Historical institutionalism views institutions as enduring elements that develop gradually over long periods of time through path dependent processes. According to this perspective, institutions are shaped by their own unique histories and evolve along distinct trajectories that are difficult to alter. Once established, institutions tend to reinforce the status quo and resist change due to the high transaction costs involved in reforming or replacing them. Historical institutionalism examines how institutions form and evolve through incremental adaptations to changing social and political environments.

1. Institutions and
Institutional
Theory

2. Institutions and Institutional Theory-
Outlines
2
Significance of Institutions
Definition of Institutions
Characteristics of Institutions
Typology of Institutions
Major institutionalTheories-Historical,
Rational-choice and Normative

3. InstitutionsandInstitutionalTheory
Significance
3
Inrecentyearsscholarsandpolicymakersalike
havepaidincreasingattentiontothecomplex
relationshipbetweeninstitutionsandeconomic
development.
Thereiswidespreadconsensusthatinstitutions
mattercruciallyfordevelopment.
Theinstitutionalsettingswithinwhicheconomic
policiesareformulatedareof crucialsignificance
ForAcemoglu(2005), differencesin economic
institutionsarethefundamentalcausesof
differencesineconomic development.
Institutionsaretherulesof thegameina society
.
Moreformallytheyarethelimitationstofree
behavioursimposedontheindividualsbythe

4. InstitutionsandInstitutionalTheory
Significance
4
Rodrik(2000)presentedoneof themostthroughanalysesof the
roleof institutionsintheprocessof economic growth.
Theanalysestaketakesintoaccounttherolesof propertyrights,
regulatoryinstitutions,institutionsformacroeconomic
stabilization,institutionsforsocialinsuranceandinstitutionsof
conflict management.
LaneandTornell(1996),observedthatmanycountriesthatare
richinnaturalresourcessuchasNigeria,TrinidadandVenezuela
havedonepoorlyintermsof economicgrowth
Intheabsenceof well-definedandprotectedproperty rights,
naturalresourcescanbeexploitedbyanumberof powerful
political groups.
Poorcountriestendtohaveunreliableof legalsystems,corrupt
governmentandinsecurepropertyrights.
Whereinstitutionsarepoor,entrepreneurssucceedonthe basis
of politicalratherthaneconomiccriteria:inefficient entrepreneurs
survivewhohappentohavethepersonaltieswithstateofficials
thatarenecessarytoprotectagainstexpropriation(Keeferand

5. InstitutionsandInstitutionalTheory-
significance
5
Politics,profoundlybyrules,steerspolitical
behaviourindifferent directions.
Sincethe1980s,politicalscientistshave
developedarenewedinterestinthestudyof
politicalinstitutionsbasedontheassumptionthat
“institutions matter”,
asetofconstitutional-legalrulesandstructural
arrangementswithinwhichpoliticstakeplace(as
wellasinformalinstitutions)arecrucial
determinantsoftheshapeofpoliticsandpolicy
outcomes(Lijphart2002).
Forothers,institutionsarerulesornormsby
whichpeopleliveeitherabidingorbreachingthem

6. InstitutionsandInstitutionalTheory-
significance
6
Mostpoliticalactionsof realconsequenceoccurin
institutions.Therefore,itiscrucialtounderstand
howthesebodiesactandhowtheyinfluencethe
behaviorof individualsworkingwithinthem(Peter
1999).
Agenerationof workhasshownthatinstitutions
affectvariouspoliticaloutcomes.Forinstance,
numerousscholarshaveshownthatelectoral
systemsshapethebehaviorsof parties,
candidatesand voters
Otherscholarshavedemonstratedthatdifferent
constitutionalstructuressuchaspresidentialor
parliamentarysystemsaffectregimestability
,

7. Whatis Institution?
7
Institutionisaslipperyterm,whichmeans
differentthingstodifferent authors.
For Olsen(1992:7), aninstitutionisthebearerof
asetof practices,astructuralarrangementanda
configurationof rules,whichdetermineswhatis
exemplary behavior.
Institutionsaredevisedbyindividuals(micro-
level) butin turn constrain their actions.
Theyarepartof thebroadsocialfabric(macro-
level)butalsotheconduitthroughwhichday-to-
daydecisionsareactionsaretaken.Hence,
institutionisameso-levelconcept.

8. Whatis Institution?
8
Institutionscanbeformalor informal.
Formalinstitutionsarenormallyestablishedand
constitutedbybindinglaws,regulationsandlegal
orderswhichprescribewhatmayormaynot be.
Informalinstitutionsontheotherhandare
constitutedbyconventions,norms,valuesand
acceptedwaysof doingthings,whether,
economic,politicalor social.
Theseareembeddedintraditionalsocial
practicesandculturewhichcanbeequally
binding(Leftwich 2006).

9. Institutions-Characteristics
9
Structure
Themostsignificantelementof aninstitution.
Structuremaybeeitherformal(legislature,bureaucracy
,
politicalparties,mass-media)orinformal(a networkof
interactingorganizationsorasetof shared norms).
Institutionalismprovidesnoplaceforindividualsandtheir
interests.
Rather itinvolves groups of individuals in some sortof
patternedinteractionsthatispredictablebasedupon
specifiedrelationshipsamongtheactors.
Stability
Theexistenceof somesortof stabilityovertime.
Somelegislatormaydecidetomeetinacommittee
meeting once in a room in theparliament house. That could
beverypleasantbutitwouldnotbeaninstitution.
If theyagreetomeetroutinelyafteraspecificperiodoftime
atthesameplace,thatwouldbegintotakeontheshape of
aninstitution.

10. Institutions-Characteristics(contd.)
10
Regulatorof individual behavior
Institutions must insomeway (formal/informal)constrain
the behaviorof its members.If we resumewith thetrivial
instanceof thecommitteemeetingabove,itmaynotbe
consideredasaninstitutionif themembersdonotattach
importanceandobligationtoattendthemeeting.
SharedValues
Thereshouldbesomesenseof sharedvaluesand meaning
amongthemembersof theinstitution.Thisviewis centralto
thenormativeinstitutionalismof MarchandOlsen
Legitimacy
Institutionsinvolvelegitimacybeyondthepreferenceof
individualactors.Theyarevaluedinthemselvesandnot
simplyfortheirimmediatepurposesandoutputs.
Institution’sstabilityof overtimemaycontributetogainthis
legitimacy(Lowndes:1996:182).

11. Typology of institutionalism
11
Thereareatleastsevenversionsof ´new
institutionalism`currentlyinuse(Peters1999).
These are
Historical institutionalism,
Rationalchoice institutionalism,
Normativeinstitutionalism,
Empiricalinstitutionalism,
International institutionalism,
Sociologicalinstitutionalism and
Institutionofmediation.

12. 12
HistoricalInstitutionalism
Historicalgrowthof aparticularOrganization is
crucialinidentifyingthedegree of
institutionalization.
Institutional history enables us understand boththe
originof aninstitutionandthepathsbywhichithas
developed(Berman 1983).
Eachinstitutionhasitsownhistory;itsowntime-
dependentlineof developmentandhowasocial
systemdevelops,operatesandaffectsitsstructure
andcapacitiesforaction(Scott 1995).
Institutionalizationissomethingthathappenstoan
Organisationovertime,reflectingthe
Organisation’sowndistinctivehistory
,thepeople
whohavebeeninit,thegroupsitincorporatesand
thevestedintereststheyhavecreatedandtheway
ithascopedwiththeenvironment(Selznick1957).

13. 13
HistoricalInstitutionalism
Historicalinstitutionalistsseeinstitutionsas
continuities.
Astheypointout,institutionsaremeanttobe
preservative.
Indeed,theemphasisonpathdependenceisanother
wayof sayingthatthetransactioncostsof doingthings
differentlyisalmostalwaysprohibitivelyhigh,although
direconditionsmayreducethemarginalcostsof
change.
Butif institutionsareaboutpreservation,politicsis
aboutmanipulationandleadershipisaboutoverturning
constraints.

14. 14
HistoricalInstitutionalism
Exitingleaderswanttohardentheirpreferences
throughinstitutions;newleadersoftenwantto
extirpatethepast.
Theconsequenceisthatinstitutionsmaybe
designedtofail.Givenuncertaintyaboutfuture
politicalcontrol,majoritiesmayprefertohedge
theirbets(Tsebelis1990)orevenprefertodesign
ineffectiveinstitutionsthanriskhavingtheir
creationsusedagainstthem.
Institutions,of course,areconstitutedatmany
levels.Theymaybeconstitutional;theymaybe
procedural;andtheymaybe programmatic—for

15. 15
HistoricalInstitutionalism
Clearly,inanyconceptionof institutions,thecost
of changewhetherformalornon-formaland
whetherfinancialororganizationalmustbepart
of whataninstitution confers.
Equally,thepoliticalcostsof tryingtodisturbthe
statusquoarefargreaterwherethestruggle
involvesmanyactorswithdiversepreferences
ratherthanonlyafewwithhomogeneous
preferences.
So, anysystemthatmakesdecision-making
difficulttendstowardthepreservationof existing
institutions.

16. 16
HistoricalInstitutionalism
TheUS Congressbecamewhatitistodaythroughan
evolutionof sometwohundredyears.TheBritish
parliamenttookitscurrentshapeafteramuchlonger
evolutionaryperiodthantheUS Congress.
Institutionsrelyuponthelogicof persistenceor path
dependencyandoncelaunchedonthatpaththey
continuealonguntilsomesufficiently strong
social/politicalforcedeflectsthemfromit(Krasner
1984).
Trendsrequiresnotonlychangingstructuresbutalso
theprevailingmind-setaboutwhattheinstitution
should do.
Further,publicinstitutionsoncecreatedtendtohave
structuralrelationshipswithsocietyandwithpowerful
socialactors.

17. 17
HistoricalInstitutionalism
Institutional Formation-
ForHI, whatismainlyof interestisthe
construction,maintenanceandadaptationof
institutions.
Theemphasisof historicalInstitutionalismismuch
moreonthepersistenceof organizationsafterthey
areformedthanitisonthefactsof theirinitial
creation.
T
osomeextenttheemphasisonembodyingideas
inthestructuresthatsupportinstitutionsmaybe
takenasadefinitionof theformationof institution.
Itcanbearguedthatwhenanideabecomes
acceptedanditisembodiedintothestructural

18. 18
HistoricalInstitutionalism
Institutional Formation-
What"may'"'be'''more'‘importantforthequestionof
formationinthehistoricalinstitutionalismisthe
definitionof whenthatcreationoccurs.
Thechoiceof therelevantdatefromwhichto count
futuredevelopmentswillbecrucialfor makingthe
casethatthoseinitialpatternswill persistand
shapesubsequentpoliciesinthepolicy area.
Forexample,whenKing(1995)wasconsidering
thedevelopmentof welfarepoliticsintheUnited
StatesandtheUnitedKingdomhebeganthe
analysisfromthepassageof majorpiecesof

19. 19
HistoricalInstitutionalism
Institutional Formation-
Thequestionof whatisadefiningevent,orwhat
changesareincrementalandwhatchangesare
fundamental,isafamiliarone.Dempsterand
Wildavsky(1980),forexample,askthesimple question
of whatconstitutesanincrement,asopposed toa
more fundamentalshift in policyor a budget.
Thefamiliarityof thisquestion,however,doesnot
makeitanyeasiertoresolve.Forpurposesof
understandinghistoricalinstitutionalism,thequestion
becomeswhetherthemovementawayfroma
presumedequilibriumpositionoccursbyevolutionor
revolution.
Bothtypesof changeoccur
,butacceptingthe

20. 20
HistoricalInstitutionalism
Institutional Change-
Historicalinstitutionalismhastreatedchangethrough
theconceptof 'punctuatedequilibria'(Krasner,1984).
Formostof itsexistence,aninstitutionwillexistinan
equilibriumstate,functioninginaccordancewiththe
decisionsmadeatitsinitiation,orperhapsthosemade
atthepreviouspointof 'punctuation.‘Thesepolicy
equilibriaarenot,however
,necessarilypermanentand
institutionsareconsideredcapableof changewithinthe
contextof theapproach.
whenamajorinstitutional(evolutionary)changedoes
occurthen,afterthefact,itcanbearguedthatthere
wasasufficientforceavailabletoproduceamovement
awayfromtheequilibriumandinertiaaffecting an

21. 21
HistoricalInstitutionalism
Institutional Change-
Themodelstatesthatpolicygenerallychanges only
incrementallyduetoseveralrestraints,namely the
"stickiness"of institutionalcultures,vestedinterests,and
theboundedrationalityof individual decision-makers.
Policychangewillthusbepunctuatedbychangesinthese
conditions,especiallyinpartycontrolof government, or
changes in public opinion. Thus policy is characterizedby
longperiodsof stability
,punctuatedbylarge—thoughless
frequent—changesduetolargeshiftsinsocietyor
government.
GuncontrolandU.S. federaltobaccopolicyhavealso been
found tofollow punctuated changes.Arecent studyby
MichaelGivelfoundthatdespiteasignificantmobilizationto
changestatetobaccopolicy
,U.S. statetobacco
policymakingfrom1990to2003wasnotcharacterizedby
punctuatedpolicychange,whichalsofavoredthepro-

22. 22
Rational Choice Institutionalism
Rationalchoiceinstitutionalismassumethat
individualsareinstrumentallypersuadedto
maximizetheir utility
.
Rational-choiceinstitutionaliststhinkof
institutionsasasystemof rulesand incentives.
Thistheorypermit,prescribeandproscriberules
thatisdesignedtoconstrainbehaviour.
For rationalchoicetheorists,institutionsare
easilychangeable:if correctsetorrulesorthe
correctpayoff matrixisselectedthenthedesired
outcomecanbe engineered.

23. 23
Rational Choice Institutionalism
Still,amoreprevalentviewof institutionsasrules—
derivedfromeconomicmodelsof cooperation—
suggeststhatinstitutionsmaybetheproductof
agreementsthatareParetooptimal—thatis,oneparty
ismadebetteroff,butnooneismadeworseoff.
Logrolls,reciprocities,mutualadvantagesalso
producenewinstitutionalarrangements.Andthereisa
reciprocalrelationshiphere;thatis,institutionsof
certainforms,particularlyonesthatfragmentpower
andprovidemultiplevetopoints,arelikelytoinduce log
rolling,reciprocities,andmutual backscratching.
Suchconditionsmakecoherentchangeordirection
andcentralleadershiplesslikely
,allthingsequal,
thoughhardly impossible.

24. 24
Rational Choice Institutionalism
Inevitably
,institutionsadvantagesomeintheshort
termanddisadvantageothers,butthelongrun
maybeadifferentstory
.
Thesamerulesandstructuresmay
,overlonger
stretchesof time,provideadvantagesor
disadvantagestodifferentinterests,indeedeven
reversingwhichinterestsareadvantagedor
disadvantaged.
Theso-calledfilibusterruleof theUS Senate,
ironicallytheproductof anefforttocreategreater
institutionalefficienciesbydeterringtinyminorities
fromtyinguptheSenateindefinitely
,clearlyhelps
concertedandsubstantialminoritiesand frustrates

25. 25
Rational Choice Institutionalism
Rationalchoicetheorydependsforitsanalytical
powerupontheutility-maximizingdecisionsof
individuals.
Institutionsareconceptualizedascollectionsof
rulesandincentivesthatestablishtheconditions
forboundedrationality
,andthereforeestablisha
'politicalspace'withinwhichmanyinterdependent
politicalactorscanfunction.
Thus,inthesemodels,theindividualpoliticianis
expectedtomaneuvertomaximizepersonal
utilities,buthisorheroptionsareinherently
constrainedbecausetheyareoperatingwithinthe

26. 26
Rational Choice Institutionalism
Individualsandinstitutionsinteracttocreate
preferences.
Theargumentisevenif individualsmaybecome
involvedwithaninstitution,includingonesuchas
themarketthatisassumedtobefavorableto
individualutilitymaximization,theymustquickly
learnmoreaccommodativenormsandaccept
institutionalvaluesif theyaretobesuccessfulin
thoseinstitutions(North,1990).
Asetof rulescanarisewithinorganizationsthat
structuresbehaviorandestablishestheboundsof
acceptability
.Further,theexistenceof thoserules
ultimatelybenefitsallparticipants,and perhaps

27. 27
Rational Choice Institutionalism
Institutionsarecapableofproducingsome
predictabilityandregularityofoutcomesthat
benefitsallparticipantsinaninstitution,andalso
clarifiestheprobablerangeofdecisionsavailable
tosocietalactorsnotdirectlyinvolvedinthe
processofanyparticularorganization.
Thus,businessesmaybenefitfromaregulatory
regimeestablishedbygovernment,eventhough
theymaycomplainaboutsomeofitsparticular
constraints.

28. 28
Rational Choice Institutionalism
Thetheorypositsthatthereisaproblemof
ensuringthatorganizations,aswellasindividual
bureaucrats,willcomplywiththewishesof political
leaders.
Thebasictaskof institutionaldesigntherefore
becomestodevelopconfigurationsof institutions
thatwillensurecompliancebytheirmemberswith
thewishesof their'principals‘.
ATabulaRasa. Unlikeothermodelsof institutions
beingdiscussedhere,therationalchoice
perspectiveassumesthatinstitutionsarebeing
formedonatabularasa.
Theoutcomesof thedesignprocessare

29. 29
Normative Institutionalism
Normativeinstitutionalismasdevelopedby March
andOlsen(1989)underlinestheroleof valuesand
logicof appropriatenessindefininginstitution
(Peters1999)meaningthatinstitutionscanbe
consideredasembeddingrulesandroutinesthat
definewhatconstitutesappropriateaction.
Thenormsandformalrulesof institutionswill
shapetheactionsof thoseactingwithinthem.
Institutionsareviewedasindependententitiesthat
overtimeshapeapolitybyinfluencingactors’
preferences,perceptions,and identities.
Inthissense,institutionsareendogenous.

30. 30
Normative Institutionalism
Thisapproachcanbereadilycontrastedwith
rationalchoiceinstitutionalism:ratherthanaseries
of calculatedactionsdesignedtomaximize
perceivedbenefit,anygivenactorwithinan
institutionwillfeeltosomeextentconstrainedand
obligatedbythenormsandrulesof the institution.
Logicof appropriatenessspecifieswhat is
appropriatefor a particular person or role in a
particular situation.
Thelogicof ruledrivenmandatoryactionis: “What
sort of situation is this? What kind of person(s)
am
I (are we)? What does a person like myself do in
situationlike this?”
The“logicof appropriateness”asdefinedby the
valuesof theinstitutionprescribesparameters of

31. 31
Normative Institutionalism
The logics of appropriateness develop over time and
through interactions among institutional members. In
thissenseitisevolutionarybynature(Peters 1999).
NIasitstitlereflectsthecentralroleassignedtonorms
andvalueswithinorganizationsinexplainingbehavior
inthis approach.
Individualsarenotatomisticbutratherareembedded
inacomplexseriesof relationshipswithother
individualsandwithcollectivities.
Theyare,assumedtobealwaysinfluencedbytheirfull
rangeof organizationalattachmentsandhencecannot
beautonomous,utilitymaximizingandfullyrational
individualsassumedby RCI.

32. 32
Normative Institutionalism
Anotherwaytounderstandthedifferencesthat
MarchandOlsenpositbetweentheirapproachto
politics andtheRCI is in the diffe rence between
exogenous andendogenouspreferenceformation
(MarchandOlsen, 1996).
ForRCI, thepreferencesof politicalactorsare
exogenoustothepoliticalprocess,andareshaped
byforcesbeyondtheconcernof theimmediate
choicesituation.
Fornormativeinstitutionaltheories,ontheother
hand,individualpreferencesareshapedtoalarge
extentbytheirinvolvementwithinstitutions(see
also Wildavsky
,

33. 33
Normative Institutionalism
Thesetwomodelsaremirroredinthedistinction
madebyMarchandOlsen(1989)between
aggregativeandintegrativepoliticalprocesses.
Theformerformatisinessenceacontractualform
fororganizations,inwhichindividualsparticipate
largelyforpersonal gain.
Thelatterformof organizationcomesclosertothe
ideaof aninstitutionasexpressinga'logicof
appropriateness,' .
Participationinintegrativeinstitutionsis
undertakenonthebasisof commitmenttothe
goalsof theorganization,oratleastan
"acceptance of thelegitimate claimsof the

34. 34
Normative Institutionalism
ForMarchandOlsen, aninstitutionisnot
necessarilyaformalstructurebutratherisbetter
understoodasacollectionof norms,rules,
understandings,andperhapsmostimportantly
routines (1989).
Politicalinstitutionsarecollectionsof interrelated
rulesandroutinesthatdefineappropriateactionin
termsof relationsbetweenrolesandsituations.
Theygoontosaythat'institutionshavea
repertoireof proceduresandtheyuserulesto
selectamongthem.

35. 35
Normative Institutionalism
Andalsoinstitutionsaredefinedbytheirdurability
andtheircapacitytoinfluencebehaviorof
individualsforgenerations(1995, p.9).
Likewise,institutionsarearguedtopossessan
almostinherentlegitimacythatcommitstheir
memberstobehaveinwaysthatmayevenviolate
theirown self-interest.
"Perhaps'themostimportantfeatureof theMarch
andOlsenconceptualizationisthatinstitutions
tendtohavea'logicof appropriateness'that
influencesbehaviormorethana'logicof
consequentiality'thatalsomightshapeindividual
action.

36. 36
Normative Institutionalism
Thatis,if aninstitutioniseffectiveininfluencing
thebehaviorof itsmembers,thosememberswill
thinkmoreaboutwhetheranactionconformsto
thenormsof theorganizationthanaboutwhatthe
consequenceswillbeforhim-or herself.
Perhapstheextremeexamplewouldbethe
behaviorof soldierswhofacealmostcertaindeath
butstillbehave'appropriately'(Macdonald,1983),
orfiremenwhowillinglyenterblazingbuildings
becausethatistheroletheyhaveacceptedasa
functionof theiroccupationalchoiceandtheir
traininginthefireservice.

37. 37
Normative Institutionalism
This'appropriate'behaviorcanbecontrastedto
thatassumedbyeconomicmodels,inwhich
individualsareexpectedtothinkfirstwhatthe
objectivepay-off willbefor them.
Thatis,individualswillmakeconsciouschoices, but
thosechoiceswillremainwithintheparameters
establishedbythedominantinstitutionalvalues.
Thosechoicesalsowillrequirethateachindividual
makeaninterpretationof justwhatthedominant
institutionalvaluesare;eventhemostthoroughly
developedinstitutionswillleavemanyareasof
behavioropentointerpretationby individual

38. 38
Normative Institutionalism
Thiswill,inturn,requiresomemeansof
monitoringbehaviorsandreinforcingdominant
viewsaboutappropriateness.
Thelogicof appropriatenessalsooperatesinless
extremesituationsthantheonesoutlinedabove.
Inmostcasesthelogicof appropriatenessin public
institutionsmaybemanifestedthrough rather
ordinaryactivitiessuchasservingtheclient as
muchaspossible,ornotengagingincorruption on
thejob.
Theseareveryroutinestandardsof proper
behavior,butinthisnormativeconceptionof
institutionsitistheroutineandthemundanethat

39. 39
Normative Institutionalism
Therefore,therewillhavetobeenforcement
mechanismstodealwithinevitablecasesof
deviance,butformostdecisionsatmosttimes
routineswillbesufficienttogenerateappropria te'
pe
rformance
.
Pe rhaps as important is the simple fact thatthe
presenceof routinesmayhelptoidentifywhatthe
exceptional,andthereforetheimportant,casesfor
anyorganization are.
Theseexceptionalcasesmaycreatethecommon
lawwithinorganizationsthatdefinewhatisreally
appropriateandwhatis not.

40. 40
Normative Institutionalism
Theoperationof thelogicof appropriatenesscan
beseenasaversionof roletheory
.Theinstitution
definesasetof behavioralexpectationsfor
individualsinpositionswithintheinstitutionand
thenreinforcesbehaviorthatisappropriateforthe
roleandsanctionsbehaviorthatis inappropriate.
Someaspectsof therolemayapplytoall
membersof theinstitution,whileother
expectationswillbespecifictothepositionheldby
an individual.
Further, like organizational culture there may be
several versions of the role among which a role
occupantcanpickandchoose- thinkof the

41. 41
Normative Institutionalism
Thus,whenindividualsareinductedintoan
institution,theywillinmostinstanceshavebeen
pre-socializedbytheirmembershipin thesociety
.
Somecommonnorms- reciprocity
,honesty
,
cooperation- thatareimportantforpublicactors
arelearnedasapartof thegeneralsocialization
process.
Routinesaremeansthroughwhichindividual
membersof aninstitutioncanminimizetheir
transactionanddecision-makingcostsduring
participation.
Further,theyaremeansthroughwhichthe
institutioncanenhanceitsownefficiencyand

42. 42
Normative Institutionalism
AsMarch and Olsen pointout,allorganizations
developroutinesandthenemploythoseroutines
asthemeansof monitoringandreactingto
changeswithintheirtask environments.
Insomewaytheroutinesdefinethenatureof the
organization- policedepartmentswillhave
differentroutinesthandofiredepartments,
althoughbothareinthe'publicsafety'business.
Asroutinesbecomemoreestablishedandhave
somegreatermeaningattachedtothemthe
degreeof institutionalizationwithinthestructureis
increased.

43. 43
Normative Institutionalism
Theabovearepartialanswerstothequestionof the
originsof institutions,butonlypartial ones.
Forexample,whileindividualsmaybringwiththema
varietyof valueswhentheyjoinmostinstitutions,the
answerdoesnotappearverysatisfyingforinstitutions
thathaverulesandvaluesthatarequitedifferentfrom
thosefoundinthesurroundingsociety
,butwhichyet
performimportantservicesforthat society
.
Again,themilitaryorquasi-militaryorganizations
appeartobethebestexampleshere.Evenwithin
more'normal'politicalinstitutionsthepersonal
ambitionof politiciansmaynotcorrespondverywellto
societalnormsabouttheroleof thepublicofficialasa
servantof the people.

44. 44
Normative Institutionalism
Inparticular,BrunssonandOlsenarguethatthe
greater
thedegreeof disjuncturebetweenthevalues
professedbyaninstitutionanditsactualbehavior,
andthevaluesheldbysurroundingsocietyandthe
behaviorof theinstitution,themorelikelywill
changebe. Further,in this
view
,changeisrarelytherational,planned
exercisefoundin strategic
plans,butrathertendstobeemergentandmore
organic.

45. 45
Normative Institutionalism
IndividualandInstitutional interaction
Itisclearhowinstitutionsaffectindividualbehaviorin
normativeinstitutionalism.Institutionshavetheir
'logicsof appropriateness'thatdefinewhatbehavior
isappropriateformembersof theinstitutionand
whichbehaviorisnot.
Membersof thatinstitutionviolatethosenormsonly
attheirperil.
Atraderwhoviolatestherulesof themarketrisks
beingexcludedfromsubsequentdeals,justasa
memberof Parliamentwhoviolatesnormsabout
partyloyaltymay'havethewhipwithdrawn,'and

46. 46
Normative Institutionalism
Inorderforthislogicof appropriatenesstobe
effectivetheremustbesomeformof
enforcement.Asnotedabove,mostinstitutions
dohavethosemeansof enforcement,evenif
theyhavenoformalizedmeansforadjudication
or sanction.
Therearealwaysinformalmeansthroughwhich
memberscanbepressuredto conform.
Partof theargumentforpositinganormative
basisforinstitutionsisthatineffectiveinstitutions
thesanctioningandenforcementprocessesare
builtintothestructuresthemselvesthrough

47. 47
Normative Institutionalism
TheMarchandOlsenperspectiveproposedseveral
importanttheoreticalcomponentsforpolitical
scienceasadiscipline.
Onesuchelementwasthereturntoitsinstitutional
rootsandtoasenseof thecollective,asopposedto
individual,rootsof politicalbehavior.
Individualsareimportantintheirmodelandstill
ultimatelymustmakethechoices,butthosechoices
arelargelyconditionedbytheirmembershipina
numberof political institutions.
Inthisviewthestructure-agencyproblemisresolved
throughtheindividualacceptedandinterpretingthe
valuesof institutions.

48. 48
Normative Institutionalism
A second crucialelementof theMarchand Olsen
view is that the basis of behavior in institutions is
normativeratherthan coercive.
Ratherthanbeingguidedbyformalstatedrules
themembersof institutionsaremoreaffectedby
thevaluescontainedwithintheorganizations.
There is no independent means of ascertaining
whether it was values that produced behaviors,
and no wayof arguing thatitwasnottheroot of
thebehavior.