Debating the USA PATRIOT Act Donna L. Point[1] Introduction The nature of the problem for research purposes is to explore the pros and cons of the USA PATRIOT Act. The paper will endeavor to find documentation that answers such questions as: who benefits from the provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act; who is harmed; what evidence exists that political rhetoric played a part in the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act; where are we now; have we gone too far? Since its inception, the USA PATRIOT Act and indeed the “War on Terror” have been controversial.  In less than six weeks, with no public debate and very little debate in the House or Senate, this legislation was set in motion. The document is over three hundred forty pages in length and affected over fifteen statutes. Most members of Congress voted for this bill without ever reading it. As our leaders rushed to respond to an enemy they did not understand well but nonetheless knew must be defeated, many concluded that the danger we faced was unlike any other in American history. They also ascertained that new approaches were needed to secure our nation, even if certain constitutional rights were curtailed in the process (Center for American Progress 2005). A Los Angeles Times poll taken on September 13 and 14, 2001, found that sixty-one percent of Americans believed that they would need to “give up some civil liberties” in order to confront terrorism (d’Estree and Busby 2001). President Bush announced on September 14, 2001, “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” (Stern 2004). This legislation, once enacted, included a laundry list of sought after law enforcement and investigatory tools perennially denied by Congress because they encroached on domestic issues of privacy (d’Estree and Busby 2001) (Weigel 2005). Many policy remedies that would have been unthinkable only days before the attacks suddenly seemed prudent. A focused examination of the provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act and what they mean to law enforcement, to governmental agencies, and to the average citizen provide the insight necessary for critical examination of these issues. The Provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act The provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act have been hotly debated since its inception, both in Congress and the arena of public opinion. The key provisions will be identified along with their meanings to both governmental agencies and the average citizen.  Section 203 (b) and (d) information sharing: allows information from criminal probes to be shared with intelligence agencies and other parts of the government. These provisions are at the heart of the effort to break down the barriers that used to separate criminal and intelligence investigations. The United States Justice Department has frequently blamed these barriers for the failure to find and detain September 11th hijackers prior to the attacks. CIA agents had information significantly prior to the attacks that some of the hijackers were in the Un.

1. Debating the USA PATRIOT Act
Donna L. Point[1]
Introduction
The nature of the problem for research purposes is to explore
the pros and cons of the USA PATRIOT Act. The paper will
endeavor to find documentation that answers such questions as:
who benefits from the provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act;
who is harmed; what evidence exists that political rhetoric
played a part in the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act; where
are we now; have we gone too far?
Since its inception, the USA PATRIOT Act and indeed the “War
on Terror” have been controversial. In less than six weeks, with
no public debate and very little debate in the House or Senate,
this legislation was set in motion. The document is over three
hundred forty pages in length and affected over fifteen statutes.
Most members of Congress voted for this bill without ever
reading it. As our leaders rushed to respond to an enemy they
did not understand well but nonetheless knew must be defeated,
many concluded that the danger we faced was unlike any other
in American history. They also ascertained that new approaches
were needed to secure our nation, even if certain constitutional
rights were curtailed in the process (Center for American
Progress 2005). A Los Angeles Times poll taken on September
13 and 14, 2001, found that sixty-one percent of Americans
believed that they would need to “give up some civil liberties”
in order to confront terrorism (d’Estree and Busby 2001).
President Bush announced on September 14, 2001, “Either you

2. are with us, or you are with the terrorists” (Stern 2004). This
legislation, once enacted, included a laundry list of sought after
law enforcement and investigatory tools perennially denied by
Congress because they encroached on domestic issues of
privacy (d’Estree and Busby 2001) (Weigel 2005). Many policy
remedies that would have been unthinkable only days before the
attacks suddenly seemed prudent. A focused examination of the
provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act and what they mean to law
enforcement, to governmental agencies, and to the average
citizen provide the insight necessary for critical examination of
these issues.
The Provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act
The provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act have been hotly
debated since its inception, both in Congress and the arena of
public opinion. The key provisions will be identified along with
their meanings to both governmental agencies and the average
citizen. Section 203 (b) and (d) information sharing: allows
information from criminal probes to be shared with intelligence
agencies and other parts of the government. These provisions
are at the heart of the effort to break down the barriers that used
to separate criminal and intelligence investigations. The United
States Justice Department has frequently blamed these barriers
for the failure to find and detain September 11th hijackers prior
to the attacks. CIA agents had information significantly prior to
the attacks that some of the hijackers were in the United States
and were suspected terrorists, but the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) claims they did not receive the information
until August 2001.
The government claims that existing procedures of disclosure
made investigators afraid of sharing information between the

3. criminal and intelligence sides of the probe. Civil libertarians
claim that the failure to share information was largely a result
of incompetence and misunderstanding of the law. They claim
that investigators were allowed to share grand jury information,
which this Act specifically authorizes. Critics claim that
investigators should have to explain why such information is
being shared between governmental agencies and that only
information related to terrorism or espionage should be
released. Critics also warn that unrestricted information sharing
could lead to the development of massive databases containing
confidential information about the lives of innocent citizens
(Abramson and Godoy 2006).
Section 206 Roving Wiretaps: this provision allows one wiretap
authorization to cover multiple devices, eliminating the need for
a separate court authorization to wiretap a suspect’s cellular
phone, computer or Blackberry. The United States Justice
Department has complained for many years about restrictions
that required separate court authorizations for each device used
by the target of an investigation. This provision specifically
allows for roving wiretaps against suspected spies and
terrorists. The government claims that they have had this type
of flexibility in criminal cases and that it is much needed in
dealing with technologically sophisticated terrorists.
Surveillance experts however, claim that criminal wiretaps must
ascertain whether the person under investigation is the one
using the device before the wiretap takes place. In order to
move from one device to another, the government must make
sure that the subject of the surveillance identified by the
warrant currently uses that device. Civil libertarians claim that
that the vague language of the USA PATRIOT Act could lead to
privacy violations of innocent citizens that come into casual
contact with the suspect (Abramson and Godoy 2006).

4. Under Section 206, FBI agents do not need to identify
the suspect in order to obtain a wiretap authorization and install
their communication surveillance devices. An undercover
connection is installed in the neighborhood of the targeted
individual or on the telephones of his or her relatives. It is not
necessary to demonstrate in any way that the individual under
surveillance even uses these telephones. This measure is known
as a “John Doe” connection since the person in question does
not have to be named before being subjected to surveillance.
Under this section, the government can legally monitor the
telephone of any individual, without having to show that that
individual is connected with a foreign power, terrorism, or any
criminal activity (Paye 2006).
Section 213 Sneak and Peek Warrants: this provision allows
“sneak and peek” search warrants, which grants authorities
authorization to search a home or business without immediately
notifying the target of a probe. Investigators still have to
explain why they want to delay the search notification and must
eventually notify the target about the search (Abramson and
Godoy 2006). Under this provision the FBI is permitted to enter
a home or an office in the absence of the occupant. During this
secret investigation, FBI agents are authorized to take
photographs, examine computer hard drives, and install a device
known as the Magic Lantern. Once installed, the Magic Lantern,
records all computer activity not just those transmitted over the
internet. The United States Justice Department claims that this
provision has already allowed investigators to search the houses
of drug dealers and other criminals without providing advance
notice that might have jeopardized the investigation (Paye
2006). Critics claim that investigators already had the power to
conduct secret searches in counterterrorism and
counterespionage probes. They claim that the USA PATRIOT
Act authorized the use of this technique for any crime, no
matter how minor. Civil Libertarians claim that sneak and peek

5. searches should be narrowly limited to cases in which an
investigation would be seriously jeopardized by immediate
notice (Abramson and Godoy 2006).
Section 215 Access to Records: this provision allows
investigators to obtain “any tangible thing” including books,
records, papers, documents and other items sought in connection
with a terrorist investigation. This is probably the most hotly
debated provision of the law and has become known as the
“libraries provision.” This section does not require any
individualized suspicion to get a court order for any record
wanted in an intelligence investigation. It allows the FBI, by
means of a secret authorization from a court, to have access to
any and all personal data without having to demonstrate that the
inquiry has anything to do with terrorism or a foreign power.
No one is allowed to reveal to another person that the FBI
sought to obtain or has obtained “tangible things” under this
section. The new version of this article makes it possible to
challenge this stipulation and the Justice Department has agreed
that the recipient of a Section 215 order can consult with an
attorney after a waiting period of one year. However, the
government has the right to override such a challenge for
reasons of national security (Paye 2006).
Critics of the USA PATRIOT Act attack the breadth of the
provision, saying that the law could be used to demand the
reading records of library or bookstore patrons. The Department
of Justice has denied that Article 215 has ever been used to
obtain library records. However, civil libertarians point out that
since 2001, federal agents have visited several libraries and in
fact, have obtained records from 178 of them. The real number
of these requests may be much higher since the USA PATRIOT
Act makes illegal any disclosure on the part of the institutions
concerned (Abramson and Godoy 2006).

6. One of the reasons Section 215 is so controversial is
due to Article 505 National Security Letters. This clause
expands the possibilities for the FBI or other governmental
agencies to obtain a National Security Letter. The letter is a
type of administrative subpoena granting access to medical and
financial data, as well as data from travel agencies, casinos,
automobile rental agencies, and library records. The Bush
administration has steadfastly refused to include a standard in
this article expressly allowing doctors, lawyers, and priests to
challenge any effort by government agents to get privileged
communications from patients, clients, or penitents. The FBI is
able to obtain authorization for these records outside the context
of any counter-espionage investigation. The USA PATRIOT Act
has led to a marked increase in the FBI’s use of National
Security Letters, one hundred times the historic average. The
FBI itself has admitted that National Security Letters allow the
Bureau to collect information about citizens who are not
suspected of any wrongdoing (Boykoff 2006). According to a
report from the Justice Department’s Inspector General in
March 2007, the FBI has issued about thirty thousand letters per
year and one hundred forty three thousand requests for
information through National Security Letters from 2003 to
2005 alone. Additionally, the report found that the Bureau had
often used the letters improperly and sometimes illegally
(Liptak 2007).
Section 218 Foreign Intelligence Wiretaps and Searches:
Criminal investigators have a high bar to reach when asking for
permission to wiretap or search a suspect’s home. This
provision lowers the bar for launching foreign intelligence
wiretaps and searches in counterterrorism or counterespionage
probes, where investigators must only prove that the suspect is
an “agent of a foreign power.” This provision authorizes secret

7. searches of a residence or business, without notification, if
there is a “reasonable presumption” to believe that the residence
or business contains information relative to the activity of an
agent of a foreign power. The existence of any proof or
indication of a crime is not required.
Prior to the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, federal agents
and investigators had to certify that the primary objective of the
search concerned obtaining intelligence in connection with the
suspect foreigner (Paye 2006). This provision allows
investigators to get a foreign intelligence wiretap or search
order, even though they may end up bringing criminal charges
against the suspect. The law now permits secret searches of
anyone’s home, foreigner or United States citizen, on the mere
suspicion that this individual is more or less linked to terrorism.
Critics of the USA PATRIOT Act claim that investigators will
too easily use spying and terrorism as an excuse to launch
foreign intelligence and wiretap searches. Additionally, they
point to the fact that the number of intelligence wiretaps now
exceeds the number of criminal wiretaps. Civil libertarians
claim that since these probes are conducted in secret, with little
oversight, abuses could be difficult to uncover (Abramson and
Godoy 2006).
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA)
allows wiretapping of aliens and citizens in the United States
based on a finding of probable cause to believe that the target is
a member of a foreign terrorist group or an agent of a foreign
power. The Federal Wiretap Act, sometimes referred to as Title
III, was adopted in 1968 and expanded in 1986. It sets
procedures for court authorization of real-time surveillance of
all kinds of electronic communications, including voice, email,
fax, and internet in criminal investigations. It normally requires
that before a wiretap can commence, a court order is issued by a

8. judge, who must conclude based on an affidavit submitted by
the government, that there is probable cause to believe that a
crime has been, is being, or is about to be committed (Center
For Democracy Technology 2006).
Title III was incorporated into the USA PATRIOT Act and
comprises the International Money Laundering Abatement and
Anti-Terrorism Financing Act of 2001. The major focus of this
Act is to affect how money flows through the borders of the
United States. It was designed to help combat terrorism and
help dismantle the finances used to fund terrorist activities.
This Act is divided into three parts. Subtitle A implements
measures that regulate international money laundering, shell
banks, and correspondent accounts. Subtitle B amends the Bank
Secrecy Act. The Bank Secrecy Act was specifically designed to
combat money laundering by requiring banks to meet specified
requirements. Subtitle B additionally, provides a new regulatory
framework through the United States Treasury to aid in the
detection and prosecution of laundered monies. Subtitle C
creates new currency crimes and regulation procedures. This
Act also created new penalties for smuggling cash across United
States borders, for the prohibition of money transmitting
businesses commonly known as hawalas, and for extraterritorial
jurisdiction in the enforcement of these new provisions
(d’Estree and Busby 2001). These are just a few of the many
controversial provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act. The
viewpoints on this subject are divergent and will be discussed in
length.
Positions that support the USA PATRIOT Act
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush
administration sought to make a powerful statement to citizens,
who were looking to the White House for leadership. The Bush

9. administration emphasized the need for anti-terrorism
legislation to be enacted quickly and with considerable support
from Congress. In a hearing before the House Judiciary
Committee on September 24, 2001 United States Attorney
General John Ashcroft opened his statement on behalf of the
proposed legislation with these words:
Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee, the
American people do not have the luxury of unlimited time in
erecting the necessary defenses to future terrorist acts. The
danger that darkened the United States of America and the
civilized world on September 11 did not pass with the atrocities
committed that day. They require that we provide law
enforcement with the tools necessary to identify, dismantle,
disrupt, and punish terrorist organizations before they strike
again. (Ashcroft 2001)
Political solidarity became a potent strategy for a White House
seeking to advance its legislative agenda in the aftermath of the
terrorist attacks. Approximately one month later, on October 26,
2001, the USA PATRIOT Act, was adopted with overwhelming
support in the Senate (98-1) and by a large majority in the
House of Representatives (357-66) (Domke, et al. 2006).
Supporters of the USA PATRIOT Act maintain that
presidents need a greater authority to act during war than in
peacetime. The “War on Terror” has given proponents of broad
executive authority an opportunity to assert and consolidate
powers for the executive branch. Unlike new legal policies for
detaining, interrogating and trying terrorism suspects, the USA
PATRIOT Act has remained much as it was originally passed in
2001, despite legal challenges and renewal requirements.
Congress has been reluctant to change or reject even the most

10. sweeping provisions when they came up for renewal in 2005
(Krause 2007).
Prior to 1978, and dating back to at least World War II,
attorney generals of the United States routinely authorized
warrantless FBI surveillance, wiretaps, and break-ins for
national security purposes. The practice was justified because
obtaining a warrant in each disparate case resulted in
inconsistent standards and posed unacceptable risks. Attorney
generals were never entirely comfortable with warrantless
searches, whose legality had never been confirmed by the
Supreme Court, so in 1978, the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) became law. This law enabled sitting
district court judges to conduct secret hearings to approve or
disapprove government applications for surveillance. It also
authorized the gathering of foreign intelligence only for its own
sake (primary purpose), and not for the possible criminal
prosecution of any foreign agent (Bork 2003).
Supporters of the USA PATRIOT Act also believe that
depriving certain captured individuals of access to lawyers and
holding them without filing charges does not in any way violate
the Geneva Convention. In order to qualify a person as a lawful
combatant under the Geneva Convention, four criteria must be
met. “He must be under the command of a person responsible
for his subordinates; wear a fixed distinctive emblem
recognizable at a distance, carry arms openly; and conduct
operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war”
(Bork 2003 p. 32). The men the United States has captured and
detained so far in the “War on Terror” do not meet these
criteria. Furthermore, according to United States policy, if a
captured unlawful enemy combatant is believed to have further
information about terrorism, he can be held without access to
legal counsel and without charges being filed. Once the

11. government is satisfied that it has all the relevant information it
can obtain, the combatant can be held until the end of the
hostilities, be released, or be brought up on charges before a
criminal court (Bork 2003).
The detention of enemy combatants serves at least two
vital purposes. First, detention prevents enemy combatants from
rejoining the enemy and continuing to fight against America and
her allies. In this respect, captivity is neither a punishment nor
an act of vengeance, but instead a simple war measure. Second,
detention in lieu of prosecution relives the burden on military
commanders to litigate the circumstances of capture around the
world. If a combatant is to be tried, the venue of choice is a
military tribunal. Military tribunals have played an important
and honorable role in American jurisprudence throughout our
history. Military tribunals have been used by several Presidents
in time of war. During the Revolutionary War, before there was
a Constitution, George Washington used them frequently.
Abraham Lincoln used them in the Civil War and Franklin
Roosevelt used them in World War II (Bork 2003).
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, our
country had no choice but to develop new techniques to combat
terrorism. Law enforcement agencies and intelligence agencies
alike were forced to devise new methods to protect our citizenry
from the menace of violence and the potential use of weapons of
mass destruction against our homeland. Prior to the attacks of
September 11, 2001, governmental entities acknowledged that
cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence agencies
was less than ideal. Grand jury testimony and information
obtained from court-authorized FBI wiretaps often could not
legally be passed on to law enforcement and the intelligence
community. Additionally, the transmission of intelligence
information to law enforcement was inhibited due to fear of

12. compromising sophisticated electronic surveillance techniques
or jeopardizing the lives of under-cover operatives and
cooperating witnesses. Since the passage of the USA PATRIOT
Act, a broad national consensus has developed regarding the
need to fully empower those to whom we have assigned the task
of fighting terrorism. The Bush administration’s post-September
11, 2001 security measures were not only reasonable, but they
sustained rather than undermined constitutional democracy
since “democracy is endangered not when strong measures are
taken to enhance safety, to protect and reassure the public, but
when those measures are not taken” (Boykoff 2006 p. 470).
Positions that do not support the USA PATRIOT Act
When a nation faces deadly attacks on its citizens at
home and abroad, it is only reasonable to expect that its leaders
will take appropriate measures to increase security. Civil
liberties can only survive under governments with the power to
protect those liberties from attack. Civil liberties are guaranteed
by the Constitution of the United States and imply the existence
of an organized society that maintains public order without
which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained
abuses. Unfortunately, in the case of the USA PATRIOT Act,
increased security leads to the systematic dismantling of civil
liberties. Critics that do not support the USA PATRIOT Act,
argue that the Act imposes “guilt by association” on aliens by
requiring deportation of any alien associated with or endorsing
a terrorist organization. Critics also assert that the detentions of
aliens without a hearing or a showing that they pose a threat to
national security are both standards below those provided to
criminal defendants. Non-United States citizens, suspected of
terrorist activities can be tried by special jurisdictions and
detained for an indefinite period of time. These and other
measures such as: detention based only on suspicion;
confinement of witnesses; special rules on the communication

13. between suspects and their attorneys; establishment of
exceptional jurisdictions; were extended to law enforcement and
intelligence agencies by a “Military Order” passed on November
13, 2001 (Thornburgh 2005) (Paye 2004).
Many believe that the USA PATRIOT Act has made life
much more difficult for both Muslims and people of Middle
Eastern descent living in the United States. Critics of the Act
cite abuses and cases where they feel the government has gone
too far in their pursuit of terrorist suspects. One such case that
has fanned the flames of skepticism is the story of Sami Omar
Al-Hussayen. Mr. Al-Hussayen was a Ph.D. candidate at the
University of Idaho; he was a native of Saudi Arabia who lived
in the United States for nine years studying computer science.
In February 2003, the FBI raided his home. He was charged
with three counts of terrorism, four counts of making false
statements and seven counts of visa fraud. Mr. Al-Hussayen’s
“crime” was helping design a web site for the Islamic Assembly
of North America, which the government said promoted “radical
Islamic ideology.” This type of work was prohibited by a USA
PATRIOT Act provision that made it a crime to give “expert
advice or assistance” to foreign terrorist groups. The state of
Idaho stood by and watched as Mr. Al-Hussayen spent a year in
prison while the government built its case. At his trial, the
government insinuated that Mr. Al-Hussayen had terrorist ties
based on his computer records. Mr. Al-Hussayen’s attorneys
argued that the “expert advice” provision violated his First
Amendment rights. In June 2004, Mr. Al-Hussayen was
acquitted of all terrorism charges (Weigel 2005).
Title III of the USA PATRIOT Act scrutinizes the ways
that money changes hands and is monitored in the post
September 11, 2001 world. This section especially Subtitle A,
has specific implications for commerce that are fundamentally

14. international in nature. The Secretary of the Treasury has the
power to impose certain regulatory restrictions on how banks
and financial institutions do business with American firms, at
home and abroad. The main theme that runs throughout Subtitle
A is that law enforcement authorities in the United States must
be able to identify to whom the money belongs, where it has
been, and where it is going, in order to detect the movements of
terrorist or other criminal funds. Subtitle C of the Act, makes
the act of smuggling bulk cash a criminal offense and authorizes
the forfeiture of any cash or instruments of bulk cash
smuggling. Subtitle C also makes it a crime punishable by five
years in prison to run an unlicensed money transmitting
business. This provision specifically refers to hawalas, which is
defined as an “alternative or parallel remittance system”
(d’Estree and Busby 2001 p. 116). Immigrant workers in the
United States annually send thirty billion dollars to relatives
back home using hawala systems (d’Estree and Busby 2001).
These financial flows help to lubricate developing third world
countries economies. Hawala systems are ancient and are
ingrained in many cultures from the Middle East to Africa and
India. In the United States there are thousands of hawalas
operating in ethnic grocery stores, travel agencies and notary
offices. These “mom- and-pop” institutions lack the legal
fortitude and political influence of major banking institutions
and are receiving intense scrutiny since the passage of the USA
PATRIOT Act. Only a tiny fraction of these hawala transfers
are even suspected of having any ties to terrorist activities.
There is far more evidence that implicates the traditional
banking institutions in money laundering and terrorist funding
activities. The USA PATRIOT Act affects the lives of specific
people who are unrelated to terrorist activities, such as
immigrants who are typically left out of the mainstream United
States financial system. (d’Estree and Busby 2001).
The Bush administration’s strategic communications

15. and accompanying news coverage did much to convert the
public’s support after the terrorist attacks into tangible political
capital, culminating in the passage of desired legislation such as
the USA PATRIOT Act. Perhaps the most troubling side-effect
of the “War on Terror” has been the temptation to imagine that
the threats we face as so extreme that ordinary moral norms and
laws do not apply. As Thurgood Marshall once stated:
History teaches that grave threats to liberty often come
in times of urgency, when constitutional rights seem too
extravagant to endure ... when we allow fundamental freedoms
to be sacrificed in the name of real or perceived exigency, we
invariably come to regret it.[2]
After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941,
the government moved quickly to forcibly relocate and intern
over one hundred-thousand Japanese-Americans, more than two-
thirds of whom were American citizens. The government’s
action was based not on individual suspicion or a sensible
assessment of the threat, but on membership in a particular
ethnic group. It is interest to note that at the height of World
War II, the United States Supreme Court upheld this evacuation
policy (Center for American Progress 2005).
Conclusion
An Army Manual defines terrorism as “the calculated
use of violence or threat of violence to attain goals that are
political, religious or ideological in nature” (Chomsky 2003 p.
605-606). This act of terrorism is carried out in various ways
such as intimidation, coercion or instilling fear. Being safe and
being free are not mutually exclusive. We do not gain one by
giving up the other. The Constitution of the United States of
America has survived many threats, including civil

16. insurrections and world wars. It is precisely during times of
crisis that rights must be most steadfastly defended. The
protection of constitutional liberties need not, and indeed
should not deprive the government of the authority necessary to
vigorously apprehend terrorists, prosecute them and defend the
homeland. America’s credibility in the world has been
dangerously compromised by the Bush administration’s blatant
disregard for the rule of law. The doctrine of preventive war,
which was used to launch the “War on Terror,” accords the
Bush administration the sovereign right to take military action
at will to control and destroy any challenge it perceives
(Chomsky 2003). The Bush doctrine is in essence a return to the
claim of right to use force or any other means necessary to
pursue national interests (O’Connell 2003).
This is not the first time in American history that political
leaders advocated and justified the suspension of civil liberties
by emphasizing national security and evoking feelings of
nationalism. As Benjamin Franklin once noted, “If we surrender
our liberty in the name of security, we shall have neither”
(Thornburgh 2005). In order to regain respect in the eyes of the
world, the president must comply with all international
agreements to which the United States is a party. Additionally,
the United States must comply with customary international
law, including the Geneva Conventions and the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment. When we adopt the principle of
universality we adhere to the premise: if an action is right or
wrong for others, it is right or wrong for us as well. Those who
do not rise to the minimal moral level of applying to themselves
the standards they apply to others, cannot be taken seriously
when they speak of right and wrong or good and evil. Only by
respecting and obeying the law, as we compel other to do, can
the United States enlist international cooperation in the “War on
Terror.”(Center for American Progress 2005) (Chomsky 2002).

17. The USA PATRIOT Act Improvement and Reauthorization Act
was signed into law on March 9, 2006.The Bush administration
succeeded in avoiding the introduction of any restrictive
judicial controls over permanent measures. Many of the
provisions that had a “sunset” clause, meaning that once the
clear and present danger dissipated they would disappear, did
not happen. Instead, fourteen temporary measures, adopted in
2001 as emergency procedures, were made a permanent part of
the Act. The “new” Act authorizes the imprisonment, for an
indefinite period of time, of foreigners suspected of terrorism,
without trial or indictment. It also establishes widespread
surveillance of the entire population. It left unchecked the
provisions that grant “sneak and peek” warrants and National
Security Letters among others. Government actions and official
proceedings should be as transparent as possible in times of war
and peace. The government should be held accountable for its
actions through our system of checks and balances as the
founding fathers intended. Measures undertaken by the
government should be narrowly tailored to the goal of
enhancing our security not threatening our civil liberties.
President Bush has been quoted as saying that “There’s no
telling how many wars it will take to secure freedom in the
homeland.” We are now in the midst of a new political order.
We have moved from a state of emergency into a permanent
state of exception with no end in sight. It is very difficult to tell
if one is a terrorist or not until they have committed a terrorist
act. Unwarranted suspicion renders even a perfect procedure
useless and may push the associative guilt beyond the
legislative intent. This “war” has not divided the terrorists it
has divided the allies. (Paye 2006).
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