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Establishing of intergrity windows evaluation OW's.ppt
- 1. Establishing Integrity Operating EstablishingIntegrity Operating Windows (IOW’s) Windows (IOW’s) IPEIA Conference IPEIA Conference February 2, 2006 February 2, 2006 Banff, Alberta Banff, Alberta John Reynolds Steamboat Springs, CO, USA Recently retired from Shell Global Solutions (US) Inc.
- 2. 2 Outline for thisPresentation Outline for this Presentation • The 10 Shell (US) Process Safety Initiatives (PSI) • The Pressure Equipment Integrity (PEI) Initiative • Corrosion Control Documents (CCD) • Integrity Operating Windows (IOW) • Standard and Critical IOW’s • Integration of IOW’s into the 10 PSI’s • Training of Operators on IOW’s • The Pressure Equipment Integrity Pyramid
- 3. 3 Ten Process SafetyInitiatives Ten Process Safety Initiatives (PSI) – Initiated in May, 2000 (PSI) – Initiated in May, 2000 • Pressure Equipment Integrity (PEI) - IOW creation process • Ensure Safe Production (ESP) - IOW monitoring process • Operator Training and Procedures - IOW knowledge transfer • Management Of Change (MOC) - IOW change process • Investigations – 3 Levels up to RCA • Protective Instrument Systems (IPF – “SIL”) • Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) • Causal Learning • Audits and Assessments • Process Hazards Analysis (PHA)
- 4. 4 Process Safety Initiative ProcessSafety Initiative Metrics Metrics • Each of the 10 PSI’s were required to have four main metrics to track implementation progress (10 X 4 = 40 metrics total) • For the PEI process safety initiative we tracked: - Numbers of Corrosion Control Documents (CCD’s) completed - Numbers of process units with RBI completed - Numbers of process units with all IOW’s implemented - Numbers of operators trained on their CCD & IOW’s • But there was only one bottom line metric for the aggregate of the ten process safety initiatives –> numbers of process safety incidents per year
- 5. 5 Results of theProcess Safety Results of the Process Safety Initiatives Initiatives YTD Totals 19 23 20 15 9 3 0 5 10 15 20 25 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Numbers of Process Safety Incidents in last 6 years – A real success story
- 6. 6 Primary Aspects ofthe Primary Aspects of the Pressure Equipment Integrity Pressure Equipment Integrity (PEI) Initiative (PEI) Initiative • Identify all necessary Integrity Operating Windows (IOW’s) • Create OEMI Teams (Operations - Engineering - Maintenance - Inspection) in each operating area to create and manage CCD’s and IOW’s • Create Corrosion Control Documents (CCD’s), which document all process IOW’s • Train operators on the CCD and IOW’s • Implement IOW’s and Risk-Based Inspection (RBI) • Implement PEI Focused Asset Integrity Reviews (FAIR® ) to monitor progress of the PEI Initiative
- 7. 7 ESP RBI CCD’s & IOW’s OEMITeams 101 Essential Elements PEI PSI PEI PSI Pyramid Pyramid
- 8. 8 Corrosion Control Documents– Corrosion Control Documents – Contents Contents • Relatively comprehensive documents for managing equipment degradation • Description of the process unit and process conditions • Shutdown and start up conditions that may affect corrosion and degradation mechanisms, as well as normal operation • Process Flow Diagram (PFD) and Materials and Corrosion Diagram (modified PFD showing construction materials) • Corrosion Control Loops (areas of similar corrosion within the PFD) e.g. overhead system, slurry system, reflux system, etc. • All potential types of degradation (and fouling) in each process unit and history of problem areas • Quantitative and predictive models for degradation mechanisms • Vital corrosion control procedures, injections, inhibitors, etc. • Recommended inspection & corrosion monitoring, process changes, construction materials changes, etc. • Integrity Operating Windows (IOW’s)
- 9. 9 Corrosion Control Documents– Corrosion Control Documents – Construction Construction • Unit specific CCD’s completed by an OEMI team which includes: - Site corrosion engineer/specialist - Unit process engineer - Unit inspector - One or more experienced unit operations representatives - Facilitator (knowledgeable / experienced corrosion engineer) • Final document represents an agreement between the OEMI Team involved and clearly benefits by the synergistic interaction of all team members
- 10. 10 Establishing Integrity Operating EstablishingIntegrity Operating Windows Windows • Historical operating, maintenance & inspection records • Design data; lab data; operating data • Metallurgical and corrosion data and modules • Process chemistry and engineering knowledge • Reactive chemistry knowledge • Recommended practices (industry and company) • Process and corrosion modeling tools • Subject matter expertise and experience (heavy dose) Result: Reasonable, practical IOW’s – not too conservative – not non-conservative
- 11. 11 Integrity Operating Windows IntegrityOperating Windows Operating Window Operating Window
- 12. 12 Integrity Operating Windows– Integrity Operating Windows – Examples Examples • Typically fall into 2 categories: • Physical - Various limits on pressures and temperatures, including design, operating, partial pressures, dew points, dry points, heating and cooling rates, delta P, etc. - Flow rates, injection rates, inhibitor dosage, amperage levels on Alky contactor motors, slurry content, hydrogen flux, vibration limits, corrosivity probes, etc. • Chemical - pH, water content, acid gas loading, sulfur content, salt content in crude, NH4HS content, NH3 content, TAN, acid strength, amine strength, inhibitor concentration, chloride contamination levels, oxygen content, etc.
- 13. 13 IOW Example –Hot Hydrogen IOW Example – Hot Hydrogen Service Service • Mechanical design window set by the design code e.g. ASME • IOW set by material limit for high temperature hydrogen attack in API RP 941 • SOR process temperature definitely within the IOW • EOR process temperature possibly beyond the IOW – need to know the hydrogen partial pressure and duration of EOR conditions Temperature Pressure Mechanical Design Limits SOR Process Temp EOR Process Temp IOW Based on H2 pp Based on Total Pressure
- 14. 14 Integrity Operating Windows– Integrity Operating Windows – Typical Numbers per Operating Unit Typical Numbers per Operating Unit (before & after an intensive review) (before & after an intensive review) • Typically start with 5 -10 IOW’s that may already be in place, along with other operating quality variable limits • Typically end up with 30 – 50 IOW’s with about 5 -10% being critical limits (requires drastic and/or immediate action), and the rest being standard limits (requires attention within a specified timeframe to get back into control)
- 15. 15 Definitions: Definitions: IOW CriticalLimit IOW Critical Limit A limit at which the operator has one last opportunity to return the process to a safe condition and, if exceeded, could result in one of the following in a fairly short timeframe: • A Catastrophic Release of Hydrocarbons or Hazardous fluids • Loss of Containment • Non-orderly Shutdown • Significant Environmental Impact • Other Unacceptable Risk
- 16. 16 Critical IOW Limit– Critical IOW Limit – Examples Examples • Boiler Feed Water Level - Lost of boiler feed water level could quickly cause boiler tube rupture • Hydroprocess Reactor Temperature - Metal temperatures below the MDMT could give rise to brittle fracture • Heater Tube Skin Temperature - Tube could rupture quickly if overheated, caused, for example, by a no flow or hot spot condition. • Sulfuric Acid Strength in Alkylation - Too low acid strength could cause runaway reaction
- 17. 17 Definition: Standard Level Definition:Standard Level A limit that, if exceeded over a defined period of time, could cause one of the following to eventually occur: • A catastrophic release of hydrocarbons or hazardous fluids • Loss of containment • Non-orderly shutdown • A negative impact to the long term unit performance and its ability to meet turnaround run length • Excessive financial impact
- 18. 18 Standard Level Examples StandardLevel Examples • REAC NH4HS Concentration - Corrosion of the air cooler and downstream piping • Heater Tube Skin Temperature - Metallurgical creep could lead to eventual tube failure. • Crude Fractionator Dew Point Temperature - Sustained operation below dew point could cause damage to fractionator internals or potential loss of containment. • pH of Crude Tower Overhead - Sustained operation below standard pH level could lead to corrosion of tubing and piping and potential loss of containment. • Desalter Outlet Salt Content - Sustained operation above standard level could lead to corrosion and potential loss of containment
- 19. 19 Integrity Operating Windows– Integrity Operating Windows – Successes Successes • In the CCD review, one IOW team noticed that a previous project had installed the wrong construction materials – immediate inspection revealed significant HTHA damage • An operator on the team disagreed with the unit process engineer and said that “we actually operate much hotter than you think because we use the by-pass” – immediate inspection revealed significant localized damage • A corrosion engineer questioned the higher level of NH4HS in the REAC system of an HCU – immediate inspection revealed a previously-missed localized spot of significant corrosion • An IOW was set on NH4HS concentration at another refinery, which then began to take routine lab samples – soon thereafter discovered the concentration was too high and took steps to increase wash water and adjust feedstock
- 20. 20 Operator Training onCCD’s and Operator Training on CCD’s and IOW’s IOW’s • Level 1 - Awareness and Overview of the PEI Process Safety Initiative - SSA Video / CCD / RBI / OEMI / Operator Training • Level 2 - Introduction to Corrosion Control Documents - What they contain; where they’re stored; how to use them • Level 3 - Details contained within each operator’s unit-specific CCD - Specific IOW’s and the reasoning behind them - What can happen if the IOW is exceeded
- 21. 21 ESP RBI CCD’s & IOW’s OEMITEAMS 101 Essential Elements PEI PSI PEI PSI Pyramid Pyramid
- 22. 22 Implementing Risk-Based Inspection ImplementingRisk-Based Inspection (RBI) (RBI) • Another major part of our pressure equipment integrity process safety initiative • We use both a Shell developed more qualitative RBI (S- RBI), as well as the more quantitative API RBI, both successfully for different needs at different sites • But RBI will not be covered today – a topic for another day, if you like • Suffice it to say that any inspection program, be it risk-based, condition-based, or time-based may not be fully reliable without effective identification and implementation of integrity operating windows (IOW’s)
- 23. 23 Integration of CCD’s,IOW’s & Integration of CCD’s, IOW’s & RBI RBI Confidence in plant integrity Creating the CCD: Type of degradation Location of degradation Susceptibility to degradation Degradation rates IOW limits: Determination & management of the operating limits to avoid degradation RBI planning: Method of inspection Where to inspect Frequency of inspection Feedback
- 24. 24 Integration of MultipleWork Processes Integration of Multiple Work Processes Leading To Sustained Asset Integrity Leading To Sustained Asset Integrity Design and Materials Selection Corrosion Control & IOW’s Risk-Based Inspection Long Term Asset Integrity Asset integrity management is a balancing process designed to achieve lowest total cost of ownership Focused Asset Integrity Reviews Focused Asset Integrity Reviews
- 25. 25 Along with AssetIntegrity Comes Along with Asset Integrity Comes Proven Better Process Safety Proven Better Process Safety Performance Performance YTD Totals 19 23 20 15 9 3 0 5 10 15 20 25 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Numbers of Process Safety Incidents in last 6 years in Shell (US) Refining Operations – Facts, not just hopes for the future
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- 28. Shell Experience withIntegrity Shell Experience with Integrity Operating Windows (IOW’s) Operating Windows (IOW’s) Time for Discussion Time for Discussion John.Reynolds@shell.com Recently retired from Shell Global Solutions (US) Inc.