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Detecting Autonomous
Systems Relationships


     Alexander Asimov
     <aa@highloadlab.com>
     Highload Lab
Our Goals

1. Traffic flow engineering
2. AS architecture design
3. BGP loop prediction
Traffic flow: prepend




  «Дерни за веревочку, дверка
откроется»… а может быть, и нет
AS architecture design

1. Where to place next point of
   presence?
2. How to forecast the
   vector/amount of traffic
   flow?
AS types
                 AS3

           AS1           AS2



                               AS4


 Is AS3 multihomed?
    Is AS4 transit?                  CORE



According to RFC - Yes
AS with separate parts




Two ASes with different route policy under
     one AS number! Transnational?
BGP Route Loops


Built-in defense for static loops

Dynamic loops!
BGP Route Loops
                                    AS-X
        200
  AS2               AS3
                          A
               200
                                    AS5

200
  AS1               AS4
                          A
              200             AS1             --

                              AS2             --

                              AS3          AS5 AS-X

                              AS4          AS5 AS-X
BGP Route Loops
                                    AS-X
        200
  AS2         A         AS3
                   200
                                    AS5
                         A
200
  AS1                   AS4
                  200         AS1               --

                              AS2          AS3 AS5 AS-X

                              AS3          AS4 AS5 AS-X

                              AS4            AS5 AS-X
BGP Route Loops
                                       AS-X
           200
  AS2            A         AS3
                      200
                                       AS5
      A
200
  AS1                      AS4
                     200         AS1          AS2 AS3 AS5 AS-X

                                 AS2          AS3 AS4 AS5 AS-X

                                 AS3            AS4 AS5 AS-X

                                 AS4              AS5 AS-X
BGP Route Loops
                                       AS-X
           200
  AS2                      AS3
                      200
                                       AS5
      A
200
  AS1            A         AS4
                     200         AS1    AS2 AS3 AS4 AS5 AS-X

                                 AS2          AS3 AS4 AS5 AS-X

                                 AS3            AS4 AS5 AS-X

                                 AS4    AS1 AS2 AS3 AS5 AS-X
BGP Route Loops
                                       AS-X
           200
  AS2                      AS3
                      200
                                       AS5
      A    Packets
200
  AS1            A         AS4
                     200         AS1    AS2 AS3 AS4 AS5 AS-X

                                 AS2          AS3 AS4 AS5 AS-X

                                 AS3            AS4 AS5 AS-X

                                 AS4    AS1 AS2 AS3 AS5 AS-X
BGP Route Loops
                                    AS-X
        200
  AS2                   AS3
                   200
                                    AS5
                         A
200
  AS1         A         AS4
                  200         AS1    AS2 AS3 AS4 AS5 AS-X

                              AS2          AS3 AS4 AS5 AS-X

                              AS3              AS5 AS-X
                    Again!
                              AS4              AS5 AS-X
BGP Route Loops


Built-in defense for static loops

Dynamic loops!
• Packet loss
• BGP Announce noise
Breaking down
1. Route flap
2. Change prepend policy
    AS-X AS-X
3. Prepend one of ASes in loop
    AS-X AS2 AS-X
    Makes AS2 ignore your route
Breaking down
    1. Route flap
    2. Change prepend policy
        AS-X AS-X
    3. Prepend one of ASes in loop
        AS-X AS2 AS-X
        Makes AS2 ignore your route
How not to fall into another loop?
One “killer” feature

    Autonomous Systems
        Reverse Map

And there are multiple projects…
Opte Project




   Beautiful!
DIMES




Interesting!
ROBTEX




Ok. But what will be used by my AS?
Missing features
• Physical links discovery
No use of route policy
• Macro map
Show links that are used by
somebody, not by your AS.
WHOIS services
Incompleteness


    Often        Sometimes      Never

                               ORIGIN
Accept Fliters    Prepend
                             EBGP vs IBGP

                                 IGP
 Local Pref
                   Med
                               Route ID
Inconsistency


From RIPE DB

aut-num:       AS42366
remarks:       Due to major changes this
object is outdated at moment
Missing features
• Physical links discovery
No use of route policy;
• Macro map
Shows links that are used by
somebody, not by your AS;
• Route policy data
Outdated, incomplete.
Deadlock?




No opportunity for route policy recovery!
Project goals

• There are more then 400k physical
  links at interdomain level;
• Only 40k links are used at every
  moment by each AS;
• The goal is to find out links, that
  could be used by single AS.
Route policy model

Accept Filters
                   Local Pref
 Local Pref
  AS_PATH        Prepend model
   ORIGIN
    MED
eBGP vs iBGP        Priority
     IGP
 Router_ID
Route policy model

           Accept Filters
                                       Local Pref
            Local Pref
             AS_PATH                 Prepend model
              ORIGIN
               MED
           eBGP vs iBGP                 Priority
                IGP
            Router_ID

Discover every route policy level!
Active policy discovery


1. Colored AS map
2. Traceroute
3. ping –R (spoofed)
Colored AS Map
AS4




AS2   AS1               AS3




      AS-X

             Prefix I
Colored AS Map
        AS4




PING!

        AS2   AS1               AS3




              AS-X

                     Prefix I
Colored AS Map
        AS4




PING!

        AS2   AS1               AS3




              AS-X

                     Prefix I
AS graph properties

BGP router announces
only what is used.

AS graph must be
connected by each
color!
Model Correction

                                AS3
Increase localpref
                           10         20
AS1  AS2
                     AS1              AS2
Verification Process

             BGP config
              change




  Model
                          Active probing
correction
WHOIS services check

 ARIN



APNIC                           ASes in RR %
                                Errors %

 RIPE


        0   20   40   60   80
Amount of neighbours
  AS Number    Description
   12389      ROSTELECOM
    9002          RETN
   20485      TRANSTELECOM
    6854        SYNTERRA
    3216         SOVAM
    8732        COMCOR
   31133        MegaFon
    2854        ROSPRINT
   39792        ANDERS
AS connectivity




AS1     AS2             AS3


               Level0
        AS-X
AS connectivity

                  Level1
AS4         AS5            AS6          AS7



      AS1         AS2             AS3


                         Level0
                  AS-X
AS connectivity
      𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝐴𝑆𝑋 =     𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑂𝑓 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑖 ∗ 𝑖

                     Level1
AS4           AS5             AS6           AS7



        AS1          AS2             AS3


                            Level0
                     AS-X
Top AS connectivity
 AS Number    Description
  12389      ROSTELECOM
   9002          RETN
  20485      TRANSTELECOM
  31133        MegaFon
   3216         SOVAM
   6854        SYNTERRA
   8744      STARTTELECOM
  39792        ANDERS
   8732        COMCOR
AS-QRATOR

          Neighbours       Connectivity
39792          9                8
41095          70             520
9002           2                2


         It is balanced!
Results

• Policy recovery is impossible;
• Active policy discovery is possible;
• There is unique graph for every AS;
• The only opportunity for
 engineering at interdomain routing
 level.
Keep your WHOIS records
       up to date



       Pretty please…
Thank you for
 listening!
   Questions?

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Detecting Autonomous Systems Relationships

  • 1. Detecting Autonomous Systems Relationships Alexander Asimov <aa@highloadlab.com> Highload Lab
  • 2. Our Goals 1. Traffic flow engineering 2. AS architecture design 3. BGP loop prediction
  • 3. Traffic flow: prepend «Дерни за веревочку, дверка откроется»… а может быть, и нет
  • 4. AS architecture design 1. Where to place next point of presence? 2. How to forecast the vector/amount of traffic flow?
  • 5. AS types AS3 AS1 AS2 AS4 Is AS3 multihomed? Is AS4 transit? CORE According to RFC - Yes
  • 6. AS with separate parts Two ASes with different route policy under one AS number! Transnational?
  • 7. BGP Route Loops Built-in defense for static loops Dynamic loops!
  • 8. BGP Route Loops AS-X 200 AS2 AS3 A 200 AS5 200 AS1 AS4 A 200 AS1 -- AS2 -- AS3 AS5 AS-X AS4 AS5 AS-X
  • 9. BGP Route Loops AS-X 200 AS2 A AS3 200 AS5 A 200 AS1 AS4 200 AS1 -- AS2 AS3 AS5 AS-X AS3 AS4 AS5 AS-X AS4 AS5 AS-X
  • 10. BGP Route Loops AS-X 200 AS2 A AS3 200 AS5 A 200 AS1 AS4 200 AS1 AS2 AS3 AS5 AS-X AS2 AS3 AS4 AS5 AS-X AS3 AS4 AS5 AS-X AS4 AS5 AS-X
  • 11. BGP Route Loops AS-X 200 AS2 AS3 200 AS5 A 200 AS1 A AS4 200 AS1 AS2 AS3 AS4 AS5 AS-X AS2 AS3 AS4 AS5 AS-X AS3 AS4 AS5 AS-X AS4 AS1 AS2 AS3 AS5 AS-X
  • 12. BGP Route Loops AS-X 200 AS2 AS3 200 AS5 A Packets 200 AS1 A AS4 200 AS1 AS2 AS3 AS4 AS5 AS-X AS2 AS3 AS4 AS5 AS-X AS3 AS4 AS5 AS-X AS4 AS1 AS2 AS3 AS5 AS-X
  • 13. BGP Route Loops AS-X 200 AS2 AS3 200 AS5 A 200 AS1 A AS4 200 AS1 AS2 AS3 AS4 AS5 AS-X AS2 AS3 AS4 AS5 AS-X AS3 AS5 AS-X Again! AS4 AS5 AS-X
  • 14. BGP Route Loops Built-in defense for static loops Dynamic loops! • Packet loss • BGP Announce noise
  • 15. Breaking down 1. Route flap 2. Change prepend policy AS-X AS-X 3. Prepend one of ASes in loop AS-X AS2 AS-X Makes AS2 ignore your route
  • 16. Breaking down 1. Route flap 2. Change prepend policy AS-X AS-X 3. Prepend one of ASes in loop AS-X AS2 AS-X Makes AS2 ignore your route How not to fall into another loop?
  • 17. One “killer” feature Autonomous Systems Reverse Map And there are multiple projects…
  • 18. Opte Project Beautiful!
  • 20. ROBTEX Ok. But what will be used by my AS?
  • 21. Missing features • Physical links discovery No use of route policy • Macro map Show links that are used by somebody, not by your AS.
  • 23. Incompleteness Often Sometimes Never ORIGIN Accept Fliters Prepend EBGP vs IBGP IGP Local Pref Med Route ID
  • 24. Inconsistency From RIPE DB aut-num: AS42366 remarks: Due to major changes this object is outdated at moment
  • 25. Missing features • Physical links discovery No use of route policy; • Macro map Shows links that are used by somebody, not by your AS; • Route policy data Outdated, incomplete.
  • 26. Deadlock? No opportunity for route policy recovery!
  • 27. Project goals • There are more then 400k physical links at interdomain level; • Only 40k links are used at every moment by each AS; • The goal is to find out links, that could be used by single AS.
  • 28. Route policy model Accept Filters Local Pref Local Pref AS_PATH Prepend model ORIGIN MED eBGP vs iBGP Priority IGP Router_ID
  • 29. Route policy model Accept Filters Local Pref Local Pref AS_PATH Prepend model ORIGIN MED eBGP vs iBGP Priority IGP Router_ID Discover every route policy level!
  • 30. Active policy discovery 1. Colored AS map 2. Traceroute 3. ping –R (spoofed)
  • 31. Colored AS Map AS4 AS2 AS1 AS3 AS-X Prefix I
  • 32. Colored AS Map AS4 PING! AS2 AS1 AS3 AS-X Prefix I
  • 33. Colored AS Map AS4 PING! AS2 AS1 AS3 AS-X Prefix I
  • 34. AS graph properties BGP router announces only what is used. AS graph must be connected by each color!
  • 35. Model Correction AS3 Increase localpref 10 20 AS1  AS2 AS1 AS2
  • 36. Verification Process BGP config change Model Active probing correction
  • 37. WHOIS services check ARIN APNIC ASes in RR % Errors % RIPE 0 20 40 60 80
  • 38. Amount of neighbours AS Number Description 12389 ROSTELECOM 9002 RETN 20485 TRANSTELECOM 6854 SYNTERRA 3216 SOVAM 8732 COMCOR 31133 MegaFon 2854 ROSPRINT 39792 ANDERS
  • 39. AS connectivity AS1 AS2 AS3 Level0 AS-X
  • 40. AS connectivity Level1 AS4 AS5 AS6 AS7 AS1 AS2 AS3 Level0 AS-X
  • 41. AS connectivity 𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝐴𝑆𝑋 = 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑂𝑓 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑖 ∗ 𝑖 Level1 AS4 AS5 AS6 AS7 AS1 AS2 AS3 Level0 AS-X
  • 42. Top AS connectivity AS Number Description 12389 ROSTELECOM 9002 RETN 20485 TRANSTELECOM 31133 MegaFon 3216 SOVAM 6854 SYNTERRA 8744 STARTTELECOM 39792 ANDERS 8732 COMCOR
  • 43. AS-QRATOR Neighbours Connectivity 39792 9 8 41095 70 520 9002 2 2 It is balanced!
  • 44. Results • Policy recovery is impossible; • Active policy discovery is possible; • There is unique graph for every AS; • The only opportunity for engineering at interdomain routing level.
  • 45. Keep your WHOIS records up to date Pretty please…
  • 46. Thank you for listening! Questions?