The document outlines Alessandro Pizzorno's theory on the rationality of democratic choice. It presents a series of assumptions that lead people to prefer democracy over other forms of government, including that each individual acts in their own self-interest and is the best judge of their interests. It also argues that the democratic system is the most efficient at satisfying people's interests. However, it acknowledges criticisms of this view, such as that people are not always the best judges of their long-term interests and voters do not fully control the politicians they elect. The document examines different perspectives on rational political action and representation.

1. ON THE RATIONALITY
OF DEMOCRATIC CHOICE
by Alessandro Pizzorno
EPLab Reading Group 6/2/19Giovanni Damele giovanni.damele@fcsh.unl.pt

2. Series of assumptions that lead people to prefer
democracy over other forms of government
Each individual acts according to his own interests
He is the best judge of these (economic or political)
interests
Democratic (representative, multi-party) system is
the most efficient one possible for satisfying people’s
interests
Pizzorno – on the rationality of democracy
EPLab Reading Group 6/2/19
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Giovanni Damele giovanni.damele@fcsh.unl.pt

3. Predictive / descriptive goal
The theory is realistic because it recognizes
individual egoism
Normative – prescriptive ambitions
The theory legitimates democracy, because it
recognizes the achievability of the common good,
thanks to its decision-making procedure
Pizzorno – on the rationality of democracy
EPLab Reading Group 6/2/19
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Giovanni Damele giovanni.damele@fcsh.unl.pt

4. economic theory of democracy
Since one person's utility will differ from another's and there
is no basis for comparing them, a maximum, collective
satisfaction is not logically conceivable; hence, such concepts as
"common good," "welfare," "collective utility," and so on, have
only rhetorical value.
Since, in a democracy, governments are obligated to present
themselves periodically to the electorate and since the voters
have uninformed and fickle opinions, a long-term, organic,
consistent political plan is not possible.
It isn't true that everyone is the best judge of his own interests.
He may be, for his immediate interests, but he lacks the
knowledge he needs to be a good judge for his long-term
interests.
Pizzorno – on the rationality of democracy
EPLab Reading Group 6/2/19
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Giovanni Damele giovanni.damele@fcsh.unl.pt

5. economic theory of democracy
Since even experts normally are divided in their judgments
about the effects a given policy will have, it is illusory to think
that citizens will choose among different policies knowing what
their consequences will be.
Political choices that are made democratically only because a
majority wants them are not necessarily good or rational. In
other words, the democratic process does not necessarily make
the result desirable or just.
Democracy is distinguished from other types of government
simply because decisions are made by politicians who hold
office only after winning competitions in which the judges are
the electorate. The voters, however, only install politicians; they
do not control them.
Pizzorno – on the rationality of democracy
EPLab Reading Group 6/2/19
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Giovanni Damele giovanni.damele@fcsh.unl.pt

6. If the voter is a rational agent, why does he do such an
irrational thing as vote?
Costs can be low, but can also increase, depending on the
circumstances
Cost of information - people who have spent hundreds of
hours informing themselves perform an act that has the
same consequences as one performed by someone who has
invested only a few hours or minutes
Voting is an investment which has a disparate utility
Pizzorno – on the rationality of democracy
EPLab Reading Group 6/2/19
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Giovanni Damele giovanni.damele@fcsh.unl.pt

7. Is it tenable to analyze political action in cost-benefit
terms?
Vote on the issue (calculation of expected utility)
Retrospective vote (reward or punishment for past
actions)
Party identification (not justifiable by the rational
calculation of the utility)
Initial bias (explains hereditary vote)
Pizzorno – on the rationality of democracy
EPLab Reading Group 6/2/19
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Giovanni Damele giovanni.damele@fcsh.unl.pt

8. Symbolic theories of politics
Solidarity: political choice would be determined by
the voter’s social affiliation, not by the utility
Rituality
Pizzorno – on the rationality of democracy
EPLab Reading Group 6/2/19
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Giovanni Damele giovanni.damele@fcsh.unl.pt

9. Three types of problems.
The rationality of individual choice
The nature of the different roles in politics — those
of citizens and those of politicians — and their
connection, that is, the process of representation.
Finally, there is the problem of the distinctions, and
the conflicts, between political parties.
Pizzorno – on the rationality of democracy
EPLab Reading Group 6/2/19
9
Giovanni Damele giovanni.damele@fcsh.unl.pt

10. Three types of problems.
The rationality of individual choice
The nature of the different roles in politics — those
of citizens and those of politicians — and their
connection, that is, the process of representation.
Finally, there is the problem of the distinctions, and
the conflicts, between political parties.
Pizzorno – on the rationality of democracy
EPLab Reading Group 6/2/19
9
Giovanni Damele giovanni.damele@fcsh.unl.pt