Cuando Ostrom se encuentra con blockchain: explorando las potencialidades de ...David Rozas
Slides from presentation "Cuando Ostrom se encuentra con blockchain: explorando las potencialidades de blockchain para la gobernanza procomunal” at GRASIA seminar, Universidad Complutense, Madrid (Spain) – 28.01.2019.
ETHICOMP 2020: Exploring Value Sensitive Design for Blockchain DevelopmentRoberto García
The potential impact that blockchain technologies might have in our society makes it paramount to consider human values during their design and development. Though the blockchain community has been moved from the beginning by a set of values that are favoured by the underlying technologies, it is necessary to explore how these values play among the diverse set of stakeholders and the potential conflicts that might arise. The final aim is to motivate the establishment of a set of guidelines that make blockchains better support human values, despite the initial bias these technologies might impose. The results so far have been used to analyze from a values perspective a blockchain application driven by ethical values.
Cuando Ostrom se encuentra con blockchain: explorando las potencialidades de ...David Rozas
Slides from presentation "Cuando Ostrom se encuentra con blockchain: explorando las potencialidades de blockchain para la gobernanza procomunal” at GRASIA seminar, Universidad Complutense, Madrid (Spain) – 28.01.2019.
ETHICOMP 2020: Exploring Value Sensitive Design for Blockchain DevelopmentRoberto García
The potential impact that blockchain technologies might have in our society makes it paramount to consider human values during their design and development. Though the blockchain community has been moved from the beginning by a set of values that are favoured by the underlying technologies, it is necessary to explore how these values play among the diverse set of stakeholders and the potential conflicts that might arise. The final aim is to motivate the establishment of a set of guidelines that make blockchains better support human values, despite the initial bias these technologies might impose. The results so far have been used to analyze from a values perspective a blockchain application driven by ethical values.
Blockchain solutions forum and crypto-economy.
This partnership will build the leading global Blockchain solutions event.
BECON (Blockchain Ecosystem Network) is a global and cross-sector platform for collaboration, networking, explaining and advancing Blockchain methodologies and solutions, driving the application and implementation of blockchain in all private and public sectors.
Fira de Barcelona is one of the most important trade fair organisations in Europe and will schedule the Blockchain Solutions Forum alongside the 3rd IOT Solutions World Congress 2017 as an integrated event.
We would like to invite you to join us – building together the leading global event for the Blockchain industry this coming 3-5 October, 2017!
Exploring Blockchain: From Ideas to ApplicationsDavid Bieri
Exploring Blockchain looks at the economic, business and social implications of blockchain technology and cryptocurrencies.
Taught by David Bieri, Associate Professor of Urban Affairs and Associate Professor of Economics at Virginia Tech, the webinar examines the basics of blockchain, along with the potential for blockchain to improve business and government operations. We'll focus on applications such as finance, supply chain management, voting and digital identity
Future Opportunities and Economic Challenges for Cryptoledgers: Trends and sp...Tim Swanson
[Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pyuCJkLF2Jo ]
[Paper: http://www.ofnumbers.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Bitcoins-Public-Goods-hurdles.pdf ]
Presentation given at the Institute for the Future on March 27, 2014. Note: there are numerous footnotes containing additional quotes and references of each slide. It covers the technical and economic limitations of Bitcoin in its current state, the financial incentives for operating a mining pool, the financial incentives for working as a developer and the various public goods issues surrounding a communal effort including special interest groups and lobbying.
The Continued Existence of Altcoins, Appcoins and Commodity coinsTim Swanson
[Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fBuwc3yu6sI]
Tim Swanson discusses altcoins, appcoins, commodity coins, bitcoin 2.0, future protocols, legal and technical challenges and opportunities for developers and the economic incentives for why coins are created. First presented at Plug and Play Tech Center in Sunnyvale on September 23, 2014 for the Bitcoin Meetup. Citations and references in the notes section. More information at: www.ofnumbers.com
These are the slides from a presentation I gave at the Yorkshire Grantmakers Forum 25th Anniversary, looking at what the next 25 years might hold in terms of technological, social and political change.
Blockchain and XBRL at the 2017 American Accounting Association presented b...Workiva
The integration of "Blockchain and XBRL" provides a seamless data solution, with blockchain as a potential output from XBRL based reporting.
Blockchain’s smart contracts might also be facilitated by an XBRL’s powerful persistent data model.
This thought leadership is a report detailing how Blockchain can be industrialized in ASEAN and how its potential can be unlocked across organizations.
The report also clearly illustrates the implications of Blockchain, its key developments, how it impacts countries across ASEAN and a five-point test for assessing the fit of Blockchain for specific processes, all serving to provide meaningful insights into the current state of the FinTech industry in the ASEAN region.
This thought leadership is a report detailing how Blockchain can be industrialized in ASEAN and how its potential can be unlocked across organizations.
The report also clearly illustrates the implications of Blockchain, its key developments, how it impacts countries across ASEAN and a five-point test for assessing the fit of Blockchain for specific processes, all serving to provide meaningful insights into the current state of the FinTech industry in the ASEAN region.
"This thought leadership is a report detailing how Blockchain can be industrialized in ASEAN and how its potential can be unlocked across organizations. The report also clearly illustrates the implications of Blockchain, its key developments, how it impacts countries across ASEAN and a five-point test for assessing the fit of Blockchain for specific processes, all serving to provide meaningful insights into the current state of the FinTech industry in the ASEAN region."
Blockchain beyond fintech by ridgelift.ioUdayan Modhe
A comprehensive paper on blockchain technology. It covers blockchain technological aspects, blockchain evolution, future trends in blockchain implementation and reference architecture.
This talk will focus on the role of blockchain in the new digital economy and the characteristics of a sustainable blockchain company. Professor Lee will talk about the 4Ds and LASIC, Hinternet and the type of deep business skill and strategy that are needed to excel in the blockchain industry. Those who are looking into fundraising by ICO/ITS’s and investing in Blockchain technology will find this talk interesting.
Blockchain solutions forum and crypto-economy.
This partnership will build the leading global Blockchain solutions event.
BECON (Blockchain Ecosystem Network) is a global and cross-sector platform for collaboration, networking, explaining and advancing Blockchain methodologies and solutions, driving the application and implementation of blockchain in all private and public sectors.
Fira de Barcelona is one of the most important trade fair organisations in Europe and will schedule the Blockchain Solutions Forum alongside the 3rd IOT Solutions World Congress 2017 as an integrated event.
We would like to invite you to join us – building together the leading global event for the Blockchain industry this coming 3-5 October, 2017!
Exploring Blockchain: From Ideas to ApplicationsDavid Bieri
Exploring Blockchain looks at the economic, business and social implications of blockchain technology and cryptocurrencies.
Taught by David Bieri, Associate Professor of Urban Affairs and Associate Professor of Economics at Virginia Tech, the webinar examines the basics of blockchain, along with the potential for blockchain to improve business and government operations. We'll focus on applications such as finance, supply chain management, voting and digital identity
Future Opportunities and Economic Challenges for Cryptoledgers: Trends and sp...Tim Swanson
[Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pyuCJkLF2Jo ]
[Paper: http://www.ofnumbers.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Bitcoins-Public-Goods-hurdles.pdf ]
Presentation given at the Institute for the Future on March 27, 2014. Note: there are numerous footnotes containing additional quotes and references of each slide. It covers the technical and economic limitations of Bitcoin in its current state, the financial incentives for operating a mining pool, the financial incentives for working as a developer and the various public goods issues surrounding a communal effort including special interest groups and lobbying.
The Continued Existence of Altcoins, Appcoins and Commodity coinsTim Swanson
[Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fBuwc3yu6sI]
Tim Swanson discusses altcoins, appcoins, commodity coins, bitcoin 2.0, future protocols, legal and technical challenges and opportunities for developers and the economic incentives for why coins are created. First presented at Plug and Play Tech Center in Sunnyvale on September 23, 2014 for the Bitcoin Meetup. Citations and references in the notes section. More information at: www.ofnumbers.com
These are the slides from a presentation I gave at the Yorkshire Grantmakers Forum 25th Anniversary, looking at what the next 25 years might hold in terms of technological, social and political change.
Blockchain and XBRL at the 2017 American Accounting Association presented b...Workiva
The integration of "Blockchain and XBRL" provides a seamless data solution, with blockchain as a potential output from XBRL based reporting.
Blockchain’s smart contracts might also be facilitated by an XBRL’s powerful persistent data model.
This thought leadership is a report detailing how Blockchain can be industrialized in ASEAN and how its potential can be unlocked across organizations.
The report also clearly illustrates the implications of Blockchain, its key developments, how it impacts countries across ASEAN and a five-point test for assessing the fit of Blockchain for specific processes, all serving to provide meaningful insights into the current state of the FinTech industry in the ASEAN region.
This thought leadership is a report detailing how Blockchain can be industrialized in ASEAN and how its potential can be unlocked across organizations.
The report also clearly illustrates the implications of Blockchain, its key developments, how it impacts countries across ASEAN and a five-point test for assessing the fit of Blockchain for specific processes, all serving to provide meaningful insights into the current state of the FinTech industry in the ASEAN region.
"This thought leadership is a report detailing how Blockchain can be industrialized in ASEAN and how its potential can be unlocked across organizations. The report also clearly illustrates the implications of Blockchain, its key developments, how it impacts countries across ASEAN and a five-point test for assessing the fit of Blockchain for specific processes, all serving to provide meaningful insights into the current state of the FinTech industry in the ASEAN region."
Blockchain beyond fintech by ridgelift.ioUdayan Modhe
A comprehensive paper on blockchain technology. It covers blockchain technological aspects, blockchain evolution, future trends in blockchain implementation and reference architecture.
This talk will focus on the role of blockchain in the new digital economy and the characteristics of a sustainable blockchain company. Professor Lee will talk about the 4Ds and LASIC, Hinternet and the type of deep business skill and strategy that are needed to excel in the blockchain industry. Those who are looking into fundraising by ICO/ITS’s and investing in Blockchain technology will find this talk interesting.
Talk at the 6th International Conference Computers, Privacy, and Data Protection, Brussels, January 23, 2013, as part of the EC JRC/OECD panel "Gamifying Citizenship?"
Reinventing Money: 2015 Buckminster Fuller Institute Challenge Contest Entry World Economic Heartbeat / Trade Federation on the Bitcoin Blockchain, system of systems signaling and telemetry framework supporting Distributed Autonomous Organizations and Bitcoin as programmable money / reinventing money, algorithm regulated economics
"Questioning technology": an introduction to Critical Theory of TechnologyLela Mosemghvdlishvili
A lecture given to BA-2 students, within an elective workshop of IBCoM program at the Erasmus University Rotterdam, 24/04/2014 by Lela Mosemghvdlishvili
Lecture given at Tufts University on 13 November 2008 on issues and methodological challenges faced my modern regulation given increasing complexity. The financial crisis provides a topical background.
Keynote by Seth Grimes, presented at the Knowledge Extraction from Social Media workshop, November 12, 2012, preceding the International Semantic Web Conference
A presentation by Mr Rudolph Louw (Director: Transnet Centre of Systems Engineering: WITS University) at the Transport Forum SIG 21 April 2016 hosted by T-Systems SA Pty)Ltd. The theme for the event was: "Innovation in Transnet" and the topic of the presentation was: "A New Systems Perspective in Context of Transnet One Company"
This is not the final slideshow for The Internet as Playground and Factory conference, but I will probably use a modified version of it. Some slides are borrowed, in that case the notefield mentions the origin.
NATO Workshop on Pre-Detection of Lone Wolf Terrorists of the FutureJerome Glenn
Future technological synergies will give lone wolf terrorists the ability to make and deploy a weapon of mass destruction (The Millennium Project calls this SIMAD - single individual massively destructive). Need to develop the public's roles around the world to prevent this.
I. What are NFTs?
II. NFT Use Cases
III. Making Sense of the NFT Market
IV. The Emergence of DAO(Decentralized Autonomous Organization)
V. The Future is NFT DAO
Climate Impact of Software Testing at Nordic Testing DaysKari Kakkonen
My slides at Nordic Testing Days 6.6.2024
Climate impact / sustainability of software testing discussed on the talk. ICT and testing must carry their part of global responsibility to help with the climat warming. We can minimize the carbon footprint but we can also have a carbon handprint, a positive impact on the climate. Quality characteristics can be added with sustainability, and then measured continuously. Test environments can be used less, and in smaller scale and on demand. Test techniques can be used in optimizing or minimizing number of tests. Test automation can be used to speed up testing.
Generative AI Deep Dive: Advancing from Proof of Concept to ProductionAggregage
Join Maher Hanafi, VP of Engineering at Betterworks, in this new session where he'll share a practical framework to transform Gen AI prototypes into impactful products! He'll delve into the complexities of data collection and management, model selection and optimization, and ensuring security, scalability, and responsible use.
Essentials of Automations: The Art of Triggers and Actions in FMESafe Software
In this second installment of our Essentials of Automations webinar series, we’ll explore the landscape of triggers and actions, guiding you through the nuances of authoring and adapting workspaces for seamless automations. Gain an understanding of the full spectrum of triggers and actions available in FME, empowering you to enhance your workspaces for efficient automation.
We’ll kick things off by showcasing the most commonly used event-based triggers, introducing you to various automation workflows like manual triggers, schedules, directory watchers, and more. Plus, see how these elements play out in real scenarios.
Whether you’re tweaking your current setup or building from the ground up, this session will arm you with the tools and insights needed to transform your FME usage into a powerhouse of productivity. Join us to discover effective strategies that simplify complex processes, enhancing your productivity and transforming your data management practices with FME. Let’s turn complexity into clarity and make your workspaces work wonders!
Transcript: Selling digital books in 2024: Insights from industry leaders - T...BookNet Canada
The publishing industry has been selling digital audiobooks and ebooks for over a decade and has found its groove. What’s changed? What has stayed the same? Where do we go from here? Join a group of leading sales peers from across the industry for a conversation about the lessons learned since the popularization of digital books, best practices, digital book supply chain management, and more.
Link to video recording: https://bnctechforum.ca/sessions/selling-digital-books-in-2024-insights-from-industry-leaders/
Presented by BookNet Canada on May 28, 2024, with support from the Department of Canadian Heritage.
GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using Deplo...James Anderson
Effective Application Security in Software Delivery lifecycle using Deployment Firewall and DBOM
The modern software delivery process (or the CI/CD process) includes many tools, distributed teams, open-source code, and cloud platforms. Constant focus on speed to release software to market, along with the traditional slow and manual security checks has caused gaps in continuous security as an important piece in the software supply chain. Today organizations feel more susceptible to external and internal cyber threats due to the vast attack surface in their applications supply chain and the lack of end-to-end governance and risk management.
The software team must secure its software delivery process to avoid vulnerability and security breaches. This needs to be achieved with existing tool chains and without extensive rework of the delivery processes. This talk will present strategies and techniques for providing visibility into the true risk of the existing vulnerabilities, preventing the introduction of security issues in the software, resolving vulnerabilities in production environments quickly, and capturing the deployment bill of materials (DBOM).
Speakers:
Bob Boule
Robert Boule is a technology enthusiast with PASSION for technology and making things work along with a knack for helping others understand how things work. He comes with around 20 years of solution engineering experience in application security, software continuous delivery, and SaaS platforms. He is known for his dynamic presentations in CI/CD and application security integrated in software delivery lifecycle.
Gopinath Rebala
Gopinath Rebala is the CTO of OpsMx, where he has overall responsibility for the machine learning and data processing architectures for Secure Software Delivery. Gopi also has a strong connection with our customers, leading design and architecture for strategic implementations. Gopi is a frequent speaker and well-known leader in continuous delivery and integrating security into software delivery.
Welcome to the first live UiPath Community Day Dubai! Join us for this unique occasion to meet our local and global UiPath Community and leaders. You will get a full view of the MEA region's automation landscape and the AI Powered automation technology capabilities of UiPath. Also, hosted by our local partners Marc Ellis, you will enjoy a half-day packed with industry insights and automation peers networking.
📕 Curious on our agenda? Wait no more!
10:00 Welcome note - UiPath Community in Dubai
Lovely Sinha, UiPath Community Chapter Leader, UiPath MVPx3, Hyper-automation Consultant, First Abu Dhabi Bank
10:20 A UiPath cross-region MEA overview
Ashraf El Zarka, VP and Managing Director MEA, UiPath
10:35: Customer Success Journey
Deepthi Deepak, Head of Intelligent Automation CoE, First Abu Dhabi Bank
11:15 The UiPath approach to GenAI with our three principles: improve accuracy, supercharge productivity, and automate more
Boris Krumrey, Global VP, Automation Innovation, UiPath
12:15 To discover how Marc Ellis leverages tech-driven solutions in recruitment and managed services.
Brendan Lingam, Director of Sales and Business Development, Marc Ellis
Observability Concepts EVERY Developer Should Know -- DeveloperWeek Europe.pdfPaige Cruz
Monitoring and observability aren’t traditionally found in software curriculums and many of us cobble this knowledge together from whatever vendor or ecosystem we were first introduced to and whatever is a part of your current company’s observability stack.
While the dev and ops silo continues to crumble….many organizations still relegate monitoring & observability as the purview of ops, infra and SRE teams. This is a mistake - achieving a highly observable system requires collaboration up and down the stack.
I, a former op, would like to extend an invitation to all application developers to join the observability party will share these foundational concepts to build on:
Removing Uninteresting Bytes in Software FuzzingAftab Hussain
Imagine a world where software fuzzing, the process of mutating bytes in test seeds to uncover hidden and erroneous program behaviors, becomes faster and more effective. A lot depends on the initial seeds, which can significantly dictate the trajectory of a fuzzing campaign, particularly in terms of how long it takes to uncover interesting behaviour in your code. We introduce DIAR, a technique designed to speedup fuzzing campaigns by pinpointing and eliminating those uninteresting bytes in the seeds. Picture this: instead of wasting valuable resources on meaningless mutations in large, bloated seeds, DIAR removes the unnecessary bytes, streamlining the entire process.
In this work, we equipped AFL, a popular fuzzer, with DIAR and examined two critical Linux libraries -- Libxml's xmllint, a tool for parsing xml documents, and Binutil's readelf, an essential debugging and security analysis command-line tool used to display detailed information about ELF (Executable and Linkable Format). Our preliminary results show that AFL+DIAR does not only discover new paths more quickly but also achieves higher coverage overall. This work thus showcases how starting with lean and optimized seeds can lead to faster, more comprehensive fuzzing campaigns -- and DIAR helps you find such seeds.
- These are slides of the talk given at IEEE International Conference on Software Testing Verification and Validation Workshop, ICSTW 2022.
Pushing the limits of ePRTC: 100ns holdover for 100 daysAdtran
At WSTS 2024, Alon Stern explored the topic of parametric holdover and explained how recent research findings can be implemented in real-world PNT networks to achieve 100 nanoseconds of accuracy for up to 100 days.
Why You Should Replace Windows 11 with Nitrux Linux 3.5.0 for enhanced perfor...SOFTTECHHUB
The choice of an operating system plays a pivotal role in shaping our computing experience. For decades, Microsoft's Windows has dominated the market, offering a familiar and widely adopted platform for personal and professional use. However, as technological advancements continue to push the boundaries of innovation, alternative operating systems have emerged, challenging the status quo and offering users a fresh perspective on computing.
One such alternative that has garnered significant attention and acclaim is Nitrux Linux 3.5.0, a sleek, powerful, and user-friendly Linux distribution that promises to redefine the way we interact with our devices. With its focus on performance, security, and customization, Nitrux Linux presents a compelling case for those seeking to break free from the constraints of proprietary software and embrace the freedom and flexibility of open-source computing.
Elevating Tactical DDD Patterns Through Object CalisthenicsDorra BARTAGUIZ
After immersing yourself in the blue book and its red counterpart, attending DDD-focused conferences, and applying tactical patterns, you're left with a crucial question: How do I ensure my design is effective? Tactical patterns within Domain-Driven Design (DDD) serve as guiding principles for creating clear and manageable domain models. However, achieving success with these patterns requires additional guidance. Interestingly, we've observed that a set of constraints initially designed for training purposes remarkably aligns with effective pattern implementation, offering a more ‘mechanical’ approach. Let's explore together how Object Calisthenics can elevate the design of your tactical DDD patterns, offering concrete help for those venturing into DDD for the first time!
GraphRAG is All You need? LLM & Knowledge GraphGuy Korland
Guy Korland, CEO and Co-founder of FalkorDB, will review two articles on the integration of language models with knowledge graphs.
1. Unifying Large Language Models and Knowledge Graphs: A Roadmap.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2306.08302
2. Microsoft Research's GraphRAG paper and a review paper on various uses of knowledge graphs:
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/blog/graphrag-unlocking-llm-discovery-on-narrative-private-data/
In his public lecture, Christian Timmerer provides insights into the fascinating history of video streaming, starting from its humble beginnings before YouTube to the groundbreaking technologies that now dominate platforms like Netflix and ORF ON. Timmerer also presents provocative contributions of his own that have significantly influenced the industry. He concludes by looking at future challenges and invites the audience to join in a discussion.
1. ‘Economic Design’
in Cryptoeconomics
I. Brief Overview of ‘Mechanism Design’ and ‘Market Design’
Jongseung Kim(deframing@gmail.com)
Director, SK telecom Blockchain Business Development Unit
2018. 8. 13
2. Outline
• What is Cryptoeconomics?
• What is Mechanism Design?
• What is Market Design?
• What role do Cryptoeconomics play?
2
3. Making Sense of ‘Cryptoeconomics’1 (Joshua Stark)
3
• Crytoeconomics is the practical science of using economic mechanisms to build distributed systems,
where important properties of that system are guaranteed by financial incentives, and where the
economic mechanisms are guaranteed by cryptography.
• Cryptoeconomics is the use of incentives and cryptography to design new kinds of systems,
applications, and networks.
• Cryptoeconomics is specifically about building things, and has most in common with mechanism
design — an area of mathematics and economic theory.
• In cryptoeconomics, the mechanisms used to create economic incentives are built using cryptography
and software and the systems we are designing are almost always distributed or decentralized.
1https://medium.com/l4-media/making-sense-of-cryptoeconomics-5edea77e4e8d
4. The properties of ‘Cryptoeconomics’1 (Jon Choi)
4
• Distributed Systems : Open network of computers that communicate with each other
• Cryptography : Mathematical proofs that hide information in open communication channels
• Microeconomics : Maximizing profit against the competition
• Macroeconomics : Aligning the interest of the individual with the interest of the entire ecosystem
• Cryptoeconomics is the study of secure transmission of digital scarcity in open networks.
• Cryptoeconomics is inherently multidisciplinary and it is necessarily a subfield of distributed
systems, cryptography, microeconomics and macroeconomics.
1https://ethresear.ch/t/cryptoeconomics-in-casper-presentation/1002
5. Vitalik Buterin on ‘Cryptoeconomics’1
5
• Cryptoeconomics is economics.
• Cryptoeconomics is economics specialized to a particular set of circumstances.
• whatever mechanisms you have in cryptoeconomics land have to be fully specified exactly — not exactly
to the standards of a court judge, but exactly to the standards of a computer programmer.
• Cryptoeconomics is basically taking economics with particular constraints and then adding together
insights from fields that are fairly close by to the cryptocurrency space — cryptography, information
theory, math, and distributed systems, including all of the research around consensus algorithms, hash
functions, signatures, zero-knowledge proofs, and what we know about all of those primitives.
• What kind of systems and what kind of mechanisms can we design to achieve the properties that we
want?
1https://medium.com/conversations-with-tyler/vitalik-buterin-tyler-cowen-cryptocurrency-blockchain-tech-3a2b20c12c97
6. What is Economic Design?
• Game theory provides a structured language that helps in analyzing interactive situations; that is, when
several individuals have to make decisions, and the outcome depends on each person’s choice.1
• The general purpose of mechanism design is to design games in order to achieve specific outcomes.2
- Auctions and matching or assignment problems are in fact special cases of mechanism design.
• Market design is rooted squarely in the tradition of game theory.3
• Market design also deals with behavioral economics.
• Game theory, experimental and behavioral economics, and market design all allow us to look at rules,
and how people interact with them, understand them, circumvent them, and change them.
6
1Guillaume Haeringer, <Market Design : Auction and Matching> The MIT Press, 2018
2Guillaume Haeringer, <Market Design : Auction and Matching> The MIT Press, 2018
3Alvin E. Roth, <Marketplaces,Markets,and Market Design>, 2018
7. Game Theory – Mechanism Design – Market Design
7
Game Theory
The study of mathematical models of strategic
interaction between rational decision-makers
Mechanism Design
How to design the ‘rule of the game’?
Market Design
A kind of economic engineering, utilizing game
theory, algorithms, simulations, and more
’94 : John Harsanyi, John F. Nash, Reinhard Selten
’05 : Thomas C. Schelling, Robert J. Aumann
’96 : William Vickrey, James Mirrlees
’07 : Leonid Hurwicz, Eric S. Maskin, Roger B. Myerson
’14 : Jean Tirole
’12 : Lloyd S. Shapley, Alvin E. Roth
Applied
Reverse
8. History of Mechanism Design
• Optimizing Social Institutions : A new theoretical framework with which to tackle the comparison of
fundamentally different types of economic organization, such as capitalist and socialist institutions1
- Discussions between the likes of Oskar Lange and Friedrich von Hayek led to the development of the
idea that economic institutions could be viewed as communication mechanisms, and set the stage for
Leonid Hurwicz to formulate a general mathematical framework for analyzing institutions
implementing collective decision making.
• Socialist calculation debate : A discourse on the subject of how a socialist economy would perform
economic calculation given the absence of the law of value, money, financial prices for capital goods,
and private ownership of the means of production2
- Debate among socialists has existed since the emergence of the broader socialist movement between
those advocating market socialism, centrally planned economies and decentralized economic planning.
8
1https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2007/speedread.html
2https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socialist_calculation_debate
10. Concept of Mechanism Design
• Mechanism design is a field in economics and game theory that takes an engineering approach to
designing economic mechanisms or incentives, toward desired objectives, in strategic settings, where
players act rationally.1
- Because it starts at the end of the game, then goes backwards, it is also called reverse game theory.
- Key words : Economic agent, economic activity, economic environment, mechanism, goal
function(social choice function), informationally efficient mechanism
• Mechanism design studies solution concepts(equilibrium concepts) for a class of private-information
games.
- In a design problem, the goal function is the main "given", while the mechanism is the unknown.
Therefore, the design problem is the "inverse" of traditional economic theory, which is typically
devoted to the analysis of the performance of a given mechanism.2
10
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mechanism_design
2L. Hurwicz & S. Reiter, <Designing Economic Mechanisms>Cambridge University Press, 2008
11. Mechanism Design for Cake Cutting1
11
1Y. Narahari, <Game Theory and Mechanism Design> World Scientific PublishingCompany, 2014
• One of the kids would slice the cake into two
pieces and
• The other kid gets the chance to pick up any of
the pieces, leaving the remaining piece to the
kid who sliced the cake into two pieces.
• Child 1, who cuts the cake will slice it exactly
into two equal halves, as any other division will
leave him with the smaller piece.
• Child 2 is happy because she gets to choose and
also chooses what in her eyes is the larger of
the two slices.
Define a social choice function f(θ) mapping the (true) type profile directly to the allocation of goods received or rendered,
f(θ):Θ→X
Define a social choice function f(θ) mapping the (true) type profile directly to the allocation of goods received or rendered,
f(θ):Θ→X
12. Structure of Mechanism Design1
12
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mechanism_design
• A game of mechanism design is a game of private information in
which one of the agents, called the principal, chooses the payoff
structure.
- The upper-left space Θ depicts the type space and the upper-right
space X the space of outcomes.
- The social choice function f(θ) maps a type profile to an outcome.
- In games of mechanism design, agents send messages M in a game
environment g.
- The equilibrium in the game ξ (M, g, θ) can be designed to implement
some social choice function f(θ).
à f(θ) : Θ → X (Define a social choice function f(θ) mapping the (true)
type profile directly to the allocation of goods received or rendered)
Define a social choice function f(θ) mapping the (true) type profile directly to the allocation of goods received or rendered,
f(θ):Θ→X
Define a social choice function f(θ) mapping the (true) type profile directly to the allocation of goods received or rendered,
f(θ):Θ→X
13. General Workflow of Mechanism Design1
• Choose a target function f * to implement
• Model the situation as a game
- Agents, Outcomes, Preferences, Message Space
• Choose a solution concept SC
• Design f such that the game and SC implements f *
13
1Lirong Xia, <Introductionto mechanism design>, 2016
14. Revelation Principle1
• The revelation principle is a fundamental principle in mechanism design.
• It states that if a social choice function can be implemented by an arbitrary mechanism(i.e. if that
mechanism has an equilibrium outcome that corresponds to the outcome of the social choice function),
then the same function can be implemented by an incentive-compatible-direct-mechanism(i.e. in which
players truthfully report type) with the same equilibrium outcome(payoffs).
• The principle comes in two variants corresponding to the two flavors of incentive-compatibility:
- The dominant-strategy revelation-principle : Every social-choice function that can be implemented
in dominant-strategies can be implemented by a dominant-strategy-incentive-compatible mechanism
- The Bayesian-Nash revelation-principle : Every social-choice function that can be implemented in
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium can be implemented by a Bayesian-Nash incentive-compatibility
mechanism
14
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revelation_principle
15. Vickrey–Clarke–Groves(VCG) mechanism
• In mechanism design, a Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism is a generic truthful
mechanism for achieving a socially-optimal solution.1
• The Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism can motivate agents to choose the socially efficient allocation
of the public good even if agents have privately known valuations.2
- It can solve the ‘tragedy of the commons’—under certain conditions, in particular quasilinear utility or
if budget balance is not required.
15
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vickrey–Clarke–Groves_mechanism
2https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mechanism_design
16. Concept of Market Design
• ‘Market Design’ is the term used to refer to a growing body of work that might also be called
microeconomic engineering and to the theoretical and empirical research that supports this effort and is
motivated by it.1
• Market design is both a science and an art.2
- It is a science in that it applies the formal tools of game theory and mechanism design.
- It is an art because practical design often calls for decisions that are beyond the reliable scientific
knowledge of the field.
• Market Design is the area of economics that is particularly interested in how who gets what is decided.3
16
1Nir Vulkan, Alvin E. Roth, Zvika Neeman, <The Handbook of Market Design> Oxford UniversityPress, 2015
2Nir Vulkan, Alvin E. Roth, Zvika Neeman, <The Handbook of Market Design> Oxford UniversityPress, 2015
3Guillaume Haeringer, <Market Design : Auction and Matching> The MIT Press, 2018
17. Why is ‘Market Design’ important?
• Market : An Institution where goods and services are exchanged or traded
- The role of a market is to determine who get what.
• The traditional approach consists of finding an equilibrium price.
- How do we get the equilibrium price?
- Is the “price recipe” the same for all markets?
- What if the price is not the only parameter driving individuals’ decisions?
• Price may affect people’s decisions, but may not be sufficient to determine the ‘equilibrium’.
• Other forces (than price) are at work, and they need to be taken into account.
17
18. Principles of Market Design1
• Market Thickness : A healthy market must have enough participants willing to transact and create
benefit through trade, and to further attract more participants.
- We need ‘enough’ actors from both sides. Sellers need to meet buyers, and buyers need to meet sellers.
• Avoid congestion : The market must mitigate traffic jams to enable the free flow of transactions.
- Too much thickness can create problems, like too much traffic can create traffic jams.
• Make the market safe : Participants must feel safe to transact on the marketplace and to reveal their true
preferences.
- Without proper safety, participants may wish to transact outside of the market.
• Additionally, certain markets must operate under the constraint of repugnance.
18
1https://medium.com/tokenfoundry/market-design-with-tokens-348a4d097a85
19. Principles of Market Design Applied to Tokens1
• Increasing Thickness
- Mining, Partnerships, Referral Bonuses
• Reducing congestion
- Transaction Fees, Membership Deposits
• Providing Safety
- Governance, Smart Contracts, Attestations, Staking
• Through the pillars of market thickness, congestion, and safety, we can orient tokens, smart contracts,
and game-theoretic mechanisms towards higher goals.
19
1https://medium.com/tokenfoundry/market-design-with-tokens-348a4d097a85
20. Simple Auctions : A Definition1
• Bidding format rules (the form of the bids)
- Bids can be price only, multi-attribute, price and quantity, or quantity only.
• Bidding process rules
- Closing/timing rules, available information, rules for bid improvements/counter-bids
• Price and allocation rules
- Final price(s) and quantities, winning bidders
• An auction is referred as
- a type of market mechanism, which uses prices to determine allocations(who gets what).
- a price discovery mechanism.
20
1Guillaume Haeringer, <Market Design : Auction and Matching> The MIT Press, 2018
21. Auction are everywhere
• eBay, Art sales, house foreclosure, etc.
• Treasury bonds
• Internet ads(Google, Bing, Facebook, Twitter, etc.)
• Public facilities(bridges, tunnels, etc.)
• Daily quotation at stock exchanges
• Course allocations at business schools
• Spectrum licences(wireless communication)
21
22. Ascending Auctions1
• Ascending auction : the price starts low and goes up (gradually) until a winner is declared(or the auction
is cancelled).
• There are various versions of the ascending auctions, depending on who can announce prices.
- Only bidders announce prices : English outcry auctions
- Only the auctioneer announces prices : Japanese button auction
• Ticking Price : The amount by which the price has to go up or down
- Price increment rule
• Truthful Bidding : It consists of pressing the button until the displayed price equals one’s own
valuation.
- In the English auction, truthful bidding is a dominant strategy.
22
1Guillaume Haeringer, <Market Design : Auction and Matching> The MIT Press, 2018
23. Second-Price Auction1
• Vickrey Auction is an auction that is aimed at capturing what we have just described for an ascending
price auction.
- Each bidder secretly submits a bid to the auctioneer. It is a sealed-bid auction.
- The winner is the bidder with the highest bid; the other bidders lose the auction.
- The price paid by the winner is equal to the second-highest bid.
• English vs Vickrey auctions
- The Vickrey auction is a strategic form game : bidders can never learn the bids of their opponents.
- The English auction is an extensive form game : bidders may observe the bids of their opponents.
• A strategy is a more complex object in an English auction : it specifies an action (press/stop pressing) for
any possible history.
23
1Guillaume Haeringer, <Market Design : Auction and Matching> The MIT Press, 2018
24. First-Price Auction1
• The first-price auction is a static auction that looks similar to the Vickrey auction, with the only
difference being the price paid by the winner.
- Each bidder secretly submits a bid(a price) to the auctioneer. It is a sealed-bid auction.
- The winner is the bidder with the highest bid; the other bidders lose the auction.
- The price paid by the winner is equal to the highest bid.
• The payoff of bidder i is
- 0 if bi < bmax
-
!
{#∶%#&%'() |
𝑣𝑖 − 𝑏𝑖 if 𝑏𝑖 = 𝑏𝑚𝑎𝑥
24
1Guillaume Haeringer, <Market Design : Auction and Matching> The MIT Press, 2018
25. Optimal Bids in the First-Price Auction1
• A Strategy of a bidder maps a valuation to a bid. (v à s(v))
- Assumption 1 - Each bidder uses the same strategy : for any pair of bidders, i and j, si = sj.
- Assumption 2 - The bidding function s is strictly increasing. So if bidder i’s valuation is higher than
bidder j’s valuation, then bidder i bids higher than bidder j.
- Assumption 3 - For each bidder i = 1, …, n, s(vi) ≤ vi.
• Equilibrium : a bidding strategy for each bidder such that no bidder can be better off by bidding
according to a different strategy
• Result : When there are n bidders and their valuations are uniformly distributed, and bidders’ bidding
strategies satisfy assumptions 1, 2, and 3, then a bidder with valuation v bid in equilibrium
- s(v) =
67!
6
𝑣
25
1Guillaume Haeringer, <Market Design : Auction and Matching> The MIT Press, 2018
26. Dutch Auction1
• The Dutch/descending price auction is a first-price auction.
- There is a ‘clock price’ that displays a price that is decreasing over time.
- The auction stops as soon as someone says ‘Mine’.
• Dutch vs first-price auction : Strategically equivalent to a first-price sealed-bid auction : bidding one’s
valuation is not a dominant strategy (in practice, not so equivalent).
- Bidders use the same strategies.
- Bidders obtain the same payoffs.
- The seller get the same revenue.
26
1Guillaume Haeringer, <Market Design : Auction and Matching> The MIT Press, 2018
27. The Basic Matching Model1
• The basic matching problem consists of matching two sets of agents.
• One-sides matching problems : We only have one set of individuals and we have to form groups of two
or more individuals.
• Many-to-One matching problems : Several individuals from one side can be matched to the same
individual from the other side.
• Many-to-many matching problems : Any individual from any side can be matched to several
individuals form the other side.
27
1Guillaume Haeringer, <Market Design : Auction and Matching> The MIT Press, 2018
28. Matching Market
• Economics studies how goods and services are exchanged or distributed via a market.
• Traditionally, markets determine allocation through prices, which are sufficient statistics to determine
who gets what.
• But in some cases prices may not be enough to characterize allocations(e.g., College admission, labor
market, etc.)
• Matching markets are typical examples of markets where there is no monetary transactions (and thus no
price)
- School assignment, Medical match, Allocation of dorms, Assignment of cadets to branches, Organ
transplants, Allocation of subsidized/public housing, etc.
28
29. Matching Definition1
• A matching is simply a mapping (or a function) from the set of all individuals to the set of all
individuals.
• A matching is a function µ : M∪S à M∪S such that :
- For each singler s∈S, µ(s)∈M∪{s}, and for each musician m∈M, µ(m)∈S∪{m}.
- If µ(s) = m, then µ(m) = s.
• A matching µ is stable if :
- it is individually rational, meaning that for each individual v∈M∪S, v weakly prefers µ(v) to v; and
- there are no blocking pairs, meaning that there is no singer-musician pair (s, m) such that µ(s) ≠ m and
mPs µ(s) and sPm µ(m).
- Stability can be understood as the equivalent of the equilibrium in a classic supply-demand problem.
29
1Guillaume Haeringer, <Market Design : Auction and Matching> The MIT Press, 2018
30. The Deferred Acceptance Algorithm1
• Step 1 : Each singer proposes to the musician who is ranked first among his preferences. Each musician
who received at least one offer temporarily holds the offer from the most preferred singer among the
singers who made a proposal to her and who are acceptable, and rejects the other proposals.
• Step k, k≥2 : Each singer whose proposal was rejected in the previous tep proposes to his most preferred
musician among the musicians to whom he has no yet proposed. If there no such musicians, the singer
remains single. Each musician receiving new proposals temporarily holds the proposal of the singer she
prefers the most among
- the singers who just proposed to her and are acceptable to her and
- the singer whose proposal she held from the previous step.
• End : The algorithm stops when no singer’s offer is rejected. Each musician is matched to the singer
who made the offer she was holding when the algorithm stopped.
30
1Guillaume Haeringer, <Market Design : Auction and Matching> The MIT Press, 2018
31. Where is Cryptoeconomics useful?
• Consensus Protocol Level1
- Economic design has an impact not only on the contributions of miners who maintain the blockchain,
- but also on how much power is exerted by those miners and
- how costly the system is to run, which both influence whether users or apps will want to adopt it.
• Layer 2 Scaling Solution Level2 : State Channel, Plasma, Truebit, etc.
- The economic mechanisms used by layer 2 solutions tend to be interactive games : they work by
creating incentives for different parties to compete against or “check” one another.
• dApp / Ecosystem Level3
- Economic design can help ensure that users contribute resources as the founding team intended.
- Cryptoeconomics is also applied to design token sales or ICOs.
31
1https://prysmgroup.attach.io/B1KdY0dEm?viewer=new
2https://medium.com/l4-media/making-sense-of-ethereums-layer-2-scaling-solutions-state-channels-plasma-and-truebit-22cb40dcc2f4
3https://prysmgroup.attach.io/B1KdY0dEm?viewer=new
32. From Authority to Governance
• Decentralized platforms, like those that utilize blockchain technology are complex economic system
that require rigorous design because they lack authority.1
- On decentralized platforms, authority has to be replaced by incentives and other mechanisms in the
day-to-day running of the platform.
• Economic design builds on the field’s methodological tools and over a century of economic research to
produce mechanisms that will guide decentralized communities toward positive outcomes.
• Authority also has to be replaced by governance in the long-run maintenance of the platform.
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1https://prysmgroup.attach.io/B1KdY0dEm?viewer=new
33. – Alvin E. Roth
“Only recently have we economists started to understand enough about
how markets work so that we can help in that process.”
33
2012 Nobel Prize laureate (with Lloyd Shapley)
“for the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design.”
34. References
• https://medium.com/l4-media/making-sense-of-cryptoeconomics-5edea77e4e8d
• https://ethresear.ch/t/cryptoeconomics-in-casper-presentation/1002
• https://medium.com/conversations-with-tyler/vitalik-buterin-tyler-cowen-cryptocurrency-blockchain-tech-3a2b20c12c97
• Guillaume Haeringer, <Market Design : Auction and Matching> The MIT Press, 2018
• Alvin E. Roth, <Marketplaces, Markets, and Market Design>, 2018
• https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2007/speedread.html
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socialist_calculation_debate
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lange_model
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mechanism_design
• L. Hurwicz & S. Reiter, <Designing Economic Mechanisms> Cambridge University Press, 2008
• Y. Narahari, <Game Theory and Mechanism Design> World Scientific Publishing Company, 2014
• Lirong Xia, <Introduction to mechanism design>, 2016
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revelation_principle
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35. References(cont’d)
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vickrey–Clarke–Groves_mechanism
• Nir Vulkan, Alvin E. Roth, Zvika Neeman, <The Handbook of Market Design> Oxford University Press, 2015
• Guillaume Haeringer, <Market Design : Auction and Matching> The MIT Press, 2018
• https://medium.com/tokenfoundry/market-design-with-tokens-348a4d097a85
• https://prysmgroup.attach.io/B1KdY0dEm?viewer=new
• https://medium.com/l4-media/making-sense-of-ethereums-layer-2-scaling-solutions-state-channels-plasma-and-truebit-22cb40dcc2f4
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