DDoS Attacks, Russia, 2011-
2012: Patterns and Trends


           Artyom Gavrichenkov
           ximaera@highloadlab.com
Statistics

    2011-2012: > 2500 attacks

    17% – ICMP/UDP/SYN/ACK flood

    40 attacks > 1 Gbps




                                   2
Statistics

    Max. attack duration before December,
    2011: 486 hours




                                            3
4
5
Statistics

    Max. attack duration, 2011-2012: 1228 hours




                                                  6
7/x
One botnet from Southern Asia

    2011, December, http://slon.ru: ~200000 bots

    2012, May, http://tvrain.ru: ~182000 bots

    ~500 IP addresses in common




                                                   8
Abuse from Indonesia

"what is your ip address 178.248.233.23. you've
done ip flooding / ddos to my server. please
stop to all conveniently. thx

178.248.233.23.80    >   x.x.x.x.56834: S ack
178.248.233.23.80    >   x.x.x.x.3821: S ack
178.248.233.23.80    >   x.x.x.x.4947: S ack
178.248.233.23.80    >   x.x.x.x.4948: S ack
178.248.233.23.80    >   x.x.x.x.32935: S ack



                                                  9
Statistics

    Max. registered bandwidth:
    56 Gbps (July, 2011)

    Max. botnet size:
    200000 bots (December, 2011)

    4 attacks from multiple botnets
    simultaneously

    Attacks often utilize the newest
    vulnerabilities


                                       10
http://www.nic.ly/   11
Monday

  Tuesday

Wednesday

 Thursday

    Friday

  Saturday

   Sunday
             0   100   200   300   400   500   600



                                               12
ISPs

    Weekends often see larger attacks

    ISP tech. support in Russia works better
    on workdays

    ISPs and IXPs often totally ignore abuses




                                                13
January
 February
    March
     April
      May
     June
      July
   August
September
  October
November
             0   20   40   60   80   100   120   140   160




 December excluded as untypical (legislative election)
                                                       14
Attack Goals

  Money

  Politics

  Botnet promotion

  Protest
+ B1TC01N$: BKDR_BTMINE.DDOS




                               15

DDoS Attacks, Russia, 2011- 2012: Patterns and Trends

  • 1.
    DDoS Attacks, Russia,2011- 2012: Patterns and Trends Artyom Gavrichenkov ximaera@highloadlab.com
  • 2.
    Statistics  2011-2012: > 2500 attacks  17% – ICMP/UDP/SYN/ACK flood  40 attacks > 1 Gbps 2
  • 3.
    Statistics  Max. attack duration before December, 2011: 486 hours 3
  • 4.
  • 5.
  • 6.
    Statistics  Max. attack duration, 2011-2012: 1228 hours 6
  • 7.
  • 8.
    One botnet fromSouthern Asia  2011, December, http://slon.ru: ~200000 bots  2012, May, http://tvrain.ru: ~182000 bots  ~500 IP addresses in common 8
  • 9.
    Abuse from Indonesia "whatis your ip address 178.248.233.23. you've done ip flooding / ddos to my server. please stop to all conveniently. thx 178.248.233.23.80 > x.x.x.x.56834: S ack 178.248.233.23.80 > x.x.x.x.3821: S ack 178.248.233.23.80 > x.x.x.x.4947: S ack 178.248.233.23.80 > x.x.x.x.4948: S ack 178.248.233.23.80 > x.x.x.x.32935: S ack 9
  • 10.
    Statistics  Max. registered bandwidth: 56 Gbps (July, 2011)  Max. botnet size: 200000 bots (December, 2011)  4 attacks from multiple botnets simultaneously  Attacks often utilize the newest vulnerabilities 10
  • 11.
  • 12.
    Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 12
  • 13.
    ISPs  Weekends often see larger attacks  ISP tech. support in Russia works better on workdays  ISPs and IXPs often totally ignore abuses 13
  • 14.
    January February March April May June July August September October November 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 December excluded as untypical (legislative election) 14
  • 15.
    Attack Goals  Money  Politics  Botnet promotion  Protest + B1TC01N$: BKDR_BTMINE.DDOS 15