Economic analysis and evidence in abuse cases – Break-out Session 2 – Techniques and evidence for assessing exclusive dealing and bundling – MEXICO – December 2021 OECD discussion

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This presentation by Mexico was made during the break-out Session 2, “Techniques and evidence for assessing exclusive dealing and bundling” in the discussion “Economic analysis and evidence in abuse cases” held at the 20th meeting of the OECD Global Forum on Competition on 7 December 2021. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found out at oe.cd/eac.

Presentations & Public Speaking

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND
EVIDENCE IN ABUSE OF
DOMINANCE CASES
Ramiro Camacho Castillo
IFT Commissioner

2
Introduction
1. -
Abuse of dominance in Mexico:
Carried out by one or
more dominant agents.
To unduly displace;
to deny market
access, or to
establish exclusive
advantages.
The Mexican Law specifies
thirteen different abuse of
dominance practices.

Abuse of Dominance Conducts
Abuse of
dominance
Vertical
segmentation
Resale price
maintenance
Bundling
Exclusive
dealing
Refusal to
sale
Boycott

Abuse of
dominance
Predatory
pricing
Loyalty
discounts
Cross
subsidization
Price
discrimination
Hinder
production
process
Refusal to
essential
facility
Margin
squeeze
Abuse of Dominance Conducts

5
Investigation Process
1. Probable
Cause
2.
Investigation
Relevant
Market
Substitutes
Distribution Costs
Costs and
possibilities to Access
other markets
Dominance
Market shares
Entry barriers
Access to inputs
Behavior of market
players
Key elements

6
Dominance Assessment
Variations of market
shares over time.
Prices, sales, profit
margins.
Entry and/or exit of
competitors.

It explains how
the conduct
reduces or
damages
competition
It uses a
counterfactual
scenario
It provides an
analytical
framework to
assess the
specific
circumstances
Theory of harm

8
Investigation findings. Two examples
.
Exclusive
dealing
Bundling
Agents: América Móvil and Bimbo.
Context: Bimbo developed a
platform to sell mobile top-ups.
Practice: America Móvil forced
Bimbo into an exclusivity.
Intent/effect: to deny access to
60,000 places to provide top-ups.
Agents: Telmex, Telnor and Claro
video.
Context: The companies belong to
same economic group.
Practice: free OTT video content
bundled with internet or telephone
services.
Intent/effect: to provide a package
of services that cannot be
replicated.

Evidence gathering
Data
collected as
sectoral
regulator
Information
submitted
voluntarily
Formal
requests of
information
Public
sources of
information

Thank you!
Commissioner Ramiro Camacho Castillo
ramiro.camacho@ift.org.mx
IFT website: http://www.ift.org.mx

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