SlideShare a Scribd company logo
Identity, Authentication and Programmable Telecoms
Pierre Demarche
VP Products
EVOLUTION OF TELESIGN
PHONE NUMBER VERIFICATION
LAUNCH OF DATA SERVICES
PhoneID & Score
• Registration Fraud
PREVENTING FRAUDS, ENABLE
TRUST & PROTECTING USERS
New Data Services
• Identity Verification
• Credit Risk Prevention
• Account Takeover Protection
• Payment Frauds Prevention
• Communication Context
EXTENDED COMMUNICATION APIS
• Voice APIs
• Messaging APIs
• Engagement (2 Way SMS, Omnichannel)
• ARN (Acknowledgement, Receipts,
Notifications)
© 2019 TeleSign 2
ADDRESSING
MARKET CHALLENGES
DATA
BREACHE
S
Usernames & passwords continue to be the
prevailing method for securing online accounts.
However, the volume of data breaches has hit record
highs, with new data breaches being reported
regularly. Essentially every username/password
combination is now available for sale somewhere.
Because of this, it’s impossible to know who is really
logging into a website/app; is it the legitimate user or
a fraudster with stolen credentials?
© 2019 TeleSign
STOP
FRAUDSTERS
FROM
CREATING
ACCOUNTS
5
Websites/apps have huge problems with
fake accounts
Using bots, fraudsters have created millions of social
media, email, and other accounts
Fraudsters create fake accounts to:
• Spam
• Phish
• Post fake reviews
• Increase number of followers
• Etc.
Phone Number based verification adds
a layer of protection
• However, fraudsters continue to find new ways to
creat bulk fake accounts
BURNER
PHONE NUMBERS
• Websites/apps introduced phone verification into
their signup flow to help with these challenges
- Fraudsters now needed a valid phone number
to create a new account
- Phone verification was initially very helpful in
stopping fraud
• However, fraudsters eventually learned how to
obtain anonymous VOIP numbers to use for
phone verification
• There are various places to obtain these numbers:
- Pinger
- Burner App
• Using these VOIP numbers, fraudsters were able to
automate their creation of new accounts again
© 2019 TeleSign
FARMING
Cheap/free mobile numbers are typically obtained by activating new prepaid SIM cards, often as part of a SIM or
phone farm. Each of these data points helps to distinguish these “farmed” numbers from legitimate subscribers.
To continue to create fake accounts, fraudsters have realized
that they need access to thousands of mobile numbers.
Fraud is a business, so these mobile numbers must be
anonymous and cheap/free for their business model to work.
© 2019 TeleSign
50%
OF INTERNET USERS
ARE FALSIFYING THE DATA
AT ONBOARDING
Phone number: 27%
Date of birth: 17%
Email address: 16%
Home address: 15%
Name: 14%
Age: 14%
© 2019 TeleSign 8
RECYCLED PHONE NUMBERS
© 2018 TeleSign 9
Phone verification during new account registration has become
extremely popular. Websites and apps now rely heavily on their
user’s verified phone numbers for both 2FA and password reset
as previously described, and also for many communications use
cases such as account alerting, anonymous communications
between users, etc.
Because of this, it’s extremely important that websites can trust that their
users’ phone numbers have not changed ownership. Otherwise, the
website/app could be communicating with the wrong subscriber,
causing frustration and annoyance.
SIM SWAP:
HOW IT WORKS
© 2019 TeleSign 10
• One way to hijack a user’s phone
number is via SIM swap
• The attack works like this:
- The fraudster identifies the victim’s phone number and
phone carrier
- He then poses as the legitimate user to the carrier, either
in-store, on the phone, or online
- The fraudster asks the carrier to transfer his (the
victim’s) phone number to a new SIM card because he
lost his phone, etc.
- The carrier transfers the phone number
- The fraudster now has access to this phone number and
receives the victim’s 2FA codes when logging in online
IRSF FRAUD
• International Revenue Share Fraud
• With IRSF, attackers use fraudulent access to a
network to artificially inflate traffic to numbers
• Fraudsters then receive payment (on a revenue
share basis with the number provider)
• If they enable automation of voice calls to these
numbers from an Internet site or application,
they can obtain a lot of money in a very short
period of time (hours or minutes).
© 2019 TeleSign 11
Lead Generation Registration Login Transactions Manage Account
(Recovery, Password reset, etc)
Interactions (P2P,
Customer
support, etc)
Incomplete Profiles of leads
Changing Profiles of leads
Prospect
Profiling/Segmentation
• Demographics
• Preferences
• Lifestyle
• Interests
Fraud Risk
• Trust
• Bulk Account Creation
• Fake Accounts
• Spam users
• Recycled numbers
• Promo Abuse
Identity Fraud
• Synthetic identity
Compliance (Reg Tech)
• KYC
• Communication Compliance
(TCPA, DND, etc.)
Communication Fraud
• IRSF
Operational
• Duplicate account creation
Profiling
• Gauge customer LTV
Account Take Over
• SIM Swap
• Port Fraud
• Recycled phone Number
• Lifecycle changes
• Identity thefts
Account Take Over
• SIM Swap
• Port Fraud
• Recycled phone Number
• Lifecycle changes
• Identity thefts
Transaction Frauds
• Payment frauds
• Charge back
Fraud/Refund Fraud
• Stolen Identity
Account Take Over
• SIM Swap
• Port Fraud
• Recycled phone Number
• Lifecycle changes
• Identity thefts
Account Take Over
• SIM Swap
• Port Fraud
• Recycled phone Number
• Lifecycle changes
• Identity thefts
Fraud Risk
• Trust
• Identity Fraud
Communication Fraud
• Inbound Context
• Spam
• Good User
• CLI Spoofing
• Outbound
• IRSF
Communication Compliance
• Communication
Compliance (TCPA, DND,
etc.)
HOW WE HELP FIGHT FRAUDS
Onboarding
PHONE NUMBER
Login
Account Recovery
Marketplace
Interactions
Payments
Trust Fraud Compliance
Customer Support
PROTECT ONLINE EXPERIENCES GLOBALLY
USING COMMUNICATION DATA
15
500 MILLION
Fraudulent transactions detected for
our customers!
THERE IS A LOT OF FRAUD!
THE GLOBAL FRAUD INTELLIGENCE
SOLUTION
16
TeleSign Score
• Fraud risk assessment API
• Reputation scoring based on:
- Phone number intelligence
- Traffic patterns
- Machine learning
- Global data consortium
- Customer-provided data inputs
• Integrates into existing account
security workflows
Score Risk Level Recommendation
801-1000 High Block
601-800 Medium-high Block
401-600 Medium Flag
201-400 Medium-low Allow
0-200 Low Allow
N/A Neutral N/A
Score Recommendations
© 2019 TeleSign
REAL-TIME PHONE NUMBER INTELLIGENCE
Industry-Leading Fraud Risk Assessment & High-Quality Data
TeleSign delivers valuable
information associated with the
phone number, which improves
SMS delivery.
TeleSign evaluates fraud risk by
using machine learning to uncover
hidden insights and predict future
events.
Phone Number Traffic Patterns & Usage Velocity
Status of Phone Subscriber’s contact details
Phone Type, Telecom Carrier, Account
and Device ID
Customer-Provided
Data Inputs:
IP Address, Email Address, Account
ID, Device ID, etc.
History of Fraud –
Global Data Consortium
Knowledge
Engineering
Customized machine
learning models
VoiP Detection
© 2019 TeleSign 17
COMMUNICATION DATA CLASSIFICATION
Strong co-relation with online frauds
MOBILE
NUMBER
New Dimensions
Behavior
No of outgoing/incoming calls/messages
Velocity
Diversity of called numbers, countries, operators
Diversity of receiving numbers, countries, operators
Duration of calls
Tenure of numbers
Length of messages
No of countries roamed
Mobile data usage
Failed call attempts
Failed messages
Failed signaling
Type of carriers
- Tier 1,2,3,4 VOIP
Risky destinations
Premium calls
Spam content
Calling Number
Called Number Roaming Number
Sender SMS Receiver SMS
Customer Supplier
Origination Country/Operator Destination Country/Operator
Trillions of Global
communication
transactions
Tokenized Privacy
Compliant Platform
CLASSIFICATION OF PHONE NUMBERS BASED ON BEHAVIOR
Velocity histogram (bar = day) Velocity histogram (bar =
hour)
Call duration histogram (bar = sec)
Application
Traffic
Robocalls
HUMAN VS MACHINE TRAFFIC
20
Legitimate traffic VOIP Numbers used
for A2P use cases
VOIP Numbers used
for Robocalling
© 2019 TeleSign
Call duration distributions on sample of 1000 subscribers
LEGITIMATE TRAFFIC EXAMPLES
© 2019 TeleSign 21
node = phone number; edge = transaction(s); direction = from A to B number;
node color = in (blue) vs out (red) degree (i.e. number of distinct B vs A neighboring nodes);
node size = total degree (total number of neighbors);
number correlated to the edge = velocity; edge thickness = call duration.
Legitimate Graph Components
SUMMARY
DATA PLATFORM
ENABLING COMMUNICATIONS &
PROTECTING ONLINE EXPERIENCES
Lead
Scoring
Registration
Risk
Score
Identity
Verification
Score
Credit Risk
Score
Account Take
Over Score
Payment
Transaction Risk
Score
Communication
Context Score
GLOBAL COMMUNICATION PLATFORM
@TeleSign
pdemarche@telesign.com

More Related Content

What's hot

Comprehensive training on bypass sim box fraud
Comprehensive training on bypass sim box fraudComprehensive training on bypass sim box fraud
Comprehensive training on bypass sim box fraud
Massango Junior
 
52 mobile phone cloning
52 mobile phone cloning52 mobile phone cloning
52 mobile phone cloningSALMAN SHAIKH
 
Survey: Identity Authentication For Banks In Malaysia
Survey: Identity Authentication For Banks In MalaysiaSurvey: Identity Authentication For Banks In Malaysia
Survey: Identity Authentication For Banks In Malaysia
FICO
 
Overcome Security Threats Affecting Mobile Financial Solutions 2020
Overcome Security Threats Affecting Mobile Financial Solutions 2020Overcome Security Threats Affecting Mobile Financial Solutions 2020
Overcome Security Threats Affecting Mobile Financial Solutions 2020
Fusion Informatics
 
Mobile ph cloning
Mobile ph cloningMobile ph cloning
Mobile ph cloning
774474
 
Mobile cloning
Mobile cloningMobile cloning
Mobile cloning
Abhishek Abhi
 
Mobile Phone Cloning By: Ritik Nagar
Mobile Phone Cloning By: Ritik NagarMobile Phone Cloning By: Ritik Nagar
Mobile Phone Cloning By: Ritik Nagar
Ritik Nagar
 
Mobile payment-security-risk-and-response
Mobile payment-security-risk-and-responseMobile payment-security-risk-and-response
Mobile payment-security-risk-and-response
DESMOND YUEN
 
Mobile phone cloning
Mobile phone cloningMobile phone cloning
Mobile phone cloning
hcls
 
MeetMe Uses TeleSign to Secure Its User Community and Reduce Threat of Fraud
MeetMe Uses TeleSign to Secure Its User Community and Reduce Threat of FraudMeetMe Uses TeleSign to Secure Its User Community and Reduce Threat of Fraud
MeetMe Uses TeleSign to Secure Its User Community and Reduce Threat of FraudTeleSign Corporation
 
Internet threats and its effect on E-commerce
Internet threats and its effect on E-commerceInternet threats and its effect on E-commerce
Internet threats and its effect on E-commerce
Vipin Subhash
 
E-commerce and fraud
E-commerce and fraudE-commerce and fraud
E-commerce and fraud
blogzilla
 
Cloning. (4)
Cloning. (4)Cloning. (4)
Cloning. (4)
Jagjit Khalsa
 
Cell phone cloning
Cell phone cloningCell phone cloning
Cell phone cloning
Jashir Chakkayil
 
Cell phone cloning
Cell phone cloningCell phone cloning
Cell phone cloning
Gudia Khan
 
52 mobile phone cloning
52 mobile phone cloning52 mobile phone cloning
52 mobile phone cloningSALMAN SHAIKH
 
Mobile cloning
Mobile cloningMobile cloning
Mobile cloning
Pushkar Dutt
 
Mobile Cloning
Mobile Cloning Mobile Cloning
Mobile Cloning
Karteek Reddy
 

What's hot (20)

Comprehensive training on bypass sim box fraud
Comprehensive training on bypass sim box fraudComprehensive training on bypass sim box fraud
Comprehensive training on bypass sim box fraud
 
52 mobile phone cloning
52 mobile phone cloning52 mobile phone cloning
52 mobile phone cloning
 
Survey: Identity Authentication For Banks In Malaysia
Survey: Identity Authentication For Banks In MalaysiaSurvey: Identity Authentication For Banks In Malaysia
Survey: Identity Authentication For Banks In Malaysia
 
Overcome Security Threats Affecting Mobile Financial Solutions 2020
Overcome Security Threats Affecting Mobile Financial Solutions 2020Overcome Security Threats Affecting Mobile Financial Solutions 2020
Overcome Security Threats Affecting Mobile Financial Solutions 2020
 
Mobile ph cloning
Mobile ph cloningMobile ph cloning
Mobile ph cloning
 
Mobile cloning
Mobile cloningMobile cloning
Mobile cloning
 
Mobile Phone Cloning By: Ritik Nagar
Mobile Phone Cloning By: Ritik NagarMobile Phone Cloning By: Ritik Nagar
Mobile Phone Cloning By: Ritik Nagar
 
Mobile cloning
Mobile cloningMobile cloning
Mobile cloning
 
Mobile payment-security-risk-and-response
Mobile payment-security-risk-and-responseMobile payment-security-risk-and-response
Mobile payment-security-risk-and-response
 
Mobile phone cloning
Mobile phone cloningMobile phone cloning
Mobile phone cloning
 
MeetMe Uses TeleSign to Secure Its User Community and Reduce Threat of Fraud
MeetMe Uses TeleSign to Secure Its User Community and Reduce Threat of FraudMeetMe Uses TeleSign to Secure Its User Community and Reduce Threat of Fraud
MeetMe Uses TeleSign to Secure Its User Community and Reduce Threat of Fraud
 
Internet threats and its effect on E-commerce
Internet threats and its effect on E-commerceInternet threats and its effect on E-commerce
Internet threats and its effect on E-commerce
 
Mobile phone-cloning
Mobile phone-cloningMobile phone-cloning
Mobile phone-cloning
 
E-commerce and fraud
E-commerce and fraudE-commerce and fraud
E-commerce and fraud
 
Cloning. (4)
Cloning. (4)Cloning. (4)
Cloning. (4)
 
Cell phone cloning
Cell phone cloningCell phone cloning
Cell phone cloning
 
Cell phone cloning
Cell phone cloningCell phone cloning
Cell phone cloning
 
52 mobile phone cloning
52 mobile phone cloning52 mobile phone cloning
52 mobile phone cloning
 
Mobile cloning
Mobile cloningMobile cloning
Mobile cloning
 
Mobile Cloning
Mobile Cloning Mobile Cloning
Mobile Cloning
 

Similar to Identity, Authentication, and Programmable Telecoms Session

Identity, Authentication, and Programmable Telecoms
Identity, Authentication, and Programmable TelecomsIdentity, Authentication, and Programmable Telecoms
Identity, Authentication, and Programmable Telecoms
Alan Quayle
 
apidays LIVE JAKARTA - Deliver A Dynamic & Secured Buying Experience by Shara...
apidays LIVE JAKARTA - Deliver A Dynamic & Secured Buying Experience by Shara...apidays LIVE JAKARTA - Deliver A Dynamic & Secured Buying Experience by Shara...
apidays LIVE JAKARTA - Deliver A Dynamic & Secured Buying Experience by Shara...
apidays
 
Skype 1 – 0 Robocalls: How TeleSign helped Skype “Score” against fraudulent c...
Skype 1 – 0 Robocalls: How TeleSign helped Skype “Score” against fraudulent c...Skype 1 – 0 Robocalls: How TeleSign helped Skype “Score” against fraudulent c...
Skype 1 – 0 Robocalls: How TeleSign helped Skype “Score” against fraudulent c...
Alan Quayle
 
Keeping Your Customers Happy and Safe: Authentication and Authorization Strat...
Keeping Your Customers Happy and Safe: Authentication and Authorization Strat...Keeping Your Customers Happy and Safe: Authentication and Authorization Strat...
Keeping Your Customers Happy and Safe: Authentication and Authorization Strat...
TransUnion
 
Contemporary Frauds.pptx
Contemporary Frauds.pptxContemporary Frauds.pptx
Contemporary Frauds.pptx
ZiaullahShah9
 
apidays LIVE Jakarta - Leveraging Business Growth with Telco API by Iwan Pujo...
apidays LIVE Jakarta - Leveraging Business Growth with Telco API by Iwan Pujo...apidays LIVE Jakarta - Leveraging Business Growth with Telco API by Iwan Pujo...
apidays LIVE Jakarta - Leveraging Business Growth with Telco API by Iwan Pujo...
apidays
 
Top 7 Phone Verification Challenges
Top 7 Phone Verification ChallengesTop 7 Phone Verification Challenges
Top 7 Phone Verification ChallengesSrivatsan Srinivasan
 
Whitepaper: Top 7 Phone Number Verification Challenges
Whitepaper: Top 7 Phone Number Verification ChallengesWhitepaper: Top 7 Phone Number Verification Challenges
Whitepaper: Top 7 Phone Number Verification Challenges
Nexmo
 
Neustar Fraud ID Collateral
Neustar Fraud ID CollateralNeustar Fraud ID Collateral
Neustar Fraud ID CollateralRick Myrick
 
New Opportunities with Two Factor Authentication (2FA) - A How To
New Opportunities with Two Factor Authentication (2FA) - A How ToNew Opportunities with Two Factor Authentication (2FA) - A How To
New Opportunities with Two Factor Authentication (2FA) - A How To
TelcoBridges Inc.
 
New Opportunities with Two Factor Authentication (2FA) - A How To
New Opportunities with Two Factor Authentication (2FA) - A How ToNew Opportunities with Two Factor Authentication (2FA) - A How To
New Opportunities with Two Factor Authentication (2FA) - A How To
Alan Percy
 
Fraud Management Industry Update Webinar
Fraud Management Industry Update WebinarFraud Management Industry Update Webinar
Fraud Management Industry Update Webinar
cVidya Networks
 
How to Prevent Telecom Fraud in Real-Time
How to Prevent Telecom Fraud in Real-TimeHow to Prevent Telecom Fraud in Real-Time
How to Prevent Telecom Fraud in Real-Time
Alan Percy
 
How to Prevent Telecom Fraud
How to Prevent Telecom FraudHow to Prevent Telecom Fraud
How to Prevent Telecom Fraud
JeraSoft
 
Protect Your SMB from Payment Security Breaches
Protect Your SMB from Payment Security BreachesProtect Your SMB from Payment Security Breaches
Protect Your SMB from Payment Security Breaches
Verifone
 
How to Prevent Telecom Fraud in Real-Time
How to Prevent Telecom Fraud in Real-TimeHow to Prevent Telecom Fraud in Real-Time
How to Prevent Telecom Fraud in Real-Time
TelcoBridges Inc.
 
TADSummit Asia 2019, Richard Im, Apigate. Apigate’s Journey from In-house Ini...
TADSummit Asia 2019, Richard Im, Apigate. Apigate’s Journey from In-house Ini...TADSummit Asia 2019, Richard Im, Apigate. Apigate’s Journey from In-house Ini...
TADSummit Asia 2019, Richard Im, Apigate. Apigate’s Journey from In-house Ini...
Alan Quayle
 
Merchant Account Tips: Proven Methods for Reducing Online Credit Card Fraud &...
Merchant Account Tips: Proven Methods for Reducing Online Credit Card Fraud &...Merchant Account Tips: Proven Methods for Reducing Online Credit Card Fraud &...
Merchant Account Tips: Proven Methods for Reducing Online Credit Card Fraud &...
CDGcommerce
 
Running head HOW TO AVOID INTERNET SCAMS AT THE WORKPLACE 1 .docx
Running head HOW TO AVOID INTERNET SCAMS AT THE WORKPLACE  1 .docxRunning head HOW TO AVOID INTERNET SCAMS AT THE WORKPLACE  1 .docx
Running head HOW TO AVOID INTERNET SCAMS AT THE WORKPLACE 1 .docx
wlynn1
 
Combating digital fraud attacks - Sip and Solve
Combating digital fraud attacks - Sip and SolveCombating digital fraud attacks - Sip and Solve
Combating digital fraud attacks - Sip and Solve
Experian
 

Similar to Identity, Authentication, and Programmable Telecoms Session (20)

Identity, Authentication, and Programmable Telecoms
Identity, Authentication, and Programmable TelecomsIdentity, Authentication, and Programmable Telecoms
Identity, Authentication, and Programmable Telecoms
 
apidays LIVE JAKARTA - Deliver A Dynamic & Secured Buying Experience by Shara...
apidays LIVE JAKARTA - Deliver A Dynamic & Secured Buying Experience by Shara...apidays LIVE JAKARTA - Deliver A Dynamic & Secured Buying Experience by Shara...
apidays LIVE JAKARTA - Deliver A Dynamic & Secured Buying Experience by Shara...
 
Skype 1 – 0 Robocalls: How TeleSign helped Skype “Score” against fraudulent c...
Skype 1 – 0 Robocalls: How TeleSign helped Skype “Score” against fraudulent c...Skype 1 – 0 Robocalls: How TeleSign helped Skype “Score” against fraudulent c...
Skype 1 – 0 Robocalls: How TeleSign helped Skype “Score” against fraudulent c...
 
Keeping Your Customers Happy and Safe: Authentication and Authorization Strat...
Keeping Your Customers Happy and Safe: Authentication and Authorization Strat...Keeping Your Customers Happy and Safe: Authentication and Authorization Strat...
Keeping Your Customers Happy and Safe: Authentication and Authorization Strat...
 
Contemporary Frauds.pptx
Contemporary Frauds.pptxContemporary Frauds.pptx
Contemporary Frauds.pptx
 
apidays LIVE Jakarta - Leveraging Business Growth with Telco API by Iwan Pujo...
apidays LIVE Jakarta - Leveraging Business Growth with Telco API by Iwan Pujo...apidays LIVE Jakarta - Leveraging Business Growth with Telco API by Iwan Pujo...
apidays LIVE Jakarta - Leveraging Business Growth with Telco API by Iwan Pujo...
 
Top 7 Phone Verification Challenges
Top 7 Phone Verification ChallengesTop 7 Phone Verification Challenges
Top 7 Phone Verification Challenges
 
Whitepaper: Top 7 Phone Number Verification Challenges
Whitepaper: Top 7 Phone Number Verification ChallengesWhitepaper: Top 7 Phone Number Verification Challenges
Whitepaper: Top 7 Phone Number Verification Challenges
 
Neustar Fraud ID Collateral
Neustar Fraud ID CollateralNeustar Fraud ID Collateral
Neustar Fraud ID Collateral
 
New Opportunities with Two Factor Authentication (2FA) - A How To
New Opportunities with Two Factor Authentication (2FA) - A How ToNew Opportunities with Two Factor Authentication (2FA) - A How To
New Opportunities with Two Factor Authentication (2FA) - A How To
 
New Opportunities with Two Factor Authentication (2FA) - A How To
New Opportunities with Two Factor Authentication (2FA) - A How ToNew Opportunities with Two Factor Authentication (2FA) - A How To
New Opportunities with Two Factor Authentication (2FA) - A How To
 
Fraud Management Industry Update Webinar
Fraud Management Industry Update WebinarFraud Management Industry Update Webinar
Fraud Management Industry Update Webinar
 
How to Prevent Telecom Fraud in Real-Time
How to Prevent Telecom Fraud in Real-TimeHow to Prevent Telecom Fraud in Real-Time
How to Prevent Telecom Fraud in Real-Time
 
How to Prevent Telecom Fraud
How to Prevent Telecom FraudHow to Prevent Telecom Fraud
How to Prevent Telecom Fraud
 
Protect Your SMB from Payment Security Breaches
Protect Your SMB from Payment Security BreachesProtect Your SMB from Payment Security Breaches
Protect Your SMB from Payment Security Breaches
 
How to Prevent Telecom Fraud in Real-Time
How to Prevent Telecom Fraud in Real-TimeHow to Prevent Telecom Fraud in Real-Time
How to Prevent Telecom Fraud in Real-Time
 
TADSummit Asia 2019, Richard Im, Apigate. Apigate’s Journey from In-house Ini...
TADSummit Asia 2019, Richard Im, Apigate. Apigate’s Journey from In-house Ini...TADSummit Asia 2019, Richard Im, Apigate. Apigate’s Journey from In-house Ini...
TADSummit Asia 2019, Richard Im, Apigate. Apigate’s Journey from In-house Ini...
 
Merchant Account Tips: Proven Methods for Reducing Online Credit Card Fraud &...
Merchant Account Tips: Proven Methods for Reducing Online Credit Card Fraud &...Merchant Account Tips: Proven Methods for Reducing Online Credit Card Fraud &...
Merchant Account Tips: Proven Methods for Reducing Online Credit Card Fraud &...
 
Running head HOW TO AVOID INTERNET SCAMS AT THE WORKPLACE 1 .docx
Running head HOW TO AVOID INTERNET SCAMS AT THE WORKPLACE  1 .docxRunning head HOW TO AVOID INTERNET SCAMS AT THE WORKPLACE  1 .docx
Running head HOW TO AVOID INTERNET SCAMS AT THE WORKPLACE 1 .docx
 
Combating digital fraud attacks - Sip and Solve
Combating digital fraud attacks - Sip and SolveCombating digital fraud attacks - Sip and Solve
Combating digital fraud attacks - Sip and Solve
 

More from Alan Quayle

What is a vCon?
What is a vCon?What is a vCon?
What is a vCon?
Alan Quayle
 
Supercharging CPaaS Growth & Margins with Identity and Authentication, Aditya...
Supercharging CPaaS Growth & Margins with Identity and Authentication, Aditya...Supercharging CPaaS Growth & Margins with Identity and Authentication, Aditya...
Supercharging CPaaS Growth & Margins with Identity and Authentication, Aditya...
Alan Quayle
 
Building a sub-second virtual ThunderDome: Considerations for mass scale sub-...
Building a sub-second virtual ThunderDome: Considerations for mass scale sub-...Building a sub-second virtual ThunderDome: Considerations for mass scale sub-...
Building a sub-second virtual ThunderDome: Considerations for mass scale sub-...
Alan Quayle
 
What makes a cellular IoT API great? Tobias Goebel
What makes a cellular IoT API great? Tobias GoebelWhat makes a cellular IoT API great? Tobias Goebel
What makes a cellular IoT API great? Tobias Goebel
Alan Quayle
 
eSIM as Root of Trust for IoT security, João Casal
eSIM as Root of Trust for IoT security, João CasaleSIM as Root of Trust for IoT security, João Casal
eSIM as Root of Trust for IoT security, João Casal
Alan Quayle
 
Architecting your WebRTC application for scalability, Arin Sime
Architecting your WebRTC application for scalability, Arin SimeArchitecting your WebRTC application for scalability, Arin Sime
Architecting your WebRTC application for scalability, Arin Sime
Alan Quayle
 
CPaaS Conversational Platforms and Conversational Customer Service – The Expe...
CPaaS Conversational Platforms and Conversational Customer Service – The Expe...CPaaS Conversational Platforms and Conversational Customer Service – The Expe...
CPaaS Conversational Platforms and Conversational Customer Service – The Expe...
Alan Quayle
 
Programmable Testing for Programmable Telcos, Andreas Granig
Programmable Testing for Programmable Telcos, Andreas GranigProgrammable Testing for Programmable Telcos, Andreas Granig
Programmable Testing for Programmable Telcos, Andreas Granig
Alan Quayle
 
How to best maximize the conversation data stream for your business? Surbhi R...
How to best maximize the conversation data stream for your business? Surbhi R...How to best maximize the conversation data stream for your business? Surbhi R...
How to best maximize the conversation data stream for your business? Surbhi R...
Alan Quayle
 
Latest Updates and Experiences in Launching Local Language Tools, Karel Bourgois
Latest Updates and Experiences in Launching Local Language Tools, Karel BourgoisLatest Updates and Experiences in Launching Local Language Tools, Karel Bourgois
Latest Updates and Experiences in Launching Local Language Tools, Karel Bourgois
Alan Quayle
 
What Everyone Needs to Know about Protecting the CPaaS Ecosystem from Unlawfu...
What Everyone Needs to Know about Protecting the CPaaS Ecosystem from Unlawfu...What Everyone Needs to Know about Protecting the CPaaS Ecosystem from Unlawfu...
What Everyone Needs to Know about Protecting the CPaaS Ecosystem from Unlawfu...
Alan Quayle
 
Master the Audience Experience Multiverse: AX Best Practices and Success Stor...
Master the Audience Experience Multiverse: AX Best Practices and Success Stor...Master the Audience Experience Multiverse: AX Best Practices and Success Stor...
Master the Audience Experience Multiverse: AX Best Practices and Success Stor...
Alan Quayle
 
Open Source Telecom Software Survey 2022, Alan Quayle
Open Source Telecom Software Survey 2022, Alan QuayleOpen Source Telecom Software Survey 2022, Alan Quayle
Open Source Telecom Software Survey 2022, Alan Quayle
Alan Quayle
 
OpenSIPS 3.3 – Messaging in the IMS and UC ecosystems. Bogdan-Andrei Iancu
OpenSIPS 3.3 – Messaging in the IMS and UC ecosystems. Bogdan-Andrei IancuOpenSIPS 3.3 – Messaging in the IMS and UC ecosystems. Bogdan-Andrei Iancu
OpenSIPS 3.3 – Messaging in the IMS and UC ecosystems. Bogdan-Andrei Iancu
Alan Quayle
 
TADS 2022 - Shifting from Voice to Workflow Management, Filipe Leitao
TADS 2022 - Shifting from Voice to Workflow Management, Filipe LeitaoTADS 2022 - Shifting from Voice to Workflow Management, Filipe Leitao
TADS 2022 - Shifting from Voice to Workflow Management, Filipe Leitao
Alan Quayle
 
What happened since we last met TADSummit 2022, Alan Quayle
What happened since we last met TADSummit 2022, Alan QuayleWhat happened since we last met TADSummit 2022, Alan Quayle
What happened since we last met TADSummit 2022, Alan Quayle
Alan Quayle
 
Stacuity - TAD Summit 2022 - Time to ditch the dumb-pipe, Mike Bromwich
Stacuity - TAD Summit 2022 - Time to ditch the dumb-pipe, Mike BromwichStacuity - TAD Summit 2022 - Time to ditch the dumb-pipe, Mike Bromwich
Stacuity - TAD Summit 2022 - Time to ditch the dumb-pipe, Mike Bromwich
Alan Quayle
 
AWA – a Telco bootstrapping product development: Challenges with dynamic mark...
AWA – a Telco bootstrapping product development: Challenges with dynamic mark...AWA – a Telco bootstrapping product development: Challenges with dynamic mark...
AWA – a Telco bootstrapping product development: Challenges with dynamic mark...
Alan Quayle
 
Founding a Startup in Telecoms. The good, the bad and the ugly. João Camarate
Founding a Startup in Telecoms. The good, the bad and the ugly. João CamarateFounding a Startup in Telecoms. The good, the bad and the ugly. João Camarate
Founding a Startup in Telecoms. The good, the bad and the ugly. João Camarate
Alan Quayle
 
How to bring down your own RTC platform. Sandro Gauci
How to bring down your own RTC platform. Sandro GauciHow to bring down your own RTC platform. Sandro Gauci
How to bring down your own RTC platform. Sandro Gauci
Alan Quayle
 

More from Alan Quayle (20)

What is a vCon?
What is a vCon?What is a vCon?
What is a vCon?
 
Supercharging CPaaS Growth & Margins with Identity and Authentication, Aditya...
Supercharging CPaaS Growth & Margins with Identity and Authentication, Aditya...Supercharging CPaaS Growth & Margins with Identity and Authentication, Aditya...
Supercharging CPaaS Growth & Margins with Identity and Authentication, Aditya...
 
Building a sub-second virtual ThunderDome: Considerations for mass scale sub-...
Building a sub-second virtual ThunderDome: Considerations for mass scale sub-...Building a sub-second virtual ThunderDome: Considerations for mass scale sub-...
Building a sub-second virtual ThunderDome: Considerations for mass scale sub-...
 
What makes a cellular IoT API great? Tobias Goebel
What makes a cellular IoT API great? Tobias GoebelWhat makes a cellular IoT API great? Tobias Goebel
What makes a cellular IoT API great? Tobias Goebel
 
eSIM as Root of Trust for IoT security, João Casal
eSIM as Root of Trust for IoT security, João CasaleSIM as Root of Trust for IoT security, João Casal
eSIM as Root of Trust for IoT security, João Casal
 
Architecting your WebRTC application for scalability, Arin Sime
Architecting your WebRTC application for scalability, Arin SimeArchitecting your WebRTC application for scalability, Arin Sime
Architecting your WebRTC application for scalability, Arin Sime
 
CPaaS Conversational Platforms and Conversational Customer Service – The Expe...
CPaaS Conversational Platforms and Conversational Customer Service – The Expe...CPaaS Conversational Platforms and Conversational Customer Service – The Expe...
CPaaS Conversational Platforms and Conversational Customer Service – The Expe...
 
Programmable Testing for Programmable Telcos, Andreas Granig
Programmable Testing for Programmable Telcos, Andreas GranigProgrammable Testing for Programmable Telcos, Andreas Granig
Programmable Testing for Programmable Telcos, Andreas Granig
 
How to best maximize the conversation data stream for your business? Surbhi R...
How to best maximize the conversation data stream for your business? Surbhi R...How to best maximize the conversation data stream for your business? Surbhi R...
How to best maximize the conversation data stream for your business? Surbhi R...
 
Latest Updates and Experiences in Launching Local Language Tools, Karel Bourgois
Latest Updates and Experiences in Launching Local Language Tools, Karel BourgoisLatest Updates and Experiences in Launching Local Language Tools, Karel Bourgois
Latest Updates and Experiences in Launching Local Language Tools, Karel Bourgois
 
What Everyone Needs to Know about Protecting the CPaaS Ecosystem from Unlawfu...
What Everyone Needs to Know about Protecting the CPaaS Ecosystem from Unlawfu...What Everyone Needs to Know about Protecting the CPaaS Ecosystem from Unlawfu...
What Everyone Needs to Know about Protecting the CPaaS Ecosystem from Unlawfu...
 
Master the Audience Experience Multiverse: AX Best Practices and Success Stor...
Master the Audience Experience Multiverse: AX Best Practices and Success Stor...Master the Audience Experience Multiverse: AX Best Practices and Success Stor...
Master the Audience Experience Multiverse: AX Best Practices and Success Stor...
 
Open Source Telecom Software Survey 2022, Alan Quayle
Open Source Telecom Software Survey 2022, Alan QuayleOpen Source Telecom Software Survey 2022, Alan Quayle
Open Source Telecom Software Survey 2022, Alan Quayle
 
OpenSIPS 3.3 – Messaging in the IMS and UC ecosystems. Bogdan-Andrei Iancu
OpenSIPS 3.3 – Messaging in the IMS and UC ecosystems. Bogdan-Andrei IancuOpenSIPS 3.3 – Messaging in the IMS and UC ecosystems. Bogdan-Andrei Iancu
OpenSIPS 3.3 – Messaging in the IMS and UC ecosystems. Bogdan-Andrei Iancu
 
TADS 2022 - Shifting from Voice to Workflow Management, Filipe Leitao
TADS 2022 - Shifting from Voice to Workflow Management, Filipe LeitaoTADS 2022 - Shifting from Voice to Workflow Management, Filipe Leitao
TADS 2022 - Shifting from Voice to Workflow Management, Filipe Leitao
 
What happened since we last met TADSummit 2022, Alan Quayle
What happened since we last met TADSummit 2022, Alan QuayleWhat happened since we last met TADSummit 2022, Alan Quayle
What happened since we last met TADSummit 2022, Alan Quayle
 
Stacuity - TAD Summit 2022 - Time to ditch the dumb-pipe, Mike Bromwich
Stacuity - TAD Summit 2022 - Time to ditch the dumb-pipe, Mike BromwichStacuity - TAD Summit 2022 - Time to ditch the dumb-pipe, Mike Bromwich
Stacuity - TAD Summit 2022 - Time to ditch the dumb-pipe, Mike Bromwich
 
AWA – a Telco bootstrapping product development: Challenges with dynamic mark...
AWA – a Telco bootstrapping product development: Challenges with dynamic mark...AWA – a Telco bootstrapping product development: Challenges with dynamic mark...
AWA – a Telco bootstrapping product development: Challenges with dynamic mark...
 
Founding a Startup in Telecoms. The good, the bad and the ugly. João Camarate
Founding a Startup in Telecoms. The good, the bad and the ugly. João CamarateFounding a Startup in Telecoms. The good, the bad and the ugly. João Camarate
Founding a Startup in Telecoms. The good, the bad and the ugly. João Camarate
 
How to bring down your own RTC platform. Sandro Gauci
How to bring down your own RTC platform. Sandro GauciHow to bring down your own RTC platform. Sandro Gauci
How to bring down your own RTC platform. Sandro Gauci
 

Recently uploaded

Monitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR Events
Monitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR EventsMonitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR Events
Monitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR Events
Ana-Maria Mihalceanu
 
Encryption in Microsoft 365 - ExpertsLive Netherlands 2024
Encryption in Microsoft 365 - ExpertsLive Netherlands 2024Encryption in Microsoft 365 - ExpertsLive Netherlands 2024
Encryption in Microsoft 365 - ExpertsLive Netherlands 2024
Albert Hoitingh
 
Communications Mining Series - Zero to Hero - Session 1
Communications Mining Series - Zero to Hero - Session 1Communications Mining Series - Zero to Hero - Session 1
Communications Mining Series - Zero to Hero - Session 1
DianaGray10
 
Alt. GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using ...
Alt. GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using ...Alt. GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using ...
Alt. GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using ...
James Anderson
 
Video Streaming: Then, Now, and in the Future
Video Streaming: Then, Now, and in the FutureVideo Streaming: Then, Now, and in the Future
Video Streaming: Then, Now, and in the Future
Alpen-Adria-Universität
 
PCI PIN Basics Webinar from the Controlcase Team
PCI PIN Basics Webinar from the Controlcase TeamPCI PIN Basics Webinar from the Controlcase Team
PCI PIN Basics Webinar from the Controlcase Team
ControlCase
 
GraphSummit Singapore | Graphing Success: Revolutionising Organisational Stru...
GraphSummit Singapore | Graphing Success: Revolutionising Organisational Stru...GraphSummit Singapore | Graphing Success: Revolutionising Organisational Stru...
GraphSummit Singapore | Graphing Success: Revolutionising Organisational Stru...
Neo4j
 
GraphSummit Singapore | Enhancing Changi Airport Group's Passenger Experience...
GraphSummit Singapore | Enhancing Changi Airport Group's Passenger Experience...GraphSummit Singapore | Enhancing Changi Airport Group's Passenger Experience...
GraphSummit Singapore | Enhancing Changi Airport Group's Passenger Experience...
Neo4j
 
GraphSummit Singapore | The Future of Agility: Supercharging Digital Transfor...
GraphSummit Singapore | The Future of Agility: Supercharging Digital Transfor...GraphSummit Singapore | The Future of Agility: Supercharging Digital Transfor...
GraphSummit Singapore | The Future of Agility: Supercharging Digital Transfor...
Neo4j
 
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: The WebAuthn API and Discoverable Credentials.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: The WebAuthn API and Discoverable Credentials.pdfFIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: The WebAuthn API and Discoverable Credentials.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: The WebAuthn API and Discoverable Credentials.pdf
FIDO Alliance
 
Climate Impact of Software Testing at Nordic Testing Days
Climate Impact of Software Testing at Nordic Testing DaysClimate Impact of Software Testing at Nordic Testing Days
Climate Impact of Software Testing at Nordic Testing Days
Kari Kakkonen
 
Removing Uninteresting Bytes in Software Fuzzing
Removing Uninteresting Bytes in Software FuzzingRemoving Uninteresting Bytes in Software Fuzzing
Removing Uninteresting Bytes in Software Fuzzing
Aftab Hussain
 
みなさんこんにちはこれ何文字まで入るの?40文字以下不可とか本当に意味わからないけどこれ限界文字数書いてないからマジでやばい文字数いけるんじゃないの?えこ...
みなさんこんにちはこれ何文字まで入るの?40文字以下不可とか本当に意味わからないけどこれ限界文字数書いてないからマジでやばい文字数いけるんじゃないの?えこ...みなさんこんにちはこれ何文字まで入るの?40文字以下不可とか本当に意味わからないけどこれ限界文字数書いてないからマジでやばい文字数いけるんじゃないの?えこ...
みなさんこんにちはこれ何文字まで入るの?40文字以下不可とか本当に意味わからないけどこれ限界文字数書いてないからマジでやばい文字数いけるんじゃないの?えこ...
名前 です男
 
Introduction to CHERI technology - Cybersecurity
Introduction to CHERI technology - CybersecurityIntroduction to CHERI technology - Cybersecurity
Introduction to CHERI technology - Cybersecurity
mikeeftimakis1
 
Uni Systems Copilot event_05062024_C.Vlachos.pdf
Uni Systems Copilot event_05062024_C.Vlachos.pdfUni Systems Copilot event_05062024_C.Vlachos.pdf
Uni Systems Copilot event_05062024_C.Vlachos.pdf
Uni Systems S.M.S.A.
 
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 6
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 6UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 6
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 6
DianaGray10
 
20240609 QFM020 Irresponsible AI Reading List May 2024
20240609 QFM020 Irresponsible AI Reading List May 202420240609 QFM020 Irresponsible AI Reading List May 2024
20240609 QFM020 Irresponsible AI Reading List May 2024
Matthew Sinclair
 
Pushing the limits of ePRTC: 100ns holdover for 100 days
Pushing the limits of ePRTC: 100ns holdover for 100 daysPushing the limits of ePRTC: 100ns holdover for 100 days
Pushing the limits of ePRTC: 100ns holdover for 100 days
Adtran
 
GridMate - End to end testing is a critical piece to ensure quality and avoid...
GridMate - End to end testing is a critical piece to ensure quality and avoid...GridMate - End to end testing is a critical piece to ensure quality and avoid...
GridMate - End to end testing is a critical piece to ensure quality and avoid...
ThomasParaiso2
 
RESUME BUILDER APPLICATION Project for students
RESUME BUILDER APPLICATION Project for studentsRESUME BUILDER APPLICATION Project for students
RESUME BUILDER APPLICATION Project for students
KAMESHS29
 

Recently uploaded (20)

Monitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR Events
Monitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR EventsMonitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR Events
Monitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR Events
 
Encryption in Microsoft 365 - ExpertsLive Netherlands 2024
Encryption in Microsoft 365 - ExpertsLive Netherlands 2024Encryption in Microsoft 365 - ExpertsLive Netherlands 2024
Encryption in Microsoft 365 - ExpertsLive Netherlands 2024
 
Communications Mining Series - Zero to Hero - Session 1
Communications Mining Series - Zero to Hero - Session 1Communications Mining Series - Zero to Hero - Session 1
Communications Mining Series - Zero to Hero - Session 1
 
Alt. GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using ...
Alt. GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using ...Alt. GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using ...
Alt. GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using ...
 
Video Streaming: Then, Now, and in the Future
Video Streaming: Then, Now, and in the FutureVideo Streaming: Then, Now, and in the Future
Video Streaming: Then, Now, and in the Future
 
PCI PIN Basics Webinar from the Controlcase Team
PCI PIN Basics Webinar from the Controlcase TeamPCI PIN Basics Webinar from the Controlcase Team
PCI PIN Basics Webinar from the Controlcase Team
 
GraphSummit Singapore | Graphing Success: Revolutionising Organisational Stru...
GraphSummit Singapore | Graphing Success: Revolutionising Organisational Stru...GraphSummit Singapore | Graphing Success: Revolutionising Organisational Stru...
GraphSummit Singapore | Graphing Success: Revolutionising Organisational Stru...
 
GraphSummit Singapore | Enhancing Changi Airport Group's Passenger Experience...
GraphSummit Singapore | Enhancing Changi Airport Group's Passenger Experience...GraphSummit Singapore | Enhancing Changi Airport Group's Passenger Experience...
GraphSummit Singapore | Enhancing Changi Airport Group's Passenger Experience...
 
GraphSummit Singapore | The Future of Agility: Supercharging Digital Transfor...
GraphSummit Singapore | The Future of Agility: Supercharging Digital Transfor...GraphSummit Singapore | The Future of Agility: Supercharging Digital Transfor...
GraphSummit Singapore | The Future of Agility: Supercharging Digital Transfor...
 
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: The WebAuthn API and Discoverable Credentials.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: The WebAuthn API and Discoverable Credentials.pdfFIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: The WebAuthn API and Discoverable Credentials.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: The WebAuthn API and Discoverable Credentials.pdf
 
Climate Impact of Software Testing at Nordic Testing Days
Climate Impact of Software Testing at Nordic Testing DaysClimate Impact of Software Testing at Nordic Testing Days
Climate Impact of Software Testing at Nordic Testing Days
 
Removing Uninteresting Bytes in Software Fuzzing
Removing Uninteresting Bytes in Software FuzzingRemoving Uninteresting Bytes in Software Fuzzing
Removing Uninteresting Bytes in Software Fuzzing
 
みなさんこんにちはこれ何文字まで入るの?40文字以下不可とか本当に意味わからないけどこれ限界文字数書いてないからマジでやばい文字数いけるんじゃないの?えこ...
みなさんこんにちはこれ何文字まで入るの?40文字以下不可とか本当に意味わからないけどこれ限界文字数書いてないからマジでやばい文字数いけるんじゃないの?えこ...みなさんこんにちはこれ何文字まで入るの?40文字以下不可とか本当に意味わからないけどこれ限界文字数書いてないからマジでやばい文字数いけるんじゃないの?えこ...
みなさんこんにちはこれ何文字まで入るの?40文字以下不可とか本当に意味わからないけどこれ限界文字数書いてないからマジでやばい文字数いけるんじゃないの?えこ...
 
Introduction to CHERI technology - Cybersecurity
Introduction to CHERI technology - CybersecurityIntroduction to CHERI technology - Cybersecurity
Introduction to CHERI technology - Cybersecurity
 
Uni Systems Copilot event_05062024_C.Vlachos.pdf
Uni Systems Copilot event_05062024_C.Vlachos.pdfUni Systems Copilot event_05062024_C.Vlachos.pdf
Uni Systems Copilot event_05062024_C.Vlachos.pdf
 
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 6
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 6UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 6
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 6
 
20240609 QFM020 Irresponsible AI Reading List May 2024
20240609 QFM020 Irresponsible AI Reading List May 202420240609 QFM020 Irresponsible AI Reading List May 2024
20240609 QFM020 Irresponsible AI Reading List May 2024
 
Pushing the limits of ePRTC: 100ns holdover for 100 days
Pushing the limits of ePRTC: 100ns holdover for 100 daysPushing the limits of ePRTC: 100ns holdover for 100 days
Pushing the limits of ePRTC: 100ns holdover for 100 days
 
GridMate - End to end testing is a critical piece to ensure quality and avoid...
GridMate - End to end testing is a critical piece to ensure quality and avoid...GridMate - End to end testing is a critical piece to ensure quality and avoid...
GridMate - End to end testing is a critical piece to ensure quality and avoid...
 
RESUME BUILDER APPLICATION Project for students
RESUME BUILDER APPLICATION Project for studentsRESUME BUILDER APPLICATION Project for students
RESUME BUILDER APPLICATION Project for students
 

Identity, Authentication, and Programmable Telecoms Session

  • 1. Identity, Authentication and Programmable Telecoms Pierre Demarche VP Products
  • 2. EVOLUTION OF TELESIGN PHONE NUMBER VERIFICATION LAUNCH OF DATA SERVICES PhoneID & Score • Registration Fraud PREVENTING FRAUDS, ENABLE TRUST & PROTECTING USERS New Data Services • Identity Verification • Credit Risk Prevention • Account Takeover Protection • Payment Frauds Prevention • Communication Context EXTENDED COMMUNICATION APIS • Voice APIs • Messaging APIs • Engagement (2 Way SMS, Omnichannel) • ARN (Acknowledgement, Receipts, Notifications) © 2019 TeleSign 2
  • 4. DATA BREACHE S Usernames & passwords continue to be the prevailing method for securing online accounts. However, the volume of data breaches has hit record highs, with new data breaches being reported regularly. Essentially every username/password combination is now available for sale somewhere. Because of this, it’s impossible to know who is really logging into a website/app; is it the legitimate user or a fraudster with stolen credentials? © 2019 TeleSign
  • 5. STOP FRAUDSTERS FROM CREATING ACCOUNTS 5 Websites/apps have huge problems with fake accounts Using bots, fraudsters have created millions of social media, email, and other accounts Fraudsters create fake accounts to: • Spam • Phish • Post fake reviews • Increase number of followers • Etc. Phone Number based verification adds a layer of protection • However, fraudsters continue to find new ways to creat bulk fake accounts
  • 6. BURNER PHONE NUMBERS • Websites/apps introduced phone verification into their signup flow to help with these challenges - Fraudsters now needed a valid phone number to create a new account - Phone verification was initially very helpful in stopping fraud • However, fraudsters eventually learned how to obtain anonymous VOIP numbers to use for phone verification • There are various places to obtain these numbers: - Pinger - Burner App • Using these VOIP numbers, fraudsters were able to automate their creation of new accounts again © 2019 TeleSign
  • 7. FARMING Cheap/free mobile numbers are typically obtained by activating new prepaid SIM cards, often as part of a SIM or phone farm. Each of these data points helps to distinguish these “farmed” numbers from legitimate subscribers. To continue to create fake accounts, fraudsters have realized that they need access to thousands of mobile numbers. Fraud is a business, so these mobile numbers must be anonymous and cheap/free for their business model to work. © 2019 TeleSign
  • 8. 50% OF INTERNET USERS ARE FALSIFYING THE DATA AT ONBOARDING Phone number: 27% Date of birth: 17% Email address: 16% Home address: 15% Name: 14% Age: 14% © 2019 TeleSign 8
  • 9. RECYCLED PHONE NUMBERS © 2018 TeleSign 9 Phone verification during new account registration has become extremely popular. Websites and apps now rely heavily on their user’s verified phone numbers for both 2FA and password reset as previously described, and also for many communications use cases such as account alerting, anonymous communications between users, etc. Because of this, it’s extremely important that websites can trust that their users’ phone numbers have not changed ownership. Otherwise, the website/app could be communicating with the wrong subscriber, causing frustration and annoyance.
  • 10. SIM SWAP: HOW IT WORKS © 2019 TeleSign 10 • One way to hijack a user’s phone number is via SIM swap • The attack works like this: - The fraudster identifies the victim’s phone number and phone carrier - He then poses as the legitimate user to the carrier, either in-store, on the phone, or online - The fraudster asks the carrier to transfer his (the victim’s) phone number to a new SIM card because he lost his phone, etc. - The carrier transfers the phone number - The fraudster now has access to this phone number and receives the victim’s 2FA codes when logging in online
  • 11. IRSF FRAUD • International Revenue Share Fraud • With IRSF, attackers use fraudulent access to a network to artificially inflate traffic to numbers • Fraudsters then receive payment (on a revenue share basis with the number provider) • If they enable automation of voice calls to these numbers from an Internet site or application, they can obtain a lot of money in a very short period of time (hours or minutes). © 2019 TeleSign 11
  • 12. Lead Generation Registration Login Transactions Manage Account (Recovery, Password reset, etc) Interactions (P2P, Customer support, etc) Incomplete Profiles of leads Changing Profiles of leads Prospect Profiling/Segmentation • Demographics • Preferences • Lifestyle • Interests Fraud Risk • Trust • Bulk Account Creation • Fake Accounts • Spam users • Recycled numbers • Promo Abuse Identity Fraud • Synthetic identity Compliance (Reg Tech) • KYC • Communication Compliance (TCPA, DND, etc.) Communication Fraud • IRSF Operational • Duplicate account creation Profiling • Gauge customer LTV Account Take Over • SIM Swap • Port Fraud • Recycled phone Number • Lifecycle changes • Identity thefts Account Take Over • SIM Swap • Port Fraud • Recycled phone Number • Lifecycle changes • Identity thefts Transaction Frauds • Payment frauds • Charge back Fraud/Refund Fraud • Stolen Identity Account Take Over • SIM Swap • Port Fraud • Recycled phone Number • Lifecycle changes • Identity thefts Account Take Over • SIM Swap • Port Fraud • Recycled phone Number • Lifecycle changes • Identity thefts Fraud Risk • Trust • Identity Fraud Communication Fraud • Inbound Context • Spam • Good User • CLI Spoofing • Outbound • IRSF Communication Compliance • Communication Compliance (TCPA, DND, etc.)
  • 13. HOW WE HELP FIGHT FRAUDS
  • 14. Onboarding PHONE NUMBER Login Account Recovery Marketplace Interactions Payments Trust Fraud Compliance Customer Support PROTECT ONLINE EXPERIENCES GLOBALLY USING COMMUNICATION DATA
  • 15. 15 500 MILLION Fraudulent transactions detected for our customers! THERE IS A LOT OF FRAUD!
  • 16. THE GLOBAL FRAUD INTELLIGENCE SOLUTION 16 TeleSign Score • Fraud risk assessment API • Reputation scoring based on: - Phone number intelligence - Traffic patterns - Machine learning - Global data consortium - Customer-provided data inputs • Integrates into existing account security workflows Score Risk Level Recommendation 801-1000 High Block 601-800 Medium-high Block 401-600 Medium Flag 201-400 Medium-low Allow 0-200 Low Allow N/A Neutral N/A Score Recommendations © 2019 TeleSign
  • 17. REAL-TIME PHONE NUMBER INTELLIGENCE Industry-Leading Fraud Risk Assessment & High-Quality Data TeleSign delivers valuable information associated with the phone number, which improves SMS delivery. TeleSign evaluates fraud risk by using machine learning to uncover hidden insights and predict future events. Phone Number Traffic Patterns & Usage Velocity Status of Phone Subscriber’s contact details Phone Type, Telecom Carrier, Account and Device ID Customer-Provided Data Inputs: IP Address, Email Address, Account ID, Device ID, etc. History of Fraud – Global Data Consortium Knowledge Engineering Customized machine learning models VoiP Detection © 2019 TeleSign 17
  • 18. COMMUNICATION DATA CLASSIFICATION Strong co-relation with online frauds MOBILE NUMBER New Dimensions Behavior No of outgoing/incoming calls/messages Velocity Diversity of called numbers, countries, operators Diversity of receiving numbers, countries, operators Duration of calls Tenure of numbers Length of messages No of countries roamed Mobile data usage Failed call attempts Failed messages Failed signaling Type of carriers - Tier 1,2,3,4 VOIP Risky destinations Premium calls Spam content Calling Number Called Number Roaming Number Sender SMS Receiver SMS Customer Supplier Origination Country/Operator Destination Country/Operator Trillions of Global communication transactions Tokenized Privacy Compliant Platform
  • 19. CLASSIFICATION OF PHONE NUMBERS BASED ON BEHAVIOR Velocity histogram (bar = day) Velocity histogram (bar = hour) Call duration histogram (bar = sec) Application Traffic Robocalls
  • 20. HUMAN VS MACHINE TRAFFIC 20 Legitimate traffic VOIP Numbers used for A2P use cases VOIP Numbers used for Robocalling © 2019 TeleSign Call duration distributions on sample of 1000 subscribers
  • 21. LEGITIMATE TRAFFIC EXAMPLES © 2019 TeleSign 21 node = phone number; edge = transaction(s); direction = from A to B number; node color = in (blue) vs out (red) degree (i.e. number of distinct B vs A neighboring nodes); node size = total degree (total number of neighbors); number correlated to the edge = velocity; edge thickness = call duration. Legitimate Graph Components
  • 23. DATA PLATFORM ENABLING COMMUNICATIONS & PROTECTING ONLINE EXPERIENCES Lead Scoring Registration Risk Score Identity Verification Score Credit Risk Score Account Take Over Score Payment Transaction Risk Score Communication Context Score GLOBAL COMMUNICATION PLATFORM

Editor's Notes

  1. As we all know website and apps DO HAVE a huge problem with the large number of fake accounts already created
  2. Highligh t how trust is important for brans engaging with their end users, outside of compliance considerations, brnds need to have trust with their end user transacting on their latforms
  3. Balanve to strike between providing less friction to good users for growth and enough security to avoid fraudulent account cretaion
  4. Intelligence, security & people Add notes from Sean KE team Voip detection
  5. Telesign Scoring 1000 Predictors BICS Score 35 Classifiers 5000 Predictors
  6. Thickness is different, indicator of quality of calls Call duration indicate that ebhviour od end user is deifferet
  7. Legit is p2p calling. Middle is otp and last is robotcalling
  8. It is not a one time event authentication is history of behaviuor Good users Call behavior gives a level of trust
  9. Data used to solve different outcomes Lead scoring: capcble to understand behavior Registration: most of customer cobined with SMS 2fa Identity verification: account creation or payment to validate end user data provided identiy Reidt risk scoring: not a customer score – dg with developing country lending market for micro loans