US Threat Perceptions and Chinese Naval Expansion - Final Submission UPDATED

Running Head: US THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND CHINESE NAVAL EXPANSION
US FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS CHINA:
CHINESE NAVAL EXPANSION AND THREAT PERCEPTIONS
by
Brent Gladney
A thesis submitted to the School of International Relations of Webster University in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Global Master of Arts in
International Relations.
Webster University
October, 2016
St. Louis, Missouri
© Copyright by
Brent Gladney
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
(2016)
The author hereby grants to Webster University permission to reproduce and distribute
publicly paper and electronic copies of this thesis document in whole or in part for
educational purposes.

WEBSTER UNIVERSITY
THESIS APPROVAL
by
Brent Gladney
APPROVED:
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would first like to thank my thesis advisor Dr. Franco Algieri, Chair of the International
Relations Department at Webster University, Vienna. His personal encouragement and
support throughout my program pushed me to work harder and accomplish more than I
thought I was capable of. He consistently allowed this paper to be my own work and
provided me with guidance and input on my writing that challenged me to become a
stronger scholar.
I would also like to acknowledge Dr. Robin Ramcharan of the International Relations
Department at Webster University, Geneva, as the second reader of this thesis, and I am
gratefully indebted to him for his very valuable time and comments on this thesis.
Finally, I must express my very profound gratitude to my parents, my friends, my
colleagues, and my girlfriend for providing me with unfailing support and continuous
encouragement throughout the year and through the process of researching and writing
this thesis. This accomplishment would not have been possible without them. Thank you
for being there for me.
Author
Brent Gladney

ABSTRACT
by
Brent Gladney
Chinese naval expansion has rapidly become a threat to US security interests. To
understand how key US foreign policy makers in the first Obama administration address
Chinese naval expansion, their personal threat perceptions of Chinese naval expansion
must be understood. By conducting a contextual analysis on how President Obama,
Secretary of State Clinton, Secretary of Defense Gates, Secretary of State Panetta,
National Security Adviser Jones and National Security Adviser Donilon formed their
threat perceptions towards Chinese naval expansion, it will provide a clearer view of how
and why certain policy decisions were made during the first Obama administration. Using
the cognitive approach to foreign policy, this paper aims to provide a better framework
for understanding key US foreign policy makers and their decision-making processes by
looking at elements of human psychology that undermine key US foreign policy makers
from making fully rational choices and maximizing their interests.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgements.............................................................................................................. i
Abstract............................................................................................................................... ii
Table of Contents............................................................................................................... iii
Chapter 1: Introduction........................................................................................................1
Chapter 2: Literature Review...............................................................................................3
Chapter 3: Theoretical Approach ......................................................................................12
3.1: Research Question .........................................................................................18
3.2: Hypotheses .....................................................................................................18
Chapter 4: Methodology ...................................................................................................19
4.1: Limitations of the Paper .................................................................................21
4.2: Anticipated Outcomes ....................................................................................22
Chapter 5: The President of the United States ..................................................................23
Chapter 6: The Secretary of State .....................................................................................53
Chapter 7: The National Security Adviser ........................................................................72
7.1: James Jones ....................................................................................................72
7.2: Thomas Donilon ............................................................................................76
Chapter 8: The Secretary of Defense ................................................................................96
8.1: Robert Gates ..................................................................................................96
8.2: Leon Panetta ................................................................................................118
Chapter 9: Analyzing Empirical Findings with the Cognitive Approach .......................140
9.1: Simplicity .....................................................................................................141
9.2: Consistency ..................................................................................................144
9.3: Poor Estimators ............................................................................................147
9.4: Loss Aversion ..............................................................................................151
Chapter 10: Conclusion ...................................................................................................157
Bibliography ...................................................................................................................161

US THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND CHINESE NAVAL EXPANSION 1
Chapter 1: Introduction
US Foreign Policy Towards China:
Chinese Naval Expansion and Threat Perceptions
National security issues have traditionally been approached through the realist
school of thought. Naturally, the subject of Chinese naval expansion has more than its
fair share of articles written from a realist point of view (Agnihotri, 2010, 2013;
Hiramatsu, 2001; Holmes & Yoshihara, 2006; Scott, 2012; Simon, 2012). A world where
states seek security through relative or absolute gains in regards to purely material
capabilities is the dominant viewpoint in this realm. This viewpoint provides a narrow
perspective, giving the impression that international politics and security exist in a world
that is two dimensional, where problems can be solved with solutions that are straight-
forward and holistic through one unified state actor. The simplicity provided by a state-
centric world system in which each state is responsible for its own survival and the only
intentions that can be trusted are one's own is a perspective that paints a portrait of a
world lacking the complexity required to understand the plethora of nuances and
variables needed to consider, calculate and create effective strategies and foreign policies.
Chinese naval expansion could be perceived by key US foreign policy makers in
the White House, National Security Council, Department of State and Department of
Defense as threatening from a realist standpoint because any increase in power by a state
de-facto poses a 'threat' to the security of all other states, and as top state representatives,
potential threats need to be taken seriously. While simple explanations are welcomed by
foreign policy makers at the top echelons of the US government and are often needed to

make decisions, there are rarely a straight-forward answers to foreign policy issues.
States are considered units of international relations, approached and analyzed by realism
at the national level of analysis. States are also made of subunits, or bureaucracies and
individuals. States' decisions are made through the interaction of individuals in key
governmental positions. How these elites perceive a given state's actions is likely to have
an impact on the foreign policies formulated and implemented towards that state. Realism
fails to address the fact that bureaucracies and individuals play a role in representing and
deciding what states’ interests are. Realism also fails to address that people, living in a
complex world with human bias and emotion, are limited in their ability to make fully
rational decisions. Therefore, the cognitive approach to threat perception appears to be a
better framework for analyzing decision-making in US foreign policy towards Chinese
naval expansion.

Chapter 2: Literature Review
The literature seeking to analyze perceptions through a cognitive approach
adheres to a few premises. These premises assume that “the world is extraordinarily
complex, incoherent, and changing” and that people lack the ability to fully process
information and maximize their interests in order to meet the requirements to be ideal
rational actors” (Levy, 2013, p. 310). According to Levy (2013), who quotes Jervis
(1976):
[T]he central proposition [for cognitivists is] that an individual’s cognitive
predispositions or mindsets play a disproportionate role in shaping his/her
perceptions [which] leads to a general tendency to selective attention to
information, to premature cognitive closure, for people to see what they expect to
see based on prior beliefs and world views (Jervis, 1976).
Articles and case studies produced in this field support Levy's 'central proposition' that
people are affected by their own biases while making decisions (Axelrod, 1973; Brecher,
Steinberg, & Stein, 1969; Hudson & Vore, 1995; Rosenau, 1984; Smith, Hadfield, &
Dunne, 2012).
Many cognitivists also prescribe to the idea that rational choice theory, while
useful for analyzing decision-making processes, is fundamentally flawed because it fails
to take into account how emotions, beliefs, cultural, experiential and historical bias affect
decision-making (Brecher et al., 1969; De Mesquita, 2009; Herrmann, Voss, Schooler, &
Ciarrochi, 1997; Hudson & Vore, 1995; Levy, 2013; Rosenau, 1984; Smith et al., 2012;
Stein, 2008). The concept that rational actors are in fact, irrational is contrary to realist
notions that states and statesmen are inherently rational actors that make rational choices
in pursuit of national interests (Mearsheimer, 2001; Morgenthau, 1973). Stein (2008)

provides four reasons that the rational model is inadequate to properly assess decision-
making for foreign policy makers. These reasons are human needs for simplicity and
consistency, people's fundamental misunderstanding of the essence of probability, and
that people are far more averse to loss than they are to gain-seeking (Stein, 2008).
The need for simplicity results in political decision makers “unconsciously
[stripping] the nuances, context, and subtleties out of the problems they face in order to
build simple frames” (Stein, 2008, p. 133). Decision makers’ need for constructing
simple frames is supported by findings Axelrod's (1973) schema theory that simple
mathematical models are highly accessible for analysis and is cited as a basic premise of
the cognitive analysis by Levy (2013). Oversimplification and the results of failing to
consider complex factors by foreign policy makers were clearly seen in NATO's 2005
plan for wrestling control of southern Afghanistan from 'terrorists' without factoring
warlords, poverty and drug trade (Stein, 2008).
Rational choice is also undermined by the need of consistency, in which beliefs
take precedence over new information inconsistent with beliefs and blame for unintended
policy outcomes is shifted onto other factors in conjunction with a multitude of
justifications designed to reinforce flawed assumptions rather than to revise them (Stein,
2008; Tetlock, 2006). Rosenau's pre-theory deviates from Stein's (2008) assessment on
consistency in that he believes “a mode of thinking cannot be achieved and maintained
unless every observed phenomenon is approached as merely one instance of a recurring
sequence” (Rosenau, 1980, p. 23). This implies that theory needs consistency in order to
be valid; however, Rosenau also mentions that “one has to be clear as to whether one

aspires to empirical theory or value theory” (Rosenau, 1980, p. 21). Stein's claim
however is also supported by Rosenau when he states that “[the] goal is to build theories
in which the central tendencies encompass the highest possible degree of probability”
(1980, p. 24). It appears that the point that Stein is trying to make is that some instances
of foreign policy decision-making work to support a policy maker's theory, but there may
be many more instances where this is not the case; this is one of the major criticisms of
Mearsheimer's application of offensive realism. Stein also claims that “belief systems and
schema do change overtime” (Stein, 2008, p. 135) however the assessment of schema has
yet to reveal certain details about schema, such as the accessibility of old schema, the
creation of new schema and the degree of blame given to information or beliefs (Axelrod,
1973). It should be noted that the results of Axelrod's study can be considered dated, and
new research methods and technology may have revealed answers to some of these
questions.
Policy makers tend to be poor estimators as well. Experts are shown by a study
conducted by Tetlock (2006, p. 77) to only meet 20% of the ideal criteria needed for
exercises performed on probability. Stein (2008, p. 136-7) believes that this is because
“they think causally rather than pay attention to the frequencies with which events occur”
making it is easier for experts to imagine war than it is to imagine the frequency of war
over an extended period of time. Another point Stein puts forth is that people seek
certainty, even if its false certainty to establish order (Stein, 2008). It is believed that
decision-makers are affected by biases through the heuristics used during individual
decision-making processes (Herrmann et al., 1997; Stein, 2008). Case studies like those

done by Herrmann (1997) can provide useful details about the relationship between
perception and decision-making; however, it is limited in the regard that in order to
provide more accurate predictions from key policy makers, these policy makers would
need to be made available for cognitive experimentation and analysis. It is unlikely that
policy makers could or would make themselves available for such experimentation.
The literature also supports the claim that foreign policy makers are more loss
averse than they are to gain-seeking (Stein, 2008). A clear example of this is shown by
US President John Kennedy's actions during the Cuban Missile Crisis (Allison, 1969; De
Mesquita, 2009). De Mesquita (2009) supports Stein in saying that “John Kennedy’s
decision to risk nuclear war over Soviet missiles in Cuba rather than risk impeachment
for failing to act even though he knew the missiles did not appreciably alter the strategic
situation between the United States and the USSR” (p. 8). While Allison (1969) provides
an in-depth case analysis of a major instance in foreign policy decision-making that is
often cited by cognitivists, a criticism of this work is that his Model I, or rational choice
model also fails to address the psychological dimension of decision-making (Levy,
2013).
The literature converges on discounting the rational choice model as a sufficient
way to assess the perceptions of individuals; however, it diverges on the implementation
and creation of theoretical models. Rosenau's (1980) pre-theory, provides guidelines and
suggestions for theorists to create a usable framework for a given theory. Rosenau (1980)
submits what is considered a 'middle-theory' in which theorists need to accept certain
premises such as underlying order to human affairs and that there is a causal-effectual

relationship regarding phenomena, while having enough flexibility to tolerate
ambiguities, adjust premises when proven wrong and welcome puzzlement without
constraining theories to detailed explanations and conditions. Brecher, Steinberg and
Stein (1969) feel that:
The Rosenau model has the merit of going beyond a taxonomy to explore
relationships among the variables [and] the concept of 'issue-area' is a valuable
organizing device [however] the variable categories are ambiguous and overlap
with one another [and] the scope of 'idiosyncratic' behavior is vast (p. 79).
Brecher, Steinberg and Stein (1969) put forward an input-output model for assessing
decision-making in foreign policy. This model inputs the internal and external factors of a
given operational environment, communicates these factors to elites who then input their
own internal and external factors into their psychological environment followed by
formulation and implementation, resulting in action or output. This input-output model
also incorporates Rosenau's 'issue-area' concept which is considered to be “a valuable
organizing device” (Brecher et al., 1969, p. 79); however Rosenau may take issue with
the assumption that “All data regarding foreign policy can be classified in one of these
categories” (Brecher et al., 1969, p. 80) as it undermines one of his nine principles, which
states that “one must be…distrustful of absolutes [which are] left for ideologues and
zealots to expound” (Rosenau, 1984, p. 24). Another shortcoming of this input-output
model is that it samples middle-sized countries instead of superpowers like the US or the
USSR. If this model were applied to US elites, it could provide useful information for
predicting and understanding foreign policy processes and outcomes.
Allison (1969) proposes two more models for approaching foreign policy that
look at the interior of a state rather than just the state as a single unitary rational actor was

proposed in Model I. The premise of Model II, the organizational decision-making
process model, is that “a conglomerate of semi-feudal, loosely allied organizations”
(Allison, 1969, p. 698) make decisions in accordance to behavioral norms, which become
outputs for foreign policy whereas Model III, the bureaucratic politics model, focuses on
groups of elites and elites as individuals making decisions that result in policy outcomes
rather than organizations in their entirety determining policy outcome. The criticisms that
are placed on these models are that they lack the emotional dimension needed to properly
access any biases or predispositions elites may have and that “[the Bargaining Politics
Model] tells a fascinating 'story' [but] its complexity is enormous, the information
requirements are often overwhelming, and many of the details of the bargaining may be
superfluous” (Allison, 1969, p. 716; Levy, 2013).
Carlsnaes (1992), while attempting to address the agency-structure problem in
foreign policy-making, creates a similar model for analyzing decision-making to that of
Brecher, Steinberg, and Stein (1969). Essentially, Carlsnaes (1992) proposes a framework
that has a given structure with objective conditions and an institutional setting that affect
the disposition of an actor whose perceptions and values are factored into the actor's
intentions, which is made up of a choice and preference. Once the actor has made a
choice and having considered all of these factors, a foreign policy action occurs, which in
turn creates new conditions affecting a given structure, an actor's disposition and
intentions (Carlsnaes, 1992). The cycle repeats, creating new conditions and modifying
structures and actors each time it occurs. While this model may not answer the larger
question of if the structure or actor came first, it translates the relationship between actors

and structures into a framework that acts as another useful tool for understanding elite
decision-making.
The previously mentioned models focus on the larger picture for understanding
foreign policy decision-making on a larger scale, however these are missing tools to
assess instances of cognition and perception within the decision-making process. Two
academics that provide tools for acquiring deeper or measurable frameworks for
cognition and perception are Axelrod (1973) and Herrmann (1997). Axelrod's schema
theory attempts to find a schema to interpret a given case. The cognitive process is
broken down into four steps: message, source, information, and type of case (Axelrod,
1973). The process goes as follows: individuals receive a message, decide what the
credibility of the source is, interpret the new information and try to categorize the type of
case it is, for example 'friendship relationship' (Axelrod, 1973). The individual tries to
incorporate the new information into their schema, but certain conditions lead to different
results. For example, if the information is able to be explained through the old schema, it
is interpreted by that but if the information is unable to explained through the old schema,
three things can happen: (1) the message is blamed and the credibility of the messenger is
downgraded and the old schema is kept, (2) if the old schema is blamed and the
credibility of the schema is downgraded, the credibility of the messenger is upgraded or
(3) if a schema can't be accessed to explain the new information, the source is
downgraded (Axelrod, 1973). This micro-level analysis would be very useful, but as
mentioned before it has some issues, such as the inability to properly measure the
proportion of blame given to a schema or source, the accessibility of schema in

comparison to others and the creation of new schema (Axelrod, 1973). Regardless, this
model provides a more concise framework for individual decision-making that could be
very useful for assessing the beliefs of elites.
The Images in IR model (Herrmann et al., 1997) takes an experimental cognitive
approach to test elements that generate perceptions of other countries. The subjects tested
were given conditions such as the kind of country they were from and its relation to
another country as well as having to answer surveys which included ranking countries
based on their motivation, capacity and decision-making processes (Herrmann et al.,
1997). Images were generated into four categories: enemies, allies, degenerates and
colonies. The findings from this study found strong evidence supporting ally, enemy and
colony images and these findings were able to provide greater knowledge about core
interests affecting perceptions, decision-making processes of given countries affecting the
perception of their intentions, and support concepts such as democratic peace theory
(Herrmann et al., 1997). This study is particularly useful because it subjects included
Americans, however these results are dated but may prove very fruitful if conducted on
policy makers, especially when trying to understand the threat perceptions of any given
policy maker.
Much of the literature on the cognitive approach provides good theoretical
frameworks and models for understanding decision-making. De Mesquita (2009) believes
that “[t]he assumption of rationality is just a starting point for constructing theories [that]
sets out the theorist’s view of how people are likely to select actions given their
motivations or preferences [but] it says nothing about the content of those preferences”

(p. 3). De Mesquita feels that while rational choice may not mention preferences, it’s
“better for analyzing models of action” (2009, p. 3). Naval theories like Mahan's Sea
Power theory provide models for action, such as securing sea lanes of communication,
establishing naval bases along sea routes and receiving support from merchant fleets as a
plan of action for protecting maritime trade assuming that rational actors are making
decisions (Agnihotri, 2010; Holmes & Yoshihara, 2006). This theory is useful for
explaining foreign policy actions in strategic terms but does not touch on other areas
involved such as the generation of threat perception and how that affects foreign policies
that may be translated into these models for action. The literature has yet to apply
methodology to specific strategic areas such as naval expansion. The cognitive approach
supplies many useful tools for understanding precisely how there may be differences in
threat perception between key officials in the US government and how those perceptions
can and do affect foreign policy decisions.

Chapter 3: Theoretical Approach
Systemic IR considers the rise of China and threat perception of naval expansion
traditionally through a realist lens. This threat, according to realists Mearsheimer, Waltz
and Morgenthau, is derived from the anarchic global system of which power is based on
states. States vie for power and distrust one another, knowing that the only intentions that
can be trusted are their own. As is such, states are presumed to create foreign policy as
unitary actors pursuing their national interests using rational choice to maximize their
interests. According to Stephen Quackenbush’s (2004) The Rationality of Rational
Choice Theory, many scholars have arrived at a fundamental misunderstanding of
rational choice theory as a singular theory; rather, Quackenbush believes that rational
choice theory is actually the instrumental rational approach, which is widely applicable to
rational decision-making. Quackenbush postulated that all theories are based on
assumptions, that assumptions need to be judged based on their usefulness, and that
assumptions need to be empirically validated from the theories that they are derived from
by accounting for dependent variables, independent variables, measurement error and
error due to assumptions (Quackenbush, 2004). Quackenbush offered the transitivity of
preferences as a strong example of actors making rational choices. For example, there are
three different pay rates for proofreading text. If the first choice is proofreading a
directory for 24 cents, the second choice is proofreading personal ads for 17 cents, and
the third choice is proofreading personal ads for a rate between 4 cents and 30 cents,
those who pick the third choice over the other two believe that there is an expected utility
of 17 cents. Therefore, their preferences should be Choice 3 > Choice 1 > Choice 2 with

the reasoning that those who chose Choice 3 instead of Choice 1 were more risk
acceptant and those that preferred Choice 1 over Choice 3 were more risk averse, thus
making rational choices according to their preferences (Quackenbush, 2004).
Quackenbush noted that while this example focuses on maximizing economic benefits
assumptions, failures to maximize benefits are explained by incorrect assumptions made
by scholars about what the pay offs are for a rational actor; for example, someone may
prefer to make less money at a job they find enjoyable in exchange for lower pay
(Quackenbush, 2004). Although Quackenbush does not explicitly state so, the concept of
‘enjoyment’ as a preference touches on emotion as the base justification for an individual
pursuing a preference. This infers that emotions influence the formation of preferences.
Quackenbush defended realism’s use of rational choice theory by arguing that
theories such as ‘realpolitik’ were falsely proven wrong by critics because they added
‘unfair’ and ‘purposive’ additional assumptions not presented in the original theory, such
as the assumption that states inherently preferred to solve issues through negotiations
instead of war since the costs of war are higher, even though it was clear that during
WWII, the Japanese and Germans clearly preferred to attack the US and Poland
respectively instead of negotiate (Quackenbush, 2004, pp. 97-8). Yet, Quackenbush also
argued against the realist claim that rational state actors in a Prisoner Dilemma were only
motivated to cooperate by their desire to maximize individual long-term pay offs, even if
a major tenant of the realist argument is to maximize relative, not absolute gains
(Quackenbush, 2004, p. 98). In Quackenbush’s opinion, this contradicts the rational
choice approach because state actors must pursue their maximum utility regardless of

their independence from or interdependence with other actors (Quackenbush, 2004, p.
98).
Quackenbush presents strong examples of how rational actors make rational
decisions based on their preferences in various scenarios, yet he fails to acknowledge the
role that emotions and bias play in forming preferences. At one point, Quackenbush
stated that Adolf Hitler’s desire to conquer Europe and wipe out races was just as rational
as Woodrow Wilson’s choice to promote democracy, citing that there is no ‘good’ or
‘evil’ with instrumental rationality and preferences. Quackenbush claimed that
psychological factors such as emotions “only interfere with procedural rationality, not
instrumental rationality” (Quackenbush, 2004, p. 95). However, the findings of
neuroscientists have indicated strong evidence that emotions play a dominant role in
neurological processes for decision-making (Stein, 2008, p. 140). Decisions are made
unconsciously and emotional responses are both fast and automatic, leading to
individuals feeling and acting before thinking as a result of automatic processes that are
associated with strong positive and negative responses (Stein, 2008, p. 140). Therefore,
some neuroscientists have proposed that the brain is composed of two separate operating
systems: emotion and reason (Stein, 2008, p. 141). The first system of emotion is slow to
change but fast to react and makes a majority of decisions which are ‘intuitive’ and
‘associative’ (Stein, 2008, p. 141). The emotional system trumps the ‘reasoned’ second
system, which is “slow, effortful, rule-governed, and flexible,” making it “extraordinarily
difficult…for the second system to educate the first” (Stein, 2008, p. 140). When
observing how true-false questions work for individuals, choice is clearly a negotiation

between reason and emotion to determine questions about issues like fair or treatment
(Stein, 2008, p. 141). The ‘ultimatum game’ provides a clear example of how emotions
affect rational decision-making (Stein, 2008, p. 142). There are two players who are
anonymous to each other and interact only once. There are $10 and Player 1 proposes that
he/she keeps $9, leaving Player 2 with $1. Player 2 has the choice to either accept or
reject the offer: if Player 2 accepts, he/she receives $1 and if he/she rejects, neither player
receives anything. Rational choice theory believes that the clear choice for Player 2
should be to accept the offer, however studies showed that Player 2 consistently rejected
the offer when it was less than twenty percent of the total, citing that the offer was
“humiliating, insulting, and unfair” as justification for their choice (Stein, 2008, p. 142).
Instead of using a line of reasoning such as the need to reject the offer because it may
damage the individual’s negotiating reputation for later negotiations, emotion is cited as
the primary reason. Clearly, there is emotional utility involved in the decision-making
process for Player 2.
The significance of such emotional utility in decision-making can and should be
extended to the formation of preferences. Quackenbush asserts that the purpose of
instrumental rational choice is for actors to pursue their preferences, regardless of what
they are, yet he omits emotion from preferences even if there is evidence that emotions
are present in all decision-making processes for human actors. To have strong empirical
evidence of how central emotions are in forming preferences and affecting decision-
making while proposing that instrumental rationality used in rational choice theory is
somehow immune to emotional influence creates the same false assumptions about

decision-making that Quackenbush claims others make to argue in favor of their theories.
Realists Mearsheimer, Waltz and Morgenthau examine foreign policy on the
systemic level of analysis and support the idea that China can be, if it is not already, a
threat to US security interests (Mearsheimer, 2001, 2014; Morgenthau, 1962; Waltz,
2000). Can China Rise Peacefully? by Mearsheimer (2014) asserted that the US as a
regional hegemon, has an interest in preventing other states from rising to regional
hegemony, in this case China in the Asia-Pacific. Mearsheimer (2014) also believed that
China is modeling itself off of the US by increasing the military gap between itself and its
neighbors and uses its power to settle territorial disputes in its favor. To this end,
Mearsheimer (2014) proclaimed that the US would lead smaller states and try to
counterbalance China’s ambitions of achieving regional hegemony in the Asia-Pacific.
Mearsheimer’s (2014) claims are supported by Waltz’s Structural Realism After the Cold
War by Waltz (2000) claim that the US will counterbalance China and attempt to prevent
it from achieving regional hegemony by maintaining a large military presence in the
Asia-Pacific and with alliances, believing that China has long-term potential for
becoming a great power. The Roots of America's China Policy by Morgenthau (1962),
however dated the observations may be in comparison with Waltz (2000) and
Mearsheimer (2014), made an observation that Mearsheimer and Waltz both chose to
ignore: that the US has historically had contradictory foreign policies towards China.
Morgenthau (1962) actually undermined the realist argument when pointing out the US
military apparatus and civilian apparatus held different perceptions of China and came to
the conclusion that there was no possibility that the US government would revise its

foreign policy on China regarding the US and Taiwan. This indicated that there was in
fact, a divide between military and civilian policy makers, resulting in contradictory
policies towards China. For a unitary state actor to act in contradiction of itself is
uncharacteristic of an entity acting rationally to make choices. Realists fail to consider
that states, which are made up of individuals with emotions and biases, craft, influence
and ultimately make foreign policy decisions that affect the state. In many ways, the
threat perceptions of these individuals become the threat perceptions of the state. Since
contradictory policies are not explained adequately by realist theory at the state level,
another method is needed to assess the sub-national and individual levels of analysis.
Cognitive Analysis, located within the field of foreign policy analysis, provides
for better ways of understanding how foreign policy analysis operates in regards to US
threat perception towards Chinese naval expansion because it provides a wide range of
models and criteria that better assess elements like individual bias, emotions, and beliefs
that affect key US policy-makers' decisions and policy outcomes. Understanding the
fundamental processes that are happening on the micro-level of international relations has
greater implications for the actions of states and the outcomes of these actions on the
macro-level. Simply put, it is difficult to understand how decisions by states are made if
the decision-making processes of individuals are not thoroughly assessed.

3.1: Research Question
How has Chinese naval expansion affected the threat perceptions of American
senior decision-makers in the White House, National Security Council, Defense
Department and the Department of State?
3.2: Hypotheses
H1: If the National Security Adviser, Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State
perceive Chinese naval expansion as particularly threatening, the US President is likely to
have an increased threat perception of Chinese naval expansion.
H2: The Secretary of Defense and the National Security Adviser are likely to have
the strongest threat perceptions as a result of the office that they hold, which is amplified
depending on how strongly their personal bias towards Chinese naval expansion is.
H3: The Secretary of State is likely to perceive Chinese naval expansion as a
threat; however, their threat perception is likely to be lower than the US President,
National Security Adviser and Secretary of Defense due to the office that he/she holds
and the diplomatic nature of that office's mission.
H Null: There is no causal relationship between Chinese naval expansion and the
rise in threat perceptions of key US foreign policy makers in the first Obama
administration.

Chapter 4: Methodology
The approach considers changes in the threat perceptions of key US foreign
policy makers in the following bureaucracies: the White House (Barack Obama), the
National Security Council (James Jones, Tom Donilon), the Department of Defense
(Robert Gates, Leon Panetta) and the Department of State (Hillary Clinton) during the 1st
Obama administration (January 2009-December 2012). The cognitive approach has been
tried and tested in controlled experiments in psychology and neuroscience, as well as
through qualitative analysis of group dynamics and foreign policy decisions made by
previous US presidential administrations, however a cognitive approach to assess the
threat perception of foreign policy makers specifically to Chinese naval expansion has
not been applied. Controlled experiments have proven fruitful for measuring threat
perceptions of actors in given scenarios, however there is a lack of direct experimentation
on key US foreign policy actors. Such experimentation is likely to yield the most reliable
results of key US policy makers’ threat perceptions, however, it is unlikely that these
actors would be available or willing to participate in such experimentation due to the
responsibilities and discretion of their office.
Due to certain limitations mentioned above, a contextual analysis of Chinese
naval expansion on the threat perception of each individual is conducted through the
dissection of biographies, autobiographies, policy reports, speeches and interviews from
each of these bureaucracies through their online databases has been chosen as the most
suitable way to conduct research on this topic. These sources were chosen because they
provided the best means of tracking changes in the threat perceptions of key US foreign

policy makers in the Obama Administration over a four-year period. Major challenges
faced by this approach include relying on the honesty of opinions and perceptions given
by key US foreign policy makers, and for National Security Adviser James Jones, a lack
of information indicating threat perceptions of Chinese naval expansion. For these
reasons, peer-reviewed articles, expert analysis, Chinese national defense policies, PRC
reports, PRC speeches, PRC defense white papers and naval actions taken in areas such
as the East China Sea and South China Sea are used to provide contextual information
and inference regarding the formation and changes in threat perception of key US foreign
policy makers in the first Obama administration.
The validity of the cognitive approach in foreign policy and the models it
generates are based upon the premise that foreign policy actors are limited in their
abilities to process information and fully maximize their interests while living in a world
that is incoherent, complex, and changing (Levy, 2013, p. 310). This approach challenges
the realist approach, based on rational choice theory, which fails to account for emotional
factors present in cognition that affect an individual’s threat perceptions and the rational
decision-making process. To validate the cognitive approach as a better approach for
analyzing foreign policy decisions, it is tested by applying information and analysis
collected from sources indicating threat perceptions of key US foreign policy decision-
makers against four attributes outlined by cognitivist Stein (2008) that compromise
rational decision-making and influence individuals’ abilities to process information and
judgment in complex and uncertain environments. These four attributes are the need for
simplicity, the need for consistency, the tendency of decision-makers to fundamentally

misunderstand probability, and the tendency of decision-makers to be more averse to loss
than gain-seeking. This approach is a more suitable approach for analyzing the threat
perceptions of key US foreign policy makers than rational choice theory because it
accounts for cognitive limitations and emotional factors present in human actors during
the formation of perception and decision-making processes. These four attributes may
better explain deficiencies in rational choice making that lead to contradictory policies
towards an actor’s preferences. Explanations are provided by empirical evidence
discovered from the research, which indicated that there are instances in which emotion
and cognitive limitations affected threat perception and influenced decision-making
processes of key US foreign policy makers towards Chinese naval expansion during the
first Obama administration.
4.1: Limitations of the Paper
Limitations of this paper include direct access to certain individuals (US
President, US Secretary of State, National Security Adviser, US Secretary of Defense) in
the US government who may be able to provide insider perspectives for a more thorough
analysis. Internal memos or confidential documents (information not made available to
the public) which may provide crucial information to indicate what perceptions, beliefs,
emotions and biases these individuals have regarding Chinese naval expansion may also
be inaccessible. There is also the assumption that individuals are being truthful about the
reasons behind their statements and the statements themselves. Some of these limitations
can be overcome by analyzing and cross-referencing speeches, interviews and

publications on Chinese naval expansion with the biographies, autobiographies and
memoirs of key US decision-makers to infer or come to a more accurate conclusion of
what personal views each decision-maker has.
4.2: Anticipated Outcomes
The anticipated outcomes of this research are expanding the understanding of how
US foreign policy towards China between January 2009 and December 2012 were
formed, what difference in perceptions were present and what points of interests created
convergence and divergence amongst key policy makers in the White House, State
Department, Defense Department and National Security Council. Each policy maker is
likely to view Chinese naval expansion as a threat since 2000; however the degrees of
threat perception are likely to differ along with opinions on what the best policy action
taken to counter this threat is.

Chapter 5: The President of the United States
Barack Obama (January 2009 – December 2016)
From the onset of his first administration, US President Barack Obama presented
his views on matters of security at the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue on
July 27, 2009, expressing that the U.S.-China relationship was previously determined by
a shared rivalry with the Soviet Union, however he believed that:
Today, we have a comprehensive relationship that reflects the deepening ties
among our people….My confidence is rooted in the fact that the United States and
China share mutual interests. If we advance those interests through cooperation,
our people will benefit and the world will be better off -- because our ability to
partner with each other is a prerequisite for progress on many of the most pressing
global challenges (Office of the Press Secretary, 2009c).
This statement set the tone for Obama’s posturing and overall foreign policy strategy
towards China: one of cooperation and partnership. Obama named four pressing
challenges that he aimed to work on with the Chinese: these were economic recovery, a
clean energy future, prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation and advancing
cooperation in dealing with transnational threats (Office of the Press Secretary, 2009c).
He proposed that these goals could be achieved “[t]hrough increased ties between our
militaries, [which] can diminish causes for dispute while providing a framework for
cooperation” (Office of the Press Secretary, 2009c). Obama’s initial push for closer
military ties with the Chinese also received support from Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (Bureau of Public Affairs Department of
State, 2009a; U.S. Department of Defense, 2009a). Obama specifically mentioned
Clinton as “[one] of my closest advisors...[who has] obtained extraordinary experience
working with China” (Office of the Press Secretary, 2009c). By stating so, Obama

designated Clinton as his second-in-command on Chinese foreign political-security
policy issues. According to Graham Allison’s Bureaucratic Politics Model, this is not
unusual as the Secretary of State is “in form and usually in fact...the primary repository of
political judgment on the political-military issues that are the stuff of contemporary
foreign policy” (Allison, 1969, p. 709). At this point in time, the Obama administration
appeared to be acting in sync on security matters with the Chinese. There would,
however, be difficulties. After the USNS Impeccable naval incident, where five Chinese
ships allegedly surrounded and ‘harassed’ the Impeccable while it conducted surveillance
operations in an area China considered its territorial waters, Obama met with Chinese
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi to discuss the matter amongst others, however it was not
deemed as important as other issues on the agenda and the meeting itself was closed to
the press (Baker, 2009). The Chinese Foreign Ministry shared a different opinion on the
matter. Ma Zhaoxu, spokesman for the China’s Foreign Ministry believed that:
The story of the US side is totally untrue and unacceptable….The US Navy
Surveillance Vessel, the Impeccable, in disregard of relevant international laws
and Chinese laws and regulations, engaged in activities in China’s exclusive
economic zones without our permission. China has lodged solemn representations
to the US side. We urge the US side to take effective measures to prevent
recurrence of similar incidents (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s
Republic of China, 2009).
The White House declined to say to what extent the Impeccable was discussed except
that Obama hoped to avoid naval incidents in the future (Baker, 2009). Secretary Gates
and Secretary Clinton also chose to focus their comments on avoiding possible incidents
in the future (Bureau of Public Affairs Department of State, 2009c; U.S. Department of
Defense, 2009a). Richard K. Herrmann and Jonathan W. Keller conducted a study titled

Beliefs, Values, and Strategic Choice: U.S. Leaders’ Decisions to Engage, Contain, and
Use Force in an Era of Globalization, which analyzed China, Russia, Iran and Japan and
their findings confirmed their hypothesis that “leaders who value free trade and reject
mercantilism are more likely to support engagement and less likely to support
containment and the use of force” (Herrmann & Keller, 2004, p. 572). Obama supported
this notion by confirming that was a leader that wanted to “pursue trade that is free and
fair” (Office of the Press Secretary, 2009c). Furthermore, Herrmann and Keller
concluded that:
Our findings strongly suggest that attitudes toward trade and global commerce
have become an important new ideational fault-line among American elites in the
post-Cold War era of globalization….not surprisingly, a ‘free trade’ orientation is
associated with engagement strategies….free traders are significantly less likely
to favor [containment and the use of force] (Herrmann & Keller, 2004, p. 576).
Herrmann and Keller’s assessment could explain strategies employed by key foreign
policy makers in the Obama administration and their preference for engagement through
free trade and regional forums instead of containment and the use of force. This may also
explain why the Obama Administration and the Chinese Foreign Ministry declined to
comment on the Impeccable and agreed to avoid naval incidents in the future. If President
Obama formed a threat perception as a result of the Impeccable incident at this time, he
chose not to reveal it publicly. The importance of focusing on economic issues and
avoidance of public discussion on the Impeccable may have been reasons for a closed
rather than open meeting between Obama and Yang Jiechi.
Obama’s speech at the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, while
glossing over the recent Impeccable incident, did indicate that there would be issues

when Obama stated that:
I have no illusion that the United States and China will agree on every issue, nor
choose to see the world in the same way…. We know that some are wary of the
future. Some in China think that America will try to contain China's ambitions;
some in America think that there is something to fear in a rising China. I take a
different view. And I believe President Hu takes a different view, as well. I
believe in a future where China is a strong, prosperous and successful member of
the community of nations; a future when our nations are partners out of necessity,
but also out of opportunity….Our task is to forge a path to the future that we seek
for our children -- to prevent mistrust or the inevitable differences of the moment
from allowing that trail to be blocked by grass; to always be mindful of the
journey that we are undertaking together (Office of the Press Secretary, 2009c).
At the time of the Impeccable incident, economic recovery after the 2008 took priority
over the naval incident and neither of the civilian governments wanted to lose focus of
that (Newsmax, 2009). Chinese military officials, however, felt differently about the
Impeccable’s presence and US Asia-Pacific strategic goals. Chinese military officials
alleged that the Impeccable was a spy ship, likely stationed near Hainan’s waters to
monitor Shang-class nuclear-powered attack submarine activities (China Daily, 2009;
Newsmax, 2009). The US reaction to China exercising what it considered its legal rights
in its territorial waters was met with some surprise, as Rear Admiral Lin Mao, former
vice commander of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) described the
Impeccable’s behavior “like a man with a criminal record wandering just outside the gate
of a family home. When the host comes out to find out what he is doing there, the man
complains that the host had violated his rights” (China Daily, 2009). The seriousness of
the Impeccable incident was downplayed by the President Obama’s and President Hu’s
administrations but acted as a starting point for disagreements between the Obama
administration and Chinese leadership over maritime security issues.

Obama’s engagement strategy in Asia did not only focus on free trade but also on
alliances and regional forums like ASEAN. Obama spoke in Japan on November 14,
2009, and stated that “alliances [with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand and the
Philippines] continue to provide the bedrock of security and stability that has allowed the
nations and peoples of this region to pursue opportunity and prosperity” (Office of the
Press Secretary, 2009d). After the ASEAN 10 Meeting on November 15, 2009, Obama
noted the importance of working with ASEAN, stating:
[T]he United States is a Pacific nation, and we enjoy deep historical ties to
Southeast Asia -- one of the most important and dynamic regions of the world. As
the first U.S. President to have a personal connection to the region, I reaffirmed to
my ASEAN friends that the United States is committed to strengthening its
engagement in Southeast Asia both with our individual allies and partners, and
with ASEAN as an institution (Office of the Press Secretary, 2009e).
This engagement was well-received by Prime Minister Abhisit of Thailand, who said
“ASEAN also stands ready to be a reliable partner of the U.S. in attacking the various
global and regional challenges, whether it's climate change, whether it's the Doha Round,
or counterterrorism and other security issues” (Office of the Press Secretary, 2009e).
‘Regional challenges’ and ‘other security issues’ included the increasing Chinese naval
presence in its neighboring seas, maritime disputes and territorial disputes in the region.
Obama, yet again, felt the need to include statements to dispel fears from China, stressing
that “rising powers with the view that in the 21st century...need not come at the expense
of another...China's emergence...does not need to be a zero-sum game” (Office of the
Press Secretary, 2009d). Obama reiterated his cooperative stance at a town hall meeting
with future Chinese leaders on November 16, 2009, saying that “power in the 21st
century is no longer a zero-sum game...that is why the United States insists we do not

seek to contain China's rise. On the contrary, we welcome China as a strong and
prosperous and successful member of the community of nations” (Office of the Press
Secretary, 2009f). In contrast to Obama’s statement of cooperation and peace, one
Chinese businessman had concerns about ongoing US arms sales to Taiwan and asked
Obama, “[A]re you supportive of improved cross-straits relations?” (Office of the Press
Secretary, 2009f). Obama gave the following response:
I have been clear in the past that my administration fully supports a one-China
policy in terms of our relations with Taiwan as well as our relations with the
People's Republic of China. We don't want to change that policy and that
approach. I am very pleased with the reduction of tensions and the improvement
in cross-straits relations, and it is my deep desire and hope that we will continue
to see great improvement between Taiwan and...the People's Republic in
resolving many of these issues….the United States, in terms of its foreign policy
and its policy with respect to China, is always seeking [ways]...through dialogue
and negotiations [to solve problems]….there are some people who still look
towards the past when it comes to these issues, as opposed to looking towards the
future. I prefer to look towards the future (Office of the Press Secretary, 2009f).
Obama showed satisfaction with ‘the reduction of tensions and improvement of cross-
strait relations’ but did not give specifics on arms sales to Taiwan or whether the US
intended to stop these sales in the foreseeable future. The Chinese Foreign Ministry
voiced its opposition to sales previously, yet Robert Kovac, acting Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for defense trade in December 2009, said the US was undertaking
negotiations with the Taiwanese involving helicopters and diesel-electric submarines
(Blanchard, 2009). Obama mentioned that there would be certain obstacles and
disagreements between the PRC and the US; this appeared to be one of them.
On November 17, 2009, China and the US released a joint statement promising
that:

The two sides will actively implement various exchange and cooperation
programs agreed between the two militaries, including by increasing the level and
frequency of exchanges. The goal of these efforts is to improve their capabilities
for practical cooperation and foster greater understanding of each other’s
intentions and of the international security environment (Office of the Press
Secretary, 2009g).
There appeared to be a genuine interest between both China and the US in improving
their security dialogue. It was clear that at the time, the two most prominent security
issues were the brief but notable Impeccable incident and the ongoing Taiwan arms sales
dispute. While Taiwan continued to be an ongoing issue, the PRC and the US employed
exchange and cooperation programs to create greater trust and avoid incidents like the
Impeccable in the future. Still, there remained skeptics who questioned the US strategy
towards China. During his interview with Obama, Xiang Xi of Southern Daily mentioned
to Obama that he “talked twice, in Tokyo and Shanghai, that America not trying to
contain China's rise” and asked “[H]ow do you plan to carry out this policy? How do you
do it?” (Obama, 2009). Obama replied by saying that:
I think through the kinds of ongoing discussions and dialogue that we're currently
having with China. It is in the United States' interests to have a stable and
prosperous China that helps to anchor a stable and prosperous Asia in the same
way that Japan's stability, South Korea's stability creates a more peaceful world
and greater commercial ties with the United States….I think that the only thing
that could prevent such a positive outcome is if there are misunderstandings and
miscalculations between the two sides. And that's why it's so important for us to
have these continuous dialogues both on the economic set of issues, but also on
security issues. And the more trust that's been established between the two
countries, the less likely such misunderstandings could occur. established between
the two countries, the less likely such misunderstandings could occur (Obama,
2009).
It was in Obama’s interest to have a stable Asia where trade could be conducted without
fear that Chinese and American misunderstandings could lead to conflict. Free trade

appeared to be the most important objective to achieve in the Asia-Pacific for Obama,
and he sought to achieve this by engaging in bilateral relations with allies and new
partners, strategic talks and military trust-building programs with China, and multilateral
relations in regional forums like ASEAN. These became themes of the 2010 US National
Security Strategy, which called for collective engagement and building cooperation with
emerging powers in the 21st
century (United States Government, 2010). Collective
engagement included “working to build deeper and more effective partnerships with
other key centers of influence – including China, India, [Russia, Brazil, South Africa and
Indonesia]...so that we can cooperate on issues of bilateral concern, with the recognition
that power...is no longer a zero sum game” (United States Government, 2010, p. 3). It
also included discussion of threats, such as “pursu[ing] engagement with hostile nations
to test their intentions, giv[ing] their governments the opportunity to change course,
reach[ing] out to their people, and mobiliz[ing] international coalitions” (United States
Government, 2010, p. 3) and “new and emerging powers hold out opportunities for
partnership, even as a handful of states endanger regional and global security by flouting
international norms (United States Government, 2010, p. 8). These threats were most
likely in reference to Iran and North Korea, however the National Security Strategy does
not make a point to limit these phrases to Iran and North Korea, possibly indicating that
there are other states that fall into these categories. The potential for China to be a threat
is present in the National Security strategy due to certain phrasing made when
referencing China in the following:
We welcome a China that takes on a responsible leadership role in working with
the United States and the international community...We will monitor China’s

military modernization program and prepare accordingly to ensure that U.S.
interests and allies, regionally and globally, are not negatively affected. We are
using our newly established Strategic and Economic Dialogue to...improve
communication between our militaries in order to reduce mistrust. We will
encourage continued reduction in tension between the People’s Republic of China
and Taiwan. We will not agree on every issue….But disagreements should not
prevent cooperation on issues of mutual interest (United States Government,
2010, p. 43).
Words and phrases such as ‘responsible leadership,’ ‘not negatively affected,’ ‘reduce
mistrust,’ ‘tension,’ and ‘disagreements’ imply that China either failed to meet Obama’s
expectations or that Obama perceived China as potentially threatening US interests by not
cooperating with the US on ‘issues of mutual interests.’ When comparing India, another
‘key center of influence’ to China, it is clear that India received greater praise from
Obama as he noted “India’s responsible advancement serves as a positive example for
developing nations, and provides an opportunity for increased economic, scientific,
environmental, and security partnership” (United States Government, 2010, p. 43).
Obama compared China and India, both key centers of influence and assigned a greater
positive overtone through word choices such as ‘shared interests,’ ‘shared values,’ and ‘a
positive example’ to the relationship with India. This positive perception of India is
reinforced during the U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue Reception on June 3, 2010 when
Obama “firmly believe[d] that the relationship between the United States and India will
be a defining partnership in the 21st
century….India is fundamentally unique --
because...we share common interests [and] common values...India is indispensable to the
future that we seek -- a future of security and prosperity for all nations” (Office of the
Press Secretary, 2010a). To this extent, Obama insisted that “[we] will seek to work with
India to promote stability in South Asia and elsewhere in the world” (United States

Government, 2010, p. 44). Strategic developments between India and the US were met
with suspicion, as elements of the People’s Liberation Army suspected a growing
strategy of encirclement. Air force colonel Dai Xu believed that “China is in a crescent-
shaped ring of encirclement. The ring begins in Japan, stretches through nations in the
South China Sea to India, and ends in Afghanistan” (Qin & Li, 2010). Other spectators at
the China Daily also voiced their concern for US strategic engagement, alleging that
“[t]he US changed its Asia strategy in a hurry to return to Asia, complicating China's
relations with its neighbors further and weakening their political mutual trust” (Zhang &
Zhong, 2010). Obama hoped that the military-to-military dialogue would help clarify US
strategic interests and objectives in the reason, however it was apparent that Obama’s
actions were received as a containment policy, especially by elements of the Chinese
military that Obama had hoped to sway.
Throughout 2010, Obama’s strategy to maintain a cooperative strategic
partnership with Chinese leadership remained consistent, highlighting repeatedly that
China and the US “have to work cooperatively together in order to achieve regional peace
and stability, because the world looks to the relationship between China and the United
States as a critical ingredient on a whole range of security issues around the world”
(Office of the Press Secretary, 2010b, 2010c). Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao echoed
Obama’s sentiments, insisting that “[o]ur common interests far outweigh our differences.
In spite of the disagreements of one kind or another between our two countries, I believe
these differences can be well resolved through dialogue and cooperation. So the China-
U.S. relationship will always forge ahead. I have confidence in this” (Office of the Press

Secretary, 2010b, 2010c). Neither President Obama nor Premier Wen decided to mention
the September 7th
, 2010 incident between Japan and China nearly three weeks before
their meeting, where a Chinese fishing trawler captain rammed two Japanese patrol boats
near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, resulting in the detention of the Chinese
captain and crew of the vessel (Nye & Rudd, 2014). In retaliation for the Japanese
bringing charges against the Chinese captain, China halted exportation of rare earth
metals for nearly two months (Nye & Rudd, 2014). This was a serious and notable flare
up between two major US trading partners and one of the most important US strategic
allies in the region. Obama let the issue be handled between the Japan and China, and
instead focused on strengthening US involvement through bilateral and multilateral
commitments in the region. Japanese Prime Minister Kan, however, indirectly mentioned
the incident, noting “in Japan’s relations with China and Russia, recently we've faced
some problems, and the United States has supported Japan throughout, so I expressed my
appreciation to him for that” (Office of the Press Secretary, 2010f). Maritime disputes
between the US regional allies started to become more frequent, and as a result the US
started to become more assertive.
On September 24, 2010 at the Opening of the U.S.-ASEAN Leaders Meeting,
Obama elevated US involvement by asserting that “As President, I’ve...made it clear that
the United States intends to play a leadership role in Asia. So we’ve strengthened old
alliances; we've deepened new partnerships, as we are doing with China; and we’ve
reengaged with regional organizations, including ASEAN” (Office of the Press Secretary,
2010d). Obama signaled his intent to deepen US involvement by elevating the US

position from a regional partner to a regional leader. This included the intent to “focus on
deepening our political and security cooperation….That is why the United States has
accepted ASEAN’s invitation to join the East Asia summit, which will help us meet
regional and global challenges together” (Office of the Press Secretary, 2010d). This
statement was welcomed by Japanese Prime Minister Kan, who stated “for the peace and
security of the countries in the region, the presence of the United States and the presence
of the U.S. military [is becoming] increasingly important. And that is not only my sense
but I think the sense of many countries, many neighboring countries in this region”
(Office of the Press Secretary, 2010f). Obama wanted the ability to shape regional
dynamics to benefit US interests and believed that “the East Asia Summit [became] a
premier organizational structure to work on political and security issues” (Office of the
Press Secretary, 2010e). Obama felt that “there’s enormous potential and enormous
promise [in Asia] -- but only if countries are cooperating, if they are observing basic rules
of the road, if potential conflicts are resolved in a peaceful fashion” (Office of the Press
Secretary, 2010e). During his meeting with Indonesian President Yudhoyono he
mentioned “the issue of the South China Sea and how various maritime issues, conflicts,
can get resolved in a peaceful fashion….But there may be a whole host of other issues
like that in which the East Asia Summit is probably the ideal venue” (Office of the Press
Secretary, 2010e). Secretary of State Clinton was becoming a more influential player
with President Obama over political-security matters in the Asia-Pacific, as she
emphasized the importance of the East Asia Summit and addressing the South China Sea
issue in a speech given in July, 2010 (Bureau of Public Affairs Department of State,

2010a). Obama has many advisers, but as he noted before, Clinton is one of his closest
and therefore has greater influence in the over Asia-Pacific strategy. While attempting to
maintain the appearance of a cooperative partner to China, Clinton noted that these tactics
were designed to curb China’s unchecked expansion as a regional power and bring it to
the table on equal footing with its smaller neighbors (H. R. Clinton & Spotswood, 2014,
p. 298). By echoing and supporting Clinton’s strategies in his speeches, Obama must
have felt that it was an appropriate strategy towards China.
Still, for Obama, the US-Japan alliance was the foundation for security in the
region, something that he had no intention of changing. As he noted in his remarks in
Japan on November 13, 2010 the US and Japan have been “allies for half a
century….[and] the partnership between Japan and the United States has been the
foundation for our security and our prosperity -- not only for our two countries, but also
for the region” (Office of the Press Secretary, 2010f). Obama clearly stated that “[t]he
commitment of the United States to the defense of Japan is unshakeable….We’ve
instructed our governments to intensify their efforts to deepen and modernize our
alliance” (Office of the Press Secretary, 2010f). Obama avoided taking sides in the
Senkaku/Diaoyu island dispute, but made it clear that if China should resort to settling
island disputes in the East China Sea with Japan through the use of force, the US would
be obligated to intervene.
In January, 2011, Obama’s speeches started becoming more detailed, specifically
outlining US security interests in the Asia-Pacific, where he “stressed that the United
States has a fundamental interest in maintaining freedom of navigation, unimpeded

commerce, respect for international law and the peaceful resolution of
differences….[and] welcomed the progress that’s been made on both sides of the Taiwan
Strait in reducing tensions” (Office of the Press Secretary, 2011a). Chinese President Hu
responded with a list of his own objectives, stating that:
The two sides [China and the US] should firmly adhere to the right direction of
our relationship; respect each other’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and
development interests; promote the long-term sound and steady growth of China-
U.S. relations; and make even greater contributions to maintaining and promoting
world peace and development (Office of the Press Secretary, 2011a).
On the same day, the US and China released a joint statement, saying that they would
continue to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, uphold commitments
to continue positive relations concerning Taiwan, continue military to military exchanges
in order to reduce misunderstandings and mistrust, acknowledged that each nation played
a major role in the security of the Asia-Pacific and agreed to work on a variety of security
issues, including increasing maritime consultations and communications (Office of the
Press Secretary, 2011b). While it may have appeared that Obama and Hu were merely
listing desired outcomes of their ongoing relationship and agreed to uphold commitments
made to one another, these lists also acted as indicators to remind or highlight
shortcomings in expectations towards one another. This rhetoric also came at a time when
China was becoming more aggressive with its territorial claims in the South China Sea
under its infamous ‘nine-dash-line’ map, which put most of the South China Sea under
the sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China. China reasserted its claims on April
14, 2011 through a letter sent to the United Nations, citing “China has indisputable
sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys

sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and
subsoil thereof” (The Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China, 2011).
Clearly, there is disagreement on how international law is applied and how Chinese
sovereignty affects US freedom of navigation. The Obama administration wants
international rules and norms based for the South China Sea to be based on the United
Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS), which outlines rules and guidelines for
defining territory and has dispute resolution mechanisms for solving disagreements
(Office of the Press Secretary, 2011j; UNCLOS, 1994). These challenges were
recognized by President Hu during his meeting with President Obama in January, where
he believed that “[u]nder the current circumstances, our two countries share broader
common interests, show their bigger common responsibilities, and face more severe
common challenges then at any time in history” (Office of the Press Secretary, 2011a).
Tensions amongst claimants remained high in the South China Sea, especially as
China continued to build islands, attempted to extract possible hydrocarbons from
disputed sea beds like that of the Chinese military drill deployed off of the Spratly Islands
in February 2011, and increased naval patrols in the South China Sea to enforce its own
claims (Banyan, 2011; BBC News, 2016; Dosch, 2011). On November 12, 2011,
President Obama and President Hu spoke again on their ongoing relationship and
reiterated the importance of China and the US working together on regional security
issues. Obama noted that “[s]uch cooperation is particularly important to the Asia Pacific
region, where both China and the United States are extraordinarily active” (Office of the
Press Secretary, 2011d). ‘Extraordinarily active’ regarding security concerns for naval

activity included increased Chinese patrols, greater interference of free navigation by the
Chinese, and Chinese resentment of US involvement in the region. On July 22, 2011, the
Indian naval vessel INS Airavat, on its way for a routine port stop in Vietnam, received a
radio transmission in international waters from the Chinese navy, ordering it to leave
Chinese territorial waters (Bagchi, 2011). Notably, this sort of interference conflicts with
the freedom of navigation, which is something that Obama previously stated was a
fundamental interest of the US. Nearly a month before on June 28, 2011, Chinese Foreign
Ministry spokesman Hong Lei responded to a question about the U.S. Senate passing a
resolution regarding China’s ‘use of force’ in the South China Sea by rejecting US
involvement in South China Sea territorial disputes and insisting that “[t]he disputes
should be resolved through direct negotiations between the countries involved” (Xinhua,
2011a). Hong added that "[f]reedom of shipping in the South China Sea has never been
affected by the disputes, and there has never been such a problem" (Xinhua, 2011a). The
Chinese Foreign Ministry rejected the notion that its actions in the South China Sea are
impeding commerce activities. In fact, it seemed that President Hu felt that it was not
China, but other states that were cause for concern, stating on November 12, 2011 that:
As things stand, the international situation is undergoing complex and profound
changes. There is growing instability and uncertainty in the world economic
recovery, and regional security threat has become more salient. Under these
circumstances, it is all the more important for China and the United States to
increase their communication and coordination. China looks forward to
maintaining and strengthening dialogue and cooperation with the United States, to
respect each other’s major concerns, appropriately manage sensitive issues, and
ensure that the China-U.S. relationship will continue to grow on a sustainable and
stable path. (Office of the Press Secretary, 2011d).
‘Regional security threat,’ ‘major concerns’ and ‘sensitive issues’ for China included the

increasing US naval presence, the mobilization of military resources to new and old allies
in the Asia-Pacific, and the establishment of new and old alliances and partnerships that
threaten to curtail Chinese ambitions to pursue its “core interests which include the
following: state sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity and national
reunification” (The People’s Republic of China, 2011). China reiterated the above core
interests in a white paper called “China’s Peaceful Development” in September, 2011,
two months before President Hu and President Obama. Since China claims state
sovereignty over most of the South China Sea, the first core interest extends to national
security and territorial integrity. Given the PRC’s perception of its core interests and their
application to what it considers sovereign territory, Chinese naval expansion is justified
to secure its territorial integrity and national security. President Hu and President Obama
have voiced their desire to work cooperatively with one another on regional security
issues, however their interests increasingly came into conflict with one another, and the
strategic actions taken by both sides appeared to continually work against instead of
towards the trust-building measures enacted before.
In November, 2011, Obama continued to deepen Asia-Pacific security
partnerships. On November 16, 2011, President Obama and Australian Prime Minister
Gillard announced two new force posture initiatives. The first committed 250 marines
starting in 2012 to the Northern Territory of Australia and would eventually increase to
2,500 by 2017 (ABC News, 2011; Office of the Press Secretary, 2011e). The second
initiative increased U.S. aircraft rotations in the Northern Territory, which likely included
B-52s, FA-18s and Harrier jump-jets (Lane, 2011; Office of the Press Secretary, 2011e).

The White House considered this initiative “part of an ongoing review of U.S. force
posture in the Asia-Pacific region intended to pursue a more geographically distributed,
operationally resilient and politically sustainable military presence in this region” (Office
of the Press Secretary, 2011e). Obama also took time to meet with regional partners and
allies to reaffirm commitments. While in Bali, Indonesia, Obama described his meeting
with US ally, Filipino President Aquino, as “an opportunity for us to discuss how we can
further deepen that relationship; also, to discuss the topics of the East Asia Summit --
issues like maritime security, nonproliferation, disaster and humanitarian relief” (Office
of the Press Secretary, 2011f). He also met with Indonesian President Yudhoyono,
agreeing to “a number of steps that will expand our cooperation, including training and
support to help the Indonesian military as it modernizes….[help] build Indonesia’s
capacity to ensure its own security [and] play an active role in promoting security in the
region” (Office of the Press Secretary, 2011i). Obama also “conveyed to President
Yudhoyono our appreciation of Indonesia’s regional leadership, which has helped us to
achieve real progress on issues like disaster relief, maritime security, and
nonproliferation” (Office of the Press Secretary, 2011i). Shoring up alliances in the
region with diplomatic and military support received scorn from the Chinese
governmental news source Xinhua, quoted as saying that “[t]he United States is also
trying to get involved in a number of regional maritime disputes, some of which concern
China's sovereignty and territorial integrity” (Rourke & Watts, 2011). It was difficult for
elements in the Chinese government to perceive Obama’s Asia-Pacific security strategy
as anything but conflicting with Chinese regional security interests. Strengthening

smaller regional states through material and logistical support while expanding and
modernizing old military alliances in the region acted as a counterweight to Chinese
naval expansion and the Chinese were well aware.
In his speech to the Australian Parliament in Canberra on November 17, 2011,
Obama made it abundantly clear that he would continue to counter Chinese naval
expansion and Chinese ambitions to secure its ‘core interests.’ Obama drew attention the
potential for conflict, presenting his perspective on Asia that:
With most of the world’s nuclear power and some half of humanity, Asia will
largely define whether the century ahead will be marked by conflict or
cooperation, needless suffering or human progress. As President, I have,
therefore, made a deliberate and strategic decision -- as a Pacific nation, the
United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its
future, by upholding core principles and in close partnership with our allies and
friends (Office of the Press Secretary, 2011g).
Obama asserted that ‘conflict or cooperation’ would define the century and created a
narrative that presented US involvement in Asia as stabilizing rather than destabilizing.
He then continued his speech to include what he wanted to see, asserting:
We stand for an international order in which the rights and responsibilities of all
nations and all people are upheld. Where international law and norms are
enforced. Where commerce and freedom of navigation are not impeded. Where
emerging powers contribute to regional security, and where disagreements are
resolved peacefully (Office of the Press Secretary, 2011g).
As previously noted, China has caused problems for the US by applying its own set of
laws and norms, impeding the freedom of navigation, escalating tensions between its
neighbors with naval assertiveness and resisting multilateral forums for discussing
maritime and territorial disputes. Obama’s language became stronger compared to
speeches previously given. The following statement is an example of this:

[W]e will allocate the resources necessary to maintain our strong military
presence in this region. We will preserve our unique ability to project power and
deter threats to peace. We will keep our commitments, including our treaty
obligations to allies like Australia. And we will constantly strengthen our
capabilities to meet the needs of the 21st century. Our enduring interests in the
region demand our enduring presence in the region. The United States is a Pacific
power, and we are here to stay. Indeed, we are already modernizing America’s
defense posture across the Asia Pacific. It will be more broadly distributed --
maintaining our strong presence in Japan and the Korean Peninsula, while
enhancing our presence in Southeast Asia. Our posture will be more flexible --
with new capabilities to ensure that our forces can operate freely. And our posture
will be more sustainable, by helping allies and partners build their capacity, with
more training and exercises (Office of the Press Secretary, 2011g).
The language was likely worded to send a strong and clear message to China. China, with
the largest naval force in the region, was the greatest traditional threat to regional peace
for the US. Obama clarified that he intended to project US power in the region, broadly
distribute power and increase the capacity for regional partners and allies to become more
effective through training. He also sought to discuss maritime security “including
cooperation in the South China Sea” at the East Asia Summit, and continued to endorse
“the rise of a peaceful and prosperous China” while seeking “more opportunities for
cooperation with Beijing, including greater communication between our militaries to
promote understanding and avoid miscalculation [and speaking] candidly to Beijing
about the importance of upholding international norms” (Office of the Press Secretary,
2011g). Obama promoted the idea of ‘peaceful’ rise for China while inferring that China
was not abiding by international norms and needed to do so. Still, Obama strategically
countered Chinese naval projection to ensure that China would be more inclined to take
the peaceful path as opposed to using its naval might to secure its ‘core interests.’ Obama
also welcomed larger regional players that could potentially counter Chinese naval
expansion like India “as it ‘looks east’ and plays a larger role as an Asian power” (Office

of the Press Secretary, 2011g). In this way, the US mobilized regional powers through
alliances and partnerships to resist Chinese heavy-handed tactics at sea. A major
difference that Obama made in his speeches at this time was he no longer attempted to
address concerns surrounding the idea of containing China. This could be due to Obama’s
perception that enough time had passed to the point where it no longer needed to be said,
he did not want to draw attention to this idea any longer and stopped doing so, or perhaps
the US strategy for checking Chinese naval assertiveness was already known to both
parties and did not need to be mentioned.
After the East Asia Summit in 2011, a senior Obama administration official gave
insight to dynamics between regional powers, China and the US. The senior official
highlighted that 16 of the 18 leaders present spoke about “maritime security in varying
levels of specificity. And most of them talked specifically about the South China Sea”
(Office of the Press Secretary, 2011j). Singapore, Vietnam and the Philippines stressed
“the importance of protecting freedom of navigation in the maritime domain in general
and in the South China Sea in particular...adherence to the rule of law in approaching and
settling disputes; the applicability of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea and the
importance for all nations to abide by its terms” (Office of the Press Secretary, 2011j).
The senior official also noted that “[s]everal other leaders stressed the importance of
protecting legitimate commerce in the maritime domain and particularly in the South
China Sea, and a number also called for a multilateral resolution of the conflicting
territorial claims by the parties themselves” (Office of the Press Secretary, 2011j). The
Russian Foreign Minister and Indonesian President Yudhoyono, who was also the

chairman of the summit, expressed that the EAS was an appropriate forum to discuss
maritime security. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao asked for the floor and the senior Obama
administration official gave their account of Jiabao’s response:
I would say that even though he started off maybe a little bit grouchy, by and
large it was very measured and interesting -- I would say a positive intervention.
Positive in the sense that he was not on a tirade, and he did not use many of the
more assertive formulas that we frequently hear from the Chinese, particularly in
public. So to be more specific, he said -- he began by saying that he did not --
China didn't think that the EAS was an appropriate forum for a discussion of this
issue….He said that he had not wanted the subject of South China Sea to be
raised, but that since it had been, he would respond. He then went on to say that
China shares the desire articulated by the ASEAN countries, for a cooperative
process to reach a code of conduct on the South China Sea (Office of the Press
Secretary, 2011j).
Premier Wen Jiabao refused to deal with maritime issues in the South China Sea where
claimants might be able to gain equal footing and collectively bargain against China.
China would not negotiate from a disadvantage and Wen:
[W]ent on to say that China believed that the disputes should be resolved between
the states or the interested parties directly. What he didn't say, and that -- what we
invariably have heard from the Chinese, was the word "bilaterally"…I can't say
that the Chinese have abandoned their position that the South China Sea
competing claims need to be resolved one-on-one, "mano a mano,"….but he
didn't say it. And he made his statement on the heels of the repeated point by
other leaders, that there needed to be a process…among the claimants for a
peaceful resolution (Office of the Press Secretary, 2011j).
China continued to follow its previous strategy of advocating for a peaceful resolution to
territorial disputes, however was reluctant to even discuss the disputes in a public forum
because this may disadvantage China’s ambitions for controlling the South China Sea.
Wen also “went on to say, as we've heard the Chinese say before in the ASEAN regional
forum and elsewhere, that there really isn't a problem because China, after all, protects
the sea lanes in the South China Sea; that China goes to great pains to ensure that the

shipping lanes are safe and free” (Office of the Press Secretary, 2011j). In this way, Wen
justified Chinese naval expansion in the South China Sea. He was looking for
endorsement from ASEAN members for China, instead of the US or any other power, as
the designated protector of the South China Sea. From the senior Obama administration
official’s perspective:
We certainly hit the mark, not by -- no confrontation; this was not ‘Showdown at
the O.K. Corral.’ This was a clear manifestation of an overwhelming consensus
among ASEAN and the other participants in the East Asia Summit about the
principles that President Obama has articulated throughout. This was spontaneous
combustion, and not artifice. These leaders were speaking openly and on their
own behalf. I think it was constructive, and one has to believe that the Chinese
premier will go back to Beijing with the sense that the center of gravity in the
Asia Pacific area is around the adherence to the principle of the rule of law,
peaceful resolution, and a constructive, rules-based approach to the resolution of
territorial disputes (Office of the Press Secretary, 2011j).
From the U.S. point of view, Obama achieved his goal of gaining regional consensus to
confront Chinese naval aggression through a multilateral forum centered around law. The
South China Sea was the focus of discussion from the EAS on the White House website,
but Chinese governmental news agency Xinhua made no mention of the South China Sea
nor maritime disputes in its coverage of the summit (Xinhua, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d).
Regardless, states attending the EAS reaffirmed their commitments to respect
international law, promote and maintain peace, stability, and security, and not interfere in
the internal affairs of another country (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 2011).
These principles conflict with the Chinese perspective of the South China Sea as
sovereign territory, which can therefore be considered an ‘internal affair,’ yet other states
in the region believed that the South China Sea fell under the rules of UNCLOS and were

deemed as international waters. This continued to be an issue for all parties involved at
the EAS.
On January, 19, 2012, Fareed Zakaria conducted an exclusive interview with
President Obama, where Obama was asked the following question:
As the Chinese watched your most recent diplomacy in Asia, is it fair for them to
have looked at the flurry of diplomatic activity — political, military, economic —
and concluded, as many Chinese scholars have, that the United States is building
a containment policy against China? (Zakaria, 2012).
Obama responded by stating the following:
No, that would not be accurate, and I’ve specifically rejected that formulation. I
think what would be fair to conclude is that, as I said we would do, the United
States has pivoted to focus on the fastest-growing region of the world, where we
have an enormous stake in peace, security, the free flow of commerce….So if you
look at what we’ve done, we’ve strengthened our alliances with Japan and South
Korea...We have involved ourselves in the regional architecture...including
organizations like ASEAN and APEC. We’ve sent a clear signal that we are a
Pacific power and we will continue to be a Pacific power, but we have done this
all in the context of a belief that a peacefully rising China is good for
everybody….I think the Chinese government respects us, respects what we’re
trying to do, recognizes that we’re going to be players in the Asia Pacific region
for the long term, but I think also recognize that we have in no way inhibited them
from continuing their extraordinary growth. The only thing we’ve insisted on, as a
principle in that region is, everybody’s got to play by the same set of rules,
everybody’s got to abide by a set of international norms. And that’s not unique to
China. That’s true for all of us (Zakaria, 2012).
Obama, while rejecting the notion that the US strategy was not to contain China’s rise,
contradicted himself by insisting that China play by the same rules as everyone else,
essentially preventing China from rising at a pace and in a way preferable to China.
While Obama’s strategy might not be strictly considered containment of China’s growth,
it certainly was an attempt by Obama to regulate China’s growth, both economically and
militarily. Obama also cited key alliances with Japan and South Korea, as well as
engagement with ASEAN and APEC. This served to remind China that the US has

powerful friends in the region who share the same perspective about Chinese naval
assertiveness and that it was expanding its friend circle, resulting in greater military
resources to counter China’s regional interests. Zakaria asked the follow-up question
“But you think they’re not?” to Obama regarding his opinion on if China was following
international rules and norms (Zakaria, 2012). Obama answered with the following
response:
I think that when we’ve had some friction in the relationship, it’s because China, I
think, still sees itself as a developing or even poor country that should be able to
pursue mercantilist policies that are for their benefit and where the rules applying
to them shouldn’t be the same rules that apply to the United States or Europe or
other major powers. And what we’ve tried to say to them very clearly is, Look,
you guys have grown up. You’re already the most populous country on earth,
depending on how you measure it, the largest or next-largest economy in the
world and will soon be the largest economy, almost inevitably. You are rapidly
consuming more resources than anybody else. And in that context, whether it’s
maritime issues or trade issues, you can’t do whatever you think is best for you.
You’ve got to play by the same rules as everybody else. I think that message is
one that resonates with other Asia Pacific countries, all of whom want a good
relationship with China, all of whom are desperately seeking access to China’s
markets and have forged enormous commercial ties, but who also recognize that
unless there are some international norms there, they’re going to get pushed
around and taken advantage of (Zakaria, 2012).
Obama mentioned that ‘[China] is consuming more resources than anybody else.’ It is not
secret that part of China’s motivation for controlling the South China Sea is to access
critical resources, such as the potentially vast amount of hydrocarbons laying beneath the
seabed or control over fertile fishing grounds. Obama pointed out China’s affinity
towards ‘taking advantage of’ smaller states by having them negotiate bilaterally on
Chinese terms. This notion was not restricted to trade either. Obama also drew attention
to China’s ‘mercantilist policies that are for their benefit,’ labeled Chinese
exceptionalism negatively, and criticized China, specifically on maritime issues, telling it

‘you can’t do whatever you think is best for you.’ Obama made it abundantly clear that
he was not going to let China do whatever it pleased, especially if its actions at sea
worked against U.S. freedom of navigation, unimpeded commerce and defied
international law. His interview gave the impression that the U.S. and states neighboring
China ‘want a good relationship with China’ but that as long as China continued to defy
international rules and norms, many which were influenced by the U.S. and European
states, China would continue to appear as self-interested and belligerent in order to get
what it wanted. Therefore, Obama revealed that he held a threat perception of Chinese
naval expansion as a result of its role in China’s continual defiance towards international
rules and norms in its neighboring seas.
On February 14, 2012, Obama held a meeting Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping,
who was the likely presidential candidate for China the following year. In this meeting
Obama repeated his position on the U.S.-China relationship, affirming that:
Throughout this process I have always emphasized that we welcome China’s
peaceful rise, that we believe that a strong and prosperous China is one that can
help to bring stability at [sic] prosperity to the region and to the world. And we
expect to be able to continue on the cooperative track that we’ve tried to establish
over the last three years…We have tried to emphasize that because of China’s
extraordinary development over the last two decades, that with expanding power
and prosperity also comes increased responsibilities….And we believe that it is
critically important that the United States and China develop a strong working
relationship to help to bring stability, order, and security that ultimately provides a
better life for both the people of the United States and the people of China (Office
of the Press Secretary, 2012a).
Obama highlighted that ‘we have tried to emphasize...China’s increased responsibilities’
implying that ‘tried’ but not succeeded at coming to an understanding were the results of
Obama’s efforts. Obama felt that ‘stability, order and security’ were areas that the U.S.

US Threat Perceptions and Chinese Naval Expansion - Final Submission UPDATED

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