This document summarizes different forms of cheating that can occur during elections, both manually and through an automated election system. It discusses retail cheating like vote buying that occurs before votes are counted, and wholesale cheating like falsifying election returns after votes are tallied. Specific cheating strategies covered include increasing votes through illegal registration or ghost voting, decreasing opponents' votes through disenfranchisement, and altering vote totals through dagdag-bawas operations. Other forms of cheating mentioned are using fake ballots, destroying election materials, and misreading ballots. The document argues that what was previously done manually through cheating can now be replicated electronically through a compromised automated system.

1. DIFFERENT FORMS OF CHEATING PLO

2. Basic Premise: What was done manually can be done electronically PLO

3. Myth: AES will eliminate cheating in the elections PLO

4. Failure of PCOS or the Entire Automated Election Process is also always a possibility PLO

5. Retail and Wholesale Cheating Retail Cheating - the kind that takes place before the votes are counted. Small scale, voter-by-voter cheating tactics Buying of votes Payments designed to keep an opponent’s supporters at home Making last minute changes in the polling places Intimidation of voters, elections officials and poll watchers Paying teams of “flying voters” to roam from precinct to precinct PLO

6. Retail and Wholesale Cheating Wholesale Cheating- large scale, massive cheating tactics Large-scale falsifying of election returns and other election documents from municipalities, and even provinces, after the votes were counted at the polling precincts PLO

7. Cheating Strategy 1: INCREASING VOTES PLO

8. Increasing Votes Objective: Increase a candidate’s total number of votes for him to defeat his opponent Forms: Registration of Illegal Voters or Padding of Voters’ List Ghost Voting Vote Buying – Simple – Before Voting Vote Buying – Simple – After Voting Vote Buying – Complicated – Lanzadera System May be adapted in the Automated Election Scenario Terrorism PLO

9. Padding of Voter’s List To guarantee that a certain candidate will have command votes. Age requirement – even minors are allowed to register Residency requirement – squatters who lack the residency requirement are allowed to register Registering more than once by using fake names PLO

10. Ghost Voting Voting under the name of a deceased person or using a fictitious name or a nonexistent address. Another variation: A group of paid voters can also go precinct-hopping to vote ahead and on behalf of those who have not voted yet. Should have been solved by purging of voter’s list through biometric analysis PLO

11. Vote Buying Many Filipinos look forward to campaign periods as the season of financial windfall . Now, even computer white/dark hackers now have the same opportunity for the same windfall As such, the party with greater resources obviously gains the most advantage. PLO

12. Vote Buying Direct Offering money or gifts to a voter to vote for a specific candidate. PLO

13. Vote Buying Indirect Dispensing money to opinion-makers and leaders; local Leaders “for sale” - (e.g., paid initially to campaign for a candidate and if the candidate wins in their locality, a bonus will be given). Heads of families - door to door buying is usually conducted the night before the elections in the guise of paying Poll Watchers. PLO

14. Vote Buying On election day, buying may take the form of a 500-peso bill attached to a sample ballot. To ensure strict compliance with the deal: some Buyers require the use of a carbon paper; others require putting an agreed symbol on the ballot to serve as identification during the reading of the votes; or, the Buyer is usually around to actually look at the ballots before they are dropped in the boxes. May be applicable to automated elections in another form “ sample ballot” with pre-punched holes/templates where the bought voter will put over the official ballot Among poll watchers whose party affiliation are not based on personal conviction, loyalty can shift to the highest bidder. PLO

15. Vote Buying – Simple – Before Voting The voters are paid before they go to the polling precincts. As assurance to the Buyer, the voters will fill out their ballots in accordance with the instructions of the Buyer. Particularly, the voters will make their ballots “identifiable” by: Placing discrete pre-agreed markings on the ballots (e.g., different ink, misspelled names, complete middle names, etc.). Arranging the names of the candidates voted for in a certain pre-agreed order. “ Sample” ballots with pre-punched/template holes PLO

16. Vote Buying – Simple – After Voting The voters are paid after voting . The voter secures a carbon paper from the Buyer and brings it to the polling place. The voter “makes a copy” of his ballot. After voting, the voter surrenders the carbon paper to and gets paid by the Buyer. PLO

17. Vote Buying – Complicated - “Lanzadera” System Chain balloting – taking an Official Ballot inside the polling place and passing it on to a voter entering the polling place. 1.The first voter goes to the polling precinct to vote and obtains an Official Ballot from the BEI. 2.At the polling booth, instead of filling up the Official Ballot, he keeps it and then drops something that looks like a ballot into the ballot box. 3.The first voter then sells the blank Official Ballot to the Buyer. PLO

18. Vote Buying – Complicated - “Lanzadera” System 4.The Buyer, now in possession of an Official Ballot, looks for the second voter. Before going to the precinct, the second voter will be asked to fill out the Official Ballot. 5.The second voter then goes to the polling precinct to vote and obtains an Official Ballot from the BEI. 6.At the polling booth, instead of filling up the Official Ballot given to him by the BEI, the second voter keeps it and then drops into the ballot box the Official Ballot earlier given to him by the Buyer. 7.The second voter then sells the blank Official Ballot to the Buyer. 8. Then the cycle repeats. PLO

19. Terrorism The voters will simply be terrorized to vote for a certain candidate. Preliminary to inflicting bodily harm on rivals, politicians often employ scare tactics. “ Malalaman namin ang resulta. Kapag natalo ang mga kandidato namin dito sa lugar ninyo, lagot kayo lahat!” Intimidation may also be directed at teachers who may be cowed into selective voting tactics. More commonly, political benefactors such as landlords use goons to threaten their tenants with eviction if they fail to vote for certain candidates. PLO

20. Terrorism Goons are employed to take over entire precincts and fill in ballots and conduct the election process themselves. The ballots are then filled out to favor a certain candidate and inserted in the PCOS. Goons simulate disorder to create the opportunity to substitute ballots right in the polling precincts during the ensuing confusion. PLO

21. Cheating Strategy 2: DECREASING VOTES PLO

22. Decreasing Votes Objective: Decrease your opponent’s total number of votes Forms: Disenfranchisement of Qualified Voters by Shaving the Voters’ List or Due to Lack of Election Paraphernalia Negative Vote Buying Failure of the Automated Elections Scenario Terrorism PLO

23. Shaving the Voters’ List The shaving of the Voters’ List favors a candidate if the excluded voters are supporters of rival candidates. Targeted for massive disenfranchisement of voters are the bailiwicks of rival candidates. The names of qualified and duly registered voters suddenly disappear from the Voters’ List and appear in another distant precinct. PLO

24. Lack of Election Paraphernalia Stealing blank ballots and other election paraphernalia in predominantly opposition precincts so that their supporters will not be able to vote. PLO

25. Negative Vote Buying Pay the known supporters of a rival for them to not go out and vote or at least not write the name of their favored candidate on the ballot. In cases where the rival supporters are too loyal to be swayed to switch sides, neutrality may be the best that money can buy. If a candidate is sure that a voter will not vote for him, the voter will be “visited” and paid the night before election day. Indelible ink - to make sure that the bought voters will not be able to vote. PLO

26. Terrorism The voters of the opposing camp are prevented from voting. Setting up of “checkpoints” to prevent the voters from going to the polling precincts. Transportation of non-supporters are disrupted. Presence of goons near the polling precincts to discourage the voters from voting. Goons vote early and stay in the voting booths too long to prevent known rival supporters from voting. PLO

27. Cheating Strategy 3: DAGDAG BAWAS OPERATIONS PLO

28. Mantra : What was done manually can be done electronically PLO

29. Dagdag Bawas - Local Dagdag Bawas (or falsifying the actual numbers of votes garnered by candidates) is the most destructive form of cheating. Achieved by adding a digit to a figure, either in the beginning or at the end. Could also be done through computer algorithms embedded in corrupt software By adding a "0" to the end of a total vote in the election reports, say "100", the result is "1000“ or additional 900 votes. By putting a "1" in the beginning of “100” to make it "1100". PLO

30. Election Documents that are Targets of Dagdag Bawas Operations Election Returns, Statement of Votes, Certificates of Canvass of Votes - by entering incorrect figures during any of the stages of tallying. Between the completed ballots and the final election results are a series of manual transfer of information, specifically, from the ballots to the Election Returns, to the municipal Certificates of Canvass, to the municipal SOV, to the provincial Certificates of Canvass, and then to the provincial SOV. Omission, substitution, switching of totals, and erroneous addition along this tedious process can be done to favor certain candidates. Again, what has been done manually can be done electronically Hacked or corrupt software Hacked or corrupt insider people PLO

31. Dagdag Bawas Operations National results tend to be more vulnerable to tampering because local watchers are usually more concerned with local results (especially, if the local contests are close) Internal/External Auditing System in place in AES Beware of manual override Beware of the backdoor No human intervention/input of data PLO

32. Dagdag Bawas - Overseas Absentee voting gives another opportunity for large-scale cheating. The votes of the absentee voters can spell the difference between winning and losing for any national candidate. If the Comelec cannot safeguard the sanctity of certificates of canvass right here in our country, how can it safeguard certificates coming from overseas? There is so much opportunity for alteration of the results or even changing the certificates before they are sent to the Philippines. PLO

33. Again: What has been done manually can be done electronically PLO

34. OTHER FORMS OF CHEATING PLO

35. Other Forms of Cheating Use of Fake Ballots or Use of “Other” Official Ballots Destruction of Ballots, Ballot Boxes and Other Election Paraphernalia Deceptive Practices: “Voter’s Assistance” Snatching of Ballots, Ballot Boxes and Other Election Paraphernalia Misreading of the ballots Ghost Precincts Grab the Proclamation and Delay the Protest Trending PLO

36. Use of Fake Ballots or Use of “Other” Official Ballots Fake ballots are placed inside the ballot box. (Inside Job possibility) Ballots taken from another municipality are placed inside the ballot boxes assigned to another municipality. PLO

37. Destruction of Ballots, PCOS Machines Ballot Boxes and Other Election Paraphernalia Goons and armed men will raid the polling precincts during the counting of the votes to make sure that the votes from these precincts will not be included in the counting. Resorted to by candidates losing in a particular precinct. PLO

38. Snatching of Ballots, PCOS Machines, Ballot Boxes and Other Election Paraphernalia Snatching happens when the ballots and the ballot boxes are physically transported from the polling precincts to the Board of Canvassers. Usually occurs during the wee hours of the night since counting is usually finished at nighttime. PLO

39. Misreading of the Ballots After the closing of the polls, the ballots are read and counted by the BEI at the precinct level in the polling place. Depending on the number of oppositions and protests during the counting, this procedure could extend up to the wee hours of the night until early morning. The Poll Watchers would already be very exhausted by this time. Fortunately for PCOS machines, but what happens in a failure of PCOS machine scenario Again, PCOS can be made to “misread” through corrupt software PLO

40. Ghost Precincts Election Returns from non-existent precincts are submitted to the Board of Canvassers for canvassing. In an automated election scenario, may only be possible through an inside job COMELEC SMARTMATIC/TIM PLO

41. Grab the Proclamation and Delay the Protest Election protests are costly. The cost of a court-mandated recount is borne by the complaining party. For most candidates, who tend to use up most of their personal funds just to keep their campaign going, the high cost of contesting election results can be too prohibitive. For instance, when Miriam Defensor-Santiago filed her election protest in 1992, she was slapped with a 60-million peso fee to finance the recount of some 120,000 contested precincts (at 500-peso fee per precinct). Such high cost obviously discourages many from pursuing legal action, even those who genuinely feel that they have been cheated of victory and have sufficient evidence to prove it. PLO

42. Trending and Surveys Survey results that are made available to the media and to the public are controlled to create an artificial trend favorable to a certain candidate . With a winning trend thus established, cheaters will then employ cheating tactics and the artificial trend will give the falsified results a sense of credibility. Also, surveys may generate a bandwagon effect since some people vote for who is leading in the surveys. Exit Polls- The result of the exit polls may be announced after the closing of the polls on election day, and must dearly identify the total number of respondents, and the places where they were taken. Said announcement shall state that the same is unofficial and does not represent a trend. (Section 5.5 [d], Fair Elections Act) PLO

43. AES will not Eliminate cheating that is external to the automated system PLO

44. DIFFERENT FORMS OF CHEATING PLO