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final paper

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final paper

  1. 1. Running head: JAC MANAGEMENT 1 Management Practices for a New Entity: The Joint Analysis Center (JAC) Eric C. Husher MGT 330 Instructor Brittian September 21, 2014
  2. 2. Running head: JAC MANAGEMENT 2 Management Practices for a New Entity: The Joint Analysis Center (JAC) With the end of the Cold War in 1990-1991, the United States government and the West in general were faced with a dilemma based on the idea that the massive numbers of troops, units and equipment that had been deployed in Europe for decades must be significantly reduced in order to take advantage of the ‘peace dividend’ as described by President G.H.W. Bush and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. One such scheme to reduce numbers and facilities, but without a reduction in capability involved the Intelligence elements of the different services, Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines, which had previously run their own facilities and operations in a variety of places throughout Europe. As each service was largely collecting and analyzing the same information, the ‘strategy’ that the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) came up with was a combination of both a ‘rapid growth, and a ‘decline strategy’ at the same time. This ‘strategy’ was accomplished by collecting the best elements and personnel of each of the different services, and placing them together at a single site, in this case, the former nuclear cruise missile base at RAF Molesworth in the UK. Thus, the first ‘joint’ intelligence facility was created that would serve all of the different services within the US European Command (USEUCOM) simultaneously. The focus of this paper is to demonstrate how the “five functions of management” (Reilly, Minnick & Baack, 2011) were applied to create the first truly ‘joint’ Intelligence unit and facility for the military of the United States. Planning for the JAC in terms of ‘vision and mission’ was conducted by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), which was completed in 1989, and approved by the
  3. 3. Running head: JAC MANAGEMENT 3 Assistant Secretary of Defense in 1991 (OASD, 1991). This plan was further condensed by DIA to include the following mission statement: “ The JAC is the principal element for ensuring effective intelligence support for combatant commanders in chiefs and theater forces." Secretary of Defense memorandum, 15 March 1991, "Strengthening Defense Intelligence," inter alia, established the JAC as the primary intelligence organization providing support to joint war-fighting at all levels. The JAC concept fuses the main support capabilities of all Service, Combat Support Agency, and combat units into a one-stop shopping center for intelligence support. The JAC is, by design, scalable and can expand to meet the needs of the Joint Force Commander. During non-crisis periods, JAC manning is normally retained at the minimum level required to perform essential functions such as I&W, current intelligence, collection management, delegated general military intelligence production, and support to the commander. As crises develop, JACs at each echelon bring together personnel and equipment needed to manage intelligence support requirements” (Pike, 1997). Note how in terms of the ‘planning’ function, both the ‘external’ and ‘internal’ environments were examined, analyzed and considered in order to create the new grouping, as the ‘external environment’ had changed significantly with the collapse of the Soviet Union, while the ‘internal environment’ of significant defense budget-cutting across the board required the new grouping, if Intelligence capabilities were to be maintained for the European Theater of Operations. All of this involved “choosing strategies, tactics, and operational plans to achieve company goals” (Reilly, Minnick & Baack, 2011), as well as the allocation of proper resources to pursue and achieve the stated goals as well.
  4. 4. Running head: JAC MANAGEMENT 4 The ‘organizing’ function was likewise critical to the overall structure, because this was the first such ‘joint operation’ ever assembled. Each of the different services ‘conducts business’ in their own particular style, and each service has its own internal ‘culture,’ which in the past (and even the present) have often been the cause of rivalry, ‘turf wars,’ and mutual disparagement (Goldman, 1966). As a result, it was critically important that the delineation of ‘command & control’ within each of the different offices and departments of the JAC needed to be clear, and this was complicated by the fact that each of the office and department heads (middle managers’) and the overall commander (‘executive manager’) would be on a ‘rotational basis,’ meaning that an office or department might be commanded by an Air Force officer for a year, then be replaced by an Army, or Navy officer with very different ‘views’ on how such an office should be run. The ‘problems’ inherent in such rotations was eventually resolved through the appointment of civilian managers to ‘second’ the officer in charge and maintain a measure of stability in terms of office procedures and schedules, which was in fact the result of a “operational-level assessment” (Reilly, Minnick & Baack, 2011). In terms of ‘staffing,’ a careful process of recruitment of the best Intelligence Analysts from each of the different services was instituted through the various services personnel departments, based on annual and semi-annual personnel evaluations, performance reviews and particular functional areas, and these were to become the ‘front- line managers.’ These positions were almost entirely filled by mid-to-senior non- commissioned-officers (NCO’s), and because of this, the problems associated with ‘rotation’ that affected the officers were not in evidence. This is because NCO’s have a ‘tour of duty’ that lasts at least three years, and thus provided the ‘stable backbone’ of not
  5. 5. Running head: JAC MANAGEMENT 5 just ‘office culture,’ but the organization of Intelligence production of all kinds, and in most respects, created a ‘professional bureaucracy’ within each office that ensured standards of all Intelligence products remained at the highest level. ‘Leading’ as a function was everywhere in evidence, in particular, “leading as coping with change” (Kotter, 2001), because the entire organization was in fact, new in every respect. Most particularly this was the case, because immediately upon ‘standing up the JAC’ in December, 1992, the Balkan wars had commenced, and the first mission to be assumed by the JAC was the creation of a ‘crises action team,’ or ‘CAT’ to address the many Intelligence issues that were developing as a result of the first wars in Europe since the end of WW2. ‘Direction’ was initially provided by the NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, in the form of a directive to produce a twice-daily Intelligence Summary (INTSUM) of all military and political activity occurring in the Balkans. This INTSUM was to be produced at four different levels of classification, suitable for distribution to NATO nations, National-level (CIA & DIA), US forces in Europe and ‘five eyes,’ which means the US, UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The ‘people’ were provided to provide the analysis and INTSUM production by skimming off the best analysts from each of the different offices (Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East/North Africa and Europe), and ‘aligned’ by ensuring there were at least two analysts to cover each aspect of Intelligence (air, ground, naval, geopolitical) in order to ensure that each of these functional areas could be covered 24 hours a day. The fact was emphasized that these were the first wars to be seen in Europe since WW2, and the fact that so many other military, political, and allied elements were now dependent on this CAT team, provided all the ‘motivation’ and ‘inspiration’ necessary to propel the JAC
  6. 6. Running head: JAC MANAGEMENT 6 instantly into the forefront of the Intelligence world. The cross-functional CAT team itself evolved rapidly into a ‘working group,’ with additional personnel assets and skill- sets added to allow for some time off for group members, and was now referred to as the ‘Yugoslavia Working Group’ (YOWG) and was composed of Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and CIA analysts too, all under the initial command of an Air Force Lieutenant Colonel. In order to emphasize the significance of this group, its importance, and the demand for its Intelligence products, the Lieutenant Colonel arranged for the Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR), four-star General George Joulwan, to come for a visit and inspection one month after the YOWG commenced operations. General Joulwan himself spoke to each and every member of the group, and the group as a whole to emphasize that our mission would be critical to the subsequent success of US and allied operations, and no stone was to be left unturned, no element unexamined in the pursuit of the Intelligence ‘picture of the battlefield,’ and that in fact, our INTSUMS were landing on the desk of the President on a daily basis as well. General Joulwan continued to make repeated and positive mention of the JAC, as seen in this speech before the House National Security Committee: “My highest intelligence priority is the Joint Analysis Center at RAF [Royal Air Force Base] Molesworth and its associated systems and communications. The JAC is the model for intelligence support to joint and combined operations, and its products meet national, theater, service component and tactical requirements. The JAC supports every level of our theater's strategy, from arms control verification to humanitarian operations to traditional war-fighting capabilities. Its success in meeting the intelligence needs of U.S. forces, NATO and our coalition intelligence at the United Nations proves that consolidated intelligence at the joint theater level is a
  7. 7. Running head: JAC MANAGEMENT 7 concept compatible with today's intelligence challenges and resource constraints” (Joulwan, 1995). ‘Controlling’ in such a ‘joint’ environment was in some ways, more difficult, because managers/officers/NCO’s would generally have reporting staff from each, or several of the different services and civilians as well. However, because of the ‘professional bureaucracy’ nature of the organization at that stage, a lot of flexibility was built-in to how business was conducted, and that applied to evaluations as well. The “360-degree appraisal’ (Reilly, Minnick & Baack, 2011) was commonly used to form the basis of the formalized evaluations, since everyone in the working group was very familiar with the work of everyone else within the group, and everyone knew who didn’t show up for shift on time (almost never happened without mitigating circumstances), and ‘slacking’ or “social loafing” (George, 1992) was simply not tolerated at all, nor was there any time or room to do so. In addition to ‘job’ functions, each service has their own training requirements, standards of physical fitness, need for special schools, promotion boards and other elements not directly related to the job of ‘Intelligence production,’ and these elements were monitored, maintained and addressed by the administrative and logistics departments of the JAC as a whole. As for the Intelligence products themselves, whether INTSUMS, topics of special research and other ‘traffic,’ all inputs and outputs were reviewed for credibility, editing quality, classification and formatting by senior analyst in charge of the shift before such would be allowed to be transmitted, thus establishing a solid measure of quality control of all outputs to the high standard of ‘distinctive competence’ for which the JAC became renowned.
  8. 8. Running head: JAC MANAGEMENT 8 It is important to remember and recognize that the primary reason the JAC was able to ‘stand up’ and commence operations to such a high standard of excellence was due to a combination of factors, all of which reflect the “five functions of management’ (Reilly, Minnick & Baack, 2011), but perhaps nowhere more significantly than in the selection of staff. While the logistics of the facilities, the planning and organizing for the same were likewise critical, if it was not for the rigorous selection of staff, all of whom could be considered experts in their fields with at least five years direct military supervisory experience as well as job experience, it is unlikely the JAC could have performed as well, or as quickly as it did. There was no ‘break-in period,’ either allowed or available for any of the personnel, or for the production of any Intelligence products either, and this could only have been achieved by personnel already well-versed in each of the expected Intelligence products. As a background to all of this, it is equally important to remember that prior to the establishment of the JAC in 1992, the US European Command (USEUCOM) possessed over 20,500 Intelligence personnel, but by the middle of 1995, only 7,600 remained; a 63% reduction in staff for the Theater as a whole (Joulwan, 1995). The fact that despite this ‘streamlining,’ the JAC was not only able to continue the production of all relevant Theater-level Intelligence analysis and reporting that had been done prior, but was to significantly exceed this in both volume, and quality as well. It is because of this success that the JAC became the template for all the Joint Intelligence Centers (JIC) which have since followed, one in each of the different military Theaters to include Central Command (CENTCOM), Pacific Command (PACOM), Southern Command (SOCOM), and now Africa Command (AFRICOM), and
  9. 9. Running head: JAC MANAGEMENT 9 each and every one is ultimately, the product of the successful application of the “five functions of management.’
  10. 10. Running head: JAC MANAGEMENT 10 References George, J. M. (1992). Extrinsic and intrinsic features of perceived social loafing in organizations. Academy of Management Journal. Vol. 35 Issue 1, p191-202. Retrieved from http://eds.a.ebscohost.com.proxy- library.ashford.edu/eds/detail/detail?vid=1&sid=7f7bcb54-d854-454a-8b3d- 0e73f24e1c8e%40sessionmgr4004&hid=4205&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWRzLWxpd mU%3d#db=bsh&AN=4397299 Goldman, R. M. (1966). A theory of conflict processes and organizational offices. Journal of Conflict Resolution. Sep66, Vol. 10 Issue 3, p328-343. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com.proxy- library.ashford.edu/docview/235708738?accountid=32521 Joulwan, G. A. (1995) European Theater remains One of Conflict and Transition. Armed Forces Information Service, Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs). Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=844 Kotter, J. P. (2001, December). What leaders really do." Harvard Business Review, 85– 96. Retrieved from http://eds.b.ebscohost.com.proxy- library.ashford.edu/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=02f85154-2b02-4747-bf27- 0f0da1c181b3%40sessionmgr198&vid=1&hid=110 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (1991). Plan for Restructuring Defense Intelligence. Retrieved from http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/homeland_defense/intelligence/224.pdf Pike, J. (1997). Joint Analysis Center (JAC). Federation of American Scientists (FAS).
  11. 11. Running head: JAC MANAGEMENT 11 Retrieved from http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/eucom/jac/ Reilly, M., Minnick, C., & Baack, D. (2011). The five functions of effective management (2nd ed.). San Diego, CA: Bridgepoint Education, Inc.

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