1) COISTs (Company Intelligence Support Teams) provide essential intelligence support to companies but their role is debated as the military shifts focus. Some see COISTs as only for counterinsurgency while others argue they are still needed.
2) The document discusses challenges to COIST effectiveness including a lack of formal doctrine and task organization not suited to hybrid threats involving both regular and irregular forces.
3) It argues that COISTs must be adapted to better integrate with company mission command systems during operations against hybrid threats, through improved training, doctrine, and organization within command posts rather than separate cells.
Army Futures Command Concept for Intelligence 2028Neil McDonnell
Neil McDonnell and the GovCon Chamber of Commerce make the Army's Futures Command concept documents available to federal government contractors as they do their "homework" to support the Department of Defense.
This document summarizes a journal article about using Company Intelligence Support Teams (CoISTs) at the troop/company level to conduct "Grey Targeting" of insurgent networks in Afghanistan. It describes how a CoIST in the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team developed a targeting process focused on identifying important logistical, political, and social nodes for insurgents, like mosques and schools, rather than targeting individuals. The process involved analyzing intelligence to identify key locations, refining those locations into specific coordinates, and disseminating that information to provide situational awareness and support operations against the insurgent network.
Army Futures Command Concept for Maneuver in Multi Domain Operations 2028Neil McDonnell
Neil McDonnell and the GovCon Chamber of Commerce make the Army's Futures Command concept documents available to federal government contractors as they do their "homework" to support the Department of Defense.
Army Futures Command Concept for Special Operations 2028Neil McDonnell
Neil McDonnell and the GovCon Chamber of Commerce make the Army's Futures Command concept documents available to federal government contractors as they do their "homework" to support the Department of Defense.
The document discusses six proposed Special Areas of Emphasis (SAEs) for the Joint Faculty Education Conference in 2007. The SAEs are nominated topics that highlight important joint subject matter to be covered in Professional Military Education curricula. The six proposed SAEs cover the topics of Joint Command and Control, Information Assurance, the Joint Force Commander's Personnel Recovery responsibilities, an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations, Irregular Warfare, and leveraging expertise through Joint Functional Component Commands.
The document summarizes the first workshop for the Soldier Systems Technology Roadmap project, which took place in Gatineau, Quebec on June 16-17, 2009. The workshop focused on developing a vision for future soldier systems and identifying key capabilities. It included presentations on topics like the soldier modernization effort, emerging technologies, and the future security environment. Participants then discussed four areas of the soldier system: power and energy, C4I/sensors, survivability and protective equipment, and lethal and non-lethal weapons. The workshop marked the beginning of an ongoing collaboration between government, industry, and academia to develop roadmaps to guide technology investments in support of the Canadian Forces soldier.
The OneSAF Objective System (OOS) is being developed to provide a simulation of the contemporary operating environment with flexibility. OOS will include over 25 unique sides operating asymmetrically. It will also include tools for users to create new entities, units, and behaviors without coding. OOS is working with subject matter experts like the TRADOC Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence to incorporate accurate representations of threats. This will allow OOS to more realistically simulate the complex, asymmetric threats faced by the US military.
SSTRM - StrategicReviewGroup.ca - Visioning and Future Capabilities WorkshopPhil Carr
The document provides an overview of the Canadian Army's land capability development plans, including:
1. The Army of Tomorrow (AoT) initiative which aims to develop a balanced, medium-weight, high-tech force optimized for mid-intensity operations across the full spectrum of conflict by 2021.
2. The concept of Adaptive Dispersed Operations which will guide force employment for the AoT through networked, agile dispersion and aggregation of forces.
3. Preliminary discussions of Future Army 2040 which will further develop capabilities towards full integration and jointness by 2028 and beyond.
Army Futures Command Concept for Intelligence 2028Neil McDonnell
Neil McDonnell and the GovCon Chamber of Commerce make the Army's Futures Command concept documents available to federal government contractors as they do their "homework" to support the Department of Defense.
This document summarizes a journal article about using Company Intelligence Support Teams (CoISTs) at the troop/company level to conduct "Grey Targeting" of insurgent networks in Afghanistan. It describes how a CoIST in the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team developed a targeting process focused on identifying important logistical, political, and social nodes for insurgents, like mosques and schools, rather than targeting individuals. The process involved analyzing intelligence to identify key locations, refining those locations into specific coordinates, and disseminating that information to provide situational awareness and support operations against the insurgent network.
Army Futures Command Concept for Maneuver in Multi Domain Operations 2028Neil McDonnell
Neil McDonnell and the GovCon Chamber of Commerce make the Army's Futures Command concept documents available to federal government contractors as they do their "homework" to support the Department of Defense.
Army Futures Command Concept for Special Operations 2028Neil McDonnell
Neil McDonnell and the GovCon Chamber of Commerce make the Army's Futures Command concept documents available to federal government contractors as they do their "homework" to support the Department of Defense.
The document discusses six proposed Special Areas of Emphasis (SAEs) for the Joint Faculty Education Conference in 2007. The SAEs are nominated topics that highlight important joint subject matter to be covered in Professional Military Education curricula. The six proposed SAEs cover the topics of Joint Command and Control, Information Assurance, the Joint Force Commander's Personnel Recovery responsibilities, an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations, Irregular Warfare, and leveraging expertise through Joint Functional Component Commands.
The document summarizes the first workshop for the Soldier Systems Technology Roadmap project, which took place in Gatineau, Quebec on June 16-17, 2009. The workshop focused on developing a vision for future soldier systems and identifying key capabilities. It included presentations on topics like the soldier modernization effort, emerging technologies, and the future security environment. Participants then discussed four areas of the soldier system: power and energy, C4I/sensors, survivability and protective equipment, and lethal and non-lethal weapons. The workshop marked the beginning of an ongoing collaboration between government, industry, and academia to develop roadmaps to guide technology investments in support of the Canadian Forces soldier.
The OneSAF Objective System (OOS) is being developed to provide a simulation of the contemporary operating environment with flexibility. OOS will include over 25 unique sides operating asymmetrically. It will also include tools for users to create new entities, units, and behaviors without coding. OOS is working with subject matter experts like the TRADOC Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence to incorporate accurate representations of threats. This will allow OOS to more realistically simulate the complex, asymmetric threats faced by the US military.
SSTRM - StrategicReviewGroup.ca - Visioning and Future Capabilities WorkshopPhil Carr
The document provides an overview of the Canadian Army's land capability development plans, including:
1. The Army of Tomorrow (AoT) initiative which aims to develop a balanced, medium-weight, high-tech force optimized for mid-intensity operations across the full spectrum of conflict by 2021.
2. The concept of Adaptive Dispersed Operations which will guide force employment for the AoT through networked, agile dispersion and aggregation of forces.
3. Preliminary discussions of Future Army 2040 which will further develop capabilities towards full integration and jointness by 2028 and beyond.
The document discusses six proposed Special Areas of Emphasis (SAEs) for the Joint Faculty Education Conference in 2007. The SAEs are nominated topics to be emphasized in the professional military education curricula of the joint colleges. The proposed SAEs include: Joint Command and Control, Information Assurance, the Joint Force Commander's Personnel Recovery responsibilities, an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations, Irregular Warfare, and Leveraging Government Expertise through Joint Functional Component Commands at USSTRATCOM.
CASE 12.1 THE U.S. ARMY As I used to tell my kids, You dont have.docxwendolynhalbert
CASE 12.1 THE U.S. ARMY As I used to tell my kids, “You don't have to make every mistake personally. I've made plenty of them, and if you just let me tell you what they were and how you can avoid them, there's still plenty of mistakes for you to make.” Col. Orin A. Nagel, former director of Center for Army Lessons Learned The first systematic application of management principles in the United States was not by, say, General Motors, but by the U.S. Army. From 1899 to 1904, Secretary of War Elihu Root made drastic reforms in the army's organization and efficiency, established the Army War College, and introduced the principle of the general staff (a group of officers that assist a commander by performing detailed duties of administration, planning, supply, and coordination). The U. S. Army has also been on the cutting edge of information technology ever since 1946, when it unveiled the Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer (ENIAC), the world's first operational, general-purpose computer. Today few institutions, if any, better exemplify the learning organization ideal than the U.S. Army; it is a premier example of a learning organization—in which everyone engages in problem solving.1 This case examines four important ways in which the U.S. Army manages its information in the twenty-first century. After-Action Reports (AARs) Probably the best-known example of leveraging knowledge within a team is the army's use of After-Action Reports (AARs). These reviews had their beginnings in training simulations as a way for a team to engage in a mock battle to gain as much learning as possible from the training. An army brigade of three thousand or so travels to the National Training Center (NTC) in California, where it engages in simulated combat with crack units based at the center. AARs proved so useful to team effectiveness that gradually they began to be used in nontraining situations as well. Today they have spread throughout the army, not because someone at the top has required their use but because the troops find them helpful in getting the job done. Thrust into a new kind of operation in postwar Iraq—certainly not the conventional combat for which they had been well trained—junior officers (lieutenants and captains) illustrate how AARs and the sharing of knowledge can improve a unit's next action. Six features of AARs are worth noting. First, although they are called After-Action Reports, they are actually cyclical—part of a cycle that starts before and continues throughout each campaign or simulation. The AAR regimen includes brief huddles, extended planning and review sessions, copious note taking by everyone, and the explicit linking of lessons to future actions. The AAR cycle for each phase of the campaign or simulation begins when the senior commander drafts “operational orders.” This document consists of four parts: the task (what actions subordinate units must take); the purpose (why the task is important); the commander's intent (wh ...
Currently, Army Intelligence Leaders/Planners are using ARFORGEN (Army Force Generation) process to attempt to meet Warfighter Operational Intelligence Requirements. The Warfighter requirements for intelligence resources (Soldiers, Structure and Equipment) challenge ARFORGEN’s ability to meet them with the current forces available. Making that challenge even more difficult, the Army Intelligence Force must do try to meet these requirements while in the midst of the Army’s transformation to a modular structure. The competing priorities of Transformation, ARFOGEN and Warfighter requirements conflict throughout the future timeline. This article will touch on the three primary challenges, 1) Army Intelligence Transformation, 2) the ARFORGEN process and its application and 3
Strategic Vision for the U.S. Army Signal CorpsScott Wagner
The document discusses the future of the US Army Signal Corps. It notes that between WWI and WWII, the Signal Corps modernized the Army through emerging technologies. Looking to the future, the document identifies that improving information systems and providing mobile platforms will be critical. It states that the Signal Corps must consolidate disparate systems, establish relationships with civilian companies, and define its role with the new Cyber branch in order to support the Army's vision for 2025.
Final White Paper Hybrid Warfare 7-26-2016 PAO approved with some PAO edits N...Frank E. Kostka Jr.
The document discusses the emerging threat of hybrid warfare and its implications for expeditionary basing. Hybrid warfare involves both state and non-state actors working together across multiple domains to create uncertainty and exploit societal weaknesses. It could have a catastrophic impact on future battlefields. The Joint Standardization Board initiated a study to determine how hybrid warfare may affect expeditionary basing activities and identified 10 threats. During phase two of the study, the board will update a troop-to-task model to quantify basing threats under a hybrid warfare scenario and identify any leading indicators of new disruptive threats from open source reports. The ultimate goals are to understand how hybrid warfare may impact future base camps and have as many soldiers operating outside the wire as feasible
Small Wars Journal - A Laboratory for Preparing Forces to Win in a Complex WorldWilliam Orkins
The Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany serves as a laboratory for preparing multinational forces to address complex problems as outlined in the U.S. Army Operating Concept. At JMRC, U.S. and partner forces conduct training exercises to improve multinational interoperability and build relationships. While U.S. units gain valuable training, incorporating multinational partners adds an additional level of complexity that better prepares forces for real-world operations. To further enhance training, JMRC should implement experimental designs and capture lessons learned to continually improve training methods for multinational, joint operations.
The case study examines how RFID technology can provide tactical value when integrated into a supply chain to increase efficiency, accuracy, visibility, and security through a simulation model; it finds that product value, lead time, and demand uncertainty impact the performance of an RFID-enabled supply chain in terms of cost, fill rate, and inventory levels. The study also explores how RFID usage in supply chain management can create and sustain a competitive advantage for companies.
This document summarizes the revised edition of Joint Publication 2-0 on joint intelligence. It reflects updated guidance for conducting joint and multinational intelligence activities across military operations. It establishes joint intelligence doctrine and principles to integrate operations, plans, and intelligence. It provides a common framework to plan and conduct intelligence cooperation with partners. The guidance aims to help current and future leaders address emerging threats by transforming intelligence organizations.
1) The document describes the Missions & Means Framework (MMF) ontology, which was developed to match military mission objectives to available assets. The MMF aims to provide a formal representation of the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) to better evaluate mission effectiveness of alternative systems and services.
2) The MDMP is the standard process that the military uses to analyze missions, develop plans to accomplish missions, and assess mission execution. It involves analyzing tasks, conditions, and standards to identify capability requirements and develop courses of action. The MMF was created to serve as an analytic surrogate for the MDMP.
3) The MMF provides a structured representation of tasks and their relationships across different levels of military operations
Marine Corps Small Unit Leaders Guide To CounterinsurgencyMarine Books
This document provides tactics, techniques and procedures for small unit leaders engaged in counterinsurgency operations. It begins with an overview of insurgency and counterinsurgency, describing their nature and root causes. The document then covers common insurgent approaches, preparation for counterinsurgency including intelligence gathering and training, mobilizing local populations, information and intelligence operations, and small unit operations in a counterinsurgency environment. While providing proven methods, the document stresses the need for adaptation to unique local circumstances and emphasizes that success requires a long-term, whole-of-government approach.
This document provides a tactical vignette describing a reconnaissance platoon conducting independent operations to screen the southern flank of a division and delay any enemy advances. The platoon has seized a bridge and established positions on both banks of the MIN River. The platoon leader reviews the situation, noting that one scout squad remains at the destroyed bridge site while scouts occupy an observation post on the south bank. The senior sergeant will conduct reconnaissance south toward a probable enemy location, while the platoon leader conducts route reconnaissance. The vignette continues the scenario presented in previous issues, focusing on reconnaissance and ambush tactics.
This document summarizes a report on urban operations in the year 2020. It begins by noting that urban areas will continue increasing in size and importance, posing challenges for NATO forces. It then outlines a conceptual framework called "USECT" to describe a manoeuvrist approach to urban operations, emphasizing understanding the environment and shaping engagements over traditional tactics. This approach seeks to gain information on enemy forces before engaging with precision strikes to minimize casualties and damage. Both tactical and operational improvements are needed, but operational initiatives hold promise for dramatic gains over the traditional approach of relying on overwhelming force.
The document provides guidance to 3BCT, 82nd Abn Div for preparing for a Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) rotation at JRTC. It outlines that DATE rotations involve complex threats requiring simultaneous offensive and defensive operations. Successful preparation requires leaders understand the operational environment and apply flexible mission command. Units must train on combined arms maneuvers, develop anti-tank capabilities like Javelin, and integrate sustainment even under reduced strength. A balanced training methodology focusing on endurance, ambiguity tolerance, and mutual support between units is critical to success in a DATE rotation.
INTL304 – Intelligence CollectionStrategic and Tactical Intelligen.docxdoylymaura
INTL304 – Intelligence Collection
Strategic and Tactical Intelligence Collection Requirements:
In this first week you will be looking at the differences between strategic and tactical intelligence collection, which address quite different problems and have different pressures and demands. To complete this discussion board you should review IIE Part 3 (3.doc), Strategic Intelligence, review the IPB, and CIA collection operations. Also review chapter 12 in the Clark book.
Once you are prepared please address the following question: Your initial post should be a substantive 250+ words, student responses 250+ words
Identify at least 5 significant differences (there are many more) between intelligence collection for strategic analysis and intelligence collection for tactical military requirements. Remember to take a strategic view of this question. Think about source of requirements, tasking of platforms, turnaround times, the effect on analysis, collection planning, etc.
Use examples, demonstrate you have read the materials, and apply critical thinking skills to earn maximum points on this board. Show your sources as well...it assists in the rigor of your thinking. You are welcome to draw on additional readings, but your work must at least reflect that you've completed the required readings.
Student Response #1 – Michael
One of the many significant differences between strategic and tactical intelligence is what it is used for and who the major consumers are for each type. Strategic intelligence is used to create strategy, plans and policy at the nation and theater level and created by national security issues.1 Where tactical intelligence is used for planning and conducting tactical operations and used by field commanders.2 This creates a completely different consumer set for each type of information produced.
Another difference is how Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) is conducted. For strategic levels the theater is evaluated and the doctrinal principles are applied in a long range large scale model. This means that every aspect of the theater is looked at from geography to the local belief systems and the overall operational plan (example: Enduring Freedom) is created and sent to the tactical units. IPB for the tactical units is what I and my team did in Afghanistan. As the ISR collection manager I used every asset I had available to collect on the terrain and saturate the target area with ISR. Mean while my team dug though the databases and HUMINT information available and created target packages. Each time we did a major air assault we had nine to ten weeks of collection going on before the troops left the Forward Operating Base (FOB). The difference is in this order. Kabul looked at the theater and conducted IPB based on that, while Kandahar conducted regional IPB’s and fed that to Kabul, we conducted area IPB in support of combat missions and fed that to both regional and theater IPB’s.3
Weather is anot.
The CSDA initiative seeks to create mobile computing environments that improve soldier training and access to operational information. It aims to enable the use of mobile apps and devices both during training and at the tactical edge. There are four main focus areas: developing device and network access; coordinating an Army app marketplace; synchronizing app development policy; and continuing app development and pilot programs. The CSDA initiative coordinates across Army organizations to address considerations around creating environments for mobile capabilities and to change how soldiers access information.
The OneSAF Objective System (OOS) is being developed to provide a simulation of the contemporary operating environment with flexibility. OOS will include over 25 unique sides operating asymmetrically. It will also include tools for users to create new entities, units, and behaviors without coding. OOS is working with subject matter experts like the TRADOC Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence Threats and the Urban Operations Functional Area Collaborative Team to develop realistic behaviors and environmental models for the simulation.
The article describes how the U.S. Army Europe Joint Multinational Readiness Center supported training Ukrainian armed forces in intelligence preparation for antiterrorism operations. It discusses how the traditional intelligence preparation process was inadequate, so the training team adapted it using the concept of "complex intelligence preparation of the battlefield" or "complex IPB". Complex IPB takes a more holistic approach analyzing the interactions between groups and how individual decisions collectively influence behavior. The training exercise applied this to Ukraine's conflict areas and was effective at understanding the separatist movement and considering how proposed military and non-military actions could impact behaviors.
This document provides a summary of the Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2007-2032. It outlines a vision for unmanned systems to project military power while reducing risks to human life over the next 25 years. The roadmap establishes six goals to improve effectiveness through integration, standardization, policies/procedures, control measures, prototyping processes, and cost control. It identifies key mission needs like reconnaissance and surveillance, target identification, counter-mine warfare, and CBRNE reconnaissance to guide research priorities.
This document provides a summary of the Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2007-2032. It outlines a vision for unmanned systems to project military power while reducing risks to human life over the next 25 years. Key points include:
- Unmanned aircraft, ground, and maritime systems have increased contributions to military operations and are highly desired by combatant commanders for missions like reconnaissance and surveillance.
- The roadmap establishes goals to improve effectiveness, interoperability, and cost control of unmanned systems through increased integration, common standards, and prioritizing validated capabilities.
- Top priority missions for unmanned systems are identified as reconnaissance and surveillance, target identification and designation, counter-mine warfare, and chemical
The document discusses the process of air campaign planning, outlining five key stages: 1) researching the combat environment, 2) determining air objectives, 3) determining air strategy, 4) analyzing centers of gravity, and 5) developing the campaign. It notes that these stages are iterative and overlap rather than being strictly sequential. The Joint Doctrine Air Campaign Course teaches this process using historical case studies and simulations where students develop air campaign plans. Effective campaign planning requires continuous research and refinement even after conflict begins to adapt to changing objectives and strategies.
The document discusses six proposed Special Areas of Emphasis (SAEs) for the Joint Faculty Education Conference in 2007. The SAEs are nominated topics to be emphasized in the professional military education curricula of the joint colleges. The proposed SAEs include: Joint Command and Control, Information Assurance, the Joint Force Commander's Personnel Recovery responsibilities, an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations, Irregular Warfare, and Leveraging Government Expertise through Joint Functional Component Commands at USSTRATCOM.
CASE 12.1 THE U.S. ARMY As I used to tell my kids, You dont have.docxwendolynhalbert
CASE 12.1 THE U.S. ARMY As I used to tell my kids, “You don't have to make every mistake personally. I've made plenty of them, and if you just let me tell you what they were and how you can avoid them, there's still plenty of mistakes for you to make.” Col. Orin A. Nagel, former director of Center for Army Lessons Learned The first systematic application of management principles in the United States was not by, say, General Motors, but by the U.S. Army. From 1899 to 1904, Secretary of War Elihu Root made drastic reforms in the army's organization and efficiency, established the Army War College, and introduced the principle of the general staff (a group of officers that assist a commander by performing detailed duties of administration, planning, supply, and coordination). The U. S. Army has also been on the cutting edge of information technology ever since 1946, when it unveiled the Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer (ENIAC), the world's first operational, general-purpose computer. Today few institutions, if any, better exemplify the learning organization ideal than the U.S. Army; it is a premier example of a learning organization—in which everyone engages in problem solving.1 This case examines four important ways in which the U.S. Army manages its information in the twenty-first century. After-Action Reports (AARs) Probably the best-known example of leveraging knowledge within a team is the army's use of After-Action Reports (AARs). These reviews had their beginnings in training simulations as a way for a team to engage in a mock battle to gain as much learning as possible from the training. An army brigade of three thousand or so travels to the National Training Center (NTC) in California, where it engages in simulated combat with crack units based at the center. AARs proved so useful to team effectiveness that gradually they began to be used in nontraining situations as well. Today they have spread throughout the army, not because someone at the top has required their use but because the troops find them helpful in getting the job done. Thrust into a new kind of operation in postwar Iraq—certainly not the conventional combat for which they had been well trained—junior officers (lieutenants and captains) illustrate how AARs and the sharing of knowledge can improve a unit's next action. Six features of AARs are worth noting. First, although they are called After-Action Reports, they are actually cyclical—part of a cycle that starts before and continues throughout each campaign or simulation. The AAR regimen includes brief huddles, extended planning and review sessions, copious note taking by everyone, and the explicit linking of lessons to future actions. The AAR cycle for each phase of the campaign or simulation begins when the senior commander drafts “operational orders.” This document consists of four parts: the task (what actions subordinate units must take); the purpose (why the task is important); the commander's intent (wh ...
Currently, Army Intelligence Leaders/Planners are using ARFORGEN (Army Force Generation) process to attempt to meet Warfighter Operational Intelligence Requirements. The Warfighter requirements for intelligence resources (Soldiers, Structure and Equipment) challenge ARFORGEN’s ability to meet them with the current forces available. Making that challenge even more difficult, the Army Intelligence Force must do try to meet these requirements while in the midst of the Army’s transformation to a modular structure. The competing priorities of Transformation, ARFOGEN and Warfighter requirements conflict throughout the future timeline. This article will touch on the three primary challenges, 1) Army Intelligence Transformation, 2) the ARFORGEN process and its application and 3
Strategic Vision for the U.S. Army Signal CorpsScott Wagner
The document discusses the future of the US Army Signal Corps. It notes that between WWI and WWII, the Signal Corps modernized the Army through emerging technologies. Looking to the future, the document identifies that improving information systems and providing mobile platforms will be critical. It states that the Signal Corps must consolidate disparate systems, establish relationships with civilian companies, and define its role with the new Cyber branch in order to support the Army's vision for 2025.
Final White Paper Hybrid Warfare 7-26-2016 PAO approved with some PAO edits N...Frank E. Kostka Jr.
The document discusses the emerging threat of hybrid warfare and its implications for expeditionary basing. Hybrid warfare involves both state and non-state actors working together across multiple domains to create uncertainty and exploit societal weaknesses. It could have a catastrophic impact on future battlefields. The Joint Standardization Board initiated a study to determine how hybrid warfare may affect expeditionary basing activities and identified 10 threats. During phase two of the study, the board will update a troop-to-task model to quantify basing threats under a hybrid warfare scenario and identify any leading indicators of new disruptive threats from open source reports. The ultimate goals are to understand how hybrid warfare may impact future base camps and have as many soldiers operating outside the wire as feasible
Small Wars Journal - A Laboratory for Preparing Forces to Win in a Complex WorldWilliam Orkins
The Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany serves as a laboratory for preparing multinational forces to address complex problems as outlined in the U.S. Army Operating Concept. At JMRC, U.S. and partner forces conduct training exercises to improve multinational interoperability and build relationships. While U.S. units gain valuable training, incorporating multinational partners adds an additional level of complexity that better prepares forces for real-world operations. To further enhance training, JMRC should implement experimental designs and capture lessons learned to continually improve training methods for multinational, joint operations.
The case study examines how RFID technology can provide tactical value when integrated into a supply chain to increase efficiency, accuracy, visibility, and security through a simulation model; it finds that product value, lead time, and demand uncertainty impact the performance of an RFID-enabled supply chain in terms of cost, fill rate, and inventory levels. The study also explores how RFID usage in supply chain management can create and sustain a competitive advantage for companies.
This document summarizes the revised edition of Joint Publication 2-0 on joint intelligence. It reflects updated guidance for conducting joint and multinational intelligence activities across military operations. It establishes joint intelligence doctrine and principles to integrate operations, plans, and intelligence. It provides a common framework to plan and conduct intelligence cooperation with partners. The guidance aims to help current and future leaders address emerging threats by transforming intelligence organizations.
1) The document describes the Missions & Means Framework (MMF) ontology, which was developed to match military mission objectives to available assets. The MMF aims to provide a formal representation of the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) to better evaluate mission effectiveness of alternative systems and services.
2) The MDMP is the standard process that the military uses to analyze missions, develop plans to accomplish missions, and assess mission execution. It involves analyzing tasks, conditions, and standards to identify capability requirements and develop courses of action. The MMF was created to serve as an analytic surrogate for the MDMP.
3) The MMF provides a structured representation of tasks and their relationships across different levels of military operations
Marine Corps Small Unit Leaders Guide To CounterinsurgencyMarine Books
This document provides tactics, techniques and procedures for small unit leaders engaged in counterinsurgency operations. It begins with an overview of insurgency and counterinsurgency, describing their nature and root causes. The document then covers common insurgent approaches, preparation for counterinsurgency including intelligence gathering and training, mobilizing local populations, information and intelligence operations, and small unit operations in a counterinsurgency environment. While providing proven methods, the document stresses the need for adaptation to unique local circumstances and emphasizes that success requires a long-term, whole-of-government approach.
This document provides a tactical vignette describing a reconnaissance platoon conducting independent operations to screen the southern flank of a division and delay any enemy advances. The platoon has seized a bridge and established positions on both banks of the MIN River. The platoon leader reviews the situation, noting that one scout squad remains at the destroyed bridge site while scouts occupy an observation post on the south bank. The senior sergeant will conduct reconnaissance south toward a probable enemy location, while the platoon leader conducts route reconnaissance. The vignette continues the scenario presented in previous issues, focusing on reconnaissance and ambush tactics.
This document summarizes a report on urban operations in the year 2020. It begins by noting that urban areas will continue increasing in size and importance, posing challenges for NATO forces. It then outlines a conceptual framework called "USECT" to describe a manoeuvrist approach to urban operations, emphasizing understanding the environment and shaping engagements over traditional tactics. This approach seeks to gain information on enemy forces before engaging with precision strikes to minimize casualties and damage. Both tactical and operational improvements are needed, but operational initiatives hold promise for dramatic gains over the traditional approach of relying on overwhelming force.
The document provides guidance to 3BCT, 82nd Abn Div for preparing for a Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) rotation at JRTC. It outlines that DATE rotations involve complex threats requiring simultaneous offensive and defensive operations. Successful preparation requires leaders understand the operational environment and apply flexible mission command. Units must train on combined arms maneuvers, develop anti-tank capabilities like Javelin, and integrate sustainment even under reduced strength. A balanced training methodology focusing on endurance, ambiguity tolerance, and mutual support between units is critical to success in a DATE rotation.
INTL304 – Intelligence CollectionStrategic and Tactical Intelligen.docxdoylymaura
INTL304 – Intelligence Collection
Strategic and Tactical Intelligence Collection Requirements:
In this first week you will be looking at the differences between strategic and tactical intelligence collection, which address quite different problems and have different pressures and demands. To complete this discussion board you should review IIE Part 3 (3.doc), Strategic Intelligence, review the IPB, and CIA collection operations. Also review chapter 12 in the Clark book.
Once you are prepared please address the following question: Your initial post should be a substantive 250+ words, student responses 250+ words
Identify at least 5 significant differences (there are many more) between intelligence collection for strategic analysis and intelligence collection for tactical military requirements. Remember to take a strategic view of this question. Think about source of requirements, tasking of platforms, turnaround times, the effect on analysis, collection planning, etc.
Use examples, demonstrate you have read the materials, and apply critical thinking skills to earn maximum points on this board. Show your sources as well...it assists in the rigor of your thinking. You are welcome to draw on additional readings, but your work must at least reflect that you've completed the required readings.
Student Response #1 – Michael
One of the many significant differences between strategic and tactical intelligence is what it is used for and who the major consumers are for each type. Strategic intelligence is used to create strategy, plans and policy at the nation and theater level and created by national security issues.1 Where tactical intelligence is used for planning and conducting tactical operations and used by field commanders.2 This creates a completely different consumer set for each type of information produced.
Another difference is how Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) is conducted. For strategic levels the theater is evaluated and the doctrinal principles are applied in a long range large scale model. This means that every aspect of the theater is looked at from geography to the local belief systems and the overall operational plan (example: Enduring Freedom) is created and sent to the tactical units. IPB for the tactical units is what I and my team did in Afghanistan. As the ISR collection manager I used every asset I had available to collect on the terrain and saturate the target area with ISR. Mean while my team dug though the databases and HUMINT information available and created target packages. Each time we did a major air assault we had nine to ten weeks of collection going on before the troops left the Forward Operating Base (FOB). The difference is in this order. Kabul looked at the theater and conducted IPB based on that, while Kandahar conducted regional IPB’s and fed that to Kabul, we conducted area IPB in support of combat missions and fed that to both regional and theater IPB’s.3
Weather is anot.
The CSDA initiative seeks to create mobile computing environments that improve soldier training and access to operational information. It aims to enable the use of mobile apps and devices both during training and at the tactical edge. There are four main focus areas: developing device and network access; coordinating an Army app marketplace; synchronizing app development policy; and continuing app development and pilot programs. The CSDA initiative coordinates across Army organizations to address considerations around creating environments for mobile capabilities and to change how soldiers access information.
The OneSAF Objective System (OOS) is being developed to provide a simulation of the contemporary operating environment with flexibility. OOS will include over 25 unique sides operating asymmetrically. It will also include tools for users to create new entities, units, and behaviors without coding. OOS is working with subject matter experts like the TRADOC Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence Threats and the Urban Operations Functional Area Collaborative Team to develop realistic behaviors and environmental models for the simulation.
The article describes how the U.S. Army Europe Joint Multinational Readiness Center supported training Ukrainian armed forces in intelligence preparation for antiterrorism operations. It discusses how the traditional intelligence preparation process was inadequate, so the training team adapted it using the concept of "complex intelligence preparation of the battlefield" or "complex IPB". Complex IPB takes a more holistic approach analyzing the interactions between groups and how individual decisions collectively influence behavior. The training exercise applied this to Ukraine's conflict areas and was effective at understanding the separatist movement and considering how proposed military and non-military actions could impact behaviors.
This document provides a summary of the Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2007-2032. It outlines a vision for unmanned systems to project military power while reducing risks to human life over the next 25 years. The roadmap establishes six goals to improve effectiveness through integration, standardization, policies/procedures, control measures, prototyping processes, and cost control. It identifies key mission needs like reconnaissance and surveillance, target identification, counter-mine warfare, and CBRNE reconnaissance to guide research priorities.
This document provides a summary of the Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2007-2032. It outlines a vision for unmanned systems to project military power while reducing risks to human life over the next 25 years. Key points include:
- Unmanned aircraft, ground, and maritime systems have increased contributions to military operations and are highly desired by combatant commanders for missions like reconnaissance and surveillance.
- The roadmap establishes goals to improve effectiveness, interoperability, and cost control of unmanned systems through increased integration, common standards, and prioritizing validated capabilities.
- Top priority missions for unmanned systems are identified as reconnaissance and surveillance, target identification and designation, counter-mine warfare, and chemical
The document discusses the process of air campaign planning, outlining five key stages: 1) researching the combat environment, 2) determining air objectives, 3) determining air strategy, 4) analyzing centers of gravity, and 5) developing the campaign. It notes that these stages are iterative and overlap rather than being strictly sequential. The Joint Doctrine Air Campaign Course teaches this process using historical case studies and simulations where students develop air campaign plans. Effective campaign planning requires continuous research and refinement even after conflict begins to adapt to changing objectives and strategies.
1. WHY COIST MATTERS
INTRODUCTION
“Do you even COIST, bro?” was the question a
young command post non-commissioned officer
(NCO) asked one of his Soldiers. The question
arose during situational exercise lane training (STX)
involving platoon level patrols in the company sector.
The young soldier asked his leader how he knew
about the enemy’s employment of IEDs and the “hot
spot” locations, which are essential to countering
asymmetric threats, maintaining situational awareness
and contributing to bottom-up refinement. There have
been numerous debates regarding the applicability
of Company Intelligence Support Teams or COISTs
and the “way ahead” in future conflicts. Opinions
such as “COIST is for COIN”, “COIST is not doctrine”,
and “Intel is for analysts” have been widespread.
In contrast, there have been positive reviews from
Specialist through Brigadier General about the efficacy
of COISTs in training and combat.
One of the current challenges involving COISTs
stems from an overall military shift. This shift involves
the reduction of counterinsurgency operations world-
wide, increase of DecisiveAction Training Environment
rotations (DATE) and global employment utilizing
Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF). The DATE rotations
support conducting Unified Land Operations in a
Hybrid Threat Environment. There is a perception that
COISTs are only relevant in an irregular warfare model
during counterinsurgency and stability operations.
Other challenges to COIST future applicability involve
a lack of doctrine and ineffective task organization.
The current company COIST model is not conducive
to effectively engaging diverse combinations of
regular and irregular forces simultaneously. Future
security challenges will include multi-faceted,
uncertain, complex and chaotic environments, and will
require more support to information and intelligence
requirements at all echelons. The initial, sustainment
and pre-deployment training must be a command
priority and must for formalized for future management
during Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycles.
Finally, teams must become better integrated into
company command posts during training and be better
supported through more emphasis on overall mission
command. COISTs must not only be maintained for
future conflicts, but adapted to be better integrated
and transitional within company mission command
systems during Unified Land Operations involving a
hybrid threat.
BACKGROUND
The complexity of irregular warfare necessitated the
need to have more enhanced intelligence capability
at the small unit level. In conventional operations,
intelligence is disseminated from higher to lower
headquarters based on the presence of intelligence
gathering resources. In counterinsurgency or other
decentralized operations, information flows in the
opposite direction, where small units gather raw
information based on their operational environment.
Recent counterinsurgency operations assessed that
company formations needed the ability to produce
intelligence to drive their operations and support
higher echelon common operational picture (COP)
WHY COIST MATTERS
By Victor R. Morris, a civilian contractor and instructor at the U.S. Army Europe’s Joint Multinational
Readiness Center (JMRC) in Germany
1counteriedreport.com
2. development. This assessment was refined and
given the designation “COIST” with the following
mission: serve as the primary source of information
and intelligence that the company commander
needs to make timely accurate decisions (CALL
COIST Handbook). Post-deployment after action
reviews (AARs) and training assessments dictated
the employment of COISTs and greatly enhanced
the company’s ability to analyze, produce and
disseminate accurate information and intelligence in a
counterinsurgency environment. They also facilitated
better situational awareness and more effective lethal
and non-lethal targeting in support of the commander’s
intent and overall mission.
THE SHIFT: UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS
In response to the current and future changes, the
combat training centers and TRADOC collaborated on
the development of a training model called the Decisive
Action Training Environment (DATE). The current
model is designated as DATE 2.2 and differs from
past training rotations and pre-deployment Mission
Readiness Exercises (MREs) utilized to prepare units
for Iraq and Afghanistan. The model was designed to
prepare tactical organizations to execute a wide range
of operations as part of Unified Land Operations. The
DATE model presents a complex training environment
that is designed to train operationally adaptable units.
The ground operations provide the ability for the unit to
build competency with mission essential tasks, while
re-fining standard operating procedures from the last
fourteen years of combat. Next, the model drew on
aspects of the contemporary operational environment,
while incorporating aspects of emerging threats and
security challenges. The threat to the brigade’s mission
involves an emerging category of threats and activities
that do not fit into the traditional understanding of
conventional and unconventional war. Lastly, the
DATE includes Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental,
and Multinational (JIIM) partners and a multifaceted
host nation security force that presents the brigade
with integration challenges and opportunities. This
paradigm shift to encompass Decisive Action, Army
Core Competencies and Mission Command has
WHY COIST MATTERS
2 Counter-IED Report online, November 2015
created debate about the applicability of COISTs
during Unified Land Operations.
THE DOCTRINE DILEMMA
There have been improvements during the last eight
years involving the development and implementation
of COIST doctrine, but the concept is still not formalized
in many company formations. It is imperative that
doctrinal references be used as the basis for COIST
training, AARs and standard operating procedure
(SOP) development. A current doctrine review and its
support to COIST operations are below:
• 25 November 2008: Field manual 2-19.4,
1-24, Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Intelligence
Operations. This section briefly mentions the need
to form COISTs based on capability requirements
and access to perishable information. It also
highlights the fact that these teams are ad hoc and
optional.
• 23 March 2010: Field Manual 2-0 Intelligence fails
to address COIST operations in detail.
• 9 November 2010: Training Circular 2-19.63
Company Intelligence Support Team. Aside from
various CALL handbooks published May 2013, this
is a very detailed doctrinal publication involving
COISTs. Although it was published in 2010, it
acts as the doctrinal foundation for our COIST,
Attack the Network, Counterinsurgency and staff
training courses.
• 15 April 2014: The revision to FM 2-0 Intelligence
highlights COISTs in BCT intelligence operations
(Chapter 2). Paragraphs 2-7 through 2-10 provide
an overview of COIST and their contribution to
intelligence sharing, enemy assessment, troop
leading procedures, and mission execution. The
manual also states that the MI Company may
augment selected maneuver companies with MI
Soldiers to form the nucleus of the COIST.
• 10 February 2015: ATP 2-19.4, 1-24, Brigade
Combat Team (BCT) Intelligence Operations. This
document has been updated from the previous
2008 version and clearly frames the CoIST’s role
& responsibilities.
3. EVALUATING THE THREAT
Hybrid threats are not new and there are myriad
examples throughout history of how adversaries
organize into conventional and irregular forces. A
hybrid threat (HT) is defined as the diverse and dynamic
combination of regular forces, irregular forces, and/
or criminal elements all unified to achieve mutually
benefitting effects (TC 7-100). The term “hybrid”
has recently been used to illustrate the increased
complexity of war, the multiplicity of actors involved,
and the blurring between traditional categories of
conflict. Contemporary hybrid warfare involves a
multiplicity of actors employing a combination of hybrid
instruments and unconventional operations facilitated
by 21st century technologies and combinations of
conventional and irregular forces. Hybrid threats are
characterized by the combination of forces, which
can further be defined as conventional military,
insurgent and extremist networks or transnational
organized criminal organizations. To be a hybrid,
these forces cooperate in the context of pursuing
their own internal objectives, which further complicate
the unit’s mission and need for increased situational
awareness and understanding. A recent example of
this threat can be seen in Buenos Aires, Argentina. On
August 10, 2014, Troops of Apolo Task Force, Third
Army Division, discovered a complex illegal structure,
which operated in La Esperanza village, Buenos Aires
municipality, Cauca. On site, troops fought against a
group of guerrillas and when they retreated, troops
searched the area and located a 200 m2
structure,
which had been adapted to manufacture explosives
and process coca paste. This facility was reported to
be the property of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC). This event is evidence of the close
relation between drug trafficking and FARC, and the
way this criminal structure intends to strengthen its
capabilities by using explosive devices. Below are
some of the goals associated with hybrid threats:
• Removal of forces from their area of operations.
• Degrade and exhaust forces rather than cause a
direct military defeat.
• Use of a dynamic variety of conventional and
WHY COIST MATTERS
3counteriedreport.com
unconventional methods to create multiple
dilemmas.
• Prevent opponents from segregating the conflict
into easily assailable parts. In many cases military
action is the least important of the hybrid threat’s
activities.
• Rapidly form, transform, adapt and abolish
cells based on requirements, environment and
opponents.
• Simultaneously inject themselves into all of the
operational variables in the OE (PMESII-PT).
• Adhere to ensuring security, accomplishing the
task, maintaining adaptability, and remaining
connected to the people.
• Preserve bases to train, self-sustain, prepare
for future missions and evolve organizational
capability.
• Initiate strategic consequences of denying an
enemy a secure area, or making it politically
untenable to remain.
• Create a dilemma where an army is vulnerable to
conventional attack when it disperses to combat
irregular forces within the population, and cede
control of the operational environment and
population if they remain concentrated.
TRAINING TO COUNTER THE THREAT
COISTs must possess core competencies associated
with engaging actors in a hybrid environment. The
below tasks are associated with offensive, defensive
and stability operations in a static or mobile command
post during operations. The core competencies can
also be aligned with a COIST framework consisting
of the following spheres: Mission, Purpose and
Function, Task Organization, Core Tasks, Situational
Development and Understanding, Support to
Targeting and Assessment. The framework is nested
in the Mission Command and Intelligence Warfighting
Functions for complimentary effects. The below list is
not all-inclusive and is subject to change based on the
mission and commander’s discretion.
Traditional or conventional Threat: Regular Military
Forces as a threat the regulated armed forces of a
state or alliance of states with the specified function of
4. WHY COIST MATTERS
Figure 2: COIST Intelligence WfF Integration.
4 Counter-IED Report online, November 2015
Figure 1: COIST Framework Spheres.
military offensive and defensive capabilities.
These forces may have matching capabilities
across all war-fighting functions.
COIST core competencies: Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) involving
detailed terrain analysis, an awareness of
various intelligence disciplines to included
TECHINT, OSINT, SIGINT, GEOINT and
HUMINT, template and company graphic
management (analog and BFT), PIR,
SIR, CCIR management, ISR program
management, proper enabler utilization (task/
purpose), planning on the move contribution
and direct support to the orders process,
which is condensed during high-tempo
operations.
Irregular Threat: Irregular forces as armed
individuals or groups who are not members
of the regular armed forces, police, or other
internal security forces (JP 3-24). These
forces include: paramilitary, special purpose
forces, insurgent, guerilla, terrorist and
criminal elements. At the tactical level, they
can apply tactics, techniques, and procedures
(TTPs) common to regular forces but do so
with asymmetric applications. The definition
of irregular warfare highlights population
centric engagement and intention to damage
an opponent’s influence over that population.
COIST core competencies: IPB with an
emphasis on understanding trends, patterns,
human networks (to include criminal), culture
and perceptions of the community within
the environments, an awareness of various
intelligence disciplines to include Weapons
Technical Intelligence (WTI), OSINT with a
social media emphasis, SIGINT, GEOINT
and HUMINT. All of the above competencies
support situational awareness and support to
targeting.
LESSONS LEARNED
James K. Greer’s article from the Small
Wars Journal entitled “The Network vs. theFigure 3: COIST Mission Command System Integration.
5. BCT: Organizational Overmatch in Hybrid Strategies”
analyzes the concept of more modular approaches
at the tactical level specifically involving “cellular
companies.” In summary, he suggests that we must
become a cellular network in order to respond to future
threats. This is accomplished through a deviation
from the current relatively fixed company identity to
a “cellular company” that operates off of rule sets
enabled by a robust information and intelligence cell.
This cell is an augmentation of the information mission
command system. He also states that the company
should be able to gain or lose modules many times in
a day without losing the coherence of operations, as
tasks and engagements are conducted simultaneously
and sequentially.
As an Infantry Company Commander during OIF
09-10, we conducted operations in a similar model.
For example, we had one platoon conducting route
security patrols (C-IED), one platoon conducting
host nation security force EOD training, one platoon
conducting indirect fire disruption patrols in a targeted
area of interest, and one platoon designated as a
company or battalion quick reaction force. Based
on the situation and operations tempo, these patrols
could be happening sequentially or simultaneously.
Additionally, each module has its own set of enablers,
which had to be planned and managed properly.
The “dynamic re-tasking” occurred when host nation
security forces required tactical support from U.S.
forces. Typically, Commanders were given six to eight
hours to dynamically re-task the company to support
host nation battalion level operations. This re-tasking
meant consolidating and re-organizing the platoons or
“cells” back at the operating base and finalizing the
troop leading procedures. The majority of the time the
mission was to conduct a company level clearance of
an urban area. In other offensive terms, we conducted
company movements to contact whilst partnered
with host nation forces. The threat was asymmetrical
at the time, but this can easily be applied to a more
conventional or hybrid threat. The OPORD was
completed and briefed within three to four hours of
the company WARNO. The company essentially went
from conducting de-centralized stability operations
WHY COIST MATTERS
5counteriedreport.com
to centralized offensive operations in six hours with
direct support from the headquarters section. COIST
employment begins with the company command team
and the commander’s mission command philosophy
and system management.
MISSION COMMAND SYSTEMS:
COIST 2020 INITIATIVES
The solution to effective and adaptable companies lies
within mission command. ADP 6-0 defines Mission
Command as the exercise of authority and direction
by the commander using mission orders to enable
disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to
empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct
of unified land operations. Additionally, mission
command system consists of five components:
personnel, networks, information systems, processes
and procedures, facilities and equipment. All of
these components are contained in the company
command post module. That module is contained in
the headquarters section with the commander as the
backbone of mission command.
Due to the nature of the future operational
environment, the current state of company command
posts and COIST cells are not effective due to a lack of
effective integration.They should not only be combined,
but augmented through experience and capability—
not personnel. The efficacy of this technique comes
from a synchronization of the five components of
mission command in one module with intelligence
as a centralized function. The module or node is
the command post, the cells are the headquarters
section/platoons, and the network is the company.
One of the primary arguments with COIST training
and employment involves creating cells “out of hide”
and taking soldier from line platoons. All the mission-
command capabilities are already present in the
headquarters section of a maneuver company/troop/
battery, which includes the 35 series MOS intelligence
soldier, Armored, Infantry, and Stryker formations.
Mission command capabilities can also be modified
or augmented in non-maneuver companies as seen
in Chapter 9 of the CALL COIST Handbook No. 13-09,
May 2013. This is not to say that a soldier from the
6. line cannot be transferred to or from the section, but
the capabilities are already there and are adaptable.
If you are conducting combined arms maneuver
through high-tempo operations, the commander is
fighting mounted through a multi-vehicle TAC or in a
dismounted configuration. There is no “COIST vehicle”
and those skill sets are executed via the personnel and
systems present on the various TAC vehicles. If you
transition to wide area security, the entire module along
with the systems transitions to a tent or hard stand
building. Company intelligence must be synchronized
with current operations and reporting, based on all of
the preparation and assessments conducted prior to
the mission. The emphasis comes from a previous
planning knowledge involving friendly maneuver,
enemy courses of action, information requirements
and enabler integration. Accurate reporting is decisive
in high-tempo operations and must be concise for
proper common operational picture development.
Doesn’t it make sense for the soldiers collecting and
analyzing the information before the mission, to report
it during and after the mission?
All modular configurations of the command post
must be able to receive, distribute and analyze
information. They must also be able to recommend
courses of action and integrate resources. All of
this is accomplished through one mission command
module that includes the company intelligence aspect.
Intelligence is innate at the company level based
on recent combat operations. There is no longer a
need to differentiate Command Posts from COISTs
because their missions are synonymous. We need
to train with increased capability in mind, in lieu of
increased personnel or equipment. Strong companies
with strong leaders have the ability to “do more
with less”.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, companies have evolved from recent
combat operations and must continue to evolve
and adapt based on the future threats involving
security. Time-honored concepts of conventional and
unconventional war involving traditional methods have
no meaning to a hybrid threat beyond their ability to
WHY COIST MATTERS
6 Counter-IED Report online, November 2015
be used against its opponents. The skill sets required
to combat this threat must be standardized and
maintained at the company level. Operations at the
tactical level directly correlate to the success or failure
of a campaign, where success is gained through
enhancing the situational awareness in tactical units
at the company/troop/battery level. All of the principles
contained in this article are applicable to maneuver
and non-maneuver companies alike. Whether you are
utilizing Company Intelligence Support Team (COIST),
Company-Level Intelligence Cell (CLIC), Company
Intelligence Cell (CIC), or Intelligence Support Team
(IST), you must be cellular and adaptive in order to
support higher echelon requirements and the mission
in a highly dynamic operational environment. ■
REFERENCES
Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Handbook No. 13-09:
Company Intelligence Support Team Update May 2013.
Field manual 2-19.4, 1-24, Brigade Combat Team (BCT)
Intelligence Operations 25 November 2008.
Field Manual 2-0 Intelligence 23 March 2010 and 15 April 2014.
Training Circular 2-19.63 Company Intelligence Support Team
9 November 2010.
ATP 3-90.37 Combined Arms Counter-Improvised Explosive
Device Operations.
ATP 3-21.11, SBCT Rifle Company 3rd QTR FY 15 (pending).
Training Circular 7-100 Hybrid Threat November 2010.
Super-cities threaten to swallow humanity The Independent
August 2014.
The Network vs. the BCT: Organizational Overmatch in Hybrid
Strategies, James K. Greer Small Wars Journal November
2013.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Victor R. Morris is a civilian
contractor and instructor at the U.S.
Army Europe’s Joint Multinational
Readiness Center (JMRC) in
Germany. The views expressed in
this article are those of the author
and do not reflect the official policy
or position of JMRC, United States
Army Europe, United States European Command, the
Department of the Army, the Department of Defense,
the United States Government or Booz Allen Hamilton.