAT
ENSURES ONLY ONE TRAIN OPERATES OVER A
PARTICULAR SECTION OF THE TRACK AT ANY TIME.
HOW IT WORKS
INTERLOCKING USES A COMBINATION OF SIGNALS,
POINT MECHANISMS, AND TRACK CIRCUITS TO
PREVENT COLLISIONS AND PROTECT THE
MOVEMENT OF TRAINS.
TYPES OF INTERLOCKING SYSTEMS
ROUTE RELAY INTERLOCKING (RRI) AND PANEL
INTERLOCKING ARE THE TWO MAIN TYPES OF
INTERLOCKING SYSTEMS USED IN JAIPUR METRO.
70. ARCHITECTURE AND WORKING OF
INTERLOCKING
• POINT MECHANISM
• POINTS ARE THE SWITCHING MECHANISMS THAT ALLOW ONE TRAIN TO MOVE
FROM ONE SECTION TO ANOTHER.
71. POINT MACHINE OR SWITCH MACHINE
• POINT MACHINES ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR CONTROLLING THE MOVEMENT OF THE
RAILWAY SWITCHES OR POINTS, WHICH ALLOW TRAINS TO CHANGE TRACKS OR
MOVE FROM ONE LINE TO ANOTHER.
• THE POINT MACHINE CONSISTS OF AN ELECTRICALLY OR HYDRAULICALLY
OPERATED MECHANISM THAT MOVES THE POINTS, ENSURING THEY ALIGN
CORRECTLY TO GUIDE THE TRAIN ONTO THE DESIRED TRACK. IT IS TYPICALLY
CONTROLLED REMOTELY FROM THE OPERATIONS CONTROL CENTER OR BY THE
TRAIN OPERATOR.
• POINT MACHINES PLAY A CRUCIAL ROLE IN ENSURING SAFE AND EFFICIENT
OPERATIONS IN METRO SYSTEMS BY ENABLING THE ROUTING OF TRAINS ALONG
DIFFERENT TRACKS, ALLOWING FOR FLEXIBILITY IN SCHEDULING, MAINTENANCE,
AND EMERGENCIES.
72. TYPE OF POINT MECHINE
• ELECTRIC POINT MACHINE: ELECTRIC POINT MACHINES ARE WIDELY
USED IN MODERN RAILWAY SYSTEMS. THEY ARE TYPICALLY POWERED BY
ELECTRIC MOTORS OR SOLENOIDS, WHICH DRIVE THE MOVEMENT OF THE
POINTS. ELECTRIC POINT MACHINES ARE CONTROLLED REMOTELY THROUGH
THE SIGNALING SYSTEM.
73. TYPE OF POINT MECHINE
• HYDRAULIC POINT MACHINE: HYDRAULIC POINT MACHINES UTILIZE
HYDRAULIC POWER TO OPERATE THE POINTS. THEY OFTEN INVOLVE THE USE
OF HYDRAULIC CYLINDERS OR ACTUATORS TO MOVE THE POINTS INTO THE
DESIRED POSITION. HYDRAULIC POINT MACHINES ARE LESS COMMON
COMPARED TO ELECTRIC ONES.
74. TYPE OF POINT MECHINE
• MECHANICAL POINT MACHINE: MECHANICAL POINT MACHINES ARE
OLDER TYPES OF POINT MACHINES THAT RELY ON MECHANICAL LINKAGES
AND LEVERS TO MOVE THE POINTS MANUALLY. THEY ARE OPERATED BY A
LEVER OR A MECHANICAL HANDLE, USUALLY BY A RAILWAY WORKER.
HOWEVER, MECHANICAL POINT MACHINES ARE LESS PREVALENT TODAY DUE
TO AUTOMATION AND ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY.
75. ARCHITECTURE AND WORKING OF
INTERLOCKING
• SIGNALS
RED, GREEN, AND VIOLET LIGHTS ARE USED TO REGULATE THE MOVEMENT OF
TRAINS. IT INDICATES WHETHER A TRAIN SHOULD STOP OR PROCEED
76. ENTERLOCKING SIGNALS IN A METRO
SYSTEM SERVE THE FOLLOWING
PURPOSES:
• TRAIN MOVEMENT CONTROL
• TRACK OCCUPATION DETECTION
• POINT (SWITCH) POSITION CONTROL
• ROUTE SETTING
• SAFETY OVERRIDE
77. PURPOSES
• RAIN MOVEMENT CONTROL: INTERLOCKING
SIGNALS GOVERN THE MOVEMENT OF TRAINS BY
INDICATING WHETHER A TRAIN IS PERMITTED TO
PROCEED, STOP, OR APPROACH WITH CAUTION. THEY
PROVIDE VISUAL INDICATIONS TO TRAIN OPERATORS
ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE TRACK AHEAD.
78. PURPOSES
• TRACK OCCUPATION DETECTION: INTERLOCKING
SIGNALS INCORPORATE TRACK CIRCUITS OR OTHER
OCCUPANCY DETECTION SYSTEMS TO DETERMINE IF A
TRACK SECTION IS OCCUPIED BY A TRAIN. THIS
INFORMATION IS USED TO CONTROL THE SIGNALS AND
PREVENT CONFLICTING MOVEMENTS
79. PURPOSES
• POINT (SWITCH) POSITION CONTROL:
INTERLOCKING SYSTEMS ENSURE THAT THE POINTS
(SWITCHES) ARE PROPERLY ALIGNED BEFORE A TRAIN
IS ALLOWED TO PASS OVER THEM. THIS PREVENTS
TRAINS FROM BEING DIRECTED ONTO THE WRONG
TRACK OR INTO POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SITUATIONS.
80. PURPOSES
• ROUTE SETTING: INTERLOCKING SYSTEMS ESTABLISH
ROUTES FOR TRAINS BY COORDINATING THE
OPERATION OF SIGNALS AND POINTS. THEY DETERMINE
THE CORRECT SEQUENCING AND POSITIONING OF
SIGNALS AND SWITCHES TO GUIDE TRAINS ALONG
THEIR INTENDED PATHS.
81. PURPOSES
• SAFETY OVERRIDE: INTERLOCKING SIGNALS
PROVIDE A FAIL-SAFE MECHANISM TO PREVENT
CONFLICTING MOVEMENTS AND PROTECT AGAINST
HUMAN ERRORS. THEY INCORPORATE SAFETY LOGIC
THAT OVERRIDES CONFLICTING COMMANDS AND
ENFORCES STRICT RULES FOR SAFE TRAIN
OPERATIONS.
82. ARCHITECTURE AND WORKING OF
INTERLOCKING
• TRACK CIRCUITS
• TRACK CIRCUITS ARE AN ELECTRICAL SYSTEM USED TO DETECT THE PRESENCE
OF TRAINS AND COMMUNICATE WITH THE INTERLOCKING CONTROL PANEL.
This Photo by
Unknown
Author is
licensed under
CC BY-NC
83. TRACK CIRCUITS WORK WITHIN AN
INTERLOCKING SYSTEM
• DETECTION OF TRAIN PRESENCE
• SIGNAL TO CONTROL SYSTEM
• OCCUPANCY DETECTION
• SIGNAL ASPECT CONTROL
84. DETECTION OF TRAIN PRESENCE: THE TRACK
CIRCUIT CONSISTS OF ELECTRICAL CONDUCTORS
PLACED ALONG THE LENGTH OF THE TRACK SECTION.
THESE CONDUCTORS FORM A CLOSED CIRCUIT WHEN NO
TRAIN IS PRESENT. WHEN A TRAIN ENTERS THE TRACK
SECTION, IT SHUNTS THE ELECTRICAL CURRENT,
CAUSING A BREAK IN THE CIRCUIT.
85. SIGNAL TO CONTROL SYSTEM: THE BREAK IN THE
TRACK CIRCUIT CAUSED BY THE TRAIN PRESENCE IS
DETECTED BY THE SIGNALING SYSTEM. THIS
INFORMATION IS RELAYED TO THE INTERLOCKING
SYSTEM, WHICH COORDINATES WITH OTHER SIGNALS
AND DEVICES TO CONTROL TRAIN MOVEMENTS
ACCORDINGLY.
86. OCCUPANCY DETECTION: THE INTERLOCKING
SYSTEM USES THE INFORMATION FROM THE TRACK
CIRCUIT TO DETERMINE IF A SPECIFIC TRACK SECTION IS
OCCUPIED BY A TRAIN. THIS DATA IS CRUCIAL FOR
MAINTAINING SAFE SEPARATION BETWEEN TRAINS AND
PREVENTING CONFLICTING MOVEMENTS.
87. SIGNAL ASPECT CONTROL: THE STATUS OF THE
TRACK CIRCUIT INFLUENCES THE DISPLAY OF SIGNALS
TO TRAIN OPERATORS. IF A TRACK SECTION IS
OCCUPIED, THE CORRESPONDING SIGNALS WILL
INDICATE THAT THE TRAIN MUST STOP OR PROCEED
WITH CAUTION. IF THE TRACK SECTION IS CLEAR, THE
SIGNALS WILL INDICATE THAT THE TRAIN CAN PROCEED.
88. ADVANTAGES OF INTERLOCKING IN JAIPUR
METRO
• SAFETY
• INTERLOCKING ENSURES THE SAFETY OF PASSENGERS AND TRAINS BY
PREVENTING COLLISIONS.
• EFFICIENCY
• INTERLOCKING OPTIMIZES THE USE OF RAILWAY INFRASTRUCTURE, REDUCES
TRAVEL TIME, AND IMPROVES THE PUNCTUALITY OF TRAINS.
• SIMPLICITY
• INTERLOCKING IS SIMPLE TO OPERATE AND MAINTAIN, INCREASING ITS
RELIABILITY.
89. FUTURE SCOPE AND IMPROVEMENTS IN THE
INTERLOCKING SYSTEM
AUTOMATED INTERLOCKING SYSTEM
• AUTOMATED INTERLOCKING SYSTEM
• THE FUTURE SCOPE OF
INTERLOCKING INVOLVES THE USE OF
AUTOMATION TO ENHANCE SAFETY
AND REDUCE THE INVOLVEMENT OF
HUMAN ERROR
90. CONCLUSION
THE INTERLOCKING SYSTEM IS A CRUCIAL FACTOR
IN ENSURING THE SAFETY AND RELIABILITY OF
JAIPUR METRO. THROUGH THE USE OF ADVANCED
TECHNOLOGY, IT WILL CONTINUE TO IMPROVE IN
THE FUTURE.
