Discusses how public support of the war in Iraq has varied more with perceptions of the likelihood of strategic success than with the number of casualties.
11. A Model of Public Attitudes Toward Casualties In Iraq Tolerance For Casualties US Right to Attack US Will Succeed Education Demographics (Age, Race, Gender) Party Identification
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13. Logit Analysis of Tolerable Casualties In Iraq Variable Coefficient T - Statistic Right to Attack 0.98 (0.75) Will Succeed 0.642 (4.80)*** Right X Succeed 0.268 (4.09)*** Female -0.294 (2.48)** Minority -0.615 (3.68)*** Education 0.293 (4.65)*** Age 0.182 (3.17)*** Party ID -0.083 (2.26)** N 1006
14. The Sources of Tolerance for Casualties in Iraq: Interactive Effects
15. The Demographic Sources of Casualty Tolerance in Iraq Explanatory Variable Change in Explanatory Variable Δ Probability of Tolerating 1500 US Deaths Age 18-29 to 60+ Years Old +12% Gender Male to Female -6% Race White to Non-White -15% Level of Education No H.S. to College Degree +20% Party Identification Strong Rep. to Strong Dem. -11%
16. Reality Check: Our Survey & Election Outcome 2004 Our Survey Actual Vote Bush 51.84% 51% Kerry 48.16% 48%
17. Logit Analysis of Presidential Vote Choice: November 2004 Variable Coefficient T - Statistic Right to Attack 0.599 (3.03)*** Will Succeed 0.027 (0.14) Right X Succeed 0.417 (3.80)*** Female 0.291 (1.66)* Minority -0.216 (0.93) Education -0.102 (1.13) Age 0.089 (1.04) Party ID -0.793 (12.59)** N 1006
19. The Demographic Sources of Presidential Vote Choice in 2004 Explanatory Variable Change in Explanatory Variable Δ Probability of Voting for Bush Age 18-29 to 60+ Years Old +6% Gender Male to Female -7% Race White to Non-White -5% Level of Education No H.S. to College Degree -6% Party Identification Strong Rep. to Strong Dem. -81%
22. Likelihood of “Success” and Whether the War in Iraq was the “Right Thing” Right | US Will Succeed Thing | 1 2 3 4 | Total -----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 1 | 84 155 49 8 | 296 | 80.77 51.16 11.89 2.72 | 26.59 -----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 2 | 12 68 91 15 | 186 | 11.54 22.44 22.09 5.10 | 16.71 -----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 3 | 3 63 167 60 | 293 | 2.88 20.79 40.53 20.41 | 26.33 -----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 4 | 5 17 105 211 | 338 | 4.81 5.61 25.49 71.77 | 30.37 -----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- Total | 104 303 412 294 | 1,113 | 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 | 100.00 Pearson chi2(9) = 631.8776 Pr = 0.000
23. A Model of Public Attitudes Toward “Success” and “The Right Thing” US Right to Attack US Will Succeed Support Preemptive force Believe Saddam links to WMD, terrorism Care about Int’l Consensus on force Confident in US & Iraqi Leaders US has plan to succeed Party ID, Demographics Education, Domestic elite consensus to stay in Iraq
24. Two-Stage Least Squares Analysis Whether US Was Right to Attack Iraq Variable Coefficient T - Statistic US Will Succeed 0.743 (10.34)** Iraq Had WMD 0.114 (3.34)** Link to Al-Qaeda 0.108 (3.60)** Link to War on Terror 0.158 (4.34)** Multilateralism -0.111 (3.02)** Bush Doctrine 0.127 (2.87)** Party ID -0.071 (4.50)** N 964
25. Two-Stage Least Squares Analysis Whether US Will Succeed Iraq Variable Coefficient T - Statistic US Right to Attack 0.451 (8.34)*** Confident in US Leaders 0.274 (5.12)*** US Plan to Win the War 0.046 (1.99)** Importance of Force 0.164 (3.64)*** US Elite Consensus 0.102 (2.44)** Party ID -0.001 (0.10) N 964
32. Framing Effects and Support for a Hypothetical Invasion of Yemen Combat Global Terror 0.256 (2.40)* Promote Human Rights 0.176 (1.85) Prevent Hostile Superpower 0.154 (1.59) Human Rights x Frame 0.437 (2.82)** Terrorism x Frame 0.598 (3.47)** US Power x Frame 0.504 (3.31)** Human Rights Frame -0.944 (2.40)* Terrorism Frame -1.403 (3.70)** Expected Casualties -0.120 (1.92) Expected Success 0.773 (8.64)**
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34. Elite Consensus and Support for Hypothetical Use of Force in E. Timor Coefficient T-statistic All Elites Support Force 3.165 (48.56)** Domestic Elites Oppose Force -0.414 (4.41)** Int’l Elites Oppose Force -0.551 (6.06)** Both Sets of Elites Oppose -1.105 (12.15)**
35. Expected Success, Casualties, and Support for Hypothetical Use of Force Probability Respondent Strongly Approves of Using Force Expect 50 Deaths Expect 500 Deaths Expect 5,000 Deaths JCS Extremely Confident .26 .20 .15 JCS Somewhat Confident .19 .13 .09 JCS Not Very Confident .12 .08 .05
36. Casualty Tolerance and Confidence in Success 1 vs. 2 1 vs. 3 1 vs. 4 JCS Confidence 0.184 (2.50)* 0.667 (8.28)** 0.719 (8.97)** Expected Deaths 0.109 (1.51) 0.490 (6.19)** 0.654 (8.28)** Casualty Tolerance -0.361 (7.41)** -0.619(10.77)** -0.933(15.19)** Ready for Force 0.138 (1.01) 0.537 (3.78)** 0.977 (7.04)** Party ID 0.120(2.75)** 0.281 (5.93)** 0.405 (8.53)** Age 0.000 (0.10) -0.002 (0.50) 0.006 (1.59) IR Knowledge 0.001 (0.02) 0.084 (1.03) -0.062 (0.76) Sex -0.134 (1.09) -0.233 (1.73) -0.093 (0.69) Constant 0.448 (0.94) -2.030 (3.83)** -3.182(5.97)** Observations 2973 2973 2973
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38. Prais-Winsten Analysis of Battle Deaths and Support for the Vietnam War Variable Model 1 Model 2 Log of Battle Deaths -3.667 (2.79)* -3.956 (5.74)** Log of Battle Deaths X Tet -8.270 (2.85)** Tet Offensive 77.486 (2.59)* Constant 76.541 (6.17)** 84.969 (14.62)** R-squared / N 0.71 / 24 0.92 / 24