The document discusses the emerging threat of hybrid warfare and its implications for expeditionary basing. Hybrid warfare involves both state and non-state actors working together across multiple domains to create uncertainty and exploit societal weaknesses. It could have a catastrophic impact on future battlefields. The Joint Standardization Board initiated a study to determine how hybrid warfare may affect expeditionary basing activities and identified 10 threats. During phase two of the study, the board will update a troop-to-task model to quantify basing threats under a hybrid warfare scenario and identify any leading indicators of new disruptive threats from open source reports. The ultimate goals are to understand how hybrid warfare may impact future base camps and have as many soldiers operating outside the wire as feasible
Small Wars Journal - A Laboratory for Preparing Forces to Win in a Complex WorldWilliam Orkins
The Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany serves as a laboratory for preparing multinational forces to address complex problems as outlined in the U.S. Army Operating Concept. At JMRC, U.S. and partner forces conduct training exercises to improve multinational interoperability and build relationships. While U.S. units gain valuable training, incorporating multinational partners adds an additional level of complexity that better prepares forces for real-world operations. To further enhance training, JMRC should implement experimental designs and capture lessons learned to continually improve training methods for multinational, joint operations.
Este documento describe los conceptos de impacto ambiental, gestión ambiental y tipos de impacto. Explica que el impacto ambiental es el efecto de las acciones humanas sobre el medio ambiente y puede ser simple, acumulativo o sinérgico. Además, detalla que la gestión ambiental establece requisitos para que las entidades locales formulen políticas y objetivos para mejorar continuamente su desempeño ambiental. Finalmente, señala que los estudios de impacto ambiental analizan cómo las transformaciones afectan al medio ambiente y a las personas.
The document discusses pitching and launching a startup business. It provides tips on creating an effective elevator pitch that tells a compelling story in a short time. An elevator pitch should answer key questions about the product or service, market, revenue model, team, competition, and competitive advantage. The document also discusses launching a business by creating an engaging story and testing it on early adopters to generate buzz before a wider launch. An effective launch relies on the product satisfying customers and creating word-of-mouth growth.
This document provides an overview of WatchOS 2 and developing Apple Watch apps. It discusses designing interfaces optimized for the Apple Watch, using Watch Connectivity for background data transfer and interactive messaging between an iOS app and Apple Watch app, and includes a code sample for setting up a Watch Connectivity session. Resources for learning more such as WWDC videos and blogs are also listed.
1) COISTs (Company Intelligence Support Teams) provide essential intelligence support to companies but their role is debated as the military shifts focus. Some see COISTs as only for counterinsurgency while others argue they are still needed.
2) The document discusses challenges to COIST effectiveness including a lack of formal doctrine and task organization not suited to hybrid threats involving both regular and irregular forces.
3) It argues that COISTs must be adapted to better integrate with company mission command systems during operations against hybrid threats, through improved training, doctrine, and organization within command posts rather than separate cells.
The document discusses six proposed Special Areas of Emphasis (SAEs) for the Joint Faculty Education Conference in 2007. The SAEs are nominated topics to be emphasized in the professional military education curricula of the joint colleges. The proposed SAEs include: Joint Command and Control, Information Assurance, the Joint Force Commander's Personnel Recovery responsibilities, an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations, Irregular Warfare, and Leveraging Government Expertise through Joint Functional Component Commands at USSTRATCOM.
The document discusses six proposed Special Areas of Emphasis (SAEs) for the Joint Faculty Education Conference in 2007. The SAEs are nominated topics that highlight important joint subject matter to be covered in Professional Military Education curricula. The six proposed SAEs cover the topics of Joint Command and Control, Information Assurance, the Joint Force Commander's Personnel Recovery responsibilities, an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations, Irregular Warfare, and leveraging expertise through Joint Functional Component Commands.
This document provides an overview of an operational environment (OE) battle book for opposing forces (OPFOR) training. It discusses the importance of considering the political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) variables that comprise any OE. It also introduces the concept of hybrid threats and how the Decisive Action Training Environment seeks to replicate real-world complexity to provide realistic training. The document is intended to assist students and trainers in developing an effective OPFOR that challenges U.S. forces.
Small Wars Journal - A Laboratory for Preparing Forces to Win in a Complex WorldWilliam Orkins
The Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany serves as a laboratory for preparing multinational forces to address complex problems as outlined in the U.S. Army Operating Concept. At JMRC, U.S. and partner forces conduct training exercises to improve multinational interoperability and build relationships. While U.S. units gain valuable training, incorporating multinational partners adds an additional level of complexity that better prepares forces for real-world operations. To further enhance training, JMRC should implement experimental designs and capture lessons learned to continually improve training methods for multinational, joint operations.
Este documento describe los conceptos de impacto ambiental, gestión ambiental y tipos de impacto. Explica que el impacto ambiental es el efecto de las acciones humanas sobre el medio ambiente y puede ser simple, acumulativo o sinérgico. Además, detalla que la gestión ambiental establece requisitos para que las entidades locales formulen políticas y objetivos para mejorar continuamente su desempeño ambiental. Finalmente, señala que los estudios de impacto ambiental analizan cómo las transformaciones afectan al medio ambiente y a las personas.
The document discusses pitching and launching a startup business. It provides tips on creating an effective elevator pitch that tells a compelling story in a short time. An elevator pitch should answer key questions about the product or service, market, revenue model, team, competition, and competitive advantage. The document also discusses launching a business by creating an engaging story and testing it on early adopters to generate buzz before a wider launch. An effective launch relies on the product satisfying customers and creating word-of-mouth growth.
This document provides an overview of WatchOS 2 and developing Apple Watch apps. It discusses designing interfaces optimized for the Apple Watch, using Watch Connectivity for background data transfer and interactive messaging between an iOS app and Apple Watch app, and includes a code sample for setting up a Watch Connectivity session. Resources for learning more such as WWDC videos and blogs are also listed.
1) COISTs (Company Intelligence Support Teams) provide essential intelligence support to companies but their role is debated as the military shifts focus. Some see COISTs as only for counterinsurgency while others argue they are still needed.
2) The document discusses challenges to COIST effectiveness including a lack of formal doctrine and task organization not suited to hybrid threats involving both regular and irregular forces.
3) It argues that COISTs must be adapted to better integrate with company mission command systems during operations against hybrid threats, through improved training, doctrine, and organization within command posts rather than separate cells.
The document discusses six proposed Special Areas of Emphasis (SAEs) for the Joint Faculty Education Conference in 2007. The SAEs are nominated topics to be emphasized in the professional military education curricula of the joint colleges. The proposed SAEs include: Joint Command and Control, Information Assurance, the Joint Force Commander's Personnel Recovery responsibilities, an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations, Irregular Warfare, and Leveraging Government Expertise through Joint Functional Component Commands at USSTRATCOM.
The document discusses six proposed Special Areas of Emphasis (SAEs) for the Joint Faculty Education Conference in 2007. The SAEs are nominated topics that highlight important joint subject matter to be covered in Professional Military Education curricula. The six proposed SAEs cover the topics of Joint Command and Control, Information Assurance, the Joint Force Commander's Personnel Recovery responsibilities, an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations, Irregular Warfare, and leveraging expertise through Joint Functional Component Commands.
This document provides an overview of an operational environment (OE) battle book for opposing forces (OPFOR) training. It discusses the importance of considering the political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) variables that comprise any OE. It also introduces the concept of hybrid threats and how the Decisive Action Training Environment seeks to replicate real-world complexity to provide realistic training. The document is intended to assist students and trainers in developing an effective OPFOR that challenges U.S. forces.
The OneSAF Objective System (OOS) is being developed to provide a simulation of the contemporary operating environment with flexibility. OOS will include over 25 unique sides operating asymmetrically. It will also include tools for users to create new entities, units, and behaviors without coding. OOS is working with subject matter experts like the TRADOC Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence to incorporate accurate representations of threats. This will allow OOS to more realistically simulate the complex, asymmetric threats faced by the US military.
The OneSAF Objective System (OOS) is being developed to provide a simulation of the contemporary operating environment with flexibility. OOS will include over 25 unique sides operating asymmetrically. It will also include tools for users to create new entities, units, and behaviors without coding. OOS is working with subject matter experts like the TRADOC Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence Threats and the Urban Operations Functional Area Collaborative Team to develop realistic behaviors and environmental models for the simulation.
The Joint Analysis Center (JAC) was established in 1992 at RAF Molesworth in the UK to combine the intelligence capabilities of the US Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines in Europe following the end of the Cold War. Planning for the JAC began in 1989 and involved organizing the different service intelligence elements into a single joint facility. Staffing the JAC required recruiting the best analysts from each service. Immediately upon standing up, the JAC created a crisis action team to address intelligence needs arising from the wars in the Balkans, demonstrating how management functions were applied to stand up a highly capable new joint organization.
This document provides a tactical vignette describing a reconnaissance platoon conducting independent operations to screen the southern flank of a division and delay any enemy advances. The platoon has seized a bridge and established positions on both banks of the MIN River. The platoon leader reviews the situation, noting that one scout squad remains at the destroyed bridge site while scouts occupy an observation post on the south bank. The senior sergeant will conduct reconnaissance south toward a probable enemy location, while the platoon leader conducts route reconnaissance. The vignette continues the scenario presented in previous issues, focusing on reconnaissance and ambush tactics.
This document summarizes a report on urban operations in the year 2020. It begins by noting that urban areas will continue increasing in size and importance, posing challenges for NATO forces. It then outlines a conceptual framework called "USECT" to describe a manoeuvrist approach to urban operations, emphasizing understanding the environment and shaping engagements over traditional tactics. This approach seeks to gain information on enemy forces before engaging with precision strikes to minimize casualties and damage. Both tactical and operational improvements are needed, but operational initiatives hold promise for dramatic gains over the traditional approach of relying on overwhelming force.
The document provides information on a supplement being developed for the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) called the DATE Operational Environment Assessment (OEA) Supplement - Pirtuni. The supplement will include an OEA of a fictional country called Pirtuni overlaid on the real-world terrain of Ukraine, along with a strategic setting section providing regional context. Developing the supplement as optional content will not disturb the existing DATE product and will provide additional options for commanders to tailor training. The supplement is scheduled for publication at the end of 2016, while the next official release of DATE 3.0 is scheduled for late spring 2017. Questions about DATE products should be directed to Angela M. Wilkins.
The document discusses the mismanagement of military operations in Iraq after Baghdad was secured. It argues that the chain of command and operational levels were destroyed, with the corps and combat service support abolished. Key aspects like close air support suffered as a result. Additionally, the total force concept of aligning all military units to specific war plans was undermined, weakening readiness. This was done through reclassifying reserve units and breaking up the proven "capstone" alignment process in order to retain Pentagon control over combat operations.
This document is a research paper written by Major Ted Middleton for the Canadian Forces College as part of his studies. The paper examines the rise of unconventional threats and the challenges they pose for military organizations. It discusses the evolution of insurgencies and how they have become more complex, operating across political and psychological domains. The paper argues that simply applying old strategies to modern insurgencies will not work and that militaries must adapt their frameworks to confront these new threats. It aims to frame the problem and highlight the challenges of adapting doctrine and strategies to effectively counter evolving insurgent actors.
USSOCOM or the Joint Staff: Who should lead the GWOTArie Richards
This document summarizes a report on balancing national instruments of power in the Global War on Terrorism. It argues that there is currently a lack of operational leadership overseeing the GWOT with the authority to direct all US government agencies. This gap has contributed to failures in Iraq and risks overall failure in the GWOT. The document examines the creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during World War II as precedent for reform during a crisis. It proposes empowering the National Counterterrorism Center to coordinate all US government efforts in the GWOT at the operational level, similar to how US Special Operations Command coordinates different military branches.
This document provides a summary of the Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2007-2032. It outlines a vision for unmanned systems to project military power while reducing risks to human life over the next 25 years. The roadmap establishes six goals to improve effectiveness through integration, standardization, policies/procedures, control measures, prototyping processes, and cost control. It identifies key mission needs like reconnaissance and surveillance, target identification, counter-mine warfare, and CBRNE reconnaissance to guide research priorities.
This document provides a summary of the Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2007-2032. It outlines a vision for unmanned systems to project military power while reducing risks to human life over the next 25 years. Key points include:
- Unmanned aircraft, ground, and maritime systems have increased contributions to military operations and are highly desired by combatant commanders for missions like reconnaissance and surveillance.
- The roadmap establishes goals to improve effectiveness, interoperability, and cost control of unmanned systems through increased integration, common standards, and prioritizing validated capabilities.
- Top priority missions for unmanned systems are identified as reconnaissance and surveillance, target identification and designation, counter-mine warfare, and chemical
This document summarizes a NATO research meeting that examined innovations in soldier load carriage system design and evaluation. The meeting brought together scientists from 10 NATO and partner nations to discuss current research, identify areas for further collaboration, and develop standardized testing methods and performance specifications. Key topics included load carriage physiology and biomechanics, objective assessment tools and tests, mathematical modeling, and pressure sensor measurement systems. Developing a better understanding of human load carriage capabilities and standardized methods can help optimize load carriage systems to improve soldier mobility, sustainability, performance and survival on the battlefield.
David Knight has over 20 years of experience as a strategic intelligence officer, including experience supervising teams and managing programs and resources. He currently serves as the Senior MASINT Site Lead in Hawaii, responsible for collecting, analyzing, and producing intelligence reports from sensor networks. Previously he was Chief of the ISR Branch at USPACOM, developing recommendations to integrate new technologies, and Chief Operations Officer of the Combating Terrorism Division, supervising all-source analysis teams. He holds a Master's degree in Strategic Intelligence and has received extensive military education and training.
This document summarizes a journal article about using Company Intelligence Support Teams (CoISTs) at the troop/company level to conduct "Grey Targeting" of insurgent networks in Afghanistan. It describes how a CoIST in the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team developed a targeting process focused on identifying important logistical, political, and social nodes for insurgents, like mosques and schools, rather than targeting individuals. The process involved analyzing intelligence to identify key locations, refining those locations into specific coordinates, and disseminating that information to provide situational awareness and support operations against the insurgent network.
This document summarizes a research paper on the utilization and safety of MRAP vehicles in Iraq and Afghanistan from the perspective of military personnel. The paper analyzes how the implementation of MRAPs, which were designed to increase survivability against IEDs, impacted tactics, mobility, and risk. Interviews with military personnel are used to understand how MRAPs compared to Humvees and if they improved or hindered engagement strategies. While MRAPs helped counter IEDs, their size and armor increased other dangers from limited mobility and visibility. The research aims to identify capabilities and limitations to optimize MRAP use and safety.
This document outlines the research methodology used to analyze Canada's rules of engagement (ROE) architecture. The research included a literature review of Canadian ROE doctrine, other countries' doctrines, and Canadian national interests. It also involved a consultation with Canadian Forces senior officers who have experience with ROE. The consultation was designed to gather expert perspectives on past operations and the future of ROE. The research aims to develop a framework to determine when the transition between permissive and restrictive ROE is warranted based on national interests and military factors.
Special Operations West will take an in depth look at the current and upcoming changes for USSOCOM and SOF to ensure attendees have a complete understanding of Special Operations’ aims and needs. Join us for solution oriented discussion on the current military-industry relationship, its current impediments, and its future success.
The document discusses the potential need for the UK to invest in ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities. It notes that the proliferation of ballistic missile technology to more states and non-state actors has increased threats faced by British forces and territories. While deterrence through nuclear weapons remains important, BMD could complement deterrence and provide additional resilience against emerging threats. The document considers different BMD options for the UK and notes that cost would be a major factor in any decision, though capabilities may need to be delivered within 5 years to satisfy political timelines.
This paper proposes the development of the Joint Readiness Assessment and Planning Integrated Decision System (JRAPIDS) to provide a more comprehensive and predictive assessment of military readiness and sustainability for 2025. JRAPIDS would integrate emerging technologies to automatically update readiness status for individuals, units, and forces while providing decision-makers with a time-variable and mission-scalable matrix depicting capability over time for given tasks. This would allow for a more objective evaluation of trade-offs between priorities than current subjective assessment methods. The paper outlines the key capabilities and components of JRAPIDS as well as technologies that could enable its implementation.
The document discusses the process of air campaign planning, outlining five key stages: 1) researching the combat environment, 2) determining air objectives, 3) determining air strategy, 4) analyzing centers of gravity, and 5) developing the campaign. It notes that these stages are iterative and overlap rather than being strictly sequential. The Joint Doctrine Air Campaign Course teaches this process using historical case studies and simulations where students develop air campaign plans. Effective campaign planning requires continuous research and refinement even after conflict begins to adapt to changing objectives and strategies.
More Related Content
Similar to Final White Paper Hybrid Warfare 7-26-2016 PAO approved with some PAO edits NSRDEC PAO U16-332 rev 2 25 Aug 2016
The OneSAF Objective System (OOS) is being developed to provide a simulation of the contemporary operating environment with flexibility. OOS will include over 25 unique sides operating asymmetrically. It will also include tools for users to create new entities, units, and behaviors without coding. OOS is working with subject matter experts like the TRADOC Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence to incorporate accurate representations of threats. This will allow OOS to more realistically simulate the complex, asymmetric threats faced by the US military.
The OneSAF Objective System (OOS) is being developed to provide a simulation of the contemporary operating environment with flexibility. OOS will include over 25 unique sides operating asymmetrically. It will also include tools for users to create new entities, units, and behaviors without coding. OOS is working with subject matter experts like the TRADOC Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence Threats and the Urban Operations Functional Area Collaborative Team to develop realistic behaviors and environmental models for the simulation.
The Joint Analysis Center (JAC) was established in 1992 at RAF Molesworth in the UK to combine the intelligence capabilities of the US Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines in Europe following the end of the Cold War. Planning for the JAC began in 1989 and involved organizing the different service intelligence elements into a single joint facility. Staffing the JAC required recruiting the best analysts from each service. Immediately upon standing up, the JAC created a crisis action team to address intelligence needs arising from the wars in the Balkans, demonstrating how management functions were applied to stand up a highly capable new joint organization.
This document provides a tactical vignette describing a reconnaissance platoon conducting independent operations to screen the southern flank of a division and delay any enemy advances. The platoon has seized a bridge and established positions on both banks of the MIN River. The platoon leader reviews the situation, noting that one scout squad remains at the destroyed bridge site while scouts occupy an observation post on the south bank. The senior sergeant will conduct reconnaissance south toward a probable enemy location, while the platoon leader conducts route reconnaissance. The vignette continues the scenario presented in previous issues, focusing on reconnaissance and ambush tactics.
This document summarizes a report on urban operations in the year 2020. It begins by noting that urban areas will continue increasing in size and importance, posing challenges for NATO forces. It then outlines a conceptual framework called "USECT" to describe a manoeuvrist approach to urban operations, emphasizing understanding the environment and shaping engagements over traditional tactics. This approach seeks to gain information on enemy forces before engaging with precision strikes to minimize casualties and damage. Both tactical and operational improvements are needed, but operational initiatives hold promise for dramatic gains over the traditional approach of relying on overwhelming force.
The document provides information on a supplement being developed for the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) called the DATE Operational Environment Assessment (OEA) Supplement - Pirtuni. The supplement will include an OEA of a fictional country called Pirtuni overlaid on the real-world terrain of Ukraine, along with a strategic setting section providing regional context. Developing the supplement as optional content will not disturb the existing DATE product and will provide additional options for commanders to tailor training. The supplement is scheduled for publication at the end of 2016, while the next official release of DATE 3.0 is scheduled for late spring 2017. Questions about DATE products should be directed to Angela M. Wilkins.
The document discusses the mismanagement of military operations in Iraq after Baghdad was secured. It argues that the chain of command and operational levels were destroyed, with the corps and combat service support abolished. Key aspects like close air support suffered as a result. Additionally, the total force concept of aligning all military units to specific war plans was undermined, weakening readiness. This was done through reclassifying reserve units and breaking up the proven "capstone" alignment process in order to retain Pentagon control over combat operations.
This document is a research paper written by Major Ted Middleton for the Canadian Forces College as part of his studies. The paper examines the rise of unconventional threats and the challenges they pose for military organizations. It discusses the evolution of insurgencies and how they have become more complex, operating across political and psychological domains. The paper argues that simply applying old strategies to modern insurgencies will not work and that militaries must adapt their frameworks to confront these new threats. It aims to frame the problem and highlight the challenges of adapting doctrine and strategies to effectively counter evolving insurgent actors.
USSOCOM or the Joint Staff: Who should lead the GWOTArie Richards
This document summarizes a report on balancing national instruments of power in the Global War on Terrorism. It argues that there is currently a lack of operational leadership overseeing the GWOT with the authority to direct all US government agencies. This gap has contributed to failures in Iraq and risks overall failure in the GWOT. The document examines the creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during World War II as precedent for reform during a crisis. It proposes empowering the National Counterterrorism Center to coordinate all US government efforts in the GWOT at the operational level, similar to how US Special Operations Command coordinates different military branches.
This document provides a summary of the Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2007-2032. It outlines a vision for unmanned systems to project military power while reducing risks to human life over the next 25 years. The roadmap establishes six goals to improve effectiveness through integration, standardization, policies/procedures, control measures, prototyping processes, and cost control. It identifies key mission needs like reconnaissance and surveillance, target identification, counter-mine warfare, and CBRNE reconnaissance to guide research priorities.
This document provides a summary of the Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2007-2032. It outlines a vision for unmanned systems to project military power while reducing risks to human life over the next 25 years. Key points include:
- Unmanned aircraft, ground, and maritime systems have increased contributions to military operations and are highly desired by combatant commanders for missions like reconnaissance and surveillance.
- The roadmap establishes goals to improve effectiveness, interoperability, and cost control of unmanned systems through increased integration, common standards, and prioritizing validated capabilities.
- Top priority missions for unmanned systems are identified as reconnaissance and surveillance, target identification and designation, counter-mine warfare, and chemical
This document summarizes a NATO research meeting that examined innovations in soldier load carriage system design and evaluation. The meeting brought together scientists from 10 NATO and partner nations to discuss current research, identify areas for further collaboration, and develop standardized testing methods and performance specifications. Key topics included load carriage physiology and biomechanics, objective assessment tools and tests, mathematical modeling, and pressure sensor measurement systems. Developing a better understanding of human load carriage capabilities and standardized methods can help optimize load carriage systems to improve soldier mobility, sustainability, performance and survival on the battlefield.
David Knight has over 20 years of experience as a strategic intelligence officer, including experience supervising teams and managing programs and resources. He currently serves as the Senior MASINT Site Lead in Hawaii, responsible for collecting, analyzing, and producing intelligence reports from sensor networks. Previously he was Chief of the ISR Branch at USPACOM, developing recommendations to integrate new technologies, and Chief Operations Officer of the Combating Terrorism Division, supervising all-source analysis teams. He holds a Master's degree in Strategic Intelligence and has received extensive military education and training.
This document summarizes a journal article about using Company Intelligence Support Teams (CoISTs) at the troop/company level to conduct "Grey Targeting" of insurgent networks in Afghanistan. It describes how a CoIST in the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team developed a targeting process focused on identifying important logistical, political, and social nodes for insurgents, like mosques and schools, rather than targeting individuals. The process involved analyzing intelligence to identify key locations, refining those locations into specific coordinates, and disseminating that information to provide situational awareness and support operations against the insurgent network.
This document summarizes a research paper on the utilization and safety of MRAP vehicles in Iraq and Afghanistan from the perspective of military personnel. The paper analyzes how the implementation of MRAPs, which were designed to increase survivability against IEDs, impacted tactics, mobility, and risk. Interviews with military personnel are used to understand how MRAPs compared to Humvees and if they improved or hindered engagement strategies. While MRAPs helped counter IEDs, their size and armor increased other dangers from limited mobility and visibility. The research aims to identify capabilities and limitations to optimize MRAP use and safety.
This document outlines the research methodology used to analyze Canada's rules of engagement (ROE) architecture. The research included a literature review of Canadian ROE doctrine, other countries' doctrines, and Canadian national interests. It also involved a consultation with Canadian Forces senior officers who have experience with ROE. The consultation was designed to gather expert perspectives on past operations and the future of ROE. The research aims to develop a framework to determine when the transition between permissive and restrictive ROE is warranted based on national interests and military factors.
Special Operations West will take an in depth look at the current and upcoming changes for USSOCOM and SOF to ensure attendees have a complete understanding of Special Operations’ aims and needs. Join us for solution oriented discussion on the current military-industry relationship, its current impediments, and its future success.
The document discusses the potential need for the UK to invest in ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities. It notes that the proliferation of ballistic missile technology to more states and non-state actors has increased threats faced by British forces and territories. While deterrence through nuclear weapons remains important, BMD could complement deterrence and provide additional resilience against emerging threats. The document considers different BMD options for the UK and notes that cost would be a major factor in any decision, though capabilities may need to be delivered within 5 years to satisfy political timelines.
This paper proposes the development of the Joint Readiness Assessment and Planning Integrated Decision System (JRAPIDS) to provide a more comprehensive and predictive assessment of military readiness and sustainability for 2025. JRAPIDS would integrate emerging technologies to automatically update readiness status for individuals, units, and forces while providing decision-makers with a time-variable and mission-scalable matrix depicting capability over time for given tasks. This would allow for a more objective evaluation of trade-offs between priorities than current subjective assessment methods. The paper outlines the key capabilities and components of JRAPIDS as well as technologies that could enable its implementation.
The document discusses the process of air campaign planning, outlining five key stages: 1) researching the combat environment, 2) determining air objectives, 3) determining air strategy, 4) analyzing centers of gravity, and 5) developing the campaign. It notes that these stages are iterative and overlap rather than being strictly sequential. The Joint Doctrine Air Campaign Course teaches this process using historical case studies and simulations where students develop air campaign plans. Effective campaign planning requires continuous research and refinement even after conflict begins to adapt to changing objectives and strategies.
Similar to Final White Paper Hybrid Warfare 7-26-2016 PAO approved with some PAO edits NSRDEC PAO U16-332 rev 2 25 Aug 2016 (20)
Final White Paper Hybrid Warfare 7-26-2016 PAO approved with some PAO edits NSRDEC PAO U16-332 rev 2 25 Aug 2016
1. NSRDEC PAO # U16-332
“Hybrid Warfare Is Coming To a Theater Near You”
By Frank Kostka (NSRDEC) and Tim Hill (PM E2S2 / PdD CBI); 27 July 2016
Shockand awe was a good concept to punish ourenemies, but lacked the breadth of solutions needed
to stabilize Iraq. Underestimated were the cultural, societal and political seams that were ripe for
exploitationbybothNon-State and State Actors. Whether in Yugoslavia, Iraq or Libya, the unshackling
of historical constraints doesn't always lead to vibrant, western style, democracies. The 2016 Joint
Concept for Integrated
Campaigning (JCIC) Executive
Overview written by the Army
Capabilities Integration Center
recognizes this and suggests
that winning at warfare in a
Hybrid Environment is more
about shaping and less about
rapid dominance. Shock and
awe was an example of the
latter.
The genie is out of the bottle
and today's military leaders are
facing complex Hybrid Warfare
(HW) adversariesandwill be for
the foreseeable future. HW is
defined as combating a
consortium of adversaries
across multiple battle-spaces,
some still undefined. They will
be a mix of State and Non-State
Actors synergistically aligned,
who have shown a lack of any constraints when dealing with their captives. Religious and sectarian
genocide, human trafficking, and rape are common outcomes.
Chief of Staff Army GEN Mark Milley at the October 2015 AUSA stated that the Army Training and
Doctrine Command was targeting specialized training for units deploying to areas where HW was a
prevalent threat.
The impact of Hybrid Warfarecould be catastrophic acrossthebattlefield
CurrentJointPub 5-0 JointOperationsPlanning doctrine focuses on two states, War and Peace and the
Warfighters' primary focus is on dominating the adversary. The 2016 JCIC is now considering this
approach through a HW lens.
2. “HybridWarfareIs ComingTo a Theater Near You” 27 July 2016
By Frank Kostka (NSRDEC) and Tim Hill (PME2S2 / PdD CBI) NSRDEC PAO # U16-332
2
Gen Milley's AUSA remarks prompted the Joint Standardization Board (JSB) for Tactical Shelters and
Expeditionary BasingSystems toinitiate aPhase I studyinNovember2015 to determineif expeditionary
basingactivitieswouldbe impacted bythisnew threat. The JSB, an element of the Joint Committee on
Tactical Shelters (JOCOTAS), recently assumed standardization responsibility for basing systems. It
works closely with the Services' Program of Record basing Product Managers, to include the Army's
Force Provider and Air Force's BEAR Base programs.
In the 2005 National Defense Strategy (NDS) four pillars of HW were identified and clear definitions
provided. Clarity of meaning is critical to fully understand communications in this area. The CBEC
(Contingency Basing Executive Council ) is currently working through eleven years of expeditionary
basing strategy, doctrine and policy only to find terms and concepts used broadly have multiple
definitions. A Joint Strategic Working Group led by Army G4 began addressing this issue in 2015.
The HW studies investigated included a series of common themes and a recognition of multiple
emerging threats. Key characteristics are listed below.
Uncertaintyand Confusion….Proverbial FogofWar
UnanticipatedGame Changes
State and Non State Players Actingin Synchrony
Blurring between,Warand Peace and; Combatants and Non Combatants
Exploitationof Societal Seams in OpenSocieties
In total the JSB study reviewedover400 documentsand identifiedtenthreatslisted in the above table.
All couldimpactbasingactivities. The firstfourincolumnone were fromthe 2005 NDSdiscussedabove.
Included are disruptive challenges that emanate
from adversaries who develop and use
breakthrough measures to negate current U.S.
advantages in key operational domains. The
Improvised Explosive Device or IED is a prime
example. IEDs were totally unexpected, cost an
estimated $150.00 to produce, consisted of an
artilleryshell, aremote control unit and detonator.
The IED made the HMMWV obsolete overnight. It
3. “HybridWarfareIs ComingTo a Theater Near You” 27 July 2016
By Frank Kostka (NSRDEC) and Tim Hill (PME2S2 / PdD CBI) NSRDEC PAO # U16-332
3
was one of the biggest killers on the battlefield causing more than 3000 deaths and approximately
30,000 injuries to U.S. and coalition Warfighters. It drove a multimillion dollar mitigation effort and
resulted in a $50 billion vehicle replacement program. It should be noted that the IED threat became
more deadlyasa resultof the use of explosivelyformedpenetrators(EFP). According to the Wall Street
Journal EFPs were provided by Iran.
Data Sources
The JSB study data base includes open source HW studies,
technical papers, reports and articles. The latter come from print
journalists, wire services, military publications, Janes and other
defense sources and electronic media. The information is
reviewed and logged into a matrix that bins the data into nine
categories listed in the chart to the right. This will allow future
sortingto quantifyintensity,identifyemerging trends, investigate
leading indicators and discover subtleties. Phase II will include a
review of the current data base to validate if the HW element
binning is consistent and captures visible insights.
A summation of work to date was presented to the J4 and the
Contingency Basing Executive Council staff, Tactical Edge Virtual
Energy Community of Practice (CoP) and the NSRDEC Soldier & Squad Performance and Optimization
Initiative Program Office. There was agreement within the group that HW would impact future
expeditionarybasingefforts. TRADOCrequirementsdocumentsidentify HW as a threat to both shelters
and basing activities in general terms. A HW front end analysis was presented at the JOCOTAS 2016
springmeetingandaugmentedbykeycurrentandhistorical documents on the topic. The goal of Phase
II of the effort is to quantify basing threats using a modified Future Soldier Initiative (FSI) model.
Duringthe nextphase of the JSBstudy on HW and
expeditionary basing an update to the 2010
NSRDEC FSI Troop to Task model linked to basing
will be executed. The FSI expeditionary basing
study investigated current approaches by user
troopswithrecentfieldexperienceto establisha
platoonsize base camp. The base leadership uses
every resource to start defining what the Camp
time line for completion will look like with the
goal to get more Soldiers conducting missions
outside the wire. An excerpt from the Executive
Summary of the 4th
Brigade,25th
InfantryDivision,
Fort Richardson, Alaska exercise, follows.
The Future SoldierInitiative conducted a scenario
4. “HybridWarfareIs ComingTo a Theater Near You” 27 July 2016
By Frank Kostka (NSRDEC) and Tim Hill (PME2S2 / PdD CBI) NSRDEC PAO # U16-332
4
basedCapabilities exercise to demonstrate the challenges of building a Small Combat Unit (SCU) base
camp. Aninfantryplatoon sergeantandplatoonleaderwere the participantsinthe exercise. They were
provided a Concept of Operation that provided the Task Organization, on hand equipment, enemy
threat and environmental conditions that shape the build of the camp. The Soldiers were provided a
four hour block of time to develop work packages that represent of the Base Camp Build phases. The
workpackagesreflectthe prioritizationof how theywouldbuildthe base’scombatoutpost withcurrent
capabilities, manning and current standards for resupply requests. Troop to Task for both Base Camp
BuildandCombatOperationsconductedoutsidethe Base campwere determinedlinkedtothe priorities
of workestablishedbythe participatingleaders.The goal of the exercise wastohighlightthe challenges
of both conducting the build and combat operations simultaneously. "
A subset of the Troop to
Task Matrix divided the
mission areas into sub-
elements allowing all
personnel to be executing
traceable activities twenty-
four hours per day. The
Soldiers are assigned to
each sub-element with
specific detailed daily work
assignments.
The FSI has now
transformedinto the NSRDECSoldierandSquadPerformance OptimizationInitiative. JSBstaff met with
the Program Integration Lead on May 9, 2016 to discuss the HW project and gather input. There was
agreement that HW was a broad-based threat applicable to expeditionary basing and that updating a
variant of the Troop to Task model was a viable approach. During Phase II, this will require that each
Troop to Task categoryand sub-element be validated for the HW environment. A further assessment
will be made to crosslink Troop to Task sub-element to threats.
The ultimate goal of basing is to
the have as many Soldiers
"Outside the Wire (OTW) as
feasible. The Soldier allocation
chart on the right documentsthat
at the onset of base camp
establishmentapproximately20%
are OTW. When the base is
completed that number moves
closer to 50%. There is a steady
state requirement of 25% of the
staff being assigned to Force
Protection duties, that are 24/7
responsibilities. The 90 day base
camp build cycle is not uncommon.
5. “HybridWarfareIs ComingTo a Theater Near You” 27 July 2016
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5
A second stretch goal for phase II of the study is to identify if leading indicators for new Disruptive
Adaption threats could be identified from open source incident articles and reports. Based on a past
effortbyJOCOTAS to better understand the impact on expeditionary basing as a result the shift to the
PacificRimI believethisispossible.Asoutlined in the 2012 Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership Priorities
for the 21st
Century, the Pacific Rim strategy made little note of Africa with the exception of the Arab
Springand Somalia. The resultsof ourresearcheffortbeguninJanuaryof 2013, and outlinedinthe Sept
2013 TDM Armor and Mobility made it clear that Africa would be a location of future conflict.
The Impact of HW on future Base Camps
ATP 3-37.10 (“Base Camps,” April 2013) defines a base camp as “an evolving military facility that
supports the military operations of a deployed unit and provides the necessary support and services
for sustainedoperations.” Base Campsare essentialforbattlefieldcommanders to project power in all
HW scenarios.The risktoWarfightersutilizingbase campsare the time it takes for the base camp to be
constructed, the troop to task ratio during construction to carry out their mission, and the ability to
sustainthe base camp duringoperations. The blending of traditional conventional and irregular forces
require base camps to become sustainable and self-sufficient in the foreseeable future.
Base camps allowthe operational missiontodevelopfullyinthe mosteffective,efficient,and
sustainable mannerwhileenablingpowerprojection.Measurestoprotectthe force are maximized;
abilitiestoresupply,reconstitute andrefitthe force are enabled;andqualityof life isintegratedto
increase overall force effectiveness.These capabilitiesmustbe approachedbyrecognizingtheir
interdependence inordertoprovide the commanderthe following:
a. Reducedsupplylinesusceptibilityfromthreatforcesbyminimizinglogisticsrequirements(e.g.,
fewerfuel andwatershipmentsanduse of insituconstructionmaterialsandlabor) while
maintainingthe same level of operational capabilitiesandreadiness;
b. Increasedflexibilityinbase campoperationsthroughmodular,scalable,sustainable,and
adaptable designs.Thismayincludeconstructionof infrastructure consideredoversizedby
conventional wisdomtoallowforexpansionormore adaptability;
c. Decreasedconstructionanddeconstructionrequirements(time,material,equipment,
personnel,andcost) throughimproved,standardized,adaptabledesignsandusingexisting
facilitieswhere possible;
d. Improvedoperationalefficiencies(energy,water,andwaste management)requiringless
Soldier,civilian,orcontractor oversightandsupport.
A recentarticle inthe Wall StreetJournal titled“U.S.ShiftsAntiterrorCommandSystem “statedthatthe
U.S. Army Special Operations Command may assume a larger responsibility in the global fight against
major terrorist organizations. The action known as the Campaign Plan for countering Trans-regional
Terrorist Organizations is awaiting approval.
6. “HybridWarfareIs ComingTo a Theater Near You” 27 July 2016
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6
This may be a leading indicator for an increased need for
highlymobile small base campssuchas the Force Provider
Expeditionary Basing system developed by PM Force
Sustainment Systems, a Product Manager under PM
Expeditionary Energy and Sustainment Systems
Base camp requirementsforHW scenarios continue to be
a priority for battlefield commanders to project power.
Nonetheless, sustainable base camps can provide
flexibility, reduce overall mission costs, and decrease
predictabilityof US movements on the battlefield so that
enemyforces are deceivedabouttroopmovements,times
and location of convoys, and their ability to recognize unit capabilities, needs, and requirements.
Phase II of the JSB Hybrid Warfare Study is Unfunded