The document summarizes research on the perceptions of Libyans and Tunisians in Tunisia regarding migration. Surveys of 954 young adults in 2012-2015 found that the most important motives for migration were career/job opportunities, money, and education. Factor analysis showed that motives clustered around family connections, religious beliefs, money/adventure, and education/career. Respondents from migrant families viewed migrants more positively than those from non-migrant families. Libyans and Tunisians differed in their views, with motives like money and career being less important for Libyans, and Libyans perceiving less difference between migrants and non-migrants. The document also lists priorities for improving education in Libya.

1. Migration: Expressed Perceptions of
Libyans and Tunisians in the Sahel of Tunisia
Jon Gresham, PhD.
Centre d'Etudes Maghrébines à Tunis, Tunisia
Aymen Briki
University of Sousse, Faculty of Law, Tunisia
5/2015

2. Migration: Expressed Perceptions
of Libyans and Tunisians in the Sahel of Tunisia
Jon Gresham, PhD
Centre d'Etudes Maghrébines à Tunis, Tunisia
and
Aymen Briki
University of Sousse, Faculty of Law, Tunisia
ABSTRACT
Young Libyan and Tunisian adults in the Sahel and adjacent towns in Tunisia in 2012-
2015 gave their top motives for outward migration as being job and career (93%),
money (86%), education (75%), and adventure (73%). Less important factors included
freedom, stability, religion, politics, family reunification, and family pressure. We had
expected that migration motives would primarily be related to money and family, that
migration-oriented families would have very different opinions than would non-
migrating families, and that Libyans and Tunisians would differ greatly in their views
of migration and migrants. To collect answers, we interviewed 954 young adults in the
Sahel and adjacent towns in Tunisia in 2012-2015 in three phases. We expected that by
using short surveys with a combination of open-ended and Likert-scale items, we could
collect an adequate depth and breadth of opinions to test the core questions that might
be a foundation for more extensive research in the future, including documenting the
most common media channels used by various demographic components of the
population samples.
Keywords: migration; Libya; Tunisia; migration. JEL Codes: J61, I31, O15.

3. Migration: Expressed Perceptions
of Libyans and Tunisians in the Sahel of Tunisia
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this research initiative was to stimulate fact-based discussions of ways
to improve human security in both Libya and Tunisia and to discern how similarities
and differences between Libyans and Tunisians could work to the benefit of both
peoples.
We expected:
a) that migration attitudes and motives for both Libyans and Tunisians would primarily
be related to money, education, and family,
b) that migration-oriented families would have very different opinions than would non-
migrant families, and
c) that Libyans and Tunisians would differ greatly in their views of emigration as a
concept and of migrants themselves.
In addition, we expected that by using short surveys with a combination of open-ended
and Likert-scale items, we could collect an adequate depth and breadth of opinions to
test the core questions that might serve as a foundation for more extensive research in
the future, including documenting the most common media channels used by various
demographic components of the population samples. To test the above expectations, we
interviewed 954 young adults in the Sahel and adjacent towns in Tunisia in 2012-2015
in the three phases described in detail below.

4. METHODS and MATERIALS
Research Design
Our intent behind building a dataset on migration in the Sahel was to enhance applied
research on human security in North Africa. We tested several sampling methods,
survey languages, and sociological domains that intersected each other in the concept
of migration as a component of human security.
Our approach on high-content, low-risk surveys might be applicable to human
security domains of study. Because of the relatively small sample size, we do not
assume the empirical findings to be applicable in other locations throughout or outside
of Libya and Tunisia. We used short, focused surveys that could be easily completed in
10-12 minutes while the respondents were sitting in a cafe or during a short online
session.
Demographic data on participants was collected but the emphasis was on
perceptions concerning motives (factors) that may influence migration. Also collected
was information on the use of social and mass media to see how these aspects
correlated to the principle motivations. Migration motives in this study included both
“push factors” and “pull factors,” but mostly as a point of comparison to historical
migration studies that often assume that rational actors will only migrate in order to
find better conditions or opportunities.1, 2
We assumed in 2011 that the primary
motivators for those who would migrate would be the pull factor of money and the
push factor of being jobless, as described by Eurostat (2000).3
Collecting Data
Our short surveys were easily completed in personal interviews in a café or classroom.
Others were completed by telephone or in a Facebook interview transcribed onto print

5. survey forms. The Facebook interviews were an interesting, spontaneous addition to the
research, and added 86 additional surveys to our research pool.
Surveying was done in three phases. Phase 1 surveys on motives concerning
emigration were collected from June 2012 to September 2013. These 123 surveys
included 32 collected through a web-based survey hosted by www.e-research-
global.com, with promotion through Facebook and website links, and 80 surveys
collected on hand-written survey forms during telephone interviews and Facebook chat
sessions. The surveys were offered in Arabic, French, and English.
In Phase 2 (November 2013 to February 2015) we added questions to compare
perceptions of differences between migrant and non-migrant families. 293 surveys were
collected using paper surveys only. These surveys were offered only in the Arabic and
French languages because of a lack of interest by respondents in using the English
language.
For Phase 3, in 2015, questions concerning human security and ethnic relations
in Libya and Tunisia were added. This survey phase was conducted only in Arabic, as
few Libyans we talked with in Phase Two spoke English or French.
Consistent elements collected in all three phases were respondent demographic
details, expressed importances of migration motivations, and information on social and
print media usage. The core questions regarding perceptions and motives towards
migration and the questions concerning demographic variables remained in all versions
of the questionnaires, while items that became superfluous to project objectives were
dropped and new items were added. By this process, the questionnaire continuously
became more focused on the specific research questions while adding new information.
Our phased approach made possible many interviews that contributed considerable data
depth and variety without the survey interview time becoming tedious to respondents.

6. There were initially 35 survey items that were adapted from previous migration
studies reported in the literature.4, 5, 6, 7
In addition to the quantitative questions, we also
collected answers to open-ended questions about the migrant/non-migrant perspectives
on migration. This was helpful as we developed follow-on surveys to compare migrant
and non-migrant families with respect to the impact of migration on communities, and
perceptions of Libyans and Tunisians about each other.
From the beginning, the survey items and data collection forms were designed
to facilitate electronic processing. Most survey items had a multiple-choice response,
with answers in a Likert-scale format of “Strongly Agree,” “Agree,” “Neutral,” “Do
Not Agree,” and “Strongly Do Not Agree,” or similar answers depending on the
particular set of questions asked. Open-ended questions were used for demographic
data such as birthplace, birth year, education, sources of information, and for
suggestions on how the education systems and security in Libya could be improved.
Textual analysis yielded answer categories that could be analyzed as quantitative data
but which also gave suggestions on additional questions to be used in the future.
Participants
Most interviews were in the Sahel region of Tunisia (Sousse and nearby towns) because
of the ease of access, the dense population mixtures of Tunisians and Libyans, and the
fact that several towns in this region have more than 50% of families participating in
circular migration patterns. 8, 9, 10
The population of young adults in the metropolitan area of Sousse was about
200,000,11
And an initial goal was to interview at least 200 people between the ages of
16 and 30. First interviews were of students met randomly in Sousse, and then those
“snowballed” through natural relationships of these first students into other networks

7. and places, including contacts through telephone and Facebook, even to other contacts
currently living outside of the Sahel. A few instructors at colleges and universities
helped us collect surveys from classroom students.
Although there are large numbers of circular migrants (tourists as well as those
living for longer terms) from Libya and Tunisia in the cities of Tunis and Sfax, the
migrant density in the Sahel was high enough to enable sufficient data collection near
to the initial clumps of interviews. Due to governmental security activities, we were
halted while collecting data in the border areas between Libya and Tunisia.
We focused on those in the age range of 18-30, calling this age range “young
adult” to reflect a useful social construct. We did complete some surveys of those both
younger and older than this target range, with no drawbacks to having some
respondents outside of our preferred age range, and the benefit was that they introduced
us to other respondents who were inside of our priority age range. In this report, we use
the term “young adults” because of the possible different meanings attributed to the
term of “youth” in the Arab context as opposed to its European perception. The term
“youth” was identified with an age of 15-29 years by Fargues (2013),12
but as we began
our process offering surveys in Arabic, French, and English, the use of “young adult”
seemed more consistent in meaning through the three languages than did the colloquial
Arabic “shaab.”
Surveys were also hosted on the Internet at e-research-global.com (known also
as StreamlineSurveys.com) and were advertised through Facebook, Twitter, emails, and
posts on other websites. Completion rates for Internet- or Facebook-based online
surveys were very low, with only 32 surveys being completed despite considerable
advertising and other incentives.
Statistical data was sought from official and unofficial sources as part of the

8. attempt to generalize about the population samples. Unfortunately, migration statistics
between 2012 and 2015 were not completely documented through government systems,
especially in the movements between Libya and Tunisia where there was little
immigration record-keeping. Government data reports only Libyans and Tunisians
transiting through border control stations between the two countries, and do not specify
reasons for entry.
For example, concerning the Libyans currently in Tunisia (varying from month
to month according to who is counting and when they are counting), there is little
consistent data from the government of Tunisia or from the Migration Policy Institute.
The National Corporation for Information and Documentation, Government of Libya,
did not seem to have online data available for comparison (14 September 2015). Most
Libyans in Tunisia are assumed to be short-term tourists, and most of those seem to be
young men between the ages of 25 and 40. Other documented Libyans include those in
Tunisia for medical care, business, and children education.13
Informal estimates
reported in the public media ranged from 50,000 to 1.5 million Libyans in Tunisia, and
from 50,000 to 150,000 Tunisians in Libya (Anonymous, Government Consular
Official, Personal Interview, 29 May 2015, Sousse, Tunisia). The wide ranges of
population estimates complicate the extrapolation of results outside of our population
sample.
We can find consistent sources for arrivals via regular migration of Tunisians
and Libyans in Europe but that does not include those resident in Europe without legal
documentation. External organizations do attempt to estimate numbers of migrants
through cross-referencing international and national databases,14
but in this study we
focused on attitudes and expressions of our sample of accessible populations in the
Sahel.

9. Questions (items) were crafted to test the relative importance of migration
factors in other studies on perceptions towards migration, such as the 2011 IOM study
in Egypt (Pitea 2011), the Boubakri study on Tunisian migration after the Arab
Spring,15
the Eurostat report on migration,16
the Borjas work on the determinants of
immigration,17
Hein de Haas,18
and Fargues.19
We considered questions from the World
Values Survey work on Libya and Tunisia (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org), but
they did not appear relevant to this research.
Tunisia offers interesting opportunities as a study field because of the relatively
high education level, the high development status, the long historical frame of circular
migration to other countries, and the large numbers of Libyans present. These factors
set the stage for Tunisia as a “labour frontier country,” in the terms of Skeldon as
described by de Haas (2005). In the broad sense, it means that Tunisia, like Morocco,
has migrants moving to and from many international directions, especially Libya.
We structured items to give a broad range of possible responses to survey items,
with intent to provoke a significant variance in responses to questions. We identified
specific demographic variables that might lend analytic value when the statistical
procedures of factor analysis and cross-tabulations were run, considering that certain
demographic factors might be strongly correlated to some of the migration motive
items. That is, we wanted to know if some background items such as education, age,
sex, employment, and birthplace would give different patterns of responses to the
attitudinal questions. For this same reason, respondents were asked about media use
(newspaper reading, Facebook usage, etc.).

10. RESULTS
We expected that migration motives for both Libyans and Tunisians would primarily be
related to money, education and family. The data from our surveys showed that career
or job was the most important motive, followed by money and education.
Figure 1.
Comparison of Most Important Motives Expressed for Migration
Responses of “Important” and “Very Important” are combined.
Figure 1 illustrates the priority given to career (and job), money, education, adventure,
and religious or political stability as reasons to emigrate.
Figure 2.
Factor Analysis: Migration Motive Correlations between Factors and Other Motives.
Components
Motive Family Rejoinment -.795
Know People Abroad -.703
Motive Family Pressure -.659
Motive Religious Liberty .773
Motive Religious Stability .662
FaceBook Frequency .564
Motive Money .705
Motive Adventure .517
Motive Political Stability -.793
Motive Political Liberty -.604
Motive Education .703

11. Motive Job/Career .600
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Oblimin, Kaiser Normalization.
KMO @ 0.647, sampling adequacy
This Factor Analysis shows 5 groups (Components) of Factors, based on how similar
they are to each other and to other answers in the surveys.
Component 1. These three items have high degree of correlation in a negative
direction: family pressure towards migration, how many people are known who live
outside, and the opportunity for family reunification. Given that respondents often
commented that their contacts outside of Tunisia were relatives, Component 1 might be
simplified to represent “Family Connection to Motives of Migration.” The negative
direction means that each of these three motives were uniformly considered as
“Unimportant” or “Very Unimportant” with respect to other questions in the surveys.
Component 2 shows that the migration factors of religious liberty and religious
stability are highly correlated to the frequency of Facebook use.
Component 3 shows that motives of money and adventure are closely related.
Component 4 indicates that political stability and political liberty are correlated,
but in a negative direction. Political motives were not important as migration motives.
Component 5 shows that motives for education and jobs (career) parallel each
other in responses to other items on the surveys.
Figure 3. Years of Education as Correlated to Migration Motives.
Figure 3 shows a zero line with motives above the line having a positive correlation
between years of education and migration motives of career, political-religious

12. stability, political-religious liberty, and migration for higher education. Respondents
with fewer years of education gave more importance to motives of money, family
pressure, adventure, and family reunification.
We expected that migration-oriented families would have very different opinions than
would non-migrant families. That proved to be true, overall. Respondents from migrant
families more often expressed that: migrants are more open to new ideas, migrants are
more likely to start their own business than to become an employee in someone else’s
business, migrants are less traditional and less religious, and migrant women cover
themselves more for cultural than religious reasons. Fewer differences were strongly
expressed by those from non-migrant families.
We expected that Libyans and Tunisians would differ greatly in their views of
emigration and perceptions of migrants vs. non-migrants. The motives of money,
career, and education were not as important for Libyans surveyed as they were for
Tunisians. Libyans also did not perceive as great of differences beween migrants' and
non-migrants' behavior, attitudes, and religious practices. Tunisians, on the other hand,
perceived that migrants and non-migrants displayed many differences from each other.
In addition to these differences, open-ended questions provided the following
priorities for improving the quality of secondary education in Libya:
-Build more buildings
-Train teachers better
-Provide better teaching methods and materials
-Increase public support for more years of education (i.e., mandatory attendance)
-Internationalize education through instruction in foreign languages, using foreign
teachers, and with external (foreign) accountability for best practices. Respondents

13. frequently mentioned that the Tunisian education system is a good model for them to
follow in Libya.
When asked about how to improve stability in the two countries, Libyans
endorsed cohesiveness through a strong Maghreb Union, while Tunisians asked for
stronger border controls.
Finally, we expected that by using these short surveys we could collect an
adequate depth and breadth of opinions. Surveys gave us a breadth and depth of
opinion from the Tunisian respondents, but a limitation was the homogeneity of the
Libyan population sample. For example, almost all Libyan respondents were male
short-term visitors to Tunisia.
Results: Extreme Contrasts in Demographics
Tunisians (N=854) Libyans (N=100)
Sex: 53% male, 44% female 95% male, 3% female
Education: 13 years 6.5 years

14. DISCUSSION.
From surveys we collected in 2012-2015, a few factors were given consistently
as the most important reasons to emigrate: career, money, and education. This was true
across all levels of education. However, when we looked at the crosstabs of the data
(comparing correlations of multiple factors against each other), we found significant
differences correlated to the number of years of education (Figure 3, above). A higher
level of education related strongly to a greater importance given to education, stability,
liberty, and career. In contrast, a lower level of education correlated positively with the
motivation to emigrate for money, family pressures, and adventure. This finding due to
the differences in years of education related as well to use of media: more educated
people read newspapers and read Facebook for information and news (textual
presentation); less educated people more often used YouTube even for local news
(video presentation). More years of education relate to quantity and quality of input
from an outside world, as well as to other quality of life measures. Dowrick (2003)
shows that “…education yields both direct and indirect benefits for health in general
and life expectancy in particular.”20
Almost all Tunisians used Facebook frequently,
even for local news. Libyans who were educated used Facebook, but those less
educated used YouTube more often for news and information. Many Tunisians read
newspapers, but few Libyans read newspapers. Tunisians reported that they used the
Internet for information (and seldom that they used television) while Libyans gave
television as a supplier of general information. These channels of communication
indicate the primary means for disseminating information in the two countries
according to education level: those with higher levels of education can be touched by
many information channels, but especially Facebook. Those with less education are
consumers of YouTube and television, and these will be the primary information

15. dissemination routes, and may reflect differences in literate/non-literate lifestyles.
Migration motives in this study included both “push factors” and “pull factors,”
but mostly as a point of comparison to traditional migration studies that usually assume
rational actors will only migrate in order to find better conditions or opportunities.
EuroStat (2000) offers, “... the push-pull model consists of a number of negative or
push factors in the country of origin that cause people to move away, in combination
with a number of positive or pull factors that attract migrants to a receiving country.”
Economic factors in migration decision-making were not addressed in this
study. Borjas (2014) says, “…large wage differences across regions can persist for a
very long time simple because many people choose not to move… and... there are
substantial psychic costs to mobility….”21
But, among our respondents, most were
unemployed or working in a temporary job and would often say, “I am here only until
I can get the right government job.” Less than 1% of all Tunisian respondents gave
details as to their current income levels, or even estimates of how much they
anticipated earning if they migrated. Among Libyans, almost all people we interviewed
were unemployed tourists, but they received monthly benefits from Libya.
IOM (Pitea 2011) surveyed of youth (ages 15-29) in Egypt in 2011 concerning
their intentions to migrate. They found that “job and income losses that were the
indirect result of contraction of economic activity following January 25 may have acted
as a primary migration push factor for youth.” This IOM study was extensive as to the
range and depth of factors that “… may have acted as a primary push factor.”
Significantly, they found that “economy and household income security” were named
as reasons to migrate, both by those inclined to migrate and those not inclined to
migrate. What does that mean? It means, in our opinion, that economic reasons were
said to be important reasons to migrate by this survey that presented mostly rational

16. and economic bases for migration. This IOM study is very important and relevant to
our study because it was initiated and completed in the first months of the “Arab
Spring.” Additionally, the Egyptian revolution occurred between the Tunisian and
Libyan revolts, and there are cultural and economic ties between Libya with Egypt due
to the long common border.
Push factors are those contributing pressures that can move people out of a
location. Pull factors are those attracting people into another location. These are useful
factors to measure because they are simple to assess, are easily understood, and are
very useable by politicians or investors. But, individual factors or motivations to move
should not be confused with system or structural contexts. On the other hand, detailed
“perception studies,”22
followed by in-depth, qualitative interviews have value for
investigating complex and sensitive issues like irregular and/or undocumented
migration. Our approach was quantitative in structure while incorporating several open-
ended questions to expand the breadth and depth of data collected.
Groenewold, de Bruijn, and Bilsborrow (2006) studied the psychosocial
elements involved in migration decision-making and found that objective benefits
(rational decision-making processes regarding migration benefits) were not as
important to the actors as were the “perceived” benefits of migration. This was indeed
the case with many of the young adults we interviewed. Some of those we talked to
(beyond the boundaries of survey items) wanted a general perceived benefit of “a better
life,” but some respondents said only that they wanted a change in life. It seemed in this
study that in the quantified and perceived communications with respondents, emotion
(passion) was more important in making important life decisions concerning migration
than was reason (objective analysis). Boccagni (2015) explains, "The study of emotions
therefore offers an important corrective to the notion of migrant as homo economicus."

17. He goes on explain that in the historical separation of reason and emotion, emotion is
considered as irrelevant to motives for migration. But, respondents in our study,
especially those with little contact to the outside world, had little information or
capacity to make analytical comparisons between qualities of life in Libya or in Tunisia
or any other outside country. They would often make comments such as, “I heard that
even a builder can make fifty or one hundred Euros per day, and here I could only
make five Euros per day—if I had a job.” But, even with such a fantastic imagined net
wage inequality, where education is correlated to migration inclination,23
most young
adults, from all levels of education, do not seek to emigrate but choose to wait. This
points out the complexity of defining exactly why so many youth want, and wanted, to
leave Libya and Tunisia. Migration motives, like other important life decisions,
appeared to be based in perceptions and emotions, even if economically justified, not in
objective, rational decision-making.
But, there are other frameworks for describing migration decision-making.
Macro-theories emphasize factors such as the push and pull of economics, legal
systems and employment, or forced migration from violence or environmental
calamities.24
Meso-theories emphasize social systems and networks. In this perspective
their connections between families, states, and countries can explain long-term patterns
of sustained voluntary migration. The third form, micro-systems, present individual
(personal) decisions that can interpret macro and meso theories into the micro
perspective. Micro factors would include the personal financial, social, and
psychological resources. The costs and benefits of proposed relocation, such as those
described by Borjas (2014) in models of economic rationalization of migration
decision-making. We can bring macro, mess, and micro theories into the push-pull

18. matrix when dealing with elements of circular migration. Boswell (2002) says,
“Migration is more likely to occur between countries within a migration system,
comprising relatively close trade, historical, cultural, linguistic or other links…. Once
initiated, migration from particular countries (or areas within them) will often be self-
perpetuating.25
Such chain migration and circular migration through the generations
may continue despite legislation in receiving countries designed to restrict immigration,
because the benefits, tangible or otherwise, seem to outweigh the costs.
In both Libya and Tunisia, there is a long history of both chain and circular
migration to Europe, from long before the political independence of both states. The
first generation was a “temporary” arrangement to help with reconstruction after the
World Wars, and there were many Tunisians who stayed in France. Of those first
migrants, some brought clansmen to join with them. Children of this first generation
circled between North Africa and Europe, being “home” for important events or at least
sending money for weddings and funerals. Then, for two or more generations, they
invested back into their home networks and into building new residential
neighborhoods in the outskirts of traditional town centers. Not all family members
worked abroad, and not all returned, but the pattern of circular migration continues to
transform the places they call “home” in Europe and in North Africa.
The pattern of circular migration can easily be observed in Sahelian towns such
as M’Saken, a town of 80,000 to the southwest of Sousse, Tunisia. From our own
interviews, almost everyone that we met in M’Saken knew at least five people who
lived outside of Tunisia, and many had frequent contact with family members living
abroad. Schiller (1995) uses the term “transmigrants” to describe those whose “daily
lives” have social connections to more than one nation-state.26
Bourghiba (2009)
presents an estimate of the considerable chain-circular migration to Europe through

19. four generations of people from M’Saken.27
Even before the 2011 revolution, there
were strong connections in Tunisia towards outward migration. Consider also the
research by Gallup (2011), where 60% of Tunisians said that they had people in France
that they could count on to help them migrate, 32% said that they would migrate if they
had opportunity, and 14% said that they intended to migrate in the next 12 months.
Similar data has not been found for Libyan migrants. For example, Italy’s official
census reports 5 million North Africans being present in Italy, but the breakout by
nationality of origin indicates relatively few Libyans present.28
Many North Africans
wanted to leave their countries before unrest in the region, and follow-up research by
Gallup (2012) said that an estimated 25,000 mostly Tunisian migrants migrated to
Europe between January 2011 and June 2012. Libya simply does not appear to have the
traditional migration culture as does Tunisia.
Several small towns and cities in the Sahel have transnational communities
where generation after generation of Tunisian laborers make money outside of their
home communities and then return to their home village or town. They bring items with
them from abroad, and money adequate to invest in real estate, in addition to meeting
needs of their nuclear or extended family. Tunisians who had worked in Europe tend to
have longer careers abroad than those Tunisians working in Libya. When asked about
their short terms in Libya, Tunisian respondents said that the cultural and security
stresses in Libya were very difficult. Those who had worked in Europe also commented
on cultural stress when living abroad but said that the workplace values in Europe made
life much less stressful than in the Maghreb.
We learned from our surveys of Libyans were that they have fewer years of
formal education (average of 6.5 years) when compared to their Tunisian counterparts
(average of 13 years). Dissatisfaction with the current Libyan educational system was

20. expressed, and respondents said that Libya needded to build more school buildings,
train teachers better, provide better teaching methods and materials, increase public
support for more years of education (i.e., mandatory attendance), and internationalize
education through instruction in foreign languages with foreign teachers, and with
external (foreign) accountability, mentioning frequently that the Tunisian education
system is a good model for them to follow in Libya. Interestingly, similar
recommendations to improve Libyan education were recommended in the Blueprint for
Education by the Libyan Secretariat of Education and Scientific Research referenced
by UNESCO.29
When asked about how to improve stability in the two countries, Libyans
endorsed cohesiveness through the Maghreb Union, while Tunisians asked for stronger
border controls. This difference seems to show that Libyans are more eager to integrate
with Tunisians than is the other way around. In fact, Libyans had positive comments
about Tunisians and their culture, but many Tunisians expressed harsh criticisms of
Libyan people. Perhaps the mantra of former Tunisian president Bourguiba of "make
no enemies" is a useful concept for Tunisians to consider in their relations to Libyans,
especially since many Tunisians could be in position to provide needed services to
Libya while bringing considerable money back to Tunisia.
This research project began with asking young adults, “As you think of your future,
how much would each of the following reasons cause you to move away?”
1.a. We expected that migration attitudes and motives for both Libyans and Tunisians
would primarily be related to money, education, and family. Years of education were
strongly correlated with attitudes towards employment and emigration.

21. 1.b. We expected that migration-oriented families would have different opinions than
would non-migrant families. Circular migration, of both short-term and long-term
stays, is common among Tunisians, whereas tourism in Tunisia or Egypt seems the
most common form of travel abroad for Libyans. Young people with strong family
networks abroad have an easier route to travel and work outside. Those without strong
family networks outside make the choices about legal/non-legal, honest/dishonest,
expensive/cheap, alone/in-group ways to embed themselves into new communities, and
those factors are not given to quantifiable measures. Tunisians with dense connections
abroad (but not necessarily living in a migrant family themselves) offered deeper
opinions as to the migration sphere of opportunities and are more frequently in contact
with more people living abroad.
1.c. We expected that Libyans and Tunisians would differ in their views of emigration
and migrants. Tunisians expressed more often than Libyans that migrants were
different than non-migrants; in particular, Tunisians believed: that migrants were less
religious, less traditional, and more entrepreneurial.
Almost all Tunisians used Facebook frequently, even for local news. Libyans
who were educated used Facebook, but those less educated used YouTube for news and
information. Many Tunisians read newspapers, but few Libyans read newspapers.
Tunisians reported that they used the Internet for information while Libyans usually
had national television as a main supplier of information. These channels of
communication indicate a significant means for disseminating information in the two
countries according to education level: those with higher levels of education can be
touched by many information channels, especially Facebook. Those with less education

22. are consumers of YouTube and television, and these will be significant information
dissemination routes.
We expected that by using short surveys with a combination of open-ended and Likert-
scale items, that we could collect an adequate depth and breadth of opinions and to test
well the core questions that might be a foundation for more extensive research in the
future, including documenting the most common media channels used by various
demographic components of the population samples. The combination of specific and
general questions in both Likert-scale and open-ended question formats provided
consistency of response formats while allowing for addition of new concepts to be
explored.
Suggestions for future work.
1. My conjecture, based on stories told but not in hard data analyzed, is that the young
people who took our surveys expressed less commitment to community/collective
decision-making factors (family, religion, political contexts) than they did to their own
personal ambitions (career, money, education, adventure). Therefore, economic
development is influenced by combinations of collective and individual motivations,
and should be tested to verify which types of motives can be used to facilitate change.
2. The role of emotion in decision-making may be more important than analytical logic
in migration patterns.
Does that affect the responsiveness of youth towards job-creation initiatives?
This is worth a look in future investigations because the emotions of group/community
versus individual decision-making processes may affect job creation and

23. entrepreneurship.
Why and how is Facebook use related to motives of Religious Liberty and
Religious Stability, but none of these correlate strongly to other survey items? Does
video media (television and YouTube) function differently in decision-making than
does print media (newspapers and Facebook)?
3. There is considerable variance in migration history, motives, education levels, and
employment behaviors even within small communities of the Sahel.
Future work may find strong patterns of worldview differences if demographic data
includes social network analysis.
As many of the differences seen in the responses may be attributed to local culture
more than national identity, we suggest an analytical framework similar to the simple
“3 Colors of Worldview” by KnowledgeWorkx.com of Dubai. Their analytical tools
are based on research throughout the Middle East on how individuals fit within
multicultural contexts. http://www.knowledgeworkx.com/
The author welcomes additional ideas and opportunities for collaboration.
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