Deng-Jiang modernization in the largest conservative backlash

POLS 7010 – Advanced China Studies (Prof. Chen Feng)
The persistence of Deng-Jiang
modernization in the largest conservative
backlash of PRC politics after 1989
Name: LEE Kwun-leung Vincent (李冠良)
Student I.D No.: 09429670
Major: Master of Social Science in China Studies (History)
Date: 13th
October, 2009
PREFACE:
JIANG’S OBLIGATION TO MAKE DENG’S
MODERNIZATION SURVIVE IN THE
CONSERVATIVE BACKLASH
The Tiananmen Crackdown in 1989, regarded as a thorough devastation of a
1

predictable bourgeoisie-liberalization within the PRC Regime, marked a turning point
of Deng Xiaoping’s Opening-Up, from his forbearing approach of socio-economic
experimentation with ‘mind-emancipation’, to a more cautious line on national
modernization inherited by his successor, Jiang Zemin. Facing the resentments from
left-minded conservatives and the repressive initiative from the discontented
democratic forces being driven underground in various provinces1
, Deng Xiaoping
instructed Jiang Zemin to uphold the principle of “socialism with Chinese features”.
Through a highly-centralized attempt of political reintegration, Jiang, in accordance to
Deng’s ultimate aspiration, developed PRC into a mixed regime in which different
ingredients such as traditional Mandarin rule, one-party domination, the form of
people’s party, functional factions representing different interest groups, democratic
elections and monitoring were combined2
. However, though a serious reflection was
made by Jiang and the paramount leaders in terms of upgrading both the bureaucratic
efficiency and the financial capacity, the PRC Regime remained extraordinarily
intolerable to the rival behaviors of regional-based dissidents, nor to say being
unpredictably vulnerable to undergo challenges from any forms of mass democratic
campaigns. What Jiang Zemin maneuvered to implement was a revival of old
Confucian teachings as a forceful attachment of ideological value to enforce
widespread submissiveness regardless of racial and class differences. In Jiang’s
philosophical arena, as Zheng Yongnian and Lai Hongyi stated, Communitarianism3
,
not individualism, is more suitable for China’s stable development and social
harmony.
1
Robert Benewick and Paul Wingrove, “China In The 1990s”, 1st
Edition in 1995, McMillian Press
Limited, United Kingdom [P.31 – ‘The Decline in Ideocracy’ by Gordon White]
2
Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard & Zheng Yongnian, “The Chinese Communist Party in Reform”, 1st
Edition
in 2006, Routledge, USA & Canada [P.206 – ‘Creating a Chinese model of democratization?’, from
‘Intra-party democracy: A revisionist perspective from below’ by He Baogang]
3
Wang Gungwu & Zheng Yongnian, “Damage Control – The Chinese Communist Party in the Jiang
Zemin Era”, 1st
Edition in 2003, Eastern University Press, Singapore [P.351 – ‘Rule by Virtue: Jiang
Zemin’s Revival of the Party’s Ideology’ by Zheng Yongnian & Lai Hongyi]
2

POST-1989 CAPITALIST REFORMS WITH NO
CONDONATION TO THE THREAT UPON
COMMUNIST AUTHORITY FROM THE
CONSERVATIVE CADRES
Throughout the second generation of PRC leadership beyond 1989, Deng Xiaoping
remained himself as an ‘octogenarian’ decision-maker without a legitimate
presidential title. By pursuing a dichotomy between the constitutional sources of
authority and the reality of power4
, Deng Xiaoping was able to reserve the
‘conservative leftists’ with a certain extent of political influence as a tactic of parallel
organization to checkmate the effectiveness of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang’s
capitalist reformation. Deng, being a wait-and-see opportunist5
and a manipulator
behind the political curtain, only let Hu and Zhao uphold the secretarial titles, but not
to transfer them all his military power. Thus, Deng remained the left-minded
conservatives, specifically Yang Shangkun, with marshal titles. If Hu and Zhao’s tasks
resulted in social disturbances and hierarchical contradictions, Deng could manipulate
the conservative force to overthrow the whole liberation path and re-introduce a more
secured plan of national modernization.
Though the Commissions for Inspecting Discipline and Central Advisory Commission
were established in 1982 for the retired Party veterans to intervene directly in current
affairs, specifically to restrain the over-rapid socio-economic re-modification initiated
by Hu Yaobang’s camp, the two commissions were dissolved in the 14th
CCP
4
Limited, United Kingdom [P.54 – ‘Leadership Politics since 1989’ by Simon Long]
5
(Same as above) [P.37 – ‘China’s Political Structure’ by Tony Saich]
{Elaboration: Deng Xiaoping has seemed to move between the two viewpoints, giving the green light to
far-reaching change, yet at crucial moments supporting the traditional viewpoint on political issues in
order to preserve his economic reforms from attack.}
3

Congress (1992)6
. It was because, after recapturing the central power from the hand of
reformative camp by assuring conservatives’ right to launch a bloodshed crackdown
on 4 June 1989, Deng Xiaoping feared that an overwhelming predominance of
conservatives’ military power would make him difficult to continue with his economic
reform. Therefore, Deng initiated Shanghai Camp, which was good at commercial
politics, to counter-balance the traditionalists.
Deng instructed Jiang to make ideological conformity be subordinated to economic
development. To continue with an aspiration of making China attain an economically
well-to-do status, Jiang moved closer to the kind of authoritarian developmental
characteristics7
. The prior task Jiang had to deal with was to desalinate both the
extreme-communist and democratic thoughts by adopting the capitalism-hoisted and
introducing the new conceptual terrain of market economics to minimize the post-
1989 Chinese generation into a status of “patriotically ignorance” in the tendency of
Late Dengism. Jiang Zemin, inclining to what the conservative leftists use to think
about, regarded intellectuals’ pursuits on liberalism as an ideological contamination
from abroad8
. While enabling the conservative cadres to retain a strong role in the
enterprises to stop bourgeoisie entrepreneurs deviating too much from Party policy9
,
Jiang pursued a dual tactic of ‘pacification-cum-restraint’. In terms of political
consideration, Jiang reiterated the formation of ‘political nucleus’ to appease the
resented conservatives concerning their privilege loss in socio-economic influence
after the end of Maoist rule and the beginning of Deng’s Opening-Up. But, on the
6
Limited, United Kingdom [P.44 – ‘China’s Political Structure’ by Tony Saich]
7
(Same as above) [P.32 – Late Dengism]
8
(Same as above) [P.31 – ‘The Decline in Ideocracy’ by Gordon White]
9
(Same as above) [P.37 – ‘China’s Political Structure’ by Tony Saich]
{Deng’s aspiration apart from pursuing an orthodox Leninist lines: With the decentralization of some of
the decision-making powers to the work-units, they (left-minded conservatives) want the Party to retain
a strong role in the enterprises to stop them (bourgeoisie entrepreneurs) deviating too much from the
Party policy……… predicted a single undifferentiated mass of people to work harmoniously for the
creation of socialism.}
4

same pace, Jiang eventually abstracted the authoritarian credentials from those
conservatives who un-pragmatically indulged in the persistence of ‘better Red than
Expert’10
.
Jiang’s inclination to Zhu Rongji as a replacement to Li Peng
While Jiang Zemin was uplifting Zhu Rongji as his imitate follower within his
Shanghai camp, Li Peng, with his Premier title, made use of his infrastructural project
on Three Gorges Dam to seek favor from the majority of the National People’s
Congress11
. As indicated by Jonathan Fenby, Li Peng’s project would result in the
unusually high proportion of one third of delegates either voting against the idea or
abstaining. Li Peng, representing the “left-minded conservatives” due to his initiation
for a military crackdown on the Tiananmen students and an outlaw of Zhao Ziyang’s
reformative fellows, was able to command other octogenarians to counteract with any
kinds of capitalist influences, or even resort to a political struggle for a restoration of
fundamental communist order. Facing the unrest from that conservative forces
throughout the 1990s, Jiang Zemin endeavored to firmly unite Zhu Rongji, Hu Jintao
and Li Ruihuan, whom were ensured to understand how the capitalist and market
reforms worked in Communist China and put prior emphasis on people’s concrete
well-being. By including Qiao Shi in the economic reform camp, PLA General Liu
Huaqing was likely to go along with the majority12
. That left Li Peng isolated as he
insisted on an onslaught against the continued dynamism of advancing capitalism in
10
Jonathan Fenby, “Modern China – The Fall and Rise of a Great Power, 1850 to the Present”, 1st
Edition, HarperCollins Publishers, the United States
{P.646 – Chen Yun’s camp published an article with a radically-left slogan in the People’s Daily called
“Better Red Than Expert” when Zhu Rongji promoted to be the vice-premier charged with supervising
industrial restructuring.}
11
(Same as above) [P.649 – The New-Old Generation]
12
Edition, HarperCollins Publishers, the United States [P.653 – The New-Old Generation] {The decline
of Li Peng}
5

China.
For sure, like the neutral tactic of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin dared not to infuriate
the conservatives by a thorough abandonment of communist morality, or else he
would suffer from the similar political miseries of either Hu Yaobang or Zhao Ziyang.
While reiterating his unquestioned obedience to Deng Xiaoping’s ideological legacy,
Jiang inclined to Chen Yun as a pseudo-appeasement tactic13
, even though he
disfavored with Chen Yun’s extremely-leftist perceptions. Such a straddling gesture of
expediential alliance with particular conservative representatives enabled him to
reconstruct socio-economic solidarity without octogenarian hindrances.
Thereafter, Jiang Zemin moved forward his secured strategy of “confiscating Li
Peng’s bureaucratic power with a tempting cup of wine”. Beyond his action of
undermining Li’s authority from the Premier position of PRC State Council to the
figurehead title of being the Head of CCP National People’s Congress, Jiang rewarded
Li Peng’s inheritors, who were ensured of having qualifications in overseas studies, to
operate the state-run enterprises. Zhu Rongji14
was then appointed as the First Deputy
Prime Minister to strengthen the Shanghai faction against the left-conservative
personnel in Beijing. With the back-up of Jiang, Zhu Rongji acted as a vigorous anti-
corruption and reformative leader to overthrow the corrupted, inferior and brutal
cadres in the revived ‘pro-soviet traditionalist camp’. Zhu prosecuted Chen Xitong,
the PLA Military General of Zhongnanhai in Beijing City, who committed serious
bribery and commanded a military suppression on the student activists on 4 June
13
{Having incurred some displeasure from the Paramount Leader for leaning towards the Chen Yun
camp at the start of the economic debate, Jiang Zemin swiftly trimmed his sails to gain Deng’s backing,
though the patriarch brought a younger man, Hu Jintao, into the Standing Committee of the Politburo
as his chosen candidate for the succession when Jiang stepped down in 2002}
14
Limited, United Kingdom [P.54 – Zhu Rongji, the latter helicoptered up Prime Minister with just three
years to ‘First Deputy Prime Minister’]
6

1989. Jiang Zemin noticed that, Li Peng, being the Premier of State Council beyond
1989, was incapable in undermining the predominance of corrupted conservatives,
specifically Chen Xitong. Thus, Jiang chose the alternative of deducting Li Peng’s
influence and appointed Zhu Rongji as the new Premier to plan for an attack on Chen
Xitong.
Eventual softening attitude of Yang Shangkun and Bao Tong
With regards to the emergent socio-economic downturn after the 1989 turmoil, Deng
Xiaoping couldn’t rely on conservatives to reconstruct the national economy from the
political ruins. He had to seek Jiang Zemin as an alternative cadre, who was both
loyal to the party constitution and was able to restrain the oppositional force, while
continuing with the capitalist reforms. When Deng handed the chairmanship of the
Military Affairs Commission to Jiang Zemin, he undoubtedly disappointed President
Yang Shangkun, who saw himself in the job15
. Yang Shangkun’s family network
within the CCP bureaucracy was unpredictably strong, as his 72-year-old brother was
a general secretary of the Military Affairs Commission. Deng’s appointment of Jiang
Zemin from Shanghai faction, which shocked Yang and his intimate followers,
undermined the authority of left-minded conservatives to predominate the direction of
national economic modernization, as well as deducting conservatives’ significance in
terms of solely manipulating their military power to stabilize the whole nation.
Yang Shangkun noticed that, Jiang got the backing from both Chen Yun and Deng
Xiaoping; while his intimate follower, Hu Jintao, was receiving the support from an
octogenarian general called Liu Huaqing. Thus, Yang’s confrontational attitude
15
Edition, HarperCollins Publishers, the United States [P.642 – The New-Old Generation]
7

against reformative camp became soften. When Jiang went out his way to warn
against leftism and insisted on the need to do everything to liberate productive forces,
Yang Shangkun also came out in support16
. Yang finally stepped down form the
Politburo at the age of eight-five. Yang’s younger brother, due to an opposition from
the PLA members, was also dropped from the Military Affairs Commission. With no
doubt, Deng Xiaoping’s eagerness on cutting the ‘Yang Family Party” down to size17
was fulfilled once Jiang came up with the presidential title after 1989.18
When Jiang Zemin signified the business people as being recognized in playing a
politically acceptable role, Bao Tong reconciled with the economic reform camp by
stressing his forbearance to the patriotic contributions of left-minded merchants:
“If the regime held out an olive branch to ‘red-capitalists’, this did not
imply the loosening of the principle of one-party rule. On the contrary, it
implies that it is now time for the CCP, which controls all, to admit the
unspoken truth and formally declare that it has become China’s Party for
the Rich, the Noble and the Power. It is that simple, and should come as
no surprise. The theory of ‘Three Represents’ will not begin a new era of
democracy. Nor will those red-capitalists attracted by absolute power
become the engine for political reform.”19
Bao Tong showed his unprecedented acceptance to those Chinese entrepreneurs, who
remained loyal with the PRC Regime regardless of their miserable experiences during
the forceful egalitarianism in Mao’s Cultural Revolution. Being assimilated by Jiang’s
perceptions, Bao Tong further understood that, to recollect talents for a prospective
16
17
18
{Jiang Zemin decreed in response to Yang Shangkun’s resentment: “It is normal to have differences of
opinion, but opposition in action is not allowed. Anybody who fails to realize this point is no
Communist!”}
19
Edition, HarperCollins Publishers, the United States [P.642 – The New-Old Generation] {Bao Tong’s
statement}
8

socio-economic modernization, ‘red experts’ could not be defined between two
extreme sides of sharp contrasts without room for ambiguity. Rather, under the
condition of selfless devotion and unbiased (faction-free) patriotism, entrepreneurs
could come to collaborative terms with the Communists. As Bao Tong was willing to
abandon his suspicions upon capitalists, Jiang could secure his strategy of regulating
a free-market economy with a facilitation of Party supervision.
Jiang strived equilibrium between traditional constituents and modern economic
philosophy with his immense trust to Shanghai faction
Throughout Jiang Zemin’s endeavor of reintegrating PRC regime with economist
cadres, it was assumed that Jiang was a ‘pragmatic socialist’ who die-heartedly
inherited Deng’s ideal. He gave up communist radicalism and political romanticism20
,
but to adore gradualism and realism that suited the new nationalist and patriotic goals
of contemporary Chinese civilization. To discipline the masses and ensure a
widespread unity from the civilian field, Jiang initially restored the autocratic values
from traditional Chinese cultures. Jiang manipulated the old verities within the
authoritative PRC personnel hierarchy to gradually alienate Li Peng and other left-
minded conservatives, with an ingenious adoption of ‘expediential appeasements’ and
‘alternative alliances’ to consolidate his justification to the ideological re-
modifications based on modern capitalist intelligences. In 2001, Jiang proclaimed
“Three Represents” as the ideological legacy of his cored leadership, namely
“advanced productive forces’, “advanced culture” and “the fundamental interests of
the majority”21
. With a rejection to Zhao Ziyang’s ideal, a full and genuine Chinese
20
Edition
in 2006, Routledge, USA & Canada [P.204 – ‘Jiang’s Pragmatic Attempts’, from ‘Intra-party
democracy: A revisionist perspective from below’ by He Baogang]
21
9

democracy, with multi-party system as the supplement, was forbidden to coexist with
the domination of Communist Party. In accordance to Jiang’s idea of “socialism with
Chinese features”, which undoubtedly offended the ‘red psychology’ of left-minded
conservative camp, the open-mindedness of PRC Regime was only limited to a
forbearing absorption of financial and entrepreneurial experiences from the West, for
example, the introduction of rural enterprises, agricultural banks, foreign investments
to farming activities and rural-currency reforms.
CONFUCIAN VALUES AS A LEGITIMIZATION OF
JIANG’S SUPREME AUTHORITY OF “TOTALISM”
The collapse of Maoist Socialism as an ideology-based solidarity would lead to an
undermining of CCP’s authoritative control over its cadres. Such phenomenon was
reflected from the widespread abuse of power and corruption by provincial leaders.
The growing tendency for the rural officials in terms of abusing their bureaucratic
power for individual financial benefits continued to tyrannize the populace after the
Tiananmen crackdown22
. Even the student protestors roared their emergent demands
for a widespread prosecution of monetary bribes, the corrupted cadres, both from the
leftist camp or from Zhao Ziyang’s camp, were still not alarmed by the administrative
crises in 1989 and continued with their financial embezzlements, injustice connivance
upon the inferior power, and illegal exploitation of people’s wealth. Meanwhile, Jiang
dared not to radically transform the PRC Regime into a democratic state with multi-
party and judiciary system as a move to outlaw the brutal cadres, as he feared of a
possible intensification of military decentralization within such a complicated
factionalized institution of the whole nation. Jiang’s introduction of old Confucian
22
(Same as above) [P.353 – Reason for Jiang to curb democracy: Re-ideologization]
10

thoughts in his ideological legacy was an applicable alternative, apart from either
Liberalism or Maoist Fundamentalism, to re-unify the Chinese populace that had
become disillusioned with socialist morality and was indulging in Western
individualism.
Rule by virtue
To strive for equilibrium between money-worship and spiritual endeavors, Jiang
Zemin introduced “Rule by Virtue” as his administrative legacy, in which the three
knowledgeable phrases were adopted from the principle of “faithful consciousness
with wholesome temperaments” (yi cheng xin zheng) from the texts of “The Virtues
of Tertiary Studies” (Da Xue):23
1. To cultivate and make oneself useful to the society (siushen)
2. To look after the family and have a strong sense of family responsibilities (qijia)
3. Peace and harmony under heaven (pintianxia)24
Not only did these phrases provide a code of conduct for party cadres with bad
absence of an official ideology, the spiritual affections from the behavioral
methodology, so-called “etiquette” (li), were to complement the legal system of PRC
Regime. Yet, as Law deterred people from doing evil, Jiang never denied the
significance of moral values, human feelings and family concerns to harmoniously re-
modify people’s personalities, as well as recollecting submissiveness from the
populace through educational means. With the influx of entrepreneurial utilitarianism,
Jiang upheld the Confucian values in a modernized manner, similar to the emergence
23
Cai Fanglu, Shu Dagang and Guo Qi, “New Horizon, New Interpretation – Zhu Xi’s Ideology and
Modern Society” (VOL.1), 1st
Edition in Dec 2007, Sichuan University Publication Limited, PRC
[P.208 - “The Innermost Temperaments of Zhu Xi’s Civilian-based Ideal and Humanist Values” by Tan
Ping, Dean of Arts and Professor of Chengdu University] {Textual origin of ‘siushen’, ‘qijia’ and
‘pingtianxia’ 修身、齊家、平天下}
24
Wang Gungwu & Zheng Yongnian, “Damage Control – The Chinese Communist Party in the
Jiang Zemin Era”, 1st
Edition in 2003, Eastern University Press, Singapore [P.313-314 & P.350: Rule
by Virtue]
11

of Neo-Liberalism25
, by encouraging business people to develop individual
professional ethic codes26
, or else the PRC would exert a limited degree of
interventionist policy in order to stabilize the civic economy.
Chinese understanding of ‘Party’ as a collective solidarity
Jiang reiterated the importance of “one-party rule” as enabling the PRC Regime with
a monitoring role to request people for making a consistent dedication to the
nationwide populace. Yet, the third generation of PRC leadership had a faithful
determination to improve CCP’s congress system and provincial politics, but it didn’t
imply that people could enjoy fully-pledged privileges in liberalistic and individualist
development or share political says with the bureaucrats. Yet, both Deng and Jiang did
not deny the usefulness of democracy in upgrading the socio-economic standards of
Chinese civilization, but they reserved the progress as the least prior concern,
stressing that the pluralistic democratic path should combine with Chinese values
which suited the pragmatic national conditions, such as the socio-economic needs of
vast agricultural majorities and the predictable resistance from the octogenarian
military influences within the provincial strata.
1. At a normative level, Party is a collective concept excluding private interest.
Party is for the promotion of collective and public interests such as community
and nation-state beyond private ones.
2. The Party is, or represents, the whole, the CCP represents all peoples in China
25
Edition, HarperCollins Publishers, the United States [P.654 – Neo-liberalism in economic development:
a limited extent of interventionist policy in the capitalist reform]
26
Edition in 2003, Eastern University Press, Singapore [P.359 – Rule by Virtue]
{Jiang’s loyal scholars argued that rule by virtue cannot be understood only in the context of China’s
cultural development, but also in socio-economic progress……. Jiang does not mean to go back to
such an ancient virtue. It is not meant to repeat China’s traditional values but to modernize these
values in modern socio-economic circumstances.}
12

and is equivalent to Chinese nation. Party = state = government = people. The
concept of party does not contain the idea that party becomes a party.
3. Because the Party is, and represents, the whole on a collective basis, factions
within the Party are denied in terms of moral principles, unity and solidarity. In
real party life, factions do exist but the Party suppresses them.
4. CCP monopolizes political power in the name of providing national security,
unity and social control. This is a link between one-party domination and denial
of liberal democracy.
5. Dissent is an enemy of the Party; and discipline is a key to maintaining the unity
of the Party.
6. The Party believes that plural parties will lead to disintegration.27
Yet, the Communist Party made an unprecedented toleration to the emancipation of
people’s intellectual thoughts and rational decision-makings, specifically the
individual hedonism of urban people’s livelihood. However, with regards to the
ancestral ideology of Maoist socialism as the legitimate pursuit of CCP Constitution,
Communists’ leadership authority, for sure, could not be institutionally offended. All
the decision-makings were not to accommodate the ever-diversifying and ever-
varying interests of particular bourgeoisie or intellectual groups in this contemporary
Chinese society, but to accommodate the universal goodness in accordance to the idea
of “collectivization”. Therefore, individualist privileges was ready to subordinate to
the national development, Party prestige and socialist commandment, and
unquestioned obedience was a vital factor to successfully uphold “totalism” (or to say,
post-totalitarianism) and ensure no hindrance to achieve national strength.
“Limited Response Model”
A flexible and comparatively humanized gesture of punishing the post-Tiananmen
dissidents in response to the international expectations
27
Edition in 2003, Eastern University Press, Singapore [P.341-342: Limited
Response Model]
13

Though Jiang Zemin noticed that the bloodshed guilty of left-minded conservatives in
June Fourth Incident could not be re-assured for the sake of preventing from another
trend of factional confrontation, he still endeavored to reconstruct a limitedly liberal
image whenever tackling with diplomatic functions. By demonstrating China with a
benevolent, compassionate, harmonious, peaceful, approachable, civilian-based,
ethical and liberal image in accordance to what Confucius expected an immortal
nation to possess; the PRC could gain more resources, tremendous applause and
greater recognition which thus benefit China in resolving unification issues with
Taiwan28
.
Prospectively speaking, the PRC Regime could not always resort to “Tiananmen-
liked” suppressive measures while the civic disputes emerged. To minimize the social
implications of those fragmented protests (such as employment disputes, conflicts
between workers and provincial governments, racial conflicts or the disturbance of
China Democratic Party in the late 1990s), a “limited response” model was applied to
make the controversy milder. Realizing that the leftist ideological forces and
octogenarian revolutionary cadres eventually retreated from the political arena, Jiang
Zemin chose not to constitute too much pressure on citizens with new mentality,
rationale and civic demands. Jiang Zemin would pressure the provincial cadres to
pacify the resented people in a low-profile manner29
, for example, publishing the
rivals in the less important newspaper columns and exiling the imprisoned dissidents
28
Edition in 2003, Eastern University Press, Singapore [P.322: Limited political
open-mindedness of Jiang]
{Take for example; China’s recent signing of two international conventions concerning human rights.
And, during the United States’ President Clinton’s visit to China, live television broadcasting was
permitted, during which President Clinton openly criticized the Chinese government’s handling of the
June Fourth Incident. For this openness, the Chinese government received tremendous applause from
abroad and, within the country, the liberalists did not take this opportunity to rise and act against the
government.}
29
Edition in 2003, Eastern University Press, Singapore [P.342 – Nature of “limited
response” model]
14

to receive medical treatments in the United States30
as a mean of minimizing the
psychological disfavor of the Hong Kong, Taiwanese and Overseas-Chinese
intellectuals.
As He Baogang commented, it is difficult for China (PRC Regime) to break her
holistic tradition (mainly in institutional and constitutional aspects) to endorse an
individualistic concept of the party31
in accordance to the Western mode of democratic
thoughts. What Jiang Zemin could do at most, as Zheng Yongnian and Lai Hongyi
indicated, was to strive for a balance between law and morality during legislation and
administration of justice, with an addition of establishing a system of moral
evaluation and moral supervision. Jiang’s occasional demonstration of flexibility in
the issues of human rights and domestic policies was appropriate to the “etiquette”
proclaimed by Confucian ethics, in which he showcased a limited extent of quasi-
citizen forbearance under his ultimate attempt of “totalism” and “post-totalitarian
authoritative rule”.
EVENTUAL PATH TO MODERN BUREAUCRATIC
PHILOSOPHY
As Lance L.P. Gore commented, the institutional acceptance of capitalist
entrepreneurs, which was an inevitable alternative for PRC China to reverse its
dilemma of economic stagnation and impoverished livelihood after the 1989 Turmoil,
would accelerate enormous contradictions within the established bureaucratic
30
(Same as above) [P.342 – Nature of “limited response” model] {Liu Nianchuan, Chairman of China
Democratic Party, was released and allowed to go with his family to the United States with the reason
of “receiving medical treatments overseas”.}
31
Edition
in 2006, Routledge, USA & Canada [P.205 – ‘Creating a Chinese model of democratization?’, from
‘Intra-party democracy: A revisionist perspective from below’ by He Baogang]
15

operations of Communist Party32
. The nation-wide implementation of ‘Shareholding
Collaborative System’, ‘Ordinance on Asset Ownership’, ‘Hoisted and Publicized
Land-Speculation System’ and ‘Ordinance of Entrepreneurship’ had to be
accommodated by judiciary re-modifications and abolishment on totalitarian manner
of commercial censorship. These provided an insurant framework to maintain the
transparency of monetary creditability, autonomy of property usage, incorporative
procedures, and financial transactions on banking, trading, shares and security bonds,
while a higher degree of autonomy was granted to commercial aspirators for their
sustainable utilization of wealth on national advancements. The first thing Jiang
Zemin had to do, same as what Deng Xiaoping expected, was to continue with a
wholesome normalization of relationship between Communists and commercial
strata. Gerontocracy, which symbolized a stagnation of developmental incentives, had
to be revised to ‘slightly and repressively demonstrate’ how the new generation of
CCP leadership forbore with professionalism, as well as bridging the durational gap of
CCP bureaucratic philosophy with the universal trend of institutional etiquette for a
better presentation of national image.
Jiang Zemin defined an “Age Limit” to regulate leadership succession and personnel
reshuffling33
. This helped the CCP to legitimize the admission of private entrepreneurs
and constitutionally avoided the cored leader to maneuver their “elderly
statesmanship” without mental rationale through a personal reservation of marshal
influence even after their institutional retirement. But, as Wang Gungwu and Zheng
Yongnian stated, Jiang enforced such an ideological breakthrough, which was
regarded as not in accordance to both the Maoist tradition of ‘idolatry’ and the
32
Edition in 2003, Eastern University Press, Singapore [P.30 – ‘Rethinking the
Collapse of Communism: The Role of Ideology Then and Now’ by Lance L.P Gore]
33
Edition in 2003, Eastern University Press, Singapore [P.15 – The establishment
of “age” as an institutional factor regulating power succession]
16

Confucian tradition of ‘aging ethical hierarchy’ because the CCP encountered the
crisis of recruitment due to the “brain drain” after the widespread outlaw of
bourgeoisie activists in 1989. To revive the authoritative reputation of CCP as an
aspiration of fulfilling his desire for personal glory, Jiang dared to restrain the
dissident voices of left-minded conservatives with political gestures and encountered
himself with the demands of private entrepreneurs.
Of course, Jiang Zemin knew that the younger Communist generations might be even
more experienced, civilized and open-minded in economic, managerial and global
philosophies. Thus, he re-enlightened a “limited revisionism” on the “nomenclature”
through a deepening of Cadre Personnel System. Seeing that a compromising
atmosphere was fabricated between conservative and reformative camp, Jiang
assigned Zeng Qinghong with the directorship of Central Organization Department,
rather than the Ministry of Personnel, to conduct open appointment and selection of
4th
CCP cored leadership34
. Jiang initially enabled democratic experiments in the
provincial levels under the ‘Public Notification System’35
. With the intensification of
“household responsibility system” in agricultural provinces as a manner of
discouraging rural emigrations, peasants were allowed to vote for their village leaders
through the rural elections (e.g. Ya’an Multiple-candidate Election for Party
Secretary36
) as a mechanism to foresee provincial leaders with merit-based civil
service under the popular supervision. In case of bureaucratic incompetence, peasants
could individually present their petitions to the State Council through a decent arrival
at Beijing, and cadres of central government could better solicit public feedbacks on
the performance of provincial cadres.
34
(Same as above) [P.288-289 – Deepening the Cadre Personnel System]
35
(Same as above) [P.288-289 – Deepening the Cadre Personnel System]
36
Edition
in 2006, Routledge, USA & Canada [P.194 – Intra-party Democracy]
17

However, Jiang Zemin’s limited release of socio-economic autonomy resulted in an
alienation of de-moralist influences without a vigorous supervision from profound
legal restrictions, in which the commercial gratification of authoritative entrepreneurs
was rewarded at the expense of privileges from weakness groups. As power
decentralization was put into effect with an immature system of social-welfare
protectionism concerning poor peasants’ secured attempts to judiciary appeals, the
provincial leaders could not be prevented from having bribing connections or the so-
called “mutual-understandings” with the authoritative entrepreneurs, who might
jointly construct latitude to disobey the indeed expectation of Beijing authorities and
drag their feet in carrying out the center’s policies. Whenever ‘land conscriptions’
were conducted for infrastructural developments that enforced a non-compensational
confiscation of peasants’ ancestral farmlands, the tortured minorities hardly made
emptive counteractions to obstruct the offending transactional procedures within the
dichotomized institutional circulations between central and provincial governments
due to the intra-bureaucracy personnel coherences.
CONCLUSION:
NEO-TRADITIONAL IMAGE OF COMMUNISM
UNDER JIANG TO ACCOMMODATE THE
CAUTIOUS SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROWTH
To sum up, Jiang Zemin obtained his presidential reign as he skillfully appeased the
octogenarians, as well as being unquestionably submissive with Deng Xiaoping’s
leadership, during the factional struggles between conservatives and liberalists.
However, Jiang was requested to reconstruct the post-1989 economic order based on
Deng Xiaoping’s cautious and moderate framework of PRC modernization. Thus,
while Jiang was introducing political recentralization for a better ideological
18

censorship on various provinces, he still endeavored to apply Confucianism as a mean
of relaxing the rigidity of the totalitarian model in terms of positing “a rich subculture
of instrumental-personal ties’ around the formal communist institutional hierarchy37
.
Under the condition of not threatening the constitutional legitimacy of Marxism,
Socialism with Chinese features and one-party dictatorship, a comparatively greater
room of liberty was eventually re-released to local entrepreneurs, bourgeoisie, traders
and other commercial aspirators by the end of 1990s, as individuals were enabled to
pursue private interests and personal advancements based on an ever-normalized
state-society relationship. But, these groups of economists were foreboded from
talking about institutional democratization. Knowing that the preoccupation of left-
minded conservatives would result in poisonous roots of “class-struggle” and
“collectivized” ideas, which hindered the wholesome socio-economic revival of PRC
Regime; Jiang thus induced the authoritative octogenarians to better influence those
who took part in Tiananmen Crackdown to surrender their supreme cadre positions.
The most famous phrase Jiang had ever adopted to criticize Li Peng and his
conservative fellows was, “To break the shackles of traditional conceptions and
subjective prejudices, and overcome our habit of following the beaten track and
rejecting new things” 38
. According to Jiang’s pragmatic cherishment, the fundamental
interest of Chinese majority in the aspect of daily livelihood was more significant than
theoretical indoctrination and ideological mobilization, whereas the improvement of
socio-economic circumstances had to be done in accordance to evolutionary logics.
Though Jiang remained less open-minded in political, constitutional and judiciary
changes with regards to his concentration on nationwide stability, his prior effort in
37
Edition in 2003, Eastern University Press, Singapore [P.31 – Neo-traditional
image of communism]
38
Edition, HarperCollins Publishers, the United States [P.651 – Jiang Zemin urged cadres to abandon
their conservative thoughts]
19

abandoning the Maoist model of collectivized economy deserves recognition as he, in
accordance to Deng’s ultimate expectation, pushed China towards a new millennium
of well-being nation with ‘interventionist capitalism’ as foundation.
Reference Materials
1. Wang Gungwu & Zheng Yongnian, “Damage Control – The Chinese
Communist Party in the Jiang Zemin Era”, 1st
Edition in 2003,
Eastern University Press, Singapore
2. Jonathan Fenby, “Modern China – The Fall and Rise of a Great
Power, 1850 to the Present”, 1st
Edition, HarperCollins Publishers, the
United States
3. Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard & Zheng Yongnian, “The Chinese Communist
Party in Reform”, 1st
Edition in 2006, Routledge, USA & Canada
4. Robert Benewick and Paul Wingrove, “China In The 1990s”, 1st
Edition in 1995, McMillian Press Limited, United Kingdom
20

5. Cai Fanglu, Shu Dagang and Guo Qi, “New Horizon, New
Interpretation – Zhu Xi’s Ideology and Modern Society” (VOL.1), 1st
Edition in Dec 2007, Sichuan University Publication Limited, PRC
21

Deng-Jiang modernization in the largest conservative backlash

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