1. Cyclical Destruction of Readiness
In response to a response to a serving Army officer who noted that the cyclical nature of training and
readiness was cyclical, I differed as follows:
Readiness in the official example drops for over a year and barely makes it back to what they had at the
beginning. Why not start from where they are and make them better?
The concept of cyclical readiness/performance is a very old concept which was purged from the Army
after Vietnam because of the repression of combat effectiveness that it caused. In order to deal with
this bloody error, Systems Engineered Task and Performance engineering tied to specific missions was
borrowed from Strategic Air Command which they developed to deal with an inherent personnel glitch
that assigned less than the best pilots, Pilots did not want bombers. Transports were resume
enhancing. Fighters were macho.
Part of the exercise of the systems engineered SAC bomber force was the “operational readiness test”
inspection in which the wing or squadron was scrambled into a combat exercise without warning. Pilots
who failed were demoted and transferred, new guys got a double promotion and bonus.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_Air_Command_(film)
And the trailer:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WkQr2T83UJc
And then there was Khe Sanh in which Close Air Support was Danger Close as was Combat Service
Support
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zQjdNK6lhdM