This document summarizes a journal article that discusses ways to evaluate the effectiveness of federal advisory committees. It provides background on the Federal Advisory Committee Act and the issues it aimed to address regarding transparency and oversight of advisory committees. The article argues that more accurate data is needed to properly assess the productivity and impact of advisory committees. It recommends that agencies provide feedback to committees on their recommendations and that best practices be identified to improve committee functions. An amendment to the Act may be required to give the GSA authority to collect additional useful data.

1. Review
The Cor nell Policy
5
29
51
65
88
100
Vo l u m e 0 3
N u m b e r 0 1
Fa l l ’12
A r t i c l e s
Advising the Executive Branch:
The Role of Federal Advisory Committees
and Ways to Evaluate Their Effectiveness
Amanda K. Mullan, the National Academy
of Public Administration
Global Digital Divide: The Role of Information
and Communications Technologies (ICTs) in
21st Century Democracy
Chisheng Li, University of Michigan
Foreign Direct Investment’s Influence on
Regional Inequality and Innovation in Hungary
Mallory Young, Cornell University
The Effect of Private Detention Policy on
Immigrant Political and Social Incorporation
Greg Jette, Cornell University
C o m m e n t
Implementing Performance Measurement:
Reflections on Tompkins County New York
Luis A. Martinez and Henry McCaslin, Cornell University
I n t e r v i e w
Interview with Ambassador Aurelia Brazeal
Jennifer Shin and Michaela Vaporis, Cornell University

3. Review
The Cor nell Policy
V o l u m e 0 3 • N u m b e r 0 1 • F a l l ’ 1 2

5. Editor-In-Chief
Sarah Gardner Evans
Senior Managing Editor
Daniel Thomas Nolan II
Executive Editorial Board
Marcus Cerroni
Joseph Mizener
Michaela Vaporis
Associate Editors
Jonathan Davey
Olinda Hassan
Kelly Hughes
Dean Mack
Jennifer Shin
Jeremy Stull
Article Editors
Kayla Bettenhauser
Elena Bussiere
D’Andre Carr
Faraz Haqqi
Abeela Latif
Victor Tchakalov
Ellie Xue Zhong
Research Editors
Rebecka Flynn
Prabhat Gautam
Dahyeong Jeong
Steve Riester
Barbara Marchiori de Assis
Alexandra Popovici
Shunjie Tu
Yuxin Wu
Hui Zhao
Layout Editor
Celine Qian You
N o r m a n U p h o f f
Director of the Cornell Institute
for Public Affairs
R i c h a r d B o o t h
Professor of City and
Regional Planning
N a n c y B r o o k s
Visiting Associate Professor of
City and Regional Planning
N a n c y C h a u
Associate Professor of Applied
Economics and Management
R a l p h D e a n C h r i s t y
Professor of Emerging
Markets, Director of Cornell
International Institute for Food,
Agriculture and Development
K i e r a n D o n a g h y
Professor of City and
Regional Planning
G a r y F i e l d s
Professor of Labor Economics
Core Faculty of the Cornell Institute for Public Affairs
R i c k G e d d e s
Associate Professor of Policy
Analysis and Management
J o e G r a s s o
ILR School Associate Dean of
Finance, Administration and
Corporate Relations
R o b e r t H a r r i s , J r .
Professor of Africana Studies
D a n i e l P. L o u c k s
Professor of Civil and
Environmental Engineering
T h e o d o r e J . L o w i
John L. Senior Professor
of American Institutions
K a t h r y n S . M a r c h
Professor of Anthropology
P e r P i n s t r u p - A n d e r s e n
Professor of Food, Nutrition
and Public Policy
Staff of the Cornell Institute for Public Affairs
Jamaica Brown, Administrative Assistant
Jennifer Evangelista, Administrative Assistant
Lisa Jervey Lennox, Assistant Director for External Relations
Judy Metzgar, Administrative Manager
Cheryl Miller, Administrative Assistant
Laurie J. Miller, Service Learning Initiative Program Coordinator
Millie Reed, Career Services Coordinator
Thomas J. O’Toole, Executive Director
Review
Th e Cor n e l l Pol ic y

7. R
ecognizing deliberate and unintended effects of public decision-mak-
ing is critical for implementing equitable policy at the local, national,
and international levels. The authors of the articles presented in this
issue of The Cornell Policy Review seek to do just that. From implementing
performance measurement for greater municipal transparency, to examin-
ing the effects of foreign investment on emerging economies, the following
articles offer an interesting juxtaposition of equity and transparency issues
across localities, nations, and contexts.
Amanda Mullan discusses the performance of federal advisory committees, with
particular attention to the need for more rigorous evaluation and public access.
Mallory Young analyzes the impacts of foreign direct investment in Hungary,
specifically with regard to regional inequalities. Gregory Jette explores issues of
transparency between private detention centers and public immigration policy,
and how this relationship affects immigrant social incorporation.
We are also pleased to include Luis Martinez and Henry McCaslin’s commentary
on implementing a performance measurement system in Tompkins County, New
York. Concluding this issue is Michaela Vaporis and Jennifer Shin’s interview
with Ambassador Aurelia Brazeal, who details her diplomatic experiences as
well as the question of equality within the Foreign Service.
The Review staff encourages readers to consider not only how the policy
reflections and recommendations presented in this issue are applicable to their
specific contexts, but also to look for ways that these recommendations might be
adapted to solve similar challenges across substantive policy areas.
I am grateful to my Managing Editor, Daniel Nolan, to our excellent editorial
staff, and to our contributing authors for their efforts in crafting this issue. I am
also thankful for the support and encouragement of the CIPA staff at Cornell
University. On behalf of The Cornell Policy Review team, we hope that you enjoy
reading.
— Sarah Gardner Evans, MPA 2013, Editor-in-Chief
E d i t o r ’ s N o t e

9. A d v i s i n g t h e E x e c u t i v e B r a n c h 5
Advising the Executive Branch:
The Role of Federal Advisory Committees
and Ways to Evaluate Their Effectiveness
A m a n d a K . M u l l a n
A b s t r a c t
The Federal Advisory Committee Act1
(FACA) stipulates that advisory committees
must be more accessible to the public. To accomplish this, FACA requires the General
Services Administration (GSA) to oversee advisory committees and report certain
information to Congress and the public. Despite increased openness and account-
ability, the Act falls short in a number of areas. The increasing number of advisory
committees renders the evaluation of the system’s effectiveness necessary. In order to
perform a thorough analysis of committees’ productivity and effectiveness, more ac-
curate and relevant data is needed. Once an analysis is conducted, Congress or GSA
should require that government agencies provide advisory committees with feedback
about their recommendations and suggest ways for advisory committee members to
improve in the future.
A b o u t t h e A u t h o r
Amanda Mullan is a Research Associate at the National Academy of Public Ad-
ministration. She is currently working on a team conducting an assessment of the
National Weather Service’s organizational structure. Prior to joining the Acad-
emy, Amanda worked as an intern at the Congressional Research Service in the
Government and Finance Division concentrating on Executive Branch Operations.
She has recently completed her Master’s thesis on the Federal Advisory Commit-
tee Act and approaches to increase the effectiveness of the federal advisory com-
mittee system. Amanda holds a Masters in Public Administration from Cornell
University and a Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science from SUNY Cortland.

10. 6 M u l l a n
Introduction
F
ederal advisory committees exist in almost every United States federal
agency as a means for government employees to solicit advice from pri-
vate individuals. More than 1,000 advisory committees exist, counseling
over fifty federal agencies. They advise on a wide array of topics ranging
from travel and stem cell research, to homeland security. Whereas the president
of the United States and Congress acknowledge that advisory committees are ben-
eficial to the policymaking process, an assessment of their cost-effectiveness has
not been completed. Although the General Services Administration (GSA) collects
data on advisory committees’ performance and effectiveness, the information pro-
vided is not sufficient for the required level of analysis. Determining how many
recommendations an advisory committee provides for an agency and how many
of those recommendations are implemented by the agency can provide insight
into the effectiveness of a committee. The GSA currently collects information on
performance measures, however the data provided is inconsistent. Since the data
is inconsistent, it cannot be used to adequately determine the effectiveness of fed-
eral advisory committees. It is unclear if GSA has the authority to collect this data
without an amendment to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA).2
Without accurate information to evaluate the effectiveness of advisory com-
mittees, it is difficult to determine if federal advisory committees are accountable
to the American public. On his first day in office, President Barack Obama issued
a memorandum to the heads of all executive departments and agencies, making
transparency and accountability a priority of his administration.3
On December 6,
2009, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) released a similar memoran-
dum titled, “Open Government Directive,” which included further instructions on
how departments and agencies should create and implement an open government
plan.4
It is unclear what impact these policies have on improving the accountability
of the federal advisory committee system. In response to these memoranda, the GSA
created an updated FACA website, which provides the same data as the FACA Da-
tabase, but in different formats. The Obama Administration also issued Executive
Order 13490, prohibiting agencies from appointing federally registered lobbyists
as members of federal advisory committees.5,6,7
Thus far, it is unclear what impact
the executive order has had on recommendations made by advisory committees.
The following actions are recommended to better assess the effectiveness
and the accountability of federal advisory committees: collect relevant data to

11. A d v i s i n g t h e E x e c u t i v e B r a n c h 7
conduct a thorough evaluation of advisory committee performance, require agen-
cies to provide feedback to advisory committees explaining why their advice was
or was not implemented, and identify best practices that agencies should adopt
to improve the functionality of their advisory committees. The GSA should also
develop distinctive methods of data collection for evaluating peer review com-
mittees, as they operate differently than most other advisory committees. To give
GSA the authority to collect more information, an amendment to FACA may be
required.
The History of Federal Advisory Committees
The president’s use of advisory committees is a long-established practice. Since
the days of George Washington, presidents have sought advice from the public.8
Congress showed little interest in regulating the executive branch’s use of advi-
sory committees, even though their undertakings were largely concealed from
Congressional oversight.9
It was not until the good government initiatives of the
1960s and 1970s that Congress took significant legislative action to increase its
oversight of the advisory committee process.10
Congress implemented these initia-
tives amid growing concerns among legislators regarding the rapidly increasing
number of advisory committees. Other concerns included the committees’ lack of
oversight, accountability, transparency, and unknown operational costs.11
In 1970, the House Committee on Government Operations, chaired by Rep-
resentative Chet Holifield of California, held investigatory hearings to determine
ways for Congress to increase its regulation of the executive branch’s use of advi-
sory committees.12
In a report titled, “The Role and Effectiveness of Federal Ad-
visory Committees,” the Committee on Government Operations identified several
problems with the federal advisory system. The Committee found a significant
number of unknown federal advisory committees in operation.13
The committee
also found it impossible to collect accurate and complete records for the number of
advisory committees existing in 1970.14
By one estimate, there were 198 presiden-
tial committees, with annual operating costs of nearly $50 million.15
The analysis
of the Committee on Government Operations appears to indicate that the presi-
dent, and many of the executive branch agencies, disregarded reports submitted
by federal advisory committees.16
The Committee’s conclusion was that Congress
failed to properly oversee federal advisory committees, which led to the develop-
ment of a system that lacked accountability and transparency.17

12. 8 M u l l a n
Following the House Committee on Government Operations’ report, several
legislative actions were taken based on the Committee’s concerns and recommen-
dations. In 1971, the House of Representatives considered H.R. 4383, which ap-
plied to all federal advisory committees. This bill contained specific membership
requirements as well as a version of the “fairly balanced” provision that would
require the membership of individual advisory committees to reflect differing
opinions.18
The Senate considered a bill which would require “at least one-third
of the members” serving on an advisory committee to be experts in that commit-
tee’s relevant subject matter. Two other Senate bills included “fairly balanced”
provisions.19
By 1972, the House of Representatives and the Senate established a
conference committee to combine the Senate bills and H.R. 4383, to be considered
by both houses of Congress.20
The result of this committee was FACA, which was
signed into law by President Nixon on October 6, 1972.21
Issues Addressed by the Federal Advisory Committee Act
FACA addresses major concerns that Congress had regarding advisory commit-
tees. The Act promotes transparency, requires public participation, and attempts
to limit the influence of special interests by imposing membership requirements.
It aims to preserve scarce federal resources by requiring justifications for the
creation of committees, in addition to periodic reviews.22
FACA also includes a
stipulation that advisory committees should be purely advisory in nature, should
work specifically with executive agencies, and should be established only after
it has been determined that they are necessary. FACA defines the term “advisory
committee” to be:
Any committee, board, commission, council, conference, panel, task force, or
other similar group, or any subcommittee or other subgroup thereof which is
established by statute or reorganization plan or established or utilized by the
President or established or utilized by one or more agencies, in the interest of
obtaining advice or recommendations for the President or one or more agencies
or officers of the Federal Government ... The Advisory Commission on Intergov-
ernmental Relations, the Commission on Government Procurement, and any
committee which is composed wholly of full-time officers or employees of the
Federal Government.23, 24
Other government agencies that establish advisory committees are exempt from
FACA requirements, including the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal
Reserve System.25

13. A d v i s i n g t h e E x e c u t i v e B r a n c h 9
FACA also attempts to ameliorate concerns that Congress and the executive
branch failed to oversee the operations of advisory committees. The Act obligates
standing committees in the House of Representatives and the Senate to oversee
the activities of advisory committees within their respective jurisdictions.26
When
Congress creates advisory committees, it must include information about the pur-
pose of the committee, how balanced membership will be achieved, and details
on appropriations and reports.27
Another requirement under the Act is that the
president must make annual reports to Congress about the advisory committees
in existence for that year.28
The OMB must conduct comprehensive reviews of
advisory committees to determine if the committee is duplicating work done by
another committee, whether they are serving their purpose, following relevant
statutes, and whether or not the committee should be abolished.29,30
The OMB
is also in charge of developing guidelines to help federal agencies and advisory
committees implement provisions of FACA.31
Agency heads must also designate
an Advisory Committee Management Officer to supervise advisory committee
meetings and reports.32
FACA also dictates certain actions that must be taken by the president when
creating an advisory committee, as well as oversight and reporting requirements
once the advisory committee is established. One requirement is that committees
must be authorized either by statute or by the president.33
Also, agency heads
must inform the public of the creation of an advisory committee via the Federal
Register.34
Additionally, an advisory committee must file a charter with the OMB
and the agency head that the committee reports to before it meets.35
The charter
must include the committee’s objectives, the time period needed to achieve its
objectives, a description of duties, an estimated annual budget, an estimate of
the number of meetings, and a termination date.36
Such documentation allows for
more transparency upon the creation of committees by Congress or the president.
The final provisions of FACA deal with administrative and financial report-
ing procedures that advisory committees must follow. These provisions mandate
transparent committee meetings and reports unless the advisory committee is
given a waiver.37
The committee is required to keep detailed records of its opera-
tions and to make those records available to the public.38
Additionally, a desig-
nated officer or employee of the federal government must be notified before com-
mittee meetings are held.39
Agencies are required to keep records of the advisory
committees and to provide support services to committees.40
Every two years,
each advisory committee is evaluated to determine whether they should be re-

14. 10 M u l l a n
newed or terminated. Renewed advisory committees must file a new charter with
the OMB.41
Some issues associated with advisory committees were not addressed by
FACA. During the hearings held by the Committee on Government Operations in
1970, Congress concluded that the recommendations made by advisory commit-
tees were beneficial to the policy-making process. In its report titled, “The Role
and Effectiveness of Federal Advisory Committees,” the Committee on Govern-
ment Operations found that the president and administrative agencies ignored
many of the recommendations of advisory bodies that they had created.42
Even
so, the Act does not include any requirement that the president implement recom-
mendations made by advisory committees.43
Amendments to the Federal Advisory Committee Act
In 1977, Congress incorporated the Government in the Sunshine Act, which bol-
stered transparency requirements under FACA.44,45
That same year, President Jim-
my Carter signed Executive Order 12024, which transferred certain responsibili-
ties of OMB to GSA. Included in the transferred responsibilities was the regulatory
power codified in FACA.46
On February 10, 1993, President Bill Clinton issued Executive Order 12838 as
a part of the National Performance Review initiative. The order required executive
agencies to terminate at least one-third of existing discretionary advisory commit-
tees governed under FACA.47
The OMB issued Circular A-135, which created a cap
on the number of discretionary advisory committees that agencies were allowed
to establish, as well as a monitoring plan for existing committees.48
The Circular
forced agencies to submit committee management plans to the GSA and the OMB,
including performance measures to evaluate committees.49
Overview of the Federal Advisory Committee Act Database
From June 1997 to April 1998, the GAO conducted an audit to determine whether
the Committee Management Secretariat of the GSA was properly carrying out its
regulatory responsibilities as stipulated under FACA.50
The GSA developed the
FACA Database in response to the GAO’s concerns after the audit in June 1997.51
The current database contains a wide range of information about federal advisory
committees by fiscal year (FY), including committee members, committee desig-
nations, costs, charters, meetings, and establishment authority (which may include

15. A d v i s i n g t h e E x e c u t i v e B r a n c h 11
the president, Congress, or an agency head).52
Committees are also designated as
active, newly created, administratively inactive, or terminated.53
The database
also provides the location of reports and recommendations made by each com-
mittee during that fiscal year.54
In federal fiscal year (FY) 2010, there were 1,045
registered federal advisory committees that contained a total of 74,321 serving
members.55,56
Committee Costs
In FY 2010, the cost of maintaining federal advisory committees was calculated
at $387,034,434. The costs that comprise this figure include payments to members
and federal staff; travel and per diem payments to members, staff, and consultants;
and other administrative costs.57
The most expensive advisory committee was the
Center for Scientific Review Special Emphasis Panel, which cost $22,718,965, or
5.87 percent of the total reported costs.58
Most of the costs associated with federal
advisory committees are payments made to non-federal members, federal mem-
bers, consultants, and federal staff. The total cost of these payments in FY 2010
was $242,565,121, or 62.7 percent of the total reported costs.59
In FY 2010, travel
and per diem payments cost $71,568,377 or 18.5 percent of the total reported
costs.60
In FY 2010, other administrative costs such as meeting rooms, commit-
tee transcripts, and the committee website totaled $72,900,936 or 18.8 percent of
the total reported costs.61
Although the total cost of federal advisory committees
is approximately 0.0001 percent of the total federal expenditures in FY 2010, gov-
ernment has a responsibility to its citizens to spend tax dollars in an ethical and
accountable manner.62
Reports
In FY 2010, the GSA counted 820 reports issued by 657 federal advisory commit-
tees. On average, advisory committees issued two reports per fiscal year.63
Other
advisory committees make informational recommendations to agencies, and it
remains unclear if those recommendations are included in the number of reports
issued in FY 2010. If committees are not issuing formal recommendations to agen-
cies, then perhaps the GSA should clarify these facts in the FACA Database. The
quantity of reports issued by an advisory committee is one method of determining
the committee’s productivity. If the data does not accurately portray the actions
of the committee, it appears as if the committee has been inactive. This would
subsequently render it unnecessary.

16. 1 2 M u l l a n
Meetings
In FY 2010, federal advisory committees held a total of 7,290 meetings with an av-
erage of seven meetings per committee.64
Pursuant to FACA, committee meetings
are open to the public unless exempt under other legislation.65,66
Despite the pre-
sumption of openness, there were 4,927 closed meetings and 300 partially closed
meetings (meetings with open and closed sessions) in FY 2010.67
Most meetings
are exempt from openness requirements because committees are reviewing grant
applications dealing with personal or proprietary information.68
Given the nature
of grant-review committee meetings, it may be beneficial for GSA to clarify the
purpose of those meetings so it does not appear that FACA’s openness provisions
are ineffective.
Shortcomings of the FACA Database
Self-Reported Data by the Agencies
FACA stipulates that the GSA must report annually to the president about the ac-
tivities of all advisory committees it supervises. The FACA Database was designed
to enable the public to access information about advisory committees without
having to submit a request. The Database, however, is limited. All the data is self-
reported by the Designated Federal Officer (DFO) and Committee Management
Officer (CMO) of each committee and verified by the GSA, which reviews the data
and certifies it by fiscal year.
Data Inconsistencies
Given the number of federal advisory committees that report data to the GSA, it
is probable that there will be inconsistencies within the data. An inconsistency
found in the FY 2010 data consisted of two committees both dealing with bio-
ethical issues. On September 23, 2009, the President’s Council on Bioethics was
terminated. Yet on March 10, 2010, a new committee called the Presidential Com-
mission for the Study of Bioethical Issues emerged. Each committee had a differ-
ent committee identification number (12,151 and 73,519, respectively) and was
included in the total number of FACA committees in FY 2010.69
The FY 2010 com-
mittee, however, has the same members listed as the FY 2009 committee. They
also have the same committee web address.70
This overlap is problematic because
some raw datasheets reported both committees separately while others did not. In

17. A d v i s i n g t h e E x e c u t i v e B r a n c h 1 3
order to perform an accurate analysis of advisory committees by fiscal year, there
must be a consistent number of advisory committees.
Performance Measurements
A major concern for Congress when it passed FACA was that the executive branch
had been spending federal money on advisory committees while disregarding its
recommendations. The Act, however, does not contain any provision that requires
the executive branch to implement recommendations made by advisory commit-
tees. Since FY 2003, the GSA attempted to collect data that would enable the
agency to assess the efficacy of advisory committees.71
Such data is located within
the database on a webpage titled, “Performance Measures” and each advisory
committee’s DFO or CMO is asked to provide the GSA with that information.72
Although the GSA provides a description of how DFOs and CMOs should
report this information, the reports contain many reporting inconsistencies. The
“Performance Measures” webpage is intended to provide information about pro-
gram outcomes, cost savings to government, the number of recommendations made
by committees during their lifetime, the percentage of recommendations fully imple-
mented and partially implemented, how the agency interacts with the advisory com-
mittee, and how the federal advisory committee reports information to the public.73
It is unclear what information the GSA is looking for among DFOs or CMOs
that submit data. When they are asked to provide the GSA with total cost savings
of the committee, it is common for DFOs and CMOs to report that they are unable
to determine cost savings. The GSA does not provide advisory committees with
guidance as to how to calculate cost savings. Another question, “What is the ap-
proximate number of recommendations produced by the committee for the life
of the committee?” similarly elicits responses that are inconsistent. Some com-
mittees report the total number of recommendations made for that year alone,
while other committees report that they do not know the total number of recom-
mendations made for the life of the committee.74,75
The number of recommenda-
tions made by a committee is useful in analyzing the performance of an advisory
committee, but the GSA fails to implement proper procedures to collect accurate
information. The GSA also requires advisory committees to provide information
about “the approximate percentage of these recommendations that have been or
are expected to be fully implemented by the agency.”76
Many committees provide
this percentage but seem uncertain about the accuracy of their figure.77

18. 14 M u l l a n
Subcommittees
Some advisory committees contribute information on subcommittees to the FACA
Database. FACA, however, does not require an advisory committee to provide
information about any subcommittee it has created in order to assist in the devel-
opment of policy recommendations.78
Without this requirement, it is impossible
to know whether the FACA Database contains an exhaustive list of existing sub-
committees. Additionally, there is a chance that subcommittees have members
that are not appointed by the agency, Congress, or the president, and have not
undergone an evaluation.79
The GSA cannot force committees to provide informa-
tion about subcommittees unless FACA is amended to include such a requirement.
The courts have found that FACA does not apply to subcommittees because of a
narrow reading of the definition of an advisory committee.80
Modern Issues and Proposals to Amend
the Federal Advisory Committee Act
Since FACA was passed, Congressional oversight of the federal advisory commit-
tee system has increased, more safeguards against unbalanced membership have
been enacted, and GSA has provided guidance on the creation and operation of
advisory committees; however, deficiencies that need to be addressed continue to
exist. Evidence suggests that certain agencies are not following the ethics require-
ments when choosing committee members. The operations of subcommittees still
lack transparency. Furthermore, peer and grant review committees that operate
differently from other types of committees may require a different set of per-
formance measurement standards. Legislative amendments may also be needed
to allow advisory committees to increase transparency and public participation
through the use of new technologies. Finally, without adequate data on the perfor-
mance of advisory committees, Congress and the GSA will be unable to evaluate
the usefulness of those committees.
Ethics Requirements
The GAO issued a report in 2004 advising the GSA and the Office of Government
Ethics (OGE) to update their guidance for agencies to ensure that they are not
misusing the membership designation of “Representative” to avoid ethics require-
ments associated with being designated a Special Government Employee (SGE).81
As a Representative, an individual is permitted to express his or her own opin-

19. A d v i s i n g t h e E x e c u t i v e B r a n c h 1 5
ions. SGEs, however, are supposed to represent the interests of government.82
As
SGEs are expected to act in the government’s interest, they are required to notify
agencies of any external interests they may have.83
In 2004, an investigation by
the GAO identified several practices that they believed would help the GSA and
the OGE provide agencies with better guidance. These included “obtaining nomi-
nations from the public, using clearly defined processes to obtain and review per-
tinent information on potential members regarding potential conflicts of interest
and points of view, and prescreening prospective members using a structured
interview.”84
The report made twelve recommendations regarding appointment
categories, methods of obtaining information to ensure that committees are bal-
anced, and ways to increase transparency in the process.85
Administrative Conference Recommendations
The Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) recently released Rec-
ommendation 2011-7, which addresses several proposed amendments to FACA
aiming to reduce procedural burdens on agencies, and to develop best practices
for enhancing their transparency and objectivity.86
To alleviate the procedural
burdens placed on agencies when creating an advisory committee, the ACUS rec-
ommends that Congress remove the phrase, “after consultation with the Adminis-
trator,” from section 9(a)(2) of FACA. Section 9(a)(2) requires agencies to consult
the Administrator of the GSA before chartering a new advisory committee.87
An-
other recommendation made by the ACUS is for agencies and Congress to include
more information in committee charters to achieve a balanced membership.88
When Congress creates an advisory committee by statute, they should clarify “the
mission, estimated duration, budget, and preferred membership balance for the
committee,” as well as any exemptions the advisory committee may have from
FACA.89
The ACUS also recommends that the OMB remove the cap on the number
of discretionary advisory committees that agencies may create.90
The next set of recommendations made by the ACUS deal with clarifying
the scope of FACA. Congress should clarify which activities constitute “prepara-
tory work” which does not require prior notice and open meetings.91
The ACUS
also suggests that the GSA amend regulations regarding the implementation of
FACA to clarify how advisory committees may hold virtual meetings, including
teleconference or web-conferences, and publicly moderated web forums. The GSA
should review these processes and determine if such methods would increase the
efficiency and transparency of advisory committee meetings.92

20. 16 M u l l a n
The last set of recommendations made by the ACUS relates to improving
the transparency and objectivity of advisory committees. Congress should amend
certain procedures dealing with ethics requirements, including clarifying the dis-
tinction between Representatives and SGEs.93
If agencies are able to grant conflict-
of-interest waivers, the ACUS recommends that they be placed online for public
review.94
The ACUS also recommends that the GSA encourage the use of technol-
ogy and the internet to expand public access to advisory committees, provided
that it is not too costly.
Peer Review Committees
Many of the peer review committees governed by FACA are used to evaluate the
merits of projects that are applying for federal government grants.95
For this rea-
son, they operate differently than most other advisory committees. For example,
they have high membership turnover, most of their committee meetings are closed
or partially closed because of the discussion of confidential information and they
mostly provide advice about the merit of applications, not policy. Some scholars
and government employees believe that because of these differences, peer review
committees should be exempt from FACA. During the House Subcommittee on
Government Management, Information, and Technology’s July 1998 hearing on
FACA, the Director of the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Executive Secretariat in-
dicated that FACA requirements were especially burdensome with regard to DOE’s
peer review committees.96
He argued that FACA’s requirements, in particular the
openness and public participation provisions, cannot be accomplished within the
peer review committee structure because of the number of meetings that are held
and the number of individual recommendations that are submitted.97
Performance Measurements
In 2004, GSA’s Office of Government-wide Policy (OGP) hired the polling and data
analytics firm Gallup to survey members of federal advisory committees. The
study, which became known as the GSA Advisory Committee Engagement Survey
(ACES), was conducted so that the GSA could assess committees’ performance
based on committee members’ opinions. After the survey, Gallup conducted tele-
phone interviews with members of advisory committees that received exceptional
ACES scores to determine best practices for other advisory committees to follow.98
Gallup found that the committee members of the highest scoring advisory com-
mittees felt that the reasons for their committees’ success were good membership

21. A d v i s i n g t h e E x e c u t i v e B r a n c h 17
selection, an effective chairperson, regular interaction with stakeholders, a posi-
tive relationship with the parent agency, and a resourceful administrative staff.99
From the survey results, Gallup also identified the weaknesses of commit-
tees with lower scores. The determinants consist of a failure to receive feedback
from agencies on the advisory committee’s recommendations, and a failure of the
agencies to effectively use committee recommendations.100
Committee members
reported that they would receive agency feedback, but often informally. Some
committee members indicated that they would like to receive more agency feed-
back.101
Committee members also mentioned that if the agency had provided their
committee with more feedback, they would have been able to direct their recom-
mendations towards more specific goals. One committee member mentioned that
they were not provided with the standardized measurements the agency would
be using to evaluate committee recommendations. If they were provided with that
information, the members could work to make their recommendations useful for
the agency.102
Legislative Response
On October 6, 2011, Representative William Lacy Clay of Missouri proposed H.R.
3124, known as the Federal Advisory Committee Act Amendments of 2011.103
The
bill requires agencies to make committee appointments without regard for po-
litical affiliation unless directed by statute. The bill also clarifies the distinction
between members who should be designated as a special government employee
and as a representative. The individual should be considered a SGE if “the indi-
vidual is providing advice based on the individual’s expertise or experience,” or
designated as a representative if “the individual is representing the view of an
entity outside of the federal government.”104
This amendment also prohibits agen-
cies from appointing individuals as representatives in an effort avoid any ethics
requirements.
Another amendment applies to individuals who may attend meetings on a
regular basis and provide information, but have not been appointed as members
or are employees of the federal government. If such individuals exist, they must
be made a member, otherwise they are not permitted to participate. With regard to
agencies that have advisory committees, the bill requires that the recommendations
be made independent of the views of the agency. Lastly, the bill requires agencies
to publish information about their advisory committees on their website, and des-

22. 1 8 M u l l a n
ignate an Advisory Committee Management Officer to supervise the committee.105
As
of October 13, 2011, the bill was reported by unanimous consent from the Committee
on Oversight and Government Reform to the House Ways and Means Committee.106
Recommendations and Conclusions
Most of the reforms proposed by members of Congress, scholars, or by the ACUS
focus on improving transparency of FACA committees. For example, ensuring
that agencies are abiding by ethics requirements when selecting committee mem-
bers, increasing public access to information about advisory committees via the
Internet, and relieving agencies of administrative burdens. These reforms, how-
ever, do not include ways to determine the effectiveness of federal advisory com-
mittees. The federal advisory committee system cannot be more accountable by
simply providing the public with more information. Data needs to be accurate and
relevant. The GSA needs to differentiate between traditional advisory committees
and peer review committees. Agencies need to provide advisory committees with
more constructive feedback about their recommendations. Congress or the GSA
should develop a set of best practices for advisory committees to follow, and in-
clude such recommendations within the committee charters.
Recommendations
The Collection of Accurate and Relevant Data
An important part of establishing a performance measurement system is the need
for accurate and relevant data. Currently, the GSA does not have the capacity to
acquire such information. Data collected for the FACA Database is reported by the
agencies and subsequently verified by the GSA. The GSA should report on what
procedures it uses to verify data produced by agencies on their advisory com-
mittees. These procedures need to be evaluated by a third party to establish the
efficacy of processes for obtaining accurate data. To evaluate the federal advisory
committee system, Congress may amend FACA to require partnerships between the
GSA and agencies to collect data for assessment advisory committee performance.
The GSA and agencies ought to be collecting information that allows of-
ficials to determine the following: whether the advisory committee provides the
government with cost savings, how many recommendations the advisory com-
mittee makes during each fiscal year, how many recommendations the parent

23. A d v i s i n g t h e E x e c u t i v e B r a n c h 1 9
agency used or implemented during each fiscal year, and detailed explanations
about why recommendations are not considered by the agency. The GSA currently
asks advisory committees to provide this information, but does not give guidance
about how committee officials should calculate cost savings, or whether to count
informal recommendations in the yearly total. FACA requires the GSA to oversee
advisory committees and make yearly reports to the president and Congress; how-
ever, it does not enable the GSA to collect any information about advisory commit-
tees. Agencies may choose to ignore the GSA’s guidance for providing information
about committee performance. It would be advantageous for Congress to amend
FACA to give the GSA the authority to collect more information.
Peer Review Committees
Peer review committees are specifically used to advise government agencies on
grant applications. An advisory committee comprised of experts evaluates indi-
vidual grant applications and then provides their own recommendations to the
agency. Since peer review committees operate differently than other types of ad-
visory committees, their productivity and effectiveness need to be evaluated dif-
ferently. These committees make most of their recommendations in the form of
grant assessments, which are generated by a larger number of committee mem-
bers. Often committee members do not meet in groups, but rather make personal
assessments on the merit of different grant applications. Without differentiation, it
appears that these committees are making more recommendations than standard
advisory committees, even though the nature of advice they provided is clearly
different. The FACA Database “Performance Measurements” survey does not ac-
count for this difference. Congress should require GSA to create differentiated
measures of performance for assessing the effectiveness of peer review committees.
Subcommittees
Currently, subcommittees are not subject to FACA requirements. They are not
required to disclose their membership, hold open meetings, or report that they
exist on the FACA Database. It is possible that advisory committees are using sub-
committees as a way to give a greater voice to certain interest groups, or obtain
advice from people who do not wish to publicly disclose that they are a member.
In order for advisory committees to be held accountable, the GSA must be able to
collect information about these subcommittees and report it to the public. Since
the courts have ruled that the definition of a federal advisory committee does not

24. 2 0 M u l l a n
include subcommittees, Congress would have to amend FACA in order for the GSA
to collect information on all of the existing subcommittees.
Agency Feedback
Gallup’s assessment of federal advisory committees that scored well on the ACES
survey revealed some practices that committees should consider using to improve
their effectiveness, and the need for more agency feedback. If agencies are obligat-
ed to provide advisory committees with formal feedback about their recommen-
dations and include reasons why they are, or are not, being implemented, it could
improve the quality of committees’ advice. The GSA should collect data in order to
determine which advisory committees’ advice is not routinely implemented. This
may indicate a committee’s ineffectiveness and lead to its eventual termination.
Without adequate data on advisory committee performance and agency feedback,
however, it is difficult for the GSA to conduct a thorough analysis.
Improving Best Practices
While Congress, agencies, or the president can create advisory committees, the
GSA must provide uniform advice on how to construct an effective advisory com-
mittee and develop a comprehensive committee charter. They should also have
final approval authority over those charters. The Gallup survey lists several other
best practices that can be incorporated into committee charters. The definition
of a committee’s goal is essential to its success and should be identified clearly
within the charter.107
Also, within the charter, the agency should identify key
stakeholders that members should be in communication with while developing
recommendations.108
The survey also indicates that committees are more success-
ful when efforts are made by existing members to mentor new members.109
By
including provisions for staggered term limits for members within the charter, the
agency can help facilitate mentoring as a best practice.
Obstacles
Without Congressional support, the GSA cannot formally implement many of
these recommendations. They should push for best practices to be included in the
committee charters since the majority of committees must renew their charter
every two years. Agencies can also work with the GSA to improve the system
without making formal changes. Providing agency officials with methods to re-

25. A d v i s i n g t h e E x e c u t i v e B r a n c h 2 1
port information on the “Performance Measurements” webpage could prove to be
a step in the right direction for conducting a thorough analysis of advisory com-
mittee effectiveness. When attempting to amend or reorganize the administrative
functions of government agencies, there are a number of obstacles to overcome.
As with the Clinton Administration’s National Performance Review, the GAO did
not conclude that agencies have been successful in implementing its provisions
according to the timeline provided. Barriers include a lack of resources such as:
time, money, expertise, conflicting agency culture, and difficultly of accurate per-
formance measurement in the public sector.110
Conclusions
Federal advisory committees play an important role in agency policy-making by
providing government employees with advice from private individuals and ex-
perts. As the government delegates responsibility to these committees, however,
it is important to know who serves on them and with what interests. It is also
important to know how their advice is being used by the agencies. This aids in
determining whether the committees are effective, and how to make the advisory
process more accountable. Given the large number of advisory committees cur-
rently in operation and their cost to the United States federal government, it is
important for Congress to amend FACA, and for the GSA to evaluate the advisory
committee system’s effectiveness regularly. ◗

26. 2 2 M u l l a n
( E n d n o t e s )
1 P.L. 92-463 1972.
2 P.L. 92-463 1972.
3 “Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies: Open
Government Directive,” Office of Management and Budget, December 8, 2009,
accessed October 7, 2012. http://www.whitehouse.gov/open/documents/open-
government-directive.
4 Ibid.
5 Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), General Services Administration, November
10, 2011, accessed April 24, 2012. www.gsa.gov/faca.
6 Federal Advisory Committee Act Database, General Services Administration, accessed
April 24, 2012. www.fido.gov/facadatabase. [Hereinafter FACA Database]
7 Executive Order 13490, “Ethics Commitments by Executive Branch Personnel,” 74
Federal Register 4673, January 21, 2009.
8 “Papers Relating to What Is Known As the Whiskey Insurrection in Western
Pennsylvania, 1794.” Pennsylvania Archives. 4 (1876).
9 Other steps had been taken by Executive Branch agencies to increase oversight of
advisory committees prior to the passage of FACA. In 1950, the Justice Department
issued guidelines about the creation of an advisory committee and the role of the
agency, but these guidelines were mostly ignored. The Bureau of Budget issued a
directive in 1959 reasserting the Justice Department guidelines. In 1962, President
Kennedy signed Executive Order 11,007 expanding the scope of the Justice
Department guidelines. However, none of these guidelines applied to Presidential
advisory committees. Steven P Croley and William F. Funk, “The Federal Advisory
Committee Act and Good Government,” Yale Journal on Regulation 14 (1997): 458-
460.
10 Freedom of Information Act; Government in the Sunshine Act.
11 Ibid. pg. 453.
12 Ibid. pg. 460.
13 “The Role and Effectiveness of Federal Advisory Committees: Forty-third Report,”
House Committee on Government Operations, 1970, 10-11.
14 Ibid. pg. 10.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid. pg. 12.
17 Ibid. pg. 12-13.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 P.L. 92-463 1972.

27. A d v i s i n g t h e E x e c u t i v e B r a n c h 2 3
22 “Recommendation 2011-7: The Federal Advisory Committee Act—Issues and Proposed
Reforms,” Administrative Conference of the United States, 2011, accessed January 31,
2012. http://www.acus.gov/acus-recommendations/the-federal-advisory-committee-
act%E2%80%93-issues-and-proposedreforms.
23 P.L. 92-463, 1972, 86 Stat. 770.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid. 86 Stat 771.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid. 86 Stat 772.
29 The OMB is no longer responsible for carrying out these provisions of FACA. Since
December 1977 the General Service Administration assumed the duties that FACA
had assigned to the Office of Management and Budget by Executive Order 12024.
30 P.L. 92-463, 1972, 86 Stat 772.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid. 86 Stat 773.
33 Ibid. 86 Stat 774.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid. 86 Stat 774-775.
39 Ibid. 86 Stat 775.
40 Ibid.
41 Since December 1977, charters are required to be filed with the General Services
Administration by E.O. 12024.
42 The Role and Effectiveness of Federal Advisory Committees, House Committee on
Government Operations.
43 David Flitner, The Politics of Presidential Commissions, (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.:
Transnational Pub, 1986), 148.
44 P.L. 94-409, 1977.
45 Wendy R Ginsberg, Federal Advisory Committees: An Overview, (Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2009), 9.
46 Executive Order 12024. “Transfer of Certain Advisory Committee Functions.” 42
Federal Register 61445. December 1, 1977.
47 Executive Order 12838. “Termination and Limitation of Federal Advisory
Committees.” 58 Federal Register 28. February 10, 1993.

28. 2 4 M u l l a n
48 OMB Circular A-135 as Applied to FACA, October 5, 1994. http://www.whitehouse.
gov/omb/rewrite/circulars/a135/a135.html.
49 Ibid.
50 “Federal Advisory Committee Act: General Services Administration’s Oversight
of Advisory Committees: Report to Congressional Requesters,” General Services
Administration, 1998, 1.
51 Oversight of the Federal Advisory Committee Act: Hearing Before the Subcommittee
on Government Management, Information, and Technology of the Committee on
Government Reform and Oversight, House of Representatives, 105th Cong, 2nd sess.,
July 14, 1998, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O, 1999), 23-24.
52 FACA Database.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 GSA reported 1046 advisory committees in FY2010 but the data that was downloaded
from the FACA Database contained information about 1045 advisory committees.
56 Analysis of the FACA Database.
57 FACA Database.
58 Analysis of data from the FACA Database.
59 FACA Database.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 “FY2010 Federal Budget,” Open Congress, accessed November 12, 2012. http://www.
opencongress.org/wiki/FY_2010_U.S._federal_budget.
63 FACA Database.
64 Analysis of data from the FACA Database.
65 FACA Database.
66 P. L. 94-409.
67 FACA Database.
68 Analysis of data from the FACA Database.
69 Within the FACA Database, GSA has assigned each advisory committee a number for
identification purposes.
70 This inconsistency was noticed in raw data that was downloaded from the FACA
Database in June 2011.
71 FACA Database, “Performance Measures.”
72 “Performance Measures” data is not required by FACA to be reported to GSA.
73 FACA Database, “Performance Measures.”

29. A d v i s i n g t h e E x e c u t i v e B r a n c h 2 5
74 For example, according to the FACA Database, the Advisory Committee for Cyber-
infrastructure reported that they made 9 recommendations in FY2010. However,
the instructions provided by GSA require that the committee report how many
recommendations were made since its creation.
75 For example, according to the FACA Database, the National Advisory Committee
on Meat and Poultry Inspection reported that they estimate they made 600
recommendations since the committee’s creation.
76 FACA Database, “Performance Measures.”
77 For example, according to the FACA Database, the National Advisory Committee
on Meat and Poultry Inspection reported that they expect that 40% of their
recommendations will be implemented by the agency, but they comment that it is a
“very rough percentage.”
78 Croley and Funk, “The Federal Advisory Committee Act,” 488.
79 Kirsten Stade, “Twisted Advice: Federal Advisory Committees Are Broken,” Center for
Science in the Public Interest, January 2009, accessed November 12, 2012, 6.
80 National Anti-Hunger Coaltion v. Executive Comm. of the President’s Private Sector
Survey on Cost Control, 711 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
81 “Federal Advisory Committees: Additional Guidance Could Help Agencies Better
Ensure Independence and Balance: Report to Congressional Requesters,” U.S. General
Accounting Office, 2004, 4.
82 Croley and Funk, “The Federal Advisory Committee Act,” 13; Stade, “Twisted
Advice,” 13.
83 FACA Database; “Federal Advisory Committees: Additional Guidance,” U.S. General
Accounting Office.
84 Ibid. pg. 6.
85 Ibid.
86 “Sharing FACA Best Practices,” Administrative Conference of the United States,
March 5, 2012 accessed April 26, 2012. http://www.acus.gov/sharing-faca-best-
practices.
87 “Recommendation 2011-7: The Federal Advisory Committee Act,” Administrative
Conference of the United States.
88 Ibid. pg. 9-10.
89 Ibid. pg. 10.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid. pg. 11.
93 Ibid. pg. 12.
94 Ibid. pg. 13.
95 “Federal Advisory Committees: Additional Guidance,” U.S, General Accounting
Office, 16-17.

30. 2 6 M u l l a n
96 United States. Congress. House of Representatives. Oversight of the Federal Advisory
Committee Act: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Government Management,
Information, and Technology of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight.
105th Cong, 2nd sess.,72. July 14, 1998. Washington: U.S. G.P.O, 1999.
97 Ibid.
98 The Gallup Organization. “General Services Administration Office of Government-
wide Policy: Advisory Committee Engagement Survey Best Practices Report.” , 2,
General Services Administration GSA, March 2005. Web. 26 April 2012. http://www.
gsa.gov/portal/content/104035.
99 Ibid. pg. 3.
100 Ibid. pg. 21.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid. pg. 22.
103 “Federal Advisory Committee Act Amendments of 2011,” H.R. 3124, 112th Cong.,
1st sess., 2011. Versions of this bill have been introduced by Representative Clay.
During the 111th Congress he introduced H.R. 1320 and during the 110th Congress
he introduced H.R. 5687.
104 Ibid.
105 “Bill Summary and Status 112th Congress H.R. 3124,” Library of Congress, accessed
April 26, 2012. http://thomas.loc.gov/.
106 Ibid.
107 “General Services Administration Office of Government-wide Policy: Advisory
Committee Engagement Survey Best Practices Report,” General Services
Administration, The Gallup Organization, March 2005, 23, accessed April 26, 2012.
http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/104035.
108 Ibid.
109 bid.
110 P.L. 103-62.

31. A d v i s i n g t h e E x e c u t i v e B r a n c h 2 7

33. G l o b a l D i g i t a l D i v i d e 2 9
Global Digital Divide:
The Role of Information and Communications
Technologies (ICTs) in 21st Century Democracy
C h i s h e n g L i
A b s t r a c t
Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) play a critical role in a citi-
zenry’s access to information, opportunities, and ability to participate in democratic
practices. Recent worldwide events such as the Arab Spring have underscored ICTs’
and social media’s importance in bringing about social change and engagement.
Research shows that ICT infrastructure and access is more prevalent in developed
countries, creating a “digital divide” between the global north and the global south.
It is crucial that governments and human rights advocates address equity with re-
gard to ICT access—in terms of ICTs’ potential to enhance democratization, as well
as ICT limitations when information access is censored or prohibited.
A b o u t t h e A u t h o r
Chisheng Li is currently working toward a Master of Science in Information
(M.S.I) and a Master of Public Policy (M.P.P.) at the University of Michigan with
academic interests in information policy, globalization, and information technol-
ogy development. He received his B.S. in Molecular and Cell Biology at the Univer-
sity of Michigan in December 2008. Sheng studied U.S. privacy laws, technology,
and journalism under Mr. Robert Ellis Smith of Privacy Journal. Sheng plans to
pursue entrepreneurship with multinational enterprises focusing on technology-
based and market-based solutions to international development.

34. 30 L i
Introduction
P
roliferation of the Internet and digital technologies in the 1990s ignited
the imagination of entrepreneurs, scholars, and policymakers alike. En-
thusiastic visionaries perceived the Internet as a decentralizing and em-
powering medium that would triumph over space and time in a globally
connected world. Others predicted information and communications technologies
(ICTs) would be used as tools to create a Habermas public sphere, where par-
ticipants are in control rather than state and commercial entities.1
For instance,
Mark Cooper, Director of Research at the Consumer Federation of America, sug-
gested that people who use digital technologies would be “better trained, better
informed, and better able to participate in democracy.”2
Thomas Friedman, New
York Times columnist, proclaimed that, “the days when government could isolate
their people from understanding what life was beyond their borders or even be-
yond their village are over . . . Thanks to the democratization of information, we
all increasingly know how each other lives—no matter how isolated you think a
country might be.”3
To these “cyber-utopians,” information technologies present
tremendous opportunities to advance social, economic, educational, and govern-
mental causes.
Despite efforts in ICT innovation by national governments and international
entities, such as the United Nations (UN) and the International Telecommunica-
tions Union (ITU), digital technologies have not created the anticipated improve-
ments. Instead, the Internet and relevant technologies have developed unevenly
throughout the world, leading to a phenomenon known as the “global digital
divide.” At present, only a quarter of the population in developing countries are
Internet users.4
Mobile phone subscription per 100 inhabitants in the developing
world is 77.8 subscriptions, compared to 122.3 subscriptions in the developed
world.5,6
While serving as UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan was concerned with the
global digital divide as a pressing humanitarian issue in the 21st
century. He em-
phasized access and usage of ICTs as a fundamental civil necessity: “The capacity
to receive, download and share information through electronic networks, the free-
dom to communicate freely across national boundaries—these must become reali-
ties for all people.”7
He warned further that for people in poverty who lack jobs,
shelter, food, healthcare, and potable water, “being cut off from basic telecommu-

35. G l o b a l D i g i t a l D i v i d e 31
nications services is a hardship almost as acute as these other deprivations, and
may indeed reduce the chances of finding remedies to them.”8
Former World Bank
President Robert Zoellick echoed similar concerns, and called for solutions that
would enable developing nations to “use ICT to improve public services, overcome
poverty, and enable regional integration.”9
The global digital divide is a complex issue that goes beyond a simple gap in
physical access and usage of digital technologies. ICTs are democratizing tools that
enable decentralized mass communications and user-generated, virally-shared
content. Through long-distance networking and political participation, ICTs can
facilitate freedom of information and expression, two fundamental human rights
and vital elements to a vibrant democracy. Conversely, the global digital divide
re-inscribes traditional hierarchies as repressive states stifle ICT access and digital
content to exercise state control over citizens. Because the United States and Euro-
pean countries remain the primary source of ICT innovation and digital content,
the global digital divide reinforces Western hegemony through ICT governance
and by using English as the language of global communication. Based on the po-
tential benefits of ICTs, government should adopt institutional reforms that foster
political freedom, while non-government organizations should consider existing
entrepreneurial strategies that promote ICT development and basic ICT skills to
alleviate the digital divide.
Global Digital Divide: An Overview
The “digital divide” is a term that emerged during the 1990s as American poli-
cymakers and civil rights advocates worried that benefits derived from the use
of digital technologies were unequally distributed within the United States.10
The
National Telecommunication and Information Agency (NTIA) published a series
of reports entitled “Falling Through The Net,” and investigated gaps in the use
of digital technologies that corresponded with educational attainment, ethnicity,
socioeconomic status, and geographic location.11
The NTIA subsequently used the
digital divide to describe the inequality in access to technologies.12
Investigations
indicate that stratification patterns in access, usage, and benefits from ICTs are
closely associated with existing societal inequalities. In particular, Americans
with high income, quality education, and influential social standings are more
likely to own electronic devices, to be capable of operating the technologies, and
benefit from usage.

36. 32 L i
Currently, there is no universal definition of “digital divide.” Manuel Cas-
tells, Chair of Communication Technology and Society at the University of South-
ern California, defines the term broadly as inequalities in Internet access.13
Ac-
cording to Castells, Internet access is “a requisite for overcoming inequality in a
society [where] dominant functions and social groups are increasingly organized
around the Internet.”14
Scholars and policymakers are often vague in their refer-
ence to computers and the Internet as ICTs because rapid digital innovations make
ICT difficult to define. In fact, ICT should be considered an umbrella term for
a broad range of technological applications (computer hardware and software),
digital broadcast technologies (video cameras), telecommunications technologies
(mobile phones), and electronic information resources (Internet).15
While research in the United States is focused on the ways in which the
digital divide reflects disparities in educational attainment, socioeconomic class,
and geographic location, the international community is concerned with the re-
markable divergence of ICT growth between developed and developing nations.
Following the Millennium Summit of the United Nations in September 2000, the
UN and its member states set forth eight Millennium Developments Goals to be
achieved by 2015.16
As part of its continual efforts to form a global partnership
towards poverty eradication, the UN specifically pledged to “make available the
benefits of new technologies, especially information and communication” in co-
operation with the private sector.17
At present, disparities in worldwide ICT development remain striking. The
UN and the ITU actively track digital development by examining the number of
fixed telephone lines and mobile cellular subscriptions per 100 inhabitants, the
number of Internet users per 100 inhabitants, and the number of wired broadband
subscriptions and mobile broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants. Accord-
ing to the ITU, 70.2 percent of the population in developed countries are Inter-
net users, as opposed to 24.4 percent of the population in developing countries
(Appendix A).18
Additionally, mobile phone subscription per 100 habitants in the
developed world is 122.3 subscriptions, as compared to 77.8 subscriptions in the
developing world (Appendix B).19
Furthermore, 25 percent of the population in
developed nations subscribes to wired-broadband Internet services, whereas only
4.9 percent of the population in developing nations are wired-broadband Internet
subscribers (Appendix C).20
In a broad overview, the ITU found a high correlation
between countries’ gross national income per capita and their level of ICT devel-
opment (Appendix D).21
Statistics from the Organization for Economic and Devel-

37. G l o b a l D i g i t a l D i v i d e 3 3
opment (OECD) also indicate that broadband Internet penetration is moderately
correlated to a nation’s gross domestic product (Appendix E).22
Collectively, these
indicators support the facts that developed and wealthier countries have higher
levels of ICT development than the industrialized and developing countries.
Although the digital divide is commonly perceived as a dichotomy between
technology “haves” and “have-nots,” it is a multidimensional issue. Ernest Wilson
III, Dean of the Annenberg School of Communication and Journalism at the Univer-
sity of Southern California, identifies eight barriers contributing to the digital divide:
1. Physical access: Communities’ and individuals’ lack of digital
technology and infrastructure to support service availability;
2. Financial access: Communities’ and individuals’ lack of
purchasing power to adopt ICTs;
3. Cognitive access: Communities’ and individuals’ lack of digital
skills to operate ICTs due to inadequate education or social
support;
4. Usage access: Communities’ and individuals’ lack of significant
ICT usage opportunity for social and personal development;
5. Content access: Lack of relevant electronic information for
communities and individuals;
6. Production access: Communities’ and individuals’ lack of
capacity to generate meaningful content;
7. Institutional access: Lack of governmental and institutional
support for ICT development;
8. Political access: Communities’ and individuals’ lack of access
to governing institutions and political participation.23
Public policy typically frames the digital divide as an issue of physical access
because the emphasis offers a simple quantitative means to measure progress in
addressing the global digital divide.24
This emphasis falsely assumes that availing
digital technologies and the necessary technical infrastructure would address the
problem entirely. It fails to acknowledge that communities without proper digital
skills may not be prepared to use ICTs in a meaningful way, and therefore may not
be positioned to reap the potential benefits of increased ICT infrastructure. More

38. 34 L i
importantly, measurements of ICT development within and among nations over-
look the political inequality associated with the digital divide; in particular, the
differences between individuals who do and do not utilize digital tools to engage
and participate in public discourse. As a result, the urgency and severity of the
digital divide is often underestimated by government agencies.
Freedom of Information and Communications
as Universal Human Rights
Information poverty, or the absence of essential information for individual devel-
opment due to a lack of information technology, is a critical disadvantage created
by the global digital divide.25
Human advancement not only involves access to
basic commodities, such as food, shelter, health care, and education. It also in-
cludes awareness of the opportunities that information would bring to personal
and social development. Equitable access to information is a necessary compo-
nent of a vibrant democracy. The freedom to access and to share information
is long recognized as a vital human right. In 1946, the United Nations General
Assembly adopted Resolution 59 Article 1 during its first session, stating that,
“Freedom of information is a fundamental human right and is the touchstone of
all the freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated.”26
This notion was
subsequently consolidated in Article 19 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights (UDHR) and Article 19 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR).27, 28
Under Article 19(1) and 19(2) of the ICCPR, all individuals “shall have the
right to hold opinions without interference,” and the “freedom to seek and impart
information of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, through any media of personal
choice”.29
The United Nations Human Rights Committee (OHCHR) adopted Gen-
eral Comment 34 in July 2011 to affirm the significance of the freedom of infor-
mation and expression.30
Accordingly, governmental efforts to coerce the holding
of opinion are prohibited. Furthermore, governments are obligated to proactively
put government information of public interest in the public domain, and ensure
practical access to such documents.31
The freedom of information and expression is also protected in all three re-
gional human rights treaties, specifically Article 10(1) of the 1950 European Con-
vention on Human Rights (ECHR), Article 13(1) of the 1969 American Convention
on Human Rights (ACHR), and Article 9 of the 1981 African Charter on Human

39. G l o b a l D i g i t a l D i v i d e 3 5
and People’s Rights (ACHPR).32,33,34
On June 29th, 2012, the United Nations Human
Rights Council extended the principles enshrined in these treaties to the Internet
by unanimously declaring that “the same rights that people have offline must
also be protected online, in particular freedom of expression.”35
Collectively, these
international and regional treaties provide persuasive evidence that the freedom
of information and expression is a universal civil application.36
The freedom of information and expression are pivotal to every democratic
society, since access to information and communications are essential to influ-
ence political control. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) noted that democracy is under threat when information
and ideas are not permitted to flow freely.37
Unfettered access to public informa-
tion enables citizens to check on their states, debate and criticize government
decisions, demand transparency and accountability, and have input in public af-
fairs. Citizen checks on government can only be effective if citizens are accurately
informed and have the means to express their opinions. The freedom of informa-
tion and expression simultaneously fosters greater public participation in political
decision-making, and promotes rights to assembly and association.
Democratizing Potential of ICTs
Media technologies differ according to the kinds of mass communications that
they facilitate. Centralized mass communications spread information to large au-
diences in a unidirectional manner, where the disseminator can easily manipu-
late and control the information’s content. This includes traditional media, such
as television, films, newspaper, radio, and books, which promote the dissemi-
nators’ manipulative and censoring capabilities. ICTs, such as the Internet and
mobile phones, enable decentralized mass communication, where the users can
take initiative and choose what information to receive. Furthermore, ICTs foster
public communication among individuals or groups via e-mails, SMS text mes-
saging, and Internet forums. Subsequently, ICTs strengthen the public sphere by
providing platforms that amplify the voices of people, allowing them to virtually
network regardless of physical distances. This in turn promotes the unfettered
exchange of ideas, and contributes to the free flow of information.38
Despite differing cultures and political institutions, developed and develop-
ing nations both experience similar opportunities and challenges with regard to
ICTs’ potential to further democratic processes and practices. ICTs enable users to

40. 36 L i
secure their own information instead of receiving state-sponsored messages. Ci-
vilians who have access to Internet services can voice their discontent over social
media forums, such as Twitter and Facebook. Also, political documents published
on Internet resources can be easily copied, stored and sent to countless electronic
devices. Moreover, smartphones and messaging devices support users’ ability to
conduct sousveillance, a form of inverse surveillance where citizens capture real-
life happenings and virtually share evidence of authority abuse via portable tech-
nologies.39
Through user-generated and virally shared information, citizens can
engage in journalistic and fact-checking endeavors. Blogs, online forums, and
social media now serve increasingly as alternative resources of news and infor-
mation, thereby diminishing state control over information. While Vladimir Putin
and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad maintain their power in Russia and Iran, respective-
ly, ICTs have threatened both regimes’ monopoly over information production and
dissemination. In December 2011, following the United Russia’s party victory in the
Russian parliamentary election, a surge of online testimonies and videos on suspect-
ed election fraud led to mass demonstrations against Putin’s political dominance.40
Similarly, during the 2009 Iranian Election Protests, social media was a crucial
tool for the Iranian diaspora to relay protest news to the international news media
which, in turn, informed the global community about developments within Iran.41
Aside from bypassing the traditional gatekeepers of information, ICTs per-
mit users to communicate with one another and participate in civic discussions,
thereby heightening their political awareness. A June 2011 Pew Research study
found that Internet users in the United States are twice as likely to attend a po-
litical meeting, and 53 percent more likely to have voted in the November 2010
elections than non-Internet users.42
Similarly, the Australian National University
indicated in “The Internet and Civil Society Report” that Australians who use the
Internet frequently are more involved in offline political activities.43
In fact, when
Iceland drafted a new national constitution in June 2011, the Iceland Constitu-
tional Council opted to crowd-source its constitution drafts in a citizen-led pro-
cess through the social media.44
The Swedish Government’s tourism board even
set up an official @Sweden Twitter account so that a Swedish citizen, selected
randomly each week, could share his or her uncensored experiences of living in
the country.45
Through ICT-assisted long-distance networking, people can organize, coor-
dinate, and cooperate in real time during activism campaigns. In 2001, hundreds

41. G l o b a l D i g i t a l D i v i d e 3 7
of thousands of Filipinos protested in central Manila against a controversial im-
peachment trial that could have removed Philippine President Joseph Estrada.
Majority protestors gathered after receiving instant messages such as “Full mblsn
tday EDSA” (long form: “Full mobilization today at the Edsa shrine in Manila”)
broadcast to their mobile phones. Eventually, their protests ousted President Es-
trada.46
Additionally, social media gained substantial attention after the 2011 Arab
Spring.47
Following the Arab Spring revolutions, social media was incorrectly her-
alded as the deterministic tool that could bring political change. In fact, social me-
dia in and of itself does not challenge government rule, nor oust dictators. Instead,
social media’s true empowering potential was not to replace, but to accelerate and
facilitate the coordination of real-world actions towards collective goals. During
the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, Richard Engel, NBC News Chief Foreign Correspon-
dent, made the following observations at the Tahrir Square:
People were communicating mostly by cell phone. That was the overwhelming
source of communications and information distribution ... [The Egyptians] set
up a little bit of media center, where people could come in, exchange informa-
tion, and use their cell phones to get out the latest information. When they
thought that the cell phones weren’t safe ... they would switch to Twitter. Then,
when the Twitter messages ... were being compromised, they would switch to
Facebook. So, there was a very sophisticated use of information, but I would
say those would be the [main] three. Cell phones the biggest, [then] Twitter
and Facebook.48
In short, ICTs are tools that enable and strengthen civil society and promote
social values. ICTs provide channels for marginalized voices to communicate and
mobilize against political oppression. Their broadcasting functionality also serves
to amplify voices calling for social justice, equality, peace, reconciliation, and truth.
Digital Divide Deters Democracy
Despite ICTs’ potential for positively promoting social values associated with de-
mocracy and public participation, ICTs can be used in oppressive ways. Because
ICTs are tools, they can be abused to pursue goals that do not promote social jus-
tice and global transformation. Janie Leatherman, Professor of Politics at Fairfield
University, suggests that information technologies could re-inscribe traditional
hierarchies, rather than subvert them.49
ICTs are just as likely to strengthen as to
weaken state authorities. In repressive states such as Iran, China, and Burma, the
government may attempt to secure its stability by policing access and monitoring

42. 38 L i
the use of ICTs, or discouraging ICT development for public usage. Oppressive
governments stifle information flow and public communication within their state
because a well-informed and coordinated population could constrain their ability
to act without oversight. Denying citizens ICTs would thereby exclude them from
fair political participation.
Access to ICTs can be restricted through direct control of the telecommuni-
cations networks. For example, North Korea maintains its isolationist policies by
banning all Internet access and prohibiting its citizen from dialing phone calls out
of the country.50
Mobile phone ownership was also banned in the country until
2009.51
Similarly, information technologies and the Internet are severely under-de-
veloped in Cuba, where the dial-up Internet access is second-slowest in the world
and Internet access in private homes is prohibited.52
Such limitations deter the
majority of people from accessing the external world, and allows populations to
remain susceptible to state propaganda. Likewise, the Mubarak regime attempted
to control rising civil unrest in January 2011 by shutting down its Internet system
nationwide so that Egyptian citizens could not coordinate their uprising across
the nation.53
With growing comprehension of ICTs’ capability for mass communi-
cations and sharing awareness among citizens, authoritative states may attempt
similar network shutdown tactics in the future to deter dissidents from real time
coordination and assembly.
Aside from tight digital network regulations, governments may also exercise
political control by denying Internet users access to specific websites or content
type. The Chinese government regularly polices popular websites, such as Baidu
and Weibo, for anti-Communist Party messages.54
In 2011, online discussions
about prominent political dissident Ai Weiwei dwindled several days before his
arrest by Chinese security agents.55
The Communist Party also removed all dis-
cussions about China’s dispute with Vietnam, until the two nations completed a
peace agreement in June 2011.56
When Italian ex-prime minister Silvio Berlusconi
was on trail for corruption in October, the Italian parliament attempted to pass the
DDL Intercettazioni (Wiretap Bill) to curb publication of leaked transcripts from
Berlusconi’s phone calls.57
Paragraph 29(a) of the proposed legislation specifically
required all online publications to correct alleged defamatory contents, or face a
$12,000 fine.58
In response to the bill, Wikipedia replaced every Italian-language
Wiki page with a statement of protest.59
Such censorship tactics are restrictive
devices that aim to silence individuals and deny them of the necessary means to
hold the government accountable.

43. G l o b a l D i g i t a l D i v i d e 3 9
A further obstacle to the full democratizing potential of ICTs lies in the
lopsided distribution of their production, where the United States and European
countries remain the primary source of ICT innovation and digital content. The
global digital divide, therefore, may reproduce the global north-south division
digitally. At present, California-based Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers (ICANN) is responsible for managing the Internet’s address system,
a role previously performed by the U.S. government.60
Also, English remains the
most common language on the Internet, with an estimated 536.6 million English-
speaking Internet users.61
Hence, the Internet provides new opportunities to rein-
force English as the language of global communication. In fact, the ten most com-
mon languages on the Internet include six European languages: English, Spanish,
Portuguese, German, French and Russian (Appendix F).62
The abundance of digi-
tal content in European languages could provide a passive electronic mechanism
to spread Western cultures and values. The Internet could distort inclusiveness in
its current structure. As a result, Professor Leatherman criticized technology, stat-
ing that there is “nothing inherently democratic or fair as far as the representation
of voices and ideas are concerned when it comes to the web.”63
Proposed Remedies to Bridge the Global Digital Divide
The global digital divide is a complex issue driven by variables that are often
neglected by the informatics sector. Differences in ICT development and usage
across the globe are results of fundamental political, economic, and social divi-
sions that continue to separate the advanced societies from the developing societ-
ies. Mobile phones and the Internet are not human rights. Instead, ICTs should
be viewed as enabling technological tools to assist individuals in achieving dem-
ocratic progress. Even if ICTs facilitate individuals’ participation in the public
sphere, the impact will only be apparent in societies that are inherently open.
For example, the South African government now struggles with civic engagement
despite setting up computer facilities to deliver municipal services electronically
online at the Thusong Service Centers.64,65
This is because most communities have
not yet cultivated a participatory culture to engage with elected government of-
ficials.66
Solutions to bridge the digital divide should not only focus on technologi-
cal innovations, but also on human capital enhancement and institutional reform
in the larger picture.
Since increased political openness and increased ICT usage feed into one
another to enhance democracy, ICT development alone will not be a quick fix to

44. 40 L i
spread democracy around the world, or to render struggling states competitive.
Internet freedom, for instance, cannot thrive in an inherently repressive environ-
ment where political openness is not a pre-existing condition. Governments must
move towards active support for civil rights that are prescribed by the ICCPR and
the UDHR; this includes recognition for civilians to express their opinions and to
participate in political decision-making. Governments should also enact and up-
hold freedom of information legislation and provide timely access to documents of
public interest upon request. An uncensored press and digital media are essential
in keeping the public informed and allowing them to comment on public issues
without restraint. Additionally, governments should guarantee editorial indepen-
dence.67
Governments of developing countries should liberate their telecommunica-
tions sector to draw investments that would upgrade their technological infra-
structure. ICTs can only diffuse into developing nations when their infrastructure
adequately supports these tools. Data from the UN show that global mobile cel-
lular subscriptions had grown to six billion by the end of 2011 and mobile cellular
penetration rate had achieved eighty-seven percent worldwide.68
Progress towards
universal and affordable connectivity is the key to bridge the digital divide. For
instance, there were fewer than 70,000 mobile phone users in North Korea in 2009
due to a nationwide ban on mobile phone ownership.69
Today, there are 800,000
mobile phone users in the country after the regime lifted the ban and built a 3G
network with the Egyptian company Orascom. The liberation of the telecommu-
nications sector is a positive step towards enabling mass social communications
among the North Koreans. Similarly, Nigeria experienced tremendous growth after
the Nigerian government liberated its telecommunication sector in 2001. Between
1999 and 2010, the phone subscription base in Nigeria skyrocketed from 508,316
to 81,931,223, representing a growth rate of 160 percent over a mere decade.71
For communities with low ICT development, assessing the needs of each
community is crucial for establishing cost-effective implementation of ICTs. Poor
states of development and low digital skills have conditioned inexperienced users
to have different expectations of digital technologies. People who do not perceive
digital technologies as relevant to their lives will avoid these tools. Currently, new
base-of-the-pyramid (BOP) strategies in ICT development projects increasingly
adopt a user-centered approach to deliver services on the mobile phone platform
that are tailored to the communities’ needs.72
Often these services are customized
to be culturally relevant and friendly to the local population. Each service is also

45. G l o b a l D i g i t a l D i v i d e 4 1
provided via local agents, human intermediaries who serve as links between digi-
tal technologies and the target end-users. By providing specific technological tools
and specialized services that suit the community’s needs, inexperienced users
can receive targeted training for quick uptake of the digital technologies.
For instance, Grameen Foundation’s Applab now actively develops solutions
to overcome the cost issue of mobile device ownership, and deploys mobile appli-
cations to rural communities for their need.73
Its Community Knowledge Worker
(CKW) program in Uganda now serves more than 19,000 farmers with a retention
rate of thirty-five percent.74
Through its partnership with the World Food Pro-
gramme, Grameen Foundation not only provides agricultural advice to the farm-
ers, but also brings them previously inaccessible agro-information, such as world
market prices. Consequently, a social entrepreneurial approach of BOP strategies
could increase digital literacy worldwide and ensure meaningful usage of infor-
mation through electronic resources.
Ultimately, the digital divide between the global north and the global south
will persist unless every contributing aspect of the divide is addressed. Fortunate-
ly, this is not a foregone conclusion. ICTs have tremendous potential to improve
individuals’ lives around the world, and benefits will be evident if reformations
of existing social constructs and political institutions occur concurrently to close
the divide. ◗
( E n d n o t e s )
1 In Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962), German sociologist Jürgen
Habermas proposed the public sphere as a realm where citizens could freely trade
ideas and debate on public affairs, beyond the control of government authority. His
concept supported the importance of the mass media and public opinion as core
components of modern democracy.
2 M. N. Cooper, “Inequality in the Digital Society: Why the Digital Divide Deserves All
the Attention It Gets,” Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal 73 (2002): 73-134.
3 Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, (New York: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, 1999), 65.
4 “ICT Data and Statistics: Individuals using the Internet per 100 inhabitants,”
International Telecommunications Union, 2001, accessed September 1, 2012. www.
itu.int/ITU-/ict/statistics/material/excel/20112/ictwebsite/Internet_users_01-11.xls.
5 There are more than 100 subscriptions per 100 inhabitants in the developed
countries, because the United Nations and the International Telecommunication
Union simply divided the total number of active mobile cellular accounts by the total

46. 42 L i
population. This methodology does not distinguish personal cell phone accounts
from business cell phone accounts.
6 “ICT Data and Statistics.”
7 Kofi Annan, “ITU Telecommunications Opening Ceremony,” International
Telecommunications Union, October 9, 1999, accessed April 17, 2012. http://www.
itu.int/telecom-wt99/press_service/information_for_the_press/press_kit/speeches/
annan_ceremony.html.
8 Ibid.
9 “Connecting Africa: How ICT is Transforming a Continent,” World Bank Group,
October 29, 2007, accessed April 17, 2012. http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:21526131~pagePK:34370~piPK:34424~theSite
PK:4607,00.html.
10 D. Epstein, E.C. Nisbet and T. Gillespie, “Who’s Responsible for the Digital Divide?
Public Perceptions and Policy Implications,” The Information Society 27 (2011):92-104.
11 Ibid. pg. 94.
12 “Falling Through The Net: Defining Digital Divide,” The National Telecommunication
and Information Agency, accessed December 18, 2011. http://www.ntia.doc.gov/
legacy/ntiahome/fttn99/introduction.html.
13 M. Castells, The Internet Galaxy. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 248.
14 Ibid.
15 N. Selwyn, Reconsidering Political and Popular Understandings of the Digital Divide
(New Media Society, 2004), 341-362.
16 “About the Millennium Development Goals Indicators,” United Nations, accessed
October 6, 2012. http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Host.aspx?Content=Indicators/
About.htm.
17 “Millennium Development Goals,” United Nations, accessed September 1, 2012.
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/global.shtml.
18 “ICT Data and Statistics: Individuals using the Internet per 100 inhabitants III,”
International Telecommunications Union.
19 “ICT Data and Statistics: Mobile-cellular subscriptions per 100 inhabitants IV.” See
also: “ICT Data and Statistics: Fixed- telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants,”
International Telecommunications Union 2001-2011, accessed September 1, 2012.
www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/material/excel/20112/ictwebsite/Fixed_01-11.xls.
20 �“ICT Data and Statistics: Fixed- broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants,”
International Telecommunications Union, accessed September 1, 2012. www.itu.int/
ITU-D/ict/statistics/material/excel/20112/ictwebsite/Fixed_bb_01-11.xls. See also:
“ICT Data and Statistics: Active mobile-broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitant,”
International Telecommunications Union, accessed September 1, 2012. www.itu.int/
ITU-D/ict/statistics/material/excel/20112/ictwebsite/Mobile_bb_07-11.xls._bb_07-11.xls.
21 “Measuring the Information Society 2011, Chart 2.5,” International
Telecommunications Union, accessed Nov. 11, 2012. http://www.itu.int/net/
pressoffice/backgrounders/general/pdf/5.pdf.

47. G l o b a l D i g i t a l D i v i d e 4 3
22 “Broadband penetration and GDP,” OECD Broadband Portal, December 2011, accessed
September 1, 2012. www.oecd.org/internet/broadbandandtelecom/1k-BBPenetration-
GDPperCap-2011-12-(NL)_Ver1.xls.
23 C. Fuchs and E. Horak, Africa and the Digital Divide. Telematics and Informatics
(2008), 99-116.
24 D. Epstein, E.C. Nisbet and T. Gillespie, Who’s Responsible for the Digital Divide? 94.
25 P. Loria, “Religious information poverty in Australian state schools,” Journal of
Christian Education, 49 (2006) : 21-31.
26 United Nations General Assembly. Resolution 59 (1). Dec. 14, 1946, accessed Nov.
11, 2012. http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/033/10/IMG/
NR003310.pdf?OpenElement
27 United Nations. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Article 19.
28 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Article 19(1) and (2).
29 Ibid.
30 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. General comment
No. 34. July 21, 2011, accessed Nov. 11, 2012. http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/
hrc/docs/gc34.pdf.
31 Ibid.
32 Council of Europe. European Convention on Human Rights: Article 10(1).
33 Organization of American States. American Convention on Human Rights: Article 13(1).
34 Organization of African Unity. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Article 9.
35 “General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Agenda item 3: The promotion, protection
and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet,” United Nations Human Rights
Council, accessed November 11, 2012. http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/
c6/19/64/51/6999c512.pdf.
36 In light of a global debate on the freedom of expression after terroristic attacks against
four American officials, including Ambassador Chris Stevens, it should be clarified
that existing international laws do not condone all types of expression. Abuse of
expression in the form of inflammatory message threatens democracy just as much
as excessive censorship does. Article 19(3) of the ICCPR recognizes that the exercise
of free speech carries special duties and responsibilities, and imposes restriction
for respect of the rights of others, as well as for the protection of national security
or public order. Article 20 of the ICCPR further prohibits any propaganda for war
and any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement
to discrimination or hostility. Article 10(2) of the ECHR and Article 13(5) of the
ACHR both adopt similar limitations to prevent political conflicts that could arise
from unchecked incitement to violence. The United States is not subjected to the
ACHR because Congress did not ratify the treaty. Congress ratified the ICCPR in 1992
with declaration that Article 1 to Article 27 is “not self-executing.” In other words,
these provisions are binding as international laws, but shall have no impact on the
American domestic laws. Specifically, interpretation of freedom of expression under

48. 44 L i
the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment would not conform to limitations imposed
by Article 19(3) of the ICCPR.
37 “Freedom of Expression and Broadcasting Regulations,” United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization, February 2011, accessed November 11, 2012.
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001916/191623e.pdf, 10.
38 Sousveillance is a term coined to mean “watching from below,” a concept where
communities keep government officials in check by monitoring how they exercise
their power. On May 14, 2012, the U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division
supported American citizens’ First Amendment right to record police activities in
a letter to the Baltimore Police Department. The Justice Department asserted that
police seizure and destruction of such recordings without warrant or due process
would violate individuals’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Likewise, on
July 19, 2012, District of Columbia Police Chief Cathy Lanier issued General Order
304-19 to forbid D.C. metro police from interfering with bystanders’ recording
of police activities in public space. See: Leatherman, Julie A. Webber, Charting
Transnational Democracy: Beyond Global Arrogance (New York: MacMillan 2005),
277-278.
39 “Special Report: Here Comes Anywhere,” The Economist, October 8, 2011, accessed
January 12, 2012. http://www.economist.com/node/21531113.
40 Alissa de Carbonnel, “Insight: Social media makes anti-Putin protests snowball,”
Reuters, December 7, 2011, accessed December 22, 2011. http://www.reuters.com/
article/2011/12/07/us-russia-protests-socialmedia-idUSTRE7B60R720111207.
41 “Scientific and Cultural Organization. Freedom of Connection, Freedom of
Expression: The Changing Legal and Regulatory Ecology Shaping the Internet,”
United Nation Educational, 2011. Box. 4.5, accessed November 11, 2012. unesdoc.
unesco.org/images/0019/001915/191594e.pdf.
42 “Social Networking Sites and Our Lives,” Pew Research Center, June 16, 2011,
accessed January 12, 2012, http://pewresearch.org/pubs/2025/social-impact-social-
networking-sites-technology-facebook-twitter-linkedin-myspace.
43 “The Internet and Civil Society,” The Australian National University, accessed
November 11, 2012. lyceum.anu.edu.au/wp-content/blogs/3/uploads//ANUpoll%20
report.pdf.
44 Elizabeth Flock, “Iceland crowd sources its next constitution,” The Washington Post,
accessed January 7, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/
iceland-crowdsources-its-next-constitution/2011/06/10/AGiBplOH_blog.html .
45 Sweden Official Twitter Account, accessed September 1, 2012. https://twitter.com/
sweden. See also: Sweden Tourism Board: Visit Sweden. http://partner.visitsweden.
com/.
46 Michael Bociurkiw, “Revolution by Cell Phone,” Forbes, September 10, 2001, accessed
January 7, 2012. http://www.forbes.com/asap/2001/0910/028.html.
47 Arsalan Iftikhar, “Arab Spring’ becoming the Arab Year?,” CNN, August 25, 2011,
accessed December 17, 2011. http://articles.cnn.com/2011-08-25/opinion/iftikhar.
arab.spring_1_moammar-gadhafi-arab-spring-democracy?_s=PM:OPINION.

49. G l o b a l D i g i t a l D i v i d e 4 5
48 Richard Engel, “Interview on The Last Word,” MSNBC , accessed January 7, 2012.
http://on.msnbc.com/h3ouHU.
49 Leatherman, Webber, 278.
50 Jeremy Laurence, “Secretive North Korea opens up to cellphones,” Reuters, November
21, 2011, accessed April 17, 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/21/uk-
korea-north-cellphone-idUSLNE7AK01C20111121.
51 Ibid.
52 “Wired, at last,” The Economist, March 3, 2011, accessed January 12, 2012. http://
www.economist.com/node/18285798.
53 Peter Bright, “Amidst chaos and riots, Egypt turns off the Internet,” Ars Technica,
January 2011, accessed March 22, 2012. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/
news/2011/01/amidst-chaos-and-riots-egypt-turns-off-the-internet.ars.
54 In January 2010, internet-search giant Google moved its data servers to Hong Kong to
sidestep rigorous censorship regulations. Google’s market share in China has since
plunged from 36% to 17%.
55 Paul Mozur, “Watching How China Censors,” Wall Street Journal, July 3, 2012,
accessed October 17, 2012. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230470860
4577502872481016502.html
56 Ibid.
57 DDL Intercettazioni, accessed December 22, 2011. http://www.camera.it/_dati/
leg16/lavori/stampati/pdf/16PDL0038530.pdf. See also: “Why Wikipedia Italy Would
Rather Perish than Publish,” Center for Democracy and Technology, October 5, 2011.
http://cdt.org/blogs/cynthia-wong/510case-point-why-wikipedia-italy-would-rather-
perish-publish.
58 Ibid.
59 “Wikipedia: Comunicato,” Wikipedia, accessed April 17, 2012. http://it.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Wikipedia:Comunicato_4_ottobre_2011/en.
60 “A Plaything of Powerful Nations,” The Economist, October 1, 2011, accessed January
7, 2012. http://www.economist.com/node/21530955.
61 “Internet World Users by Language,” Internet World Statistics, accessed September 1,
2012. http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats7.htm.
62 Ibid.
63 Leatherman, Webber, Charting Transnational Democracy, 278.
64 Thusong is a Sesotho word meaning ‘a place to get assistance.’ Thusong Service
Centers were initiated by the South African government in 1999, and were formerly
known as Multi-Purpose Community Centers. These centers are intended to serve
as one-stop, community development centers that provide government services and
computer facilities mainly in rural and disadvantaged urban areas. 171 Thusong
Service Centers are in operation as of March 2012.

50. 46 L i
65 H. Twinomurinzi, J. Phahlamohlaka, and E. Byrne, “The small group subtlety of
using ICT for participatory governance: A South African experience,” Government
Information Quarterly, September 2012.
66 Ibid.
67 General comment No. 34, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights.
68 “The Millennium Development Goals Report,” The United Nations, 2012, 63,
accessed Nov. 11, 2012. http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Resources/Static/Products/
Progress2012/English2012.pdf.
69 Laurence, “Secretive North Korea.”
70 Ibid.
71 A.O. Hassan, “Telecommunications Reform and Effects of Competition on
Availability, Quality and Cost of Services in Nigeria,” Public Policy and
Administration Research Vol. 1 No. 3 (2011) : 1.
72 “Leveraging Information and Communication Technology for the Base of the
Pyramid,” Hystra, 2011. www.hystra.com/opensource/Hystra_Rapport_ICT_for_the_
BoP.pdf.
73 Ibid. pg. 118.
74 Ibid. pg. 118.
Source: International Telecommunications Union (2012).
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Number of Internet Users Per 100 Inhabitants 2001-2011
Developed countries Developed countries
2.8
2.94
37.7 41.5
46.3 50.8 53.4
59
61.2
62.5 66.8
70.2
4.3 5.5 6.6 7.7 9.3
11.9 14.7
17.5
21
24.4
( A p p e n d i x A )

51. G l o b a l D i g i t a l D i v i d e 4 7
Source: International Telecommunications Union (2012).
Source: International Telecommunications Union (2012).
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Number of Fixed Telephone Lines and Mobile Cellular Subsccriptions
Per 100 Inhabitants, 2001-2011
Number of Fixed Telephone Lines and Mobile Cellular Subsccriptions
Per 100 Inhabitants, 2001-2011
Fixed telephone lines, developed countries
Fixed broadband, developed countries
Fixed telephone lines, developing countries
Fixed broadband, developing countries
Fixed telephone lines, developing countries
Mobile broadband, developed countries
Fixed telephone lines, developing countries
Mobile broadband, developing countries
( A p p e n d i x B )
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
( A p p e n d i x C )

52. 48 L i
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
IDI2010
10’0000 20’000 30’000 40’000 50’000 60’000 70’000
Norway
Luxembourg
Macao (China)
Norway
Korea(Rep.)
Botswana
Gabon
Moldova
Source: International Telecommunications Union (2012)
Source: OECD Broadband Portal (2012)
Correlation between Broadband Penetration and National Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) per capita PPP$.
( A p p e n d i x D )
( A p p e n d i x E )

53. G l o b a l D i g i t a l D i v i d e 4 9
Source: Internet World Stats (2012)
English
Chinese
Spanish
Japanese
Portuguese
German
Arabic
French
Russian
Korean
Other
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
Top 10 Languages on the Internet (In Millions of Users)
536.6
99.1
153.3
82.6
75.2
65.4
59.8
59.7
39.4
350.6
444.9
( A p p e n d i x F )

54. 50

55. F o r e i g n D i r e c t I n v e s t m e n t ’s I n f l u e n c e 5 1
Foreign Direct Investment’s Influence
on Regional Inequality and
Innovation in Hungary
M a l l o r y Yo u n g
A b s t r a c t
The Central and Eastern European Countries’ (CEEC) transition from socialist states
to open-market democracies has been a long and arduous affair; however, many
argue that CEECs are finally developing a solid economic standing. A global pow-
erhouse since the early 2000s, Eastern Europe has seen continued economic growth
and a steady influx of foreign direct investment (FDI), with a number of countries
assenting to the European Union’s plan.1
Hungary, in particular, has been a quickly
emerging market and a frontrunner among the CEECs’ transitions toward successful
capitalist economies.2
Yet, Hungary continues to be plagued by regional inequality
and ongoing limitations to innovation. This is even the case within the automotive
industry, which is a significant sector of the national economy and one of the pri-
mary beneficiaries of FDI.
A b o u t t h e A u t h o r
Mallory Young is a Masters of Public Administration candidate at Cornell Uni-
versity, where she’s concentrating in Economic and Financial Policy with a focus
on the health care field. Prior to returning to school, she worked for the Pew En-
vironment Group, a part of the Pew Charitable Trusts. Mallory worked with the
communications team to track and influence environmental policy and increase
public understanding of current environmental concerns. She has also had ex-
perience interning with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Of-
fice of Budget, the Colorado Democratic Party, and Sprocket Communications, a
boutique public relations and communications firm located in Denver, Colorado.
Mallory has a bachelor degree in Anthropology from Mount Holyoke College.

56. 5 2 Yo un g
An Overview of Hungary’s Socialist System
and Transition to An Open Market
H
ungary was a centrally planned state while under Soviet rule with the
federal government dictating economic activity. The Soviet Union as-
sessed its industry needs and allocated production centers according
to state capacity, availability of natural resources, and relationships
within the Eastern Bloc.3
Industries were then “built up and run in complex clus-
ter-like web[s] of planning and competition.”4
Each region within the Soviet Union
and its satellite countries became highly specialized in its delegated production
focus. Hungary’s major production regions, Budapest and the Northeast, played
a significant role in production and component manufacturing for the automobile
industry. They supplied parts domestically, as well as to other socialist countries.5
Budapest became the center of Hungary’s industrial production during so-
cialist rule as Europe’s postwar centralization of infrastructure development led
populations to relocate to urban areas.6
Regional disparities had existed through-
out Hungary’s history due to continuous governance by foreign powers, such as
the Habsburgs or the Soviet state. These existing disparities were intensified by
the relocation of industries to the nation’s capital as a part of postwar development
policies. As a result, an increased amount of job opportunities and regional invest-
ment also moved to Budapest and the Northeast region.7
Government policies did relocate some industry to areas outside of Buda-
pest in an attempt to relieve the overabundance of agricultural laborers in that
area, as well as to limit the growing disparities between regions.8
While this move
helped ease inequalities to a degree, regional differences ultimately grew within
the socialist system due to the preferential treatment of high-producing regions.
Additionally, beginning in the 1980s, growing financial uncertainty throughout
the Eastern Bloc rendered Hungary’s regional concerns secondary to the fate of the
national economy.9
In 1990, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, CEECs decided to adopt
an open-market approach to economic development called “shock therapy.”10
Hun-
gary employed this strategy, immediately implementing a democratic government
accompanied by open-market regulations in an effort to develop an economically
modern and viable nation.11
The CEECs’ implementation of shock therapy policies
reflected their common desire to replicate the economic success of liberal Western
nations.

57. F o r e i g n D i r e c t I n v e s t m e n t ’s I n f l u e n c e 5 3
An open economy guided by neo-liberal financial policies requires a “hands-
off” approach to the market, and assumes that any deficiencies will be accounted
for and remedied without a need for government intervention.12
Hungary’s new
open-market approach made attracting FDI a top priority in order to encourage
growth and improve economic stability. FDI was seen as an “engine of transition,
bringing badly needed capital, new technology, efficient management, up-skilling,
value-added production, jobs and economic growth to Eastern Europe.”13
The na-
tional leadership believed that foreign investment would not only address the in-
novation needs of the economy, but also reduce regional inequality throughout the
country by bringing industry to less developed regions, and driving populations to
new areas of production.
Regional Inequalities Under Socialism
and Foreign Direct Investment
Under socialist rule, Hungary’s regional policies were essentially a product of its
industrial policies.14
Specialized industries made significant contributions to the
nation’s economic output, and provided their regions with “a virtual monopoly
within the national economy.”15
Thus, areas endowed with particularly beneficial
or productive industries, such as Northeastern Hungary and Budapest, became
pivotal to the country’s economy.16
From the 1950s through the 1980s, Hungary attempted to diffuse production
by relocating industrial facilities to peripheral regions.17
The resulting outward
migration allowed for outlying areas to diversify their economies, while concur-
rently easing the growing labor surpluses in Budapest. The creation of new pro-
duction facilities in less developed regions also reduced problematic agricultural
labor surpluses as unemployed individuals found industrial employment.18
Many of the relocated plants, however, were equipped with largely outdated
and polluting technology.19
Socialist interventions made migration to more rural
areas compelling in order to increase social justice as well as the quantity of jobs
and products available in Hungary and the Soviet market.20
Business efficiency
and economic gains were largely secondary concerns, meaning that much of the
new industry was not equipped to compete or produce on a profit-maximizing lev-
el within an open market. Transitioning from the planned economic system proved
more difficult than expected due to a lack of enterprise oriented toward operating
for profit, or being capable of withstanding the pressures of market competition.21

58. 5 4 Yo un g
As Hungary opened its markets to world trade, a new challenge arose in
determining which state enterprises to privatize. The government gave prefer-
ence to businesses with proven production capability (and thus potential to be
the most beneficial in the socialist economy) due to their political importance and
assumed ability to succeed within a free market.22
State enterprises held enough
power within the national political sphere to successfully lobby for privatization
while remaining intact in the new open market era. Consequently, many of the
businesses that carried over from the socialist era were those with high produc-
tion capacity and substantial political power.23
The continued presence of former
state-owned businesses in the new open market maintained ideologies towards
cost-cutting and minimal production diversity, and held established power rela-
tionships intact. Hence, the remaining companies were not necessarily those most
capable of adapting to an open market or profit maximizing business approaches,
but were rather those companies that had been most immersed in the policy de-
velopment process.24
New competition within the country and exposure to a larger market drove
companies—even formerly prosperous ones—to collapse. Ikarus, a state-run au-
tomotive company specializing in bus manufacturing with a strong base in the
Soviet Bloc, serves as a poignant example.25
At one point, 90 percent of Ikarus’
output went to the USSR, accounting for 10 percent of Hungary’s export trade.26
Ikarus had some experience and customers in the Western market, but was unable
to keep up with the level of production demanded of companies operating within
the global automobile market. Ikarus was also dependent on other state-owned
businesses for parts, as the automobile industry within socialist Hungary, like
all sectors, was extremely intertwined.27
The shift to an open-market economy,
and Ikarus’ loss of a near monopoly on the Soviet automobile market, resulted in
dwindling sales, a shrinking workforce throughout the 1990s, and a decrease in
production from 14,000 buses in 1980 to 3,000 in 1992.28
The government attracted FDI, in part, to increase the diversity and location
of industry throughout Hungary.29
However, economic incentives tend to build
upon existing advantages, augmenting structural inequity. Hungary was no ex-
ception.30
Industry production sites that had been relocated outside of Budapest
were some of the first to be shut down or have segments sold off under the open-
market economy. This was due to the economically artificial nature of their in-
dustries and inadequate production capabilities. Rather than build new facilities,

59. F o r e i g n D i r e c t I n v e s t m e n t ’s I n f l u e n c e 5 5
which would have entailed substantial capital and time investments, foreign com-
panies instead focused on exploiting available businesses, sites, and infrastruc-
ture. Most foreign industry settled in Budapest since the city had an ideal central
location within Hungary, was well connected to other European capitals, and
was better technologically equipped than outlying locations within the country.31
Central Hungary, where Budapest is located, attracted approximately 65 percent
of all FDI between 1994 and 2000. Over the same period, Southern Transdanubia,
the region with the lowest inflow of FDI, received only two percent of total foreign
investment.32
Thus, Budapest not only received the majority of FDI, but did so at
a time when surrounding regions lost industry.
The newly-formed government proved unable to direct FDI to where devel-
opment and job creation was most needed, leaving investors to decide where to
settle and which industries to participate in according to availability of supply
infrastructure and financial gain.34,35
As foreign companies favored investments in
secure industries with proven production capacity, such as the automotive sector,
industries such as mining, agriculture, and some manufacturing slowly died out
along with the jobs they had provided.36
Additionally, Hungary was no longer in
a position to provide significant subsidies to industries like agriculture and raw
material extraction, due to its focus on market-driven development.36
Formerly
state-funded industries were heavily concentrated and often the sole source of
employment in rural areas.37
Many regions subsequently suffered, as they were
not equipped to benefit from FDI.
Foreign investors saw Hungary as an untapped source of cheap labor and
capitalized on decreasing employment opportunities in order to expand their
power and presence within the country. In many ways they were able to use re-
sidual socialist workforce tensions to build up existing industry and strengthen
labor control. Many foreign firms were not willing to invest in Hungary without
guarantees that unionism would not be enforced. This was a stark change from
the socialist state, in which the unionization rate was 95 percent.38
In its desire to
attract more FDI and modernize the automotive industry, the government allowed
firms substantial leeway on labor terms and conditions. This was only enhanced
by the workers’ openness to seek out new labor relationships: “general dissatis-
faction with the previous union—which had become inextricably associated with
ruling power structures—and by competition between new and old unions, which
enabled employers to play one off against the other.”39

60. 5 6 Yo un g
Foreign automotive firms were able to tailor labor structures to their specific
needs as additional industries failed and other foreign companies grew in promi-
nence within the economy. Suzuki, for instance, became the largest employer in
the town of Esztergom, located just outside of Budapest, due to the collapse of the
local economy after all other industry failed to meet its market demands.40
Ultimately, regions with industry useful to investors benefitted from capital
inflow and new jobs. Average employment, however, was slow to catch up due
to the simultaneous deterioration of sectors that had little investment. FDI played
some role in all regions of Hungary, although the availability of investment op-
portunities and attractive industries were, in some locations, extremely limited.41
Attractive areas such as Budapest were able to gain substantial investment as
“57.5 percent of enterprises of the region received foreign funding.”42
The capital’s
economy continued to develop, with a GDP 3.5 times as high as that of the least
developed county in the 1990s. This was a significant increase compared to Buda-
pest’s economy in the mid-1970s, which was only twice that of the least developed
county.43
Regions that lost industry, or were forced to focus on select sectors in
order to compete for foreign investment, ended up worse off or economically stag-
nated, resulting in few quality employment opportunities.
Approaches Toward Innovation in Socialist
Hungary and Under Foreign Direct Investment
The centrally planned system under socialism attempted to regulate the market
with greater efficiency than the open market by utilizing the strategy of innova-
tion by order, whereby the government responded to perceived innovation needs
immediately and also adopted new approaches as a result of its complete control
of supply.44
In reality, however, Soviet “financial support for innovation was rel-
egated mostly to process innovation,” due to an emphasis on cost reduction and
the large-scale production of a limited group of goods.45
New products represented
an average of 1.3 percent of the total number of products produced between 1981
and 1986, while an average of 91.7 percent of total products remained unchanged
during the same time period.46
Hungary made attempts to move towards a public-private crossover system
in the 1980s. They allowed the creation of small firms in hopes of increasing in-
novation and trade connections, as well as partnerships with non-socialist coun-
tries. The firms were essentially teams contracted by state enterprises to work

61. F o r e i g n D i r e c t I n v e s t m e n t ’s I n f l u e n c e 5 7
overtime within a “separately structured partnership.”47
The government created
new regulations, as well as the Ministry of Industry, to govern such partnerships
and apply uniform policies across all sectors.48
State enterprises had substantially
more political power and control over supply than their competitors, however,
and therefore they continued to act as central players in determining policies and
affecting political objectives.49
In this environment of uneven competition, small
firms had little opportunity to grow and gain influence within their respective
sectors, and in the overall economy. Additionally, the socialist cultural aversion to
large-scale returns on investment further diminished small businesses’ chances
of success.50
Profits within a socialist state were seen as detrimental when at-
tained for individual gain rather than for furthering the public good.51
Regulation
dictated by state enterprises and the societal scrutiny over profits meant that
small firms had little chance to grow. This meant that there would be little motiva-
tion to maintain competitiveness due to the lack of financial opportunity.
Another motivation for allowing FDI into Hungary’s economy was to create
connections between domestic firms and foreign investors. Substantial linkages
failed to develop, however, since investor interest was limited to manufacturing.
The links that did materialize were committed to the low value end of the produc-
tion chain. Within the automotive industry, the major foreign companies relied on
existing European suppliers for components, using Hungary instead for the gener-
ous duty-free status given to them in an attempt to attract additional investment.52
General Motors (GM), for instance, had domestic ties with regard to ownership, but
due to its small production capacity in Hungary, the gains were modest with limited
training or skill development for the labor force and only 700 jobs were created.53
GM’s association with the domestic firm Astras accounted for only 15 percent
of assembly and “mainly comprised of basic low-technology items like paint, sun
visors [and] mudguards.”54
Therefore, the work that was passed on to domestic
firms was on the low-end of the value chain, meaning that new skills and im-
proved technology did not spill over into the domestic market, as would have been
the case with high-end production.55
Financial gain rested predominantly with
foreign investors while producing a marginal number of domestic jobs in periph-
eral regions. Significantly less profit and technology transfer to local businesses
and the national economy occurred than had been expected.56
While innovation in the socialist economy had been limited by a cost cut-
ting mentality, innovation in the open market economy was limited in many ways

62. 5 8 Yo un g
by a blind faith in market-centered rhetoric. Hungarian policymakers were in-
experienced with the open market, and they felt that they could fully trust its
mechanisms to anticipate and address the research and development needs of in-
dustries. This resulted in very little national investment in research and develop-
ment (R&D).57
R&D remained significantly lower throughout the 1990s compared
to countries such as South Korea, which began transitioning to an open-market
system around the same time as Hungary. South Korea, however, had dedicated
more effort and financing to innovation-focused policies.58
Recommendations
It has been noted that the “spatial structure of the country still does not suit
the conditions required for the rise of a modern market economy.”59
Hungary is in
a position where industry is growing after significant losses during the transition
period. Yet, regional inequalities have only increased, while innovation has remained
limited. It is imperative for policymakers to assess what has contributed to this, and
what can be done to promote regional equality. Responsibility falls on both the Hun-
garian government and on foreign investors. The government failed to adequately
regulate while the risk-averse foreign investors failed to diversify their investments,
focusing instead on exploiting political conflict and cheap labor to their benefit.
The Hungarian government was at an immediate disadvantage in the new
open-market system since Hungary had not been capitalist since 1947. The leader-
ship, therefore, had very little knowledge of how an open-market system worked
or what role government should play in its regulation. Foreign investors were
left with few policy guidelines, in part due to the belief that markets were self-
regulating, and in part because the government had little knowledge or ability to
formulate policies on its own.
Convergence with prosperous Western European economies was such a
driving force in Hungary’s decision-making process that policy strategies were
borrowed and installed directly from the countries whose economies Hungary
wished to replicate. In retrospect, it is clear that the country’s post-socialist eco-
nomic base was ill suited for such a quick conversion to capitalism. Given that
Hungary had been devoted to social benefits and minimal competition for de-
cades, a sudden, successful shift to an open market economy seems improbable.
While Hungary’s socialist system may not have implemented all of the ideol-
ogy’s proposed approaches for governance and policy, people were provided with

63. F o r e i g n D i r e c t I n v e s t m e n t ’s I n f l u e n c e 5 9
healthcare, universal education, and nearly guaranteed employment.60
To go from
being guaranteed complete individual care to competing fiercely for resources,
jobs, and the learning of entirely new skills virtually overnight is a nearly insur-
mountable task. The “shock therapy” Hungary underwent did not simply create
a new market and a democratic political system, but it reshaped society without
sufficient regard for its social needs.
With the concept that “global capitalists will locate their resources where they
earn the maximum return on their investment”61
comes the realization that guid-
ance is not only needed, but is also vital to the development of a healthy and diverse
economy. Hungary needs to look not only at what foreign investors want, but also at
what communities and regions need. Greater involvement of local non-governmen-
tal organizations and community leaders in the initial stages of policy formation is
necessary to guarantee that the people are represented, and that decisions made by
both the government and foreign investors are transparent and easily questioned.
Foreign companies must also be held accountable for good governance and
greater regulation. While investors seek out cheap labor and opportunities for cut-
ting production costs, greater equality within investment relationships must de-
velop for countries to truly benefit from FDI. Issues arising from the transition to
an open-market economy are not limited to Hungary. All of Eastern Europe, and
many countries throughout the world, have at various times experienced similar
concerns and conflict. Thus, international governance must be involved for such
large-scale reforms to succeed.
Large foreign investors often have the upper hand in negotiating business
agreements in new markets, and some countries are not positioned to achieve
balanced associations or fair results. The International Labor Organization, and
to some degree the United Nations—as the governing bodies of the international
community—should attempt to implement standards and regulations for FDI in
transitioning economies. As FDI relationship structures will inevitably vary be-
tween states based on context and country-specific needs, government officials
and local representatives must be involved in leading their nations’ economic
conversion to an open market.
While transitions will take longer due to the increased number of actors
involved, immediate effect solutions, such as ”shock therapy,” have repeatedly
shown the negative and often economically detrimental repercussions of sudden
and culturally insensitive approaches to economic development.62
Strictly regu-
lated FDI is often feared as countries feel too much interference will lead to a loss

64. 6 0 Yo un g
of investment. Nonetheless, the current approach of competing for FDI among
developing countries only encourages a “race to the bottom” response, where gov-
ernments attempt to create the most beneficial environment for investors, often to
the detriment of their own economy and labor force.63
Instead, slower and more
inclusive transitional methods involving the international community will put
more bargaining power in the hands of developing economies and their people.
Conclusion
Regional inequality has existed throughout most of Hungary’s history. It is clear,
however, that the influx of FDI into the country’s economy has increased regional
disparities in terms of industry creation, employment opportunities, and capital
gain. While Budapest has historically experience higher growth rates than other
areas of the country, FDI has amplified this imbalance. The automotive industry
has always been crucial to Hungary’s economy, and continues to represent a large
portion of the country’s exports.
The introduction of FDI has centralized production with few linkages to do-
mestic firms, resulting in large-scale losses to local industry. Ultimately, foreign
investors have become central figures in business and job creation in Hungary.
While Budapest and other higher-income areas have profited to an extent, poorer
regions continue to lag behind, with growing inequality as additional industry is
lost, and foreign firms remain uninterested in investing in rural areas.
Attempts at greater innovation have also seen significant hurdles. Under so-
cialism, innovation was a largely ignored development tool due to concerns over
limited supply that grew greater as the country’s financial state worsened. Under
capitalism, the government had little to offer in the way of research and develop-
ment funding due to a total reliance on market mechanisms to account for all
innovation needs. FDI did little to remedy the situation, using Hungary as a cheap
base of operation, and relying on existing suppliers elsewhere in Europe rather
than domestic companies for the more specialized production and labor needs.
Hungary has been stuck at the lower end of the value chain, working to pro-
duce low-end goods, such as paint and sun visors, rather than developing engines
or other high technology products. As a result, domestic firms have been unable to
gain from technological spillovers. Instead, Hungary has found itself with limited
employment and capital gains, while foreign investors have been reaping signifi-
cant profits from cheap labor and increased access to the rest of Europe’s market.

65. F o r e i g n D i r e c t I n v e s t m e n t ’s I n f l u e n c e 6 1
The unbalanced power relationship between Hungary and FDI illustrates is-
sues affecting many developing nations, where concerns over attracting investors
often outweigh the actual needs and ambitions of the country. Higher standards
for foreign investors must be enforced on an international level to ensure that the
voices of developing countries’ governments, and their populations, are involved
in the decision-making process. Quick fixes such as “shock therapy” have proven
to be ineffective. Rather, a slower approach consisting of negotiation between par-
ties must be employed to ensure multi-lateral involvement, rather than unilateral
control of markets by foreign firms. ◗
( E n d n o t e s )
1 Gabor Kezdi “Two Phases of Labor Market Transition in Hungary: Inter-Sectoral
Reallocation and Skill-Based Technological Change,” Budapest Working Papers on
the Labour Market (July 2002): 1.
2 Rainer Kattel, “Financial and Economic Crisis in Eastern Europe,” Journal of Post
Keynsian Economics 33.1 (2010): 42.
3 David Sadler and Adam Swain, “State and market in eastern Europe: regional
development and workplace implications of direct foreign investment in the
automobile industry in Hungary,” Transactions Institute of British Geographers NS 19:
390.
4 Rainer Kattel, “Financial and Economic Crisis in Eastern Europe,” Journal of Post
Keynsian Economics 33(1) (Fall 2010): 53.
5 Sadler and Swain, “State and market in eastern Europe,” 390.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Sadler and Swain, “State and market in eastern Europe,” 392.
9 Ibid.
10 Mick Dunford and Adrian Smith, “Catching Up or Falling Behind? Economic
Performance and Regional Trajectories in the ‘New Europe,’” Economic Geography
76.2 (2000): 170.
11 Martin Sokol, “Central and Eastern Europe a Decade After the Fall of State-socialism:
Regional Dimensions of Transition Processes,” Regional Studies 35(7): 645.
12 Dunford and Smith, “Catching Up or Falling Behind?” 170.
13 Ibid. pg. 651.
14 Sadler and Swain, “State and market in eastern Europe,” 390.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.

66. 6 2 Yo un g
17 Gyula Horvath, “Regional and cohesion policy in Hungary,” CAP Working Paper: 91.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Sadler and Swain, “State and market in eastern Europe,” 390.
21 Sokol, “Central and Eastern Europe a Decade After the Fall of State-socialism,” 650.
22 Sadler and Swain, “State and market in eastern Europe,” 396.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 David L. Brown et. al, “Leading Sectors and Leading Regions: Economic
Restructuring and Regional Inequality in Hungary since 1990,” International Journal
of Urban and Regional Research 31.3 (2007): 525.
31 Ibid.
32 I. Palne Kovacs et al, “Institutional ‘Legacies’ and the Shaping of Regional
Governance in Hungary” Regional and Federal Studies 14(3) (Autumn 2004): 434.
33 Sadler and Swain, “State and market in eastern Europe,” 390.
34 Brown et. al, “Leading Sectors and Leading Regions,” 533.
35 Sadler and Swain, “State and market in eastern Europe,” 390.
36 Horvath, “Regional and Cohesion Policy in Hungary,” 95.
37 Ibid.
38 Sadler and Swain, “State and market in eastern Europe,” 393.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid. pg. 400.
41 David L. Brown et. al, “Leading Sectors and Leading Regions,” 538.
42 Andreas Lange, Uneven Regional Development: The European Union and its New
Member States (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2004), 90.
43 I. Palne Kovacs et al, “Institutional ‘Legacies’ and the Shaping of Regional
Governance,” 433.
44 John P. Bonin and Istvan Abel. “Will Restructuring Hungarian Companies Innovate?”
Comparative Economic Studies, 2 (1998): 55.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.

67. F o r e i g n D i r e c t I n v e s t m e n t ’s I n f l u e n c e 6 3
47 Sadler and Swain, “State and market in eastern Europe,” 390.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Bonin and Abel, “Will Restructuring Hungarian Companies Innovate?” 56.
51 Ibid.
52 Sadler and Swain, “State and market in eastern Europe,” 398.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Rainer Kattel, “Financial and Economic Crisis in Eastern Europe,” Journal of Post
Keynsian Economics 33.1 (2010): 51.
56 Ibid.
57 Erkki Karo and Rainer Kattel, “The Copying Paradox: Why Converging Policies but
Diverging Capacities for Development in Eastern European Innovation Systems?” The
International Journal of Institutions and Economies, 2.2 (2009): 10.
58 Ibid.
59 Horvath, “Regional and cohesion policy in Hungary,” 91.
60 Matthew C. Mahutga and Nina Bandelj, “Foreign Investment and Income Inequality:
The Natural Experiment of Central and Eastern Europe,” International Journal of
Comparative Sociology 49.6 (2008): 434.
61 Brown et. al, “Leading Sectors and Leading Regions,” 539.
62 Sadler and Swain, “State and market in eastern Europe,” 398.
63 Sokol, “Central and Eastern Europe a Decade After the Fall of State-socialism,” 650.

68. 64

69. T h e E f f e c t o f P r i v a t e D e t e n t i o n P o l i c y 6 5
The Effect of Private Detention Policy
on Immigrant Political and
Social Incorporation
G r e g J e t t e
A b s t r a c t
Immigration policy remains a contentious issue at both the federal and state levels,
and post 9/11, has overwhelmingly favored detention and deportation strategies. Pri-
vate detention companies have gained increasing political and economic influence
as national rhetoric has characterized many immigrant groups as posing a threat
to national security. As a result, private detention companies have been successful
in influencing policy and increasing detention facilities, particularly in states facing
fiscal crises. The short-term economic gains from private detention facilities, such
as industry jobs and income from prisons, may dwarf the long-term economic and
social costs, however.
A b o u t t h e A u t h o r
Greg Jette is a second year M.P.A. candidate studying Government, Politics and
Policy Analysis at Cornell University. Greg grew up in Lexington, Massachusetts
and attended nearby Tufts University and the Autonomous University of Madrid
for his undergraduate studies. After graduating from Tufts University in 2008 with
a B.A. in International Relations, Greg worked in the Massachusetts State Legisla-
ture as a legislative aide to Revenue Committee Chairman Jay Kaufman. Follow-
ing his graduate studies, Greg plans to relocate to Washington D.C. and work in
the private sector as a management consultant to the federal government with a
focus in emergency preparedness and labor policy.

70. 6 6 J e t t e
M
igration policy, defined as policy dealing with the transit of persons
or groups across borders into a country, affects the capacity of a
migrant to establish connections to political and social networks.
Barriers to political and social incorporation in the United States
prevent migrants from accessing critical human services, such as education, ad-
equate nutrition, healthcare, emergency services, and affordable housing. In the
United States, private detention enterprises play an increasingly important role
in defining migration policy and guiding the dialogue that surrounds it. Current
detention policy affects the ability of migrant groups, particularly the undocu-
mented, to participate in their communities through public engagement forums.
Additionally, detention facilities create hostile environments for political and so-
cial engagement that promotes detention rather than integration, leading to poli-
cies that are destructive to community and family networks.
Both Arizona and California rely on private detention facilities to house and
process undocumented migrants until they can be processed and deported to
their respective countries of origin. A prevailing perception exists in both states
that detention policy offers an effective solution to undocumented migration,
while providing a source of economic stimulus and stability. This misperception
is slowly shifting as more information suggests that private detention is not the
answer to either economic instability or undocumented migration.
The Politics of Detention and Deportation
The discourse on U.S. migration policy is sharply divided along restrictionist and
expansionist lines. Restrictionists prefer to see more stringent regulation lead-
ing to the detention and eventual deportation of undocumented migrants, while
expansionists prefer assimilation policies that acknowledge undocumented mi-
grants’ potential to contribute to society. The tension between restrictionist and
expansionist policies exists at the federal, state, and local levels. The trend toward
restrictionist migration policies represents a strong electoral support for policies
that favor detention and deportation as methods of migration policy enforcement.
As a result, detention enterprises and state governments formed new public-pri-
vate partnerships. Such a partnership is similar to a franchise contract, and al-
though there are some exceptions (e.g. New York), agreements are most prevalent
in low-income regions reliant on manufacturing and low skill jobs for economic
growth. The facility siting process requires local government officials to approve
construction—pending an environmental and economic impact assessment—and

71. T h e E f f e c t o f P r i v a t e D e t e n t i o n P o l i c y 6 7
issue bonds to finance the project, while the detention contractor provides the com-
munity with jobs, training, and the promise of a sustainable source of revenue.
State and local governments, however, often cut funding to critical social
programs while protecting the private detention companies’ interests. Detention
companies invest in media presence in order to lobby for policies that protect
detention facility funding from budget cuts. They often cite the danger of un-
derfunded detention facilities to incite fear in policy-makers and protect fund-
ing each budget cycle. As a result, state and local governments protect detention
facilities and cut funding to critical social welfare programs instead. To better
illustrate the scale and relationship between community and contractor, consider
the Corrections Corporations of America (CCA). CCA is the largest private deten-
tion and corrections facility contractor in the United States and established the
market for private detention in 1983.1
CCA currently owns and operates more than
sixty facilities in twenty states, capable of housing 91,000 detainees and inmates.2
Since CCA has a fiduciary responsibility to its shareholders to remain profitable,
the company protects its facilities from budget cuts by using aggressive lobbying
campaigns at the state and local levels. For example, CCA’s lobbying efforts in the
south and southwest portions of the country during the 2000 election cycle led
to decisive political victories—and new business—in states experiencing chronic
budget deficits.3
State policy-makers cut educational funding and state contribu-
tions to Medicaid in an effort to balance the deficit.4,5
This trend reflects a hostile
political environment, cultivated by conflict between pro-detention and pro-citi-
zenship advocates, and produced policies like the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act, and California’s Proposition 187.
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA) was enacted into law on September 30, 1996 and imposed additional
border security and residency requirements to make legal entry and reentry more
difficult for migrants.6
The IIRIRA states that if an undocumented immigrant is
present in the United States for 180 days, but less than 365 days, he or she must
leave the country and remain outside of the United States for at least three years
before he or she is able to reenter the country legally. If an undocumented migrant
resides in the United States for over a year, he or she must leave the country for
at period of ten years before attempting to legally reenter the country. Any at-
tempt at unauthorized reentry may trigger a probationary penalty, during which
the individual is ineligible to apply for legal re-entry. The IIRIRA established a
standard for deportation policy where “numerous crimes were reclassified as ag-

72. 6 8 J e t t e
gravated felonies requiring detention and possibly deportation. To compound the
harshness of the revised statute, enforcement was retroactive.”7
The statute also
targeted migrant access to employment and social welfare programs, imposing
financial sanctions on employers who hired undocumented workers, and restrict-
ing migrant access to public services and social welfare programs.
California’s Proposition 187 was introduced as a ballot initiative in 1994, and
passed as a referendum in the general election. The referendum imposed legal
barriers to prevent undocumented migrants from accessing health care, public
education, and other social services funded by the state of California. In 1998, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that Proposition 187 was in violation of the Supremacy
Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Proposition 187 was repealed in 1998; however,
permutations of the referendum have appeared in many other states, including
Alabama, Arizona, and Oklahoma.
The dialogue surrounding models of migration policy is divided among sev-
eral overlapping categories of stakeholders: nativists, free-marketeers, liberals
and conservatives. Nativists support strict migration laws and oppose a pathway
to citizenship for undocumented migrants. Free marketeers are traditionally pro-
migrant and support policies that facilitate labor exchange and incorporation.
The discourse surrounding immigration enforcement shifted from a conversation
between conservatives and liberals, to a conversation between nativists and free
marketeers.8
Advocates for detention and deportation policy aligned their interests
with prison detention organizations, and through lobbying and political advocacy
were able to manufacture a nationwide need for additional holding facilities. In re-
sponse, state and local governments accepted the responsibility of financing facil-
ity construction projects. Facility construction projects were funded through bond
sales, as well as broad cuts to state and municipal budgets, where money was
reallocated toward the debt service on the detention facility construction bonds.
The financial contributions of migrants to the United States are substan-
tial; yet, despite the substantial financial contributions migrants make over the
long term, state and local governments targeted migrant populations indirectly
by eliminating literacy programs, legal advocacy programming, and subsidized
health care services. The Congressional Research Service conducted an analysis
of the net fiscal impact of migrants in the United States, and concluded that a mi-
grant arriving in 1994 would contribute an estimated net surplus of $80,000. 9,10
By 1999, migrants represented twelve percent of the American workforce, or 15.7

73. T h e E f f e c t o f P r i v a t e D e t e n t i o n P o l i c y 6 9
million employees, and continue to constitute a growing percentage of the U.S.
workforce.11
Preventative care services and social welfare programs—particularly
those that benefit migrant populations—are notoriously difficult to quantify and
justify in the short-term, given political expediency issues and fiscal pressures. As
a result, health and human services programs, many of which are crucial to the
social and political equity of immigrants, are often the first to experience budget
cuts to support debt service payments on infrastructural development and con-
struction projects. As social welfare programs are cut, and as the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) continues to grapple with policies to detain and deport
immigrants, the costs associated with enforcement become a greater concern and
endanger the long-term viability of detention and deportation strategies and trends.
While immigrant detention and deportation policies have become increas-
ingly controversial since the IIRIRA and warrant considerable financial scrutiny,
it is also important to evaluate the effects of prisons and privately owned deten-
tion centers on social and political incorporation. California and Arizona offer
two unique settings where the political and social tension between migrant popu-
lations and detention organizations translates into policy at the state and local
levels.
Political and Social Incorporation
Practical Application in Detention Policy
Political incorporation is defined as “the responsiveness of the [political] sys-
tem to the interest of inclusion and substantial authority and influence.” In other
words, political incorporation is the extent to which a group’s interests are ef-
fectively represented in policy-making; in this case, detention policy.12
Political
incorporation applies to several different social contexts, the first of which occurs
through self-identified groups with interests that focus on specific demographic
characteristics, emotions, attitudes, and perceptions. Second, political incorpora-
tion can span from “an individual’s law-abiding residence in the polity,” to his or
her full engagement with the process of democracy.13
The concept of membership
slides across a broad spectrum of participatory activity, from simply existing in a
community, to participation in a detention facility siting hearing, to full-fledged
civic engagement and deliberative participation in the democratic process.
The state is responsible for providing a framework for incorporation, yet
private enterprise plays a large role in molding detention policy within state and
local government. The theory of central contradictions asserts that there is a rap-

74. 7 0 J e t t e
idly changing dynamic between the industry and the host community. Private de-
tention enterprises fear the erosion of their influence on detention policy, as well
as the consequences that may result from a shift in balance of political power.
This transition may include changes to an industry’s exploitation of labor market
segments by race, gender, locality, sector, and citizenship. Loss of status trans-
lates into the loss of a company’s ability to advocate for, and influence policy in
state and federal legislatures. Public awareness campaigns of detention enter-
prises create environments in which immigrants “may be isolated in separate
neighborhoods, schools, and workplaces with no party or organization seeking to
make connections with them.”14
Within the budgeting process and facility siting
process, political capital is essential for creating and maintaining programs that
support public policy. The tension created by conflicting interests among nativist
groups, migrant groups, and private detention advocates creates an environment
in which each party competes for limited political capital. The winner earns the
right to engage policy-makers and shape migration policy, while the losers must
adapt and position their membership for an opportunity to shift the balance to a
more favorable arrangement. Within the context of detention and migrant policy,
detention enterprises use targeted information campaign strategies to solicit feed-
back and approval from community members. Political and social incorporation
plays a large role in outreach strategies, and allows detention companies to go
through the motions of soliciting approval without soliciting input from all demo-
graphics or income brackets.
Smaller migrant communities lack the legal and social resources to effec-
tively advocate in opposition to policies targeting members of the group, exposing
communities to policies that target access to services and engagement. The nu-
ances embedded in the spectrum of political incorporation become more compli-
cated as the size of the group increases. Jennifer Hochschild and John Mollenkopf
argue that larger, more concentrated groups, “as long as they are not isolated,
have more political resources and internal channels of communication than do
small groups thinly scattered among the native born or people of nationalities.”
15
Groups located in urban settings have a greater likelihood of incorporating
into the political fabric and hierarchy of their community because of their physi-
cal proximity to participatory activities, whereas groups located in rural settings
are less likely to incorporate successfully into their communities. Smaller rural
groups may be separated from labor markets, school systems, and other groups
that share similar values and identities. The correlations among geographical dis-

75. T h e E f f e c t o f P r i v a t e D e t e n t i o n P o l i c y 7 1
tribution, educational attainment, and access to labor markets is important for
the ability of groups to advocate for policy at the state, local, and federal levels.
Education is another essential factor in the political, social, cultural, and
economic incorporation process.16
While local government institutions (e.g. city
councils, town meetings, etc.) are relatively accessible to immigrants, they also
have the capacity to be fractious, disorganized, and fragmented.17
Despite its ac-
cessibility, local government is incapable of responding to the complex needs of
an immigrant population attempting to incorporate. Local government lacks the
authority to make decisions about migration status, and in many cases, lacks the
financial resources and expertise to develop and implement programming that
delivers linguistic and cultural support to non-English speaking members of a
community. Nevertheless, state and federal authorities rely heavily on municipali-
ties (as proxies) to develop localized solutions to provide services to, or enforce
policy in, the migrant population.
Often the host country is willing and able to provide some pathway to in-
corporation such that both individuals and groups have access to polity. There
are many factors that can influence the rate and degree of incorporation, such as
group size and geographical distribution. For example, large ethnic groups that
are far-removed from social programs and forums for civic engagement are pre-
disposed to form enclaves and incorporate at a slow rate. Daniel Tichenor argues
that there are at least two influential factors that affect policy outcomes and in-
corporation. First, consistent economic growth in a stable economy leads to non-
incremental policy change and policy breakthroughs. Second, economic decline
is the catalyst for policy innovation.18
Economic forces provide compelling reasons
for immigration policy innovation, and justify policy decisions in times of both
fiscal prosperity and fiscal distress.
While education and proximity refer specifically to the social and political
contexts of a community, the economic context is the most frequently cited and
misinterpreted framework for measuring assimilation and incorporation. Immi-
grants contribute to the economy of their community in proportion to their share
of the population. Context is a far more nuanced phenomenon than simple finan-
cial contribution into a locality. The oversimplified interpretation of economic
contribution equates contribution to tax dollars spent and financial investment in
the local economy. In fact, economic context goes beyond financial indicators tar-
geting local economic growth. Local economic context is critical in the incorpora-

76. 7 2 J e t t e
tion process, and may include any combination of several indicator variables: “the
demographic composition of an area, its economic base and level of well-being,
the nature and quality of schools and social services, the structure and practices
of local governance, the location of municipal boundaries, the permeability of
neighborhoods, and transportation and communication channels.”19
The conflu-
ence of economic and social indicators facilitates of impeded economic contribu-
tion and ultimately political and civic participation in a given community.
Despite the importance of social and political incorporation, policy-makers
use economic arguments to support recommendations regarding migration policy
since quantitative information is easier to measure, interpret, and communicate
within the state or local budgeting process. Policy is quantified in terms of “in-
flation and unemployment rates, links to global markets, the robustness of the
manufacturing and service sectors, the organization of the agricultural sectors,
and the accessibility of banking services.”20
The interpretation of these variables
is a point of contention between restrictionist and expansionist advocates. Politi-
cal participation and mobilization may favorably or unfavorably shift the balance
of political capital, depending on the relative persuasiveness and visibility of each
participatory group.
Political participation extends beyond the ballot box, and into many forms
of civic engagement such as town meetings, campaign events, rallies, demon-
strations, education or awareness campaigns, and other forms of assembly. The
traditional concept of participation is insufficient to encapsulate the breadth of
advocacy options available to immigrants, and must be expanded to include more
accessible, non-citizen alternatives. Immigrants can advocate within trade unions,
voluntary associations, religious groups, and community organizations.21
Com-
munication skills, lack of education, and obstacles to migrant membership within
a community act as barriers to political participation at the local level, margin-
alizing migrants, and prolonging the political and social incorporation process.
Rather than embrace the qualities that make a community diverse, “localities may
isolate immigrants, sharpen their differences from the native-born, [and] discour-
age their political participation and civic socialization.”22
In this context, the fi-
nancial interests of private detention enterprises are detrimental to the formation
of migrant community networks and the incorporation process, since they detain
the undocumented migrant population in order to maximize revenues.
Detention policy is one area where the influence of political, social, and

77. T h e E f f e c t o f P r i v a t e D e t e n t i o n P o l i c y 7 3
economic factors is visible at the state and local levels. In communities where
detention facilities exist, the facility siting process provides an opportunity to
assess the economic and social impact of facilities on the abutting communities,
while effectively dominating and controlling the public’s perception of immigrant
detention policy. In communities where there is a strong immigrant presence,
companies like the Corrections Corporation of America use communication, or
lack thereof, to alienate the immigrant population from policy discussions and
planning decisions. Communication and community outreach is an essential step
in the detention facility siting process, and mirrors the siting process for correc-
tional facilities. Detention companies go to great lengths to involve the abutting
communities in the planning process, and receive input at the state and federal
levels to determine the ultimate desirability of a facility within a community. The
companies are accomplished at using media to communicate with the community
through awareness campaigns, and are acutely aware of the stigma associated
with detention facilities. A poor public image can lead to negative externalities
and have a considerable effect on how the stakeholders perceive the health of the
company. As a result, detention companies work to create a receptive environ-
ment as a first step in the siting process.
Private prison and detention facilities are predominantly located in rural
counties with low rates of educational attainment and per capita income.23
While
immigrants are located in both rural and urban environments, immigrant com-
munities and networks tend to be concentrated in urban settings. Detention com-
panies solicit information throughout the siting process in rural communities,
where migrant populations are least concentrated, by utilizing community en-
gagement forums, where native, predominantly English-speaking members of
abutting communities dominate the local conversation. The forum alienates the
immigrant population that may exist within the state, but outside of the local
community, from participating in the siting process. Regional distribution is im-
portant to advocacy at the local level, but becomes less relevant in the context of
federal or state policy matters.
Detention Policy and National Security
Post-9/11, immigration policy has focused on the perception of an impending im-
migrant threat to U.S. national security. As a result, “enacting and implementing
harsh immigration policies has been equated with protecting the nation, allowing
those selling immigration enforcement goods and services to the government to

78. 74 J e t t e
do so with high moral imperative of ensuring homeland security.”24
The Depart-
ment of Homeland Security (DHS) was formed in 2003 to address terrorism and
new threats to national security. The formation of DHS and the subsequent in-
corporation of the Immigration Customs Enforcement agency were the first steps
toward linking immigration with terrorism, and acknowledging the connection at
an institutional level.
Before the World Trade Center attacks, state legislators wanted to project a
zero tolerance attitude toward crime, and to appear fiscally conservative by con-
tracting with private companies to build, staff, and manage detention facilities.
However, gross deficiencies in the quality of service delivered to inmates, accom-
panied by frequent accounts of abuse and mismanagement turned the public per-
ception of private prisons as unviable alternatives to federal or state-run institu-
tions. In 2000, Business Week magazine published an article describing the prison
industry as passé.25
September 11, 2001 marked a dramatic shift in immigration
policy that rebranded private detention centers as a necessary means to an end:
managing the supposed security threat that immigration presented. Accordingly,
the private prison industry entered a boom period. Detention and deportation
became viable strategies for enhancing national security, and the resources and
innovations of private sector detention contractors were needed once again. The
industry tied detention with enhanced national security, and was successful in its
campaign to target immigrant populations as a national security risk.
Moreover, the following meltdown of the real-estate and financial markets
in 2008 crystallized an already hostile anti-immigrant sentiment into legislation:
“Crisis leads to remedies that may address the problem regionally in the short
run but lack a broad-based sticking power in the long term. States step in and in-
tervene, but their power is limited by political boundaries (borders, tariffs, race,
gender, and international divisions of territories and labor markets).”26
The social
and economic crises of the Post-9/11 period presented policy-makers with a chal-
lenging set of decisions. The product of these circumstances was a renewed vigor
for immigrant detentions and deportations, which inevitably led to new chal-
lenges in immigration policy.
In periods of economic decline, and under increased pressure from constitu-
encies and federal authorities to create jobs while maintaining a balanced bud-
get, state policy-makers look for innovative solutions to encourage employment
growth in their respective districts. Since the Reagan administration’s pledge to

79. T h e E f f e c t o f P r i v a t e D e t e n t i o n P o l i c y 7 5
get tough on crime in the 1980s, prison construction has become a reliable strat-
egy for controlling regional unemployment and encouraging job growth. Prison
construction is a highly visible undertaking within a community, and represents
a seemingly substantial investment in local infrastructure and jobs. Throughout
the 1980s and 1990s, in response to the Reagan Administration’s “tough on crime”
and the Bush Administration’s “war against drugs” law enforcement campaigns,
prison construction surged.
The facility planning and siting process is speculative and anticipates fu-
ture capacity needs. The Reagan and Bush Sr. prison booms led to the excessive
construction of prison facilities, as well as costs that were “not only economic,
but political and therefore social in nature, and require political organization and
mobilization to achieve lasting solutions.”28
Communities that financed prison
and detention facilities through bond sales were confronted with payments they
could ill afford. The best solution, given the pressing need to repay the bond debt,
was a policy favoring incarceration and detention facilities.
Unlike traditional jails or prisons, detention facilities are meant to detain,
rather than rehabilitate. When this service is privatized, an ulterior set of objec-
tives factors into the operation process, and places an emphasis on profit maximi-
zation. In other words, it is in the detention industry’s profit maximizing interest
to detain as many undocumented migrants as possible for as long as possible. A
private detention enterprise has the power to frame the discourse around immi-
gration policy and detain the migrant population, affecting the migrant popula-
tion’s ability to advocate and mobilize in opposition. Detention policy disrupts
community building and networking activities in migrant populations, and sup-
presses the ability of an undocumented migrant group to assemble. Undocument-
ed migrants fear being detained, and as a result, are unlikely to draw attention to
their status through participatory activities. The reimbursement scheme presents
another barrier to migrant participation, because it creates incentives for deten-
tion rather than addressing political, social, and economic concerns regarding
incorporation and assimilation.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and DHS developed a
pay scheme whereby local county and private detention facilities would be re-
imbursed using per diem rates to detain non-citizens. Under the per diem pay-
ment scheme, 900 jails rented space to DHS in 2007, with the average period of
detention recorded as approximately forty-two days per detainee.29
Aside from

80. 7 6 J e t t e
the compensation scheme, the dispensation of authority to regulate and enforce
immigration policy is ambiguous, and contributed to a more aggressive detention
and enforcement policy. These changes affect immigrants awaiting a deportation
verdict, and are ambiguous about where authority falls. Initially, the power to
make determinations about deportation status fell within the purview of the At-
torney General, whose role in the transition of authority from the INS to ICE to the
DHS remains unclear.
While the majority of detained immigrants have committed a crime while
residing in the United States, asylum seekers, or those who attempt entry without
proper documentation, also occupy detention facilities. Asylum seekers are de-
ported through a process known as expedited removal, and as a result, stay in de-
tention facilities for only a brief duration. The creation of the DHS transferred au-
thority to detain immigrants awaiting deportation (i.e. undocumented residents,
asylum seekers, and convicted criminals) to the Department of Justice. In that
transition, authority to decide matters concerning deportation proceedings should
have transferred to the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Undersecretary of
Border and Transportation Security. As a temporary solution, however, authority
was shared between both the Attorney General and the Under Secretary.30
Within this new enforcement scheme, detainees are assigned to four catego-
ries: required, high priority, medium priority, and low priority. Under the new
scheme, migrants who fall under categories other than “required” may be de-
tained depending on available detention space on a case-by-case basis.31
The Pa-
triot Act further amended the detention policy to expand the enforcement power
of the Attorney General. As of 2001, the addition of section 236A requires “the
detention of an alien whom the Attorney General certifies as someone who the
Attorney General has ‘reasonable grounds’ to believe is involved in terrorist ac-
tivities or in any other activity that endangers national security.”32
Additionally,
the Attorney General has the authority to detain immigrants suspected of violat-
ing any immigration laws, and who pose a plausible flight risk. While the DHS is
responsible for arresting and detaining the suspect, the Attorney General has the
authority to issue a warrant for arrest. Federal authorities may place a detainer on
the suspect, essentially petitioning the state facility to detain the suspect until a
final decision can be made about deportation. The legality of the request and the
prolonged detention of the suspect are questionable.
The narrative about current immigration law enforcement practices, while

81. T h e E f f e c t o f P r i v a t e D e t e n t i o n P o l i c y 7 7
informative for understanding the context of the immigration policy enforcement
debate, presents an incomplete account of the consequences that result from de-
portation and prolonged detention. The institutionalization of immigrants, remov-
al from the labor force, and displacement from community networks is disruptive
to the individual as well as the community at large. While the mean period of
detention for this population is forty-two days, a small number of immigrants are
detained indefinitely by DHS because they are incapable of securing the docu-
mentation necessary to support their immigration status. Without this essential
documentation, deportation cannot occur, and detainees often remain in deten-
tion facilities long after their sentence expires.33
In 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Zadvydas v. Davis that indefinite
detention raises significant ethical and legal questions about the protections af-
forded by the Fifth Amendment and the Due Process Clause.34
Categories for de-
tainees were established as a result of the ruling, creating special circumstances
under which the Attorney General could legally detain immigrants indefinitely.
Communicable disease, diplomatic or foreign policy repercussions, national secu-
rity concerns or terrorism, and threats to the community or society represent cir-
cumstances that warrant indefinite detention. Cases that fall under the first three
categories are at the discretion of DHS, while the fourth category requires judicial
review and the involvement of the Immigration Court.35
One of the key factors that influences immigrant detention policy is the per-
ception that immigrants are predisposed to criminal activity. Reports evaluating
immigration policy enforcement place an emphasis on criminal statistics, using
this information as evidence to support expanded detention and deportation poli-
cy. Between 1996 and 2004, the average size of the daily population increased by
153 percent (from 9,011 to 22,812) between FY 1996, when IIRIRA was enacted,
and FY 2004.36
Approximately 27 percent of federal prisons are of foreign origin,
accounting for approximately $1.2 billion in federal incarceration costs in 2004.
Between 2001 and 2004, the number of migrants serving sentences in federal fa-
cilities increased by 7,000, from 42,000 to 49,000. These figures do not include the
large number of immigrants detained in state prisons and local jails.37
The rising number of detainees is misleading for several reasons. There is
no indication that immigrants are engaging in criminal activities at an increas-
ing rate, nor is there evidence to suggest that enforcement agents are becom-
ing increasingly efficient. A more plausible explanation for the recent increase in

82. 7 8 J e t t e
detention rates is the positive correlation between detention rates and detention
capacity. This argument makes the case that “the increase in the detained popu-
lation after FY 1998 reflects an increase in detention space, not in the amount of
people who should be detained.”38
This correlation suggests that as detention rates
increase, and detention capacity increases, the total costs associated with deten-
tion paid for by society will increase as well.39
Detention in California
Just as the National Security Council privatized the war against Nicaragua and
used private security companies to complement military operations, the Justice
Department began to privatize immigration prisons. In 1985, Laredo City, Cali-
fornia became the first site of a privately run INS detention facility in the United
States. Contracted through the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), the
facility had a capacity of 208 beds, and was designed specifically to accommodate
the children and babies of undocumented immigrant families. Children were held
without bond, and could only be released into the custody of a permanent legal
guardian who was required to prove legal residency at the time of the child’s re-
lease. If the parent or permanent legal guardian could not provide supporting doc-
umentation to prove the regularized status of the child and other detained family
members, the entire family would be subject to immediate detention and sub-
sequent deportation.40
These facilities lacked the strict adherence to regulations
governing best practices, which are meant to minimize human right violations.
As a result, child abuse was common and often led to significant physical and psy-
chological trauma. With the intention of minimizing the abuses taking place in
private detention facilities, Las Madres and other watchdog groups filed lawsuits
in California in an attempt to either close private detention facilities, or align the
enforcement and management practices with federal facilities’ standards.41
At one point, California embraced the detention industry—and incarcera-
tion—as important sources of employment and as a resource for economic growth.
“The state built itself by building prisons fashioned from surpluses that the newly
developing political economy had not absorbed in other ways.”42
This model has
since become the object of scrutiny, as maintenance and incarceration costs con-
sume a greater portion of the state’s budget each year. As a result of the unsustain-
able nature of the current model, California is becoming increasingly desperate
for solutions that cut costs, maintain service, and adhere to state policy.

83. T h e E f f e c t o f P r i v a t e D e t e n t i o n P o l i c y 7 9
The decision to site a prison in a specific location is a complex and lengthy
process that involves legislative hearings, zoning approvals, and a precise blend of
economic circumstances that make detention centers an attractive alternative to
job seekers over other employers. In many cases, “when a major employer leaves
a location, the individuals and households dependent on it for wages face a crisis,
as does the state—at all levels—dependent on tax revenues paid by capital and
workers.”43
The reshuffling of human capital creates a vacuum within the greater
community, wherein local and state institutions experience new pressures and
react accordingly. Immigrant communities are affected by this phenomenon from
an economic perspective, due to their ineligibility to work within the prison in-
dustry because of their citizenship status. The vacuum effect alters the dynamics
of the community, softening the tax base, and destabilizing the funding of state-
based social services and agencies. While the expansion of community-based
institutions is a direct result of the state’s reduction of social services, community
institutions seldom have the resources to satisfy the need for their services.
The frustration with prison policy and its effect on the state’s ability to fund
local initiatives and services was palpable during the late 1970s. In 1978, the Jerry
Brown administration’s neglect of the constitutional mandate for infrastructural
improvement led to long-term public divestment in the state, and reallocation of
privately held and managed surplus to municipal-based solutions.
Agriculture is an important sector in California’s economy, and was par-
ticularly hard hit during the 1970s recession. The importance of the agricultural
sector in economies with large rural populations is well established. Rural com-
munities “are integrated into broader economic flows via transnational social di-
visions of labor.”44
Politics, demographics, and previous investments influence
the dispersion of capital, and factor into the decision to break ground on a new
prison. In California, drought coupled with poor economic conditions led to a
surplus of cheap, readily available, under-utilized real estate. The stubbornly high
unemployment rate led voters to explore creative solutions to induce economic
security and, “in tightening labor markets through deportation of reserve labor
force cadres to prison or abroad, fear driven voter made laws allowed employers to
exploit actual and implied undocumented workers’ political powerlessness.”45
As a
rule, dominant power blocs exercise their leverage through advocacy and political
mobilization to maintain their relative status over dominating advocates. In Cali-
fornia, undocumented workers were removed from the labor force in an effort to
decrease unemployment within the remaining population. The prison movement

84. 8 0 J e t t e
in California was a conscious decision by the state to encourage economic growth
outside of agriculture, mining and manufacturing.46
The fact that California de-
veloped a tougher position against undocumented immigration labor during Pres-
ident Reagan’s tenure is not a coincidence. In 1982, President Reagan embarked on
a campaign to “get tough on crime” and foster job growth through the detention
industry. Following a recession in the early 1980s, state policy-makers leapt at the
opportunity to encourage job growth through detention and corrections facilities.
Since the 1970s, the California immigrant population has partnered with
other community advocates to oppose further detention facility construction proj-
ects in the state. Community groups mobilize across ethnic boundaries in oppo-
sition to construction projects in their immediate neighborhoods. Las Madres, a
Latino community group based in East Los Angeles, is one example of political
mobilization at the grass roots level that has benefited from the opposition of
private detention companies. As the subject of detention policy becomes more ap-
parent in state and local government discourse, documented and undocumented
migrants alike are finding their voice and joining Las Madres in opposition to
pro-detention initiatives. Slowly, community networks are developing and coordi-
nating outreach strategies in the East Los Angeles region to inform other residents
and advocates of policies that are more tolerant of immigrants.
The policies that were initially intended to address illegal immigration and
economic crisis have instead encouraged debt and long-term economic and so-
cial instability in the region. Detention policies and restrictions on social ben-
efit programs, like Proposition 187, have had unanticipated economic, social, and
political consequences.47
From a fiscal perspective, California’s penal system is
bankrupting the state, forcing the legislature to explore privatized solutions to
detention. By promulgating policy that institutionalizes a greater proportion of the
labor force, the migrant community is effectively sequestered from opportunities
to contribute to social institutions.
Detention in Arizona
In the 1980s, the Castro Regime opened up Cuba’s boarders and allowed 120,000
Cubans to leave the country from the Port of Mariel.48
The exodus occurred in
waves distinguishable by social status, with poor and lower class Cubans domi-
nating the third wave. Those who were strong enough to make the trip fled to
Florida to seek asylum on the grounds of political persecution. This group of refu-

85. T h e E f f e c t o f P r i v a t e D e t e n t i o n P o l i c y 8 1
gees is commonly referred to as the Marielitos. Before the Marielitos could land
in Florida, they were intercepted prior to their arrival to the United States. While
almost the entire group was given special parole, they were left with severely
limited constitutional rights that denied them the right to legal representation and
due process. This meant that their parole status could have been revoked with no
advance notice, and resulted in indefinite detention. Some Marielitos received a
judgment for immediate deportation back to Cuba, after which the INS had six
months to process and comply with the order. The members of the group who
were detained were transported to a facility in Florence, Arizona.
Florence prison was built in the 1940s to imprison Japanese Americans dur-
ing the 1942 Japanese Relocation, and later was repurposed to detain Marielitos
asylum seekers with a criminal history. Prior to the construction of the prison, the
town of Florence had a long tradition of copper mining. When the copper mines
closed in the 1970s as a result of the recession, miners were forced to make the ca-
reer transition to the only other source of employment available: the prison. Flor-
ence, Arizona is home to two privately run prison complexes and one Department
of Homeland Security jail. Many of the families residing in the nearby community
are employed by the prisons and have few alternatives for employment. Decades
of economic decline slowly killed the mining industry, and the town embraced
prison policy as a viable alternative for employment and economic sustainabil-
ity.49
The town of Florence is representative of a broad shift toward restriction-
ist immigrant detention policy in Arizona. In 2010, the Arizona state legislature
passed HB 2162, requiring all immigrants over the age of fourteen to register with
the state and carry documentation supporting their immigration status for stays
in excess of thirty days.50
Failure to comply with any provision of the law would
result in a Class II misdemeanor, as well as temporary arrest and detention. The
offender, regardless of minor or adult status, would be released from custody
when a relative or family member could produce documentation supporting his
or her immigration status. The bill was introduced to the state legislature as a
measure to ensure the integrity and security of the Arizona-Mexico border.
House Bill 2162 was pitched as a necessary step toward restoring state and
national security along the border. After the bill’s passage, it was discovered that
SB1070, a mock-up of the final law, was written by a group of private detention
companies and introduced at an ALEC legislative conference in Colorado.51,52
Al-
though this practice is widely accepted as an innovative forum for the exchange

86. 8 2 J e t t e
of ideas, the circumstances suggest that private interests had unique advocacy
privileges and access to policymakers.
Concluding Thoughts
Post 9/11, detention and subsequent deportation are perceived as sustainable
policy for addressing undocumented immigration in the United States. While
the price of detention and deportation can be calculated through per diems and
logistical expenses, deciphering the actual cost of the disruption to community
networks, political integration, and families is much more complex. The process
of quantifying these social disruptions is tedious and yields relatively imprecise
results. As a result, policy-makers have discounted the underlying social and
political cost of detention policy. Evidence of this tendency to ignore the social
and political costs of detention is present in many states, but the combination of
border proximity, economic makeup, and state policy makes California and Ari-
zona particularly intriguing. In both states, detention policy was adapted from
prison policy, providing a penal undertone to detention policy.
There are four fundamental elements that describe the framework of prison
operations: retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation. Legislative
action is often implemented to induce policy changes at the state and federal
levels that are favorable to sustaining this penal model. The model effectively
locks incarcerated or detained individuals out of educational opportunities, em-
ployment, housing programs, and other stabilizing institutions.53
This institu-
tionally reinforced marginalization of the incarcerated population sequesters the
resources that society invests in them, making upward economic mobility and
political participation exceedingly difficult. The effects of this practice are slowly
emerging, presenting both an economic and social dilemma for policy-makers
and municipal authorities contending with tight budgets, diminishing revenues,
and rising rates of unemployment. Initially, research to address this problem was
directed toward the prison industry as a whole. Emerging immigration policies,
however, have reestablished the focus on detention facilities in particular. Immi-
grant detentions and deportations have risen to unprecedented levels, command-
ing a greater share of state and federal resources than ever before. As detainees
and their families continue to experience marginalization, the resources used to
fund the four-pronged penal model, upon which American incarceration policy is
built, are redistributed from social investment to social expense.
While the future of U.S. immigration policy enforcement remains a mystery
as a result of shifting attitudes toward detention policy, the prevailing discourse

87. T h e E f f e c t o f P r i v a t e D e t e n t i o n P o l i c y 8 3
continues to favor private detention companies. In some cases, non-detention so-
lutions are following a similar restrictionist trend by focusing on parole programs,
whereby immigrants would wear an electronic monitoring device while awaiting
deportation and appeals proceedings.54
These solutions rely on greater contribu-
tions from states and municipal authorities to monitor and enforce immigration
policy. In 2003, Representative Thomas G. Tancredo, a republican from Colorado’s
sixth congressional district, introduced House 3534 to increase the minimal bond
amount required to release an immigrant from detention from $1,500 to $10,000.
The bill would also require that the Secretary of Homeland Security detain an
immigrant unless otherwise ordered by an immigration judge. This bill, should
it pass in future sessions, would prolong the detention stay of immigrants, tar-
geting individuals and families unable to secure the necessary assets or court
order to secure release. The Safer Act (House 3522), proposed by Representative J.
Gresham Barrett, approaches enforcement policy from a different perspective, by
stipulating that immigrants would not have to be taken into a DHS facility while
imprisoned for a criminal act. The bill transfers full authority from the Attorney
General to the Secretary of Homeland Security and any other federal entity that
may have the power to overrule or influence enforcement decisions.
The narratives in California and Arizona represent two unique policy envi-
ronments with distinct historical contexts that influenced policy to address the
needs of the native community. In times of crisis, the public sector has partnered
with the private sector to develop detention and deportation policies without re-
gard to the social consequences. In each scenario, policy was created to rebrand
the immigrant population as an economic or national security threat in an effort
to facilitate the removal of newcomers from the established population. While
this mentality continues to shape the discourse around policy reform, communi-
ties will continue to suffer from the excessive economic and social costs that ac-
company detention policy, and immigrant populations will remain marginalized
without the proper resources for full social and political incorporation. ◗

88. 8 4 J e t t e
( E n d n o t e s )
1 “About CCA,” Corrections Corporation of America, accessed November 27, 2011.
http://www.cca.com/about/.
2 Suevon Lee, “By the numbers: The U.S.’s growing for profit detention industry,” June
20, 2011, accessed November 27, 2012. http://www.propublica.org/article/by-the-
numbers-the-u.s.s-growing-for-profit-detention-industry.
3 Edwin Bender, A contributing influence: The private-prison industry and political
giving in the south. (Helena, MT: The National Institute on Money in State Politics,
2002), 8. http://www.followthemoney.org/press/ZZ/20020430.pdf, 8.
4 Cody Mason, Too good to be true: Private prisons in America. (Washington D.C.: The
Sentencing Project, 2012) 10. http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_Too_
Good_to_be_True.pdf.
5 Mary J. Pitzl, “Arizona lawmakers approve $1.1 billion in budget cuts,” The Arizona
Republic, 2011, accessed Nov. 27, 2011. http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/201
1/04/02/20110402arizona-lawmakers-approve-budget-cuts.html.
6 The Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 was enacted on
September 30, 1996, and addressed many areas of immigration and immigration
enforcement policy. The statute imposed new procedures on immigration
enforcement agents regarding border patrols, border security, equipment, and
training. The bill also included provisions related to immigrant labor, access to
public housing and social welfare programs, and imposed sanctions on employers
who employed undocumented migrant labor.
7 Michael Welch, Detained: Immigration laws and the expanding I.N.S. Jail Complex
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2002), 2-4.
8 Welch, Detained, 4.
9 William A. Kandel, Fiscal impacts of the foreign born population. (Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Research Service, 2011), 9.
10 The net fiscal impact was calculated by subtracting the migrant’s estimated social
benefit consumption from total tax contributions each year throughout his or her
lifespan. The calculation also takes the contributions of descendants into account.
11 Welch, Detained, 5.
12 Jennifer L. Hochschild and John H. Mollenkopf, Bringing outsiders in: Transatlantic
perspectives on immigrant political incorporation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
2009), 15.
13 Ibid. pg.16.
14 Ibid. pg. 26.
15 Ibid. pg.19.
16 Ibid. pg. 10.
17 Ibid. pg. 21.
18 Daniel J. Tichenor, Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002), 19.

89. T h e E f f e c t o f P r i v a t e D e t e n t i o n P o l i c y 8 5
19 Hochschild and Mollenkopf, Bringing Outsiders In, 27.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid. pg. 36.
22 Ibid. pg. 61.
23 Gregory Hooks et al. “The Prison Industry: Carceral Expansion and Employment in
U.S. Counties, 1969-1994.” Social Science Quarterly 85.1 (2004): 37-57.
24 Deepa Fernandes, Homeland security and the business of immigration, (New York:
Seven Stories Press, 2007), 197.
25 Charles Haddad, “Private Prisons Don’t Work,” Business Week Magazine,
September 11, 2000, accessed December 12, 2011. http://www.businessweek.com/
archives/2000/b3698159.arc.htm.
26 Ruth Gilmore, Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing
California (Berkeley CA: California University Press), 56.
27 Hooks,“The Prison Industry,” 37-57.
28 Gilmore, Golden Gulag, 56.
29 Fernandes, Homeland Security, 195.
30 C.C. Haddal and A. Siskin, Immigration-Related Detention: Current Legislative Issues,
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010), 5. http://digitalcommons.
ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace/707.
31 Ibid. pg. 9.
32 Ibid. pg. 10.
33 Ibid. pg. 12.
34 Ibid. pg. 13.
35 Ibid. pg. 17.
36 Haddal and Siskin, Immigration-Related Detention, 17.
37 Peter Schuck, “Immigrants’ incorporation into the United States after 9/11,” In
Bringing Outsiders In. eds. Hochschild, Mollenkopf, 172.
38 Bruno T. Isenberg, Immigration Enforcement and Policies. (New York: Nova Science
Publisher, 2007), 22.
39 In FY2002 the INS budgeted $1,583,025 per day for 21,107 beds.” (Unpublished INS
data obtained from Mark Schaffer, INS Office of Congressional Affairs, August 29,
2002.)
40 Robert S. Kahn, Other People’s Blood: U.S. Immigration Prisons in the Reagan Decade.
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), 118.
41 Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488 - Dist. Court, CD California (April
29, 1988) and Nunez v. Boldin, 537 F. Supp. 578 - Dist. Court, SD Texas (April 6,
1982) were cases filed in California siting abuse-related trauma to minors under the
supervision of private detention personnel.
42 Gilmore, Golden Gulag, 54.

90. 8 6 J e t t e
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid. pg. 64.
45 Ibid. pg. 77.
46 Ibid. pg. 88.
47 Proposition 187 is a 1994 ballot initiative to establish a screening system for
undocumented immigrants, and prevent this portion of the population from
accessing health care, public education, and other social services.
48 William Durch, “Keepers of the gates: National militaries in an age of international
population movement,” Demography and national security. eds. Myron Wiener,
Sharon Russell (Berghahn Books, 2001), 123.
49 Fernandes, Homeland Security, 169-170.
50 HB 2162 was a modified version of SB 1070, The Support Our Law Enforcement and
Safer Neighborhoods Act proposed by Arizona Senator Russell Pearce (R). The bill
was modified to address concerns regarding the potential for racial profiling and
violation of due process. It was signed into law by Governor Jan Brewer on April 30,
2010.
51 American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC).
52 Laura Sullivan, “Prison Economics help Drive Arizona Immigration Law,”
NPR Radio, October 28, 2010, accessed November 28, 2011. http://www.npr.
org/2010/10/28/130833741/prison-economics-help-drive-ariz-immigration-law.
53 Through the federal requirements to volunteer information about past legal
transgressions through CORIs.
54 Haddal and Siskin, Immigration-Related Detention, 19.

91. T h e E f f e c t o f P r i v a t e D e t e n t i o n P o l i c y 8 7

92. 8 8 M a r t i n e z a n d M c C a s l i n
Introduction
I
n a time of declining municipal
revenues and rising fixed costs, the
importance of effectively managing
the delivery of municipal services,
C o m m e n t
Implementing Performance Measurement:
Reflections on Tompkins County New York
L u i s A . M a r t i n e z a n d H e n r y M c C a s l i n
Luis A. Martinez is a second-year graduate student in the Department of City and
Regional Planning at Cornell University. His professional focus is organizational
strategy and design in the public and social sectors. Specifically, Luis is interested
in performance measurement indicators, metrics, and evaluation strategies in or-
der to quantify the impact of programs, policies, and development. Luis received
his Bachelor’s of Science in Architectural Studies from the University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign.
Henry McCaslin is a second-year Master of Public Administration student at Cor-
nell University, with a concentration in Environmental Policy. His studies have
focused on how local government policy can impact sustainability in a way that
is innovative, cost-effective, and equitable to all citizens. More specifically, he is
interested in exploring how quantitative data can be collected and displayed in a
way that improves policymaking. Henry has worked at the Chicago-based Urban
Sustainability Directors Network, where he coordinated an international network
of local government sustainability professionals. Most recently, he served as an
intern at Tompkins County Government in Ithaca, New York, where he developed
a County-wide performance measurement system. He has a Bachelor’s Degree in
Politics from Oberlin College.
evaluating performance, and monitor-
ing trends cannot be overstated. This
field report outlines steps that Tomp-
kins County, located in the Finger

93. I m p l e m e n t i n g P e r f o r m a n c e M e a s u r e m e n t 8 9
Lakes Region of central New York and
home to Cornell University and Ithaca
College, has taken in developing a
performance measurement system
over the past two years. Tompkins
County has a population of 101,564, an
adopted budget of 77.5 million dollars
for the 2012 fiscal year, just over 700
full-time equivalent units (FTEs)1
, and
over twenty departments. This report
focuses on the efforts undertaken by
County administration in the summer
of 2012 to develop and standardize
performance scorecards, measure
program costs, and build an automat-
ed database that spans departments.
Joe Mareane, County Administrator,
initialized the County’s performance
measurement efforts in 2009 with
the assistance of Kevin Sutherland,
Executive Assistant, the participation
of several department directors, and
a team of Cornell University graduate
students. Kevin Sutherland was hired
to pilot a performance measurement
system; however, a year later was as-
signed to budget coordination respon-
sibilities that delayed implementation
efforts. Thereafter, in 2010, graduate
students from Cornell’s Institute for
Public Affairs and Department of City
and Regional Planning were taken on
to evaluate programs and develop pre-
liminary measures for pilot programs.
The students’ work resulted in two re-
ports: the fall 2011 performance mea-
surement report and manual that was
included as part of the Budget Priority
Setting, Performance Measurement,
Shared Services, and Charter Revi-
sion Report prepared for the Tompkins
County Chamber of Commerce, and
the spring 2012 Performance Measure-
ment Study prepared for the Depart-
ment of County Administration.2, 3
These reports collectively developed
preliminary inputs, outputs, efficien-
cies, and outcomes for various pro-
grams in the departments of County
Administration, Office of the Aging,
Assessment, Finance, Mental Health,
Health, Solid Waste Management, and
Workforce Development.
The studies provided a particular
focus on understanding performance
measurement as a management
process that could track efficiency,
improve effectiveness, and reveal
latent opportunities. The scope of
evaluation within each department
varied and was tailored to specific
departmental needs. Initial research
was conducted on each department
and then formally engaged in designing
a performance measurement system
collaboratively. This provided the time
and space for public managers to
reflect on current needs and constraints
of their staff, programs, and processes.
In turn, this information provided the
framework for drafting initial mea-
sures, determining how data was
going to be collected, and developing a
scorecard. The assessment process
revealed that performance measure-
ment should go beyond reporting data.

94. 9 0 M a r t i n e z a n d M c C a s l i n
Public managers should engage in this
reflective process in a structured
manner so as to correlate individual
performance to overall department
goals. The studies developed a work-
ing theory and recommendations that
provided mechanisms for evaluation
and reporting.
In the summer of 2012, the authors
of this report were tasked to examine
and synthesize the findings of previous
Cornell graduate students and develop
an implementation strategy. The
resulting process is outlined below
and will be discussed in detail in the
succeeding paragraphs.
Implementation Steps:
1. Determining goals of performance
measurement
2. Defining scope and initial steps
3. Creating a scorecard template
4. Meeting with departments
5. Creating a database infrastructure
6. Next steps and future expansion
Determining Goals of
Performance Measurement
A well-designed performance
measurement system provides
numerous benefits to a public
manager. These benefits can be
divided into expected benefits and
unexpected benefits. The expected
benefits are generally well understood
by anyone familiar with the concept of
performance measurement. These are
often the primary motivation behind
decisions to undertake a performance
measurement initiative. There are,
however, a wide array of ancillary
benefits that are not as obvious to
one who is considering performance
measurement, and these are no less
valuable than the expected benefits.
Expected Benefits
At its most basic level, performance
measurement provides managers with
meaningful quantitative data about
government programs. Importantly,
this data is available over a period
of several years so that trends can
become apparent.
This data allows managers to quickly
assess how efficiently and effectively a
program is operating, and then to take
any necessary actions to address the
situation. For example, a performance
scorecard for an immunization
program may show that the number
of immunizations administered has
remained constant over a five-year
period, while the number of cases of
vaccine-preventable diseases in the
area has increased.
Clearly, the number of immunizations
provided is inadequate. The manager
can couple this information with
more qualitative data from program
managers and staff to determine
whether the number of immunizations
can be increased using existing

95. I m p l e m e n t i n g P e r f o r m a n c e M e a s u r e m e n t 9 1
resources, or if additional funding is
required to increase staff hours.
All of the information required to assess
performance measurement may already
exist, but as we found in Tompkins
County, important data about programs
is often locked away in separate
information silos. Even within a single
department, data collection is often
carried out differently from year to
year, with some pieces essentially
hidden deep within a spreadsheet on
one computer, and other pieces in
three-ring binders elsewhere.
As staff members come and go, so do
systems of recording and presenting
data. Software changes, new annual
report formats, and the physical
relocation of offices can also fragment
important data. Without a systematic,
centralized, and consistent way to
record and report data, the task of
learning about what goes into and
comes out of a program each year is
prohibitively inconvenient.
Developing a performance measurement
system requires reorganizing key pieces
of information in a way that is consis-
tent across the entire government body.
A manager (or interested citizen) does
not have to be an expert on a given
program or its data system to be able
to understand how efficiently and
effectively the program is operating.
Performance measurement, when
initiated by elected officials, is
also often used to increase public
transparency. Performance data can
be posted on a government website,
distributed to the press, or otherwise
made public so that interested citizens
can easily know the full scope of what
their government is executing, how
efficiently it runs, and how effectively
it accomplishes its goals.
Unexpected Benefits
The actual process of collecting and
organizing data in order to build a
performance measurement system,
aside from the end product itself,
can yield its own benefits for the
public manager. These are benefits
that are often overlooked when
considering undertaking performance
measurement, but they are as tangible
as the direct benefits mentioned above.
It is not rare for local governments
to lack a complete inventory of all
programs. This was the case in
Tompkins County, where there was
no comprehensive list of all County
programs in an accessible format
that could be manipulated. This
meant that one had to be compiled.
Already, a clearer picture of the scope
of Tompkins County government was
developed and a new resource created.
Similarly, we decided that a crucial
measure for each program must be its
cost to the County. We soon found that
while the budgeted cost of a program
was relatively easy to find, the actual
net local cost (the dollars actually
spent minus any revenues and

96. 9 2 M a r t i n e z a n d M c C a s l i n
external funding) was somewhat more
elusive to calculate. It was necessary
to delve into the County’s accounting
software to connect individual
expenses and revenues to each
program in our inventory. Thereafter,
we were able to tell exactly what the
County spent on a given program.
Once again, a valuable resource had
been created, not by recording any
new data, but by simply organizing
and processing what already existed.
Finally, it was collaboratively decided
that a data collection system with
a centralized design to maximize
its utility for County administration
should be created. In our case, we
built a relational database in Microsoft
Access that could electronically collect
data from program managers and
store it in a central location. Over
time, the aim is to have departments
transition from the myriad reporting
practices already in place to simply
transferring their data directly
into the system. Any necessary
calculations can be automated, and
in many cases, entering of data itself
could be automated. For example,
the Tompkins County Emergency
Response Department electronically
managed their 911 call center and
dispatch operations. Given time, this
system could be connected to the
performance database so that any
necessary information is automatically
collected and centrally accessible.
An Important Caveat
It should be clearly stated that such
a performance measurement system
can only supply quantitative data.
It does not provide managers with
qualitative information about how
their programs are perceived, how
staff feel about their work, and other
intangible factors. While quantitative
performance metrics can tell a
detailed and informative story, they
cannot tell the whole story, and thus
should always be supplemented with
qualitative data.
Defining Scope
and Initial Steps
Performance measurement as an
administrative endeavor should be
considered a process by which man-
agers can analyze how different
departments and their corresponding
sub-units (e.g. divisions and offices)
are being managed and operated.
Consequently, defining scope becomes
a fundamental first step. In the case of
Tompkins County, defining scope and
mapping how resources are utilized to
provide all mandated and discretion-
ary programs became a project prior-
ity. This process provided an opportu-
nity to discern the level of interaction
and cooperation between sub-units in
order to reveal opportunities for coop-
eration and resource sharing.
Strategic consideration was given in
our implementation strategy as to
when performance measurement is

97. I m p l e m e n t i n g P e r f o r m a n c e M e a s u r e m e n t 9 3
executed with regard to specific pro-
grams. In an ideal scenario, depart-
ments would independently determine
which programs to evaluate, set
strategic goals, determine measures,
track data, and report their findings
with regard to impact. Performance
measurement becomes, or has the
potential to become, an administrative
burden with each department yielding
varying degrees of success if adminis-
tered with limited staff capacity.
Initial Steps
The questions of where and how to
begin measurement are of central
concern when attempting to imple-
ment a centralized system. Is it at the
program, sub-unit (office-division),
or departmental level? Each described
level would have a different type of
associated impact. The associated
impact of a specific program can
be directly linked to how it affects
external stakeholders and/or the
socio-economic environment. The
sub-unit level will have an overall
functional impact for the organiza-
tion; for example, the number of press
releases created by the Public Informa-
tion Office. The overall performance
of a department can be linked to the
budget and tracked to determine how
staff, resources, and organizational
infrastructure are used, deployed, and
shared over time to execute service.
This does not, however, necessarily in-
dicate the quality or impact of service
provided. Therefore, there is a distinc-
tion between the level of analysis and
the type of associated impact that will
be examined.
For our purposes, the unit of analysis
was individual programs; specifically,
it was the programmatic “low-hanging
fruit” within each department. This
strategy was pursued for two reasons.
First, department heads were heavily
involved in submitting their corre-
sponding annual budgets, resulting
in limited time and staff capacity.
Second, not all department heads were
approached about performance mea-
surement in the earlier studies, and
thus time was spent introducing the
new administrative effort.
Further Considerations
When considering when and how
to start performance measurement,
planning is key. Programs have the
potential to be cut, staff turnover
produces gaps in knowledge, limited
staff capacity slows the process, de-
partmental priorities can change, data
collection and technology barriers are
likely to confound progress, and other
unforeseen environmental factors can
suddenly appear. Determining and
enforcing a clear administrative prior-
ity as to the purpose of implementing
performance measurement becomes
vital since it provides a clear directive
to all departmental managers on why
they are engaging in this process.

98. 9 4 M a r t i n e z a n d M c C a s l i n
Creating a Scorecard Template
Once the scope and direction of the
system was decided, it was necessary
to design a scorecard template. The
format of the scorecard was chosen to
record data for each program, and to
dictate the types of data that we would
be collecting.
There is a large body of literature on
performance measurement that sug-
gests different ways of characterizing
and categorizing data.4,5,6
We decided
on the following system because it laid
out program costs (in dollars but also
in time and staff resources), efficiency,
and effectiveness in a simple manner.
It was also general enough to apply
to a wide variety of programs, from
emergency dispatching to home meal
delivery for seniors to tax assessing.
For each program, measures were
defined as follows:
• Inputs: Inputs are the resources
that go into a program, excluding
standard departmental resources
such as computers, desks, pens, etc.
For most programs, this category
had three measures: actual net local
program cost, number of FTEs as-
signed, and number of staff mem-
bers assigned.
• Outputs: Outputs refer to what a
program directly produces. These
measure workload, such as the
number of immunizations admin-
istered or the number of properties
assessed. Outputs contribute to
achieving a program’s goals, but
do not achieve them directly. For
example, a teen counseling program
may try to boost outputs (number of
counseling hours provided), but this
is not the same thing as discourag-
ing destructive behaviors in teens.
• Efficiencies: Efficiencies are out-
puts divided by inputs. They show
how many dollars, staff members,
or hours are required to produce a
single unit of output.
• Outcomes: Outcomes are the most
important measurement. They gauge
the degree to which a program is
accomplishing its goals. They are
not directly under the control of a
program, but are influenced by the
program’s outputs. To determine
the effectiveness of a teen counsel-
ing program, the number of teens
involved in violent incidents would
be a suitable outcome measure. The
counseling program cannot directly
prevent such acts, but if it is work-
ing well, the counseling can help
to reduce the likelihood of violent
incidents occurring. Outcomes
should always be explicitly related
to a program’s stated goals. Often,
outcomes are the most difficult of
the measurements to define.7
The scorecards provided space for
several measures within each of these
categories. The specific measures
themselves were defined in coopera-
tion with program managers who were

99. I m p l e m e n t i n g P e r f o r m a n c e M e a s u r e m e n t 9 5
familiar with the department. Ad-
ditionally, each scorecard displayed
the program name, department, and a
description of its goals and operations.
Meeting with Departments
Engaging department heads under this
administrative endeavor was a critical
component of our work. We spent time
introducing the new administrative
effort to those department heads that
had not been approached in the earlier
studies, while at the same time, listen-
ing to how department heads current-
ly manage staff, resources, accounting
practices, reporting demands, and
data tracking systems. The diversity of
management practices across depart-
ments was vast. These initial conver-
sations allowed us to understand the
challenges faced by each individual
manager and helped identify areas
of data collection overlap in order to
mine information efficiently.
The goal was not to create more work
for program managers, but rather to
understand how each department is
currently collecting and reporting
data, and enhance their efforts via
the centralized system. We made a
distinct effort to highlight how our
system would appear via the scorecard
template while at the same time pre-
senting research on how other coun-
ties evaluated similar programs. This
had a two-pronged effect. The tem-
plate gave managers a concrete visual
of what type of data we were looking
to identify and it served as an immedi-
ate data collection mechanism as we
recorded what measures they believed
would be of significance.
The research we presented on other
counties showed managers the goal we
were trying to achieve. In most cases,
this information was a relief to man-
agers since they quickly realized the
data we were requesting was already
being tracked in a different form in the
annual reports they were producing.
For each department engaged, we col-
laboratively identified one or two pro-
grams that would be feasible to study
within our limited timeframe and that
had consistent and accurate data over
a period of at least five years.
Further inquiry was made into each
department’s data collection methods
and their processes were recorded.
In some instances, such as with the
Office of the Aging, they were already
using the database management
technology that we were seeking to
connect systematically.
The Database
Data management technology can
substantially streamline any perfor-
mance measurement system. There
are numerous software packages on
the market designed to provide a
pre-built performance measurement
database and reporting system. These
are often powerful products, able to
collect vast amounts of data and create
sleek, attractive reports. These soft-

100. 9 6 M a r t i n e z a n d M c C a s l i n
ware packages, however, are also very
expensive. Performance measurement
can be particularly valuable to govern-
ments facing restrictive budgets that
must make difficult decisions about
resource allocation and program cuts.
These governments need performance
measurement the most, but are the
least able to afford expensive software.
With this limitation in mind, we
decided to use Microsoft Access,
software already available on every
computer in the County, to build our
performance measurement database.
Access is a relational database pro-
gram, which allows the creation of a
system of interconnected tables. Rath-
er than having a single table that lists
every program on its own row, and
every data point for each program in
columns, a relational database reduces
data duplication by having separate
lists of programs, measures, and data
points, and then creating links be-
tween these tables. This enabled us to
store all of the necessary program data
in a secure and stable format that is
easily updated and modified.
Access also allowed us to create an
intuitive user interface. We wanted
program managers and staff to be able
to enter data in the system each year.
Therefore, it was crucial that users
find it easy to use the database. Using
text entry fields, drop down menus,
and navigation buttons, elements
familiar to anyone who uses modern
operating systems, we created a set of
forms that guided a user through the
process of entering in program perfor-
mance data. Furthermore, the data-
base could be located on the County’s
intranet, so staff from every depart-
ment could enter data from their own
computers.
In order to produce the scorecard
reports which will ultimately
inform County managers and the
public, we exported performance
data from the database to Crystal
Reports, report-building software
also already available on County
computers. This software produces
detailed, informative, professional-
quality reports that will display our
performance scorecards.
Using these relatively inexpensive soft-
ware tools, we were able to replicate
what could be done with expensive
performance measurement software.
In some ways, we were able to im-
prove upon what could have been pur-
chased. The system we designed was
specifically tailored for the particulars
of Tompkins County government. We
were able to determine the scope (en-
tire government), the level of analysis
(every program), and the exact types
of measures that we thought would be
appropriate. This is a level of cus-
tomization that could not have been
provided in other programs.

101. I m p l e m e n t i n g P e r f o r m a n c e M e a s u r e m e n t 9 7
Next Steps and
Future Expansion
IThe database created an immense
capacity for the expansion of program-
matic evaluation for Tompkins County
moving into the future. Barriers to the
growth of the system will foreseeably
be the same as in the beginning of our
assignment: lack of capacity and time
to engage department managers. The
benefits will undoubtedly increase
exponentially as more information is
inputted into the system and trends
are analyzed over time. Although this
type of database tool is not novel, the
overall management process, engaging
managers, linking information sys-
tems, and centralizing measurement
data has the potential to be a power-
ful administrative endeavor for the
County.
In the upcoming year we look forward
to continuing our work with the
Department of Administration in
order to produce the County’s first
performance measurement report
with the data compiled over this
past summer. This will introduce the
public to the administration’s priorities
of tracking how resources are being
allocated and understanding the
impact of existing programs.
Lessons Learned
A major feature of Tompkins County’s
efforts to implement performance
measurement is its heavy reliance on
a partnership with Cornell University.
Since the initiative’s inception, County
representatives have worked closely
with the University to create projects
for individual students and entire
classes that provide useful services
to the County while giving a valuable
professional experience to students.
Graduate students produced the initial
review of academic literature, devel-
oped scorecards, built a data manage-
ment infrastructure, and collected
the bulk of the actual data. Student
interns and consulting classes are
low-cost (and often no-cost) resources
which, when adequately guided by a
full-time staff member, can provide an
immense benefit to a project.
A reliance on university students is
only a benefit if it is well managed.
There are three inherent challenges
presented by student projects that can
be countered by good management.
First, students are not familiar with
a project’s context at the outset. They
are newcomers who must learn a great
deal about their host government to be
effective. This requires clear guidance
from local managers. Second, as pre-
professionals and outsiders, students
do not necessarily possess the insti-
tutional respect and authority often
required when asking departmental
managers for information and behav-
ior change. If they are strongly sup-
ported by a central administrator, they
have the potential to become empow-
ered by that administrator’s authority
and meaningful interaction with other
managers will subsequently become

102. 9 8 M a r t i n e z a n d M c C a s l i n
easier. Finally, long-running projects
require a multi-year commitment;
however, a student intern’s tenure
is rarely longer than a semester. To
ensure that a project maintains long-
term continuity, there must be a single
coordinator present in the government
who can bridge the gaps between out-
going and incoming student groups.
Governments with similarly tight bud-
gets and limited staff resources should
take heed of this approach. One of the
central aims of performance measure-
ment is to do less with more, and thus
it is often most valuable to govern-
ments facing restrictive budgets.
Declining revenue is often an indica-
tor that local government services
are in increased demand. The careful
measurement of program costs and
resources can ensure that every dollar
spent and every staff member assigned
is accounted for.
The measurement of program outputs
and outcomes encourages manag-
ers and staff to think about the exact
impact that their efforts have on the
community and how those impacts
relate to the resources allocated to a
program.
Strong programs can be more effec-
tively defended to budget-conscious
legislators, and weak programs are
highlighted. They then will be able
to receive the managerial attention
needed for improvement or, if neces-
sary, be cut. Without performance
measurement, it is very difficult to de-
termine whether efforts are being di-
rected effectively towards the citizens
who need them the most. Therefore,
a performance measurement system
designed to reduce costs efficiently
should not itself be an expensive in-
vestment. A well-managed partnership
with a local university is an excellent
way to ensure that implementation
costs are kept low while program
quality remains high.
With clear administrative leadership,
effective use of university partner-
ships, and the creative utilization of
existing software, a local government
with limited resources can begin to
build a comprehensive, flexible, and
useful performance measurement
system without stretching its budget.
Such a system can turn a period of
cost-cutting and reduced service into
one where new opportunities are real-
ized through empowered, data-driven
management. ◗

103. I m p l e m e n t i n g P e r f o r m a n c e M e a s u r e m e n t 9 9
( E n d n o t e s )
1 A full-time equivalent is a unit of measurement of labor, which is equal to the
amount of work done by one full-time employee. This varies depending on how “full-
time” is defined. In Tompkins County, this is equal to a 35-hour, 37.5-hour, or 40-hour
week, depending on the position.
2 Martinez, Luis A., Greg Jette, Tao Wang, and Shi Xia. “Tompkins County New York
Performance Measurement Study,” May 2012. Rep. Cornell University, accessed Sept.
26, 2012. http://ecommons.library.cornell.edu/handle/1813/30150.
3 Brea, Dubary, Theresa Burridge, Nicole Chavez, Marilyn Cheng, Byron Chiu, Eric
Christensen, Adam Davis, Miriam Edelman, Alyssa Funk, Hunter Gradie, Marquis
Hawkins, Toniqua Hay, Eugene Kettler, Nicole Majestic, Matthew Metzgar, Eliza
Mohlie, Yusuke Naruse, Abigail Petry, Jillian Reynolds, Carolyn Strauss, and
Austin Zwick. “Tompkins County New York Budget Priority Setting, Performance
Measurement, Shared Services, and Charter Revision Report Fall 2011.” ECommons@
Cornell. Cornell University, accessed Nov. 11, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/1813/30234.
4 Lichiello, Patricia, and Bernard J. Turnock. Turning Point Guidebook for Performance
Measurement. Publication. Turning Point National Program Office at the University
of Washington, Dec. 1999, accessed April 30, 2012. www.turningpointprogram.org/
toolkit/pdf/pmc_guide.pdf.
5 “A Performance Management Framework for State and Local Government: From
Measurement and Reporting to Management and Improving,” National Performance
Management Advisory Commission, 2010, accessed April 30, 2012. http://
pmcommission.org/.
6 Ammons, David N. “Management Services: Executive Offices, Budgets, and
Management Audit.” Municipal Benchmarks: Assessing Local Performance and
Establishing Community Standards. Second ed. (London, England: Sage Publications,
2001), 240.
7 Measures adapted from: Martinez, Luis A., Greg Jette, Tao Wang, and Shi Xia.
Tompkins County New York Performance Measurement Study May 2012. Rep.
Cornell University, accessed Sept. 26, 2012. http://ecommons.library.cornell.edu/
handle/1813/30150.

104. 10 0 S h i n a n d Va p o r i s i
JS: Thank you for speaking with us
today, Ambassador Brazeal. As the
first U.S. Ambassador to Micronesia
from 1990 to 1993 and Deputy Assis-
tant Secretary for East Asia and the
Pacific from 1996 to 1998, how did
you view the importance of the Asia
Pacific region at the time? Why do
you think the U.S. Pivot to Asia now
is so critical?
I n t e r v i e w
Ambassador Aurelia Brazeal
The President of the Association
of Black American Ambassadors
I n t e r v i e w b y J e n n i f e r S h i n a n d M i c h a e l a Va p o r i s
Ambassador Aurelia Brazeal is currently the President of the Association of
Black American Ambassadors (ABAA). Ambassador Brazeal served as the first
ever United States Ambassador to Micronesia (1990-93), as U.S. Ambassador to
Kenya (1993-96), and most recently as U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia (2002-05).
She has held Department of State appointments working with Japan, Paraguay,
Uruguay, and Argentina. She is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the
Washington Institute of Foreign Affairs, the Foreign Affairs Council, and the As-
sociation for Diplomatic Studies and Training. Ambassador Brazeal retired in 2008
from the Senior Foreign Service with the rank of Career Minister, having served
as Distinguished Visiting Ambassador and Diplomat-in-Residence at Howard Uni-
versity. She received her BA from Spelman College and her MIA from Columbia
University, in addition to completing post-graduate work at the Harvard Kennedy
School of Government. Ambassador Brazeal sat down with Cornell Policy Review
staff on September 13, 2012 to discuss her diplomatic experiences, as part of the
Cornell Institute for Public Affair Colloquium Speaker Series. The following is a
transcript of that conversation, edited for written publication.
Back in 1990/93, when I was in
Micronesia, I thought Asia was very
important to the United States, as the
U.S. has consistently been engaged in
Asia through its foreign policy. As a
result, the current pivot to Asia is not
a surprise for me. I think the “pivot”
is simply a continuation of what we’ve
done over the years, but with a higher
level of concentration, and higher

105. I n t e r v i e w w i t h A m b a s s a d o r A u r e l i a B r a z e a l 10 1
involvement by U.S. senior officials in
Asian issues. Asia has the economic
dynamism that will continue to help
the world grow in the 21st century.
The U.S. has always been an Asian
nation because we border the Pacific,
even though we’ve oriented ourselves
to the Atlantic through historic events
like World War II. Pivoting towards
Asia, in my view, does not mean that
we ignore the Atlantic either, or the
Atlantic relationship.
Too often in today’s world, people get
caught up in an “either-or” mind-set
or paradigm. This mindset of consid-
ering either the Pacific or the Atlantic
ignores other parts of the world that
are still equally important to the
United States. Rather than an “either-
or” situation, it should be an “and-
also” situation. It’s Asia, and also the
Atlantic, and other parts of the world.
You may think of Micronesia as a
small country, which it is since its
land mass is only about as large as
Rhode Island; but if you think of its
territorial reach in terms of its reach
out into the waters, it’s about as big
as the United States. That’s a large
swatch of the Pacific. So, I’m happy to
say that I was able to emphasize that
economic reach that Micronesia has,
and its importance to the U.S. The U.S.
was the trustee under U.N. auspices
of that area after World War II. Today
we interact with Micronesia as an
independent country fully represent-
ing its own interests, which I hope are
similar to ours.
MV: Ethiopia has had long-standing
conflicts with Eritrea over land.
Territorial disputes, particularly
in the Asia Pacific region, continue
to worsen. What lessons have you
learned about settling these disputes
while you were Ambassador to
Ethiopia?
Ethiopia and Eritrea did have a war
ostensibly over land, but other issues
were critical factors as well, such
as economic issues, as well as some
political issues.
The territorial disputes in Asia have
currently gained more attention.
I learned that there are different
approaches to each issue, and you
have to take into account cultural
differences, as well as political will
and economic relationships between
countries or between places; but there
are some constants at work. One of the
constants that most countries think
about is who or what organization
can be an honest broker between the
fighting parties. A second constant
would be confidence-building
measures that countries could put into
place to establish confidence between
them around certain issues.
By taking small confidence-building
measures, or trying to encourage those
small steps, countries begin to build
the trust that is needed to deal with
the bigger problems. My hope in Asia

106. 10 2 S h i n a n d Va p o r i s i
is that the countries involved could
quietly work out some confidence-
building measures that would allow
them to address the underlying issues
regarding who has sovereignty over
what.
Many of those basic underlying
problems are economic because
of territorial waters, which are
considered to be somewhat rich, so
every country wants to have a part of
that, or have sovereignty over those
riches. So, looking at the underlying
questions as well as confidence-
building measures, I think we
can peacefully move toward some
resolution.
I’m hoping ASEAN, as an organiza-
tion, might be able to help as an hon-
est broker. Many of its members are
either involved or have interests in the
situation, and they have mechanisms
that can bring people together.
We also have unofficial diplomatic
efforts and Track II diplomatic efforts,
where you can have private groups
come together to talk about issues. I
think it’s possible with good will, but
if people want to pander to domestic
concerns then that’s not very helpful.
While I could speculate, that wouldn’t
be helpful either. There’s going to be
a power change in China and perhaps
they’re deflecting public interest there
from their domestic situation onto the
issue about sovereignty over islands.
I’m not sure.
JS: We are deeply saddened by the
attacks on the U.S. Embassy in Egypt
and the U.S. Consulate in Libya
and the tragic death of Ambassador
Chris Stevens. How do these
attacks reinforce the importance
of American diplomacy, and how
has the Foreign Service changed to
address the issues of 21st century
global politics?
Thank you for mentioning the current
situation in Egypt and Libya, and the
Ambassador’s death, as well as the
death of three other diplomats when
they were visiting Benghazi, Libya.
Diplomats know that there is a
certain amount of risk, but we’re
peacemakers, really. When you
think about diplomacy, it’s all about
being unarmed in another country
to talk about issues, to make friends,
and to try to get people to think
about potential common areas for
cooperation.
As Secretary Clinton and President
Obama said, there is no excuse for that
kind of violence. I am pleased that we
are investigating what happened in
Benghazi. I think we also should look
closely here at home at who is behind
that so-called movie. There seems to
be some question about who’s involved
and how the voiceover in Arabic was
added to the film. I think that would
be of interest to our government and
to the American people.

107. I n t e r v i e w w i t h A m b a s s a d o r A u r e l i a B r a z e a l 10 3
But in terms of conflict, diplomats are
mediators; we’re conciliators; we are
people who want to find a peaceful
way forward. Diplomats are the real
tip of the spear. We are constantly
deployed overseas as diplomats with
our families. We try to not only
integrate ourselves into any country
and the community we’re involved
with to represent U.S. interests, but
also to find those common areas for
cooperation. I would not want to
change that objective, but I think on
security concerns we have hardened
ourselves in terms of making sure
embassies are a little bit safer as
buildings and training people how to
exist if there is a crisis.
Security concerns are part of the 21st
century diplomatic world. But frankly,
in the 20th century, I experienced
some of these same security problems.
It’s something that will remain with
us. It’s simply a risk that our country
and diplomats take—diplomats from
any country.
MV: Racial and gender diversity con-
tinue to be a problem, particularly
at the higher levels of the Foreign
Service. What challenges did you
face as an African-American woman?
What is the Foreign Service doing to
promote diversity, and is it enough?
Thank you for the question about
diversity in the Foreign Service. It’s
something that’s been an interest of
mine my entire career. I think we
have, from time to time, historically
had programs that are meant to bring
diverse people into the U.S. Foreign
Service.
We also had a class action suit brought
by women of the Foreign Service. I’m
happy to say that women won the
class action suit, and as a result of
that, we had many more changes in
our Foreign Service regarding women.
Some of the practices at that time
included not assigning women to any
country where that country’s culture
did not allow women to serve in a
high level position, or in any position
as a diplomat. Today, we will send
women to any country, and that
country interacts with that woman
diplomat if it wants to talk to the
United States of America.
When I entered the Foreign Service,
women who got married had to resign
from the Foreign Service. We’ve had a
lot of changes. I’m happy to have lived
through those, so that now women are
on an equal level.
We have done a lot of recruiting. We
have perhaps more women now than
men. We have women moving through
the middle ranks and to the senior
levels of the Foreign Service.
One of our most respected diplomats,
Ann Patterson, is our ambassador
in Egypt. She wasn’t at post during
the current events, but she is one
of the most respected senior-level
ambassadors we have.

108. 10 4 S h i n a n d Va p o r i s i
Women have been doing okay. What
we do not have in the Foreign Service
yet is a Foreign Service that looks like
America, and America has different
groups. We need more African-
Americans, more Hispanics, more
Native Americans, more Americans
from immigrant groups who’ve come
here, more Indian-Americans, more
Asian-Americans, more whatever-
Americans, because America is a
multicultural country.
My guess is that the number of
African-Americans in the Foreign
Service roughly equals the numbers
we had when I entered the service in
1967! We need a Foreign Service that
looks like America. We need to give
this objective more emphasis because,
in general, it takes about twenty years
to twenty-two years on average to
grow an entry-level diplomat into a
senior diplomat.
If you keep bringing people in at
the bottom, it’s going to take twenty
years before you see them at the
mid-levels and at the top levels of the
Foreign Service. We need to increase
our intake of diverse candidates on
a consistent basis so that the Foreign
Service looks like the world, because
we are the world in the composition of
this country.
JS: You have been active in
addressing the lack of diversity
within the Foreign Service. Do you
believe that greater diversity is
important to the perception of the
U.S. government both at home and
overseas, or do you believe that an
increase in diversity would have a
direct effect on foreign policies?
Greater diversity is key to continued
U.S. strength and influence. A person
can become an American. I used to
say that to foreigners who didn’t
understand. You can’t just become
Japanese, or you can’t become Chi-
nese, or you can’t become another
country’s citizen either because you
weren’t born there or you don’t have
bloodlines.
In America, you can become an
American by signing onto U.S. values
and U.S. norms that are enshrined in
our founding documents. That’s
unique. And because we have people
from all over the world, I think it
shows strength as a nation; but it is
also a way to relate to the world in a
different way than if you just happen
to have a white face, which has been
the traditional face that America has
put forth.
Demographics is the future that has
already happened. The children are
already born in America who will
outnumber whites by the year 2050.
They are already born. You can’t
change that future.
So, we’re going to have to look like
America, which means we’re going to
have to have people from all ethnic
groups in the Foreign Service repre-

109. I n t e r v i e w w i t h A m b a s s a d o r A u r e l i a B r a z e a l 10 5
senting our country. They will repre-
sent it well because they’ve signed on
to the values that we hold dear in our
founding documents, not because they
come from a bloodline. That’s the
beauty of America. It’s the strength,
and it’s our future.
MV: Upon leaving Ethiopia, you quot-
ed Toni Morrison and her concern
with “the future of time,” stating that
her phrase expressed “her concern
that people have become too mired
in the past and too little interested in
the future.” What advice would you
give to individuals who are thinking
about pursuing a career in Foreign
Service in order to address this con-
cern?
I was making that comment about
Ethiopia at the time, but it also
applies to the United States. When
you think about what our forefathers
gave us in terms of, for example, our
transportation structure. Or if you
think even further back to people
building cathedrals in Europe who
thought of taking 500 years to finish
that cathedral. People built for a future
500 years ahead of them, or they
built a transportation structure in the
Eisenhower Administration that had a
way forward into the 21st century.
That, to me, is where Americans
need to be: thinking ahead for years,
decades, and even one hundred years
or two hundred years. It would make
me happy because it would mean all
of us are working for the common
good, but also working for a future
that we will not be there to see, but
can envision.
Such a long-term perspective broadens
your viewpoint; it broadens your
vision, and it gives you something
to work for beyond yourself. I think
technology in America has shortened
our viewpoint, has killed off time, and
has made us think in terms of Now.
Even students I meet come in and say,
“What do I need to know now, for this
exam? Don’t give me the context, don’t
give me the history, just tell me what I
need to know now.”
That needs to change. We need to use
our technology somehow to project
ourselves into a future that would
give us something worthwhile for
which to work. That’s what I meant
about signing on to Toni Morrison’s
viewpoint. Stretch that timeline out,
please. You are the future, so I hope
you will.
JS: Do you have any closing advice
that you would give to CIPA Fellows
and MPA candidates in general?
Master technology and don’t let tech-
nology master you. I hope you’ll think
about the Foreign Service as a career
because there’s a commitment to con-
tinuing education.
You’re always learning something,
you’re always having to apply your
intellect, you learn other cultures,

110. 10 6 S h i n a n d Va p o r i s i
you work on issues important to the
American people, and you represent
the United States of America.
It gives you flexibility to serve over-
seas, as well as at home in Washing-
ton, D.C. and New York, if you’re at
the U.N.
There are a lot of experiences that you
can have as a Foreign Services Officer,
but most importantly, you are a peace-
maker. Peace is what we want to reach
in the United States, as well as the rest
of the world. ◗
Jennifer Shin is a first-year fellow
at the Cornell Institute for Public
Affairs, pursuing a Master of Public
Administration. Her concentration
is in international development
with a specific interest in Southeast
Asia. Prior to her studies at Cornell,
Jennifer worked at the U.S. Embassy
Jakarta and received a B.A. in English
Literature from the University of
California, Berkeley.
Michaela G. K. Vaporis is a second-
year graduate student at the Cornell
Institute for Public Affairs. Her
academic focus is international
development and she is interested in
the role of trade and land rights on
international development. Prior to
starting at Cornell, Michaela studied
history and economics at The Johns
Hopkins University.

111. I n t e r v i e w w i t h A m b a s s a d o r A u r e l i a B r a z e a l 10 7

112. We solicit contributions for consideration with a view to publication.
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