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“Reliability analysis of wireless automotive 
applications with transceiver redundancy.” 
Final Presentation – Master Thesis: 
Roshan Chulyada 
(EEIT Master at FH-Rosenheim – University of Applied Science) 
Supervisors: Prof. Dr.-Ing. Holger Stahl Advisor: Dipl.-Ing. Hauke Stähle 
Prof. Dr. –Ing. Markus Stichler 
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis 1
Outline 
1. Problems and Solution. 
2. Challenges for Solution. 
3. Comparison of Wireless technologies. 
4. Safety Analysis of Existing System in eCar. 
5. Approach and Analysis to get Reliable System in 
eCar. 
6. Design of Fail-Operational System. 
7. Implementation. 
8. Experiments. 
9. Conclusion and Further works. 
10. Demonstration 
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis 2
1. Problems (I). 
3 
Increase comfort and safety. 
Increase sensors (150), switches etc. 
Increase integration efforts (inter domain)and complexity. 
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
1. Problem (II). 
source: http://bainite.wordpress.com/category/cars/ 
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis 4
1. Solution (III). 
5 
Simple 
integration. 
Wireless 
Reduce weight. 
Increase 
design 
Flexibility. 
Enable dynamic 
inter-domain 
data 
Transmission. 
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
2. Challenges 
• Interferences 
• Complete Blocking 
• Distortion 
Wireless Channel 
• Protocols are not designed for this use case. 
No protocols are designed 
for automotive in vehicle 
communication. 
Fail-Operational Behavior • System runs with failure. 
Safe System 
Fail Operational 
System 
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis 6
3. Comparison of Wireless Technologies. 
Data rate 
Range Cost 
Link Budget 
ZigBee 
Bluetooth 
Wi-Fi 
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis 7
4. Safety Analysis of Existing System in eCar. 
1. System 
Architecture 
Safety 
Analysis 
2. FMEA 
3. MTTF 
5. Reliability 
4. Reliability 
Block 
Diagram. 
Reliable = ASIL D 
Source: ISO 26262 ASIL standard 
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis 8
4. Safety Analysis of Existing System in eCar. 
9 
Master Node 
1 
Safety 
Analysis 
2 
4 3 
5 
Slave Node 
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
4. Safety Analysis of Existing System in eCar. 
10 
2. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA). 
2.6. Severity ranking and 
probability 
2.5. Perform failure 
Source: "Department of the Army, TM 5-698-4, Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analyses (FMECA) for Command, Control, 
Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Facilities, 29 September 2006." 
1 
Safety 
Analysis 
2 
4 3 
5 
FMEA 
2.1. Define the system and 
Identify elements or 
components. 
2.2. Define Ground 
Rules and Assumptions 
2.3. System 
Block 
Diagram 
2.4. Identify 
Failure 
modes 
effects/causes 
Methodology 
The system is inside the car with 
the shielding box. The master 
node is at central system and 
slave node is at rear axel 
connected to the sensor to 
control the wheel. Master and 
Slave node sends or received data 
via wireless channel. 
•Overview of system failure by 
research and brain storming. 
•Assume severity and probability 
values are according to system. 
•Mission Time: 12hrs. 
•Severity Classifications (IV to I). 
•Probability levels(1 to 4). 
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
4. Existing System Arch. in e-Car (II) 
11 
Node 
(MSP430F5438) 
Transceiver 
(CC2520) 
Power Supply 
System 
UART SPI 
Networks 
or 
Systems. 
Node 
(MSP430F5438) 
Transceiver 
(CC2520) 
UART SPI 
Networks 
or 
Systems. 
Master Node 
Slave Node 
ZigBee 
Protocols 
2. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA). 
2.3 System Block Diagram. 
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
4. Safety Analysis of Existing System in eCar. 
12 
2. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA). 
FMEA Table 
LOW HIGH 
1, 1 
1, 2 
2, 2 
Probability and Severity 
3, 1 
Moderate 
1, 3 
4, 3 
1, 4 
2, 1 
3, 4 
4, 2 
1 2 
3 
4 
5 
1 2 3 4 5 
Severity 
Probability 
Severity 
HIGH 
High risk 
Moderate 
Low 
LOW 
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
4. Safety Analysis of Existing System in eCar. 
13 
3. Mean Time To Failure. 
• Measure of rate of failure in useful time for non-repairable systems. 
• Formulas for MTTF, Failure Rate( ) and reliability (R) calculation. (Ref: mil-hdbk 338B 
and mil-hdbk 217F version 1 and 2) 
MTTF ( )  1/ 
- t -t/MTTF Re R(t)  e  e  liability 
Failure Rate = base failure rate X temperature X stress X 
environment X etc.. Failures/10^6 hours 
For example : 
Resistor 
) ( 
 
Base failure 
Power factor 
Environment factor 
b T P S Q E         res 
Temp. factor 
Power Stress 
Quality factor 
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
4. Safety Analysis of Existing System in eCar. 
3. Mean Time To Failure. 
Example : 
Resistors on MSP430 board: 
base failure 
Temperature Factor , for 120 degree centegrate 
Power Stress Factor , for max. power stress 0.9 
Quality Factor 
Environmental factor , for environment GM, Ground, Mobile 
Power factor 
14 
( )  0.0024 b  
( )  2.1 T  
( ) 1.9 S  
( )  0.03 Q  
( ) 16 E  
( )  0.3391 P  
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
4. Safety Analysis of Existing System in eCar. 
15 
3. Mean Time To Failure. 
MTTF of Resistor 
-3 
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis 
hours 
failures 
res 6 
10 
( ) 1.5586610 
Total MTTF of Board = hours 5 9.8210 
Reliability of Board = 6 999987.7 10 
4. Safety Analysis of Existing System in eCar. 
16 
3. Reliability Block Diagram (RBD). 
• What is RBD? (Ref: mil-hdbk 338B) 
1 
Safety 
Analysis 
2 
4 3 
5 
Reliability Block Diagram RBD 
Types of RBD 
3.1 Series 3.2 Parallel 
3.3 Combine 
Series & Parallel. 
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
4. Safety Analysis of Existing System in eCar. 
4.Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) of Existing System. 
17 
Master Node 
1 
Safety 
Analysis 
2 
4 3 
5 
Networks 
or 
Systems. 
Series Combination 
ps u n sp tr ch Rs  R  R  R  R  R  R 
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
4. Safety Analysis of Existing System in eCar. 
18 
5.Reliability Evaluation of System. 
How we did: 
R 
FMEA 
MTTF 
RBD 
• System Architecture. 
• System Block diagram 
• Mil-hdbk-338. 
Components Reliability 
• Component List 
• Mil-hdbk-217F 
(Process 
Reliability) 
(Passive 
components) 
Mission Time 
12 hours 
1 
Safety 
Analysis 
2 
4 3 
5 
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
4. Safety Analysis of Existing System in eCar. 
R t 
(t 12hrs) R (t) R (t) R (t) R (t) R (t) R ( ) ps u n sp tr ch 
19 
5.Reliability Evaluation of System. 
 Calculations and Analysis: 
Reliability in Series combination: 
1 
Safety 
Analysis 
2 
4 3 
       
5 
(t)  
0.999956 
s 
R 
s 
0.36 10 failures/hrs. -5    
ASIL A 
Suppose 40 million autos running 
12hrs then failure will be 1760 
autos. 
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
5. Approach & Analysis to get Reliable System in eCar. 
Approach System Design: 
CHx 
20 
Transceiver1 
(CC2520) 
UART1 SPI1 
Transceiver2 
(CC2520) 
UART-R 
SPI2 
ZigBee 
Protocols 
Networks 
or 
Systems. 
CHr 
CHy 
Node1 
(MSP430F5438) 
Power Supply 
System1 
Power Supply 
System2 
Node2 
(MSP430F5438) 
UART2 
Redundancy 
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
5. Approach & Analysis to get Reliable System in eCar. 
Reliability Block Diagram: 
21 
Networks 
or 
Systems. 
Rps1 
Rps2 
(t) R (t) R (t) R (t) R ( ) ps sys com ch R t 
p 
    
Ru1 
Ru2 
Rn1 
Rn2 
Rsp1 
Rsp2 
Rtr1 
Rtr2 
Rchx 
Rchy 
Rur 
Rchr 
Power System Controller System 
Rps Rsys 
Rch Rcom 
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
5. Approach & Analysis to get Reliable System in eCar. 
Analysis: 
22 
R t 
(t)  R (t)  R (t)  R (t)  
R ( ) 
p 
R t 
(  12hrs)  0.999999999  0.9999999996  1  
1 
p 
R (t) 0.999999995 
-9 
 
0.41666 10 failures/hour 
p 
ps sys com ch 
  
 
ASIL D 
Suppose 40 million autos running 
12hrs then failure will be 0.2 
autos. 
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
6. Design of Fail-Operational System 
Algorithm Design (I): Master Node2 monitoring Master Node1 
Start 
Is 
UART-R 
status 
Ok? 
YES 
Is 
Master 
Node1 
Ok? 
Inform to 
All Nodes. 
Get Status 
of Master 
Node1 
from 
Wireless 
Channel. 
Inform to 
All Nodes. 
1 
NO 
NO 
YES 
Major Failure Levels 
•UART-R failure 
•Power Supply failure 
•Node Failure 
•Freeze 
•Signal Blocked 
30.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis 23
6. Design of Fail-Operational System 
24 
Start 
YES 
Is Tx & 
Rx 
counter 
increasing 
CRC 
BIT 
Ok? 
Switched 
to backup 
Channel. 
Block data 
send from 
Master 
Node1 to 
Network. 
2 
Algorithm Design (II): 
Start 1 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES 
Major Failure Levels 
•Babling Idiot 
Moderate Failure Levels 
•Frame error 
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
6. Design of Fail-Operational System 
25 
Start 
YES 
RSSI > 
-80dBm? 
50 >= 
Corr. 
Value 
<= 108 
? 
Increase 
Transmit 
Power. 
3 
Algorithm Design (III): 
2 
Switched 
to backup 
Channel. 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES 
Moderate Failure Levels 
•Path loss 
•Distortion 
•Signal Blocked 
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
6. Design of Fail-Operational System 
26 
Start 
YES 
Is 
Payload 
size 
equal? 
YES 
Frame 
sequence 
number 
equal? 
Block data 
send from 
Master 
Node1 to 
Network. 
Algorithm Design (IV): 
3 
Send 
data from 
Master 
Node1 to 
Network. 
END 
NO 
YES NO 
Minor Failure Levels 
•Payload mismatch 
•Packet lost 
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
7. Implementation 
Channelstat. Tx. Power reset block n/w 
Fig. Action Protocol 
27 
7.1 Redundant Fail-Operational Protocol - RFOP (I). 
Status Actions RSSI Correl. CRC Fra. Sq. PayloadSize Tx. Count. Rx. Count. 
Fig. Redundant Fail-Operational Protocol (RFOP) for UART 
Redundant rUart1 rUart2 M. Node1 M. Node2 S. Node1 S. Node2 
Fig. Status Protocol 
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
7. Implementation 
MAC Protocol 
Fig. Redundant Fail-Operational Protocol (RFOP) for Wireless Channel 
channelstat. Tx. Power reset block n/w 
Fig. Action Protocol 
28 
7.1 Redundant Fail-Operational Protocol - RFOP (II). 
Status Actions PayloadSize 
Redundant rUart1 rUart2 M. Node1 M. Node2 S. Node1 S. Node2 
Fig. Status Protocol 
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
7. Implementation 
29 
7.1 Redundant Fail-Operational Protocol – RFOP (III). 
MAC 
header 
RFOP for 
wireless 
FCS 
.. 
Status, Action, RSSI, 
Corr. val. , CRC, Fra. Sq., 
payload, Tx. Counter, 
Rx. counter 
Master Node1 Slave Node1 
RFOP for UART 
UART-R UART-R1 
RFOP for UART 
MAC 
header 
RFOP for 
wireless 
FCS 
.. 
Master Node2 Slave Node2 
Status, Action, RSSI, 
Corr. val. , CRC, Fra. Sq., 
payload, Tx. Counter, 
Rx. counter 
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis 
RFOP for UART-R 
How it works?
7. Implementation (Hardware-I). 
30 
FET connector 
MSP430F5438 LCD 
PWR 
SPI 
UART 
SPI 
LEDs 
Header Ports (GPIOs) 
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
7. Implementation (Hardware-II). 
31 
CC2520 Radio Module 
Block diagram of CC2520 
Features: 
1. Excellent link budget (103dB). 
2. Extended temp. range (-40 to +125°C). 
3. DSSS transceiver. 
4. Three flexible power modes. 
5. Very good sensitivity (-98dBm). 
6. High adjacent channel rejection. 
7. 768 bytes on-chip RAM. 
8. 4 wires SPI and 6 configurable GPIOs. 
9. Many more… 
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
7. Implementation (Hardware-III). 
32 
UART connection between Node and its redundant node: 
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
7. Implementation (Hardware-III). 
33 
MSP430F5438 Board 
CC2520EMK 
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
7. Implementation (Software-I). 
FreeRTOS 
• FreeRTOS used as Operating System. 
• Open source and royalty free. 
• Priority based preemptive scheduling. 
• Same priority tasks use round-robin fashion. 
• Queues, binary semaphores, counting semaphores, recursive semaphores 
34 
and mutexes for communication and synchronisation between tasks, or 
between real time tasks and interrupts. 
• Available five different memory allocation and management algorithms 
heap1 to heap5. 
• Heap2 is favorable. 
NOTE: reference from http://www.freertos.org/ 
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
7. Implementation (Software - II). 
35 
• Software Architecture Overview. 
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
7. Implementation (Software - III). 
36 
• Software Architecture Detail. 
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
8. Experiments(I). 
37 
Experiment Setup: 
Master Node2 
Or 
Redundant Node 
Master Node1 
Slave Node2 
Or 
Redundant Node 
Slave Node1 
UART-R1 
UART-R 
Aluminum foil 
Default Channel – 12 & 19 
Backup Channel - 16 & 21 
Transmit power – 3dBm 
Max. Transmit Power – 5dBm 
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
8. Experiments(II). 
38 
Test Case – I (UART failure): 
UART1 
Network 
s or 
Systems. 
CH12 
CH19 
Master 
Node1 
Power 
Supply 
Sys1/Sys2 
UART-R 
Master 
Node2 
UART2 
UART3 
Networks 
or 
Systems. 
CH12 
CH19 
Slave 
Node1 
Power Supply 
Sys3/Sys4 
Slave 
Node2 
UART4 
UART-R1 
Master Slave 
Experiment Scenario 12 
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
UART-R 
UART-R1 
8. Experiments(III). 
39 
Test Case – II (Node Failure): 
UART1 
Network 
s or 
Systems. 
CH12 
CH19 
Master 
Node1 
Power 
Supply 
Sys1/Sys2 
Master 
Node2 
UART2 
UART3 
Networks 
or 
Systems. 
CH12 
CH19 
Slave 
Node1 
Power Supply 
Sys3/Sys4 
Slave 
Node2 
UART4 
Master Slave 
Experiment Scenario 1234 
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
Tx Pow. 5dBm CH16 CH16 Tx Pow. 5dBm 
UART-R 
UART-R1 
8. Experiments(IV). 
40 
Test Case – III (RSSI Decreases): 
UART1 
Network 
s or 
Systems. CH12 
CH21 CH21 
CH19 
Master 
Node1 
Power 
Supply 
Sys1/Sys2 
Master 
Node2 
UART2 
UART3 
Networks 
or 
CH12 Systems. 
CH19 
Slave 
Node1 
Power Supply 
Sys3/Sys4 
Slave 
Node2 
UART4 
Tx Pow. 5dBm 
Tx Pow. 5dBm 
Master Slave 
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
UART-R 
UART-R1 
8. Experiments(V). 
41 
Test Case – IV (Wireless Channel Failure): 
UART1 
Network 
s or 
Systems. CH12 
CH16 CH16 
CH19 
Master 
Node1 
Power 
Supply 
Sys1/Sys2 
Master 
Node2 
UART2 
UART3 
Networks 
or 
CH12 Systems. 
CH19 
Slave 
Node1 
Power Supply 
Sys3/Sys4 
Slave 
Node2 
UART4 
CH21 CH21 
Master Slave 
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
9. Conclusion and Further works. 
With using parallel redundant system we can have higher reliability 
(ASIL D) of wireless automotive application and we have verified 
mathematically using our research and methodologies. 
The algorithm and protocol have been designed and implemented 
using software architecture for controlling and monitoring nodes so 
that even with single point failure system works in fail-operational 
behavior. 
42 
Further works: 
-UART connection can be replaced by wireless channel. 
-Initial main component like CPU, Power supply etc. of system 
check before other functions start. 
-Integration in eCar. 
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
Demonstration. 
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis 43
Thank You All! 
Any questions or suggestion? 
09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis 44

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Reliability analysis of wireless automotive applications with transceiver redundancy.

  • 1. “Reliability analysis of wireless automotive applications with transceiver redundancy.” Final Presentation – Master Thesis: Roshan Chulyada (EEIT Master at FH-Rosenheim – University of Applied Science) Supervisors: Prof. Dr.-Ing. Holger Stahl Advisor: Dipl.-Ing. Hauke Stähle Prof. Dr. –Ing. Markus Stichler 09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis 1
  • 2. Outline 1. Problems and Solution. 2. Challenges for Solution. 3. Comparison of Wireless technologies. 4. Safety Analysis of Existing System in eCar. 5. Approach and Analysis to get Reliable System in eCar. 6. Design of Fail-Operational System. 7. Implementation. 8. Experiments. 9. Conclusion and Further works. 10. Demonstration 09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis 2
  • 3. 1. Problems (I). 3 Increase comfort and safety. Increase sensors (150), switches etc. Increase integration efforts (inter domain)and complexity. 09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
  • 4. 1. Problem (II). source: http://bainite.wordpress.com/category/cars/ 09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis 4
  • 5. 1. Solution (III). 5 Simple integration. Wireless Reduce weight. Increase design Flexibility. Enable dynamic inter-domain data Transmission. 09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
  • 6. 2. Challenges • Interferences • Complete Blocking • Distortion Wireless Channel • Protocols are not designed for this use case. No protocols are designed for automotive in vehicle communication. Fail-Operational Behavior • System runs with failure. Safe System Fail Operational System 09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis 6
  • 7. 3. Comparison of Wireless Technologies. Data rate Range Cost Link Budget ZigBee Bluetooth Wi-Fi 09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis 7
  • 8. 4. Safety Analysis of Existing System in eCar. 1. System Architecture Safety Analysis 2. FMEA 3. MTTF 5. Reliability 4. Reliability Block Diagram. Reliable = ASIL D Source: ISO 26262 ASIL standard 09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis 8
  • 9. 4. Safety Analysis of Existing System in eCar. 9 Master Node 1 Safety Analysis 2 4 3 5 Slave Node 09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
  • 10. 4. Safety Analysis of Existing System in eCar. 10 2. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA). 2.6. Severity ranking and probability 2.5. Perform failure Source: "Department of the Army, TM 5-698-4, Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analyses (FMECA) for Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Facilities, 29 September 2006." 1 Safety Analysis 2 4 3 5 FMEA 2.1. Define the system and Identify elements or components. 2.2. Define Ground Rules and Assumptions 2.3. System Block Diagram 2.4. Identify Failure modes effects/causes Methodology The system is inside the car with the shielding box. The master node is at central system and slave node is at rear axel connected to the sensor to control the wheel. Master and Slave node sends or received data via wireless channel. •Overview of system failure by research and brain storming. •Assume severity and probability values are according to system. •Mission Time: 12hrs. •Severity Classifications (IV to I). •Probability levels(1 to 4). 09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
  • 11. 4. Existing System Arch. in e-Car (II) 11 Node (MSP430F5438) Transceiver (CC2520) Power Supply System UART SPI Networks or Systems. Node (MSP430F5438) Transceiver (CC2520) UART SPI Networks or Systems. Master Node Slave Node ZigBee Protocols 2. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA). 2.3 System Block Diagram. 09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
  • 12. 4. Safety Analysis of Existing System in eCar. 12 2. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA). FMEA Table LOW HIGH 1, 1 1, 2 2, 2 Probability and Severity 3, 1 Moderate 1, 3 4, 3 1, 4 2, 1 3, 4 4, 2 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 Severity Probability Severity HIGH High risk Moderate Low LOW 09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
  • 13. 4. Safety Analysis of Existing System in eCar. 13 3. Mean Time To Failure. • Measure of rate of failure in useful time for non-repairable systems. • Formulas for MTTF, Failure Rate( ) and reliability (R) calculation. (Ref: mil-hdbk 338B and mil-hdbk 217F version 1 and 2) MTTF ( )  1/ - t -t/MTTF Re R(t)  e  e  liability Failure Rate = base failure rate X temperature X stress X environment X etc.. Failures/10^6 hours For example : Resistor ) (  Base failure Power factor Environment factor b T P S Q E         res Temp. factor Power Stress Quality factor 09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
  • 14. 4. Safety Analysis of Existing System in eCar. 3. Mean Time To Failure. Example : Resistors on MSP430 board: base failure Temperature Factor , for 120 degree centegrate Power Stress Factor , for max. power stress 0.9 Quality Factor Environmental factor , for environment GM, Ground, Mobile Power factor 14 ( )  0.0024 b  ( )  2.1 T  ( ) 1.9 S  ( )  0.03 Q  ( ) 16 E  ( )  0.3391 P  09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
  • 15. 4. Safety Analysis of Existing System in eCar. 15 3. Mean Time To Failure. MTTF of Resistor -3 09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis hours failures res 6 10 ( ) 1.5586610 Total MTTF of Board = hours 5 9.8210 Reliability of Board = 6 999987.7 10 
  • 16. 4. Safety Analysis of Existing System in eCar. 16 3. Reliability Block Diagram (RBD). • What is RBD? (Ref: mil-hdbk 338B) 1 Safety Analysis 2 4 3 5 Reliability Block Diagram RBD Types of RBD 3.1 Series 3.2 Parallel 3.3 Combine Series & Parallel. 09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
  • 17. 4. Safety Analysis of Existing System in eCar. 4.Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) of Existing System. 17 Master Node 1 Safety Analysis 2 4 3 5 Networks or Systems. Series Combination ps u n sp tr ch Rs  R  R  R  R  R  R 09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
  • 18. 4. Safety Analysis of Existing System in eCar. 18 5.Reliability Evaluation of System. How we did: R FMEA MTTF RBD • System Architecture. • System Block diagram • Mil-hdbk-338. Components Reliability • Component List • Mil-hdbk-217F (Process Reliability) (Passive components) Mission Time 12 hours 1 Safety Analysis 2 4 3 5 09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
  • 19. 4. Safety Analysis of Existing System in eCar. R t (t 12hrs) R (t) R (t) R (t) R (t) R (t) R ( ) ps u n sp tr ch 19 5.Reliability Evaluation of System.  Calculations and Analysis: Reliability in Series combination: 1 Safety Analysis 2 4 3        5 (t)  0.999956 s R s 0.36 10 failures/hrs. -5    ASIL A Suppose 40 million autos running 12hrs then failure will be 1760 autos. 09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
  • 20. 5. Approach & Analysis to get Reliable System in eCar. Approach System Design: CHx 20 Transceiver1 (CC2520) UART1 SPI1 Transceiver2 (CC2520) UART-R SPI2 ZigBee Protocols Networks or Systems. CHr CHy Node1 (MSP430F5438) Power Supply System1 Power Supply System2 Node2 (MSP430F5438) UART2 Redundancy 09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
  • 21. 5. Approach & Analysis to get Reliable System in eCar. Reliability Block Diagram: 21 Networks or Systems. Rps1 Rps2 (t) R (t) R (t) R (t) R ( ) ps sys com ch R t p     Ru1 Ru2 Rn1 Rn2 Rsp1 Rsp2 Rtr1 Rtr2 Rchx Rchy Rur Rchr Power System Controller System Rps Rsys Rch Rcom 09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
  • 22. 5. Approach & Analysis to get Reliable System in eCar. Analysis: 22 R t (t)  R (t)  R (t)  R (t)  R ( ) p R t (  12hrs)  0.999999999  0.9999999996  1  1 p R (t) 0.999999995 -9  0.41666 10 failures/hour p ps sys com ch    ASIL D Suppose 40 million autos running 12hrs then failure will be 0.2 autos. 09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
  • 23. 6. Design of Fail-Operational System Algorithm Design (I): Master Node2 monitoring Master Node1 Start Is UART-R status Ok? YES Is Master Node1 Ok? Inform to All Nodes. Get Status of Master Node1 from Wireless Channel. Inform to All Nodes. 1 NO NO YES Major Failure Levels •UART-R failure •Power Supply failure •Node Failure •Freeze •Signal Blocked 30.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis 23
  • 24. 6. Design of Fail-Operational System 24 Start YES Is Tx & Rx counter increasing CRC BIT Ok? Switched to backup Channel. Block data send from Master Node1 to Network. 2 Algorithm Design (II): Start 1 NO NO YES YES Major Failure Levels •Babling Idiot Moderate Failure Levels •Frame error 09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
  • 25. 6. Design of Fail-Operational System 25 Start YES RSSI > -80dBm? 50 >= Corr. Value <= 108 ? Increase Transmit Power. 3 Algorithm Design (III): 2 Switched to backup Channel. NO NO YES YES Moderate Failure Levels •Path loss •Distortion •Signal Blocked 09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
  • 26. 6. Design of Fail-Operational System 26 Start YES Is Payload size equal? YES Frame sequence number equal? Block data send from Master Node1 to Network. Algorithm Design (IV): 3 Send data from Master Node1 to Network. END NO YES NO Minor Failure Levels •Payload mismatch •Packet lost 09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
  • 27. 7. Implementation Channelstat. Tx. Power reset block n/w Fig. Action Protocol 27 7.1 Redundant Fail-Operational Protocol - RFOP (I). Status Actions RSSI Correl. CRC Fra. Sq. PayloadSize Tx. Count. Rx. Count. Fig. Redundant Fail-Operational Protocol (RFOP) for UART Redundant rUart1 rUart2 M. Node1 M. Node2 S. Node1 S. Node2 Fig. Status Protocol 09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
  • 28. 7. Implementation MAC Protocol Fig. Redundant Fail-Operational Protocol (RFOP) for Wireless Channel channelstat. Tx. Power reset block n/w Fig. Action Protocol 28 7.1 Redundant Fail-Operational Protocol - RFOP (II). Status Actions PayloadSize Redundant rUart1 rUart2 M. Node1 M. Node2 S. Node1 S. Node2 Fig. Status Protocol 09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
  • 29. 7. Implementation 29 7.1 Redundant Fail-Operational Protocol – RFOP (III). MAC header RFOP for wireless FCS .. Status, Action, RSSI, Corr. val. , CRC, Fra. Sq., payload, Tx. Counter, Rx. counter Master Node1 Slave Node1 RFOP for UART UART-R UART-R1 RFOP for UART MAC header RFOP for wireless FCS .. Master Node2 Slave Node2 Status, Action, RSSI, Corr. val. , CRC, Fra. Sq., payload, Tx. Counter, Rx. counter 09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis RFOP for UART-R How it works?
  • 30. 7. Implementation (Hardware-I). 30 FET connector MSP430F5438 LCD PWR SPI UART SPI LEDs Header Ports (GPIOs) 09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
  • 31. 7. Implementation (Hardware-II). 31 CC2520 Radio Module Block diagram of CC2520 Features: 1. Excellent link budget (103dB). 2. Extended temp. range (-40 to +125°C). 3. DSSS transceiver. 4. Three flexible power modes. 5. Very good sensitivity (-98dBm). 6. High adjacent channel rejection. 7. 768 bytes on-chip RAM. 8. 4 wires SPI and 6 configurable GPIOs. 9. Many more… 09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
  • 32. 7. Implementation (Hardware-III). 32 UART connection between Node and its redundant node: 09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
  • 33. 7. Implementation (Hardware-III). 33 MSP430F5438 Board CC2520EMK 09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
  • 34. 7. Implementation (Software-I). FreeRTOS • FreeRTOS used as Operating System. • Open source and royalty free. • Priority based preemptive scheduling. • Same priority tasks use round-robin fashion. • Queues, binary semaphores, counting semaphores, recursive semaphores 34 and mutexes for communication and synchronisation between tasks, or between real time tasks and interrupts. • Available five different memory allocation and management algorithms heap1 to heap5. • Heap2 is favorable. NOTE: reference from http://www.freertos.org/ 09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
  • 35. 7. Implementation (Software - II). 35 • Software Architecture Overview. 09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
  • 36. 7. Implementation (Software - III). 36 • Software Architecture Detail. 09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
  • 37. 8. Experiments(I). 37 Experiment Setup: Master Node2 Or Redundant Node Master Node1 Slave Node2 Or Redundant Node Slave Node1 UART-R1 UART-R Aluminum foil Default Channel – 12 & 19 Backup Channel - 16 & 21 Transmit power – 3dBm Max. Transmit Power – 5dBm 09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
  • 38. 8. Experiments(II). 38 Test Case – I (UART failure): UART1 Network s or Systems. CH12 CH19 Master Node1 Power Supply Sys1/Sys2 UART-R Master Node2 UART2 UART3 Networks or Systems. CH12 CH19 Slave Node1 Power Supply Sys3/Sys4 Slave Node2 UART4 UART-R1 Master Slave Experiment Scenario 12 09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
  • 39. UART-R UART-R1 8. Experiments(III). 39 Test Case – II (Node Failure): UART1 Network s or Systems. CH12 CH19 Master Node1 Power Supply Sys1/Sys2 Master Node2 UART2 UART3 Networks or Systems. CH12 CH19 Slave Node1 Power Supply Sys3/Sys4 Slave Node2 UART4 Master Slave Experiment Scenario 1234 09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
  • 40. Tx Pow. 5dBm CH16 CH16 Tx Pow. 5dBm UART-R UART-R1 8. Experiments(IV). 40 Test Case – III (RSSI Decreases): UART1 Network s or Systems. CH12 CH21 CH21 CH19 Master Node1 Power Supply Sys1/Sys2 Master Node2 UART2 UART3 Networks or CH12 Systems. CH19 Slave Node1 Power Supply Sys3/Sys4 Slave Node2 UART4 Tx Pow. 5dBm Tx Pow. 5dBm Master Slave 09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
  • 41. UART-R UART-R1 8. Experiments(V). 41 Test Case – IV (Wireless Channel Failure): UART1 Network s or Systems. CH12 CH16 CH16 CH19 Master Node1 Power Supply Sys1/Sys2 Master Node2 UART2 UART3 Networks or CH12 Systems. CH19 Slave Node1 Power Supply Sys3/Sys4 Slave Node2 UART4 CH21 CH21 Master Slave 09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
  • 42. 9. Conclusion and Further works. With using parallel redundant system we can have higher reliability (ASIL D) of wireless automotive application and we have verified mathematically using our research and methodologies. The algorithm and protocol have been designed and implemented using software architecture for controlling and monitoring nodes so that even with single point failure system works in fail-operational behavior. 42 Further works: -UART connection can be replaced by wireless channel. -Initial main component like CPU, Power supply etc. of system check before other functions start. -Integration in eCar. 09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis
  • 43. Demonstration. 09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis 43
  • 44. Thank You All! Any questions or suggestion? 09.10.2014 Final presentation - Master Thesis 44

Editor's Notes

  1. Welcome Prof. and Introduction myself.
  2. Current vehicles have more than 150 sensors and switches. And it is still growing because of new features and customer requirements. So, this will further increase the more complexity, cost and weight of the wiring harness.
  3. 3. Decrease vehicle weight, increases the fuel efficiency. (source: http://bainite.wordpress.com/category/cars/)
  4. 1. Simple integration: No hares of connections of wires. 2. Almost 50kg weight will be reduced so it will increase fuel efficiency. 3. Placement of sensor will be easy. Also can put sensor in tyres etc. Enable Dynamic inter-domain data transmission: In wired system transmission goes through gateway only and chaotic design for inter-domain communication. Now, from wireless we can use wireless channel between any of two domain. Explanation example is in note book.
  5. Electromagnetic interferences. Same frequency signal can block – maybe hacker. More noise from engines, vibrations or reflection cause path loss results Distortion Even run with single point failure of some component. Safety + Fail Operational System = Reliable System.
  6. Bandwidth bluetooth: 1Mhz wifi: 22Mhz zigbee:2MHz Data rate bluetooth: <1Mbps wifi: 10-105Mbps zigbee: 250kbps No. of cell Nodes 8 2007 >65000 Latency Low High Low Data rate <1Mbps 10-105Mbps 250kbps component Cost Cheap expensive very cheap Power consuption low high very low Protocol overhead 158 bytes 31 58 range 10m 10-100m 10-400m link Budget 97dB Low 103dB
  7. Methodology for safety analysis Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) Our objective to get failure rate = 10-9 failure per hour which is ASIL D level. From standard ISO 26262 automotive is safe or reliable if its ASIL D containment.
  8. FMEA is a systematic techniques for failure analyze using component level or functional level of the system. Qualitative analysis
  9. FMEA – Qualitative analysis – from the research and environmental scenario we have decided the probabilities and severity. 3,1 – Software hang. 4,2 – Signal Distortion. 4,3 – Path loss. Severity classification: A) Category I - Catastrophic: A failure which may cause death or weapon system loss (i.e., aircraft, tank, missile, ship, etc.)   B) Category II - Critical: A failure which may cause severe injury, major property damage, or major system damage which will result in mission loss.   C) Category III - Marginal: A failure which may cause minor injury, minor property damage, or minor system damage which will result in delay or loss of availability or mission degradation.   D) Category IV - Minor: A failure not serious enough to cause injury, property damage or system damage, but which will result in unscheduled maintenance or repair.
  10. Quantitative analysis
  11. All values are from mil-hdbk 217F version 1 and 2.
  12. Excel sheet for component list are from vendor. From that table is created to calculate total MTTF – mean time to failure is rate of failure time.
  13. Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) is a graphical representation of how the components of a system are connected from reliability point of view. Reliability Block Diagram helps reliability analysis using a functional diagram to portray and analyze the reliability relationship of components in a system.
  14. Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) is a graphical representation of how the components of a system are connected from reliability point of view. Reliability Block Diagram helps reliability analysis using a functional diagram to portray and analyze the reliability relationship of components in a system.
  15. For component reliability we calculate MTTF and we did not take consideration of process reliability that how board is develop and its processes. Component list collected from vendor like Texas instruments, Murata, KOA etc. Process reliability: How the board layers is developed and its MTTF. Passive components on board: audio jack, IC, resistors, USB connector which is not actively connected with our ICS or which components we used from the board. All components from LCD also not included. FMEA we came to know the failure components and causes to develop RBD. We assume that one driver can only drive for 12 hrs in a day non-stop.
  16. Let 40 million vechicles, Series combination: Rch = 0.999999999 => unreliability = 17600.4 Rch = 1 => unreliability = 1760 Parallel combination: Rch = o.999999999=> unreliability = 0.8 Rch = 1 => unreliability => 0.2
  17. Redundant system
  18. Redundant system
  19. Let 40 million vechicles, Series combination: Rch = 0.999999999 => unreliability = 17600.4 Rch = 1 => unreliability = 1760 Parallel combination: Rch = o.999999999=> unreliability = 0.8 Rch = 1 => unreliability => 0.2
  20. After the reliability analysis, to run the reliable system the algorithm is design for failure detection which again secure to more reliable system even in single point failure. Whole redundant system is working without error on start. Algorithm is designed for failure detection/monitoring and controlling. Major Failure – Major failure level are more related with the system component which are most essential for running the system and to detect other failures. Although in the FMEA graph, path lost and distortion are in High risk area these are not in Major failure level because without the detection of power supply failure, node failure, UART-R failure etc. it is not possible to detect the path lost and distortion in the wireless communication system. 4) Various type of failure levels are distinguished according to the effects on system. If failure has effect on whole redundant system or on mission time then it is major failures. Example: If one Node power supply is failed then drive may lost complete control over car. 5) Explanation of each cases.
  21. 1) Moderate Failure. – This failure level includes failures in which the wireless system may not be effected on complete failures and it can be overcome by remedies. 2)Babbling idiot – Channel occupies all the time rejecting others and does not follow the scheduling. 3) Only with valid frame we can detect the below failures.
  22. High risk failures are in Moderate failure. Link Quality can be determined by RSSI and Correlation value Reflection of channel inside the shielding box and vibrations of car can cause Path loss and engine noise can cause distortion which results in bad frame quality and bad reception value RSSI (Receiver signal strength indicator). Signal Block can happen if nothing is received although node status is fine and also if signal link quality is bad so it can be divided in Major and Moderate level. Assumption, below -80dBm may lost the communication. From the cc2520 data sheet, approx. less than 50 – bad frame quality and approx. 108 and less – good frame quality
  23. Minor failure levels includes minor risk area and it has almost no effect on complete failure. Even with this failure in one node other node can send the data to the network. Payload size mismatch refer to data lost or payload corruption. Packet lost determined by frame sequence number results in BER increase.
  24. To implement the algorithm, protocol has been designed with reference to failure levels. RFOP for UART-R and UART-R1 Node Status bit are set by itself. Redundant bit is set and unset according to the ruart1 and ruart2 bits. All the data in RSSI, Correl., CRC, Frame seq. payloadsize, tx count., rx. Count. is from received frame of one Node and send to another node or redundant node via UART. Action protocol are send according to the failure of one node to another.
  25. To implement the algorithm, protocol has been designed with reference to failure levels. After 9bytes of MAC protocol, there are additional 14bytes for protocol design which now useful for redundant wireless to send status, actions and payloadsize. If uart-r is failed then status can be sent via this RFOP wireless channel protocol.
  26. The components used – for debug: JTAG, Power switches, System switches, UART and SPI connectors, MSP430 micorcontroller, LCD. Passive component: - Audio volume, joystick, temp. sensor. Features: It incorporates a 16-bit RISC CPU that has access to 16kB of SRAM and 256kB of flash memory. -various power saving modes to fulfill strict power consumption requirements. -built-in hardware support for common serial communication interfaces such as I2C, SPI or UART. -quartz crystal (32.768kHz ) on board that can be used as a timer clock source.
  27. -ZigBee RF transceiver (IEEE 802.15.4). -operating frequency is 2.4 GHz -16 Orthogonal channel. -payload size 125bytes. -250 Kbps. Link budget: transmitter output, receiver sensitivity, antenna gain, Free space loss, connector and cable loss, link margin etc. DSSS modulation technique: http://www.telecomabc.com/d/dsss.html Means spread spectrum technique. -It is spread spectrum technique whereby the original data signal is multiplied with a pseudo random noise spreading code. -Produce wideband time continuous scrambled signal. -DSSS significantly improves protection against interfering (or jamming) signals, especially narrowband and makes the signal less noticeable. Sensitivity: Sensitivity in a receiver is normally taken as the minimum input signal (Smin) required to produce a specified output signal having a specified signal-to-noise (S/N) ratio and is defined as the minimum signal-to-noise ratio times the mean noise power. Adjacent channel: if channel 13 is desirable then 12 and 14 are adjacent but 11 and 15 are alternate channels. The CC2520 radio module can transmit frames on carrier frequencies from 2394MHz to 2507MHz2. The carrier frequency is defined in steps of 1MHz.
  28. Tx and Rx are connected and has common ground. UART-R example connection but for all nodes its same.
  29. SPI connection: -the radio module is connected to the microcontroller via a serial peripheral interface (SPI) using four digital lines: Clock (SCLK), Master-In-Slave-Out (MISO), Master-Out-Slave-In (MOSI) and Chip Select (CS). -The microcontroller acts as SPI master and the CC2520 radio module is the SPI slave. SPI is main interface to configure and transport data. -MISO and MOSI provide bidirectional data communication between master and slave. GPIO: -They provide a more direct and also faster way of communication than the SPI interface. -GPIO pins that are used as input can be driven high or low by the microcontroller to directly issue some of the SPI commands without using the SPI interface. This gives very precise control about the timing of certain commands because changing the output level of a microcontoller pin is fast and the commands are directly executed without delay. -Output GPIO pins can be used to directly signal the occurrence of exceptions which trigger the interrupt at the microcontroller. Signaling by GPIO to microcontroller are : -SFD: This signal is raised each time the start of frame delimiter (SFD) of a frame is sent or received. Slave nodes store the reception time of beacon SFDs and use this time stamp to synchronize to the master node and correct their clock offset. -FIFOP: The FIFOP signal is raised when a certain amount of bytes is received and written to the rx buffer by the CC2520. It is also raised when a compelete packet is received and available in the CC2520’s rx buffer. -TX FRM DONE: When a packet is successfully transmitted, this signal is raised. -STXON: to enable receiver after transmission. Enable transmitter in node.
  30. -FreeRTOS provides a priority based preemptive scheduling mechanism: Tasks are assigned priorities and it is ensured that from the set of all currently runnable tasks, the task with the highest priority is active. -HEAP2 is used because this scheme or algorithm can be used when the tasks are created and deleted dynamically with always same size of stack allocation.
  31. -The implementation and functionality of the application depends on the ECU. -The communication Controller is the main component. It is responsible for schedule execution, timeslot interval generation as well as node synchronization. -MAC Logic controller is my propose layer to make the logics for controlling CC2520 and communication controller from which we can have control over transceiver. -Because we can control from the mac layer services are: beacon loss/active, synchronization, power lost, logical channel support by PHY layer and also security services etc. -cc2520 driver is used by communication controller to utilize spi and access to MSP430 hardware via SPI driver. -UART drive is used by MAC logic layer for connection with redundant node/active node.
  32. DB wireless In and DB wireless OUT are two databases (Double buffer) for external network. UART TX and RX tasks are for controlling and maintaining the redundant node by issuing the actions, status etc. HAL is Hardware Abstraction Layer different functionalities to access hardware layer by different tasks. Explain from Master Beacon task and end at receiver task. SPI commands always writes not read.
  33. More explanation on demonstration.