This document summarizes the political situation in Ethiopia following the death of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. It discusses that Meles had led Ethiopia with an authoritarian grip for 21 years through his Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) party. His death leaves the country's political system weakened without its central figure. The transition of power will likely be an internal TPLF process, leading to a weaker government and increased instability risks unless political reforms are enacted. The international community has an interest in actively influencing the transition.
1) Ethiopia transitioned from a multi-ethnic empire to an ethnic federation following two historical developments - the late 19th century expansion of the Ethiopian state which increased ethnic diversity, and the emergence of Marxist-Leninist opposition since the 1960s advocating for ethnic self-determination.
2) Ethiopia's federal system is based on principles of ethnic federalism and self-determination influenced by Marxist-Leninist ideology, with regional states organized along ethnic lines.
3) However, the dominant ruling party, EPRDF, has faced criticism for centralizing power and limiting political openness and competition, contradicting the principles of federalism.
The document discusses the development of democracy in Chile and Poland. It describes how Salvador Allende was democratically elected in Chile but was overthrown in a military coup led by Augusto Pinochet. Pinochet then ruled as a dictator for 17 years until democracy was restored. Michelle Bachelet, whose father was imprisoned and tortured under Pinochet, later became Chile's first female president. The document also describes the rise of the Solidarity trade union in communist-ruled Poland led by Lech Walesa, which helped lead to democratic reforms, though the government initially cracked down. Both cases involved a transition from non-democratic to democratic rule and show how democracy has expanded unevenly worldwide.
This document discusses and compares democracy and dictatorship as forms of government. It provides definitions and highlights of democracy, including that it is a form of government by the people through elections. It also outlines some merits and demerits of democracy, such as people having a choice in leaders but the potential for corruption. The document then defines dictatorship as rule by a single individual or group, and provides examples of dictatorial regimes in Pakistan's history. It analyzes periods of economic development under dictators compared to challenges faced by democracies. In conclusion, it emphasizes the importance of strengthening democracy through fair elections and an engaged, educated citizenry.
This document discusses the expansion of democracy throughout the 20th century based on three maps showing democratic governments in 1900-1950, 1950, and 2000. It notes that democracy has spread over time, starting first in some regions like Europe and North America in 1900 and 1950, and becoming more global by 2000. However, some regions still lack democratic governments today. The document also provides historical context on the development of democracy in countries like France, Britain, and the United States from the 18th century onward, including struggles to expand voting rights.
The crisis of nation building in the case of lebanon11Abir Chaaban
1. The document discusses the crisis of nation-building in Lebanon, including issues with identity, legitimacy, participation, and distribution.
2. It examines the National Pact which divided power between the Christian president and Sunni prime minister, and the resulting confessional system.
3. Tensions and disagreements between political leaders polarized public opinion and contributed to civil conflicts in 1958 and 1975 that weakened the state.
The minorities question and the willink interventionSANI BALA SHEHU
The document summarizes the findings of the Henry Willink Commission, which was appointed in 1957 to investigate the fears of ethnic minorities in Nigeria. The Commission found that in each of Nigeria's three regions, there was a majority ethnic group comprising about two-thirds of the population, with minority groups making up the remaining one-third. The minorities expressed fears of domination by the majority groups in terms of political influence, access to resources and public posts, and discrimination in law and order. The Willink report outlined these fears and proposed constitutional safeguards to protect minority rights and address their concerns regarding the new independent Nigerian federation.
Eritrea is located in the Horn of Africa and has a long history, transitioning between rule by various kingdoms and empires. It was eventually colonized by Italy in the late 19th century. After World War II, Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia but Ethiopia annexed Eritrea in 1962, leading to a 30-year war for independence. Eritrea gained independence in 1993 after a UN-monitored referendum but is now a one-party totalitarian dictatorship under an authoritarian president and ruling party, with no active democracy or civil liberties.
1) Ethiopia transitioned from a multi-ethnic empire to an ethnic federation following two historical developments - the late 19th century expansion of the Ethiopian state which increased ethnic diversity, and the emergence of Marxist-Leninist opposition since the 1960s advocating for ethnic self-determination.
2) Ethiopia's federal system is based on principles of ethnic federalism and self-determination influenced by Marxist-Leninist ideology, with regional states organized along ethnic lines.
3) However, the dominant ruling party, EPRDF, has faced criticism for centralizing power and limiting political openness and competition, contradicting the principles of federalism.
The document discusses the development of democracy in Chile and Poland. It describes how Salvador Allende was democratically elected in Chile but was overthrown in a military coup led by Augusto Pinochet. Pinochet then ruled as a dictator for 17 years until democracy was restored. Michelle Bachelet, whose father was imprisoned and tortured under Pinochet, later became Chile's first female president. The document also describes the rise of the Solidarity trade union in communist-ruled Poland led by Lech Walesa, which helped lead to democratic reforms, though the government initially cracked down. Both cases involved a transition from non-democratic to democratic rule and show how democracy has expanded unevenly worldwide.
This document discusses and compares democracy and dictatorship as forms of government. It provides definitions and highlights of democracy, including that it is a form of government by the people through elections. It also outlines some merits and demerits of democracy, such as people having a choice in leaders but the potential for corruption. The document then defines dictatorship as rule by a single individual or group, and provides examples of dictatorial regimes in Pakistan's history. It analyzes periods of economic development under dictators compared to challenges faced by democracies. In conclusion, it emphasizes the importance of strengthening democracy through fair elections and an engaged, educated citizenry.
This document discusses the expansion of democracy throughout the 20th century based on three maps showing democratic governments in 1900-1950, 1950, and 2000. It notes that democracy has spread over time, starting first in some regions like Europe and North America in 1900 and 1950, and becoming more global by 2000. However, some regions still lack democratic governments today. The document also provides historical context on the development of democracy in countries like France, Britain, and the United States from the 18th century onward, including struggles to expand voting rights.
The crisis of nation building in the case of lebanon11Abir Chaaban
1. The document discusses the crisis of nation-building in Lebanon, including issues with identity, legitimacy, participation, and distribution.
2. It examines the National Pact which divided power between the Christian president and Sunni prime minister, and the resulting confessional system.
3. Tensions and disagreements between political leaders polarized public opinion and contributed to civil conflicts in 1958 and 1975 that weakened the state.
The minorities question and the willink interventionSANI BALA SHEHU
The document summarizes the findings of the Henry Willink Commission, which was appointed in 1957 to investigate the fears of ethnic minorities in Nigeria. The Commission found that in each of Nigeria's three regions, there was a majority ethnic group comprising about two-thirds of the population, with minority groups making up the remaining one-third. The minorities expressed fears of domination by the majority groups in terms of political influence, access to resources and public posts, and discrimination in law and order. The Willink report outlined these fears and proposed constitutional safeguards to protect minority rights and address their concerns regarding the new independent Nigerian federation.
Eritrea is located in the Horn of Africa and has a long history, transitioning between rule by various kingdoms and empires. It was eventually colonized by Italy in the late 19th century. After World War II, Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia but Ethiopia annexed Eritrea in 1962, leading to a 30-year war for independence. Eritrea gained independence in 1993 after a UN-monitored referendum but is now a one-party totalitarian dictatorship under an authoritarian president and ruling party, with no active democracy or civil liberties.
The document summarizes the efforts of President Corazon Aquino's administration from 1986 to 1992 to reestablish democratic institutions and processes in the Philippines after the Marcos regime. It discusses how the administration established political freedom, free elections, an independent judiciary and bicameral legislature, freedom of expression, and helped restore peace and order. This included peace talks with communist insurgents and regional secessionist groups, as well as programs to support rebel returnees and encourage development in conflict-affected areas.
Nigeria’s federalism, an exploration of its dilemmaAlexander Decker
This document examines the dilemma of Nigeria's federalism. It discusses how Nigeria originally adopted a federal system that decentralized power to regions, but military rule later distorted this by centralizing power. While federalism can strengthen integration and development, Nigeria's practice has been weakened. The paper aims to analyze Nigeria's federalism, identify the sources of its dilemmas, and propose solutions to strengthen federalism in Nigeria.
The document provides information about the Philippines under several sections. It begins by describing the Philippine government as a presidential representative democratic republic with executive, legislative, and judicial branches. It then discusses the current president Benigno Aquino III and his background. It also covers key aspects of Philippine culture including traditions, arts, and festivals. The climate section notes the tropical marine climate with a rainy and dry season and frequent typhoons. The economy is discussed as the 12th largest in Asia with important industries like food, textiles, electronics and mining. Foreign relations priorities include ASEAN membership and the welfare of overseas Filipino workers. Philippine cuisine and popular tourist spots are also briefly mentioned.
Iran has a theocratic political system ruled by an Islamist ideology under the leadership of the Supreme Leader. It has an elected president and parliament but all candidates must be approved by the Guardian Council. The Supreme Leader is the highest political authority and appoints heads of key positions in the military, media, and security councils. The President is powerful but still subordinate to the Supreme Leader, nominating ministers who also require the Leader's approval.
This document is a thesis submitted by Blen Fitsum to Addis Ababa University in partial fulfillment of a master's degree in journalism. It examines the Ethiopian government's management of the media during the Ethio-Eritrean War from 1998 to 2000. Chapter 1 provides an overview of Ethiopia's media landscape and a background on the war. It establishes the research problem, questions, and objectives. Chapter 2 will review literature on media roles during war and techniques of media management and control. Chapter 3 describes the study's methodology, including data collection and sampling. Chapters 4 and 5 will present and analyze data on how the government managed information sources, access, censorship, patriotism, and the media
This document discusses the history of local government in Ethiopia and whether it has shifted from being an apparatus of control. It describes how Ethiopia transitioned from a decentralized system before 1855 to a highly centralized unitary state by the 20th century. Local authorities were used as political and administrative extensions of the central government to exert control over opposition and extract resources. While decentralization began in 1991, the document argues local authorities still primarily serve as a means of control rather than promoting grassroots democracy and development as intended. It provides historical context on how local control evolved under different emperors up until the 1974 revolution.
Under the 1962 constitution, local governments in Uganda enjoyed substantial autonomy, with kingdoms like Buganda having devolved powers over things like taxes, budgets, and services. However, central governments grew uncomfortable with this autonomous local governance and began curtailing powers. The 1967 Local Administration Act centralized all powers under the central government, transforming local governments into mere agents and removing their autonomy. This state of affairs persisted until Idi Amin's military regime took over in 1971, suspending the constitution and local governments. Amin later reorganized local administration under military control through provinces and appointed governors. Local governance remained centralized and non-participatory until the NRM took power in 1986.
The document summarizes Guinea's government system. It has a semi-presidential republic system with a president as head of state and prime minister as head of government. The unicameral National Assembly is the legislative body. The president has significant powers but must work with the prime minister and assembly. There are also judicial and local government structures described. The country has faced political instability and transitions of power since independence.
This document provides an overview of Benin's Constitutional Court and its role in protecting human rights. It discusses the court's origins following Benin's transition to democracy in 1990 after decades of authoritarian rule. The court was given broad subject matter jurisdiction over human rights violations and liberal standing rules allowing direct citizen access. This hybrid structure gives it functions of both a constitutional court and a human rights commission. The document analyzes the court's institutional design and jurisprudence, finding it has served as a model but that limitations have impeded its ability to provide full redress to victims.
I do not have any other questions. The document provided a detailed overview of the process of democratization in India and Pakistan after partition in 1947.
The document discusses the history and political system of Vietnam. It covers 3 key periods: 1) The independent Democratic Republic of Vietnam led by Ho Chi Minh from 1945-1975. 2) Reunification under a socialist regime from 1975-1986. 3) Vietnam as a one-party state led by the Communist Party of Vietnam from 1986 onward, with prospects for democratization. The Communist Party maintains a monopoly on political power and cracks down on dissent, though some reforms have expanded social and economic freedoms.
This document discusses the evolution of Turkish democracy and the potential relevance of the Turkish model for democratization in the Arab world. It outlines Turkey's transition from an authoritarian single-party system under Ataturk to a more democratic multi-party system over subsequent decades. Though Turkey's democracy is still imperfect with issues like human rights abuses and military influence, the rise of the AKP party improved reforms and alignment with Western institutions. However, the document argues Turkey's experience cannot be directly replicated in the Arab world due to different historical, economic, and geopolitical conditions that have consolidated authoritarianism. While Turkey provides an example for Arab liberals, its democratic development was unique to the Turkish context.
The document discusses the division and history of North and South Korea after World War 2. It summarizes that North Korea allied with the Soviet Union and became a communist state while South Korea allied with the US and became capitalist. This led to conflict, as the Korean War began in 1950 when North Korea invaded South Korea. Though UN troops intervened and pushed North Korea back, China joined and a stalemate ensued, dividing the country along similar borders. Today tensions remain high as South Korea thrives economically while North Korea struggles under its authoritarian regime.
National conference 2014 report, final draftninethchord
The document discusses the history of agitations for national conferences in Nigeria from 1914 to 2014. It describes three types of national conferences - constitutional, national, and sovereign - and explains their differing scopes and objectives. It then outlines the agitations for national dialogue and political restructuring that occurred after amalgamation in 1914 through various phases, including the push for decolonization from 1945 to 1960 and the early years of independence. The document provides historical context on the different eras and issues that led to calls for national conferences to discuss Nigeria's constitutional and political development.
National conference 2014 report, final draftninethchord
The document discusses the history of agitations for national conferences in Nigeria from 1914 to 2014. It describes three types of national conferences - constitutional, national, and sovereign - and explains their differing scopes and objectives. It then outlines the key agitations and events relating to national conferences within six historical periods of Nigeria's development: 1914-1945 during amalgamation and the problem of nationhood; 1945-1960 during decolonization and agitation for constitutional reform and independence; 1960-1966 in the early years of independence; 1966-1999 during military rule and the movement for democratization; and 1999-2014 during democratic rule and agitation for a sovereign national conference.
Corazon Aquino (1986-1992) was the first female president of the Philippines. She restored democracy after the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos and enacted the 1987 constitution, which crippled presidential power and restored democratic institutions and freedoms. She pursued national reconciliation and granted autonomy to the Muslim Mindanao region. Her administration implemented agrarian reform and pursued the recovery of wealth stolen under Marcos.
1. The document analyzes and compares the economic outputs and growth rates of different regimes in Pakistan from 1947 to 2007, including both elected democratic governments and military dictatorships.
2. It finds that several dictatorships, such as Ayub Khan's and Pervez Musharraf's, achieved relatively high GDP growth rates averaging around 6% annually, while some democratic governments struggled more with lower growth.
3. However, it also notes some dictatorships like Yahya Khan's saw economic difficulties, and democratic governments under Zulfiqar Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto still managed growth rates around 4-5% despite challenges.
4. In the conclusion, the author argues that unelected
Historical and Biographical Approach on HamletYuna Lesca
This document provides a historical and biographical analysis of William Shakespeare's play Hamlet. It discusses how the play was influenced by Shakespeare's life and the time period in which he lived. Specifically, it notes that Shakespeare lost a son named Hamnet around the same age as the character in the play. It also discusses how the setting of Elsinore Castle was based on a real castle in Denmark. Finally, it mentions that during Shakespeare's era, women were not allowed to be actresses, as reflected by the all-male cast in Hamlet.
The document summarizes the efforts of President Corazon Aquino's administration from 1986 to 1992 to reestablish democratic institutions and processes in the Philippines after the Marcos regime. It discusses how the administration established political freedom, free elections, an independent judiciary and bicameral legislature, freedom of expression, and helped restore peace and order. This included peace talks with communist insurgents and regional secessionist groups, as well as programs to support rebel returnees and encourage development in conflict-affected areas.
Nigeria’s federalism, an exploration of its dilemmaAlexander Decker
This document examines the dilemma of Nigeria's federalism. It discusses how Nigeria originally adopted a federal system that decentralized power to regions, but military rule later distorted this by centralizing power. While federalism can strengthen integration and development, Nigeria's practice has been weakened. The paper aims to analyze Nigeria's federalism, identify the sources of its dilemmas, and propose solutions to strengthen federalism in Nigeria.
The document provides information about the Philippines under several sections. It begins by describing the Philippine government as a presidential representative democratic republic with executive, legislative, and judicial branches. It then discusses the current president Benigno Aquino III and his background. It also covers key aspects of Philippine culture including traditions, arts, and festivals. The climate section notes the tropical marine climate with a rainy and dry season and frequent typhoons. The economy is discussed as the 12th largest in Asia with important industries like food, textiles, electronics and mining. Foreign relations priorities include ASEAN membership and the welfare of overseas Filipino workers. Philippine cuisine and popular tourist spots are also briefly mentioned.
Iran has a theocratic political system ruled by an Islamist ideology under the leadership of the Supreme Leader. It has an elected president and parliament but all candidates must be approved by the Guardian Council. The Supreme Leader is the highest political authority and appoints heads of key positions in the military, media, and security councils. The President is powerful but still subordinate to the Supreme Leader, nominating ministers who also require the Leader's approval.
This document is a thesis submitted by Blen Fitsum to Addis Ababa University in partial fulfillment of a master's degree in journalism. It examines the Ethiopian government's management of the media during the Ethio-Eritrean War from 1998 to 2000. Chapter 1 provides an overview of Ethiopia's media landscape and a background on the war. It establishes the research problem, questions, and objectives. Chapter 2 will review literature on media roles during war and techniques of media management and control. Chapter 3 describes the study's methodology, including data collection and sampling. Chapters 4 and 5 will present and analyze data on how the government managed information sources, access, censorship, patriotism, and the media
This document discusses the history of local government in Ethiopia and whether it has shifted from being an apparatus of control. It describes how Ethiopia transitioned from a decentralized system before 1855 to a highly centralized unitary state by the 20th century. Local authorities were used as political and administrative extensions of the central government to exert control over opposition and extract resources. While decentralization began in 1991, the document argues local authorities still primarily serve as a means of control rather than promoting grassroots democracy and development as intended. It provides historical context on how local control evolved under different emperors up until the 1974 revolution.
Under the 1962 constitution, local governments in Uganda enjoyed substantial autonomy, with kingdoms like Buganda having devolved powers over things like taxes, budgets, and services. However, central governments grew uncomfortable with this autonomous local governance and began curtailing powers. The 1967 Local Administration Act centralized all powers under the central government, transforming local governments into mere agents and removing their autonomy. This state of affairs persisted until Idi Amin's military regime took over in 1971, suspending the constitution and local governments. Amin later reorganized local administration under military control through provinces and appointed governors. Local governance remained centralized and non-participatory until the NRM took power in 1986.
The document summarizes Guinea's government system. It has a semi-presidential republic system with a president as head of state and prime minister as head of government. The unicameral National Assembly is the legislative body. The president has significant powers but must work with the prime minister and assembly. There are also judicial and local government structures described. The country has faced political instability and transitions of power since independence.
This document provides an overview of Benin's Constitutional Court and its role in protecting human rights. It discusses the court's origins following Benin's transition to democracy in 1990 after decades of authoritarian rule. The court was given broad subject matter jurisdiction over human rights violations and liberal standing rules allowing direct citizen access. This hybrid structure gives it functions of both a constitutional court and a human rights commission. The document analyzes the court's institutional design and jurisprudence, finding it has served as a model but that limitations have impeded its ability to provide full redress to victims.
I do not have any other questions. The document provided a detailed overview of the process of democratization in India and Pakistan after partition in 1947.
The document discusses the history and political system of Vietnam. It covers 3 key periods: 1) The independent Democratic Republic of Vietnam led by Ho Chi Minh from 1945-1975. 2) Reunification under a socialist regime from 1975-1986. 3) Vietnam as a one-party state led by the Communist Party of Vietnam from 1986 onward, with prospects for democratization. The Communist Party maintains a monopoly on political power and cracks down on dissent, though some reforms have expanded social and economic freedoms.
This document discusses the evolution of Turkish democracy and the potential relevance of the Turkish model for democratization in the Arab world. It outlines Turkey's transition from an authoritarian single-party system under Ataturk to a more democratic multi-party system over subsequent decades. Though Turkey's democracy is still imperfect with issues like human rights abuses and military influence, the rise of the AKP party improved reforms and alignment with Western institutions. However, the document argues Turkey's experience cannot be directly replicated in the Arab world due to different historical, economic, and geopolitical conditions that have consolidated authoritarianism. While Turkey provides an example for Arab liberals, its democratic development was unique to the Turkish context.
The document discusses the division and history of North and South Korea after World War 2. It summarizes that North Korea allied with the Soviet Union and became a communist state while South Korea allied with the US and became capitalist. This led to conflict, as the Korean War began in 1950 when North Korea invaded South Korea. Though UN troops intervened and pushed North Korea back, China joined and a stalemate ensued, dividing the country along similar borders. Today tensions remain high as South Korea thrives economically while North Korea struggles under its authoritarian regime.
National conference 2014 report, final draftninethchord
The document discusses the history of agitations for national conferences in Nigeria from 1914 to 2014. It describes three types of national conferences - constitutional, national, and sovereign - and explains their differing scopes and objectives. It then outlines the agitations for national dialogue and political restructuring that occurred after amalgamation in 1914 through various phases, including the push for decolonization from 1945 to 1960 and the early years of independence. The document provides historical context on the different eras and issues that led to calls for national conferences to discuss Nigeria's constitutional and political development.
National conference 2014 report, final draftninethchord
The document discusses the history of agitations for national conferences in Nigeria from 1914 to 2014. It describes three types of national conferences - constitutional, national, and sovereign - and explains their differing scopes and objectives. It then outlines the key agitations and events relating to national conferences within six historical periods of Nigeria's development: 1914-1945 during amalgamation and the problem of nationhood; 1945-1960 during decolonization and agitation for constitutional reform and independence; 1960-1966 in the early years of independence; 1966-1999 during military rule and the movement for democratization; and 1999-2014 during democratic rule and agitation for a sovereign national conference.
Corazon Aquino (1986-1992) was the first female president of the Philippines. She restored democracy after the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos and enacted the 1987 constitution, which crippled presidential power and restored democratic institutions and freedoms. She pursued national reconciliation and granted autonomy to the Muslim Mindanao region. Her administration implemented agrarian reform and pursued the recovery of wealth stolen under Marcos.
1. The document analyzes and compares the economic outputs and growth rates of different regimes in Pakistan from 1947 to 2007, including both elected democratic governments and military dictatorships.
2. It finds that several dictatorships, such as Ayub Khan's and Pervez Musharraf's, achieved relatively high GDP growth rates averaging around 6% annually, while some democratic governments struggled more with lower growth.
3. However, it also notes some dictatorships like Yahya Khan's saw economic difficulties, and democratic governments under Zulfiqar Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto still managed growth rates around 4-5% despite challenges.
4. In the conclusion, the author argues that unelected
Historical and Biographical Approach on HamletYuna Lesca
This document provides a historical and biographical analysis of William Shakespeare's play Hamlet. It discusses how the play was influenced by Shakespeare's life and the time period in which he lived. Specifically, it notes that Shakespeare lost a son named Hamnet around the same age as the character in the play. It also discusses how the setting of Elsinore Castle was based on a real castle in Denmark. Finally, it mentions that during Shakespeare's era, women were not allowed to be actresses, as reflected by the all-male cast in Hamlet.
The document provides a summary of Act I of Shakespeare's play Othello. It introduces the main characters and sets up the conflict between Othello and Iago. Iago is bitter about being passed over for a promotion and plots to get revenge on Othello. He manipulates Roderigo and awakens Brabantio to tell him that his daughter Desdemona has run off with Othello. This leads Brabantio to accuse Othello of bewitching Desdemona. The act culminates in Othello defending his marriage to the Duke and insisting it be judged fairly.
This document provides background information on William Shakespeare's play Othello. It summarizes the key plot points and characters of the tragedy, which centers around the titular character Othello and his jealousy and betrayal by Iago. The document also provides context about Elizabethan theatre and performances of Othello during Shakespeare's lifetime.
The document summarizes William Shakespeare's play Othello. It provides background on Shakespeare, a synopsis of the plot which involves Iago manipulating Othello into believing his wife Desdemona has been unfaithful, and descriptions of the main characters. The climax occurs when Othello vows revenge, believing Desdemona has betrayed him. This leads to tragic consequences as Othello kills Desdemona and then himself when the truth is revealed, while themes of trust, jealousy, and the incompatibility of love and war are explored.
Othello Powerpoint presentation English 102 jesmintz
The document provides background information on William Shakespeare and Elizabethan England. It discusses Shakespeare's plays being performed at the Globe Theatre in London. Shakespeare was a shareholder in the theatre and many of his greatest plays premiered there. The Globe could accommodate an audience of around 3,000 people and had an intimate stage projecting into the yard. The document also provides biographical details about Shakespeare, noting he was born in Stratford-upon-Avon and wrote around 37 plays between 1591-1611 as well as 154 sonnets.
- German Chancellor Angela Merkel declined an invitation to address Ethiopia's parliament during an upcoming visit, citing that it is dominated by a single party.
- Prominent Ethiopian opposition politician Hailu Shawel passed away at age 80 in Thailand while receiving treatment for diabetes. He had previously led the Coalition for Unity and Democracy party.
- An editorial calls on Ethiopians to come together following the tragic deaths that occurred during Irreecha celebrations, find constructive solutions to end unrest, and address citizens' legitimate concerns through open dialogue to avoid further violence and calamity.
The document is a response opposing H.Res.128, which accuses the Ethiopian government of human rights abuses. The summary argues:
1) Ethiopia has made significant progress in establishing democracy and inclusive governance since overthrowing a military dictatorship in 1991.
2) Testimony provided to support H.Res.128 included false and exaggerated claims not supported by evidence, and some witnesses were not credible.
3) The Ethiopian government is taking legitimate steps to maintain stability and protect its citizens from threats posed by militant opposition groups operating from outside Ethiopia.
4) Ethiopia still faces challenges in its political development but is making progress, and accusations in H.Res.128 are
The document discusses the economic repercussions and political implications of protest movements based on a study of 12 protest movements from 2003-2011. The key findings were that prolonged social unrest and strikes can compromise economic activity, with implications for politics taking longer to emerge fully. While the accuracy of findings depends on source data, the results help understand the importance and impact of social movements in changing world politics. The case study of Tunisia's 2010-2011 protests that ousted President Ben Ali is provided, highlighting unemployment, inflation, lack of freedoms, and living conditions as drivers. Economic factors like jobs declines also contributed to Arab uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Algeria. In Egypt, the economic costs of 580 labor protests in
Economic repercussion of political movementsAmarwaha
Drawing on both classic and modern work, we propose to find out the economic repercussions and political implications of protest movements. Due to failure in experiment in social changes and development mass hysteria has developed among masses which are heavily burdened by state but does not profit from countries boom.
The EU initially prioritized stability over democracy in its relations with MENA countries like Tunisia and Egypt under their authoritarian regimes. The Arab Spring uprisings in 2011 surprised and challenged this approach. While the EU quickly supported democratic transitions in Tunisia, endorsing its first free elections, the transition in Egypt proved more complicated without significant reforms. The limits of the EU's soft power were exposed as stability and security concerns in Egypt's polarized politics came to the fore again, marking a partial return to the EU's realpolitik priorities of the past.
The Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet, a civil society group comprising the Tunisian General Labor Union; the Tunisian Union of Industry, Trade, and Handicrafts; the Tunisian Human Rights League; and the Tunisian Order of Lawyers the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize on Friday, October 9, 2015 "for its decisive contribution to the building of a pluralistic democracy in Tunisia." In a new Atlantic Council Issue Brief, "Tunisia: The Last Arab Spring Country," Atlantic Council Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East Senior Fellows Mohsin Khan and Karim Mezran survey the successes of Tunisia's consensus-based transition and the challenges that lie ahead.
"The decision to award this year's Nobel Peace Prize to Tunisia's National Dialogue Quartet is an extremely important recognition of the efforts made by Tunisian civil society and Tunisia's political elite to reach a consensus on keeping the country firmly on the path to democratization and transition to a pluralist system," says Mezran. With the overthrow of the authoritarian regime of President Zine El Abedine Ben Ali in 2011, Tunisia embarked on a process of democratization widely regarded as an example for transitions in the region. The National Dialogue Conference facilitated by the Quartet helped Tunisia avert the risk of plunging into civil war and paved the way for a consensus agreement on Tunisia's new constitution, adopted in January 2014.
In the brief, the authors warn that despite political successes, Tunisia is hampered by the absence of economic reforms. Facing the loss of tourism and investment following two terror attacks, Tunisia's economy risks collapse, endangering all of the painstaking political progress gained thus far. Unless the Tunisian government moves rapidly to turn the economy around, Tunisia risks unraveling its fragile transition.
This document summarizes and analyzes the relationships between governments and both the press and public education. Regarding the press, the author discusses debates around its independence from government influence and bias in different news sources. In education, the author examines the government's responsibility to provide it while also encouraging multiculturalism. The author argues that governments have a duty to ensure honest, unbiased information for citizens through both a free press and education that presents diverse perspectives.
Here are 3 key sources that provide background information on Tunisia:
1. The Middle East (Text) - Provides an in-depth country profile of Tunisia covering history, politics, economy, foreign relations and more.
2. "Twenty Years of Change: Tunisia's Journey of Progress Continues" - Discusses Tunisia's political and economic development over 20 years leading up to 2008.
3. "Tunisia Country Report" from Economist Intelligence Unit - A comprehensive report analyzing Tunisia's political and economic situation, including forecasts.
The document discusses several obstacles to development in Egypt, including lack of freedom of the press, creativity, and religion. It notes recent crackdowns on protesters, journalists, and activists who are critical of the government. Restrictive new laws have been passed limiting the activities of NGOs and imposing censorship. Incidents of violence against Christians in Egypt are also mentioned. The optimal solution involves promoting discussion of societal problems and respecting freedoms of expression, press, and religion, which are important for democratic values and development.
The Arab Spring was a series of protests and uprisings in the Middle East that began in Tunisia in late 2010 in response to corruption, lack of political freedom, poor economic prospects, and repressive regimes. The protests spread to other countries including Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria. In Tunisia and Egypt, the presidents were ousted, but both countries faced ongoing instability and power struggles during their transition periods. In Libya, civil war broke out and NATO intervened, allowing rebels to take control, but the country remains divided. Yemen's president resigned under pressure but the country faces ongoing violence and poor economic conditions. Bahrain's protests were crushed by military intervention while Syria's protests led to a full
Greece-EU relations: hypocrisy in all its greatnessTakis Karagiannis
“Hypocrisy, Anti-Hypocrisy and International Order” project addresses the problem of the West’s policy of double standards and the criticism of the West’s own hypocrisy as an ideological basis for attacking the liberal order created by the West. It aims to formulate policy proposals for how Western governments should act and speak in a situation where the relative decline of Western powers will make it increasingly difficult for governments to practice idealistic politics; while, at the same time, non-Western policy actors work to delegitimize the current liberal order and to justify their own revisionism by escalating accusations about the hypocrisy of the West.
Does Democracy Promote or Retard Economic Development?CAI Weichao
This document discusses the relationship between democracy and economic development. It presents arguments that democracy both promotes and retards economic growth. Democracy may promote growth by distributing wealth more evenly, preventing social and political disasters, and ensuring stability through strong political institutions. However, democracy can also hinder growth by imposing large costs, reducing policy efficiency, and causing social confusion if emphasized too much. Overall, the document concludes that democracy's impact depends on contextual factors like a country's development level and whether democratic policies match economic conditions. Maximum benefits and minimum risks may occur when democracy is adopted gradually and opportunities are stable.
Initially published on 25th June 2008 in AfroArticles, American Chronicle and Buzzle
Republished on 8th March 2013 here:
https://kafaforfreedom.wordpress.com/2013/03/08/liberate-the-shekacho-nation-from-the-abyssinian-tyranny-stop-the-shekacho-genocide-now/
This document compares perceptions of corruption in Ethiopia and Sudan using two different data sets. In Sudan, the data focuses on identifying corruption as the most important problem facing the country. In Ethiopia, the data examines perceptions of corruption among local state agents. The analysis finds that concerns and perceptions of corruption increase with education and age, and are also influenced by local conditions like quality of services or drought. Regression analysis is used to examine factors influencing perceptions of corruption at the regional and individual levels in both countries.
The document discusses the socio-economic factors that contributed to the Tunisian revolution in 2011. It finds that while Tunisia enjoyed relatively high GDP and economic growth, wealth was highly concentrated and most people faced poverty and unemployment. The revolution was driven by high youth unemployment, rising food and living costs, corruption, and restrictions on civil liberties. Social media also helped protesters organize and spread information about the uprising. Thus, the combination of economic grievances and dissatisfaction with the authoritarian political system led Tunisians to rise up and overthrow the long-standing regime.
The document summarizes freedom of expression and association in Ethiopia based on its constitution, laws, and practices. It notes that while the constitution recognizes these freedoms, subsequent laws like the anti-terrorism and CSO laws have been used to restrict them. Specifically, after the 2005 election where the opposition almost won, these laws have been applied to silence journalists, activists, and opposition parties. As a result, civic space has shrunk and Ethiopia has become a de facto one-party state with little political or civic participation. International organizations continue to criticize Ethiopia's poor human rights record in this area.
History, Politics and economic Review of EthiopiaArega Getaneh
This is a presentation I did in universita deglii studi di Brescia, Italy. The intention is to introduce my country's history, political happenings and economic environment. In doing so, I would like to share the work to my friends in LinkedIn, too. Here you go!
Similar to Ethiopia after PM Meles or Legesse Zenawe 1900-2012 (20)
The document discusses the benefits of exercise for mental health. Regular physical activity can help reduce anxiety and depression and improve mood and cognitive function. Exercise causes chemical changes in the brain that may help protect against mental illness and improve symptoms.
VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT
A political history of the Tigray Pe
ople’s Liberation Front (1975-1991):
Revolt, ideology and mobilisation in Ethiopia
~ Dr. Aregawi Berhe
was in prison.
It is with great humility and appreciation that I convey my gratitude to all who protested and condemned my incarceration by the EPRDF Government which is known worldwide for trampling on freedom of the press and human rights, and demanded my unconditional release.
I would like to thank those international and local Medias for being with me in my darkest days.
Special thanks goes to UNSECO , IWMF, Media Legal Defense Initiative, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, CPJ, Pen International , Doha freedom center, Article 19 and countless organization whose championship of my incarceration helped expose the cross dictatorship prevailing in Ethiopia. I am also very appreciative of the steadfast commitment shown by those individuals who made my release their case like Martin shibbye, Prof. Alemayehu G.mariam, Ana Gomez, Nani Jansen, Christian Amanpour and so many others.
Though the harsh conditions under which I was kept some times incommunicado, precipitated in the deterioration of my health, I came out morally unscathed and even more resolved to do everything within my power in the cause of democracy, particularly freedom of the press in my country.
My thoughts go out to my so many compatriots and compatriots and comrades who are suffering in Ethiopian jails for no reason other than expressing their views and advocating democracy. I urge all Ethiopians and all people who abhor injustice to work tirelessly for their release.
I thank you all again
Reeyot Alemu
The document discusses the Ark of the Covenant from the Old Testament, describing it as the most important object in Israel's history as it represented God's presence among his people. It provides 30 parallels between attributes of the Ark and attributes of Jesus Christ, such as both being anointed and leading God's people. It also lists other facts about the Ark's construction, measurements, and role in Israelite worship before God's presence departed from it due to their sins.
This document discusses evidence supporting the Ethiopian tradition that the Ark of the Covenant was brought to Ethiopia in 950 BC by Menelik, son of King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba. It summarizes the account in the Kebra Nagast, an Ethiopian epic compiled in 1314 AD, which describes how the eldest sons of Solomon's kingdom stole the Ark and fled to Ethiopia with Menelik. It argues this tradition is supported by inscriptions on incense burners in an Ethiopian church, and that the tradition explains discrepancies in archaeological evidence about the location of pre-586 BC Israel described in the Old Testament.
Deep filled with anger and unforgiving picture conversation with Ethiopian PM Meles of Ethiopia Dec 2012, shortly after the deceased, in the language Amarigna
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The document summarizes the history of a Tabot, a consecrated wooden altar slab that represents the Ark of the Covenant in the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. It describes how a Tabot was looted from Ethiopia in 1868 and ended up in St. John's Church in Edinburgh, where it lay unrecognized for over 100 years. In 2002, the Tabot was returned to the Ethiopian Orthodox Church in a ceremony celebrating the restitution of an important cultural and religious artifact.
Ethiopian Coment on-ato-Girma- Seyfu speeches, on x eth pm meles and Mr. Girma- Seyfu The Only One Ethiopian Members of parliament.
The secret of seasoning, in Amarigna language.
The kidnapping and torture of Ethiopian Air Force.. Captain Teshome Tenkolu,
&
TheSecret of Bus Hajiabdu 45their departed from Asmera to Shire in 1966 premeditated organized operation.and further ......coming soon !!
In Ethiopia Human Rights Watch is dedicated to protecting the human rights of people around theworld. We stand with victims and activists to prevent discrimination, to up hold political freedom
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You have to read it to believe it, but after you read it, you won't believe it. And I included eight examples of defamatory statements/
El Puerto de Algeciras continúa un año más como el más eficiente del continente europeo y vuelve a situarse en el “top ten” mundial, según el informe The Container Port Performance Index 2023 (CPPI), elaborado por el Banco Mundial y la consultora S&P Global.
El informe CPPI utiliza dos enfoques metodológicos diferentes para calcular la clasificación del índice: uno administrativo o técnico y otro estadístico, basado en análisis factorial (FA). Según los autores, esta dualidad pretende asegurar una clasificación que refleje con precisión el rendimiento real del puerto, a la vez que sea estadísticamente sólida. En esta edición del informe CPPI 2023, se han empleado los mismos enfoques metodológicos y se ha aplicado un método de agregación de clasificaciones para combinar los resultados de ambos enfoques y obtener una clasificación agregada.
Essential Tools for Modern PR Business .pptxPragencyuk
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Acolyte Episodes review (TV series) The Acolyte. Learn about the influence of the program on the Star Wars world, as well as new characters and story twists.
An astonishing, first-of-its-kind, report by the NYT assessing damage in Ukraine. Even if the war ends tomorrow, in many places there will be nothing to go back to.
Ethiopia after PM Meles or Legesse Zenawe 1900-2012
1. Policy Briefing
Africa Briefing N°89
Nairobi/Brussels, 22 August 2012
Ethiopia After Meles
I. OVERVIEW
The death of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, who had not
been seen in public for several months, was announced on
20 August 2012 by Ethiopian state television. The passing
of the man who has been Ethiopia’s epicentre for 21 years
will have profound national and regional consequences.
Meles engineered one-party rule in effect for the Tigray
People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and his Tigrayan inner
circle, with the complicity of other ethnic elites that were
co-opted into the ruling alliance, the Ethiopian People’s
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The Front
promised freedom, democracy and ethnic devolution but
is highly centralised, tightly controls the economy and
suppresses political, social, ethnic and religious liberties.
In recent years, Meles had relied ever more on repression
to quell growing dissent. His successor will lead a weaker
regime that struggles to manage increasing unrest unless
it truly implements ethnic federalism and institutes fundamental governance reform. The international community
should seek to influence the transition actively because it
has a major interest in the country’s stability.
tions under his tight control. Without him, however, the
weaknesses of the regime he built will be more starkly
exposed.
The transition will likely be an all-TPLF affair, even if
masked beneath the constitution, the umbrella of the
EPRDF and the prompt elevation of the deputy prime minister, Hailemariam Desalegn, to acting head of government.
Given the opacity of the inner workings of the government and army, it is impossible to say exactly what it will
look like and who will end up in charge. Nonetheless, any
likely outcome suggests a much weaker government, a
more influential security apparatus and endangered internal stability. The political opposition, largely forced into
exile by Meles, will remain too fragmented and feeble to
play a considerable role, unless brought on board in an
internationally-brokered process. The weakened Tigrayan
elite, confronted with the nation’s ethnic and religious
cleavages, will be forced to rely on greater repression if it
is to maintain power and control over other ethnic elites.
Ethno-religious divisions and social unrest are likely to
present genuine threats to the state’s long-term stability
and cohesion.
Despite his authoritarianism and poor human rights records, Meles became an important asset to the international
community, a staunch Western ally in counter-terrorism
efforts in the region and a valued development partner for
Western and emerging powers. In consequence, Ethiopia
has become the biggest aid recipient in Africa, though
Meles’s government was only able to partially stabilise
either the country or region.
The regional implications will be enormous. Increasing internal instability could threaten the viability of Ethiopia’s
military interventions in Somalia and Sudan, exacerbate
tensions with Eritrea, and, more broadly, put in question
its role as the West’s key regional counter-terrorism ally.
Should religious or ethnic radicalisation grow, it could
well spill across borders and link with other armed radical
Islamic groups.
Ethiopia’s political system and society have grown increasingly unstable largely because the TPLF has become
increasingly repressive, while failing to implement the
policy of ethnic federalism it devised over twenty years ago
to accommodate the land’s varied ethnic identities. The
result has been greater political centralisation, with concomitant ethnicisation of grievances. The closure of political space has removed any legitimate means for people to
channel those grievances. The government has encroached
on social expression and curbed journalists, non-governmental organisations and religious freedoms. The cumulative effect is growing popular discontent, as well as radicalisation along religious and ethnic lines. Meles adroitly
navigated a number of internal crises and kept TPLF fac-
The international community, particularly Ethiopia’s core
allies, the U.S., UK and European Union (EU), should accordingly seek to play a significant role in preparing for
and shaping the transition, by:
tying political, military and development assistance to
the opening of political space and an end to repressive
measures;
encouraging the post-Meles leadership to produce a clear
roadmap, including transparent mechanisms within the
TPLF and the EPRDF for apportioning the party and
Front power Meles held and within parliament to lead
to an all-inclusive, peaceful transition, resulting in free
and fair elections within a fixed time; and
2. Ethiopia After Meles
Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°89, 22 August 2012
helping to revive the political opposition’s ability to
represent its constituencies, in both Ethiopia and the
diaspora.
II. AN INVISIBLE ILLNESS
In June 2012, rumours that Meles Zenawi was seriously
ill ran rampant through Ethiopian communities across the
world.1 At the G20 summit on 17 June in Los Cabos, Mexico, he had appeared pale and thin, sparking speculation
that prompted a government spokesperson to issue a statement five days later that, “the Prime Minister is in good
health, to my knowledge”, and “the Prime Minister is carrying out his duties properly”. However, on 26 June, when
Ethiopian television aired footage of Meles receiving Somalia President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, his weight
loss was so apparent that it unleashed a new round of stories and worries.2
Meles’s absence drew international attention when parliament extended its session beyond 7 July – the scheduled
start of its three-month recess. Many observers concluded
that ill health had prevented him from attending to defend
the budget bill, a task he has traditionally performed since
1991.3 Subsequently, he missed the anniversary celebrations of South Sudan’s independence, on 9 July, and then,
most importantly, failed to attend the African Union (AU)
summit in Addis Ababa. On 14 July Senegalese President
Macky Sall opened that meeting on his behalf and for the
first time officially disclosed his sickness to the general
public. Ethiopian authorities dissembled, reluctantly confirming Meles was receiving medical treatment but providing scant and sometimes contradictory details. Some officials spoke of “exhaustion”; one said, “he is not in a critical
Page 2
state. He is in good condition”, another that “there is no
undesirable eventuality regarding his health. I am 100 per
cent sure that he’s recovering health-wise, and he will be
back to his official duty in a number of days”.4
The failure of authorities to respond adequately to the rumours only strengthened them, and finally, on 19 July, his
close aid and government spokesman, Bereket Simon,
explained to journalists that the prime minister was taking
“sick leave” but remained in charge of the government
while dealing with an unspecified illness. Bereket added
he was “in a good and stable condition”, denied the illness
was brain cancer and said Meles would resume work as
soon as he recuperated. However, a founding TPLF member and veteran liberation fighter, Sebhat Nega, contradicted this account, stating that while he was convalescing,
“legislatively it is the parliament [in charge] and executively it is the deputy prime minister”, adding, “the system does not depend on one person”.5
In reality, Ethiopia’s political system has no institutional
mechanism to manage a handover of executive responsibilities or provide clear lines of communications between
the government and the people. The authorities refused to
confirm who was in control while Meles was ill, and even
now that Deputy Prime Minister Hailemariam is acting
head of government (chair of the Council of Ministers),
there is reason to believe there is no agreement on a succession plan, whether formal or informal.6 Since 1991, the
political system has revolved around Meles; without its
centre of gravity, the Federal Democratic Republic risks
growing instability.
1
Ethiopia has a history of concealing a leader’s incapacitation
and death, and there had been rumours, never confirmed, of
Meles’s poor health in the past, but he was never out of sight for
a long period. On 30 July 2012, a satellite TV journalist claimed
Crisis Group had confirmed Meles’s death. The following day,
Crisis Group put out a statement saying it “has no direct knowledge about the state of health of Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles
Zenawi. Crisis Group has never commented on Mr Zenawi’s
health or his fate, and is not in a position to speculate about it.
Crisis Group categorically denies any media claims to the contrary”. “Ethiopia: Crisis Group Denies Media Reports about PM’s
Fate”, Brussels, 31 July 2012.
2
“Ethiopia: Meles Zenawi at G20 Summit in Los Cabos”, Mexico in Pictures, www.nazret.com, 19 June 2012. “PM Meles
Zenawi’s health: how critical could it be?”, Danielberhane’s Blog,
http://danielberhane.wordpress.com, 15 July 2012. “PM Meles
Zenawi’s health: a new wave of rumor hits the web”, Danielberhane’s Blog, http://danielberhane.wordpress.com, 19 July
2012.
3
“The fine line”, Addis Fortune, 29 July 2012.
4
“Meles Zenawi no-show at African Union summit”, Associated
Press, 16 July 2012. “‘PM Meles is not attending this meeting
for health reason’ – Senegalese President, Macky Sall”, Aramba
Times, 15 July 2012; Tesfalem Waldyes, “The burden of executive power”, Addis Fortune, 15 July 2012. “Ethiopian PM in critical state in Brussels”, Agence France-Presse, 18 July 2012; James
Butty, “Ethiopian PM undergoing treatment in Europe” Voice
of America (VOA), 19 July 2012.
5
“Ethiopian PM Meles on ‘sick leave’”, VOA, 19 July 2012;
“Ethiopia – English – PM Meles Zenawi Health – One of TPLF
Founders Sebhat Nega on VOA”, audio, YouTube, 19 July 2012.
6
Hailemariam Desalegn, a Wolayta from the Southern Nations,
Nationalities and Peoples Region and its former president, was
seen as one of Meles’s most loyal servants. His ethnicity is considered an advantage, because it is a minority in a multi-ethnic
region and, most importantly, not from the numerically dominant Oromo or Amhara.
3. Ethiopia After Meles
Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°89, 22 August 2012
III. A POLITICAL SYSTEM CENTRED
ON MELES ZENAWI
Meles’s absolutely pivotal role developed during the armed
struggle to overthrow the Derg – the military regime of
Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam that ruled from 1974 to
1991 – when he was a core member of the TPLF, an ethnoMarxist guerrilla movement founded in the northern Tigray
region. By 1989 he chaired both the TPLF and the EPRDF,
the umbrella-party for a number of ethno-national fronts
created to rule after it toppled the Derg.7 In 1991, Meles
was appointed president of the transitional government
and remained chairman of the TPLF and EPRDF. Following a new constitution in 1994 and a new government established the next year, he took over the powerful post of
prime minister, created alongside a ceremonial president.8
The EPRDF is formally committed to a “stable multiparty
democratic system”; “to build a free market economy”;
and to answer the “national question” through ethnic federalism.9 The constitution enshrined protections for political freedoms, human rights and liberal democracy and was
widely regarded as innovative and democratic. It restructured the multi-ethnic country into a federation of nine
ethnic-based regional states that promised to recognise
existing differences, allow their articulation at the central
level and thereby limit ethnic discontent.10 The aspira-
7
The EPRDF is an alliance of four political organisations created in 1989: the Tigrayan Peoples’ Liberation Front (TPLF), the
Oromo Peoples’ Democratic Organization (OPDO), the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM) and the South
Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Front (SEPDF).
8
Ethiopia’s ceremonial president and head of state is the 88year-old Oromo Girma Woldegiorgis, who in 2001 succeeded
Negasso Gidada. Girma was re-elected in 2007 and rumoured
dead in March 2012. He is not a power factor and will not play
any role in the transition.
9
“EPRDF program”, 2005, at www.eprdf.org. “Ethiopian minister on objective of revolutionary democracy”, People’s Daily,
13 August 2001. Crisis Group Africa Report N° 153, Ethiopia:
Ethnic Federalism and its Discontents, 4 September 2009, pp. 4-5.
10
Under the regimes of Emperor Haile Selassie and Mengistu
Haile Mariam, Ethiopia was ruled according to different but
highly centralised models. Local authorities had little power,
and ethnic groups’ rights were denied in favour of a rigid Amhara rule. The ethnically highly diverse population includes
more than 77 tribes with distinct languages. According to the
2007 census, the Oromo are 34.5 per cent, the Amhara 26.9 per
cent, the Somali 6.2 per cent and the Tigrayan 6.1 per cent of
the population. Other groups are much smaller, some as few as
10,000 members. Religiously, the population is mainly divided
between the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, 44.3 per cent; Muslims, 33.9 per cent; and Protestants, 18.6 per cent. “Summary
and Statistical Report of the 2007 Population and Housing Census”, www.csa.gov.et/pdf/Cen2007_firstdraft.pdf. Some question the religious census and believe the Muslim population
Page 3
tions of “nationalities” were recognised, including the
right of self-determination.11
These formal commitments were incompatible with the
culture of the TPLF, which, from its start, has been guided
by Marxist-Leninist political practices.12 Its founders considered themselves best able to understand the needs of
the populace.13 Its ideological and organisational methods
led to a “small, highly centralised … leadership”, obsessed
with secrecy. The TPLF remained the centre of political
decision-making in the EPRDF and kept the principles
and discourses of its guerrilla years.14 This includes Leninist “democratic centralism”, in which the executive and
central committees make all major political decisions,
then transmit orders to junior officials and administrators.
“Revolutionary democracy” that advocates capitalism and
free market is promoted, but at the same time state and
party retain iron control through five-year development
plans. At the top of this political system, until 20 August
2012, sat Meles, its creator.
Expectations were high in the early years of the EPRDF.
Ethiopians, exhausted after years of hardship, sought peace,
reconciliation and development. Meles was seen as part
of a new “African renaissance”, leaders breaking from the
post-colonial order, and his rhetoric was welcomed by the
West.15 Nonetheless, one of the TPLF’s first acts was to
may be larger. Crisis Group analyst’s interviews in another capacity, Addis Ababa, 2007-2008.
11
The concept of ethnicity was ideologically grounded in Marxist-Leninist tradition and led to the creation of five regional
states dominated by a single group (Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromyia, Somali) and four without a dominant ethnic group (Benishangul-Gumuz, Southern Nations, Gambella and Harar).
12
For more, see Crisis Group Report, Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and its Discontents, op. cit., p. 6.
13
In this briefing, EPRDF is used to refer to decisions taken on
behalf of the government. TPLF is used when referring to the
real power within the government or to inner circle politics.
The TPLF’s original objective was an independent Tigray republic. In the 1980s it amended its program to become an Ethiopian national liberation movement, allied with similar insurgencies across the land. Aregawi Berhe, A Political History of
the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. Revolt, Ideology and
Mobilization in Ethiopia 1975-1991 (Los Angeles, 2009).
14
Gebru Tareke, Ethiopia: Power and protest. Peasant revolts
in the Twentieth century (Lawrenceville, 1996), p. 218. Secrecy
and ultra-centralised decision-making led to creation of the secret Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray (Malalit) within the
TPLF during the liberation struggle. It was led by Meles and
further contributed to paranoia and internal rivalries within the
front. Aregawi Berhe, “The Origins of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front”, African Affairs, vol. 103, no. 413 (2004), pp.
569-592; and Crisis Group Report, Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism
and its Discontents, op. cit., p. 6.
15
Then-South African Deputy President Thabo Mbeki popularly defined the post-Cold War period of transformation as an
4. Ethiopia After Meles
Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°89, 22 August 2012
replace in the transitional government several genuine ethnic fronts that had fought against Mengistu and had strong
constituencies in their tribal bases with EPRDF ethnic parties on which it could rely to guarantee its predominance.
While repression and intimidation of political foes began,
the opposition was too divided and feeble to pose any real
threat for more than a decade.16 This gave Meles the space
and time to build the foundations of a de facto one-party
system, its apparatus fused with the state’s behind the façade of national, regional and local administrations.
The war with Eritrea (1998-2000) eroded support for the
EPRDF and Meles.17 In March 2001 his TPLF leadership
was challenged by other senior members and war veterans,
who accused him of being soft on Eritrea and undermining Tigrayan nationalism. Meles purged them for “Bonapartism”. The way the leadership was perceived within
the Front changed dramatically, as Meles continued to
eliminate all relevant critics.18 Ethiopians’ expectations
for genuine democratisation were dashed, and many began to perceive ethnic federalism as a TPLF tactic to sow
divisions so as to facilitate its own ethnic-based, minority
rule. Devolution was seen as a means to co-opt servile,
often corrupt, elites from other ethnicities while Tigrayan
“African renaissance”. See his address to the Corporate Council
on Africa, 19-22 April 1997 in the U.S., www.dfa.gov.za/docs/
speeches/1998/mbek0419.htm. In March 1998, U.S. President
Bill Clinton visited Africa and praised this new generation. It is
often assumed that he was referring to Yoweri Museveni (Uganda), Isaias Afewerki (Eritrea) and Paul Kagame (Rwanda), in
addition to Meles. See Marina Ottaway, “Think Again: Africa”,
Carnegie Endowment, spring 1999.
16
Most of the replacements were abruptly created before Mengistu’s fall and had little local support. The junior partners who
were forced out, especially the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)
and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), restarted
their insurgencies, this time against the EPRDF. Their struggle
has not yet found a political settlement. The idea an opposition
could take power through the ballot box was regarded as treasonous. Siegfried Pausewang, “Aborted or nascent democracy?
Structural reasons for the failure of democratisation in Ethiopia”,
in G. M. Sorbo and S. Pausewang (eds.), Prospects for peace,
security and human rights in Africa’s Horn (Bergen, 2004), p. 135.
17
See Crisis Group Africa Reports N°68, Ethiopia and Eritrea,
War or Peace?, 24 September 2003; N°101, Ethiopia and Eritrea: Preventing War, 22 December 2005; N°141, Beyond the
Fragile Peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea: Averting a New
War, 17 June 2008; and Africa Briefing N°48 Ethiopia and Eritrea: Stopping the slide to War, 5 November 2007; also Tekeste
Negash and Kjetil Tronvoll, Brothers at War: Making Sense of
the Eritrean-Ethiopian War (London, 2000).
18
Some hardliners, believing Ethiopia was winning, wanted to
re-annex Eritrea. “Bonapartism”, is a Marxist term for counterrevolutionary attitude. Crisis Group Report, Ethiopia: Ethnic
Federalism and Its Discontents, op. cit., p. 6. René Lefort,
“Ethiopia after Meles”, OpenDemocracy (www.opendemocracy.
net), 8 August 2011; Crisis Group interview, July 2012.
Page 4
elites were the main beneficiaries, increasing their economic and political power.19 Nonetheless, Meles presented
himself to the international community as a wise leader,
committed to development and economic growth and a
natural partner in efforts to achieve regional stability and
counter terrorism, and Ethiopia became one of Africa’s
biggest aid and investment recipients.20
Internal discontent coalesced during the 2005 general elections when, for the first time, the opposition united on a
vague political platform to challenge the ruling party. At
the same time, the EPRDF opened political space to demonstrate its democratic credentials and ensure the flow of
aid. It was convinced rural voters (more than 80 per cent
of the population) would reject the opposition, either because they had benefitted from the government’s development policies or feared reprisal. This was a dramatic
miscalculation. Urban elites and many rural citizens voted
against it in the hope of a “new era of democracy”.21
International observers witnessed extensive rigging and
called the elections below international standards. Despite
this, the opposition won 172 of 547 seats in the lower house
and control of the Addis Ababa city council.22 It claimed
the EPRDF had cheated it of a national victory and contested the results. Quickly organised urban demonstrations
19
Crisis Group analyst’s field notes and interviews in another
capacity, Ethiopia, 2003-2011.
20
Western security concerns aligned with Ethiopia’s national
security interests in Somalia. The first Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) incursions there occurred in 1996, against
the radical Islamist group Al Ittihad Al Islami, which wanted to
unite the Somali region of Ethiopia to Somalia. Since then,
Ethiopia has played a major role in fighting political Islam in
the region. For analysis of its recent activity, see Crisis Group
Africa Briefings N°74, Somalia’s Divided Islamists, 18 May
2010; N°45, Somalia: The Tough Part Is Ahead, 26 January
2007; and Africa Reports N°95, Counter-Terrorism in Somalia:
Losing Hearts and Minds?, 11 July 2005; and N°45, Somalia:
Countering Terrorism in a Failed State, 23 May 2002. In 2010,
Ethiopia received $3.529 billion in Overseas Development Aid
(ODA), the most in Africa. “Aid statistics, recipient aid at a
glance – Ethiopia”, OECD, January 2012. Aid comes not only
from Western donors; China and other countries provide assistance for specific development projects. Additionally, in 2011 it
received $4.4 billion in foreign direct investment, up from $1.3
billion in 2001. “UN Conference on Trade and Development
Statistics”, http://unctadstat.unctad.org/TableViewer/tableView.
aspx.
21
Crisis Group, analyst’s field observations in another capacity,
Addis Ababa, January-May 2005.
22
Crisis Group analyst’s field observations in another capacity,
May-June 2005. “Ethiopia National Elections”, The Carter Center Observation Mission 2005, final report; “Ethiopia Legislative Elections 2005”, EU Election Observation Mission, final
report, 2005. Crisis Group Report, Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism
and Its Discontents, op. cit., pp. 8-10.
5. Ethiopia After Meles
Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°89, 22 August 2012
turned violent. The government called the protests an attempt to overthrow the elected government and cracked
down, killing at least 193, arresting more than 20,000 and
detaining more than 70 opposition leaders, human rights
activists and journalists who were charged with treason.23
Subsequently, the EDPRF became more repressive. Authoritarianism was given a veneer of legitimacy through
laws that – under the guise of national security – the parliament passed between 2007 and 2009 to stifle dissent and
ensure against any interference in government affairs.24
Any political matter became an issue of “national interest”
and critics potential terrorists. The EPRDF ostensibly won
99.6 per cent of the vote in the 2010 elections, the blatant
manipulation of which sent a clear message that the opposition would pay the price for what happened in 2005, and
the EPRDF would not accept any scrutiny of its rule.25
Meles promised to step down a number of times, but instead
he and his closest allies purged the EPRDF and the TPLF
of potential challengers. Former comrades and political
allies were relegated to honorary posts, and a new generation, including Meles’s wife, Azeb Mesfin, was given important party and government roles.26 Publicly described
23
Crisis Group analyst’s field observations in another capacity,
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, June-November 2005. On 6 November
2005, leaders of the opposition Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD, known in Ethiopia as Qinijit) called for further
demonstrations and a boycott of the ruling party’s activities, and
were imprisoned alongside critical journalists and human rights
activists. The Supreme Court sentenced them to life imprisonment. After lengthy mediation by the international community
and Ethiopian elders, they were pardoned by the government
and released in July 2007.
24
A draconian Press Law was passed in July 2008, a Civil Society Organisations (CSO) Law in January 2009 and an Antiterrorism Law in July 2009. “New Ethiopian press law draws criticism“, Reuters, 2 July 2008; “Ethiopian parliament adopts repressive new NGO law”, Amnesty International, 8 January 2009;
and “Ethiopia: Stop Using Anti-Terror Law to Stifle Peaceful
Dissent“, Human Rights Watch, 21 November 2011.
25
“Hundred ways of putting pressure”, Human Rights Watch,
24 March 2010; “Ethiopia: Government Repression Undermines
poll”, 24 May 2010; “Ethiopia election marred by intimidation,
say rights group”, Associated Press, 25 May 2010; Crisis Group
analyst’s observation in another capacity, May 2010. See also
“Breaking News: Meles criticizes EU observers for mixing
their political outlooks with facts”, Addis Neger online, 26 May
2010; and Barry Malone and David Clarke, “Ethiopia’s Meles
urges recognition of poll win”, Reuters, 25 May 2010.
26
“Ethiopia’s Meles says preparing to step down – report”,
Reuters, 23 June 2009. Crisis Group analyst’s interviews in another capacity, Addis Ababa, 2010. The nine-member TPLF
executive committee, the real core of power, includes Meles
Zenawi, Tsegay Berhe, Abay Woldu, Abadi Zemo, Tewodros
Hagos, Tewodros Adhanom, Debretsion Gebre-Mikael, Beyene
Mikru and Azeb Mesfin. The central committee additionally
Page 5
as “internal generational renovation” and an opening of
relevant positions to non-Tigrayans, such as the current
acting head of government, Deputy Prime Minister/Foreign Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, this policy seemed
aimed at eliminating any remaining dialogue between the
party leadership and its chairman by creating an entourage
directly indebted to Meles and his inner circle, with little
constituency of its own.27 A shrinking number of politicians – members of the TPLF executive committee and
the prime minister’s immediate advisers – rule. All decisions remained with Meles, who neither clearly anointed
a successor nor allowed any possible natural replacement
to emerge.
The system endured because of Meles’s power, political
skill and capacity to attract aid and investment. The international community rarely questioned his domestic leadership and political trajectory, leading it to misconstrue the
state of the nation.28 Despite overstated economic growth,29
and promised federalism and democratisation, discontent
is growing with the EPRDF’s ethnic politics, rigid grip on
power and perceived corruption.30
includes Seyoum Mesfin, Abay Tsehaye, Fetlework GebreEgziabher, Arkebe Equbay, Roman Gebre-Selassie, Nega Berhe,
Desta Bezabih, Abay Nebso, Gobezay Wolde-Aregay, Kiros
Bitew, Mikael Abreha, Yitbarek Ameha, Alem Gebre-Wahd,
Dr Addisalem Balema, Teklewoyni Assefa, Berhane KidaneMariam, Niguse Gebre, Hadish Zenebe, Getachew Belay, Berhane Gebre-Kirstos, Tirfu Kidane-Mariam, Tewolde GebreTsadikan, Hishe Lemma, Kidusan Nega, Essayas Wolde-Giorgis,
Tilahun Tarek, Zeray Asgedom, Meseret Gebre-Mariam, Mengisteab Wolde-Kidan, Getachew Assefa, Daniel Assefa, Tesfalem Yehdego, Gebre-Meskel Tarek, Tewolde Berhe, Sahleselassie Teka, and Eyassu Tesfay. All members of the two committees will be important in any succession plan, and the new
leader will emerge from them.
27
Jawar Mohammed, “Meles Zenawi and OPDO Relations Enter A New Phase”, http://dhummuugaa.wordpress.com, 16 March
2011. The EPRDF sought to implement generational renovation
by promoting figures not in the liberation struggle, most prominently current acting head of government Hailemariam. William Davison, “A new breed of leaders shall come to receive
the baton: Bereket Simon”, Bloomberg, 19 July 2012.
28
“It’s Mubarak syndrome …. We only talked to Mubarak about
Egypt’s role in the region, never about what was happening inside Egypt. It’s the same with Ethiopia”, unnamed U.S. diplomat quoted in Richard Dowden, “How Meles Rules Ethiopia”,
African Arguments (www.africanarguments.org), 21 May 2012.
Officials were aware Meles’s autocratic policies could destabilise the country but were unwilling to risk losing his cooperation on counter-terrorism. Crisis Group interview, U.S. government official, Washington DC, 20 August 2012.
29
See Section IV.B below.
30
Abdi Tsegaye, “Ethiopia: Corruption could undermine nation’s develoment goals – Sebhat Nega”, Addis Fortune, 26
February 2012; Tesfa-Alem Tekle, “Ethiopia: Thousands of
government officials register their assets“, Sudan Tribune, 30
6. Ethiopia After Meles
Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°89, 22 August 2012
IV. THE STATE OF THE NATION
Meles’s 21-year rule both produced and disguised several
fundamental vulnerabilities of the state. Some were already
present, like government failure to accommodate ethnic
and religious diversity effectively. Others were the products of his policies and ideology, in particular those relating to federalism, corruption and the economy. Should a
prolonged and divisive transition result in a weaker leadership, these fragilities may put stability at stake. The few
independent, critical voices still in the country have been
suffocated, closing political avenues through which to
channel social grievances and making inter-ethnic relations even more delicate.31
A. UNFULFILLED FEDERALISM, RISING
ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS DISCONTENT
To preserve its power, the EPRDF abandoned any meaningful implementation of federalism and, behind the façade of devolution, adopted a highly centralised system
that has exacerbated identity-based conflicts.32 Exclusion
and disfranchisement have provided fertile ground for
ethnic and religious radicalisation, already evident in some
lowland regions, where the ruling party exploits resources
without local consent. The TPLF’s ethnicisation of politics has neither empowered local societies nor dampened
conflict, “but rather increased competition among groups
that vie over land and natural resources, as well as administrative boundaries and government budgets”.33
March 2011; Wondwossen Mezlekia, “The case of alleged
fraud and corruption at Ethiopia Commodity Exchange”, nazret.com, 21 March 2012. In a survey, 48 per cent of Ethiopians
report having paid a bribe to service providers in the last twelve
months. “Daily Lives and Corruption: Public Opinion in East
Africa”, Transparency international, 2012, p. 13.
31
For example, William Davison, “Ethiopia’s terror conviction
of journalist raises doubts on free speech”, The Christian Science Monitor, 27 June 2012; “UN rights chief [Navi Pillay] ‘seriously alarmed’ by intimidation of journalists in Ethiopia”, UN
News Centre, 18 July 2012.
32
Crisis Group Report, Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its
Discontents, op. cit.; analyst’s field observation in another capacity, 2003-2012.
33
In Gambella, the population violently opposes policies of
land leasing and forced relocation of villages to free areas for
foreign investments. After clashing with the army, scores of
Anuak civilans sought refuge in South Sudan. There is also tension in Oromia and the Omo Valley, where the government has
allegedly relocated people to lease land. “Waiting Here for
Death: Forced Displacement and ‘Villagization’ in Ethiopia’s
Gambella Region”, Human Rights Watch, 17 January 2012. In
Ogaden, the ONLF is fighting a low-level insurgency, exacerbated after forcible relocations to allow oil and gas exploration
Page 6
The case of the main ethnic group, the Oromo, exemplifies
the deep dissatisfaction. The TPLF eliminated or defeated
all the parties with genuine constituencies in the community, both those with an armed secessionist agenda and
those that acted within constitutional limits. The assertion
is that the parties in the EPRDF properly address their expectations, but most Oromo maintain these have been coopted, deeply corrupted and will not challenge the TPLF’s
central role or truly represent their ethnic or regional constituencies. Similar dissatisfaction is widespread, and is
particularly high in the peripheries, such as Ogaden, Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz. Resentment has recently
intensified even in Tigray, where parts of the population
feel the TPLF is composed of faraway elites no longer representing their communal interests and interested only in
making money and investing it in the capital or abroad.34
In a religiously diverse and traditionally tolerant country,
tensions are mounting between the government and the
large Muslim community.35 Informal Muslim committees
have protested perceived interference in religious affairs,
claiming the government imposes the beliefs of al-Ahbash,
an Islamic sect created by an Ethiopian-Lebanese imam
and considered pro-Western because of its opposition to
Salafism, at the expense of traditional Sufi-inspired movements. The authorities sought to link their demonstrations
to Islamic extremism and terrorism, and Meles exacerbated matters by accusing the protestors of “peddling ideologies of intolerance”. That what started as a simple demand for religious independence has become a much
broader protest against repressive tendencies was evident
when Christians joined the demonstrations in solidarity.36
by foreign companies. Army and paramilitary forces loyal to
Ogaden regional President Abdi Iyle have been accused of a
terror campaign against alleged rebel supporters. “Collective
Punishment: War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity in the
Ogaden Area of Ethiopia’s Somali Regional State”, Human
Rights Watch, June 2008; Crisis Group analyst’s interviews in
another capacity, Gode, 2006-2007, Dadaab, Kenya, 2010. Crisis Group Report, Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents, p. i.
34
Crisis Group, analyst’s field notes and interviews in another
capacity, Oromiya, Ogaden, Amhara Region, 2003-2012. Arena Tigray, an ethnic opposition party within the TPLF region,
was created by ex-TPLF members (including Gebru Asrat, former executive committee member and Tigray president). With
other ex-senior figures, like former Defence Minister Seye Abraha, Arena collects dissenting voices in Tigray despite repression. Crisis Group, analyst’s field notes and interviews, Mekelle,
Adigrat, Adwa, Axum, Ethiopia, 2010.
35
According to the 2007 census, 33.9 per cent of the population
is Muslim. “Summary and Statistical Report”, op. cit. Observers say the government deliberately undercounted Muslims.
Crisis Group analyst’s interviews in another capacity, Ethiopia,
2007-2008.
36
In a speech to parliament, Meles claimed Salafis had formed
clandestine al-Qaeda cells in the south and said, “we are ob-
7. Ethiopia After Meles
Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°89, 22 August 2012
B. UNEVEN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
AND CORRUPTION
Ethiopia’s much praised economic development is not as
robust or cost-free as Meles would have wanted or the international community believes. The ambitious five-year
“Growth and Transformation Plan” launched after 2010
elections was meant to realise widely-claimed but suspect
double-digit increases.37 In an effort to attract foreign investment, over four million fertile hectares were leased at
low prices, accompanied by reported forceful eviction of
indigenous inhabitants, to international companies and
foreigners to produce food, flowers and bio-fuel for export.
Rights groups condemned this as inconsistent with the government’s stated aim of achieving food security.38 Rather
serving tell-tale signs of extremism. We should nip this scourge
in the bud”. Aaron Maasho, “Ethiopian Muslims protest ‘interference’”, Reuters, 10 May 2012. In May, the government announced deportation of two Arabs accused of inciting violence.
It alleged the men had flown in the previous day to disseminate
jihad materials on jihad and make inflammatory statements in
Anwar Mosque. “Ethiopia expels 2 Arabs amid tension with
Muslims”, Associated Press, 5 May 2012. A court ruled on 17
May that eleven people, including a Kenyan, would be charged
with plotting terrorist bombings. The government claimed the
group’s aim was to overthorw it and establish an Islamic state.
Aaron Maasho, “Eleven face trial over Ethiopia bomb plot”,
Reuters, 18 May 2012. William Davison, “Will Ethiopian crackdown stir Islamist backlash?”, The Christian Science Monitor,
27 July 2012; Crisis Group interview, July 2012.
37
The plan foresees GDP growth of 11 to 15 per cent per year
between 2010 and 2015, at a total cost estimated around $75
billion. It offers vast investment opportunities, mainly in industry and agriculture, in areas chosen by the government and under its supervision, and promises to develop roads, rail, electricity and telecoms. It is available at www.ethiopians.com/ Ethiopia_GTP_2015.pdf. The IMF said 7.5 per cent was a more realistic 2010 growth estimate than the government’s 11.4 per cent.
In 2011, it forecast about 6 per cent for 2012. Former World
Bank Ethiopia director Kenichi Ohashi questioned the state’s
massive investment in development projects, suggesting a focus
on private investment and education might be wiser. “World
Bank, IMF Fault Ethiopia’s Economic & Development Policies”,
VOA, 8 June 2011. According to the World Bank, “though
Ethiopia made progress in tackling the 2008-2011 macroeconomic challenges, the recent surge of inflation depicts the country’s vulnerable macroeconomic condition … inflation … more
than doubled reaching 36 per cent in February 2012 … food
inflation increased from 13 per cent to 47 per cent”, www.world
bank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview.
38
Crisis Group analyst’s field notes and interviews in another
capacity, Ethiopia, 2008; René Lefort, “The great Ethiopian
land-grab: feudalism, leninism, neo-capitalism … plus ça change”,
OpenDemocracy (www.opendemocracy.net), 31 December 2011;
Stefano Liberti, Land Grabbing (Rome, 2011); and “Waiting
Here for Death: Forced Displacement and ‘Villagization’ in
Ethiopia’s Gambella Region”, Human Rights Watch, 17 January 2012.
Page 7
than to increase domestic access to electric power, critics
claim dams are being built to export it and gain hard currency and geopolitical influence, without apparent concern
for environmental and social impacts.39 Meles dismissed
criticism, and added he did not “believe in … bedtime stories and contrived arguments linking economic growth
with democracy”.40
The government claims its socio-economic policies have
produced sustainable internal development. However, many
critics call them state-driven capitalism or authoritarian
development, whose major beneficiaries are the political
elite and their entourage, not the wider polity.41 While
they have superficial similarity to those in China, they face
greater challenges and are unlikely to work well in the long
run. The system in Ethiopia was almost entirely dependent on Meles, whereas in China it is based on a party not
as troubled by ethnic diversity and with a relatively effective mechanism for transferring power. Now that Meles is
no longer at the helm, the Ethiopian elite may well pay a
high cost for years of corruption and factionalism and of
decreasing attention to the complexity of the society and
its demands.
39
The widely publicised Great Renaissance Dam has reportedly
created issues with Egypt because it may reduce the Nile’s flow.
Victoria Eastwood and Nima Elbagir, “Ethiopia powers on with
controversial dam project”, CNN, 8 June 2012; “A dam nuisance. Egypt and Ethiopia quarrel over water”, The Economist,
20 April 2011; “What Cost Ethiopia’s Dam Boom”, International Rivers, February 2008; “Blue Nile Blues”, Africa Confidential, 27 May 2011. There are also concerns about Gibe III, a
large dam under construction in the Omo Valley. According to
the government, it is needed to duplicate power-generating capacity and increase economic dynamism. However, environmental and rights groups have accused the government of displacing inhabitants, and there are major concerns for its effect
on the Omo River and valley, with repercussions up to Lake
Turkana in Kenya. “A Commentary on the Environmental, Socioeconomic and Human Rights Impacts of the Proposed Gibe
III Hydrodam in the Lower Omo River Basin of Southwest
Ethiopia”, African Resources Working Group, January 2009;
David Turton, “Africa: Concerns about Gibe III Dam”, Pambazuka News, 2 February 2012. Chinese investors have also expressed concern. At the World Economic Forum in Addis Ababa, 9-11 May 2012, Gao Xiqing of the China Investment Forum
warned Meles: “Do not necessarily do what we did”. Policies of
“sheer economic growth” should be avoided. “We now suffer
pollution and an unequal distribution of wealth and opportunities”. Richard Dowden, “How Meles Rules Ethiopia”, op. cit.
40
“Africa: Development or Democracy, Which Comes First?”.
Meles spoke on a panel on African leadership at the 22nd World
Economic Forum, Addis Ababa, 9-11 May 2012, Sheba Post,
15 May 2012.
41
Crisis Group analyst’s field notes and interviews in another
capacity, Ethiopia, 2011-2012.
8. Ethiopia After Meles
Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°89, 22 August 2012
The immediate consequence of these policies – coupled
with high food and commodity prices – is social deterioration. The difference between rich and poor has increased;
annual inflation is in the 30 per cent range, squeezing the
fragile middle class and decimating the poor. Social mobility for most is nearly impossible.42 Schools are under
direct control of the ruling party, with educational and career opportunities connected to loyalty to the EPRDF.
Universities produce an increasing number of locallyeducated youth whose only remaining dream is emigration, by any means. The only new beneficiaries are a small
group of locals and returnees, rarely well-educated, who
are totally dependent on the ruling party and prey on the
economy and country at large. Corruption and smallscale, often violent criminality is of increasing concern, a
classic symptom of social and economic malaise.43
V. TRANSITION: A TPLF AFFAIR
Mechanisms for succession in the 1994 constitution are
not clear. Articles 72-75 treat executive powers. Article
72 vests “the highest executive powers” in “the Prime
Minister and the Council of Ministers”. It also states, “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution the term of
office of the Prime Minister is for the duration of the
mandate of the Council of People’s Representative”, that
is, five years. While Article 75 states that the deputy prime
minister may “[a]ct on behalf of the Prime Minister in his
absence”, it also provides that in such circumstances he
42
Crisis Group, analyst’s field observation in another capacity,
Ethiopia, 2003-2012. William Davison, “Ethiopia’s annual inflation rate falls to 35.9% in December”, Bloomberg, 9 January
2012. The cost of staple food like teff increased five times in a
few months; fuel prices rise continuously. Seble Teweldebirhan, “Skyrocketing cost of living testing many Ethiopians”,
www.ezega.com, 7 October 2011.
43
Crisis Group analyst’s field notes and interviews in another
capacity, Ethiopia, 2003-2012. “Higher education in Ethiopia
on death row”, www.debirhan.com, 23 June 2012. While for
years corruption was seen as solely an option for the highest
political and administrative echelon, it is now apparent in all
levels of the administration. For example, civil servants routinely solicit bribes in return for official documents such as a
driving license or an ID. Crisis Group analyst’s observations in
another capacity, Ethiopia, 2003-212. While there have been
some government efforts to curb corruption, they have come under criticism and proven insufficient. Abdi Tsegaye, “Ethiopia:
Corruption could undermine nation’s develoment goals, op.
cit.; Tesfa-Alem Tekle, “Ethiopia: Thousands of government
officials register their assets”, op. cit.; Wondwossen Mezlekia,
“The case of alleged fraud and corruption”, op. cit. In a survey,
as noted above, 48 per cent of Ethiopians report having paid a
bribe to service providers in the last twelve months. “Daily Lives
and Corruption”, Transparency international, op. cit., p. 13.
Page 8
remains “responsible to the Prime Minister”. His role is not
otherwise constitutionally endowed with executive power
(beyond membership of the Council of Ministers), so this
article does not constitute a succession mechanism.
On a strict reading of the constitution, executive responsibility in event of the prime minister’s death is with the
Council of Ministers until the end of parliament’s mandate,44 at which point the new parliament chooses a new
prime minister. Members of the Council of Ministers include the prime minister, deputy prime minister, federal
ministers and other federal officials as determined by law.
The deputy prime minister has no specific role in it.45
The lack of guidance is by design. The constitution was
drafted so as not to constrain the ruling party. The wording
of Article 75 ensures that a non-Tigrayan deputy prime
minister, necessary to preserve the image of ethnic balance, would not automatically be promoted once Meles
was dead, thereby endangering the Tigrayan elite. A likely explanation for the government’s handling of questions
about his health is that there was no agreement on who
would become prime minister and chairman of both the
TPLF and the EPRDF if the prime minister died. With
Meles’s death a power-vacuum opens, and as TPLF factions jostle for position, the rules of engagement appear
uncertain.
It was rumoured that Meles was grooming Deputy Prime
Minister Hailemariam before his death;46 others pointed
to members of his inner circle, including Tewdros Adhanom, Berhane Gebrekristos, Arquebe Equbay or Abay
Woldu. It is believed his wife, Azeb Mesfin, would like to
succeed her husband or play a major role in the political
future, but without Meles she probably has little chance.47
44
Article 72.
Article 76
46
On Haliemariam, see fn. 6 above.
47
Tewdros Adhanom is health minister and TPLF executive
committee member, a medical doctor with a PhD from the University of Nottingham, considered very close to Meles and apparently well regarded by the U.S. There are concerns in the
TPLF about his ability to run the country, and he was not a liberation fighter. Crisis Group, interview, July 2012. Berhane
Gebrekristos has always been a main actor, very close to Meles
and discreet. Considered the TPLF spokesperson abroad during
and after the guerrilla war, he was ambassador to the U.S. and
is now deputy foreign minister, and, many say, runs the ministry. He is also a central committee member. Crisis Group interview, July 2012. Meles appointed Arkebe Oqubay mayor of
Addis Ababa (2003-2005), after which he was state minister of
works and public services; he is now an adviser and central
committee member. Since he is not in parliament, he cannot
constitutionally be prime minister. Abay Woldu is president of
Tigray Region since 2010, TPLF deputy chairman and executive committee member. His wife, Tirfu Kidane-Mariam, is an
influential central committee member. He is not considered
45
9. Ethiopia After Meles
Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°89, 22 August 2012
Since alliances are probably in no more than an early
stage, it is not possible to predict who will prevail. However, none of the above appears to possess the gravitas
and acumen to gain the support of all TPLF factions or
even its old guard, represented by Sebhat Nega and Abay
Tsehaye.48 This highlights the risk of an intra-TPLF powerstruggle and increases the prospect senior Tigrayans in
the military (ENDF) and National Intelligence and Security Service (ENISS) could become the real arbiters.
The prevailing faction would need the security apparatus’s
support. It is not possible to know whom it will back,
whether it will find common ground. Surely, it will play a
more prominent political role. Its increased influence might
powerful enough to take power by some TPLF observers. Crisis
Group interview, July 2012. For years Azeb Mesfin was simply
first lady, pursuing her education and business career. She was
elected to parliament in 2005, promoted in 2010 to the executive committee and won a fight to demote Sebhat Nega, a senior old guard figure. She is also deputy head of the Endowment
Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray (EFFORT), led by Abadi
Zemu, who replaced Sebhat Nega. A Tigrayan holding company set up to invest money raised by the TPLF during the guerrilla war, EFFORT controls companies valued at some $125
million. Crisis Group analyst’s interviews in another capacity,
Addis Ababa, 2011. While there have been corruption allegations against Azeb, she has denied them. “‘Audit me if you like’,
First Lady Azed Mesfin”, Danielberhane’s Blog (http://daniel
berhane.wordpress.com), 4 March 2011.
48
Sebhat Nega, born 1934, is a founder of the TPLF and the
Marxist Leninist League of Tigray and a hardline Tigrayan nationalist. His original stand against Mengistu was that the country should be broken up into ethnic states, and he may still not
necessarily support unity at any cost. TPLF head 1979-1989, he
was replaced by Meles at its Third Congress. Since then, he has
been at the periphery but remains respected. John Young, Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia: The Tigray’s People Liberation
Front 1975-1991 (Cambridge, 1997). He was the EPRDF’s economic department chairman, a major supporter of Meles during
the war with Eritrea and its aftermath and helped Meles retain
the TPLF’s leadership during the 2001 internal crisis by persuading his sister, Kidusan Nega, and her husband, Tsegaye Berhe
(central committee members initially opposed to him). In 2012,
he publicly raised concerns about corruption (but stopped short
of calling for investigation in the prime minister’s family), oneman rule and Meles’s “dominant party” concept. Abdi Tsegaye,
“Ethiopia: Corruption could undermine nation’s develoment
goals – Sebhat Nega”, op. cit.; Crisis Group analyst’s field notes
and interviews in another capacity, Ethiopia, 2003-2012. Abay
Tsehaye is another founding member of the TPLF and the Marxist Leninist League of Tigray. An ex-federal affairs minister, he
is a member of the TPLF central committee and in 2010 was
appointed by Meles director general of the Sugar Corporation
with ministerial rank. Demoted after the 2010 elections in the
generational renewal Meles imposed, he could be at the forefront of any old-guard refusal to accept a new generation leader.
Crisis Group analyst’s field notes in another capacity, Ethiopia,
2003-2012.
Page 9
result in a more hawkish regional attitude, especially
toward Eritrea. Meles worked hard to ensure it was completely obedient to him, but his successor should not take
its loyalty for granted.49
A. SUCCESSION SCENARIOS
Ethiopian authorities announced on 21 August that Deputy
Prime Minister Hailemariam is acting head of government.50
However, this seems a temporary emergency solution. The
lack of an obvious true successor remains the main issue
and opens three possible scenarios for post-Meles Ethiopia. The first is an agreement within the TPLF to appoint
a non-Tigrayan prime minister. It might be so motivated
to give the appearance of a broad base and that Meles’s
promised opening was underway. Hailemariam – loyal
and already part of the inner circle – could be confirmed
and may prove the best choice even in the long run. For
many, however, this would be window-dressing, designed
to placate potential critics, while the Tigrayan TPLF elite
keep real power.51 The true leader would almost certainly
be Meles’s successor as EPRDF and TPLF chairman. Also
relevant would be the process by which this individual
gained the chairmanships. If it involved a long factional
struggle rather than consensus, the party’s resilience might
be seriously damaged, leaving more room for the security
apparatus to be the real power.
In a second scenario, a Tigrayan TPLF member would
eventually become prime minister and TPLF and EPRDF
chairman with broad consensus, including among army
and intelligence power brokers. The most likely candidates
in this eventuality appear to be Berhane Gebrekristos and
Tewdros Adhanom. However, Crisis Group was told the
old guard, led by Sebhat Nega, is lobbying against both,
as are influential security personalities such as Army Chief
of Staff General Samora Younus, Northern front commander General Seare Mekonnen and ENISS head Getachew Assefa. While this scenario holds the greatest potential for a stable, TPLF-managed transition, identifying
a figure palatable to the many power centres may prove
49
The majority of the senior ENDF and ENISS ranks are ethnic
Tigrayan or Agew (an ethnic group in Tigray and Eritrea). The
“retirement” of some 120 generals and colonels left over from
the guerrilla war in late 2011-early 2012 was part of Meles’s
control effort. Kirubel Tadesse, “Ethiopian military retires 13
generals, 300 senior officers”, The Capital, 26 December 2011.
50
“… will, in accordance with the… Constitution, continue to
carry out the responsibilities of heading the Council of Ministers”. “Statement from the Council of Ministers of the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia”.
51
Crisis Group interview, July 2012.
10. Ethiopia After Meles
Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°89, 22 August 2012
impossible.52 The party’s reluctance to reveal leadership
arrangements during Meles’s long illness suggests the
difficulty.
A third possible scenario is that different TPLF members
will in the end be selected as prime minister and party
chairman. The questions would then be the balance of
influence between them and the sustainability of the arrangement, including whether divided power in a regime
crafted for one-man rule could make for a stable alliance
among TPLF factions. The security apparatus would be
even more crucial to guarantee the arrangement worked,
perhaps to the point of it becoming the real power behind
the scenes or openly taking control. But if divisions emerge
within it, the security apparatus might be unable either to
accept a civilian ruler or nominate one of its own.53
In all scenarios, the ruling party will need to reconcile its
decision with the constitution, or at least give the impression of doing so. This might be by obtaining an interpretation of Article 75 from the Constitutional Court and having it approved by the Federal Council pursuant to Article
83.54 It is likely that, given the court’s lack of independence, any opinion would be informed by the TPLF’s political agenda. Alternatively, a perceived internal or external
threat might be used to justify imposition of martial law.
B. THE REPERCUSSIONS
OF A WEAKENED REGIME
In any scenario, the successor or joint successors will be
weaker than Meles. In the short run, stability will depend
upon TPLF capacity to reach consensus among its factions
and an agreement with senior security figures. However,
fissures would likely grow during the transition. The regime has traditionally relied heavily on repression to suppress criticism and popular discontent. Weaker without
Meles, it may have little choice but to further restrict political space and rely on repressive tactics to preserve its
authority.
Signs of government nervousness are already evident.
During Meles’s illness, the security apparatus dealt especially brutally with Muslim protests. The police entered
mosques, injuring and killing worshipers and detaining
leaders. The last remaining Amharic private weekly, Feteh,
52
Crisis Group interview, July 2012. Samora, Seare and Getachew are from Tigray. Getachew is also a TPLF executive
committee member and a very close Meles aid, though there
are rumours of his dissatisfaction with some Meles decisions,
including the apparent decision that Getachew’s deputy, Esayas
Woldegiorgis, is to run the security service.
53
Crisis Group interview, July 2012.
54
Article 85 provides that the Constitutional Court has 30 days
to render a decision in any case brought to it.
Page 10
was banned after trying to report on the illness and the
Muslim protests. There was apprehension among the ruling
elite that mass demonstrations to express grievances could
occur.55 Were that to happen and the army be required to
quell them, the obedience of its lower ranks – mainly Oromo or Amhara, not Tigrayan – would be a major question.
It will be difficult for any new leadership to address fundamental grievances within the current political framework,
especially in the absence of any meaningful domestic
political opposition. Resentments would likely continue to
be turned into ethnic and religious channels, thus undermining stability and, in the worst case of civil war, even
survival of a multi-ethnic, multi-faith state. In a country
divided between Christians and Muslims, the risk that unanswered social and political complaints might find their
breaking point along religious lines is real.56
Nor would the implications of a weak, unstable Ethiopia
be limited to the country itself. A weakened regime facing
significant internal pressure – such as an escalation of the
Muslim protests – might be tempted to resume the conflict
with Eritrea to divert attention from domestic troubles.57
In the first part of 2012, Ethiopia made a number of military
incursions, and tensions between the neighbours mounted.
Conversely, Eritrea might seek to exploit unrest in Ethiopia both to regain territories awarded it by the Ethiopia and
Eritrea Border Commission (EEBC) and to take revenge
on the TPLF. If direct confrontation was unfeasible for its
weakened military, Asmara might more actively support
rebel groups in Ethiopia for the same objectives.58
To prevent or repress ethnic or religious unrest, Ethiopia
might have to withdraw troops from operations in Somalia and Sudan. Should discontent expressed on a religious
basis lead to Islamic radicalisation of the Oromo and Og-
55
Crisis Group interviews, July 2012; William Davison, “Ethiopian police clash with Muslims before AU summit meeting”,
Bloomberg, 14 July 2012; Aaron Maasho, “Ethiopia mosque
sit-ins see deaths, arrests: protesters”, Reuters, 15 July 2012;
“Ethiopia: Locking up Feteh newspaper’s edition”, Danielberhane’s Blog (http://danielberhane.wordpress.com), 27 July 2012.
56
Crisis Group interview, July 2012. Moreover, if the TPLF is
fundamentally threatened and seeks to keep power by any
means, it might return to its original ethnic platform, call for
Tigrayan independence, move most of the army to Tigray and
unilaterally implement the self-determination enshrined in the
1994 constitution. In a worst case, such ethnicisation of the
struggle inside Ethiopia might trigger similar attempts elsewhere in the Horn of Africa.
57
Crisis Group interview, July 2012.
58
In the contingency postulated in fn. 55 above, that under heavy
domestic pressure the TPLF might conceivably implement Tigrayan independence, a new war with Eritrea might seem attractive in order to gain access to the sea and make Tigray a viable
state.
11. Ethiopia After Meles
Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°89, 22 August 2012
adeni communities (respectively the country’s first and
third biggest), such groups might form links with similar
movements in the region, as the ONLF did with radicals
in Somalia.59
VI. PREVENTING THE SPREAD
OF INSTABILITY
Much as other authoritarian regimes in the region, Ethiopia
is struggling with rising discontent, linked to both economic hardship and simmering political grievances.60 Without
Meles, this could lead to growing unrest and the spread
of armed insurgencies. To prevent this, the government
should open up political space, allow the political opposition a greater role and prepare for free and fair elections
within a few years.
A. OPENING POLITICAL SPACE
AND RESCINDING REPRESSIVE LAWS
The draconian legislation in place after the 2005 elections
severely weakened political opposition and a fragile but
growing civil society, forcing them out of the political
arena and either to remain mute or move their leadership
into exile, thereby losing political relevance. The innovative constitution is constantly bypassed by laws, edicts and
practices that openly contravene it.61 The government wants
the population to be an unaware, uninformed witness of
its decisions. After Meles’s death, it is likely that Ethiopia
can manage a smooth transition only if political, social
and cultural space is reopened. The first step should be to
replace Meles with the constitution as the epicentre of the
political system. The anti-terrorism, press and civil society
organisation (CSO) laws would need to be rescinded or
radically amended, a new parliament elected and judicial
independence guaranteed. Political prisoners should be
released and exiled opposition members allowed back.
These fundamental steps could help avoid instability and
permit the peaceful channelling of grievances, greatly reducing ethnic or religious radicalisation.
Page 11
B. REANIMATING A DIASPORA
OPPOSITION ON LIFE SUPPORT
The diaspora opposition has been feeble and divided, incapable of producing a common platform or posing a meaningful challenge to the regime. However, it was reanimated
by news of Meles’s illness and inserted itself into the debate, in order to better position itself in any transition.
Opposition forces may now be able to agree on a basic
platform calling for an all-inclusive transitional process
leading to free and fair elections in a couple of years.
Such an arrangement should include all political forces –
inside and outside the country, armed and unarmed – that
endorse a non-violent process to achieve an inclusive,
democratically-elected regime.62
An agreement between the ruling party and opposition –
conceivable only with some international mediation – would
need to include a series of fundamental reforms, including
release of all political prisoners and the repeal or radical
amendment of repressive legislation, leading to opening
of political space and preparation for elections and thus
avoiding radicalisation of the opposition. However, there
are no signs that any figure within the EPRDF, and particularly in the TPLF, is willing to champion the idea.63 In
that case, the questions whether the diaspora could play
any role and how remain open. At the moment, it seems
to count, in the event of Meles’s departure, on support
from major international actors, mainly the U.S. and EU.
Should this not be forthcoming, the possibility would remain of mass demonstrations or armed rebellion inside
Ethiopia, though in the short term, no political forces seem
to have the capacity to pose a real threat to the TPLF
leadership.64
C. THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY
The international community supported the regime, and
Meles played Western and Eastern actors alike well, deploying a targeted narrative for each. Washington and London
in particular found him a trusted ally for countering terrorism in the Horn of Africa and a partner who boosted
economic growth, pleased the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and made progress toward the
Millennium Development Goals. While rights organisations have accused the ruling party of using aid money to
suppress political dissent and consolidate its power, do-
59
Crisis Group interview, August 2012.
There is similar discontent in Eritrea, Uganda and Sudan.
Crisis Group Africa Report N°158, Uganda: No Resolution to
Growing Tensions, 5 April 2012.
61
Legislations passed between 2007-2009 and other edicts controlling the media and NGOs flout rights enshrined in the constitution.
60
62
Crisis Group interview, July 2012.
Ibid.
64
Crisis Group interview, July 2012.
63
12. Ethiopia After Meles
Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°89, 22 August 2012
Page 12
nors have at times downplayed the allegations or turned a
blind eye.65
VII. CONCLUSION
Washington, Brussels and London have publicly raised concerns in 2012 on the pervasive use of the anti-terrorism
law, but criticism has not been backed by penalties or
been strong enough to change Addis Ababa’s course.66 If
a weaker regime exposed the full extent of the country’s
fragilities, however, a resolute push might be more effective. Sustaining such a regime and turning a blind eye to
its rights record, even if it secured short-term benefits,
would increase legitimate grievances that could fuel armed
rebellion and radicalisation of ethnic and religious groups
(notably the Muslim minority), leading to an internal crisis
with regional repercussions.
For more than two decades, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi
managed Ethiopia’s political, ethnic and religious divides
and adroitly kept the TFPL and EPRDF factions under
tight control by concentrating power, gradually closing
political space and stifling any dissent. His death poses
serious risks to the ruling party’s tenure. Deprived of its
epicentre, the regime will find it very difficult to create a
new centre of gravity. In the short-term, a TPLF-dominated transition will produce a weaker regime that probably
will have to rely increasingly on repression to manage
growing unrest.
More constructively and prudently, the U.S., EU and UK
might develop a common position on continued, but conditional support that links political, military and development aid to an immediate return to constitutionalism,
improvement of democratic and human rights practices
and a clear roadmap. The latter should include transparent
mechanisms within the TPLF and the EPRDF for apportioning the party and Front power Meles held and within
parliament to remove repressive laws and open space so
political opponents can return, leading to free and fair elections within a fixed time.
65
China gives relatively little direct foreign aid, but by 2009, its
direct investment had reached $900 million. The EU, U.S, UK,
and Germany are the largest bilateral donors. The World Bank
and donor nations cancelled direct budgetary support after the
2005 disputed elections, providing protection of basic services
(PBS) instead. Funds are distributed to five sectors, water, education, health, roads and agriculture, in a block grant to the federal government that then passes it to the local administrations
(woredas), supposedly without touching them itself. The World
Bank says the program is free from political capture and directly
helps people in need, but it appears the central government does
influence allocations. See also “Development Without Freedom”, Human Rights Watch, October 2010, pp. 23-32; “Ethiopia: Donor Aid Supports Repression“, Human Rights Watch,
19 October 2010; “Aid Management and Utilisation in Ethiopia
– A study in response to allegations of distortion in donorsupported development programmes”, Development Assistance
Group (DAG) Ethiopia, July 2010; “Social protection: safety
nets for the vulnerable”, World Bank, no date, http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/AFRICAEXT/Resources/sp_education_select
_brochure.pdf.
66
“Minister for Africa raises concerns over harsh sentencing
under Ethiopia Anti-Terrorism laws”, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 18 July 2012; “EU HR Ashton followed
closely recent trials under the Ethiopian Anti-Terrorism Proclamation”, EU, 13 July 2012; “US ‘concerned’ over Ethiopian
journalist’s sentence”, Agence France-Presse, 14 July 2012.
The international community ignored and to some degree
supported the authoritarian tendencies. It preferred shortterm security to long-term stability and turned a blind eye
to growing dissatisfaction that in the absence of political
space is being channeled along ethnic and religious lines,
potentially radicalising society. In the post-Meles era, it
needs instead to push the ruling party to revive the rights
and freedoms of the 1994 constitution and promote inclusive reforms as the only way to ensure internal and regional
stability, as well as durable development.
Nairobi/Brussels, 22 August 2012
13. Ethiopia After Meles
Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°89, 22 August 2012
Page 13
APPENDIX A
MAP OF HORN OF AFRICA
14. Ethiopia After Meles
Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°89, 22 August 2012
Page 14
APPENDIX B
CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON AFRICA SINCE 2009
Central Africa
Chad: Powder Keg in the East, Africa
Report N°149, 15 April 2009 (also available in French).
Congo: Five Priorities for a Peacebuilding
Strategy, Africa Report N°150, 11 May
2009 (also available in French).
Congo: A Comprehensive Strategy to
Disarm the FDLR, Africa Report N°151,
9 July 2009 (also available in French).
Burundi: réussir l’intégration des FNL,
Africa Briefing N°63, 30 July 2009.
Chad: Escaping from the Oil Trap, Africa
Briefing N°65, 26 August 2009 (also
available in French).
CAR: Keeping the Dialogue Alive, Africa
Briefing N°69, 12 January 2010 (also
available in French).
Burundi: Ensuring Credible Elections,
Africa Report N°155, 12 February 2010
(also available in French).
Libye/Tchad : au-delà d’une politique
d’influence, Africa Briefing N°71, 23
March 2010 (also available in Arabic).
Congo: A Stalled Democratic Agenda,
Africa Briefing N°73, 8 April 2010 (also
available in French).
Chad: Beyond Superficial Stability, Africa
Report N°162, 17 August 2010 (only
available in French).
Congo: No Stability in Kivu Despite a
Rapprochement with Rwanda, Africa
Report N°165, 16 November 2010 (also
available in French).
Dangerous Little Stones: Diamonds in the
Central African Republic, Africa Report
N°167, 16 December 2010 (also
available in French).
Burundi: From Electoral Boycott to
Political Impasse, Africa Report N°169,
7 February 2011 (also available in
French).
Le Nord-ouest du Tchad : la prochaine
zone à haut risque ?, Africa Briefing
N°78, 17 February 2011.
Congo: The Electoral Dilemma, Africa
Report N°175, 5 May 2011 (also
available in French).
Congo : The Electoral Process Seen from
the East, Africa Briefing N°80, 5
September 2011 (also available in
French).
Africa without Qaddafi: The Case of Chad,
Africa Report N°180, 21 October 2011
(also available in French).
Implementing Peace and Security
Architecture (I): Central Africa, Africa
Report N°181, 7 November 2011 (also
available in French).
The Lord’s Resistance Army: End Game?,
Africa Report N°182, 17 November
2011.
Burundi: A Deepening Corruption Crisis,
Africa Report N°185, 21 March 2012
(also available in French).
Black Gold in the Congo: Threat to
Stability or Development Opportunity?,
Africa Report N°188, 11 July 2012 (also
available in French).
Horn of Africa
Sudan: Justice, Peace and the ICC, Africa
Report N°152, 17 July 2009.
Somalia: The Trouble with Puntland,
Africa Briefing N°64, 12 August 2009.
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its
Discontents, Africa Report N°153, 4
September 2009.
Somaliland: A Way out of the Electoral
Crisis, Africa Briefing N°67, 7 December 2009.
Sudan: Preventing Implosion, Africa
Briefing N°68, 17 December 2009.
Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts: Countering
Insecurity in South Sudan, Africa Report
N°154, 23 December 2009.
Rigged Elections in Darfur and the Consequences of a Probable NCP Victory in
Sudan, Africa Briefing N°72, 30 March
2010.
LRA: A Regional Strategy Beyond Killing
Kony, Africa Report N°157, 28 April
2010 (also available in French).
Sudan: Regional Perspectives on the
Prospect of Southern Independence,
Africa Report N°159, 6 May 2010.
Somalia’s Divided Islamists, Africa
Briefing N°74, 18 May 2010 (also
available in Somali).
Sudan: Defining the North-South Border,
Africa Briefing N°75, 2 September
2010.
Eritrea: The Siege State, Africa Report
N°163, 21 September 2010.
Negotiating Sudan’s North-South Future,
Africa Briefing N°76, 23 November
2010.
Somalia: The Transitional Government on
Life Support, Africa Report N°170, 21
February 2011.
Politics and Transition in the New South
Sudan, Africa Briefing N°172, 4 April
2011.
Divisions in Sudan’s Ruling Party and the
Threat to the Country’s Stability, Africa
Report N°174, 4 May 2011.
South Sudan: Compounding Instability in
Unity State, Africa Report N°179, 17
October 2011 (also available in
Chinese).
Kenya: Impact of the ICC Proceedings,
Africa Briefing N°84, 9 January 2012.
Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalisation,
Africa Briefing N°85, 25 January 2012.
The Kenyan Military Intervention in
Somalia, Africa Report N°184, 15
February 2012.
Somalia: An Opportunity that Should Not
Be Missed, Africa Briefing N°87, 22
February 2012.
China’s New Courtship in South Sudan,
Africa Report N°186, 4 April 2012.
Uganda: No Resolution to Growing
Tensions, Africa Report N°187, 5 April
2012.
Southern Africa
Zimbabwe: Engaging the Inclusive Government, Africa Briefing N°59, 20 April
2009.
Zimbabwe: Political and Security Challenges to the Transition, Africa Briefing
N°70, 3 March 2010.
Madagascar : sortir du cycle de crises,
Africa Report N°156, 18 March 2010.
Madagascar : la crise à un tournant
critique ?, Africa Report N°166, 18
November 2010.
Zimbabwe: The Road to Reform or Another
Dead End, Africa Report N°173, 27
April 2011.
Resistance and Denial: Zimbabwe’s Stalled
Reform Agenda, Africa Briefing N°82,
16 November 2011.
Zimbabwe’s Sanctions Standoff, Africa
Briefing N°86, 6 February 2012.
15. Ethiopia After Meles
Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°89, 22 August 2012
West Africa
Liberia: Uneven Progress in Security
Sector Reform, Africa Report N°148,
13 January 2009.
Guinea-Bissau: Building a Real Stability
Pact, Africa Briefing N°57, 29 January
2009 (also available in French).
Guinea: The Transition Has Only Just
Begun, Africa Briefing N°58, 5 March
2009 (also available in French).
Nigeria: Seizing the Moment in the Niger
Delta, Africa Briefing N°60, 30 April
2009.
Guinea-Bissau: Beyond Rule of the Gun,
Africa Briefing N°61, 25 June 2009
(also available in Portuguese).
Côte d’Ivoire: What’s Needed to End the
Crisis, Africa Briefing N°62, 2 July
2009 (also available in French).
Guinea: Military Rule Must End, Africa
Briefing N°66, 16 October 2009 (also
available in French).
Côte d’Ivoire : sécuriser le processus électoral, Africa Report N°158, 5 May 2010.
Cameroon: Fragile State?, Africa Report
N°160, 25 May 2010 (also available in
French).
Cameroon: The Dangers of a Fracturing
Regime, Africa Report N°161, 24 June
2010 (also available in French).
Guinea: Reforming the Army, Africa
Report N°164, 23 September 2010 (also
available in French).
Côte d’Ivoire : Sortir enfin de l’ornière ?,
Africa Briefing N°77, 25 November
2010.
Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict,
Africa Report N°168, 20 December
2010.
Nigeria’s Elections: Reversing the
Degeneration?, Africa Briefing N°79, 24
February 2011.
Côte d’Ivoire: Is War the Only Option?,
Africa Report N°171, 3 March 2011
(also available in French).
A Critical Period for Ensuring Stability in
Côte d’Ivoire, Africa Report N°176, 1
August 2011 (also available in French).
Liberia: How Sustainable Is the Recovery?,
Africa Report N°177, 19 August 2011.
Guinea: Putting the Transition Back on
Track, Africa Report N°178, 23
September 2011.
Côte d’Ivoire: Continuing the Recovery,
Africa Briefing N°83, 16 December
2011 (also available in French).
Au-delà des compromis : les perspectives
de réforme en Guinée-Bissau, Africa
Report N°183, 23 January 2012 (also
available in Portuguese).
Liberia: Time for Much-Delayed
Reconciliation and Reform, Africa
Briefing N°88, 12 June 2012.
Mali: Avoiding Escalation, Africa Report
N°189, 18 July 2012 (also available in
French).
Beyond Turf Wars: Managing the PostCoup Transition in Guinea-Bissau,
Africa Report N°190, 17 August 2012.
Page 15
16. International Headquarters
149 Avenue Louise, 1050 Brussels, Belgium · Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 · Fax: +32 2 502 50 38
Email: brussels@crisisgroup.org
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Email: newyork@crisisgroup.org
Washington Office
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Email: washington@crisisgroup.org
London Office
48 Gray’s Inn Road, London WC1X 8LT · Tel: +44 20 7831 1436 · Fax: +44 20 7242 8135
Email: london@crisisgroup.org
Moscow Office
Kutuzovskiy prospect 36, Building 41, Moscow 121170 Russia · Tel: +7-926-232-6252
Email: moscow@crisisgroup.org
Regional Offices and Field Representation
Crisis Group also operates out of over 25 different locations in Africa,
Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Latin America.
See www.crisisgroup.org for details.
www.crisisgroup.org