The EU initially prioritized stability over democracy in its relations with MENA countries like Tunisia and Egypt under their authoritarian regimes. The Arab Spring uprisings in 2011 surprised and challenged this approach. While the EU quickly supported democratic transitions in Tunisia, endorsing its first free elections, the transition in Egypt proved more complicated without significant reforms. The limits of the EU's soft power were exposed as stability and security concerns in Egypt's polarized politics came to the fore again, marking a partial return to the EU's realpolitik priorities of the past.

1. 1
THE
EUROPEAN
APPROACH
TO
ARAB
SPRING
AND
WINTER
(A
TURNING
BACK
TO
REALPOLITIK)
By
Edoardo
Costa
20149806
Universiteit
Antwerpen
2014-­‐2015
Master
Politieke
Wetenschappen
Paper
EU
as
a
Global
Actor

2. 2
INTRODUCTION
The revolutionary wave of demonstrations, riots, and civil wars, known as the “Arab
spring”, overwhelmed almost all the most important Middle East and North-African
(MENA) countries and it has produced several effects on the European Union’s attitude
and behavior regarding its relations to these countries and their populations. The EU
was founded on a shared set of common liberal democratic norms and values and this
make its uniqueness as an international actor. The big contradiction is that, while these
norms shape its relations with the outside world, at the same time its foreign policy
continues to be driven by its member states, not by the EU’s common institutions.
Regarding its Mediterranean neighbors this has meant a tendency to favor stability over
democracy. The result is that the Union often has to face a dilemma between promote its
founding democratic principles and its ideology or defend its interests and concerns
regarding the geopolitical situation beyond its borders (Behr, 2013). The trade-off
between security and democracy is sometimes in favor of the former and others in favor
of the latter and has produced contradictions about the priorities of the EU in its relations
with MENA countries. For instance, before the fall of two enduring regimes, Zine El-
Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, the EU and its members have
cooperated with these dictators for economic reasons and in order to face critical issues
like illegal migration, terrorism and to guarantee stability on their southern borders.
Obviously, even if the violation of democracy, human rights and civil liberties were well
known the EU turned a blind eye under a realistic approach that was also influenced by
the belief that the Arabs countries were not ready for a democratic transition (Dandashly,
2014). The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects that these revolutions have
had on the European attitude. With this analysis I will try to answer some questions that
regard the European external policies and the European role in the MENA. For instance
which were and which are the EU’s priorities? Furthermore, after the Arabian world call
for democracy has Europe supported this new movements and the opportunity to spread
democracy with a more idealistic strategy or has it prioritized security concerns as a
response to the threat of instability as in the past? In order to answer this question I will
analyze the events in Tunisia and Egypt during last years and the evolution of the EU’s
approach to face them.
BEFORE ARAB SPRING
After the 1992 Maastricht Treaty the European Union has increased significantly its
international role by developing the relations with its Eastern and Mediterranean
neighbors. However, mostly with regard to the MENA countries, these relations were
heavily shaped by the EU’s security and stability concerns on its borders (Dandashly,
2014). Before the awakening of the Arab springs the autocratic and monarchic states
have justified their role as international guarantors of stability against extremism and
chaos. During the years it was seen in this area the rise of new political groups against
the regimes, many of which had Islamic roots, like the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt or
the Ennahda Party in Tunisia (Salamey, 2015). Their nature was an obstacle for the
European Union due to its essential perception of political Islam as a non-democratic
actor. In order to understand that is also important to stress that the European actors
were influenced also by the understandable public opinion’s fear of terrorism after the
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States, March 2004 in Madrid and

3. 3
July 2005 in London (Cafaro, 2014). Thus, the European Union during its relationships
with the North-African dictatorship has showed a realistic approach and the geopolitical
significance of these countries has helped their dictators to be shield from serious
international condemnation (Salamey, 2015). However, during these years is undeniable
that the EU’s first interest was in favor of stability instead of the promotion of its values.
This attitude is clear also if we look at formal documents, for instance as it is reported in
the European Security Strategy (2003) ‘[n]eighbours who are engaged in violent conflict,
weak states where organized crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding
population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe’ (Noutcheva, p.22, 2014).
The Union, during these years, has never been able to understand the irreversible
society changes that were going to upset the Arabian word. The problem is that in an
always more globalized world in which ideas and news circulate with an uncontrolled
velocity, a situation in which leaders, as Mubarak and Ben Ali, were accumulating
immense personal fortunes while the minimum wage of their citizens didn’t exceed $150
was not sustainable anymore (Salamey, 2015). This conditions in a rising highly
educated populations like the Tunisian and Egyptian one become unacceptable and the
two dictators early had to realized that they didn’t have the control on their populations
anymore. From the other side also the EU and its member states had to turn back on the
role they have played and on their more or less connivance with these authoritarian
regimes.
AFTER ARAB SPRING
The protests that started in Tunisia resulted with the overthrow of the former Tunisian
president Ben Ali on 14 January 2011 and spilled over to other countries like Egypt
where after eighteen days of demonstrations on 11 February Mubarak had to resign as
president and transferred authority to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF).
As I said before the EU with its member states believed on an unfavorable domestic
environment for a democratic transition in the area and they were surprised by the Arab
spring events (Dandashly, 2014). The EU and its member states, even if discredited by
their previous support for authoritarian leaders in the region, finally, were quick to
denounce the short-termism of their security preoccupations. They begun to support the
new movements seeing for the first time these countries as a window of opportunity for
democracy (Noutcheva, 2014). Although the climate for relations with the newly
emerging political formations were anything but easy, after the fall of the two dictators
the EU demonstrated its support for this transition. In Tunisia for instance was sent a
series of high-level visits starting from the EU High Representative Catherine Ashton,
followed by European Commission President Barroso as well as the European
Parliament President of that time Jerezy Buzek. The positive situation enabled the first
free and fair elections to take place on 23 October 2011 and the EU provided immediate
support by an Election Observation Mission (EOM) whose report stated that the
elections were generally well-conducted (European Union, 2012). These elections saw
the success of the coalition guided by the moderate Islamic Ennahda Party. Although the
transition was not completely peaceful and without violence, the well-established political
parties and highly educated middle class created a favorable domestic political
environment for democratic reforms (Dandashly, 2014).
Another story is the transition in Egypt after the fall of its dictator. The EU relations with
the new actors were more complicated, for instance the Union offered its help to monitor
the parliamentary and presidential elections but, despite its effort, the Egyptian
authorities declined this offer. Despite that, 2 million of euro were allocated in order to

4. 4
“assist the High Electoral Commission in its work and provide support to civil society
organizations”. Furthermore, the parliamentary and presidential elections increased the
EU’s trust and support towards democratic and socio-economic reforms and the new
elected President Morsi was invited to visit Brussels. Moreover, it was established a new
EU-Egypt Task Force and the EU pledged to invest 253 million euro in order to promote
a peaceful transition in the country. Unfortunately, in a polarized society these tools of
soft diplomacy were not sufficient and no significant reforms and transformations were
conducted since the fall of Mubarak (Dandashly, 2014).
Doubtless, after the first positive evolution of the Arab spring facts the EU has changed
its attitude to its southern neighbors with a more idealistic approach that was guided by
the enthusiasm of a finally feasible democratic transition in Africa. The first strategic
political response came with the launch of the Partnership for Democracy and Shared
Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean in March 2011, followed by a strategic
review of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) released in May 2011 (Noutcheva,
2014). Sadly, the following evolutions, and above all the new instability in Egypt’s
domestic politics showed the limits of these soft diplomacy approach and the European’s
focus to push for more democratic reforms was challenged by the urgent need to deal
with more pressing stability and security concerns which continue to threaten Egypt’s
delicate economic situation (Dandashly, 2014).
3) THIRD PARAGRAPH: WINTER AND A TURN BACK TO REALPOLITIK
The evolution of the situation in Egypt has showed that is not sufficient to announce new
elections in order to have a democratic transition. The economic situation instead of
improve became even worse and new president and the Muslim Brotherhood were not
able to cooperate with the other political actors while the polarization in a society
plagued by political and social distrust was growing. The risk after elections in a new
democratic system is that the winners can take advance from the situation in order to
restrict the same liberty that has allowed them to get the power (Cafaro, 2014). For all
these reasons, after a massive demonstration in July 2013, Morsi was finally overthrown
by the army and placed under arrest (salamey, 2015). Unfortunately the violence that
started during the last months of Morsi’s government continued even after the military
coup and the constitutional vote. The effects of this continual instability reduce the EU’s
ability to push for democratic reforms and the result was a new concern and focus on
stability and security issues. Most of the Muslim Brotherhood’s leaders were persecuted
and this limited stability brought to the election of the new President Abel Fattah el-Sisi
(Dandashly, 2014). As instability came back in the region the EU first concern was again
to guarantee its borders and to reduce the collateral effects that the new situation in
North-Africa could have produced. The number of migrants and refugees arriving in the
Mediterranean countries grew exponentially and produced the member states’ instinct to
seek the cooperation of the new authorities in the Arab countries to help curb the flow
(Noutcheva, 2014).
CONCLUSION
What results after this analysis is that in the European Union there is a tendency to look
at its borders under a realistic approach. It would be superficial to think that the EU has
no interests to pursue in the neighborhood and the existing literature showed that prior to
the Arab Spring the EU has preferred to support inconvenient dictators in order to
preserve the stability of its brothers. Although, after the first promising changes, the
external policy approach of the Union has changed and it has done a concrete effort in

5. 5
order to promote a real democratic transition, the soft diplomacy tools it has used have
demonstrated to be inadequate for certain realities. If in Tunisia is possible to notice the
implementation of a variety of democratic instruments the EU attempt to support
democratic reforms in Egypt has been faced by resistances from different Egyptian
elites; first from the Muslim Brotherhood while more recently from the military
government bore after the coup. The European idealism and support for democracy saw
as a priority with the outbreak of the Arab spring events has quickly been influenced
again by the new concerns of migration and the fear of a spread of terrorism. The EU
goals in the MENA have not moved away from its previous prioritization of security and
stability in what is better known as the European Realpolitik.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY
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European Union (2012) HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IN THE WORLD:
REPORT IN EU ACTION IN 2011,Published by the European External Action Service,
June 2012 retrieved from http://eeas.europa.eu
Gergana Noutcheva (2015) Institutional Governance of European Neighbourhood Policy
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10.1080/07036337.2014.975987
Imad Salamey (2015) Post-Arab Spring: changes and challenges, Third World Quarterly,
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