The document analyzes Mongolia's policy, law, and regulations for public-private partnerships (PPP). According to the Infrascope index, which scores countries on their PPP environment, Mongolia had one of the lowest scores in Asia-Pacific in 2012 and 2014, indicating its environment was not very conducive for PPPs. While countries like Australia, the UK, and Korea had very high scores and ideal PPP environments, Mongolia's score improved slightly but was still relatively low, showing it has an emerging but not fully developed PPP framework. The document recommends evaluating Mongolia's PPP laws and regulations to identify ways to further intensify effective PPP development in the country.

1. 1
Policy, Law and Regulatory Analysis for
Public Private Partnerships (PPP) Development in Mongolia
By NARANTSETSEG P.
One. Goal
Main goal of the speech is to analyze PPP policy, law and regulations of Mongolia, to evaluate
and to make recommendation for the intensifying effective PPP development.
Two. Research importance
 The PPP development has the great role and effective contributions to develop Infrastructure
sector intensively, which define the development and investment results of the country. So the
creating favorable law and regulatory environment for the PPPs development is necessary for
the investment results, effective risk management and effective debt and equity management.
For that the PPPs law and regulatory analysis and evaluations and monitoring is of great
significance for the countries intensive development.
 PPP- is a long-term contract between government and private parties. The effective PPP project
management and stakeholders management is of importance for the long-term results of the
PPP contracts. Also the variety stakeholder’s effective relationship should be managed
effectively for the successful PPP project cycle, so managing complicated issues is necessary
toward project results.
 PPPs are complex method of the procuring public services and infrastructure accordance with
their benefits or demand for services by combining main abilities of the public and private
sectors with great importance on Value for Money, efficient risk allocation and delivering high
quality public services.
 PPP is a knowledge based process to sign effective concession contracts and to provide
successful implementation of contracts in long term. So PPP contracts are complex and require
a high level of professional skills by officers and they need design concession contract
accurately.

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 The public-private partnerships is mechanism for developing, maintaining and operating
infrastructure and other sectors facilities where the responsible governmental entity lacked the
budgetary resources to undertake the expensive capital projects.
 The effective risk management is crucial for the successful process and implementation of PPP
programs and projects in long term. The risk identification and risk allocation methodologies are
related to forms of risks (such as fiscal, legislative and regulatory, completion, cost overrun,
operational, design, environmental, supply, exchange rate, political, private partner, stakeholder,
resources and input risk, construction cost, Force Majeure risks, inflation risk, total project value,
distributional risks, Market, demand, volume risks, technology and utilities risks and etc.),
process of risk management and methodologies of risk analysis. The possible main risky issues
are the corruption on part of both government and private partners in PPPs, limited ability of the
government to maintain long-term capabilities, unfavorable outcomes for public partners and
inqualitative service and product (Sandeep Verma, Government Obligations in PPP Contracts).
So the effective risk and guarantee management is a key function for the protecting financers,
investors and high quality public service delivery.
 Main role of government is to provide guarantee of process and implementations of the PPPs
programs and projects in long term financing. Government guarantees are a key method to
protect investors and financers for the providing long-term investment and financing. So
valuation, international accounting and financial statement standard, budget rule, guarantee
revenue and returns are necessary.
 The well developed infrastructure intensifies countries development and investment. But main
problem of developing countries are inadequate infrastructure. Main challenges of infrastructure
services are not matching demand, low quality, inreliability, limitation of spending to proive
enough infrastructure services, poor planning and coordintation, poor management, weak
analysis, political risks, spending to wrong projects, poor service delivery, high cost, poor
maintenance and low benefits . Also main problems are related to insufficent fund, poor
planning and project selection, Inifficient management and inadequate maintenance. PPPs
help on creating additional sources for funding and financing, improving project and service
delivery, better construction management, improving project selection, improving private sector
analysis and supporting innovation and improving maintenance. PPP value drivers to improve
value for money in infrastructure is risk transfer, whole of life costing, innovation, asset

3. 3
utilization, focus service delivery, predictability and transparency of costs and funding,
mobilization of additional funding and accountability.
Three. Analysis for PPP development in Mongolia
a. Infrascope index
The Mongolian PPP development was analyzed by the Infrascope index. Index score
countries on scale 0 to 100. Score 100 represents ideal environment for PPP projects.
According to the Infrascope, ideal environment for PPP projects are created in Australia, UK
and Korea. PPP project environment is created well in India and Japan. Mongolian environment
is not ideal for PPP projects and in the lowest ranking in comparing to the other countries of
Asia-Pacific. Evidently, countries with high index score procure on the using fair and
transparent competitive bidding in wide range. Also all analyzed countries conduct PPP
procurement on the using competitive bidding. (Table 1. Infrascope of Asia-Pacific countries)
In 2012, according to Infrascope index, environment for PPP projects are ideal and mature
in Australia (92.3), UK (89.7) and Korea (71.3). PPP project environment is developed well in
India (64.8) and Japan (63.7). Environment for PPP projects is nascent and is not developed in
Mongolia (23.3) in 2012. Also according to Infrascope index, Mongolia has ranked in lowest
ranking comparing to other Asia‐Pacific countries. Infrascope index is improved in those
countries in 2014 comparing to infrascope index in 2012. In 2014, environment for PPP projects
are ideal and mature in Australia (91.8) and UK (88.1). Infrascope index is improved and PPP
project environment is developed well in Japan (75.8), Korea (78.8), and India (70.3) in 2014.
Moreover, infrascope index is improved in Mongolia in 2014 on comparing to infrascope index of
2012 and environment for PPP projects is emerging in Mongolia (39.7). Evidently, countries with
high index score procure on using fair and transparent competitive bidding in wide range. (Table
2. Comparison of Infrascope)

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Table 1. Infrascope of Asia-Pacific countries
Country Infrascope Bidding process
Australia 92.3 Bidding is transparent and fair, and the government’s policy requires a
competitive process, Dispute resolution is handled through expert
evaluation or arbitration, in order to avoid expensive and time.
Japan 63.7 Most projects are delivered through competitive tender, and the Civil Code,
Antimonopoly Law and the PFI Law support fair and competitive bidding.
Dispute-resolution is available through the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes, or the courts.
Korea 71.3 The bidding process is considered fair, and there are no single-bid
contracts. There are no PPP-specific dispute-resolution mechanisms, but
private mediation firms, as well as the Office of the Ombudsman may offer
mediation.
UK 89.7 Bidding is open and fair, and usually conducted via a “competitive dialogue”
process; the winner is the bidder adjudged to offer the most economically
advantageous proposal, rather than simply the cheapest, in accordance
with the Public Contracts Regulations (2006). Disputes are resolved either
through direct consultation between the parties, or through the judgment of
an expert; if these prove unsatisfactory, arbitration or the courts (which are
impartial and efficient) can be used.
Bangladesh 39.2 Policy and Strategy for Public-Private Partnerships provides for a
competitive bidding process and oversight, although it remains ambiguous
on the question of risk-allocation and compensation. The bidding process
has suffered from a lack of transparency, although improvements were
made in 2010. The judicial process is also problematic, with a lack of
capacity to deal with cases, poor knowledge, and lengthy settlement
periods holding up proceedings.
India 64.8 Following a Supreme Court ruling in 2009, the awarding of projects has
been subject to the meeting of requirements on transparency and
competition. Strategic planning, prefeasibility analysis, financial viability,
PPP suitability, and “readiness” must all be demonstrated, leading to a
process that is seen as largely fair and predictable, albeit time-consuming.
Dispute-resolution takes place through either “amicable settlement” or
arbitration; foreign bidders may also make use of international arbitration.
Pakistan 38.8 A relatively small field of bidders also limits competition. Dispute-resolution
usually takes place in court; the process is lengthy (although not
unfavorable towards private partners), and an Alternative Dispute
Resolution Centre was recently established.
Philippines 47.1 The competitive bidding process is well structured; in each case, the
procuring agency must create a Prequalification, Bids and Awards
Committee (PBAC) composed of relevant experts, to invite, evaluate, and
recommend bids. Dispute-resolution, is a weak point, with loopholes in
rules leading to ambiguity; disputes are usually left to parties to solve
between themselves, although arbitration and the courts are used. The
courts themselves are not truly independent, although the situation is
improving.
Mongolia 23.3 The new Concession law provides a framework for PPP selection and
decision-making, with Article 30 offering options on government support for
concessionaires, such as loan guarantees and tax credits. Practice PPP
decision-making in Mongolia is weak; regarding previous PPP projects,
there is little evidence of cost-benefit analysis or benchmarking having
been used.
Source: Evaluating Environment for PPPs in Asia Pacific, The Infrascope: Findings and Methodologies.
Economist Intelligence unit, 2011

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Table 2. Comparison of Infrascope
No Country 2012 2014 Difference
1 Australia 92.3 91.8 -0.5
2 UK 89.7 88.1 -1.6
3 Korea 71.3 78.8 7.5
4 India 64.8 70.3 5.5
5 Japan 63.7 75.8 12.1
6 Mongolia 23.3 39.7 16.4
Source: Evaluating the environment for PPPs in Asia-Pacific, The 2014 Infrascope,
Mongolian Infrascope index is improved in 2014 comparing to index of 2012. Infrascope
index includes factors and category indicators such as regulatory framework, institutional
framework, operational maturity, investment climate, financial facilities and subnational
adjustment. So it means that all those infrascope indicators are improved for PPP project
development in Mongolia. (Table 3. Change of Infrascope, Mongolia)
Table 3. Change of Infrascope, Mongolia
No Country 2012 2014 Difference
1 regulatory framework 25 43.8 18.8
2 institutional framework 25 50 25
3 operational maturity 3.1 18.8 15.7
4 investment climate 46.9 59.3 12.4
5 financial facilities 13.9 30.6 16.7
6 subnational adjustment 25 25 0
Source: Evaluating the environment for PPPs in Asia-Pacific, The 2014 Infrascope,
b. Lenders and investors requirements for Legal and regulatory framework
The favorable law, regulatory, institutional and contractual environment should be created
for the ensuring effectiveness of the PPP contract and project cycle in long-term. The certain
matters should be decided for the sufficient PPP legal framework regarding investors and
lenders. The Mongolian state policy on PPPs and concession law was analyzed by criteria
related to necessary requirements for legal and regulatory framework, which are crucial for
lenders and investors. Regulating next questions in acts are important for lenders and investors.
(Table 2. Requirements for PPP legal and regulatory framework)

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Table 2. Requirements for PPP legal and regulatory framework
Deciding questions for PPP Legal framework
regarding investors and lenders
State Policy on
PPPs, Resolution
No 64 Mongolia
2009
Concession law of
Mongolia, 2010
1 fair, transparent is the PPP bidding process -√ +√
2 Robust, forward planning program of public sector -√ -√
3 Allocation process to ensure government payments -√ -√
4 Legal capacity of public sector on long-term
payment commitments
-√ -√
5 Risk that obligations transfer to body without legal
capacity
-√ -√
6 Transition path for harmonizing contract with
regulations
-√ -√
7 Certain roles of regulator in supervising and during
implementation
-√ -√
8 End-user tariffs and availability tariffs -√ -√
9 Investors right in contract termination -√ -√
10 Government right in contract termination -√ -√
11 Accounting regulation affect to profit distribution -√ -√
12 Restriction and use of qualified expatriate
personnel
-√ -√
13 Lender’s right to take over assets management -√ -√
14 Form of government guarantee available for certain
risks
-√ -√
15 Handling contract change -√ +√
16 Compensation mechanism -√ +√
17 Bear risk of law change -√ -√
18 Combined procurement of construction, long-term
operation and maintenance
-√ -√
Note: -√ provision related to this question is regulated in the legal act of Mongolia.
+√ provision related to this question is not regulated in the legal act of Mongolia.
Deciding questions related to requirements are defined on the using source: Edward Farquharson and
others, How to Engage with the Private Sector in Public-Private Partnerships in Emerging Markets,
2011
According to the comparative analysis in table 2, advantages and disadvantages for the
creating PPP law and regulations of Mongolia are defined in the next.
Advantages for PPP project according to the approaches for creating PPP law and
regulations of Mongolia.
-Created PPP law and regulatory environment.
-Provision on the PPP bidding process principles is reflected in concession law.
-Provision on compensation mechanism is reflected in concession law.

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-Provision related to right to receive commission in situation of cost increasing and income
reducing is reflected in provision of Concession agreement condition of the concession law.
Disadvantages for PPP project according to the approaches for creating PPP law and
regulations of Mongolia.
-The formula, tariff and price adjustments are not regulated in the concession law in detail.
-Mongolian PPP law and regulatory environment is not regulated according to the international
approaches of PPP methodology.
-Objective of PPP contract management for government and end users is not reflected in PPP
policy and concession law in detail according to the international approaches for PPP contract
management.
-PPP contract management framework: partnership management, service delivery management
and contract administration management is not regulated accurate and detail in PPP policy and
concession law of Mongolia.
-Risk, risk matrix and risk allocation is reflected in the PPP policy and concession law very
limited and uncertain scope.
-Matters related to allocation process to ensure government payments is not reflected in PPP
policy and law.
-Matters related to robust, forward planning program of public sector is not regulated in PPP
policy and law.
-Matters on Legal capacity of public sector on long-term payment commitments are not
regulated in PPP policy and law.
-Risk that obligations transfer to body without legal capacity is not regulated in PPP policy and
law.
-Transition path for harmonizing contract with regulations is not regulated in PPP policy and law.
-Matters related to certain roles of regulator in supervising and during implementation are not
regulated in PPP policy and law.
-End-user tariffs and availability tariffs are not regulated clear in PPP policy and law.
-Government and Investors right in contract termination is not reflected in the PPP policy and
law.
-Matters on accounting regulation affect to profit distribution are not regulated in the PPP policy
and law.

8. 8
-Matters on restriction and use of qualified expatriate personnel are not regulated in PPP policy,
law and regulation.
-Matters on Lender’s right to take over assets management are not regulated in PPP policy, law
and regulation.
-Matters on form of government guarantee available for certain risks and bear risk of law
change are not reflected in PPP policy, law and regulation.
-Matters on combined procurement of construction, long-term operation and maintenance is not
regulated certain in PPP policy, law and regulation.
-PPP principles are not implemented in full, in particular transparency and accountability.
c. Risk assessment
The Mongolian situation credit risk enhancement is evaluated by the Banking industry
country risk assessment and government rating according to the Standard & Poor’s rating
service.
1. Banking industry country risk assessment (Source: www.standardandpoors.com, 22-
Mar-2012)
The Standard & Poor’s evaluated the Mongolian banking system according to the BICRA
methodology in 2012. BICRA is scored on scale from 1 to 10, “group 1” lowest risk banking
group, “group 10” highest risk banking group. The BICRA is consisted of two main areas of
analysis—"economic risk" and "industry risk"--on which the Mongolian banking system scores '9'
and '8'. Mongolia has ranked on group '9'. (See picture 1. BICRA comparison, Mongolia)

9. 9
Picture 1. BICRA comparison, Mongolia
Source: Banking industry country risk assessment from web www.standardandpoors.com, 22-
Mar-2012
The Mongolian banking sector strengths and disadvantages were evaluated according to
the Standard and Poor’s analysis. The Mongolian banking sector strengths are defined by the
Controllable economic imbalance, low reliance on external funding and Banks' limited exposure
to innovative, complex, and risky products. Weaknesses of banking sector are defined by the
vulnerabilities in a small, undeveloped, primarily commodity-based, low-income economy;
regulatory framework with weak transparency and disclosure and Aggressive lending and weak
underwriting standards. (Table 3. Strengths and weaknesses of banking industry of Mongolia).

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Table 3. Strengths and weaknesses of banking industry of Mongolia
Strengths Weaknesses
-Controllable economic imbalance with moderate
growth records in credit levels and property prices.
-Low reliance on external funding in the banking
sector.
-Banks' limited exposure to innovative, complex,
and risky products.
-Vulnerabilities inherent in a small, undeveloped,
primarily commodity-based, low-income economy.
-Loose regulatory framework with weak
transparency and disclosure.
-Aggressive lending and weak underwriting
standards in the fragile banking system.
Source: Banking industry country risk assessment from web www.standardandpoors.com, 22-
Mar-2012
The Mongolia is included in the country with high risk according to the Standard and
Poor’s economic risk evaluations in 2012. Economic risks of Mongolia were analyzed by main
factors as economic resilience, economic imbalances, and credit risk in the economy.
Mongolian economic risks score has been ranked on score 9 according to the banking industry
assessment. (Table 4. Economic risks of Mongolia and Table 6. Peer BICRA Scores) The
Standard and Poor’s rated the Mongolian credit rating on BB- and positve in 2015.

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Table 4. Economic risks of Mongolia
Form of Risk Risk situation Main factor Reliance
Economic
resilience
Very high
risk
Economic
structure and
stability:
-High dependence on mining sector,
-Mining sector in GDP about 30%,
-Mineral products in export of Mongolia about 80%,
-Vulnerability of commodity-based economy -Country's
inadequate infrastructure difficulties to the stability of
economy.
Macroeconomic
policy flexibility
-Weaknesses in macroeconomic policy flexibility.
-Country's fiscal policy to be pro-cyclical, which reflects
volatility and narrow source of revenues, and the
shortfall of basic services in country.
Political risk -Overall political stability of Mongolia is adequate but
lack of policy consistency and the electoral cycle
increase the risks.
Economic
imbalances
High risk Expansionary
phase
Mongolian economy remains in an expansionary phase
as reflected in the general rise in credit levels and
property prices.
Private sector
credit growth
-Private sector credit growth because of the country's
strong economic growth prospects.
-The country's private sector credit growth to double-digit
from 2011.
Real estate
prices
growth in commercial real estate prices does not suggest
significant additional risk of economic imbalances.
Equity prices -high volatility in Mongolia's equity market brings
additional risk to the banking system's economic
imbalances.
-end December 2011, the inflation-adjusted equity index
(MSE Top 20) has been extremely volatile.
Current account
and external
debt position
“-external risks" cause moderate vulnerability with
respect to economic imbalances.
-The economy's exposure to terms of trade volatility and
narrow export profile remains a weakness.
-the economy's negative narrow net external debt as
export capacity expands somewhat moderates the
"external risks".
Credit risk in
the economy
Extremely
high risk
Private sector
debt capacity
and leverage
-Private sector credit as "moderately high" relative to
income levels based on the forecast of US$2,973 per
capital GDP
-About 53% private sector credit as a percentage of GDP
in 2011.
Lending and
underwriting
standards
Lending and underwriting standards in Mongolia are
"aggressive", as reflected in a high concentration of
lending in volatile sectors, contributing to a persistently
high level of nonperforming assets.
Payment culture
and rule of law.
-Payment culture and rule of law are "very weak". -
Mongolia as having a lengthy and ineffective legal
process with regards to loan default claims and the
recovery of collateral.
Source: Banking industry country risk assessment from web www.standardandpoors.com, 22-Mar-2012

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The Mongolia has ranked on the country with high risk according to the Standard and
Poor’s industrial risk evaluations. Industrial risks of Mongolia were analyzed by main factors as
institutional framework, competitive dynamics, and systemwide funding. Mongolian economic
risks score has been ranked on score 8 according to the banking industry assessment. (Table 5.
Industrial risks of Mongolia)
Table 5. Industrial risks of Mongolia
Form of Risk Risk situation Main factor Reliance
Institutional
framework
Extremely
high risk
Banking
regulation and
supervision
-Banking regulation in Mongolia as more relaxed than
international standards.
-Regulatory framework is rudimentary and overall banking
supervision is more compliance based than risk based.
Regulatory
track record
-Regulator has shown forbearance towards the banking
sector reflected in the regulator's "weak" track record of
imposing adherence to requirements. Strict enforcement is
lacking despite weak credit underwriting practices and
governance systems in local banks.
Governance
and
transparency
-The transparency and degrees of disclosure of bank
accounts are "weak" on an industry-wide basis, and without
standardization.
-Disclosure with respect to banks' financials and ownership
is weak.
-Certain aspects of ownership, management and
governance lead to transparency risks.
-some banks have strengthened their governance through
the participation of minority equity shareholders.
Competitive
dynamics
High risk Risk appetite -Risk appetite as "aggressive",
-The system's underwriting standard is relatively weak and
the banking industry has a higher level of exposure to
riskier industries such as mining, agriculture, and property
market than less risky industries.
-Usage of innovative, complex financial products is limited.
Industry
stability
-Banking industry is "at least moderately stable", with a
lack of new entrants to materially change the competitive
environment in Mongolia's banking system.
-The bank margin relatively stable in recent years, despite a
certain level of competition from foreign banks on large
project lending.
Market
distortions
-"Absence of distortions" in Mongolia's banking industry.
-No government-owned banks except a small bank
currently under receivership.
-Regulator's benchmark rate has no influence on the market
deposit and loan rate. Non-bank financial institutions are
also quite small in size and number compared to banks.
Systemwide
funding
high risk Core customer
deposits &
external funding
The banking industry's core customer deposits have been
higher than total domestic loans resulting in no need for net
external borrowing.
Domestic debt
capital markets
Debt capital market in Mongolia as "narrow and shallow",
which weighs on the funding risks facing the domestic
banking system. Private-sector debt issue in the domestic
capital market is extremely limited compared with the GDP

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of Mongolia, and there is no active capital market for
issuance of private-sector debt.
Government
role
Government's role as "adequate" given the Mongolian
government has a moderately successful track record of
providing guarantees and liquidity during periods of market
turmoil.
Source: Banking industry country risk assessment from web www.standardandpoors.com, 22-Mar-2012
Table 6. Peer BICRA Scores
Mongolia Cambodia Papua New Guinea
BICRA group 9 9 9
Economic risk score 9 9 9
Industry risk score 8 9 8
Government propensity
to support
Highly Supportive Support Uncertain Support Uncertain
Sovereign rating BB-/Positive/B B/Stable/B B+/Negative/B
Source: Standard & Poor's Financial Institutions Ratings.

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2. Mongolian government rating for credit enhancement
The Mongolian government rating was analyzed by issuer credit rating and Sovereigns
Rating. The Standard and Poor’s rated Mongolian issuer credit rating on BB- on foreign and local
long-term rating and B foreign and local short-term rating. They rated the Sovereigns Rating of
Mongolia on BB- rating. (See Table 5. Mongolian government rating and Table 6. Sovereigns Rating
of Mongolia)
Table 5. Mongolian government rating
issuer credit rating
Ratings Rating Date
Regulatory
Identifiers
Last Credit Rating Action
Foreign Long
Term
BB- 13-Dec-2007 EE
19-Dec-2011
Outlook POSITIVE
Foreign Short
Term
B 14-Jun-2001 EE
Local Long
Term
BB- 13-Dec-2007 EE
19-Dec-2011
Outlook POSITIVE
Local Short
Term
B 14-Jun-2001 EE
. Transfer & Convertibility Assessment
Local Long
Term
BB 20-Nov-2009
Source: Standard & Poor's Financial Institutions Ratings.
Table 6. Sovereigns Rating of Mongolia
Local
Currency Rating
Foreign Currency Rating T&C Assessment
Mongolia BB- BB- BB
Source: Standard & Poor's Financial Institutions Ratings.
The issuer credit rating of the Mongolian Mining Corporation (MMC) was evaluated by the
Standard and Poor’s corporate rating indicators. The Standard and Poor’s rated the MMC on 'B+'
corporate credit rating to the company and a 'B+' issue rating to its proposed senior notes.
According to the Standard and Poor’s evaluations, the MMC's coal sales will grow and profitability
will be sustainable over the next two years. The issuer credit ‘B’ rating is more vulnerable to adverse
business, financial and economic conditions but currently has the capacity to meet financial
commitments. (Table 7. Issuer Credit rating, Mongolian Mining Corporation)

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Table 7. Issuer Credit rating, Mongolian Mining Corporation
Ratings Rating Date
Regulatory
Identifiers
Last Credit Rating
Action
Foreign Long
Term
B+ 14-Mar-2012 EE
14-Mar-2012
Outlook STABLE
Local Long
Term
B+ 14-Mar-2012 EE
14-Mar-2012
Outlook STABLE
Source: Standard & Poor's Financial Institutions Ratings.
The Development Bank of Mongolia was evaluated by the Standard & Poor’s foreign
currency issue rating and has rated ‘BB-“. Main role of the development bank is to secure
variety infrastructure including railroad, transportation and energy and industrial projects
financing. ‘BB’ rating expresses the meaning less vulnerable in the near-term but faces major
ongoing uncertainties to adverse business, financial and economic conditions.
Mongolia is country with high risks. So variety risks are possible to have impact to the
PPP project cycle, successful implementation and final results and cost grow of the project in
Mongolia. Risk allocation, risk mitigation and risk management is of importance for the effective
PPP project cycle management in Mongolia. Risk category, risk status and impact should be
defined for the PPP project. The PPP procurement stage should be conducted and managed
effectively for the selecting best and final clear preferred bidder. The negotiation process is one
of main part of the PPP procurement stage, so risks matters should be discussed and
negotiated clearly. The possible risk status is high in Mongolia according to the completion risk,
cost overrun risk, design risk, environmental risk, force majeure risk, operating risk, political risk
and regulatory risk. So the risk mitigation measures should be optimal and correct. (Table 8.
Possible risks for PPP project, Mongolia)
The Standard and Poor’s rated the Mongolian credit rating on BB- and positve in 2015.
Table 8. Possible risks for PPP project, Mongolia
Risks category Brief description Mitigation Possible Risk
status
Possible
Impact
1 Completion risks Possible delay:
-service delivery cannot
start in scheduled
commence time.
-delay, unless greater
expenditure is incurred to
keep start date.
-variations,
-uncertain expectation.
-delay insurance
-certify completion,
-liquidate damages,
construction bonds and
appropriate security to
reach completion,
high high
2 Cost overrun Actual project cost is -fixed price construction high high

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risk exceeded projected
project cost during design
and construction phase.
contracts.
-Contingency provision.
-Debt facility and additional
equity.
3 Design risk Private party design may
not achieve to required
output and
standardization.
-Clear output specification.
-design warranty.
-patent and latent defect
liability, consultation with
institution.
-monitoring.
high high
4 Environmental
risk
Environmental damage:
-from construction and
operating activities,
-from pre-transfer
activities.
-Due diligence by bidders of
project site condition.
-independent survey of
project site.
-indemnity for latent pre-
transfer environmental
pollution.
-independent monitoring.
-high-tech policy without
pollution.
high high
5 Exchange rate
risk
Exchange rate fluctuation Hedging instrument medium Medium
6 Force Majeure
risks
Occurrence of certain
unexpected event beyond
of control
Insurance
Termination
Safety, security
high high
7 Inflation risks Actual inflation rate will
exceed the projected
inflation rate.
Index linked adjustment to
unitary payment.
high high
8 Market,
demand, volume
risks
Demand for services
generated by project may
be less than projected.
-Unitary payment type PPP
on availability,
-Improve demand for
services,
-Improve quality for
services
-Right cost policy for market
medium medium
9 Operating risks Any factors impacting on
operating requirements
of project, including
operating expenditure,
skills requirement and
etc.
-Clear output specification
-Penalty regime and
monitoring
Insurance
-Certain operational action
and procedure
high high
10 Political risk* -Unforeseeable conduct
by institution and other
government authority
that materially and
adversely affect the
expected return on
equity, debt, service and
other results increased
cost.
-expropriation,
-Limit risk to unforeseeable
conduct.
-unofficial cost
management.
-fighting with bribe and
creating integrity system.
-accountability for political
actions and misuse action.
-Multilateral investment
guarantee convention
high high

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nationalization,
privatization of assets
illegal ways
implementation.
-UN convention against
corruption.
11 Regulatory risks Uncertainty and
instability of regulations
-To sign long term certain
contract and to provide
implementation.
-limit uncertainty and
instability.
-indicate cost of loss and
reflect in contract.
high high
12 Resource and
input risks
Shortage of resources
and inputs
-supply contract according
to the PPP project
requirement and standards.
-effective permanent supply
management.
low medium
13 Tax rate change
risk
Change and instability of
tax
Contract and
implementation
medium medium
14 Technology risks Negative impact of
technology to project
output,
-Apply suitable technology.
-optimal technology policy,
option and implementation.
-improve technological
requirement and criteria in
procurement stage.
medium high
15 Utilities risks -Insufficient utility
And delay of project
-Contract
-Insurance
-emergency facility
medium High
*The resource curse explanation is divided to two classes: economic factor and institutional or
political economy factors. Key idea of political economy explanation is defined by the money corrupt.
(Source: Martin E. Sandbu, Natural Wealth Accounts: Proposal for Alleviating the Natural Resource
Curse. University of Pennsylvania, 2005)
d. Assessment for law and regulations
The creating favorable policy, law, regulatory and contractual environment is necessary
for the successful and efficient PPP project development, investment efficiency and ensuring
greater VFM, better quality service delivery and affordability in long-term. Each country has
specific policy for the successful PPP development. But Mongolia has less experience in PPP
field. The Mongolian Great Hural has approved resolution No. 64 of state policy on PPP in 15
October, 2009 and Concession law in 28 January, 2010. This policy and law regulate the PPP
relation in Mongolia. Concession forms, participating parties, accountability and risk allocation
were regulated and defined in concession law. The accountability according to concession law
of Mongolia is defined by assets responsibility, administrative punishment and discipline
punishment. (Table 9. General Specific of Concession law).

18. 18
Table 9. General specific of concession law
1 Approved date of
Great hural
resolution No. 64 of
state policy on PPP:
15 October, 2009
2 Approved date of
Concession law of
Mongolia:
28 January, 2010
3 Concession form
according to
concession law of
Mongolia:
-Build-operate-transfer BOT,
-Build-operate BO,
-Build- own-operate BOO,
-Build-own-operate-transfer BOOT,
-Build-lease-transfer BLT,
-Design-Build-Finance-operate DBFO,
-Restructure-operate-transfer ROT.
4 Participating parties
in PPP according to
state policy on PPPs
in Mongolia:
a. Participating parties of state organization is the next:
-Mongolian Government,
-Ministry of Mongolia,
-Government Agency,
-Citizen Representatives hural of the Capital city and province,
-Governor and governor office of the Capital city and province,
-Legal entity with state and local property participation.
b. Participating parties on behalf of private sector is the next:
-company,
-cooperative and friendship,
-non-government organization,
-person.
5 Responsibility: Risk
allocation,
Concession law,
article 31.1-3
1. Concession owner would be responsible for operational risks fully
for the implementing concession, which is not indicated in
concession contract differently.
2. Responsibility for Force majeure risks are regulated concession
contract.
3. Concession owner would be responsible for loss, damage and
roles before third parties relying on his/her incorrect operation
fully in period for own-operate concession item.
6 Responsibility: for
person, who violated
law
Concession law,
article 35.1-3
1. Assets responsibility
If Concession contract parties do not implement roles according to the
laws and concession contract, then those parities will be responsible for
assets according to the signed contract or if this not indicated in
concession contract, then the parties should be responsible for assets
according to the Citizen law of Mongolia.
2. Administrative punishment and penalty for guilty by judge and
state inspector,
3. Discipline punishment according to the state authority law for
state official, who violated concession law.
Sources: Concession law of Mongolia, 2010 from ppp.mn
According to the comparison of the international PPP methodology measurements with
Mongolian PPPs policy and concession law specifics, Mongolia has specifics on PPPs policy
and regulation. PPP is regulated by the Commission in Mongolia. Main role of the State

19. 19
Property Committee of Mongolia is to conduct work to own, exploit and protect the state
property. (Table 10. Comparison of Mongolia specifics to PPP methodology measurements)
Table 10. Comparison of Mongolia specifics to PPP methodology measurements)
Main
measurements
PPP methodology Mongolian specifics
1 Regulation by
contract
Formula, price and tariff
adjustments must be
defined in the contract
clearly. Contract
monitoring body allows
new change to prices
and payments.
2 Regulation by
commission
Establishment of
independent entity on
the defined rules: laws,
regulations, contracts
and licenses. Regulatory
commission decides
price adjustment during
PPP project life.
Main role of the State Property Committee of
Mongolia is to conduct work to own, exploit and
protect the state property. The PPP and concession
department is one of main parts of the
organizational structure of the State Property
Committee. The Mongolian Great Hural has
approved resolution No64 “State policy on PPP” in
15 October 2009 and Concession law in 28 January
2010. Also according to the concession law, the
government approved resolution No 103 in 2012
and State Property Committee approved resolution
No 153 in 2010.
3 Objective of PPP
contract
management for
government and
end users
-to obtain services set
worth in output
specifications of
contract,
-to ensure affordability
and VFM,
-To ensure risks
transferred to private
sector,
-Improvement
performance,
Concession agreement condition (provision 21) by
concession law:
-property ownership move to concession owner,
-role and accountability of regulatory organization for
concession implementation,
-work and service condition, scope, limitation,
specific right of concession owner,
-right to receive fee for concession owner, pricing
and fee set, method to change and control,
-move the share auditing portfolio to concession
owners and to receive permission,
-fee of body for the performing work and service of
concession owner,
-to form right for bail and financing find of
concession owner,
-financial support of state to implement concession
contract,
-Right and role of regulatory organization to support
for the receiving license, land and land exploitation,
-role and right to exploit land and land subsoil,
-right of concession owner to provide permanent
condition for work and service and qualitative
requirements,
-role of concession owner to conduct service for
users on even condition,
-to establish legal entity and requirement for equity
and legal body,

20. 20
-right to receive commission in situation of cost
increasing and income reducing,
-condition to move concession item temporary,
-condition to change concession owner,
-rule to prepare report,
-rule to decide liabilities,
-rule to audit contract with conflict of interest,
-role and responsibility to issue qualitative
confirmation,
-controlling, tech transfer and training,
-service for continue,
-fee for the moving concession item to new owner,
-expiry, expand, termination of concession.
4 PPP contract
management
framework:
partnership
management
This is concern with
structures of
accountability and
relationships between
government and private
sector.
Accountability for law violations (article 35):
-assets accountability,
-administrative punishment and penalty,
-discipline punishment.
5 PPP contract
management
framework:
service delivery
management
This is systems and
procedure designed to
manage risk and
performance.
Risk allocation (article 31 of concession law)
-Concession owner would be responsible for
operational risks fully for the implementing
concession, which is not indicated in concession
contract differently.
-Responsibility for Force majeure risks are regulated
concession contract.
-Concession owner would be responsible for loss,
damage and roles before third parties relying on the
his/her incorrect operation fully in period for own-
operate concession item.
6 PPP contract
management
framework:
contract
administration
management
This is administrative
processes required to
ensure all procedures
contained in PPP
contract and all
documentation.
Power of state and local administrative organization
on concession:
-article 6: power of state organization,
-article 7: power of local administrative organization,
-article 8: prohibition in organizational and officer’s
activity.
Control implementation auditing-article 25:
-state administrative organization on state property
matters and organization on local property matters,
-Central state administrative organization
responsible for concession item,
-other organization and officer, who has right audit
on laws.
Four. Recommendation and improving ways
The creating certain and stable policy, law, regulatory and contractual environment is
necessary for the intensive investment and PPP development and effective PPP project cycle
management in Mongolia. Improvement of infrastructure network is importance for intensive
mining development and the long-term investment is necessary for infrastructure intensive

21. 21
development. So concession contract specific is defined by the long term investment and long-
term contract duration. In this case the long term concession contract stable implementation
should be provided.
The taking next measures are necessary:
-Provide qualitative services deivery to users.
-Improve personal income, job position and benefit to social development.
-Improve quality of life,
-Provide stable law, regulatory and contractual environment.
Five. Main references:
1. Banking industry country risk assessment from web
www.standardandpoors.com, 22-Mar-2012
2. Concession law of Mongolia
3. Edward Farquharson and others, How to Engage with the Private Sector in
Public-Private Partnerships in Emerging Markets, 2011
4. Evaluating Environment for PPPs in Asia Pacific, The Infrascope: Findings and
Methodologies. Economist Intelligence unit, 2011
5. Source: Evaluating the environment for PPPs in Asia-Pacific, The 2014 Infrascope,
6. Guide to Credit Rating Essentials, Standard & Poor’s from web
www.standardandpoors.com, 22-Mar-2012
7. Martin E. Sandbu, Natural Wealth Accounts: Proposal for Alleviating the Natural
Resource Curse. University of Pennsylvania
8. PPP policy documentation of Mongolia
9. PPP Reference Guide, WBI, 2012
10. Sandeep Verma, Government Obligations in PPP Contracts, Journal of Public
Procurement, Volume 10, No.4, 2010, p.564-567
11. Standard & Poor's Financial Institutions Ratings from web
www.standardandpoors.com, 22-Mar-2012
Note:
‘AAA’ Extremely strong capacity to meet financial commitments. Highest rating
‘AA’ Very strong capacity to meet financial commitments

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‘A’ Strong capacity to meet financial commitments, but somewhat susceptible to adverse economic
conditions and changes in circumstances
‘BBB’ Adequate capacity to meet financial commitments, but more subject to adverse economic
conditions
‘BBB-’ Considered lowest investment grade by market participants
‘BB+’ Considered highest speculative grade by market participants
‘BB’ Less vulnerable in the near-term but faces major ongoing uncertainties to adverse business, financial
and economic conditions
‘B’ More vulnerable to adverse business, financial and economic conditions but currently has the capacity
to meet financial commitments
‘CCC’ Currently vulnerable and dependent on favorable business, financial and economic conditions to
meet financial commitments
‘CC’ Currently highly vulnerable
‘C’ A bankruptcy petition has been filed or similar action taken, but payments of financial commitments
are continued ‘D’ Payments default on financial commitments
Ratings from ‘AA’ to ‘CCC’ may be modified by the addition of a plus (+) or minus (-) sign to show relative
standing within the major rating categories.
Source: Guide to Credit Rating Essentials, Standard & Poor’s