Diss-updated

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‘La Main Tendue’ – The Changing Policy of the French
Communist Party towards Catholics 1934 - 1938
1109399
BA History
2014
Word Count: 9901
Dissertation Supervisor: Kevin Passmore

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Contents:
Introduction and historiography - pp. 3-5
Section 1: Political Context of French Catholicism and the PCF 1920-
34 - pp. 6-8
Section 2: The PCF’s 1934 shift from ‘class against class’ and the
lessening of Communist anti-clericalism – pp. 8-10
Section 3: The Hand Extended in 1936; were the Communists still
anti-clerical? – pp. 10-13
Section 4: Catholic responses and dialogue with Communists – pp.
13-17
Section 5: The Expansion of PCF membership – down to la Main
Tendue? How should the appeal be viewed by historians? – pp. 17-19
Conclusion pp. 19-21

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‘La Main Tendue’ – The Changing Policy of the French Communist Party
towards Catholics 1934-1938
“Only Communism and Catholicism offer two diverse, complete and inconfusible [sic]
conceptions of human life.”1
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin.
Not without justification, the words above encapsulate the classic depiction of
Catholic-Communist relations. French Communists, in line with Communist International
(Comintern) guidance, were explicitly anticlerical from their outset in 1920. Similarly, Papal
condemnation of Communism was frequent during the inter-war period with Pius XI
describing it in 1936 as, “threatening everything all over the world”.2
It is against this
background that the French Communist Party’s (PCF) appeal to Catholics in 1936 is most
striking. From 1934, the PCF lessened its previously vitriolic criticism of religion and, in the
lead up to the 1936 election, party leader Maurice Thorez made an impassioned appeal to
French Catholics; an appeal now known as ‘la main tendue’ (the extended hand). Thorez
found some audience among French Catholics and the PCF would sustain its appeal right up
until the fall of the Popular Front, despite the risk of alienating die-hard anti-clericals among
their ranks. The move provoked furious dialogue between the media outlets of the PCF and
Catholic journalists and clergymen. Although the outstretched hand was formally rejected
by Rome, the moralistic nature of the Communist offer forced French Catholics to ask
difficult questions about what side of history they wanted to be on. Given the huge numbers
of French Communists and Catholics as well as the sustained nature of their dialogue,
analysing how the PCF appealed to the Catholics is of great importance to understanding
the political instability of 1930s France and the rise in Communist support.3
Much can be learned about the state of French Catholicism and Communism
through analysis of the dialogue between the two. This essay, focusing on the latter of the
two, will attempt to answer several questions arising from ‘la main tendue’. Firstly, did the
PCF’s appeal to Catholics constitute an evolution of their Communist ideology or was it an
appeal made with little ideological concession? Secondly, what role (if any) did Catholic
acceptance of the outstretched hand play in the explosive increase in PCF membership from
1934 – did French Catholics accept it in defiance of the message from Rome? Finally, how
should historians view ‘la main tendue’ in the context of the history of the PCF. To provide a
brief answer to these questions, my research has indicated that the PCF never really
1
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin quoted in Hellmen, John. ‘French ‘Left-Catholics’ and Communism in the Nineteen-
thirties’ Church History 45, (1976), p. 507.
2
Murphy, Francis. Communists and Catholics in France 1936-39: The Politics of the Outstretched Hand,
(Gainesville, 1989), p. 22.
3
Krigel, Annie. The French Communists: Profile of a People, trans. Elaine P. Halperin, (Chicago, 1968) p. 340.
Kriegel notes here that, with the exception of Italy, no other European country contained such large numbers
of Catholics and Communists. Exact calculations are dubious as they are often based on baptism figures and
give little insight into what percentage of the population go on to become practising Catholics.

4
departed from their anti-clerical roots. When doctrinal incompatibility was brought up by
Catholic and Communist critics, Thorez and other party officials dodged the issue by
highlighting the threat of fascism. By presenting the Pope as a foreign influence, the PCF
integrated the policy of the outstretched hand into their broader move towards appealing
to French nationalism to expand their support base. It should therefore not be viewed as a
policy in isolation but as a broader move towards entering mainstream politics. It is
impossible to ascertain the religious composition of the PCF membership during the 1930s,
however it would appear that the PCF’s broadening of their appeal along religious and
nationalist lines had a powerful effect on their membership figures, which went from 40,000
in 1934 to 320,000 in 1938.4
What can be said is that the PCF certainly believed the policy
was making an impact considerable enough to justify its continuation in the face of criticism
from Rome and from within the Party itself. This is because ‘la main tendue’ was part of the
PCF’s attempt to capitalise on the perceived threat posed by fascism through emphasising
nationhood and religion. It was one part of a broader Communist strategy to appeal to all
those who might oppose fascism and persuade them to unite under the flag of French
Communism.
To shed light on the above issues, I will draw upon the media outlets with which the
PCF advanced their message. L’Humanité, the daily PCF newspaper, is indispensable in this
regard as it offers short term responses to articles in Catholic publications such as L’Aube
and Terre Nouvelle. Cahiers du Bolchévisme is also useful as it offers a monthly self-appraisal
of the Party from senior Communist figures. As I do not have full access to the
contemporary Catholic newspapers such as L’Aube and L’Echo de Paris, I shall rely on what
can be gleaned from the Communist replies to them, as well as the compilation of articles
put together by René Rémond in 1960. Where possible, I refer to the original source
material, however secondary accounts must sometimes be relied upon where such sources
are not at my disposal. Although this is not ideal from a research standpoint, the focus of
this essay is on what we can learn about the PCF and so should not be unduly hindered by a
lack of Catholic perspectives, especially if the PCF did not see fit to respond to them. Francis
Murphy’s work of 1989 does an admirable job of analysing the Catholic side of the dialogue
and so that is not my main aim. Unless otherwise stated, translations from French are my
own.
Although multiple histories of the PCF have been written, few have given ‘la main
tendue’ more than passing attention. This is despite some acknowledgment of its
significance for wider French society. Annie Kriegel wrote in 1968 that the political instability
of 1930s France was “the result of the specific and converging crisis that is buffeting the two
main entities within which the nation’s spiritual tradition is inscribed; Catholicism and
Socialism.” However, she makes no mention of ‘la main tendue’ (the main attempt at
dialogue between these two world views) in her 408 page book on the French Communists.5
Similarly, Ronald Tiersky’s influential 1974 work on French Communism makes no reference
at all to Catholic-Communist relations.6
Susan Witney’s 2009 work on Catholics and
Communists in France initially seems relevant, but hers is a comparative focus that does not
address the dialogue between the two world views.7
Other historians, such as Daniel Brower
4
Krigel, Annie. The French Communists: Profile of a People, trans. Elaine P. Halperin, (Chicago, 1968), p. 32.
5
Ibid. p. 340.
6
Tiersky, Ronald. French Communism 1920-1972, (New York and London, 1974).
7
Witney, Susan. Mobilising Youth: Communists and Catholics in interwar France, (London, 2009).

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and the more recent Jessica Wardhaugh, do make direct mention of the Communist appeal,
however both do so very briefly and leave much room for analysis as to the impact of the
policy on French Communism.8
These works reflect a broader trend among historians to
focus on how the policy failed, as opposed to what it achieved. This probably stems from
the denunciation of the Communist appeal from Rome but this assumes an absolute
doctrinal link between the Vatican and ground-level French Catholics which, as I will
demonstrate in this work, is unfounded. Scholarly output on the PCF has declined since the
1980s, possibly linked to the decline of international Communism. This has left the topic in
need of a modern update, beyond that which Jessica Wardhaugh has achieved to date.
With this said, there exists a small but intellectually rich body of work that
specifically addresses French Communist-Catholic relations during the 1930s. One of the
original studies on the subject is René Rémond’s work of 1960: Les Catholiques: le
Communisme et les crises 1929-1939. Rémond’s work was essentially a compilation of
articles depicting the Communist-Catholic dialogue of the period and will be referred to
multiple times in this essay for examples from the Catholic press.9
Francis J. Murphy’s 1989
monograph on ‘la main tendue’ is perhaps the most comprehensive work on the topic as it
offers a strong chronological narrative of the policy from 1934 onwards.10
However,
Murphy has focused more on how the policy affected the Catholics and the brevity of his
work leaves room for further analysis, particularly regarding the policy’s impact on the PCF’s
electoral success and whether it constituted a genuine intellectual shift for the party. These
are the questions I will seek to address in this essay as I feel they have been poorly served
by the existing historiography.
It would be remiss of me to write about political Catholicism and Communism
without setting the scene in terms of their respective contexts. Both have played powerful
roles in French political history but occupied different positions in French society by the
time of the 1936 appeal of the PCF. My first section will therefore sum up the political paths
of Communism and Catholicism leading up to 1934. I will then move on to the PCF’s move
away from ‘class against class’ in 1934, as this is when we first see L’Humanité and Thorez
lessen their criticism of religion (see the June 26 headline “No Clenched Fist Policy toward
Religion”).11
The following two sections will cover the proclamation of the policy in 1936, the
nature of the ideological changes and also Catholic reactions to it. It is here that I will
highlight how the PCF saw fit to maintain their appeal, despite harsh criticism from the Pope
and some French Catholics. Examples from L’Humanité will demonstrate an increased
sensitivity for potential Catholic readers as well as the fierce dialogue between the PCF and
the Catholic right. In the final section prior to the conclusion, I will address two important
questions that arise from this topic – whether ‘La main tendue’ played a significant role in
the PCF’s electoral success and how the policy should be viewed by historians.
Section 1: The Political Context of French Catholicism and the PCF
8
Brower, Daniel. The New Jacobins: The French Communist Party and the Popular Front, (New York, 1968), pp.
132-135 and Wardhaugh, Jessica. In Pursuit of the People: Political Culture in France 1934-39, (London, 2009),
pp. 102-104.
9
Remond, Rene. Les Catholiques, le communisme et les crises 1929-1939, (Paris, 1960), pp. 218-253.
10
(Gainesville, 1989).
11
L’Humanité, June 26 1934.

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1920-1934.
“…this rupture of French stability is… the result of the specific and converging crisis
that is buffeting the two main entities within which the nation’s spiritual tradition is
inscribed: Catholicism and Socialism.”12
Annie Kriegel, 1968.
Catholicism in France has experienced a long and turbulent history that, by the
1930s, had seen the Church lose much of its political power. Despite being, as Pope Leo XIII
described it, “a Catholic nation… by virtue of the faith of the great majority of her sons
today”, France had undergone a far-reaching and drastic process of secularisation.13
This
culminated in 1905, with the Promulgation of Law of Separation, officially dividing Church
and State. The lingering memory of the Church’s privileged position left a large number of
active Catholics desiring the reintegration of the Church into French society, however, this
aim faced numerous obstacles. The Dreyfus affair had added to the already anti-clerical
character of the Third Republic and the laws separating Church and state halted national
funding for the Church.14
Despite Pope Leo XIII urging French Catholics to rally behind their
republic in 1892, the divide between Catholics and Republicans was pervasive and would
persist through until the Second World War.15
In the words of historian Francis J. Murphy,
“For most champions of the Republic, the enemy was the church. For most champions of
the church, the enemy was the Republic.”16
France did, however, have the second largest contingent of Catholics in liberal
Europe (behind Italy) as well as a well-established Catholic press.17
A minority of Catholic
publications, such as Terre Nouvelle, were explicitly left wing or even Communist in their
politics.18
For the most part though, Catholic publications were hostile to Communism.
Publications such as l’Aube and l’Echo de Paris were well established dailies that would be
the primary source of journalistic criticism of the Communist appeal from its announcement
in April 1936. This reflected the broadly right-leaning (but not universal) nature of French
Catholics. The newly disestablished French Catholics sought to reach out to sections of the
‘dechristianised’ French working classes – the demographic for whom the PCF always
claimed to be the legitimate voice.
12
Kriegel, Annie, The French Communists: Profile of a People, trans. Elaine P. Halperin, (Chicago, 1968), p. 340.
13
Larkin, Maurice. Church and State after the Dreyfus Affair: The Separation Issue in France, (London and
Basingstoke, 1974), p. 6.
14
Ibid. p. 2.
15
McManners, John. Church and State in France, 1870-1914, (London, 1972), pp. 69-73.
16
17
Krigel, Annie. The French Communists: Profile of a People, trans. Elaine P. Halperin, (Chicago, 1968) p. 340.
18
Terre Nouvelle, October 1935 as cited in Murphy, Francis. ‘Communists and Catholics in France 1936-1939;
The Politics of the Outstretched Hand’, University of Florida Monographs in Social Sciences 76, (1989), pp. 46-
47. Terre Nouvelle declares its goal to “bring together Socialists and Christians of every persuasion in order to
bring break down the reactionary prejudice of incompatibility of Christianity and socialism by proving that
these two realities are complementary.” Their readership was small (under 10,000) and so does not feature
heavily in my analysis.

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Unlike Catholicism, French Communism was a very recent affair in the 1930s and one
viewed with no small degree of suspicion by many Frenchmen due its association with the
Comintern. The PCF was formed at the Congress of Tours in December 1920 where the
majority of delegates from the Section Francaise de l’Internationale Ouvriere (SFIO) decided
to adhere to the Third Communist International, thereby creating the Section Francaise de
l’Internationale Communiste (SFIC) which later took the name Parti Communiste Francais
(PCF). From its outset, the PCF was inextricably linked to Moscow and would follow
instructions given from above (such as the twenty one conditions of membership) to the
letter.19
This created what historian Lesek Kolakowski referred to as “institutional” as
opposed to “intellectual” Marxism, as it relied on decree from above as opposed to
independent ideological convictions.20
The newly revolutionary PCF was to play a relatively
marginal role in French politics until 1935, when their popularity shot up and they became
part of the Popular Front alliance of Communists, Socialists and Radicals. They would take
power as part of the Popular Front in the 1936 April election and leave power as the left-
wing alliance fell apart two years later.
The PCF’s approach to advancing their cause was at all times dictated from Moscow.
This would be demonstrated in 1928 when the PCF was ordered to adopt ‘class against
class’ tactics in attempting to further the revolution. This was a departure from the ‘united
front’ tactics that had been employed since 1921. The adversarial nature of ‘class against
class’ prevented the PCF from allying with any other party and saw the movement enter its
most challenging period. From 1928 to 1933, the membership of the PCF fell from 50,000 to
just 19,000 and l’Humanité’s circulation hit an all-time low of about 75,000 a day.21
Ironically, by splitting the left, the Communist tactic had actually strengthened the
candidates of the right and centre. Although weakened, the party was tightly organised and
ready to act when the opportunity arose in 1934. The riots of the 6th
of February and the rise
of Hitler the year before convinced the Comintern of the need to reverse ‘class against class’
and so PCF leader Maurice Thorez was summoned to Moscow in April 1934 to be redirected
along a path of working-class and national unity. It is from these instructions that the first
moves towards a rapprochement with religion stem, with early signs of it in l’Humanité
within weeks of this Communist ‘U-turn’.
We can see that, despite having starkly different histories, French Communism and
Catholicism shared some short term ambitions in 1934. Proponents of both sought a way for
their weakened movements to enter mainstream politics through winning the hearts and
minds of ordinary Frenchmen. Some Catholics and Communists also saw value in reaching
out to each other. Communists saw advantage in expanding their appeal to everyday French
Catholics and organisations such as the Jeunesse Ouvriere Chrétienne (Young Catholic
Workers or JOC).22
Catholics viewed the ‘dechristianised’ working masses the PCF claimed to
represent as a key barrier to the re-establishment of the Church. Conditions were thus well
set for a reconciliation between these two world views. Some, such as the readership of
Terre Nouvelle, saw no incompatibility between the Church of the past and the Marxist
doctrines of the future and would be the first to grasp Thorez’s outstretched hand. For most
19
Tiersky, Ronald. French Communism 1920-1972, (New York and London, 1974), pp. 14-15.
20
Kolakowski, Lesek. Toward a Marxist Humanism: Essays on the Left Today, (New York, 1968), p. 174.
21
(Gainesville, 1989), pp. 2-4.
22
L’Humanité, June 26 1934. The JOC is mentioned specifically as a group the PCF should appeal to. See
excerpt in following section.

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French Catholic’s and Communists however, the ideological barriers between the two world
views rendered the idea of long term collusion difficult to envisage.
Section 2: The PCF’s 1934 shift from ‘class against class’ and the
lessening of Communist anti-clericalism.
“We will in no circumstances pursue an agreement with the leadership of the
Socialist Party which we consider… as an enemy…”23
Maurice Thorez, 24 January 1934.
Six months after Thorez gave the above statement to the Central Committee of the
PCF, the ‘unity pact’ was signed between the Socialist and Communist parties. Despite
Thorez’s protestation that, “This is not a new line, nor is it a turn. This is a more determined
and more rapid march down the right road marked out by the Communist International…”
the sudden reversal of policy betrays the extent to which the PCF was more a wing of the
Comintern as opposed to a national party in its own right.24
Yet a national party was exactly
what they set out to become in 1934. In the June 26 issue of l’Humanité, the report on the
national Communist conference carried two headlines of relevance: “No closed fist policy
towards religion” and “We love our country”.25
This marked the beginning of the PCF’s
appeal to the patriotic and religious sentiments of France and of their campaign to be
viewed as a party of, and for, Frenchmen. Previously, they had rejected the French
Republican tradition, including the Tri-colour flag and the July 14th
celebration. 1935 saw
Communists appearing alongside Socialists on Bastille Day in the hundreds of thousands.26
The headline of “No clenched fist policy towards religion” certainly indicates a
change in how the Party viewed religion but it would be another two years before ‘la main
tendue was extended. The text below the headlines revealed a policy that was still a long
way from being consistent with the unequivocal openness of the 1936 appeal:
We fight against the Church, we fight against the clerical forces, we fight against the
Church that serves the forces of reaction, we fight not just against the Catholic
Clergy but all forms of religion, we consider religion the opium of the people.
But is it not a right tactic to try and work within the Christian Trade Unions and win
over the JOC? Is it not necessary to win ourselves the peasantry, the workers who
are under the influence of the Church? Are we going to win over these workers when
we simply present ourselves at the entrance of the church with a big quarrelsome
23
Maurice Thorez quoted in Jackson, Julian. The Popular Front in France: Defending Democracy 1934-38,
(Cambridge, 1988), p. 22.
24
25
26
Brower, Daniel. The New Jacobins: The French Communist Party and the Popular Front, (New York, 1968), p.
104.

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demonstration whose result, on the contrary, is to assure fascist influence among
their numbers?27
This ‘tactic’ does not seem designed to appeal to Catholics directly as such. The
strident tone and proclaimed desire to “win” the hearts and minds of the Catholics is less an
offer of collaboration as it is a plan for subversion of the Catholic Church itself. It is,
however, early evidence that the PCF was shifting, albeit slowly, from the previous
‘clenched fist’ policy of non-collaboration. A year later, in July 1935, Jacques Duclos (a senior
member of the PCF’s Central Committee) commented in the Cahiers du Bolchévisme that
“even among the Catholics, there are signs of hostility against the Croix de Feu.”28
That
Catholics were starting to appear in Communist publications pointing out similarities
between Communist and Catholic opposition to fascism is an early sign that the PCF was
moving towards reconciliation with some elements of religion as part of their campaign to
broaden their base of support.
We should not overstate this point however; prior to the outstretched hand of April
1936, these messages were mingled with the anti-clericalism more familiar to the PCF. Two
weeks after Duclos’ article in Cahiers du Bolchévisme, Georgi Demitrov (Leader of the
Comintern under Stalin), gave eight tasks to the PCF. The seventh of these was, “to develop
the struggle against the leaders of the reactionary cliques of the Catholic church, as one of
the most important strongholds of French fascism.”29
Attempting to follow this instruction
and appeal to Catholics as a part of their ‘United front’ tactic proved difficult for the PCF.
Thorez’s comments in January 1936 demonstrate this conflict:
We are not abandoning the criticism of religion… but ours is not a policy of the
clenched fist with regard to Christian workers and Catholic working class youth. We
want to continue the criticism, not only of religion but also the clergy, taking into
consideration, however, the fact that a segment of the lower clergy is opposed to
fascism.30
The time between the retraction of ‘class against class’ in April 1934 and the
proclamation of ‘la main tendue’ in April 1936 was a developmental one for the PCF’s policy
towards Catholics. Thorez and the rest of the PCF leadership lacked the confidence to
implement a fully-fledged appeal to the religiously inclined Frenchman just yet, possibly due
to concern that to do so would draw criticism from anti-clericals within their own ranks or
uncertainty as to how it would be received in Moscow. Writings from the time, however,
give an early indication that the PCF saw sense in adding France’s considerable Catholic
population to their voter base and that they had fully engaged with the idea of securing
their revolution through democracy. This approach proved far more successful than the
‘class against class’ tactics of 1928 and would eventually see them take nearly twice the
votes they had taken in previous elections, securing 12.45% of the popular vote in 1936.31
27
28
Cahiers du Bolchévisme, July 15 1935, p. 781.
29
30
Ibid. p. 13. trans. F. Murphy.
31
Jackson, Julian. The Popular Front in France: Defending Democracy 1934-38, (Cambridge, 1988), p. 50.

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Section 3: The Hand Extended in April 1936; were the Communists still
anti-clerical?
We extend our hand to you, Catholic, worker, employee, tradesman, and
peasant; we who are secular extend our hand to you because you are our brothers
and you, like us, are burdened with the same troubles…
We Communists, who have reconciled the Tricolour Flag of our fathers with
the red flag of our hopes, we appeal to you, workers, peasants and individuals,
young and old, men and women, to join our struggle and declare yourselves on April
26.32
Maurice Thorez in his radio address to the French nation, April 17 1936.
The above extract appeared in Thorez’s radio address to the French nation on April
16, 1936 as a brief part of a much longer speech. The outstretched hand was given no
particular emphasis or attention in l’Humanité, however, within a few days, Jacques Duclos
and editor of the newspaper, Marcel Cachin, would give greater detail to the Communist
initiative. On April 24, in an article on the front page of the newspaper titled, “La Main
Tendue”, Duclos made the following statement:
Some find that we are going too far when we extend our hand to the Catholic worker
to organise, with him and his friends, actions of human solidarity on behalf of those
without work. In fact, it is even going further to condemn such acts of union. We are
proud of our record, because we prefer to see believing workers united with non-
believers than see both fall together under the mocking eye of the great capitalists
who burden them.33
On the same day that Duclos’ article was being distributed around France, Marcel
Cachin would make a radio address of his own, elaborating on certain aspects of Thorez’s
speech. A transcript of his speech appears in l’Humanité the following day, from which I
have translated the following extract:
Yes! The Communists extend a hand to the Catholic worker, the Christian, the
believer, the young worker out of the service. The Communists ask nothing of these
men, victims of the 200 families. We do not demand they vote for us, nor abandon
their religion or part with their ideals. But we want to establish with them, and all
their comrades, a fraternal relationship for the defence of their common interests…
This policy of union goes to the heart of all French workers. We have received
thousands of touching testimonials since the recent radio announcement of our
comrade Maurice Thorez.
32
L’Humanité, April 18 1936. The full transcript of Thorez’s speech appeared in the paper the day after it was
made.
33
L’Humanité, April 24 1936.

11
As has to be expected, this policy of union has found a very different reception
among the defenders of the feudal enemies of the people. They insinuate that this
attitude on our part is insincere and purely electoral.34
This rapid succession of statements from senior party officials outlines the new
Communist policy towards Catholics in some detail. What is very clear is that the hand was
extended specifically to Catholic workers, not to the Church itself. The PCF sought to present
the destinies and “common interests” of all workers as entwined, regardless of individual
distinctions such as faith. This is in much the same way that Communist parties often see
workers of different nationalities. It is therefore interesting that we also see part of the
Communist appeal to French nationalism in Thorez’s speech. His reference to, “the Tricolour
flag of our fathers” reminds us that the PCF were appealing to multiple and overlapping
demographics they had previously not engaged with. ‘La main tendue’ might seem directed
specifically to Catholics, but it was part of a broader strategy of appealing to as much of the
French populace as possible.35
We can also see from the statements of Duclos and Cachin that the PCF was acutely
aware of the criticism this policy could bring upon their party. The fact that Duclos’
explanation was given front page status only two days after Thorez’s address speaks of the
need the PCF felt to explain itself. He alludes to criticism from the non-Communist left,
angered by the Communist willingness to cooperate with Catholics after their reluctance to
work with Socialists.36
He is probably also aware that the change in policy to Catholicism
could cause questions from within the Communist ranks as well. Fear of such a reaction
might go some way towards explaining why the PCF’s earlier moves towards reconciliation
with Catholics were so cautious.
The humanitarian and undemanding nature of the PCF appeal might be taken as
evidence that Communist anti-clericalism was declining, at least from the top of the party, if
not from the everyday followers. It is certainly true that strident criticism of religion in
general is completely absent from PCF publications and statements after April 1936.
However, the PCF was to continue their criticism of the Vatican itself as a political
institution. Their responses to the rejection of ‘la main tendue’ from Rome in the weeks and
months to come would demonstrate this clearly.37
Restricting opposition to the institutions
of religion (as opposed to religious people themselves) is still a form of anti-clericalism, if
only because these institutions were entirely comprised of religious people. With that said,
‘la main tendue’ was still a notable shift in PCF policy towards broader tolerance and they
would fiercely defend it in spite of substantial criticism. The distinction made by the PCF
between the hierarchy of the Church in Rome and everyday French Catholics was one they
sought to popularise. Future references to the Pope would emphasise his ‘foreignness’ in
contrast to the PCF’s new-found ‘Frenchness’. Florimond Bonte, member of the PCF central
committee, would demonstrate this in his response to some of the most scathing criticisms
from Rome: “French Catholics will take their stand on the same ground as other French
34
L’Humanité, April 25 1936. The ‘200 families’ is a reference to the capitalist oligarchy who, according to the
Communists, controlled France.
35
L’Humanité, May 10 1936 provides further evidence to this effect, with great prominence given to an article
praising Joan of Arc as a symbol of fighting foreign influence in the interests of the French people.
36
(Gainesville, 1989), pp. 17-18.
37
Examples of this can be found in the following section.

12
citizens. That is why we do not think that Catholics who want peace and oppose fascism will
follow the advice of Pius XI.”38
In this manner, ‘la main tendue’ was entirely linked and
dependent on the PCF’s appeal to French nationalism.
In answering the question: Did the PCF depart from their anti-clerical roots, Thorez
provided further evidence that they did not, albeit unintentionally. The following words are
taken from an article he wrote in the November 1936 edition of The Communist
International, a publication of the Comintern itself:
Your mode of thinking, your convictions, are your business. We do not believe in
God; we are Communists, materialists and consequently non-believers; but we are
not sectarians or bigots. The party has done all that was necessary to unite the
workers, Communists and Catholics, in the battle for bread, for ourselves our wives
and our children, for peace and freedom.39
Thorez justifies his reasoning in this passage by recourse to an earlier work by Lenin;
“The Attitude of the Workers’ Party to Religion”, however, he significantly omits to mention
that Lenin only condemned converting the religious as “superfluous and harmful” because
“the actual progress of the class struggle… will convert Christian workers to Social
Democracy and to atheism a hundred times more effectively than any bald atheist
sermons.”40
Thorez struggled to reconcile his new appeal to Catholics with the anti-clerical
legacy of Communism and the self-proclaimed goal of his party to create a world without
religion. This central inconsistency would be a recurrent theme in Catholic criticism of ‘la
main tendue’.
After the initial statements from Thorez, Duclos and Cachin, there is a period of just
under two weeks where little mention of Catholics or ‘la main tendue’ is made in
l’Humanité. However, shortly after the outstanding success of the PCF was announced, the
party made a euphoric repeat of their appeal:
We secularists have extended a hand to you, the Catholic worker. Nothing will turn
you against us, whom the noblest ideal of human brotherhood inspires. You will not
reject the hand we extend to you.41
This passage is significant, not just because it presumes the success of the policy, but
because it is the first instance of the authors of L’Humanité assuming that their readership
includes Catholics. Previous statements aimed at the religious had appeared only as
transcripts of radio broadcasts. This, probably optimistic, assumption of the success of the
policy was to continue through the next two years of sustained criticism. In the next section
of this essay, I will examine the nature of that criticism, how the Communists responded to
it and what can be learned from the two year dialogue. Despite the Communist assurance
38
Bonte, Florimond, quoted in Murphy, Francis. Communists and Catholics in France 1936-39: The Politics of
the Outstretched Hand, (Gainesville, 1989), pp. 83-84. This quote is in response to ‘Divini Redemptoris’, a
Catholic encyclical released on March 19 1937 denouncing the PCF’s appeal as deceptive and intrinsically
wrong.
39
(Gainesville, 1989), p. 66. Obtaining the original article from The Communist International has proved
impossible and so cautious use of a second hand account will have to suffice.
40
Ibid. pp. 66-67. This disconnect between Thorez and Lenin was first noticed by Jesuit philosopher Gaston
Fessard in 1936 and later highlighted by Murphy.
41
L’Humanité, May 5 1936.

13
that nothing could come between the Catholic worker and the PCF, the challenges of the
Papal criticism and the Spanish Civil War were to cause significant difficulty for ‘la main
tendue’.
Section 4: Catholic Responses and Dialogue with Communists
In the beginning, Communism showed itself for what it was in all its perversity, but
very soon it realised that it was thus alienating the people. It has therefore changed
its tactics, and strives to entice the multitudes by trickery of various forms, hiding its
real designs behind ideas that in themselves are good and attractive.42
Pius XI in his encyclical of March 19 1937 entitled Divini Redemptoris.
There are several things of note that can be learned from the Catholic-Communist
dialogue of 1936-1938. Firstly, the Pope did not hold a monopoly over the minds of French
Catholics. Despite the denunciation of ‘la main tendue’ by Rome, debate and discussion
over cooperation continued for over two years. In the words of historian John Hellman, “if
Catholics had been convinced that Catholic religious dogma was diametrically opposed to
Marxism or French Communism, there would have been no more room for dialogue with
Communists any more than with, say, a cult of murderers.”43
Secondly, we can see the
considerable extent to which ‘la main tendue’ was valued by the leadership of the PCF.
Despite the formidable barriers presented by the right-wing Catholic press, the divisive
effects of the Spanish Civil War and the efforts of Vatican itself, Thorez, Bonte and Duclos
would continue to defend their appeal for more than two years. Finally, we can conclude
from the volume of responses that Catholics, from both left and right, recognised the
significance of the PCF’s appeal and felt the need to respond to it. The Communist appeal to
Catholics would prove controversial enough to become familiar to any regular reader of
Communist or Catholic publications.
Some Catholics were very quick to accept the outstretched hand of Maurice Thorez.
On May 15 1936, Catholic journalist and layman Robert Honnert released an article titled,
“Faith and Revolution” in the Catholic publication Europe. In it, he posed the pertinent
question: “Can a Catholic extend his hand to the revolutionary without ceasing to be a
Catholic? Can a revolutionary admit the faith of a Catholic without ceasing to be a
revolutionary?” His answer was yes; he justified the acceptance of the Communist offer with
an interpretation of the Gospels as supporting the disposal of an old and “feeble order”. He
ends his article with words that echo Thorez himself: “what can prevent the hand which is
offered with prudence today from being offered with enthusiasm tomorrow?”44
Honnert’s
42
Pius XI, Divini Redemptoris, March 19 1937, No. 57. Official English translation (from which the above extract
is taken, available at: http://tinyurl.com/lrmed9o.
43
Hellman, John. ‘French ‘Left-Catholics’ and Communism in the Nineteen-thirties’, Church History 45, (1976),
p. 516.
44
Rémond, René. Les Catholiques, le communisme et les crises 1929-1939, (Paris, 1960), pp. 219-221 and
(Gainesville, 1989), pp. 24-25. Honnert’s original work “Foi et Révolution” has proved impossible to find

14
article would draw criticism from other Catholics, most notably from prestigious writer and
Catholic François Mauriac. In an article responding to Honnert on May 26, Mauriac criticises
Honnert’s willingness to rush into, “foolhardy alliances” but makes his own uncertainty
surrounding the issue quite clear. He asks, “Must we reject the outstretched hand of
Comrade Thorez? Or must we shut our eyes and clasp it?” but does not offer us a definitive
answer to his question.45
His uncertainty over the issue demonstrates that the Pope did not
have absolute control of Catholic opinion in France; influential and prominent Catholics
were openly entertaining ideas explicitly denounced by the Pope.
There existed a substantial voice of more assured French Catholics who occupied a
middle ground. Florimond Bonte’s article in the August 25 edition of Cahiers du Bolchévisme
titled, “Communists and Catholics” appealed specifically to the widely read journals,
Christus and La Vie Intellectuelle. He urged “Christians living the true life of Christ’s charity”
to accept the outstretched hand because, “the one who has offered it is concerned about
justice and human brotherhood…” In response, the editor of Christus admitted “the
possibility… of a temporary and limited collaboration” although he cited doctrinal
incompatibility as rendering any longer term agreements impossible.46
We can conclude
from the fact that Bonte saw fit to appeal to Catholics in Cahiers du Bolchévisme that the
PCF remained convinced that French Catholics could be persuaded to support Communism.
The limited but positive response Bonte’s article received suggests that this view was not
entirely unjustifiable.
There was also substantial opposition to the PCF’s appeal, firstly from the Vatican. It
is likely the Pope saw Thorez’s offer to Catholic workers in France as another threat to the
Vatican’s influence, made all the more pressing given the secularisation laws passed three
decades earlier. Condemnation was therefore swift and sustained. On May 11 1936, shortly
after the magnitude of the Communist rise had become apparent, the Pope spoke of
Communism to a congregation of Hungarian pilgrims:
It is unfortunately true that even today there exists a common enemy threatening
everything all over the world… That enemy is communism, which is trying to
penetrate everywhere… by violence, by plot, or by deceit, by going so far as to clothe
its appearances with the best intentions.47
Although no direct reference was made to the PCF, its relevance was clear and not
lost on the party. Communists were being accused of duplicity and a timely response was
needed if the PCF was to win the hearts and minds of uncertain Catholics. The Pope’s line of
reasoning was echoed in numerous Catholic writings, most of which stressed doctrinal
incompatibility as their justification.48
Three days later, on May 14, Thorez spoke in reply:
however Rémond helpfully included a large excerpt from it in his work (from which the above is translated).
45
Rémond, René. Les Catholiques, le communisme et les crises 1929-1939, (Paris, 1960), pp. 221-224. Rémond
provides a French copy of this text from which the above is translated.
46
Cahiers du Bolchévisme, August 25 1936, pp. 495-496 and Murphy, Francis. Communists and Catholics in
France 1936-1939: The Politics of the Outstretched Hand, (Gainesville, 1989), p. 47.
47
(Gainesville, 1989), p. 22. Translation that of Murphy as original source not available.
48
(Gainesville, 1989), p. 61. See the example of Cardinal Lienart, bishop of Lille, who highlighted doctrinal
conflicts between Catholicism and “the error of atheistic materialism”. This view was common among
members of the clergy.

15
We regret these words of division… We want to understand each other in order to
help the unfortunate. We will continue, so long as there is an infant’s tear left to
dry…49
Thorez’s reply was made along humanitarian lines, in an attempt to appeal to the
French Catholic’s sense of morality. This approach, combined later with reference to the
threat of fascism, was to be the standard Communist reply to Catholic protestations of
doctrinal incompatibility for two years. They would also indulge in parody and satire to
criticise the Pope, as can be seen in the May 17 edition of l’Humanité.50
Fig. 1 and 2 depict
the comic cartoon printed on the front page of the paper:
Fig. 1:
Fig. 2:
This cartoon outlines several aspects of the PCF defence against Papal accusations of
duplicity. We can see here that the PCF relies heavily on the threat of fascism in proving
49
Ibid. p. 23.
50
L’Humanité, May 17 1936.

16
their own virtue. The cartoon to the far right of Fig. 1 satirically references the 6th
of
February riots as proof that fascism, not communism, is the true enemy of the people; one
that the Pope is blind to. The danger presented by fascism in Europe is a recurrent reason
cited by the PCF for Catholics to overlook clashes of doctrine. The implications of the
cartoon to the far right of Fig. 2 is clear; the Pope is implied to be pandering to the wishes of
Mussolini and Hitler and only criticising Communism because of this policy. By making these
accusations, the PCF sought to drive a wedge between French Catholics and the Vatican.
Associating the Pope with fascist foreigners was central to the PCF’s appeal and one that
tied into their appeal to nationalism.
The PCF was to stress Catholic opposition to fascism at every opportunity as a
method of demonstrating the necessity of ‘la main tendue’. On June 8 1937, l’Humanité
featured an article in their “Read in the Press” section from the prestigious Catholic journal
l’Aube. The article in question, by Joseph Hours, highlighted the persecution of the Church in
Germany and the progressively destructive nature of National Socialism for both Christians
and Marxists:
After it has crushed Marxism and excluded the Jews, the moment must surely come
when it will attack the Christian Churches… It has waited some time to do this; it is
no doubt considered preferable to divide the opponents.51
L’Humanité, was quick to capitalise on a Catholic writing in l’Aube on the threat of
fascism, especially in the light of the Pope’s silence on the matter in Divini Redemptoris.52
Although Hours’ makes no direct reference to accepting ‘la main tendue’, the idea of
Catholicism and Communism sharing mutual enemies was one that fitted neatly into the
existing narrative being woven by the PCF. Their comment below predictably linked Hours’
line of reasoning with support for the PCF:
The example of Germany lets us draw a lesson for our country. In France, although
Catholicism is influential, it lacks a political party. Moreover, although fascism has
undergone a number of changes, it remains a menacing danger against which the
union of all democrats – Socialists, Radicals, Communists and Catholics – is
indispensable.53
Once again, we are reminded of the PCF’s appeal to nationalism – France is “our
country”; a homeland that Communism seeks to defend against fascism. This article had
additional significance against the background of the Spanish Civil War. More than anything
else in this period, the Spanish Civil War was a great challenge to the Catholic/Communist
relationship. Although horrified by the bombing of Guernica, Catholics were swayed by the
loyalty of the Basque clergy, and so religious opinion in France was predominantly in favour
of the insurgents.54
In contrast, the Communists were the most vocal supporters of
51
L’Humanité, July 8 1937. I have not been able to access Hours’ complete article and so must rely on the PCF’s
account of it.
52
Pius XI, Divini Redemptoris, March 19 1937, Official English translation (from which the above extract is
taken, available at: http://tinyurl.com/lrmed9o. The Pope’s focus was on Communism in this encyclical but he
did release Mit brennender Sorge 9 days earlier in which he criticised Germany for breaches of the 1933
Reichskonkordat. Communist accusations of Papal silence over fascism were thus not entirely true.
53
L’Humanité, July 8 1937.
54
Rémond, René. Les Catholiques, le communisme et les crises 1929-1939, (Paris, 1960), pp. 175-177. See here
for examples such as Mauriac and Mounier.

17
intervention in defence of the Spanish Popular Front. For the most part, the PCF did not
comment on the Catholic support of Franco in l’Humanité, but this divide between Catholics
and Communists did nothing to help reconciliation between the two.
In this section, I have provided a brief outline of some aspects of the Catholic
Communist dialogue. Due to the overwhelming volume of source material, it is not practical
for me to be exhaustive in my efforts, but I feel the examples I have provided evidence
several key aspects of my argument. Firstly, that there was no uniform Catholic response to
‘la main tendue’, despite the clear message from Rome as well as figures in the French
Clergy. Catholicism did not have as much of a rigidly enforced dogma as Communism and
we can see that this led to a broad range of reactions to the Communist initiative. Some saw
‘la main tendue’ as the devilish plot of anti-clericals seeking to undermine the Church
through deception. Others were less certain, swayed as they were by the looming threat of
fascism, the PCF’s stated desire to help the poor (an idea most familiar in Christian doctrine)
or perhaps by the PCF’s simultaneous appeal to patriotic sentiments.
We can also conclude that the PCF were willing to invest heavily in their appeal to
Catholics despite the constant opposition from the Vatican and the Catholic right. Articles
from senior party figures such as Thorez, Duclos, Bonte and Cachin would appear
prominently in Cahiers du Bolchévisme and L’Humanité to reiterate and defend ‘la main
tendue’. On some level at least, the PCF believed their policy was having a positive impact.
The degree to which the Catholic press engaged with the debate over two years makes it
seem likely that any regular reader of these publications would be familiar with the
Communist appeal to Catholics. The possibility that this may have contributed to the PCF’s
rise in popularity is one I shall explore in the following section.
Section 5: The Expansion of the PCF Membership – down to la Main
Tendue? How should the appeal be viewed by historians?
Assessing the impact of ‘la main tendue’ on the electoral success of the PCF is a very
difficult task but there are several observations we can make. In truth, the only evidence
that could conclude this question without doubt would be a complete record of the religious
inclination of PCF voters. No such record has appeared in my research of primary or
secondary materials and, to my knowledge, does not exist. We can, however, reasonably
propose that the PCF believed in ‘la main tendue’ and in its capacity to boost their
popularity. This assertion is supported by the fact that they stood their ground resolutely in
the face of fierce criticism for more than two years within the pages of Cahiers du
Bolchévisme and L’Humanité fierce criticism. It also seems clear that the appeal would have
been impossible to avoid for regular readers of widely consumed Catholic publications such
as l’Aube or La Vie Intellectuelle. Articles for and against the policy appeared in Catholic (and
Communist) publications with steady regularity and considerable prominence from April
1936. This, of course, does not prove widespread Catholic acceptance of the outstretched
hand, but there were at least occasional examples of individuals showing public support for
the policy in the press. Finally, we do have clear evidence that PCF popularity rose steadily

18
until the end of 1937 before levelling out and declining until their interruption by the Nazi
occupation. The approximate numbers of Communist card carriers in the relevant period is
listed below:
1933: 28,000
1934: 40,000
1935: 86,902
1936 (Dec.): 280,000
1937 (Sept.): 328,647
1938 (Sept.): 320,000
1939 (Aug.): 300,00055
As these figures demonstrate, the most significant change in PCF membership had
occurred by the end of 1936, after the PCF’s proclamation of ‘la main tendue’. It would be
highly simplistic to suggest that these numbers are entirely explicable with reference to ‘la
main tendue’ but, if we are to try to account for them, we should not leave it out of
consideration. In Francis Murphy’s analysis of this topic, most of the new members after
1935 were “overwhelmingly working class”. He combines this view with the work of
sociologists Henri Godin and Yvan Daniel, who aimed to demonstrate that France’s eighteen
million strong ‘working class’ were almost completely dechristianised. In his view therefore,
the majority of new Communist voters were not motivated by ‘la main tendue’.56
A
satisfactory critique of Godin and Daniel’s sociological methods would not fit within the
constraints of this work, but Murphy’s conclusion can be faulted in another respect. He fails
to establish that the 200,000 new supporters entirely fitted his description of the anticlerical
‘working class’. He refers the reader to Annie Kriegel’s previous work on the social
stratification of the PCF, but Kriegel makes the same argument without providing any
supporting or evidential references herself.57
Given that there is very little material that
provides insight into the religious composition of the ‘Generation of the Popular Front’, we
should not be so quick to dismiss the potential influence of ‘la main tendue’.
I am unable to prove the exact extent to which ‘la main tendue’ affected the PCF’s
rise in popularity due to the limitations of the source material. With that said, the
conclusions I can draw suggest ‘la main tendue’ did play some role and is deserving of
greater recognition from historians. Catholic responses in the media were varied and
numerous but were not uniformly dismissive. We can see from the pure volume of
responses that the outstretched hand of Maurice Thorez was widely discussed and well
known among politically minded Catholics. Given the considerable number of Catholics in
55
Kriegel, Annie. The French Communists: Profile of a People, trans. Elaine P. Halperin, (Chicago, 1968), p. 32.
56
(Gainesville, 1989), pp. 116-117. His description of the French working class also borrows from Godin and
Daniel’s analysis: “lacking everything: security, savings, tradition and culture”.
57
Kriegel, Annie. The French Communists: Profile of a People, trans. Elaine P. Halperin, (Chicago, 1968), pp.
109-135 esp. 112.

19
France, it seems likely this had an impact on the voting statistics and, when combined with
the PCF’s appeal to nationalism, goes some way towards explaining the huge surge of
support for the Communists in 1936.
As I covered at the start of this essay, most historians of French Communism have
either omitted mention of ‘la main tendue’ or have done so in a fashion that assumes its
failure. Despite the rejection from Rome, this is an unjustified assumption. Historians should
assign greater significance to this Communist initiative, if only to reflect the considerable
attention the PCF saw fit to devote to this policy. This, however, is not the only reason the
topic is in need of greater study. ‘La main tendue’ represented a dialogue between two of
the most influential world views of the 20th
century. Such a meeting of minds, where
common ground is not only sought, but in some cases found, is worthy of inclusion in
histories of both Communism and Catholicism. Analysis of this dialogue helps illuminate
aspects of French history and opinion shifts between the wars. We cannot hope to
comprehend why the Communists rose to such sudden popularity in such a brief time-frame
without first understanding how they broadened their appeal and exploring the possible
role of ‘la main tendue’ in shaping the views of French citizens.
‘La main tendue’ was not a policy in isolation and should not be viewed as such.
Although the central focus of this work has been the offer made to Catholics, the PCF
expanded their policy of ‘United Front’ by appealing strongly to the nationalist sentiments
of France as well. This helped the Communists present a contrast between the ‘foreign-ness’
of the Pope with their own new-found, ‘French-ness’, most clearly apparent in their cartoon
sketch of May 1936 (see p. 15). Given how these appeals were linked and supported each
other, considering one without the other would lead to an incomplete understanding of
both.
In summary, ‘la main tendue’ should be viewed as one of several, linked ways the
PCF sought to broaden their appeal and as part of a programme that helped catapult the
party into mainstream French politics. It was not an abject and immediate failure; it
provoked great debate and discussion among Catholics and that, in and of itself,
demonstrates that the Pope did not have absolute command over popular opinion. It was
provoked by Catholicism and Communism having similar short-term goals, such as entering
mainstream politics by capturing the hearts and minds of everyday Frenchmen. It was
hindered by their differing long-term goals, with Communism’s inherently anti-clerical
nature presenting a major sticking point for many right-wing Catholics.
Conclusion
Shortly after the fall of the Popular Front, France itself would fall to the German
occupation. With the invasion came Vichy France, an institution openly hostile to
Communism and set upon recreating the nation under the banner of “Work, family and
fatherland!” All dialogue between Catholics and Communists was effectively halted by this
turn of events, especially after l’Humanité was banned in 1940. Communism was forced
underground while Catholicism enjoyed something of a political reversal of fortunes. After
three and a half decades of secularism, France once again had a state religion under Vichy.

20
The situation was problematic for the Vatican, opposed as they were to many aspects of
Nazism, but there can be no doubt that many Catholics welcomed Pétain and his National
Revolution.
‘La Main Tendue’ was formulated under very different political circumstances.
Before the 1936 April election, the PCF and Catholicism had some striking similarities but
also some jarring differences. Both movements sought to achieve greater political
representation from a relatively modest starting point, however their long term aims were
irreconcilable. Catholicism in France was weakened by the 1905 secularisation and many
Catholics saw their loss of influence as a progressive decline; one they were keen to reverse.
Communism, on the other hand, outlines a revolution that leads to a post-religion utopia.
Despite Thorez’s protestations that the appeal to Catholics could be justified in light of the
threat of fascism, it was unsustainable in the context of the Marxist narrative of human
progress.
Despite the obvious and problematic conflict of ideology, ‘la main tendue’ was
presented as a personal offer from Communists to Catholic workers. Although it did not
constitute a rejection of the anti-clericalism inherent in Lenin and Marx’s ideology, it was a
significant step towards a productive dialogue. The fact that Catholics did not immediately
and uniformly reject Thorez’s offer tells us much. The Pope did not command absolute
authority among French Catholics and the PCF was correct in thinking that there was a gulf
between them and the Vatican. They were astute in trying to widen it with appeals to
nationalism and the threat of fascism. Many French Catholics were open to persuasion in
light of the pressing threat posed by Mussolini and Hitler and some may have seen a moral
link between the Communist desires to help the disadvantaged and their own Christian
values.
Clearly not all French Catholics embraced the offer with open arms. Even those who
accepted some degree of collaboration did so tentatively. The enthusiasm of Robert
Honnert was not representative of all Catholic responses; many regarded Communism with
distrust, exemplified in the fearful writings of François Mauriac. It is, however, testament to
the breadth of political opinions among Catholics that discussion and debate continued for
over two years without consensus. From the openly revolutionary readership of Terre
Nouvelle to the stridently right-wing French bishops, Catholics presented a multitude of
different opinions in response to Thorez’s offer.
It is the diversity of opinion within Catholic circles that leads me towards the view
that ‘la main tendue’ found a receptive audience among some. Although confirming that
Catholics voted for the PCF en masse is an almost impossible task (unless new evidence
comes to light), we can certainly say that the highly publicised and consistently promoted
appeal by the PCF makes such a possibility worthy of serious consideration. If we are to
explain the sudden and considerable increase in public support for the PCF, ignoring their
appeal to the largest religious demographic in France makes little sense.

21
Dissertation Bibliography
Primary Sources:
Newspapers:
1) L’Humanité.
2) L’Aube.
3) La Vie Intellectuelle
Articles/Contemporary Publications:
1) Duclos, Jacques. ‘Temoignage sur les origins et la victoire du Front Populaire’ (ND)
Interview transcript accessed from: http://tinyurl.com/qy54zue
2) Cahiers du Bolchévisme.
3) Pope Pius XI, Divini Redemptoris, March 19, 1937. Full translated text accessible
from: http://tinyurl.com/lrmed9o.
Access to L’Humanité and Cahiers du Bolchévisme made possible by the Gallica Online
Archieves: http://gallica.bnf.fr/?lang=EN and the Cardiff University SCOLAR collection.
Other source extracts were taken from secondary material where original was unavailable.
Where this has happened, it is indicated in the footnotes.

22
Secondary Sources:
1) Brower, Daniel. The New Jacobins: The French Communist Party and the Popular
Front, (New York, 1968).
2) Bullivant, Stephan. ‘From “Main Tendue” to Vatican II: The Catholic Engagement
w7ith Atheism 1936-1965’ New Blackfriars 90, (2009), pp. 178-187.
3) Hainsworth, Paul. ‘Towards a New Ralliement? Left-Wing Unity and the Catholic
Policy of the French Communist Party’ Parliamentary Affairs 30, (1977), pp. 427-442.
4) Hellman, John. ‘French ‘Left Catholics’ and Communism in the Nineteen-thirties’,
Church History 45, (1976), pp. 507-523.
5) Jackson, Julian. The Popular Front in France: Defending Democracy 1934-38,
(Cambridge, 1988).
6) Kriegel, Annie. The French Communists: Profile of a People, trans. Elaine P. Halperin,
(Chicago, 1972).
7) Larkin, Maurice. Church and State after the Dreyfus Affair: The Separation Issue in
France, (London and Basingstoke, 1974).
8) McManners, John. Church and State in France, 1870-1914, (London, 1972).
9) Rémond, René. Les Catholiques, le communisme et les crises 1929-1939, (Paris,
1960).
10) Tiersky, Ronald. French Communism 1920-1972, (New York and London, 1974).
11) Wardhaugh, Jessica. In Pursuit of the People: Political Culture in France 1934-39,
(London, 2009).
12) Kolakowski, Lesek. Toward a Marxist Humanism: Essays on the Left Today, (New
York, 1968).
13) Witney, Susan. Mobilising Youth: Communists and Catholics in interwar France,
(London, 2009).
14) Murphy, Francis. Communists and Catholics in France 1936-1939: The Politics of the
Outstretched Hand, (Gainesville, 1989).

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