cornell-policy-review1

Review
The Cor nell Policy
5
29
51
65
88
100
Vo l u m e 0 3
N u m b e r 0 1
Fa l l ’12
A r t i c l e s
Advising the Executive Branch:
The Role of Federal Advisory Committees
and Ways to Evaluate Their Effectiveness
Amanda K. Mullan, the National Academy
of Public Administration
Global Digital Divide: The Role of Information
and Communications Technologies (ICTs) in
21st Century Democracy
Chisheng Li, University of Michigan
Foreign Direct Investment’s Influence on
Regional Inequality and Innovation in Hungary
Mallory Young, Cornell University
The Effect of Private Detention Policy on
Immigrant Political and Social Incorporation
Greg Jette, Cornell University
C o m m e n t
Implementing Performance Measurement:
Reflections on Tompkins County New York
Luis A. Martinez and Henry McCaslin, Cornell University
I n t e r v i e w
Interview with Ambassador Aurelia Brazeal
Jennifer Shin and Michaela Vaporis, Cornell University

Review
The Cor nell Policy
V o l u m e 0 3 • N u m b e r 0 1 • F a l l ’ 1 2

Editor-In-Chief
Sarah Gardner Evans
Senior Managing Editor
Daniel Thomas Nolan II
Executive Editorial Board
Marcus Cerroni
Joseph Mizener
Michaela Vaporis
Associate Editors
Jonathan Davey
Olinda Hassan
Kelly Hughes
Dean Mack
Jennifer Shin
Jeremy Stull
Article Editors
Kayla Bettenhauser
Elena Bussiere
D’Andre Carr
Faraz Haqqi
Abeela Latif
Victor Tchakalov
Ellie Xue Zhong
Research Editors
Rebecka Flynn
Prabhat Gautam
Dahyeong Jeong
Steve Riester
Barbara Marchiori de Assis
Alexandra Popovici
Shunjie Tu
Yuxin Wu
Hui Zhao
Layout Editor
Celine Qian You
N o r m a n U p h o f f
Director of the Cornell Institute
for Public Affairs
R i c h a r d B o o t h
Professor of City and
Regional Planning
N a n c y B r o o k s
Visiting Associate Professor of
City and Regional Planning
N a n c y C h a u
Associate Professor of Applied
Economics and Management
R a l p h D e a n C h r i s t y
Professor of Emerging
Markets, Director of Cornell
International Institute for Food,
Agriculture and Development
K i e r a n D o n a g h y
Professor of City and
Regional Planning
G a r y F i e l d s
Professor of Labor Economics
Core Faculty of the Cornell Institute for Public Affairs
R i c k G e d d e s
Associate Professor of Policy
Analysis and Management
J o e G r a s s o
ILR School Associate Dean of
Finance, Administration and
Corporate Relations
R o b e r t H a r r i s , J r .
Professor of Africana Studies
D a n i e l P. L o u c k s
Professor of Civil and
Environmental Engineering
T h e o d o r e J . L o w i
John L. Senior Professor
of American Institutions
K a t h r y n S . M a r c h
Professor of Anthropology
P e r P i n s t r u p - A n d e r s e n
Professor of Food, Nutrition
and Public Policy
Staff of the Cornell Institute for Public Affairs
Jamaica Brown, Administrative Assistant
Jennifer Evangelista, Administrative Assistant
Lisa Jervey Lennox, Assistant Director for External Relations
Judy Metzgar, Administrative Manager
Cheryl Miller, Administrative Assistant
Laurie J. Miller, Service Learning Initiative Program Coordinator
Millie Reed, Career Services Coordinator
Thomas J. O’Toole, Executive Director
Review
Th e Cor n e l l Pol ic y

R
ecognizing deliberate and unintended effects of public decision-mak-
ing is critical for implementing equitable policy at the local, national,
and international levels. The authors of the articles presented in this
issue of The Cornell Policy Review seek to do just that. From implementing
performance measurement for greater municipal transparency, to examin-
ing the effects of foreign investment on emerging economies, the following
articles offer an interesting juxtaposition of equity and transparency issues
across localities, nations, and contexts.
Amanda Mullan discusses the performance of federal advisory committees, with
particular attention to the need for more rigorous evaluation and public access.
Mallory Young analyzes the impacts of foreign direct investment in Hungary,
specifically with regard to regional inequalities. Gregory Jette explores issues of
transparency between private detention centers and public immigration policy,
and how this relationship affects immigrant social incorporation.
We are also pleased to include Luis Martinez and Henry McCaslin’s commentary
on implementing a performance measurement system in Tompkins County, New
York. Concluding this issue is Michaela Vaporis and Jennifer Shin’s interview
with Ambassador Aurelia Brazeal, who details her diplomatic experiences as
well as the question of equality within the Foreign Service.
The Review staff encourages readers to consider not only how the policy
reflections and recommendations presented in this issue are applicable to their
specific contexts, but also to look for ways that these recommendations might be
adapted to solve similar challenges across substantive policy areas.
I am grateful to my Managing Editor, Daniel Nolan, to our excellent editorial
staff, and to our contributing authors for their efforts in crafting this issue. I am
also thankful for the support and encouragement of the CIPA staff at Cornell
University. On behalf of The Cornell Policy Review team, we hope that you enjoy
reading.
— Sarah Gardner Evans, MPA 2013, Editor-in-Chief
E d i t o r ’ s N o t e

A d v i s i n g t h e E x e c u t i v e B r a n c h 5
Advising the Executive Branch:
The Role of Federal Advisory Committees
and Ways to Evaluate Their Effectiveness
A m a n d a K . M u l l a n
A b s t r a c t
The Federal Advisory Committee Act1
(FACA) stipulates that advisory committees
must be more accessible to the public. To accomplish this, FACA requires the General
Services Administration (GSA) to oversee advisory committees and report certain
information to Congress and the public. Despite increased openness and account-
ability, the Act falls short in a number of areas. The increasing number of advisory
committees renders the evaluation of the system’s effectiveness necessary. In order to
perform a thorough analysis of committees’ productivity and effectiveness, more ac-
curate and relevant data is needed. Once an analysis is conducted, Congress or GSA
should require that government agencies provide advisory committees with feedback
about their recommendations and suggest ways for advisory committee members to
improve in the future.
A b o u t t h e A u t h o r
Amanda Mullan is a Research Associate at the National Academy of Public Ad-
ministration. She is currently working on a team conducting an assessment of the
National Weather Service’s organizational structure. Prior to joining the Acad-
emy, Amanda worked as an intern at the Congressional Research Service in the
Government and Finance Division concentrating on Executive Branch Operations.
She has recently completed her Master’s thesis on the Federal Advisory Commit-
tee Act and approaches to increase the effectiveness of the federal advisory com-
mittee system. Amanda holds a Masters in Public Administration from Cornell
University and a Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science from SUNY Cortland.

6 M u l l a n
Introduction
F
ederal advisory committees exist in almost every United States federal
agency as a means for government employees to solicit advice from pri-
vate individuals. More than 1,000 advisory committees exist, counseling
over fifty federal agencies. They advise on a wide array of topics ranging
from travel and stem cell research, to homeland security. Whereas the president
of the United States and Congress acknowledge that advisory committees are ben-
eficial to the policymaking process, an assessment of their cost-effectiveness has
not been completed. Although the General Services Administration (GSA) collects
data on advisory committees’ performance and effectiveness, the information pro-
vided is not sufficient for the required level of analysis. Determining how many
recommendations an advisory committee provides for an agency and how many
of those recommendations are implemented by the agency can provide insight
into the effectiveness of a committee. The GSA currently collects information on
performance measures, however the data provided is inconsistent. Since the data
is inconsistent, it cannot be used to adequately determine the effectiveness of fed-
eral advisory committees. It is unclear if GSA has the authority to collect this data
without an amendment to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA).2
Without accurate information to evaluate the effectiveness of advisory com-
mittees, it is difficult to determine if federal advisory committees are accountable
to the American public. On his first day in office, President Barack Obama issued
a memorandum to the heads of all executive departments and agencies, making
transparency and accountability a priority of his administration.3
On December 6,
2009, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) released a similar memoran-
dum titled, “Open Government Directive,” which included further instructions on
how departments and agencies should create and implement an open government
plan.4
It is unclear what impact these policies have on improving the accountability
of the federal advisory committee system. In response to these memoranda, the GSA
created an updated FACA website, which provides the same data as the FACA Da-
tabase, but in different formats. The Obama Administration also issued Executive
Order 13490, prohibiting agencies from appointing federally registered lobbyists
as members of federal advisory committees.5,6,7
Thus far, it is unclear what impact
the executive order has had on recommendations made by advisory committees.
The following actions are recommended to better assess the effectiveness
and the accountability of federal advisory committees: collect relevant data to

conduct a thorough evaluation of advisory committee performance, require agen-
cies to provide feedback to advisory committees explaining why their advice was
or was not implemented, and identify best practices that agencies should adopt
to improve the functionality of their advisory committees. The GSA should also
develop distinctive methods of data collection for evaluating peer review com-
mittees, as they operate differently than most other advisory committees. To give
GSA the authority to collect more information, an amendment to FACA may be
required.
The History of Federal Advisory Committees
The president’s use of advisory committees is a long-established practice. Since
the days of George Washington, presidents have sought advice from the public.8
Congress showed little interest in regulating the executive branch’s use of advi-
sory committees, even though their undertakings were largely concealed from
Congressional oversight.9
It was not until the good government initiatives of the
1960s and 1970s that Congress took significant legislative action to increase its
oversight of the advisory committee process.10
Congress implemented these initia-
tives amid growing concerns among legislators regarding the rapidly increasing
number of advisory committees. Other concerns included the committees’ lack of
oversight, accountability, transparency, and unknown operational costs.11
In 1970, the House Committee on Government Operations, chaired by Rep-
resentative Chet Holifield of California, held investigatory hearings to determine
ways for Congress to increase its regulation of the executive branch’s use of advi-
sory committees.12
In a report titled, “The Role and Effectiveness of Federal Ad-
visory Committees,” the Committee on Government Operations identified several
problems with the federal advisory system. The Committee found a significant
number of unknown federal advisory committees in operation.13
The committee
also found it impossible to collect accurate and complete records for the number of
advisory committees existing in 1970.14
By one estimate, there were 198 presiden-
tial committees, with annual operating costs of nearly $50 million.15
The analysis
of the Committee on Government Operations appears to indicate that the presi-
dent, and many of the executive branch agencies, disregarded reports submitted
by federal advisory committees.16
The Committee’s conclusion was that Congress
failed to properly oversee federal advisory committees, which led to the develop-
ment of a system that lacked accountability and transparency.17

8 M u l l a n
Following the House Committee on Government Operations’ report, several
legislative actions were taken based on the Committee’s concerns and recommen-
dations. In 1971, the House of Representatives considered H.R. 4383, which ap-
plied to all federal advisory committees. This bill contained specific membership
requirements as well as a version of the “fairly balanced” provision that would
require the membership of individual advisory committees to reflect differing
opinions.18
The Senate considered a bill which would require “at least one-third
of the members” serving on an advisory committee to be experts in that commit-
tee’s relevant subject matter. Two other Senate bills included “fairly balanced”
provisions.19
By 1972, the House of Representatives and the Senate established a
conference committee to combine the Senate bills and H.R. 4383, to be considered
by both houses of Congress.20
The result of this committee was FACA, which was
signed into law by President Nixon on October 6, 1972.21
Issues Addressed by the Federal Advisory Committee Act
FACA addresses major concerns that Congress had regarding advisory commit-
tees. The Act promotes transparency, requires public participation, and attempts
to limit the influence of special interests by imposing membership requirements.
It aims to preserve scarce federal resources by requiring justifications for the
creation of committees, in addition to periodic reviews.22
FACA also includes a
stipulation that advisory committees should be purely advisory in nature, should
work specifically with executive agencies, and should be established only after
it has been determined that they are necessary. FACA defines the term “advisory
committee” to be:
Any committee, board, commission, council, conference, panel, task force, or
other similar group, or any subcommittee or other subgroup thereof which is
established by statute or reorganization plan or established or utilized by the
President or established or utilized by one or more agencies, in the interest of
obtaining advice or recommendations for the President or one or more agencies
or officers of the Federal Government ... The Advisory Commission on Intergov-
ernmental Relations, the Commission on Government Procurement, and any
committee which is composed wholly of full-time officers or employees of the
Federal Government.23, 24
Other government agencies that establish advisory committees are exempt from
FACA requirements, including the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal
Reserve System.25

FACA also attempts to ameliorate concerns that Congress and the executive
branch failed to oversee the operations of advisory committees. The Act obligates
standing committees in the House of Representatives and the Senate to oversee
the activities of advisory committees within their respective jurisdictions.26
When
Congress creates advisory committees, it must include information about the pur-
pose of the committee, how balanced membership will be achieved, and details
on appropriations and reports.27
Another requirement under the Act is that the
president must make annual reports to Congress about the advisory committees
in existence for that year.28
The OMB must conduct comprehensive reviews of
advisory committees to determine if the committee is duplicating work done by
another committee, whether they are serving their purpose, following relevant
statutes, and whether or not the committee should be abolished.29,30
The OMB
is also in charge of developing guidelines to help federal agencies and advisory
committees implement provisions of FACA.31
Agency heads must also designate
an Advisory Committee Management Officer to supervise advisory committee
meetings and reports.32

FACA also dictates certain actions that must be taken by the president when
creating an advisory committee, as well as oversight and reporting requirements
once the advisory committee is established. One requirement is that committees
must be authorized either by statute or by the president.33
Also, agency heads
must inform the public of the creation of an advisory committee via the Federal
Register.34
Additionally, an advisory committee must file a charter with the OMB
and the agency head that the committee reports to before it meets.35
The charter
must include the committee’s objectives, the time period needed to achieve its
objectives, a description of duties, an estimated annual budget, an estimate of
the number of meetings, and a termination date.36
Such documentation allows for
more transparency upon the creation of committees by Congress or the president.
The final provisions of FACA deal with administrative and financial report-
ing procedures that advisory committees must follow. These provisions mandate
transparent committee meetings and reports unless the advisory committee is
given a waiver.37
The committee is required to keep detailed records of its opera-
tions and to make those records available to the public.38
Additionally, a desig-
nated officer or employee of the federal government must be notified before com-
mittee meetings are held.39
Agencies are required to keep records of the advisory
committees and to provide support services to committees.40
Every two years,
each advisory committee is evaluated to determine whether they should be re-

10 M u l l a n
newed or terminated. Renewed advisory committees must file a new charter with
the OMB.41

Some issues associated with advisory committees were not addressed by
FACA. During the hearings held by the Committee on Government Operations in
1970, Congress concluded that the recommendations made by advisory commit-
tees were beneficial to the policy-making process. In its report titled, “The Role
and Effectiveness of Federal Advisory Committees,” the Committee on Govern-
ment Operations found that the president and administrative agencies ignored
many of the recommendations of advisory bodies that they had created.42
Even
so, the Act does not include any requirement that the president implement recom-
mendations made by advisory committees.43
Amendments to the Federal Advisory Committee Act
In 1977, Congress incorporated the Government in the Sunshine Act, which bol-
stered transparency requirements under FACA.44,45
That same year, President Jim-
my Carter signed Executive Order 12024, which transferred certain responsibili-
ties of OMB to GSA. Included in the transferred responsibilities was the regulatory
power codified in FACA.46
On February 10, 1993, President Bill Clinton issued Executive Order 12838 as
a part of the National Performance Review initiative. The order required executive
agencies to terminate at least one-third of existing discretionary advisory commit-
tees governed under FACA.47
The OMB issued Circular A-135, which created a cap
on the number of discretionary advisory committees that agencies were allowed
to establish, as well as a monitoring plan for existing committees.48
The Circular
forced agencies to submit committee management plans to the GSA and the OMB,
including performance measures to evaluate committees.49
Overview of the Federal Advisory Committee Act Database
From June 1997 to April 1998, the GAO conducted an audit to determine whether
the Committee Management Secretariat of the GSA was properly carrying out its
regulatory responsibilities as stipulated under FACA.50
The GSA developed the
FACA Database in response to the GAO’s concerns after the audit in June 1997.51
The current database contains a wide range of information about federal advisory
committees by fiscal year (FY), including committee members, committee desig-
nations, costs, charters, meetings, and establishment authority (which may include

the president, Congress, or an agency head).52
Committees are also designated as
active, newly created, administratively inactive, or terminated.53
The database
also provides the location of reports and recommendations made by each com-
mittee during that fiscal year.54
In federal fiscal year (FY) 2010, there were 1,045
registered federal advisory committees that contained a total of 74,321 serving
members.55,56
Committee Costs
In FY 2010, the cost of maintaining federal advisory committees was calculated
at $387,034,434. The costs that comprise this figure include payments to members
and federal staff; travel and per diem payments to members, staff, and consultants;
and other administrative costs.57
The most expensive advisory committee was the
Center for Scientific Review Special Emphasis Panel, which cost $22,718,965, or
5.87 percent of the total reported costs.58
Most of the costs associated with federal
advisory committees are payments made to non-federal members, federal mem-
bers, consultants, and federal staff. The total cost of these payments in FY 2010
was $242,565,121, or 62.7 percent of the total reported costs.59
In FY 2010, travel
and per diem payments cost $71,568,377 or 18.5 percent of the total reported
costs.60
In FY 2010, other administrative costs such as meeting rooms, commit-
tee transcripts, and the committee website totaled $72,900,936 or 18.8 percent of
the total reported costs.61
Although the total cost of federal advisory committees
is approximately 0.0001 percent of the total federal expenditures in FY 2010, gov-
ernment has a responsibility to its citizens to spend tax dollars in an ethical and
accountable manner.62
Reports
In FY 2010, the GSA counted 820 reports issued by 657 federal advisory commit-
tees. On average, advisory committees issued two reports per fiscal year.63
Other
advisory committees make informational recommendations to agencies, and it
remains unclear if those recommendations are included in the number of reports
issued in FY 2010. If committees are not issuing formal recommendations to agen-
cies, then perhaps the GSA should clarify these facts in the FACA Database. The
quantity of reports issued by an advisory committee is one method of determining
the committee’s productivity. If the data does not accurately portray the actions
of the committee, it appears as if the committee has been inactive. This would
subsequently render it unnecessary.

1 2 M u l l a n
Meetings
In FY 2010, federal advisory committees held a total of 7,290 meetings with an av-
erage of seven meetings per committee.64
Pursuant to FACA, committee meetings
are open to the public unless exempt under other legislation.65,66
Despite the pre-
sumption of openness, there were 4,927 closed meetings and 300 partially closed
meetings (meetings with open and closed sessions) in FY 2010.67
Most meetings
are exempt from openness requirements because committees are reviewing grant
applications dealing with personal or proprietary information.68
Given the nature
of grant-review committee meetings, it may be beneficial for GSA to clarify the
purpose of those meetings so it does not appear that FACA’s openness provisions
are ineffective.
Shortcomings of the FACA Database
Self-Reported Data by the Agencies
FACA stipulates that the GSA must report annually to the president about the ac-
tivities of all advisory committees it supervises. The FACA Database was designed
to enable the public to access information about advisory committees without
having to submit a request. The Database, however, is limited. All the data is self-
reported by the Designated Federal Officer (DFO) and Committee Management
Officer (CMO) of each committee and verified by the GSA, which reviews the data
and certifies it by fiscal year.
Data Inconsistencies
Given the number of federal advisory committees that report data to the GSA, it
is probable that there will be inconsistencies within the data. An inconsistency
found in the FY 2010 data consisted of two committees both dealing with bio-
ethical issues. On September 23, 2009, the President’s Council on Bioethics was
terminated. Yet on March 10, 2010, a new committee called the Presidential Com-
mission for the Study of Bioethical Issues emerged. Each committee had a differ-
ent committee identification number (12,151 and 73,519, respectively) and was
included in the total number of FACA committees in FY 2010.69
The FY 2010 com-
mittee, however, has the same members listed as the FY 2009 committee. They
also have the same committee web address.70
This overlap is problematic because
some raw datasheets reported both committees separately while others did not. In

A d v i s i n g t h e E x e c u t i v e B r a n c h 1 3
order to perform an accurate analysis of advisory committees by fiscal year, there
must be a consistent number of advisory committees.
Performance Measurements
A major concern for Congress when it passed FACA was that the executive branch
had been spending federal money on advisory committees while disregarding its
recommendations. The Act, however, does not contain any provision that requires
the executive branch to implement recommendations made by advisory commit-
tees. Since FY 2003, the GSA attempted to collect data that would enable the
agency to assess the efficacy of advisory committees.71
Such data is located within
the database on a webpage titled, “Performance Measures” and each advisory
committee’s DFO or CMO is asked to provide the GSA with that information.72
Although the GSA provides a description of how DFOs and CMOs should
report this information, the reports contain many reporting inconsistencies. The
“Performance Measures” webpage is intended to provide information about pro-
gram outcomes, cost savings to government, the number of recommendations made
by committees during their lifetime, the percentage of recommendations fully imple-
mented and partially implemented, how the agency interacts with the advisory com-
mittee, and how the federal advisory committee reports information to the public.73
It is unclear what information the GSA is looking for among DFOs or CMOs
that submit data. When they are asked to provide the GSA with total cost savings
of the committee, it is common for DFOs and CMOs to report that they are unable
to determine cost savings. The GSA does not provide advisory committees with
guidance as to how to calculate cost savings. Another question, “What is the ap-
proximate number of recommendations produced by the committee for the life
of the committee?” similarly elicits responses that are inconsistent. Some com-
mittees report the total number of recommendations made for that year alone,
while other committees report that they do not know the total number of recom-
mendations made for the life of the committee.74,75
The number of recommenda-
tions made by a committee is useful in analyzing the performance of an advisory
committee, but the GSA fails to implement proper procedures to collect accurate
information. The GSA also requires advisory committees to provide information
about “the approximate percentage of these recommendations that have been or
are expected to be fully implemented by the agency.”76
Many committees provide
this percentage but seem uncertain about the accuracy of their figure.77

14 M u l l a n
Subcommittees
Some advisory committees contribute information on subcommittees to the FACA
Database. FACA, however, does not require an advisory committee to provide
information about any subcommittee it has created in order to assist in the devel-
opment of policy recommendations.78
Without this requirement, it is impossible
to know whether the FACA Database contains an exhaustive list of existing sub-
committees. Additionally, there is a chance that subcommittees have members
that are not appointed by the agency, Congress, or the president, and have not
undergone an evaluation.79
The GSA cannot force committees to provide informa-
tion about subcommittees unless FACA is amended to include such a requirement.
The courts have found that FACA does not apply to subcommittees because of a
narrow reading of the definition of an advisory committee.80
Modern Issues and Proposals to Amend
the Federal Advisory Committee Act
Since FACA was passed, Congressional oversight of the federal advisory commit-
tee system has increased, more safeguards against unbalanced membership have
been enacted, and GSA has provided guidance on the creation and operation of
advisory committees; however, deficiencies that need to be addressed continue to
exist. Evidence suggests that certain agencies are not following the ethics require-
ments when choosing committee members. The operations of subcommittees still
lack transparency. Furthermore, peer and grant review committees that operate
differently from other types of committees may require a different set of per-
formance measurement standards. Legislative amendments may also be needed
to allow advisory committees to increase transparency and public participation
through the use of new technologies. Finally, without adequate data on the perfor-
mance of advisory committees, Congress and the GSA will be unable to evaluate
the usefulness of those committees.
Ethics Requirements
The GAO issued a report in 2004 advising the GSA and the Office of Government
Ethics (OGE) to update their guidance for agencies to ensure that they are not
misusing the membership designation of “Representative” to avoid ethics require-
ments associated with being designated a Special Government Employee (SGE).81
As a Representative, an individual is permitted to express his or her own opin-

ions. SGEs, however, are supposed to represent the interests of government.82
As
SGEs are expected to act in the government’s interest, they are required to notify
agencies of any external interests they may have.83
In 2004, an investigation by
the GAO identified several practices that they believed would help the GSA and
the OGE provide agencies with better guidance. These included “obtaining nomi-
nations from the public, using clearly defined processes to obtain and review per-
tinent information on potential members regarding potential conflicts of interest
and points of view, and prescreening prospective members using a structured
interview.”84
The report made twelve recommendations regarding appointment
categories, methods of obtaining information to ensure that committees are bal-
anced, and ways to increase transparency in the process.85
Administrative Conference Recommendations
The Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) recently released Rec-
ommendation 2011-7, which addresses several proposed amendments to FACA
aiming to reduce procedural burdens on agencies, and to develop best practices
for enhancing their transparency and objectivity.86
To alleviate the procedural
burdens placed on agencies when creating an advisory committee, the ACUS rec-
ommends that Congress remove the phrase, “after consultation with the Adminis-
trator,” from section 9(a)(2) of FACA. Section 9(a)(2) requires agencies to consult
the Administrator of the GSA before chartering a new advisory committee.87
An-
other recommendation made by the ACUS is for agencies and Congress to include
more information in committee charters to achieve a balanced membership.88
When Congress creates an advisory committee by statute, they should clarify “the
mission, estimated duration, budget, and preferred membership balance for the
committee,” as well as any exemptions the advisory committee may have from
FACA.89
The ACUS also recommends that the OMB remove the cap on the number
of discretionary advisory committees that agencies may create.90

The next set of recommendations made by the ACUS deal with clarifying
the scope of FACA. Congress should clarify which activities constitute “prepara-
tory work” which does not require prior notice and open meetings.91
The ACUS
also suggests that the GSA amend regulations regarding the implementation of
FACA to clarify how advisory committees may hold virtual meetings, including
teleconference or web-conferences, and publicly moderated web forums. The GSA
should review these processes and determine if such methods would increase the
efficiency and transparency of advisory committee meetings.92

16 M u l l a n
The last set of recommendations made by the ACUS relates to improving
the transparency and objectivity of advisory committees. Congress should amend
certain procedures dealing with ethics requirements, including clarifying the dis-
tinction between Representatives and SGEs.93
If agencies are able to grant conflict-
of-interest waivers, the ACUS recommends that they be placed online for public
review.94
The ACUS also recommends that the GSA encourage the use of technol-
ogy and the internet to expand public access to advisory committees, provided
that it is not too costly.
Peer Review Committees
Many of the peer review committees governed by FACA are used to evaluate the
merits of projects that are applying for federal government grants.95
For this rea-
son, they operate differently than most other advisory committees. For example,
they have high membership turnover, most of their committee meetings are closed
or partially closed because of the discussion of confidential information and they
mostly provide advice about the merit of applications, not policy. Some scholars
and government employees believe that because of these differences, peer review
committees should be exempt from FACA. During the House Subcommittee on
Government Management, Information, and Technology’s July 1998 hearing on
FACA, the Director of the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Executive Secretariat in-
dicated that FACA requirements were especially burdensome with regard to DOE’s
peer review committees.96
He argued that FACA’s requirements, in particular the
openness and public participation provisions, cannot be accomplished within the
peer review committee structure because of the number of meetings that are held
and the number of individual recommendations that are submitted.97
Performance Measurements
In 2004, GSA’s Office of Government-wide Policy (OGP) hired the polling and data
analytics firm Gallup to survey members of federal advisory committees. The
study, which became known as the GSA Advisory Committee Engagement Survey
(ACES), was conducted so that the GSA could assess committees’ performance
based on committee members’ opinions. After the survey, Gallup conducted tele-
phone interviews with members of advisory committees that received exceptional
ACES scores to determine best practices for other advisory committees to follow.98
Gallup found that the committee members of the highest scoring advisory com-
mittees felt that the reasons for their committees’ success were good membership

selection, an effective chairperson, regular interaction with stakeholders, a posi-
tive relationship with the parent agency, and a resourceful administrative staff.99

From the survey results, Gallup also identified the weaknesses of commit-
tees with lower scores. The determinants consist of a failure to receive feedback
from agencies on the advisory committee’s recommendations, and a failure of the
agencies to effectively use committee recommendations.100
Committee members
reported that they would receive agency feedback, but often informally. Some
committee members indicated that they would like to receive more agency feed-
back.101
Committee members also mentioned that if the agency had provided their
committee with more feedback, they would have been able to direct their recom-
mendations towards more specific goals. One committee member mentioned that
they were not provided with the standardized measurements the agency would
be using to evaluate committee recommendations. If they were provided with that
information, the members could work to make their recommendations useful for
the agency.102
Legislative Response
On October 6, 2011, Representative William Lacy Clay of Missouri proposed H.R.
3124, known as the Federal Advisory Committee Act Amendments of 2011.103
The
bill requires agencies to make committee appointments without regard for po-
litical affiliation unless directed by statute. The bill also clarifies the distinction
between members who should be designated as a special government employee
and as a representative. The individual should be considered a SGE if “the indi-
vidual is providing advice based on the individual’s expertise or experience,” or
designated as a representative if “the individual is representing the view of an
entity outside of the federal government.”104
This amendment also prohibits agen-
cies from appointing individuals as representatives in an effort avoid any ethics
requirements.
Another amendment applies to individuals who may attend meetings on a
regular basis and provide information, but have not been appointed as members
or are employees of the federal government. If such individuals exist, they must
be made a member, otherwise they are not permitted to participate. With regard to
agencies that have advisory committees, the bill requires that the recommendations
be made independent of the views of the agency. Lastly, the bill requires agencies
to publish information about their advisory committees on their website, and des-

1 8 M u l l a n
ignate an Advisory Committee Management Officer to supervise the committee.105
As
of October 13, 2011, the bill was reported by unanimous consent from the Committee
on Oversight and Government Reform to the House Ways and Means Committee.106
Recommendations and Conclusions
Most of the reforms proposed by members of Congress, scholars, or by the ACUS
focus on improving transparency of FACA committees. For example, ensuring
that agencies are abiding by ethics requirements when selecting committee mem-
bers, increasing public access to information about advisory committees via the
Internet, and relieving agencies of administrative burdens. These reforms, how-
ever, do not include ways to determine the effectiveness of federal advisory com-
mittees. The federal advisory committee system cannot be more accountable by
simply providing the public with more information. Data needs to be accurate and
relevant. The GSA needs to differentiate between traditional advisory committees
and peer review committees. Agencies need to provide advisory committees with
more constructive feedback about their recommendations. Congress or the GSA
should develop a set of best practices for advisory committees to follow, and in-
clude such recommendations within the committee charters.
Recommendations
The Collection of Accurate and Relevant Data
An important part of establishing a performance measurement system is the need
for accurate and relevant data. Currently, the GSA does not have the capacity to
acquire such information. Data collected for the FACA Database is reported by the
agencies and subsequently verified by the GSA. The GSA should report on what
procedures it uses to verify data produced by agencies on their advisory com-
mittees. These procedures need to be evaluated by a third party to establish the
efficacy of processes for obtaining accurate data. To evaluate the federal advisory
committee system, Congress may amend FACA to require partnerships between the
GSA and agencies to collect data for assessment advisory committee performance.
The GSA and agencies ought to be collecting information that allows of-
ficials to determine the following: whether the advisory committee provides the
government with cost savings, how many recommendations the advisory com-
mittee makes during each fiscal year, how many recommendations the parent

agency used or implemented during each fiscal year, and detailed explanations
about why recommendations are not considered by the agency. The GSA currently
asks advisory committees to provide this information, but does not give guidance
about how committee officials should calculate cost savings, or whether to count
informal recommendations in the yearly total. FACA requires the GSA to oversee
advisory committees and make yearly reports to the president and Congress; how-
ever, it does not enable the GSA to collect any information about advisory commit-
tees. Agencies may choose to ignore the GSA’s guidance for providing information
about committee performance. It would be advantageous for Congress to amend
FACA to give the GSA the authority to collect more information.
Peer Review Committees
Peer review committees are specifically used to advise government agencies on
grant applications. An advisory committee comprised of experts evaluates indi-
vidual grant applications and then provides their own recommendations to the
agency. Since peer review committees operate differently than other types of ad-
visory committees, their productivity and effectiveness need to be evaluated dif-
ferently. These committees make most of their recommendations in the form of
grant assessments, which are generated by a larger number of committee mem-
bers. Often committee members do not meet in groups, but rather make personal
assessments on the merit of different grant applications. Without differentiation, it
appears that these committees are making more recommendations than standard
advisory committees, even though the nature of advice they provided is clearly
different. The FACA Database “Performance Measurements” survey does not ac-
count for this difference. Congress should require GSA to create differentiated
measures of performance for assessing the effectiveness of peer review committees.
Subcommittees
Currently, subcommittees are not subject to FACA requirements. They are not
required to disclose their membership, hold open meetings, or report that they
exist on the FACA Database. It is possible that advisory committees are using sub-
committees as a way to give a greater voice to certain interest groups, or obtain
advice from people who do not wish to publicly disclose that they are a member.
In order for advisory committees to be held accountable, the GSA must be able to
collect information about these subcommittees and report it to the public. Since
the courts have ruled that the definition of a federal advisory committee does not

2 0 M u l l a n
include subcommittees, Congress would have to amend FACA in order for the GSA
to collect information on all of the existing subcommittees.
Agency Feedback
Gallup’s assessment of federal advisory committees that scored well on the ACES
survey revealed some practices that committees should consider using to improve
their effectiveness, and the need for more agency feedback. If agencies are obligat-
ed to provide advisory committees with formal feedback about their recommen-
dations and include reasons why they are, or are not, being implemented, it could
improve the quality of committees’ advice. The GSA should collect data in order to
determine which advisory committees’ advice is not routinely implemented. This
may indicate a committee’s ineffectiveness and lead to its eventual termination.
Without adequate data on advisory committee performance and agency feedback,
however, it is difficult for the GSA to conduct a thorough analysis.
Improving Best Practices
While Congress, agencies, or the president can create advisory committees, the
GSA must provide uniform advice on how to construct an effective advisory com-
mittee and develop a comprehensive committee charter. They should also have
final approval authority over those charters. The Gallup survey lists several other
best practices that can be incorporated into committee charters. The definition
of a committee’s goal is essential to its success and should be identified clearly
within the charter.107
Also, within the charter, the agency should identify key
stakeholders that members should be in communication with while developing
recommendations.108
The survey also indicates that committees are more success-
ful when efforts are made by existing members to mentor new members.109
By
including provisions for staggered term limits for members within the charter, the
agency can help facilitate mentoring as a best practice.
Obstacles
Without Congressional support, the GSA cannot formally implement many of
these recommendations. They should push for best practices to be included in the
committee charters since the majority of committees must renew their charter
every two years. Agencies can also work with the GSA to improve the system
without making formal changes. Providing agency officials with methods to re-

port information on the “Performance Measurements” webpage could prove to be
a step in the right direction for conducting a thorough analysis of advisory com-
mittee effectiveness. When attempting to amend or reorganize the administrative
functions of government agencies, there are a number of obstacles to overcome.
As with the Clinton Administration’s National Performance Review, the GAO did
not conclude that agencies have been successful in implementing its provisions
according to the timeline provided. Barriers include a lack of resources such as:
time, money, expertise, conflicting agency culture, and difficultly of accurate per-
formance measurement in the public sector.110
Conclusions
Federal advisory committees play an important role in agency policy-making by
providing government employees with advice from private individuals and ex-
perts. As the government delegates responsibility to these committees, however,
it is important to know who serves on them and with what interests. It is also
important to know how their advice is being used by the agencies. This aids in
determining whether the committees are effective, and how to make the advisory
process more accountable. Given the large number of advisory committees cur-
rently in operation and their cost to the United States federal government, it is
important for Congress to amend FACA, and for the GSA to evaluate the advisory
committee system’s effectiveness regularly. ◗

2 2 M u l l a n
( E n d n o t e s )
1 P.L. 92-463 1972.
2 P.L. 92-463 1972.
3 “Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies: Open
Government Directive,” Office of Management and Budget, December 8, 2009,
accessed October 7, 2012. http://www.whitehouse.gov/open/documents/open-
government-directive.
4 Ibid.
5 Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), General Services Administration, November
10, 2011, accessed April 24, 2012. www.gsa.gov/faca.
6 Federal Advisory Committee Act Database, General Services Administration, accessed
April 24, 2012. www.fido.gov/facadatabase. [Hereinafter FACA Database]
7 Executive Order 13490, “Ethics Commitments by Executive Branch Personnel,” 74
Federal Register 4673, January 21, 2009.
8 “Papers Relating to What Is Known As the Whiskey Insurrection in Western
Pennsylvania, 1794.” Pennsylvania Archives. 4 (1876).
9 Other steps had been taken by Executive Branch agencies to increase oversight of
advisory committees prior to the passage of FACA. In 1950, the Justice Department
issued guidelines about the creation of an advisory committee and the role of the
agency, but these guidelines were mostly ignored. The Bureau of Budget issued a
directive in 1959 reasserting the Justice Department guidelines. In 1962, President
Kennedy signed Executive Order 11,007 expanding the scope of the Justice
Department guidelines. However, none of these guidelines applied to Presidential
advisory committees. Steven P Croley and William F. Funk, “The Federal Advisory
Committee Act and Good Government,” Yale Journal on Regulation 14 (1997): 458-
460.
10 Freedom of Information Act; Government in the Sunshine Act.
11 Ibid. pg. 453.
12 Ibid. pg. 460.
13 “The Role and Effectiveness of Federal Advisory Committees: Forty-third Report,”
House Committee on Government Operations, 1970, 10-11.
14 Ibid. pg. 10.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid. pg. 12.
17 Ibid. pg. 12-13.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 P.L. 92-463 1972.

22 “Recommendation 2011-7: The Federal Advisory Committee Act—Issues and Proposed
Reforms,” Administrative Conference of the United States, 2011, accessed January 31,
2012. http://www.acus.gov/acus-recommendations/the-federal-advisory-committee-
act%E2%80%93-issues-and-proposedreforms.
23 P.L. 92-463, 1972, 86 Stat. 770.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid. 86 Stat 771.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid. 86 Stat 772.
29 The OMB is no longer responsible for carrying out these provisions of FACA. Since
December 1977 the General Service Administration assumed the duties that FACA
had assigned to the Office of Management and Budget by Executive Order 12024.
30 P.L. 92-463, 1972, 86 Stat 772.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid. 86 Stat 773.
33 Ibid. 86 Stat 774.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid. 86 Stat 774-775.
39 Ibid. 86 Stat 775.
40 Ibid.
41 Since December 1977, charters are required to be filed with the General Services
Administration by E.O. 12024.
42 The Role and Effectiveness of Federal Advisory Committees, House Committee on
Government Operations.
43 David Flitner, The Politics of Presidential Commissions, (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.:
Transnational Pub, 1986), 148.
44 P.L. 94-409, 1977.
45 Wendy R Ginsberg, Federal Advisory Committees: An Overview, (Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2009), 9.
46 Executive Order 12024. “Transfer of Certain Advisory Committee Functions.” 42
Federal Register 61445. December 1, 1977.
47 Executive Order 12838. “Termination and Limitation of Federal Advisory
Committees.” 58 Federal Register 28. February 10, 1993.

2 4 M u l l a n
48 OMB Circular A-135 as Applied to FACA, October 5, 1994. http://www.whitehouse.
gov/omb/rewrite/circulars/a135/a135.html.
49 Ibid.
50 “Federal Advisory Committee Act: General Services Administration’s Oversight
of Advisory Committees: Report to Congressional Requesters,” General Services
Administration, 1998, 1.
51 Oversight of the Federal Advisory Committee Act: Hearing Before the Subcommittee
on Government Management, Information, and Technology of the Committee on
Government Reform and Oversight, House of Representatives, 105th Cong, 2nd sess.,
July 14, 1998, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O, 1999), 23-24.
52 FACA Database.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 GSA reported 1046 advisory committees in FY2010 but the data that was downloaded
from the FACA Database contained information about 1045 advisory committees.
56 Analysis of the FACA Database.
57 FACA Database.
58 Analysis of data from the FACA Database.
59 FACA Database.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 “FY2010 Federal Budget,” Open Congress, accessed November 12, 2012. http://www.
opencongress.org/wiki/FY_2010_U.S._federal_budget.
63 FACA Database.
65 FACA Database.
66 P. L. 94-409.
67 FACA Database.
69 Within the FACA Database, GSA has assigned each advisory committee a number for
identification purposes.
70 This inconsistency was noticed in raw data that was downloaded from the FACA
Database in June 2011.
71 FACA Database, “Performance Measures.”
72 “Performance Measures” data is not required by FACA to be reported to GSA.

74 For example, according to the FACA Database, the Advisory Committee for Cyber-
infrastructure reported that they made 9 recommendations in FY2010. However,
the instructions provided by GSA require that the committee report how many
recommendations were made since its creation.
75 For example, according to the FACA Database, the National Advisory Committee
on Meat and Poultry Inspection reported that they estimate they made 600
recommendations since the committee’s creation.
77 For example, according to the FACA Database, the National Advisory Committee
on Meat and Poultry Inspection reported that they expect that 40% of their
recommendations will be implemented by the agency, but they comment that it is a
“very rough percentage.”
78 Croley and Funk, “The Federal Advisory Committee Act,” 488.
79 Kirsten Stade, “Twisted Advice: Federal Advisory Committees Are Broken,” Center for
Science in the Public Interest, January 2009, accessed November 12, 2012, 6.
80 National Anti-Hunger Coaltion v. Executive Comm. of the President’s Private Sector
Survey on Cost Control, 711 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
81 “Federal Advisory Committees: Additional Guidance Could Help Agencies Better
Ensure Independence and Balance: Report to Congressional Requesters,” U.S. General
Accounting Office, 2004, 4.
82 Croley and Funk, “The Federal Advisory Committee Act,” 13; Stade, “Twisted
Advice,” 13.
83 FACA Database; “Federal Advisory Committees: Additional Guidance,” U.S. General
Accounting Office.
84 Ibid. pg. 6.
85 Ibid.
86 “Sharing FACA Best Practices,” Administrative Conference of the United States,
March 5, 2012 accessed April 26, 2012. http://www.acus.gov/sharing-faca-best-
practices.
87 “Recommendation 2011-7: The Federal Advisory Committee Act,” Administrative
Conference of the United States.
88 Ibid. pg. 9-10.
89 Ibid. pg. 10.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid. pg. 11.
93 Ibid. pg. 12.
94 Ibid. pg. 13.
95 “Federal Advisory Committees: Additional Guidance,” U.S, General Accounting
Office, 16-17.

2 6 M u l l a n
96 United States. Congress. House of Representatives. Oversight of the Federal Advisory
Committee Act: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Government Management,
Information, and Technology of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight.
105th Cong, 2nd sess.,72. July 14, 1998. Washington: U.S. G.P.O, 1999.
97 Ibid.
98 The Gallup Organization. “General Services Administration Office of Government-
wide Policy: Advisory Committee Engagement Survey Best Practices Report.” , 2,
General Services Administration GSA, March 2005. Web. 26 April 2012. http://www.
gsa.gov/portal/content/104035.
99 Ibid. pg. 3.
100 Ibid. pg. 21.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid. pg. 22.
103 “Federal Advisory Committee Act Amendments of 2011,” H.R. 3124, 112th Cong.,
1st sess., 2011. Versions of this bill have been introduced by Representative Clay.
During the 111th Congress he introduced H.R. 1320 and during the 110th Congress
he introduced H.R. 5687.
104 Ibid.
105 “Bill Summary and Status 112th Congress H.R. 3124,” Library of Congress, accessed
April 26, 2012. http://thomas.loc.gov/.
106 Ibid.
107 “General Services Administration Office of Government-wide Policy: Advisory
Committee Engagement Survey Best Practices Report,” General Services
Administration, The Gallup Organization, March 2005, 23, accessed April 26, 2012.
http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/104035.
108 Ibid.
109 bid.
110 P.L. 103-62.

G l o b a l D i g i t a l D i v i d e 2 9
Global Digital Divide:
The Role of Information and Communications
Technologies (ICTs) in 21st Century Democracy
C h i s h e n g L i
A b s t r a c t
Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) play a critical role in a citi-
zenry’s access to information, opportunities, and ability to participate in democratic
practices. Recent worldwide events such as the Arab Spring have underscored ICTs’
and social media’s importance in bringing about social change and engagement.
Research shows that ICT infrastructure and access is more prevalent in developed
countries, creating a “digital divide” between the global north and the global south.
It is crucial that governments and human rights advocates address equity with re-
gard to ICT access—in terms of ICTs’ potential to enhance democratization, as well
as ICT limitations when information access is censored or prohibited.
A b o u t t h e A u t h o r
Chisheng Li is currently working toward a Master of Science in Information
(M.S.I) and a Master of Public Policy (M.P.P.) at the University of Michigan with
academic interests in information policy, globalization, and information technol-
ogy development. He received his B.S. in Molecular and Cell Biology at the Univer-
sity of Michigan in December 2008. Sheng studied U.S. privacy laws, technology,
and journalism under Mr. Robert Ellis Smith of Privacy Journal. Sheng plans to
pursue entrepreneurship with multinational enterprises focusing on technology-
based and market-based solutions to international development.

30 L i
Introduction
P
roliferation of the Internet and digital technologies in the 1990s ignited
the imagination of entrepreneurs, scholars, and policymakers alike. En-
thusiastic visionaries perceived the Internet as a decentralizing and em-
powering medium that would triumph over space and time in a globally
connected world. Others predicted information and communications technologies
(ICTs) would be used as tools to create a Habermas public sphere, where par-
ticipants are in control rather than state and commercial entities.1
For instance,
Mark Cooper, Director of Research at the Consumer Federation of America, sug-
gested that people who use digital technologies would be “better trained, better
informed, and better able to participate in democracy.”2
Thomas Friedman, New
York Times columnist, proclaimed that, “the days when government could isolate
their people from understanding what life was beyond their borders or even be-
yond their village are over . . . Thanks to the democratization of information, we
all increasingly know how each other lives—no matter how isolated you think a
country might be.”3
To these “cyber-utopians,” information technologies present
tremendous opportunities to advance social, economic, educational, and govern-
mental causes.
Despite efforts in ICT innovation by national governments and international
entities, such as the United Nations (UN) and the International Telecommunica-
tions Union (ITU), digital technologies have not created the anticipated improve-
ments. Instead, the Internet and relevant technologies have developed unevenly
throughout the world, leading to a phenomenon known as the “global digital
divide.” At present, only a quarter of the population in developing countries are
Internet users.4
Mobile phone subscription per 100 inhabitants in the developing
world is 77.8 subscriptions, compared to 122.3 subscriptions in the developed
world.5,6
While serving as UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan was concerned with the
global digital divide as a pressing humanitarian issue in the 21st
century. He em-
phasized access and usage of ICTs as a fundamental civil necessity: “The capacity
to receive, download and share information through electronic networks, the free-
dom to communicate freely across national boundaries—these must become reali-
ties for all people.”7
He warned further that for people in poverty who lack jobs,
shelter, food, healthcare, and potable water, “being cut off from basic telecommu-

G l o b a l D i g i t a l D i v i d e 31
nications services is a hardship almost as acute as these other deprivations, and
may indeed reduce the chances of finding remedies to them.”8
Former World Bank
President Robert Zoellick echoed similar concerns, and called for solutions that
would enable developing nations to “use ICT to improve public services, overcome
poverty, and enable regional integration.”9
The global digital divide is a complex issue that goes beyond a simple gap in
physical access and usage of digital technologies. ICTs are democratizing tools that
enable decentralized mass communications and user-generated, virally-shared
content. Through long-distance networking and political participation, ICTs can
facilitate freedom of information and expression, two fundamental human rights
and vital elements to a vibrant democracy. Conversely, the global digital divide
re-inscribes traditional hierarchies as repressive states stifle ICT access and digital
content to exercise state control over citizens. Because the United States and Euro-
pean countries remain the primary source of ICT innovation and digital content,
the global digital divide reinforces Western hegemony through ICT governance
and by using English as the language of global communication. Based on the po-
tential benefits of ICTs, government should adopt institutional reforms that foster
political freedom, while non-government organizations should consider existing
entrepreneurial strategies that promote ICT development and basic ICT skills to
alleviate the digital divide.
Global Digital Divide: An Overview
The “digital divide” is a term that emerged during the 1990s as American poli-
cymakers and civil rights advocates worried that benefits derived from the use
of digital technologies were unequally distributed within the United States.10
The
National Telecommunication and Information Agency (NTIA) published a series
of reports entitled “Falling Through The Net,” and investigated gaps in the use
of digital technologies that corresponded with educational attainment, ethnicity,
socioeconomic status, and geographic location.11
The NTIA subsequently used the
digital divide to describe the inequality in access to technologies.12
Investigations
indicate that stratification patterns in access, usage, and benefits from ICTs are
closely associated with existing societal inequalities. In particular, Americans
with high income, quality education, and influential social standings are more
likely to own electronic devices, to be capable of operating the technologies, and
benefit from usage.

32 L i
Currently, there is no universal definition of “digital divide.” Manuel Cas-
tells, Chair of Communication Technology and Society at the University of South-
ern California, defines the term broadly as inequalities in Internet access.13
Ac-
cording to Castells, Internet access is “a requisite for overcoming inequality in a
society [where] dominant functions and social groups are increasingly organized
around the Internet.”14
Scholars and policymakers are often vague in their refer-
ence to computers and the Internet as ICTs because rapid digital innovations make
ICT difficult to define. In fact, ICT should be considered an umbrella term for
a broad range of technological applications (computer hardware and software),
digital broadcast technologies (video cameras), telecommunications technologies
(mobile phones), and electronic information resources (Internet).15
While research in the United States is focused on the ways in which the
digital divide reflects disparities in educational attainment, socioeconomic class,
and geographic location, the international community is concerned with the re-
markable divergence of ICT growth between developed and developing nations.
Following the Millennium Summit of the United Nations in September 2000, the
UN and its member states set forth eight Millennium Developments Goals to be
achieved by 2015.16
As part of its continual efforts to form a global partnership
towards poverty eradication, the UN specifically pledged to “make available the
benefits of new technologies, especially information and communication” in co-
operation with the private sector.17
At present, disparities in worldwide ICT development remain striking. The
UN and the ITU actively track digital development by examining the number of
fixed telephone lines and mobile cellular subscriptions per 100 inhabitants, the
number of Internet users per 100 inhabitants, and the number of wired broadband
subscriptions and mobile broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants. Accord-
ing to the ITU, 70.2 percent of the population in developed countries are Inter-
net users, as opposed to 24.4 percent of the population in developing countries
(Appendix A).18
Additionally, mobile phone subscription per 100 habitants in the
developed world is 122.3 subscriptions, as compared to 77.8 subscriptions in the
developing world (Appendix B).19
Furthermore, 25 percent of the population in
developed nations subscribes to wired-broadband Internet services, whereas only
4.9 percent of the population in developing nations are wired-broadband Internet
subscribers (Appendix C).20
In a broad overview, the ITU found a high correlation
between countries’ gross national income per capita and their level of ICT devel-
opment (Appendix D).21
Statistics from the Organization for Economic and Devel-

opment (OECD) also indicate that broadband Internet penetration is moderately
correlated to a nation’s gross domestic product (Appendix E).22
Collectively, these
indicators support the facts that developed and wealthier countries have higher
levels of ICT development than the industrialized and developing countries.
Although the digital divide is commonly perceived as a dichotomy between
technology “haves” and “have-nots,” it is a multidimensional issue. Ernest Wilson
III, Dean of the Annenberg School of Communication and Journalism at the Univer-
sity of Southern California, identifies eight barriers contributing to the digital divide:
1. Physical access: Communities’ and individuals’ lack of digital
technology and infrastructure to support service availability;
2. Financial access: Communities’ and individuals’ lack of
purchasing power to adopt ICTs;
3. Cognitive access: Communities’ and individuals’ lack of digital
skills to operate ICTs due to inadequate education or social
support;
4. Usage access: Communities’ and individuals’ lack of significant
ICT usage opportunity for social and personal development;
5. Content access: Lack of relevant electronic information for
communities and individuals;
6. Production access: Communities’ and individuals’ lack of
capacity to generate meaningful content;
7. Institutional access: Lack of governmental and institutional
support for ICT development;
8. Political access: Communities’ and individuals’ lack of access
to governing institutions and political participation.23
Public policy typically frames the digital divide as an issue of physical access
because the emphasis offers a simple quantitative means to measure progress in
addressing the global digital divide.24
This emphasis falsely assumes that availing
digital technologies and the necessary technical infrastructure would address the
problem entirely. It fails to acknowledge that communities without proper digital
skills may not be prepared to use ICTs in a meaningful way, and therefore may not
be positioned to reap the potential benefits of increased ICT infrastructure. More

34 L i
importantly, measurements of ICT development within and among nations over-
look the political inequality associated with the digital divide; in particular, the
differences between individuals who do and do not utilize digital tools to engage
and participate in public discourse. As a result, the urgency and severity of the
digital divide is often underestimated by government agencies.
Freedom of Information and Communications
as Universal Human Rights
Information poverty, or the absence of essential information for individual devel-
opment due to a lack of information technology, is a critical disadvantage created
by the global digital divide.25
Human advancement not only involves access to
basic commodities, such as food, shelter, health care, and education. It also in-
cludes awareness of the opportunities that information would bring to personal
and social development. Equitable access to information is a necessary compo-
nent of a vibrant democracy. The freedom to access and to share information
is long recognized as a vital human right. In 1946, the United Nations General
Assembly adopted Resolution 59 Article 1 during its first session, stating that,
“Freedom of information is a fundamental human right and is the touchstone of
all the freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated.”26
This notion was
subsequently consolidated in Article 19 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights (UDHR) and Article 19 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR).27, 28
Under Article 19(1) and 19(2) of the ICCPR, all individuals “shall have the
right to hold opinions without interference,” and the “freedom to seek and impart
information of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, through any media of personal
choice”.29
The United Nations Human Rights Committee (OHCHR) adopted Gen-
eral Comment 34 in July 2011 to affirm the significance of the freedom of infor-
mation and expression.30
Accordingly, governmental efforts to coerce the holding
of opinion are prohibited. Furthermore, governments are obligated to proactively
put government information of public interest in the public domain, and ensure
practical access to such documents.31
The freedom of information and expression is also protected in all three re-
gional human rights treaties, specifically Article 10(1) of the 1950 European Con-
vention on Human Rights (ECHR), Article 13(1) of the 1969 American Convention
on Human Rights (ACHR), and Article 9 of the 1981 African Charter on Human

and People’s Rights (ACHPR).32,33,34
On June 29th, 2012, the United Nations Human
Rights Council extended the principles enshrined in these treaties to the Internet
by unanimously declaring that “the same rights that people have offline must
also be protected online, in particular freedom of expression.”35
Collectively, these
international and regional treaties provide persuasive evidence that the freedom
of information and expression is a universal civil application.36
The freedom of information and expression are pivotal to every democratic
society, since access to information and communications are essential to influ-
ence political control. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) noted that democracy is under threat when information
and ideas are not permitted to flow freely.37
Unfettered access to public informa-
tion enables citizens to check on their states, debate and criticize government
decisions, demand transparency and accountability, and have input in public af-
fairs. Citizen checks on government can only be effective if citizens are accurately
informed and have the means to express their opinions. The freedom of informa-
tion and expression simultaneously fosters greater public participation in political
decision-making, and promotes rights to assembly and association.
Democratizing Potential of ICTs
Media technologies differ according to the kinds of mass communications that
they facilitate. Centralized mass communications spread information to large au-
diences in a unidirectional manner, where the disseminator can easily manipu-
late and control the information’s content. This includes traditional media, such
as television, films, newspaper, radio, and books, which promote the dissemi-
nators’ manipulative and censoring capabilities. ICTs, such as the Internet and
mobile phones, enable decentralized mass communication, where the users can
take initiative and choose what information to receive. Furthermore, ICTs foster
public communication among individuals or groups via e-mails, SMS text mes-
saging, and Internet forums. Subsequently, ICTs strengthen the public sphere by
providing platforms that amplify the voices of people, allowing them to virtually
network regardless of physical distances. This in turn promotes the unfettered
exchange of ideas, and contributes to the free flow of information.38
Despite differing cultures and political institutions, developed and develop-
ing nations both experience similar opportunities and challenges with regard to
ICTs’ potential to further democratic processes and practices. ICTs enable users to

36 L i
secure their own information instead of receiving state-sponsored messages. Ci-
vilians who have access to Internet services can voice their discontent over social
media forums, such as Twitter and Facebook. Also, political documents published
on Internet resources can be easily copied, stored and sent to countless electronic
devices. Moreover, smartphones and messaging devices support users’ ability to
conduct sousveillance, a form of inverse surveillance where citizens capture real-
life happenings and virtually share evidence of authority abuse via portable tech-
nologies.39
Through user-generated and virally shared information, citizens can
engage in journalistic and fact-checking endeavors. Blogs, online forums, and
social media now serve increasingly as alternative resources of news and infor-
mation, thereby diminishing state control over information. While Vladimir Putin
and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad maintain their power in Russia and Iran, respective-
ly, ICTs have threatened both regimes’ monopoly over information production and
dissemination. In December 2011, following the United Russia’s party victory in the
Russian parliamentary election, a surge of online testimonies and videos on suspect-
ed election fraud led to mass demonstrations against Putin’s political dominance.40
Similarly, during the 2009 Iranian Election Protests, social media was a crucial
tool for the Iranian diaspora to relay protest news to the international news media
which, in turn, informed the global community about developments within Iran.41
Aside from bypassing the traditional gatekeepers of information, ICTs per-
mit users to communicate with one another and participate in civic discussions,
thereby heightening their political awareness. A June 2011 Pew Research study
found that Internet users in the United States are twice as likely to attend a po-
litical meeting, and 53 percent more likely to have voted in the November 2010
elections than non-Internet users.42
Similarly, the Australian National University
indicated in “The Internet and Civil Society Report” that Australians who use the
Internet frequently are more involved in offline political activities.43
In fact, when
Iceland drafted a new national constitution in June 2011, the Iceland Constitu-
tional Council opted to crowd-source its constitution drafts in a citizen-led pro-
cess through the social media.44
The Swedish Government’s tourism board even
set up an official @Sweden Twitter account so that a Swedish citizen, selected
randomly each week, could share his or her uncensored experiences of living in
the country.45
Through ICT-assisted long-distance networking, people can organize, coor-
dinate, and cooperate in real time during activism campaigns. In 2001, hundreds

of thousands of Filipinos protested in central Manila against a controversial im-
peachment trial that could have removed Philippine President Joseph Estrada.
Majority protestors gathered after receiving instant messages such as “Full mblsn
tday EDSA” (long form: “Full mobilization today at the Edsa shrine in Manila”)
broadcast to their mobile phones. Eventually, their protests ousted President Es-
trada.46
Additionally, social media gained substantial attention after the 2011 Arab
Spring.47
Following the Arab Spring revolutions, social media was incorrectly her-
alded as the deterministic tool that could bring political change. In fact, social me-
dia in and of itself does not challenge government rule, nor oust dictators. Instead,
social media’s true empowering potential was not to replace, but to accelerate and
facilitate the coordination of real-world actions towards collective goals. During
the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, Richard Engel, NBC News Chief Foreign Correspon-
dent, made the following observations at the Tahrir Square:
People were communicating mostly by cell phone. That was the overwhelming
source of communications and information distribution ... [The Egyptians] set
up a little bit of media center, where people could come in, exchange informa-
tion, and use their cell phones to get out the latest information. When they
thought that the cell phones weren’t safe ... they would switch to Twitter. Then,
when the Twitter messages ... were being compromised, they would switch to
Facebook. So, there was a very sophisticated use of information, but I would
say those would be the [main] three. Cell phones the biggest, [then] Twitter
and Facebook.48
In short, ICTs are tools that enable and strengthen civil society and promote
social values. ICTs provide channels for marginalized voices to communicate and
mobilize against political oppression. Their broadcasting functionality also serves
to amplify voices calling for social justice, equality, peace, reconciliation, and truth.
Digital Divide Deters Democracy
Despite ICTs’ potential for positively promoting social values associated with de-
mocracy and public participation, ICTs can be used in oppressive ways. Because
ICTs are tools, they can be abused to pursue goals that do not promote social jus-
tice and global transformation. Janie Leatherman, Professor of Politics at Fairfield
University, suggests that information technologies could re-inscribe traditional
hierarchies, rather than subvert them.49
ICTs are just as likely to strengthen as to
weaken state authorities. In repressive states such as Iran, China, and Burma, the
government may attempt to secure its stability by policing access and monitoring

38 L i
the use of ICTs, or discouraging ICT development for public usage. Oppressive
governments stifle information flow and public communication within their state
because a well-informed and coordinated population could constrain their ability
to act without oversight. Denying citizens ICTs would thereby exclude them from
fair political participation.
Access to ICTs can be restricted through direct control of the telecommuni-
cations networks. For example, North Korea maintains its isolationist policies by
banning all Internet access and prohibiting its citizen from dialing phone calls out
of the country.50
Mobile phone ownership was also banned in the country until
2009.51
Similarly, information technologies and the Internet are severely under-de-
veloped in Cuba, where the dial-up Internet access is second-slowest in the world
and Internet access in private homes is prohibited.52
Such limitations deter the
majority of people from accessing the external world, and allows populations to
remain susceptible to state propaganda. Likewise, the Mubarak regime attempted
to control rising civil unrest in January 2011 by shutting down its Internet system
nationwide so that Egyptian citizens could not coordinate their uprising across
the nation.53
With growing comprehension of ICTs’ capability for mass communi-
cations and sharing awareness among citizens, authoritative states may attempt
similar network shutdown tactics in the future to deter dissidents from real time
coordination and assembly.
Aside from tight digital network regulations, governments may also exercise
political control by denying Internet users access to specific websites or content
type. The Chinese government regularly polices popular websites, such as Baidu
and Weibo, for anti-Communist Party messages.54
In 2011, online discussions
about prominent political dissident Ai Weiwei dwindled several days before his
arrest by Chinese security agents.55
The Communist Party also removed all dis-
cussions about China’s dispute with Vietnam, until the two nations completed a
peace agreement in June 2011.56
When Italian ex-prime minister Silvio Berlusconi
was on trail for corruption in October, the Italian parliament attempted to pass the
DDL Intercettazioni (Wiretap Bill) to curb publication of leaked transcripts from
Berlusconi’s phone calls.57
Paragraph 29(a) of the proposed legislation specifically
required all online publications to correct alleged defamatory contents, or face a
$12,000 fine.58
In response to the bill, Wikipedia replaced every Italian-language
Wiki page with a statement of protest.59
Such censorship tactics are restrictive
devices that aim to silence individuals and deny them of the necessary means to
hold the government accountable.

A further obstacle to the full democratizing potential of ICTs lies in the
lopsided distribution of their production, where the United States and European
countries remain the primary source of ICT innovation and digital content. The
global digital divide, therefore, may reproduce the global north-south division
digitally. At present, California-based Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers (ICANN) is responsible for managing the Internet’s address system,
a role previously performed by the U.S. government.60
Also, English remains the
most common language on the Internet, with an estimated 536.6 million English-
speaking Internet users.61
Hence, the Internet provides new opportunities to rein-
force English as the language of global communication. In fact, the ten most com-
mon languages on the Internet include six European languages: English, Spanish,
Portuguese, German, French and Russian (Appendix F).62
The abundance of digi-
tal content in European languages could provide a passive electronic mechanism
to spread Western cultures and values. The Internet could distort inclusiveness in
its current structure. As a result, Professor Leatherman criticized technology, stat-
ing that there is “nothing inherently democratic or fair as far as the representation
of voices and ideas are concerned when it comes to the web.”63
Proposed Remedies to Bridge the Global Digital Divide
The global digital divide is a complex issue driven by variables that are often
neglected by the informatics sector. Differences in ICT development and usage
across the globe are results of fundamental political, economic, and social divi-
sions that continue to separate the advanced societies from the developing societ-
ies. Mobile phones and the Internet are not human rights. Instead, ICTs should
be viewed as enabling technological tools to assist individuals in achieving dem-
ocratic progress. Even if ICTs facilitate individuals’ participation in the public
sphere, the impact will only be apparent in societies that are inherently open.
For example, the South African government now struggles with civic engagement
despite setting up computer facilities to deliver municipal services electronically
online at the Thusong Service Centers.64,65
This is because most communities have
not yet cultivated a participatory culture to engage with elected government of-
ficials.66
Solutions to bridge the digital divide should not only focus on technologi-
cal innovations, but also on human capital enhancement and institutional reform
in the larger picture.
Since increased political openness and increased ICT usage feed into one
another to enhance democracy, ICT development alone will not be a quick fix to

40 L i
spread democracy around the world, or to render struggling states competitive.
Internet freedom, for instance, cannot thrive in an inherently repressive environ-
ment where political openness is not a pre-existing condition. Governments must
move towards active support for civil rights that are prescribed by the ICCPR and
the UDHR; this includes recognition for civilians to express their opinions and to
participate in political decision-making. Governments should also enact and up-
hold freedom of information legislation and provide timely access to documents of
public interest upon request. An uncensored press and digital media are essential
in keeping the public informed and allowing them to comment on public issues
without restraint. Additionally, governments should guarantee editorial indepen-
dence.67
Governments of developing countries should liberate their telecommunica-
tions sector to draw investments that would upgrade their technological infra-
structure. ICTs can only diffuse into developing nations when their infrastructure
adequately supports these tools. Data from the UN show that global mobile cel-
lular subscriptions had grown to six billion by the end of 2011 and mobile cellular
penetration rate had achieved eighty-seven percent worldwide.68
Progress towards
universal and affordable connectivity is the key to bridge the digital divide. For
instance, there were fewer than 70,000 mobile phone users in North Korea in 2009
due to a nationwide ban on mobile phone ownership.69
Today, there are 800,000
mobile phone users in the country after the regime lifted the ban and built a 3G
network with the Egyptian company Orascom. The liberation of the telecommu-
nications sector is a positive step towards enabling mass social communications
among the North Koreans. Similarly, Nigeria experienced tremendous growth after
the Nigerian government liberated its telecommunication sector in 2001. Between
1999 and 2010, the phone subscription base in Nigeria skyrocketed from 508,316
to 81,931,223, representing a growth rate of 160 percent over a mere decade.71
For communities with low ICT development, assessing the needs of each
community is crucial for establishing cost-effective implementation of ICTs. Poor
states of development and low digital skills have conditioned inexperienced users
to have different expectations of digital technologies. People who do not perceive
digital technologies as relevant to their lives will avoid these tools. Currently, new
base-of-the-pyramid (BOP) strategies in ICT development projects increasingly
adopt a user-centered approach to deliver services on the mobile phone platform
that are tailored to the communities’ needs.72
Often these services are customized
to be culturally relevant and friendly to the local population. Each service is also

provided via local agents, human intermediaries who serve as links between digi-
tal technologies and the target end-users. By providing specific technological tools
and specialized services that suit the community’s needs, inexperienced users
can receive targeted training for quick uptake of the digital technologies.
For instance, Grameen Foundation’s Applab now actively develops solutions
to overcome the cost issue of mobile device ownership, and deploys mobile appli-
cations to rural communities for their need.73
Its Community Knowledge Worker
(CKW) program in Uganda now serves more than 19,000 farmers with a retention
rate of thirty-five percent.74
Through its partnership with the World Food Pro-
gramme, Grameen Foundation not only provides agricultural advice to the farm-
ers, but also brings them previously inaccessible agro-information, such as world
market prices. Consequently, a social entrepreneurial approach of BOP strategies
could increase digital literacy worldwide and ensure meaningful usage of infor-
mation through electronic resources.
Ultimately, the digital divide between the global north and the global south
will persist unless every contributing aspect of the divide is addressed. Fortunate-
ly, this is not a foregone conclusion. ICTs have tremendous potential to improve
individuals’ lives around the world, and benefits will be evident if reformations
of existing social constructs and political institutions occur concurrently to close
the divide. ◗
( E n d n o t e s )
1 In Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962), German sociologist Jürgen
Habermas proposed the public sphere as a realm where citizens could freely trade
ideas and debate on public affairs, beyond the control of government authority. His
concept supported the importance of the mass media and public opinion as core
components of modern democracy.
2 M. N. Cooper, “Inequality in the Digital Society: Why the Digital Divide Deserves All
the Attention It Gets,” Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal 73 (2002): 73-134.
3 Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, (New York: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, 1999), 65.
4 “ICT Data and Statistics: Individuals using the Internet per 100 inhabitants,”
International Telecommunications Union, 2001, accessed September 1, 2012. www.
itu.int/ITU-/ict/statistics/material/excel/20112/ictwebsite/Internet_users_01-11.xls.
5 There are more than 100 subscriptions per 100 inhabitants in the developed
countries, because the United Nations and the International Telecommunication
Union simply divided the total number of active mobile cellular accounts by the total

42 L i
population. This methodology does not distinguish personal cell phone accounts
from business cell phone accounts.
6 “ICT Data and Statistics.”
7 Kofi Annan, “ITU Telecommunications Opening Ceremony,” International
Telecommunications Union, October 9, 1999, accessed April 17, 2012. http://www.
itu.int/telecom-wt99/press_service/information_for_the_press/press_kit/speeches/
annan_ceremony.html.
8 Ibid.
9 “Connecting Africa: How ICT is Transforming a Continent,” World Bank Group,
October 29, 2007, accessed April 17, 2012. http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:21526131~pagePK:34370~piPK:34424~theSite
PK:4607,00.html.
10 D. Epstein, E.C. Nisbet and T. Gillespie, “Who’s Responsible for the Digital Divide?
Public Perceptions and Policy Implications,” The Information Society 27 (2011):92-104.
11 Ibid. pg. 94.
12 “Falling Through The Net: Defining Digital Divide,” The National Telecommunication
and Information Agency, accessed December 18, 2011. http://www.ntia.doc.gov/
legacy/ntiahome/fttn99/introduction.html.
13 M. Castells, The Internet Galaxy. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 248.
14 Ibid.
15 N. Selwyn, Reconsidering Political and Popular Understandings of the Digital Divide
(New Media Society, 2004), 341-362.
16 “About the Millennium Development Goals Indicators,” United Nations, accessed
October 6, 2012. http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Host.aspx?Content=Indicators/
About.htm.
17 “Millennium Development Goals,” United Nations, accessed September 1, 2012.
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/global.shtml.
18 “ICT Data and Statistics: Individuals using the Internet per 100 inhabitants III,”
International Telecommunications Union.
19 “ICT Data and Statistics: Mobile-cellular subscriptions per 100 inhabitants IV.” See
also: “ICT Data and Statistics: Fixed- telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants,”
International Telecommunications Union 2001-2011, accessed September 1, 2012.
www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/material/excel/20112/ictwebsite/Fixed_01-11.xls.
20 �“ICT Data and Statistics: Fixed- broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants,”
International Telecommunications Union, accessed September 1, 2012. www.itu.int/
ITU-D/ict/statistics/material/excel/20112/ictwebsite/Fixed_bb_01-11.xls. See also:
“ICT Data and Statistics: Active mobile-broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitant,”
International Telecommunications Union, accessed September 1, 2012. www.itu.int/
ITU-D/ict/statistics/material/excel/20112/ictwebsite/Mobile_bb_07-11.xls._bb_07-11.xls.
21 “Measuring the Information Society 2011, Chart 2.5,” International
Telecommunications Union, accessed Nov. 11, 2012. http://www.itu.int/net/
pressoffice/backgrounders/general/pdf/5.pdf.

22 “Broadband penetration and GDP,” OECD Broadband Portal, December 2011, accessed
September 1, 2012. www.oecd.org/internet/broadbandandtelecom/1k-BBPenetration-
GDPperCap-2011-12-(NL)_Ver1.xls.
23 C. Fuchs and E. Horak, Africa and the Digital Divide. Telematics and Informatics
(2008), 99-116.
24 D. Epstein, E.C. Nisbet and T. Gillespie, Who’s Responsible for the Digital Divide? 94.
25 P. Loria, “Religious information poverty in Australian state schools,” Journal of
Christian Education, 49 (2006) : 21-31.
26 United Nations General Assembly. Resolution 59 (1). Dec. 14, 1946, accessed Nov.
11, 2012. http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/033/10/IMG/
NR003310.pdf?OpenElement
27 United Nations. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Article 19.
28 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Article 19(1) and (2).
29 Ibid.
30 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. General comment
No. 34. July 21, 2011, accessed Nov. 11, 2012. http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/
hrc/docs/gc34.pdf.
31 Ibid.
32 Council of Europe. European Convention on Human Rights: Article 10(1).
33 Organization of American States. American Convention on Human Rights: Article 13(1).
34 Organization of African Unity. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Article 9.
35 “General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Agenda item 3: The promotion, protection
and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet,” United Nations Human Rights
Council, accessed November 11, 2012. http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/
c6/19/64/51/6999c512.pdf.
36 In light of a global debate on the freedom of expression after terroristic attacks against
four American officials, including Ambassador Chris Stevens, it should be clarified
that existing international laws do not condone all types of expression. Abuse of
expression in the form of inflammatory message threatens democracy just as much
as excessive censorship does. Article 19(3) of the ICCPR recognizes that the exercise
of free speech carries special duties and responsibilities, and imposes restriction
for respect of the rights of others, as well as for the protection of national security
or public order. Article 20 of the ICCPR further prohibits any propaganda for war
and any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement
to discrimination or hostility. Article 10(2) of the ECHR and Article 13(5) of the
ACHR both adopt similar limitations to prevent political conflicts that could arise
from unchecked incitement to violence. The United States is not subjected to the
ACHR because Congress did not ratify the treaty. Congress ratified the ICCPR in 1992
with declaration that Article 1 to Article 27 is “not self-executing.” In other words,
these provisions are binding as international laws, but shall have no impact on the
American domestic laws. Specifically, interpretation of freedom of expression under

44 L i
the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment would not conform to limitations imposed
by Article 19(3) of the ICCPR.
37 “Freedom of Expression and Broadcasting Regulations,” United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization, February 2011, accessed November 11, 2012.
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001916/191623e.pdf, 10.
38 Sousveillance is a term coined to mean “watching from below,” a concept where
communities keep government officials in check by monitoring how they exercise
their power. On May 14, 2012, the U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division
supported American citizens’ First Amendment right to record police activities in
a letter to the Baltimore Police Department. The Justice Department asserted that
police seizure and destruction of such recordings without warrant or due process
would violate individuals’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Likewise, on
July 19, 2012, District of Columbia Police Chief Cathy Lanier issued General Order
304-19 to forbid D.C. metro police from interfering with bystanders’ recording
of police activities in public space. See: Leatherman, Julie A. Webber, Charting
Transnational Democracy: Beyond Global Arrogance (New York: MacMillan 2005),
277-278.
39 “Special Report: Here Comes Anywhere,” The Economist, October 8, 2011, accessed
January 12, 2012. http://www.economist.com/node/21531113.
40 Alissa de Carbonnel, “Insight: Social media makes anti-Putin protests snowball,”
Reuters, December 7, 2011, accessed December 22, 2011. http://www.reuters.com/
article/2011/12/07/us-russia-protests-socialmedia-idUSTRE7B60R720111207.
41 “Scientific and Cultural Organization. Freedom of Connection, Freedom of
Expression: The Changing Legal and Regulatory Ecology Shaping the Internet,”
United Nation Educational, 2011. Box. 4.5, accessed November 11, 2012. unesdoc.
unesco.org/images/0019/001915/191594e.pdf.
42 “Social Networking Sites and Our Lives,” Pew Research Center, June 16, 2011,
accessed January 12, 2012, http://pewresearch.org/pubs/2025/social-impact-social-
networking-sites-technology-facebook-twitter-linkedin-myspace.
43 “The Internet and Civil Society,” The Australian National University, accessed
November 11, 2012. lyceum.anu.edu.au/wp-content/blogs/3/uploads//ANUpoll%20
report.pdf.
44 Elizabeth Flock, “Iceland crowd sources its next constitution,” The Washington Post,
accessed January 7, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/
iceland-crowdsources-its-next-constitution/2011/06/10/AGiBplOH_blog.html .
45 Sweden Official Twitter Account, accessed September 1, 2012. https://twitter.com/
sweden. See also: Sweden Tourism Board: Visit Sweden. http://partner.visitsweden.
com/.
46 Michael Bociurkiw, “Revolution by Cell Phone,” Forbes, September 10, 2001, accessed
January 7, 2012. http://www.forbes.com/asap/2001/0910/028.html.
47 Arsalan Iftikhar, “Arab Spring’ becoming the Arab Year?,” CNN, August 25, 2011,
accessed December 17, 2011. http://articles.cnn.com/2011-08-25/opinion/iftikhar.
arab.spring_1_moammar-gadhafi-arab-spring-democracy?_s=PM:OPINION.

48 Richard Engel, “Interview on The Last Word,” MSNBC , accessed January 7, 2012.
http://on.msnbc.com/h3ouHU.
49 Leatherman, Webber, 278.
50 Jeremy Laurence, “Secretive North Korea opens up to cellphones,” Reuters, November
21, 2011, accessed April 17, 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/21/uk-
korea-north-cellphone-idUSLNE7AK01C20111121.
51 Ibid.
52 “Wired, at last,” The Economist, March 3, 2011, accessed January 12, 2012. http://
www.economist.com/node/18285798.
53 Peter Bright, “Amidst chaos and riots, Egypt turns off the Internet,” Ars Technica,
January 2011, accessed March 22, 2012. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/
news/2011/01/amidst-chaos-and-riots-egypt-turns-off-the-internet.ars.
54 In January 2010, internet-search giant Google moved its data servers to Hong Kong to
sidestep rigorous censorship regulations. Google’s market share in China has since
plunged from 36% to 17%.
55 Paul Mozur, “Watching How China Censors,” Wall Street Journal, July 3, 2012,
accessed October 17, 2012. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230470860
4577502872481016502.html
56 Ibid.
57 DDL Intercettazioni, accessed December 22, 2011. http://www.camera.it/_dati/
leg16/lavori/stampati/pdf/16PDL0038530.pdf. See also: “Why Wikipedia Italy Would
Rather Perish than Publish,” Center for Democracy and Technology, October 5, 2011.
http://cdt.org/blogs/cynthia-wong/510case-point-why-wikipedia-italy-would-rather-
perish-publish.
58 Ibid.
59 “Wikipedia: Comunicato,” Wikipedia, accessed April 17, 2012. http://it.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Wikipedia:Comunicato_4_ottobre_2011/en.
60 “A Plaything of Powerful Nations,” The Economist, October 1, 2011, accessed January
7, 2012. http://www.economist.com/node/21530955.
61 “Internet World Users by Language,” Internet World Statistics, accessed September 1,
2012. http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats7.htm.
62 Ibid.
63 Leatherman, Webber, Charting Transnational Democracy, 278.
64 Thusong is a Sesotho word meaning ‘a place to get assistance.’ Thusong Service
Centers were initiated by the South African government in 1999, and were formerly
known as Multi-Purpose Community Centers. These centers are intended to serve
as one-stop, community development centers that provide government services and
computer facilities mainly in rural and disadvantaged urban areas. 171 Thusong
Service Centers are in operation as of March 2012.

cornell-policy-review1

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

What's hot

What's hot (20)

Viewers also liked

Viewers also liked (9)

Similar to cornell-policy-review1

Similar to cornell-policy-review1 (20)

cornell-policy-review1