1. THE RUSI JOURNAL
© RUSI JOURNAL AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 2013 VOL. 158 NO. 4 pp. 82–87 DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2013.826514
S
ince leaving the US government, I
have had an opportunity to think
about some of the missions in
which I was privileged to engage while in
uniform and then at the CIA. Reflecting
on what some observers have termed the
‘Counter-Insurgency Era’, I would like to
highlight some of the lessons that might
be drawn from our experiences, and also
offer my view that, contrary to pundit
opinion, the Counter-Insurgency Era is
not over. That is, quite simply, because
the Insurgency Era is not over.
The Bottom Line
Insurgency does not appear to have
gone out of style. It is, after all, among
the oldest forms of warfare, and certainly
remains the most prevalent. Whether
triggered by domestic struggles for power
and influence, ideological inspirations
or ethno-sectarian differences, the
outcomes of such conflicts will continue
to shape the world in which we live – as
the upheavals associated with the Arab
Spring and the extremist challenges
in Mali and the Maghreb remind us.
Indeed, the significance of these and
other conflicts around the world to
our long-term interests should not be
underestimated.
The United States, the United
Kingdom and the other countries that
have sacrificed so much since 9/11 may,
understandably, be reluctant to put
boots on the ground either to counter
insurgencies or to support groups
seeking to topple oppressive regimes.
In spite of that, however, we do need to
preserve the intellectual understanding
and skills gained from the wars of the
last decade – many of which, as fellow
counter-insurgency scholar John Nagl
has observed, have been paid for and
written in blood. Numerous countries
and regions face or will face insurgencies;
and undoubtedly, it will be in our interest
to help at least some of those countries
counter those insurgencies, even if we
do so in ways that do not involve large
military footprints.
Having offered my ‘bottom line’, I
will return to the beginning by reflecting
on our experiences in some of the
campaigns in which we have engaged in
the past decade – Iraq and Afghanistan
in particular. There are obviously
other cases that are also worthy of
discussion: Yemen, Somalia, Colombia,
the Philippines, Pakistan, Libya, Syria
and now Mali. While I will not explicitly
examine these cases here, my discussion
of the lessons learned will reflect the
insights gleaned from them as well.
Iraq
The US and the UK learned some very
hard lessons in the ‘land of the two
rivers’ and, leaving aside the question
of whether the invasion should have
happened in the first place, it is clear
that we came up short on a number of
critical issues. We lacked a sufficiently
detailed understanding of the country
and its dynamics at the outset. We
toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime with
inadequate civilian and military plans,
and organisations, for stabilising the
country thereafter. And we compounded
those problems with decisions that led
to hundreds of thousands of Iraqis not
only no longer having a stake in the
success of the new Iraq, but actually
having a stake in its failure – and here I
refer specifically to the decisions to fire
the Iraqi military without simultaneously
announcing a plan to look after the
unemployed soldiers and to embark on
de-Ba’athification without an agreed,
workable mechanism for reconciliation.
Through these actions, we unwittingly
planted the seeds of what would quickly
become a full-blown insurgency that,
over time, evolved into vicious sectarian
fighting.
We spent nearly four tough years
in Iraq before recognising what needed
to be done. At the end of 2006, when
the violence had reached horrific levels,
President George W Bush made the
courageous decision to deploy to Iraq
what would amount to nearly 30,000
REFLECTIONS ON THE
COUNTER-INSURgENCy ERA
DAvID H PETRAEUS
This June, General David H Petraeus (Rtd) became the 35th
recipient of the RUSI Chesney
Gold Medal, awarded by the Institute to mark both his role in devising and implementing
the US counter-insurgency doctrine that was used to such great effect in the campaigns
in Iraq and Afghanistan, and his distinguished lifetime service and contribution to
international defence and security. In his acceptance speech – an edited version of which
is presented here – General Petraeus reflects on the ‘Counter-Insurgency Era’ of the past
decade and draws lessons for the future.
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DAvID H PETRAEUS
General Petraeus (Rtd), the 2013 winner of the RUSI Chesney Gold Medal, speaking at RUSI, London, in
2010. Image courtesy of RUSI.
additional American troops. The surge,
however, did not simply entail the
addition of more forces. Indeed, the most
important element of the surge was the
surge of ideas – the concepts that would
guide the augmented military and civilian
contingents. Each of the components of
the new campaign – security, governance,
economic development, rule of law and
so on – was designed to complement the
others. Progress in one area enabled, or
reinforced, progress in another.
Central to the new strategy was the
recognition that the decisive terrain in
Iraq was the human terrain, and also that
we would not be able to kill or capture
our way out of the industrial-strength
insurgency that was tearing apart the
very fabric of Iraqi society.
There were six key elements to this
strategy. First, a focus on the security of
the people, by living with them in their
neighbourhoods – in small, joint security
stations – rather than consolidating
our forces on sprawling, isolated
bases. Second, an explicit decision to
aggressively support reconciliation with
Sunni insurgents who were willing to
become part of the solution in Iraq rather
than remain a continuing part of the
problem – and, later, to do the same with
Shia militia fighters. Third, an increase in
the tempo of targeted special operations
raids to capture or kill irreconcilable
insurgent and militia leaders. Fourth,
additional attention to the reform,
rebuilding and then expansion of Iraqi
police and military forces – with a halt of
the transition of security tasks to them
for several months until the situation
improved. Fifth, the overhaul of our
detainee operations by establishing a
rehabilitation initiative – after recognising
that our detention facilities had
unwittingly become terrorist universities.
Sixth, a host of co-ordinated civil-military
initiatives to help the Iraqis restore basic
services, build local institutions, establish
the rule of law, repair and construct
infrastructure, rebuild the energy sector,
and support Iraqi efforts to resolve their
differences through politics rather than
through violence.
Without the new, comprehensive
civil-military strategy to guide the
employment of all the assets at our
disposal – enabled enormously by the
additional forces – we would not have
been able to make sufficient progress
in our campaign before the crucial
congressional hearings that were held
in Washington in September 2007. Had
we lost the remaining political support
on Capitol Hill, we would have lost the
campaign. But I truly did believe we could
turn the tide in Iraq as we did during the
surge, though I was not certain in the
early months that we could do so as
rapidly as we eventually did.
The ultimate success was
foreshadowed by a handful of localised
successes on the part of some of our
most capable commanders and units
in the years prior to 2007. There were,
in fact, several brigade and battalion
commanders who had carried out
effective counter-insurgency operations
prior to the surge. There were also units
that had pursued reconciliation, including
the 101st
Airborne Division in the first
year of the war, when I was privileged to
be its commander.
However, the surge marked the
first time that the entire Multinational
Force and its civilian partners carried out
a comprehensive counter-insurgency
campaign theatre-wide. The surge also
marked the first time that reconciliation
was pursued systematically throughout
the country, when I directed that we
would support the nascent Sunni
Awakening outside Ramadi – seeking to
set off a chain reaction throughout Sunni
Arab areas – and, subsequently, that we
would pursue similar activities in areas
challenged by violent Shia militias as well.
It is, of course, worth recalling that
the strategy during the surge was guided
by a new US field manual produced in
2006 after an unprecedentedly rapid
drafting process by a superb team of
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3. REFLECTIONS ON THE COUNTER-INSURgENCy ERA
diverse, talented men and women.
Indeed, it was a privilege to be part of
that undertaking as well. As is widely
known, however, even the best doctrine
and strategy are not guarantors of sound
execution, and there were many people
involved in the effective execution of the
surge.1
Readers may recall that by the
latter part of 2008, the results of this
strategy – and its implementation – were
indisputable: the level of violence in Iraq
was reduced by some 90 per cent; the
country’s infrastructure was repaired
or under repair; basic services were
largely restored; and local, provincial
and national institutions were reasonably
functional. All of this was, of course,
achieved in close partnership with the
leaders and, indeed, the people of
Iraq. To be sure, greater progress in the
Iraqi political arena would have been
desirable – and we have seen why in
recent months in particular, as violence
stemming from sectarian and political
disputes has returned to worrisome
levels. Nevertheless, our new strategy
accomplished the vast amount of what
was envisioned in the campaign plan,
albeit at considerable cost in lives and
money. And, in the end, those who
executed the new strategy did provide
renewed hope and opportunity for the
Iraqi people, after years of war and
indescribable violence.
Iraq was thus rescued from what
many in early 2007 assessed to be a
‘death spiral’. Again, the key was not the
surge of forces; rather, it was the surge of
ideas and having the necessary additional
forces to enable their swift application.
Beyond that, it was the skilful,
courageous translation of ideas into
action on the ground by selfless young
Americans, Britons, other internationals
and, of course, Iraqis.
Afghanistan
Moving on to the land in the shadow
of the Hindu Kush, Afghanistan was, of
course, the ‘necessary war’ – a war that
followed the conclusion that the 9/11
attacks had been planned by Al-Qa’ida
on Afghan soil. It was a deceptively easy
war in its early days, when the Taliban
was routed by intelligence operatives and
special forces, which themselves enabled
the Northern Alliance with operational
guidance, technology and, of course,
substantial amounts of air power and
cash.
In the quest to avoid a large
footprint, however, we then failed to
invest in the efforts needed to sustain
our success in ridding Afghanistan of
Al-Qa’ida and the Taliban regime. We
thus delayed the full-on development
of Afghan capacities for the provision of
security, governance and basic services.
Then, of course, Iraq diverted both our
attention and our resources.
Ultimately, we did not even get close
to having the right ‘inputs’ in Afghanistan
until the late autumn of 2010; and when
we eventually did get close to what was
needed in terms of strategy, forces,
funding, organisations and key people,
we were engaged in a race against the
insurgents and, of course, in a race
against time. Beyond that, the sanctuary
that the Taliban and others found in
Pakistan, combined with the myriad
other challenges in Afghanistan, rendered
the campaign a very difficult one indeed.
The situation in Afghanistan was, of
course, very different from that in Iraq –
a point I made to Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld in late 2005, after coming home
from my second tour in Iraq through
Afghanistan to conduct an assessment
there at his request. My briefing to the
secretary enumerated the differences
that arose from challenges such as
the insurgent safe havens in Pakistan. I
highlighted the dearth of human capital
and economic development in a land
ravaged by war for so long; the lack of
infrastructure and sinews of government;
the near-absence of the rule of law; the
cancer that was corruption; the lack of
revenue-generating endeavours; and
the terrible effects of the country’s
most profitable export crop being illegal
narcotics. I noted, as well, that the
very notion of centralised government
in Afghanistan is one that has been
challenged throughout history.
With these challenges in mind, as
commander of US Central Command
I subsequently observed publicly on
several occasions that we would not
be able to ‘flip’ Afghanistan as we
had ‘flipped’ Iraq, and that progress
in Afghanistan would be hard-fought
and exceedingly difficult. Yet despite
all of the hurdles, I do believe that, to
date, we have generally achieved the
goals established for ISAF when the US
force increase was approved in 2009:
halting, and in some places reversing,
the momentum of the insurgents;
enabling the accelerated development
of Afghan security forces and institutions;
transitioning security and other
responsibilities from ISAF forces to host-
nation authorities; and, most importantly,
preventing Al-Qa’ida from re-establishing
the sanctuaries in Afghanistan that it had
prior to 9/11. Furthermore, all of this has
been undertaken while supporting the
regional counter-terrorist campaign in
which, of course, very significant blows
have been struck against Al-Qa’ida’s
senior leadership.2
Afghanistan obviously remains a
work in progress – one with no shortage
of difficulties and frustrations. However,
there have been indicators of increased
capability in our Afghan National Security
Force partners as transition continues.
Some civilian achievements have also
been heartening. Yet the challenges
that have made progress so difficult – in
particular, the insurgent sanctuaries in
Pakistan – continue to undermine our
efforts, and it is clear that our Afghan
partners will need sustained coalition
assistance for a number of years to come.
Beyond this, however, we should not
forget why we went to Afghanistan in the
first place and why we have stayed there
since. We should also keep in mind the
words of Ambassador Ryan Crocker that
‘the movie doesn’t end just because we
leave the theater’.
Countering Insurgency
Elsewhere
During the past decade, other partner
nations have also been in need of help in
the face of insurgency, including Yemen,
Somalia, the Philippines, Pakistan and
Colombia, among others. Indeed, I was
keenly focused on some of these missions
as commander of US Central Command,
and on all of them as the director of the
CIA.
In each of these countries, we were,
of course, able to avoid large ground
commitments of our forces, as there
were capable host-nation elements
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DAvID H PETRAEUS
or, as in the case of Somalia, regional
forces such as AMISOM that could carry
out the required ground operations.
We provided a variety of enablers –
funding, equipment, advisers, training
and intelligence – as well as civilian
programmes in order to start addressing
some of the root causes of the instability.
Needless to say, such an approach is
always preferable to having to deploy a
large ground element, except where the
host nation is unable to deal with the
situation on its own and our national
interests warrant the commitment of
our forces.
Lessons for the Future
So, what have we learned from all of this?
What policy implications, war-fighting
lessons and institutional insights should
we draw from the counter-insurgency
decade?
In answering these questions, I
will recall some personal observations
I made in an article for the US Army’s
Military Review published in 2006.
Entitled ‘Learning Counterinsurgency:
Observations from Soldiering in Iraq’,3
I wrote it in late 2005 after my second
tour in Iraq (which had lasted fifteen-
and-a-half months), during which
we established the train-and-equip
mission. As I look back now, it strikes
me that although those observations
were intended to inform leaders at the
operational and tactical levels in Iraq, the
same lessons apply to the strategic and
policy realms.
The most significant lesson we
have learned – as I observed in 2005 –
is the importance of ‘analyzing the costs
and benefits before each operation’.
This observation was meant to instil
the reflex of testing each envisioned
operation or initiative by asking a simple
but critically important question: ‘Will
this operation (or policy) take more bad
guys off the street than it creates by its
conduct?’ As noted earlier, several of
the early missteps in Iraq that fuelled
the insurgency resulted from initiatives
that failed that test. Moreover, such a
concept easily translates to the strategic
and policy arenas where interventions
are considered. Clearly, we must be clear-
eyed, coldly realistic and professionally
objective during deliberations over the
possible use of force. Above all, the
decision-making processes must be
imbued with intellectual humility, not
hubris.
In order to maintain professional
objectivity, we need well-developed
intelligence to inform our decisions
and actions. Thus a second of my
observations in 2005 – that ‘intelligence
is the key to success’ – obviously obtains
at higher levels as well. Needless to say,
intelligence analyses must be carefully
examined and challenged, but not
swayed or influenced. As the military
adage goes: assess the situation; do not
situate the assessment. This must be
heeded at all levels; it is the cornerstone
of sound policy-making.
This observation can be followed
with one I offered about the need for
appreciation of local customs, practices
and religions – that is to say, that ‘Cultural
awareness is a force multiplier’. Clearly,
we must achieve and maintain a very
detailed, granular understanding of
the countries and societies in which we
operate – and not just at the macro level,
but village by village, valley by valley as
well.
A fourth observation I put forward
in late 2005 was that ‘everyone
must do nation-building’, whether
they like it or not. Linked to this was
another observation that ‘success in
a counterinsurgency requires more
than just military operations’. These
principles run deep in both history
and common sense; nonetheless, they
remain contested, particularly by some
who would like to return the focus of
the military exclusively to its so-called
traditional war-fighting tasks. My caution
would be that shedding the capabilities
for stability operations will not make
future needs for these capabilities
disappear. Indeed, as the biggest of the
US Army’s doctrinal ‘big ideas’ reminds
us, all future operations will continue to
include some mix of offensive, defensive
and stability operations; the key is to
determine the right mix for each specific
endeavour and each specific geographic
area. Indeed, this observation further
reminds us that most future campaigns
will be comprehensive civil-military
endeavours, requiring us to employ every
available tool in our diplomatic, economic
and defence arsenals in complementary
fashion – and to do so in concert with
coalition partners and host-nation
elements.
Of course, given the understandable
desire to minimise the scale of
commitments abroad, we will have to
place a greater emphasis on security
assistance and advisory programmes
that enable others to meet their
security challenges. Along these lines,
it would be wise to recognise that an
ounce of prevention in the international
arena will often be worth a pound of
cure. This, of course, recalls another
observation from my early days in Iraq,
that ‘money is ammunition’ at a certain
point in a counter-insurgency campaign
– something that is equally true at the
strategic level.
To add a cautionary note from one
of Britain’s own insurgents of the past,
T E Lawrence once warned: ‘Do not try
to do too much with your own hands’.
This again points to the fact that a light
footprint is obviously desirable whenever
possible. Indeed, it is typically the right
approach – except when it is the wrong
approach, that is, when it is not enough.
And in those cases, policy-makers need
to be forthright in determining, assessing,
considering and then explaining our
interests, our options and, ultimately,
our actions. Moreover, all of this must be
captured in a coherent strategic narrative,
a point persuasively explained by Emile
Simpson’s recent work, War From The
Ground Up.4
On Leadership
Perhaps the most important lesson of
all – and one that I highlighted in my
article in late 2005 and have reaffirmed
many times since – is that ‘There is
no substitute for flexible, adaptable
leaders’. This holds especially true in
counter-insurgency operations, which
some observers have described as the
‘graduate level of warfare’ due to their
complexity.
We have, during the past decade,
developed very experienced leaders who
have learned a great deal about irregular
warfare – about how to prepare for
and conduct it. They have also learned
a great deal about training, equipping
and enabling foreign forces. In fact, over
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the last decade of war, our armies more
broadly have transformed themselves
into learning organisations that foster a
culture of innovation and that demand of
their leaders and soldiers unprecedented
levels of adaptability, initiative and
courage. Such qualities, along with the
battle hardening that the conflicts of
the last ten years have provided, must
be preserved and protected, as they
inevitably will serve us well on future
battlefields.
We thus need to nurture and build
on the considerable human capital that
has been developed and, as we do so,
we need to promote and protect the
iconoclasts, the quirky thinkers, the bright
and the bold. This is an area in which the
UK has traditionally done admirably well.
Indeed, the roster of past Chesney Gold
Medal recipients is heavily populated by
such individuals.
The reason to protect the bright and
the bold is that such individuals can lead
campaigns and units in places like Iraq or
Afghanistan. They are the leaders who
can ensure that they get the big ideas
right at their respective levels; who can
communicate the big ideas effectively
throughout their organisations and
beyond; who then can effectively oversee
the implementation of the big ideas; and,
finally, who also can identify lessons that
need to be learned and incorporate them
as refinements to the big ideas as the
process is repeated, again and again.
However, our leaders need
even more than these qualities.
They must also have forthrightness,
determination, resilience and endurance
– both mental and physical. Waging a
counter-insurgency campaign, or any
expeditionary operation for that matter,
is just plain hard, all of the time. And
speaking truth to power is not always
the easiest of tasks either. But our leaders
must be fearless in the advice they offer
upwards and then, of course, absolutely
loyal in the execution of the orders they
receive.
Finally, our leaders must be able to
inspire, to energise and to help those
doing difficult work believe in what they
are doing and to understand why they are
doing it. In truth, it will be important for
everybody to be a leader in this respect:
every corporal and captain assigned to a
combat or advisory role, every diplomat
and every development expert. Our
friends and allies throughout the world
will count on this and on our leadership.
Security-Policy Implications
What future policy implications may we
now derive from this reflection on the
past decade of war?
Certainly, the superiority of the US
and the UK in defence and security must
be maintained to safeguard our interests.
And while our military capabilities will
afford us an ability to dissuade some
actions, they will also make it unlikely
that future enemies will confront us
head on. Rather, as we have seen in the
past, they will attack us asymmetrically,
avoiding our conventional strengths.
Clearly, the continuation of so-called
small wars cannot be discounted in an
increasingly multipolar environment
overlaid with ideological tensions and a
variety of disputes in many parts of the
world. Beyond that, we should never
forget that we do not always get to
choose the wars we fight.
Moreover, situations will continue
to arise from time to time in which
minimalist forms of intervention may not
suffice. Indeed, there may be occasions
when our strategic interests will leave
little choice but to weigh in heavily.
Small wars will continue to span a
wide spectrum of political violence. At
one end of the spectrum, some fanatical
enemies will remain marginalised
from their host populations, allowing
us to defeat them through aggressive
intelligence work and targeting. But at
the opposite end of the spectrum will
lie enemies that are heavily embedded
in the fabric of their host population,
forcing the host nation – and possibly
us – to adopt a more comprehensive
and therefore more costly approach in
order to win the peace. It follows from
this that the much-debated dichotomy
between counter-terrorism and counter-
insurgency – or enemy-centric versus
population-centric – is not always well
founded.
In fact, counter-terrorism and
counter-insurgency each have their
rightful place on the spectrum of
asymmetric warfare. Importantly,
neither approach is exclusive of the
other; in particular, targeted operations
by Special Mission Units will always be a
component of a comprehensive counter-
insurgency campaign, as they were in Iraq
and Afghanistan. In any case, we cannot
lose our proficiency in either method –
when so required – without degrading
the relevance of our militaries to address
future threats and to achieve foreign-
policy objectives.
But we clearly must become
better at waging small wars through
our host-nation partners. This is akin
to applying productivity equations to
military power to achieve our aims – an
imperative in times of fiscal restraint and
understandable reluctance to commit to
another costly ground campaign.
In the coming decades, our militaries
undoubtedly will be required to help
extend the reaches of our soft power,
filling in the continuum that spans
from diplomacy, trade and economic
development to that of armed intervention
in the interests of our nations. All told, it is
clear that future policy will best be served
by an attitude of temperance, rather than
one of retrenchment.
It follows from this that we will
continue to need agile forces capable
of conducting operations across the
spectrum, from humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief at home and abroad
to major combat operations – and
everything in between. Both special and
general-purpose forces will be needed to
support a strategy of helping host-nation
or regional forces by working through
them, in support of them with certain
enablers and, perhaps, directly with them
in pursuit of common objectives.
One of the final observations I
made in late 2005 was that ‘Increasing
the number of stakeholders is key to
success’ – something that applies equally
to stakeholders inside the country
countering the insurgency, but also to
those outside the country as well. In fact,
our two nations’ security and prosperity
often will be contingent on the strength
of our alliances and partnerships. It
was in recognition of this reality that
I used to quote Winston Churchill’s
observation that the only thing worse
than having allies is not having them. (I
always assumed, of course, that he was
not referring to the United States when
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he voiced such thoughts.) In any event,
that observation will be increasingly true
in the years ahead, as gradual shifts in
power continue and as the authority and
influence of international organisations
are challenged. In fact, this likely would be
a very good time not only to reaffirm, yet
again, the value of NATO, but to expand
the economic ties and trade agreements
between its members so that we may help
each other to strengthen the foundations
of our economic power – foundations
which are, after all, also critical to the
maintenance of our military capabilities.
Conclusions
The missions of the past decade have
required a team effort,5
and the progress
in the various undertakings of the post-
9/11 period has typically been achieved
by coalitions of the willing working
together. The United States has, to be
sure, led the largest of these endeavours
– but no other country has been more
instrumental or sacrificed more as a
partner than the United Kingdom. Indeed,
British soldiers, diplomats, development
experts and intelligence officers have
repeatedly demonstrated that they are
worthy heirs to the legacy handed down
by those who served before them and
demonstrated such intellect, courage,
resourcefulness, capacity for initiative
and, yes, endearing quirkiness, as well as
a capacity to ‘keep calm and carry on’ in
the face of enormous challenges.
In the eleven years following 9/11,
no American was more privileged than I
in serving with those personnel from the
UK in missions of consequence to our two
countries. It was an awesome honour
indeed.
Shortly after I resigned last
November, I received an e-mail from
one of my great British deputies in Iraq
during the surge, which quoted an SAS
colonel from the Second World War era:
‘True riches cannot be bought’, Colonel
Paddy Mayne had observed. ‘One cannot
buy the experience of brave deeds or
the friendship of companions to whom
one is bound forever by ordeals suffered
in common; true friendship itself is an
emerald simply beyond price.’
I have been fortunate to accumulate
a number of those priceless emeralds, the
true friendships of which Colonel Mayne
spoke; and many of these – founded on
shared experiences during tough missions
in the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan and
elsewhere – were with those who served
the UK. The bands of brothers that were
forged out of those experiences have
developed into friendships that truly
represent emeralds beyond price, and
their infinite worth was proven in recent
months when those friendships were so
important to me and to my family.
As I have previously noted, there
was a reason – beyond having another
opportunity to run in Hyde Park – that
I used to stop in London almost every
time I travelled back to the United States
from Iraq, Afghanistan or elsewhere in
my various capacities. In essence, those
visits here reflected my deep respect
and profound gratitude for the United
Kingdom, which has been and will
continue to be the United States’ closest
partner in international endeavours. 
General David H Petraeus (Rtd) served
for thirty-seven years in the US military,
including as Commander of coalition
forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, and as
Commander of the US Central
Command. Following retirement from
the military in August 2011, he served as
the Director of the CIA until November
2012.
Notes
1 I would like to single out General Ray
Odierno and his successor, General
Lloyd Austin, for their great leadership
as the operational-level architects of the
campaign; General Stanley McChrystal
and then Admiral Bill McRaven for their
expert, visionary command of the Special
Mission Unit component; Lieutenant
Generals Sir Graeme Lamb, Sir William
Rollo and John Cooper (my deputies
who helped to launch the process of
reconciliation and then helped to guide
the overall effort so superbly); Major
Generals Sir Paul Newton and Chris
Hughes, Emma Sky (my special adviser
on reconciliation) and their US diplomatic
counterparts who helped to shepherd the
reconciliation effort. I would also like to
recognise Ambassador Ryan Crocker who,
along with a host of US, UK and other
nations’ diplomats, worked in complete
partnership with those of us in uniform to
ensure progress in a host of civil tasks that
were needed to solidify and build on the
military progress on the ground. On the
UK side, thanks, also, to Sir John Scarlett
and Sir John Sawers for their team’s work
together with US intelligence agencies,
and sincere thanks to those who served
as the secretary of state for defence in
those years as well.
2 In this regard, I would like to acknowledge
the contributions of Ambassadors Mark
Sedwill and Simon Gass, General Sir Nick
Parker, Lieutenant General Sir James
Bucknall and Major General Phil Jones,
each of whom was hugely important in
helping to shape and guide the effort
during my time as the commander of
ISAF. I also need to thank two Chiefs
of the Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshal
Sir Jock Stirrup and General Sir David
Richards, for the great support that they
provided in both Afghanistan and Iraq.
3 David H Petraeus, ‘Learning
Counterinsurgency: Observations from
Soldiering in Iraq’, Military Review
(January/February 2006), <http://
usacac.army.mil/cac2/AIWFC/COIN/
repository/Learning_COIN_Mil_Review-
Petraeus%28Jan-Feb06%29.pdf>,
accessed 10 July 2013.
4 Emile Simpson, War From The Ground
Up: Twenty-First-Century Combat as
Politics (London: Hurst & Co, 2012).
5 In the past, I have always noted that I
would accept an award – such as the
Chesney Gold Medal – only inasmuch
as I could do so on behalf of those
with whom I was privileged to serve
in the important endeavours of the
past decade, when our armed forces
were faced with two of our greatest
challenges in as many generations. That
group included not just those in uniform,
but those of the intelligence services,
diplomatic corps and development
organisations as well.
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