The document discusses identifying and addressing behaviors that undermine a culture of safety in healthcare. It provides examples of unprofessional behaviors, such as a physician yelling at a radiology technician. It emphasizes the importance of professionalism, communication, and accountability in promoting patient safety. Infrastructure is needed to capture concerns, guide interventions, and promote reliability. Tools like complaint tracking can identify physicians at high risk and show that interventions generally improve behavior or lead to departure.
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Handout final acs women in surgery 10.3.12a
1. The CPPA: Center for Patient and
Professional Advocacy
Identifying and Intervening When
Behavior/Performance Undermines a
Culture of Safety
Gerald B. Hickson, MD
Assistant Vice Chancellor for Health Affairs
Associate Dean for Faculty Affairs
Joseph C. Ross Chair in Medical Education & Administration
Center for Patient & Professional Advocacy,
Vanderbilt University School of Medicine
1
2. Pursuit of Reliability
⢠Safety Culture
⢠Willingness to report and address
âPsychological safety
âTrust
⢠âBehaviors that undermine a culture of
safetyâ threaten trust, therefore must be
addressed promptly, fairly, and in a
measured way
Hickson, Moore, Pichert, Benegas Jr. Balancing systems and individual accountability in a safety culture. In: Berman S, ed. From
Front Office to Front Line. 2nd ed. Oakbrook Terrace, IL: Jt Comm Resources;2012:1-36.
2
3. A Case: âMy Timeâ
⢠Radiology tech entered the ORâŚattempted to
position the fluoro arm.
⢠Dr. X, âWhat took you so long?â
⢠Tech tried to explainâŚshe (Dr. X) began
yelling, âMy time is more valuable than
yoursâŚyou better come when I call.â
3
4. A Case: âMy Timeâ
⢠Tech continuedâŚattempted to maneuver the
fluoro armâŚDr. X became more agitatedâŚasked
âDo you know what you are doing?â Then
looked at the image and yelled that tech was
incompetentâŚOrdered tech out of the roomâŚ
⢠Tech explained that her presence was necessary
for safety and image entry into PAXâŚ(Dr. X)
became even more agitated and yelled for tech
to leaveâŚ
4
5. Professionalism and Self-Regulation
⢠Professionals commit to:
⢠Technical and cognitive competence
⢠Professionals also commit to:
⢠Clear and effective communication
⢠Modeling respect
⢠Being available
⢠âSelf awarenessâ
⢠Professionalism promotes teamwork
⢠Professionalism demands self and group regulation
⢠You have a critical role
Hickson GB, Moore IN, Pichert JW, Benegas Jr M. Balancing systems and individual accountability in a safety
culture. In: Berman S, ed. From Front Office to Front Line. 2nd ed. Oakbrook Terrace, IL: Joint Commission
5 Resources;2012:1-36.
6. Definition of Behaviors That
Undermine A Culture of Safety
Include but are not limited to, words or actions that:
⢠Prevent or interfere w/an individualâs or groupâs
work, academic performance, or ability to achieve intended
outcomes (e.g. intentionally ignoring questions or not returning phone
calls or pages related to matters involving patient care, or publicly
criticizing other members of the team or the institution);
⢠Create, or have the potential to create, an
intimidating, hostile, offensive, or potentially unsafe work or academic
environment (e.g. verbal abuse, sexual or other harassment, threatening
or intimidating words, or words reasonably interpreted as threatening or
intimidating);
⢠Threaten personal or group safety, aggressive or violent physical actions;
⢠Violate VUMC policies, including conflicts of interest and compliance.
6
Itâs About Safety
Vanderbilt University and Medical Center Policy #HR-027, 2010
7. Perhaps More Common
Failure to:
â Practice hand hygiene
â Complete handoffs/documentation
â Observe time outs
â Arrive on time
â Answer pages/cover call
â Practice EBM
â Refrain from âjoustingâ
â Others?
7
8. The Balance Beam
Competing priorities
Not sure how lack
tools, training
Leaders âblinkâ
âCanât changeâŚâ
Fear of antagonizing
Do nothing Do something
June 2009, Unprofessional Behavior in Healthcare Study, Studer Group and Vanderbilt Center for Patient and Professional Advocacy; Hickson GB, Pichert
JW. Disclosure and Apology. National Patient Safety Foundation Stand Up for Patient Safety Resource Guide, 2008; Pichert JW, Hickson GB, Vincent C:
âCommunicating About Unexpected Outcomes and Errors.â In Carayon P (Ed.). Handbook of Human Factors and Ergonomics in Healthcare and Patient Safety, 2007
8
9. Why Might a Medical Professional Behave
in Ways that Undermine�
1. Substance abuse, psych issues
2. Narcissism, perfectionism
3. Spillover of family/home problems
4. Poorly controlled anger (2 emotion)/Snaps under
heightened stress, perhaps due to:
a. Poor clinical/administrative/systems support
b. Poor mgmt skills, dept out of control
c. Back biters create poor practice environments
Samenow CP. Swiggart W. Spickard A Jr. A CME course aimed at addressing disruptive physician
behavior. Physician Executive. 34(1):32-40, 2008.
9
10. Why Might a Medical Professional Behave
in Ways that Undermine�
5. Make others look bad - for some advantage
6. Distract from own shortcomings
7. Family of origin issuesâguilt and shame
8. Well, it seems to work pretty well (Why? See #9)
9. No one addressed it earlier (Why?)
Samenow CP. Swiggart W. Spickard A Jr. A CME course aimed at addressing disruptive physician
behavior. Physician Executive. 34(1):32-40, 2008.
10
11. Consequences of Unsafe Behavior:
Patient Perspective
Lawsuits (tip of the iceberg)
Non adherence/ Infections/
noncompliance Errors
Drop out
Costs Bad-mouthing the
practice to others 11
12. Consequences of Unsafe Behavior:
Healthcare Professional Perspective
Harassment suits (tip of the iceberg)
Lack of retention Infections/
Errors
Burnout
Costs
Jousting
Bad-mouthing the organization in the community
Felps W, et al. How, when, and why bad apples spoil the barrel: negative group members and 12
dysfunctional groups., Research and Organizational Behavior. 2006; 27:175-222.
13. Infrastructure for Promoting Reliability &
Professional Accountability (PA)
1. Leadership commitment (will not blink)
2. Goals, a credo, and supportive policies
3. Surveillance tools to capture observations/data
4. Process to guide graduated interventions
5. Processes for reviewing observations/data
6. Multi-level professional/leader training
7. Resources to address unnecessary variation
8. Resources to help affected staff and patients
Hickson GB, Pichert JW, Webb LE, Gabbe SG. A complementary approach to promoting professionalism: Identifying, measuring and
addressing unprofessional behaviors. Academic Medicine. 2007.
Hickson GB, Moore IN, Pichert JW, Benegas Jr M. Balancing systems and individual accountability in a safety culture. In: Berman
S, ed. From Front Office to Front Line. 2nd ed. Oakbrook Terrace, IL: Joint Commission Resources;2012:1-36.
13
14. What Are âSurveillance Toolsâ?
⢠Risk Event Reporting System
â âDr. __ entered the room without foaming inâŚproceeded
to touch area with purulent drainageâŚI offered a pair of
glovesâŚtook them and dropped them into the trash.â
⢠Patient Relations Department
â Record patient/family concerns: Father: âMy son had to
have surgery so I asked Dr. XX to explain their plan. Dr. XX
said, âI drew a picture. If you don't get it, you just don't
get it.ââ
⢠Compliance hotline; Equal Opportunity, Affirmative
Action, and Disability Services (EAD)
Hickson GB, Moore IN, Pichert JW, Benegas Jr M. Balancing systems and individual accountability in a safety culture. In:
Berman S, ed. From Front Office to Front Line. 2nd ed. Oakbrook Terrace, IL: Joint Commission Resources;2012:1-36.
14
15. Promoting Professionalism Pyramid
Mandated Reviews
Adapted from Hickson
GB, Pichert JW, Webb No Level 3 "Disciplinary"
LE, Gabbe SG, Acad â Intervention
Med, Nov, 2007
Pattern Level 2 âGuided"
persists Intervention by Authority
Apparent Level 1 "Awareness"
pattern Intervention
"Informal" Cup
Single of Coffee
âunprofessional" Intervention
incidents (merit?)
Mandated
Vast majority of professionals - no issues -
provide feedback on progress
17. Med Mal Research Background Summary
⢠1-6%+ hosp. pts injured due to negligence
⢠~2% of all pts injured by negligence sue
⢠~2-7 x more pts sue w/o valid claims
⢠Non-$$ factors motivate pts to sue
⢠Some MDs attract more suits
⢠High risk today = high risk tomorrow
Sloan et al, JAMA 1989; Brennan et al, NEJM 1991; Hickson et al, JAMA
1992; Hickson et al, JAMA 1994; Bovjberg & Petronis, JAMA 1994
17
18. Patient Complaints
âDr. __ was rude and uncaringâŚtold me, âThereâs no amount of
surgery that can fix your problems.ââ
Patient reported: âI showed up for my surgery only to find it had
been cancelled by Dr. XX. No one gave me any reason for the
cancellation. They said someone would call to rescheduleâŚbeen a
week and still havenât heard anything from Dr. XXâs office.â
âDr. __ had not looked at my records before my visit. Dr. __ said
she was going to show up the day of the surgery and wing itâŚâ
18
19. Academic vs. Community Medical Center
50% of concerns associated with 9-14% of Physicians
(half of risk $)
100
Academic Med Ctr
% of Concerns
75 Community Med Ctr
50
25
0
30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
% of Physicians
Note: 35-50% are associated with NO concerns (4% of risk $)
19 Hickson GB, et al. So Med J. 2007;100:791-6; Hickson GB, et al. JAMA. 2002 Jun 12;287(22):2951-7.
20. Predictors of Risk Outcomes
(logistic regression)
⢠Gender
⢠Physician specialty
⢠Volume of service
⢠Unsolicited patient complaints
Predictive concordance of risk models
ranges from 81-92%
Hickson et al, JAMA. 2002 Jun 12;287(22):2951-7.
20
21. Incurred Expense By Risk Category
Predicted Risk # (%) Relative % of Total Score
Category Physicians Expense Expense (range)
1 (low) 318 (49) 1 4% 0
2 147 (23) 6 13% 1 - 20
3 76 (12) 4 4% 21 - 40
4 52 (8) 42 29% 41 - 50
5 (high) 51 (8) 73 50% >50
Total 644 (100) 100%
* In multiples of lowest risk group
Moore, Pichert, Hickson, Federspiel, Blackford. Vanderbilt Law Review, 2006
22. Promoting Professionalism Pyramid
Mandated Reviews
Adapted from Hickson
GB, Pichert JW, Webb No Level 3 "Disciplinary"
LE, Gabbe SG, Acad â Intervention
Med, Nov, 2007
Pattern Level 2 âGuided"
persists Intervention by Authority
Apparent Level 1 "Awareness"
pattern Intervention
"Informal" Cup
Single of Coffee
âunprofessional" Intervention
incidents (merit?)
Mandated
Vast majority of professionals - no issues -
provide feedback on progress
23. Awareness Intervention on Dr. __
⢠Letter with standings, assurances prior to & at meeting
⢠âYou are hereâ graph with
4-yr Risk Scores
⢠Complaint Type Summary
âConcerns bullet listâ
⢠Redacted narrative reports
23
24. Risk Score vs. Percent of Physicians - National PARSÂŽ Data
The Risk Score reflects the complaints with which each physician was associated. It is based on an algorithm that
weights complaints recorded in the past year more heavily than those recorded in prior years.
300
250
Risk Score
200
150
100
Risk Score of 114 puts Dr. __
in the top 3% of orthopedists
50
0
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Percent of Physicians *Submitted for publication
25. Does it work?
PARSÂŽ Overall Progress Report
Total # of high complaint physicians 853
Confidential and privileged
Departed after initial intervention 61 pursuant to the provisions
of State Peer Review
Statutes
First follow-up later in 2012 â2013 157
Total with follow-up results 635
Results for those with follow-up data:
Good â Intervention visits suspended 336 53%
Good â Anticipate suspension in 2012-2013 107 17%
Some improvement â Still need tracking 43 7%
Subtotal 486 77%
Unimproved/worse 110 17%
Departed Unimproved 38 6%
Total follow-up results 635
25 Hickson GB, Pichert JW. Identifying and addressing physicians at high risk for medical malpractice claims. In: Youngberg
25 B, ed. The Patient Safety Handbook, 2nd ed. Burlington, MA: Jones & Bartlett Learning; Chapter 28, 347-368; 2012
26. Malpractice Claims (per 100 MDs) FY1992 â 2012 *
16
14
12
Claims per 100 MDs
10
8 **
6
4
**TN Certificate of Merit
2
0
92-93 94-95 96-97 98-99 00-01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
Fiscal Years
* Data used with permission, State Volunteer Mutual Insurance Company, a mutual insurer of 10,500 TN
26 non-VUMC physicians of all specialties, 29% to 33% who practiced in Middle TN during the target date.
This material is confidential and privileged information under the provisions set forth in T.C.A. §§ 63-1-150 and 68-11-272 and shall not be disclosed to unauthorized persons
27. Professionalism and Self-Regulation
⢠Professionals commit to:
⢠Technical and cognitive competence
⢠Professionals also commit to:
⢠Clear and effective communication
⢠Modeling respect
⢠Being available
⢠âSelf awarenessâ
⢠Professionalism promotes teamwork
⢠Professionalism demands self and group regulation
⢠You have a critical role
Hickson GB, Moore IN, Pichert JW, Benegas Jr M. Balancing systems and individual accountability in a safety
culture. In: Berman S, ed. From Front Office to Front Line. 2nd ed. Oakbrook Terrace, IL: Joint Commission
27 Resources;2012:1-36.
28. Upcoming CPPA Conferences
⢠Promoting Professional Accountability: Addressing
Behaviors that Undermine A Culture of Safety
â Spring, 2013
⢠The How and When of Communicating Adverse
Outcomes and Errors
â October 5th, 2012
For more information
visithttp://www.mc.vanderbilt.edu/centers/cppa/courses.htm
28
Editor's Notes
Disruptive behavior is best defined in bullet one:Behavior that creates stressful work environments and interferes with othersâ effective functioning. Disruptive behavior represents any behavior that adversely affects the ability of the team to achieve its intended outcome (using James Reasonâs definition of a medical error). James Reason â well published in the work of âwhy errors happenâ; human errors; This slide mirrors the language and definitions used in TJCâs Alert and in many institutional policies, such as Vanderbiltâs. What is your organizationâs definition, if they have one?
There are eight essential elements of an institutionâs/organizationâs infrastructure for addressing disruptive behavior. The bulletsare taken from our article A Complementary Approach to Promoting Professionalism: Identifying, Measuring and Addressing Unprofessional Behaviors, Academic Medicine, November 2007. We strongly encourage you to read this article. The infrastructure serves as the foundation for The Joint Commission Sentinel Event Alerts: Behaviors That Undermine a Culture of Safety. This Sentinel Event Alert can be found in the Tools Section of your Participantsâ Guide (Tool 2: The Joint Commission Sentinel Event Alert: Behaviors That Undermine a Culture of Safety). The slide should be used several times during the training to reinforce that exemplary programs will include all eight elements. At this point in the presentation the slide serves as an outline, reminding participants of what will be covered in their training. This slide also allows us to let people know where the course is goingThis slide is a list of must-haves for dealing with DB in your environment; it is applicable to all healthcare environments. Aspire to create the right system. First thing is leadership. Will not blink independent of special status of individual that is behaving in ways that donât promote teamwork. Will we blink or not? If blink, breeds cynicismNote on surveillance: This might make people uncomfortable, but as leaders, you must have awareness of whatâs going on in your organization. Define surveillance early on as âawareness of what is going onâ, âThis is not the KGB butâŚâ If you have surveillance, have to have models to guide the interventions⌠Lastly, you cannot have tools without processes to ensure fair and consistent application of those tools.
Three examples of surveillance tools are presented on this slide. Add your own notes hereâŚ
In spite of routine dogmas about predictors of medical malpractice claims (âit is my disciplineâ, âI attract all the challenging cases/patientsâ, âif it werenât for bad luck Iâd have no luck at allâ), risk can be modified by attention to two of the four predictors: Volume of service and, more importantly, efforts to identify and address sources of patient dissatisfaction including unprofessional behavior. Unsolicited patient concerns are the biggest predictor. So while busy doctors may claim that complaints are just a function of seeing more patients, the answer is that BOTH volume and complaints are independent predictors of risk for lawsuits. Must look at what you can control â volume and complaints.
Add your own notes hereâŚ
2000 - Ended study; Started general Interventions; Service recovery excellence initiatives2003 - Claims Awareness Meetings: Department chairs made aware every 3-4 months of status of all claims associated with member physicians2005 â Specific goals and progress transparently presented system-wide every quarter; all goals tied to leadership incentive bonus plan; MM&I Conferences2006 - Training on âthe how and when of communicating about unexpected adverse outcomes and errorsâ for Faculty begins2008 (July 2007) - Start of Rebate Program: Risk Management incentivizes departments to have all physicians trained on disclosure, do early event reporting, identify physician quality/safety officers, etc.2008 (May 2008) â Certificate of Merit Bill signed: a tort reform legislation passed in the state of TN