Contextualizing Turkey’s Tangled Threaded Web

Contextualizing Turkey’s Tangled Web
Illuminating Turkey’s Troubled Present Through a Look at its Recent
Past
Patrick Elder, Sarah Jordan, Moatasem al-Bitar, Zach Carman, Kenyon Murley
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to historically contextualize Turkey‟s unique position
at the crossroads of East and West and how its interactions with the outside world
reverberate into the complex milieu of pressing issues in which the country occupies
center stage. We reject simplistic grand theorizing in favor of an approach that takes into
account how the past defines the terms in which we consider the present and act therein.
Turkey‟s current array of crises – the Kurds, Syria and its refugees, tensions with Russia,
authoritarian majoritarianism and liberal democratic backsliding – are all interconnected.
They are also the West‟s crises, and any Western policymaker or diplomat looking to
confront any of these problems must not only understand how they all interact, but also
the influence of Turkey‟s history in how these crises have played out to the present.
Introduction
Initially, this project‟s focus was on historically contextualizing the Syrian refugee crisis
from a wide variety of perspectives in order to provide a wider understanding of what is
one of the most pressing issues for the world to come to grips with, not only because of
its deep moral salience but also due to the potential knock-on effects at every level of
politics in the regions affected. But we came to realize the scope of such a project was
simply too broad and ambitious for the purposes of a master‟s thesis. As we attempted to
scale down, we searched for a connective thread that encompasses many of the same
tensions the refugee crisis is exposing and inflaming. Looking back, it now seems
inevitable that this would lead to a focus on the one place nearly every thread intersects:
Turkey.
The reason Turkey encompasses all these threads is not merely a coincidence. Nor
is it simply a product of its central role as a migration route for Syrian refugees. Rather, it

speaks to the country‟s unique position straddling not only the geographical boundary
between what we generally think of as East and West but also the political, socio-cultural,
and security boundaries and the institutions that encompass them.
However, Turkey is not simply the middle of the rope in a game of tug-of-war
between East and West. Nor is it simply a “torn country” seeking to cast off its ancient
identity in favor of joining an alternate civilization as conceived of by Sam Huntington in
his seminally controversial “Clash of Civilizations” (Huntington, 1997). Turkey‟s
Ottoman forerunner is in part responsible for and representative of the blurred boundary
between East and West. When we use these terms, they are not meant to invoke two
dichotomous, irreconcilable civilizations, but should rather be viewed as rough concepts
of shared geography, ethnicity, religion, culture, and so on. When one considers the
myriad facets of a “civilization” it should be no wonder that it is exceedingly difficult to
draw definitive boundaries around them. Each component of civilization spreads beyond
its borders at different speeds and with different intensities, creating overlaps and gaps
alike between it and its neighbors.
Here we eschew the commonplace resort to popular theories of international
relations such as realism, neoliberalism, and the various offshoots and opposing theories
they‟ve spawned in an attempt to move past the constraints of fitting facts to
generalizable notions of how international structures function. Instead, we attempt to
provide historical context to demonstrate that the history we‟ve lived and yet to live is
shaped by myriad forces which rise and fall in import as structures and ideas change over
time. We hew to the notion that, on the whole, international relations theories tend to
restrict our ability to piece together the complex web of forces that determine our present,
and are the antithesis of an objective approach to understanding the past and its
determination of our present.
Therefore we‟ve tried to pull from a diverse array of sources, primarily focused
on history and intimate understandings of the complex processes that have mostly
unwittingly shaped current perceptions. Turkey and its multifarious connections to topics
of import to international relations scholars provide fertile ground for disproving
simplistic notions that have driven foreign policy decision-making the world over.

This is an attempt to expose the most influential components of Turkey‟s
connections with West and East in order to better illuminate how the West in particular
can better understand this uniquely important country. By highlighting how history has
shaped Turkey‟s self-perception and others‟ perceptions of Turkey, we can better
understand how easy it is to talk past one another, assuming a shared lens through which
current events are perceived and positions are presented that often does not actually exist.
Those ignorant of the past and the lessons it illuminates will be doomed to stumble into
the same pitfalls that have plagued interstate relations for all of human history. Though
difficulties cannot be avoided simply through an understanding of both history and how
others perceive history, it is a central component to navigating how pre-existing policies
and the courses of action on offer for future policy are likely to unfold.
As former US Ambassador to Greece Monteagle Stearns writes in reference to the
inability of the US‟ foreign policy apparatus to deal with the issue of Cyprus:
As Henry Kissinger once observed, when events are compartmentalized
by experts, insufficient attention is given to their overall effect, and the
government spends more time “deciding where [it] is than where [it] is
going.” One might add that when policies are formulated without
reference to the experts, the government may go in circles, because it does
not know where it is or where it has been before (Stearns, 1992).
It is our intention to contribute to the squaring of this circle, because that is the essence of
historical contextualization.
We will begin with an historical overview of the foundations of the modern
Turkish republic, interspersed with details we felt relevant to Turkey‟s current situation.
We will then provide an overview of the development of Turkish foreign policy
throughout the ruling AKP‟s tenure in power along with a laying out of Turkey‟s various
current foreign policy challenges. We conclude with a section that ties together the
threads spun throughout the paper, showing how current conceptions of interests and
relations have been influenced by the past and how that same past provides examples of
various modes of interaction with Turkey and the lessons that can be derived from them.

Historically Contextualizing Modern Turkey
Turkey Turns West
The Turkish republic was born in fire and blood. Mustafa Kemal led the Turks on
a seemingly impossible campaign against an array of forces outnumbering and
outgunning him. His success against the odds and the subsequent establishment of the
Turkish nation-state earned him the name “Atatürk” – father of the Turks. When Atatürk
swept the European powers attempting to parcel out Anatolia amongst themselves and
other parties chief among them the Greeks and the Kurds, his was a fight epitomizing the
complicated relationship Turkey was to have with the West throughout its modern
history. For while he fought stridently against the grasping overreach of European
imperialism, he did so in an effort to establish a Turkish nation-state inspired by and
founded upon the ideals born of the enlightenment that Europe claimed as its guiding
light and justified its spreading power and subjugation of foreign unenlightened peoples
upon (Kinzer 2010). This struggle to at once reject Europe in an effort to further embrace
it presages much of Turkey‟s conflicted march toward modernity.
Atatürk and the Kemalist clique he fostered to perpetuate his aims utterly rejected
what they viewed as the constraining backwardness that the old Ottoman system and its
attachment to Islam shackled Turkey with. He was disgusted by the anachronisms of
Turkish rural life and the religion it was by then so closely entwined with. But not only
did he reject Islam and the sultanate, he also began the wage a social war to establish (to
his thinking, restore) a nationalist sentiment throughout all of Turkey meant to bind the
nation together, much in line with the nationalist tide Europe rode through the 19th and
early 20th centuries.
The legacy of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk is still the lodestone of Turkish politics. He
is revered as the founder of the Turkish nation state, the one man who had more impact
on shaping modern Turkey than any other. He shaped the education and formative
experiences of generations of Turks, not only through expansion of public schooling and
the shaping of its curriculum, but through even more fundamental reforms like the
Romanisation of the Turkish language from its original Arabic script and the replacement

of many Arabic and Persian loanwords with either archaic or brand-new words with a
more Turkish sound (Kinzer, 2010).
His Turkey was a sharp break from the past, a rejection of all the trappings of the
Ottoman empire, those visible and pervasive signs reminding the Turks of their fall from
the heights of world power. Some may see the simultaneous rejection of foreign powers
and embracing of their ideals and culture as a strange paradox, one sustained by the
unquestioned rule of a paradoxical man himself. But this is the dilemma that has defined
Turkey throughout its modern lifespan. Turkey doesn‟t neatly fit into any larger grouping
of nations due to its complex and tortured past. It occupies a precarious space on so
many levels: geographically, politically, culturally, ethnically. And it is this precarious
position that helps to explain the modern Turkey and its international relations.
As can be seen in the story of its birth, Turkey‟s turn to the West did not begin
after World War II, but it was for the first time cemented and institutionalized by its
joining of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Contextualizing Turkey‟s current
attitudes and policies toward the US and NATO are necessary to moving forward and
addressing Turkey‟s grievances, both legitimate and mythological. Without a full
understanding of Turkey‟s history within NATO the relationship is likely to continue
deteriorating as the two sides increasingly talk past each other. And while a firm
understanding of how Turkey‟s past conditions its present is no guarantee of the
achievement of harmonious relations, it can only be of benefit in the effort. The US in
particular has repeatedly failed to take into account how its policies affect Turkey and
then acted bewildered at its sudden about-faces and outbursts of anger and distrust.
Turkey‟s decision to join NATO was not much of a decision at all given the
choices on the table. Immediately after World War II, Stalin presented a set of demands
completely unacceptable to the Turkish government – to cede significant swathes of
territory in its east to an expanded Armenian state while ceding key port facilities to
Soviet control in the Dardanelles Straits in order to assure Soviet access to the
Mediterranean from its Black Sea ports (Larrabee, 2010). This proposal was just as
unpalatable to the US and its allies, presenting a clear case to apply the newly formulated
Truman Doctrine, which led quickly to escalating support and cooperation initiatives.
These culminated in Turkey‟s joining of NATO in 1952 along with Greece, who despite

their antagonistic past and future were at this time on relatively amicable terms, a
situation soon to deteriorate.
Turkey‟s integration into NATO was the start of formalized military and political
relations between the West and Turkey. Military aid and the promise of US intervention
in case of attack backed up by the growing US nuclear arsenal afforded Turkey external
stability. But this did not mean the complete satisficing of Turkish security concerns.
Internal security was never fully sated by the West‟s tentative embrace, and modern
tensions between the West and Turkey in part emanate from its interactions with
Turkey‟s efforts at achieving internal security and stability. In particular, the West‟s
disproportionately strong interaction with the Turkish military as opposed to civil society,
business, and non-military government contacts exposed it to accusations of complicity in
what was and still is (though to a lesser extent) a more complex and explicit role in
politics than was and is present in the Western nations with which Turkey was gravitating
toward (Aydinli, 2009).
The US in particular was unsure of how to handle Turkey for quite a while after it
joined NATO. Much of the problem stemmed from the US‟ simple lack of competency in
foreign affairs. It had little bureaucratic infrastructure to be a well-informed and
competent actor in most of the places throughout the world it was now exerting its
influence. Greece and Turkey were grouped with Italy in NATO‟s Southern Command,
despite the lack of geographical contiguity that would would necessary or even possible
the coordination and integration of the three countries‟ forces in the event of Soviet attack
(Chourchoulis, 2014). Until 1974, Greece and Turkey weren‟t even the responsibility of
the European bureau of the State Department. Instead, they were assigned to the State
Department‟s Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (NEA), within which they
were grouped with Iran in the Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs (Stearns,
1992). It was rare that an NEA Assistant Secretary of State would be well-versed in both
Greek and Turkish affairs, which was certainly an enabling factor in the US‟ lack of
interest or understanding regarding Greek-Turkish relations.
Turkish armed forces were never so fully integrated into NATO command and
control structures as the armies of Western Europe (with the exception of the French,
depending on the period). The chief reasons for this lack of integration were the relative

geographical isolation of Turkey, the fact that it was never occupied during World War II
by either Axis or Allied troops, and its different conception of how its armed forces
should be composed to best accomplish its security objectives. Despite NATO‟s adoption
in the early 50s of a defensive posture predicated on the US‟ rapidly expanding arsenal of
nuclear weapons in order to compensate for the USSR‟s advantage in conventional
forces, Turkey was reluctant to restructure its armed forces to better incorporate nuclear
forces, preferring to maintain its focus on conventional infantry (Chourchoulis, 2014).
This amicability was not to last, however, due in principle to one issue: Cyprus.
This is not to say that Cyprus by itself invented or sustains Greek-Turkish animosity. But
Cyprus is the funnel through which Greco-Turkish tensions have been poured ever since
the outset of the Cold War and continuing to the present day.
Cyprus has been a thorn in Turkey‟s relations with the West ever since the British
began the process of granting Cyprus its independence, which was finally achieved in
1960 after years of Greek Cypriot revolt in favor of a political union with Greece, or
enosis. There is a deep well of historic grievance that people on both sides of the Aegean
have recourse to, but that well is most easily drawn upon by means of unresolved
disputes, left in such a state by past leaders who could afford to agree to disagree due to
more pressing issues at hand – issues that no longer prevent the issue from occupying a
prominent place in the minds of state and public. Chief among these was both the
domestic project of consolidating the nation-state, followed by threat from the Soviet
Union.
Both Turkey and Greece required the acquiescence of the European colonial
powers in some respect to achieve independence as nation-states. The cause of Greek
independence from the Ottoman Empire was one of long British, French, and Russian
involvement, with the British emerging as the most solidly pro-Greek power by the time
of the Ottoman Empire‟s collapse and dismemberment. Prime Minister Lloyd George
was an ardent supporter of the Greeks and their revanchist cause of claiming for Greece
the lands of East Thrace and Ionia1
, which were granted to Greece under the terms of the
1
Ionia being wholly located on the Anatolian peninsula, while East Thrace was situated on the
west bank of the Dardanelles reaching north to the Black Sea, and within spitting distance of
Constantinople.

Treaty of Sevres in the face of what seemed to be a lack of any capacity on the side of the
Turks to prevent this seizure (Kinzer, 2010). Atatürk thoroughly abused them of this
notion when he drove the Greek Army into the Aegean and secured Anatolia for the
Turkish nation state. But Atatürk was not all-powerful, and he was forced to bargain
away the islands of the Aegean as well as any claim to Cyprus to the British and Greeks.
This set the stage for the tensions in Turkey‟s surrounding waters that persist to this day.
The issue of Cyprus was initially of little salience in the immediate post-War
years, as it was firmly under British control and Greece was embroiled in civil war. The
issue moved to the forefront of Greek and Turkish foreign policy in 1955 as Britain
intensified its efforts to grant Cyprus independence (Bolukbasi, 1993). However, the
Greek Cypriot population was united behind the charismatic leader Patriarch Makarios
and his call for enosis – union with the Greek state – while the British were adamant on
establishing an independent Cyprus with a liberal, democratic constitution respecting
minority rights on the island. The Americans, meanwhile, decided the matter was best
considered a British colonial affair and should thus be left to the British to handle. Even
after being granted independence, the Americans tended to view Cyprus as an out-of-area
problem to be dealt with only at times of extreme tension that could have destabilizing
effects on American security interests. By adopting this approach, the US set itself up for
a series of belated interventions that former US Ambassador to Greece Monteagle Stearns
aptly described as, “Too much, too late” (Stearns, 1992).
1955 was the first year in which the Americans attempted to involve themselves
in the Cyprus dispute. It was in this year that tensions exploded between the Greeks and
Turks, catalyzed by anti-Greek riots in Istanbul which only encouraged more violence
against Turkish Cypriots by Greek Cypriot militants. In response to the outbreak of
violence Secretary of State John Foster Dulles sent identically-worded letters to the
Greek and Turkish prime ministers expressing the US‟ desire for the two countries to act
in the interests of NATO and the US by tamping down tensions and peaceably resolving
the Cyprus dispute. While Turkey reacted favorably to the letter, Greece was outraged by
the lack of acknowledgement of the Istanbul riots and the damage to the Greek
community in Turkey. The letter was sent in spite of the advice of the US embassy in

Greece, and was viewed as blackmail by the Greek government due to an implicit threat
to halt aid transfers if the parties were to exacerbate tensions (Stearns, 1992).
Ironically, NATO‟s stabilizing effect on the security situations of both Greece and
Turkey in the face of the threat from the Soviet Union likely contributed to each country
feeling confident enough to confront the other over Cyprus. And despite it being in
NATO‟s interest to promote peaceful, harmonious relations between the members of its
southeastern flank, it took a largely hands-off stance toward the brewing conflict. In fact,
Cyprus was considered an “out-of-area” issue by NATO during its early years
(Chourchoulis, 2014). As former ambassador Stearns describes the US approach to
problem-solving not just in the Cyprus situation, but in general, “When tensions between
Greece and Turkey are high, compromise is unthinkable; when low, unnecessary”
(Stearns, 1992). This was largely driven by a relative disinterest in the region as a whole,
its focus on the more immediate threat of guarding against the USSR along the border
with East Germany. However, it was also at least in part due to its not wanting to be seen
to take a side in the conflict, which would pose the threat of the offended party pulling
out of the alliance.
Again ironically, NATO‟s desire not to take sides ended up earning it the ire of
Greece and Turkey, who both perceived NATO as tacitly having taken the other‟s side by
not intervening in their favor. When the US eventually intervened at the height of tension
in the mid-60s via the infamous Johnson Letter, in which President Lyndon Johnson
suggested NATO‟s Article 5 commitment to defend Turkey from outside attack may not
hold if Turkey were to invade Cyprus and the USSR were to take advantage of this to
attack Turkey, the outrage amongst the Turkish government and its population was swift
and furious. The Johnson Letter became the locus of Turkish distrust of the US for the
next several decades, and served as the impetus for its own attempts at strategic
diversification up until the fall of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War (Larrabee, 2010).
Yet to simply pin the blame for the fallout in US-Turkish relations on this one
letter is misleading. Prime Minister Inönü was well aware of the dire consequences of a
Turkish invasion, as it had a high probability of resulting in war between Greece and
Turkey. Not only that, but Inönü knew that the Turkish military simply was not capable
of carrying out an amphibious assault and conquering the territory it sought to protect.

Inönü therefore made American mediation his primary focus. He suggested myriad ways
for America to resolve the crisis, none of which the Americans were willing or able to do.
What the Americans did suggest in the end was that Turkey simply invade Cyprus to
establish facts on the ground, at which point a peace deal could be brokered between
Greece and Turkey that would see the island partitioned between the two. However, not
only did the Americans refuse to give the official approval that Inönü insisted upon, but
they failed to realize the inability of Turkey‟s military to successfully carry out such an
invasion, which Inönü was well aware of (Bolukbasi, 1993).
The Cyprus dispute is an excellent example of the misunderstandings that can
manifest in a relationship between allies with differing conceptions of pressing threats to
their national interests, and how these different conceptions of security and the decisions
they beget have perpetuating effects over time. The US took a mostly disinterested stance
while the crisis brewed, gradually becoming more involved over time as it was made to
realize the potential consequences of allowing the situation to fester. This placed the US
in such a bind that it resorted to ill-considered, rash actions that durably tainted the trust
between the US and Turkey. Instead of conducting a concerted effort to mediate the
dispute, successive American administrations allowed the situation to fester until issuing
ultimatums. The Dulles and Johnson letters each each engendered the enmity of one of
the parties through implicit revocation of American support should they take actions
contrary to the US and NATO‟s interests, a result unintended in either situation, but
foreseeable by knowledgeable US agents.
Turkey’s History in the Middle East
Given the shift in Turkey‟s focus over the past decade-plus to the Middle East it is
only logical to contextualize Turkey‟s relationship with the region, in particular its
complex and often fraught relations with the Arab world. This section sheds some light
on the historic rivalry between the Turks and the Arabs, as well as between the Turks and
their other neighbors - especially the Kurds – which have large influences on Turkey‟s
regional foreign policy.
The Turkish-Arab relations go back centuries. Muslim Arabs began to conquer
Turkic regions starting in 705. The Ottomans, as heir to the Seljuk and Abbasid Empires

and, began to conquer Arab territories from 1516 onwards (Ekinci, 2015). Hence, the
Arab-Turkish convergence was always through Islam. Arabs coexisted peacefully under
Ottoman rule for four centuries. However, when the Turks seized power, the Arabs
became an oppressed ethnic community to a point where the Arabic language was strictly
prohibited. The first Arab „revolt‟ against the Ottoman regime was the beginning of the
bloodshed between the two. Subsequently, the Turks still hold a feeling of resentment of
being betrayed by their subjects, whereas the Arabs hold a memory of the Turks as
savage oppressors. The latter centuries of the Ottoman rule and their bloody expansion
into Eastern Europe only feeds into that „savagery‟ perception. The modern Turkish-Arab
relations - from 1920s onwards - have had its fair share of tensed relations. Turkey‟s
declared position of indifference during the Iraq war was a dark spot in how the Turks are
perceived as a pro-Western state that would not jump to the defense of its Arab or
Muslim neighbors. Turkey‟s position in NATO, Western alliances, and its quasi-
diplomatic and military ties with Israel remains as a major point of criticism. The fact that
Turkey did not have any notable accomplishments in terms of advocating for a
Palestinian state is naturally another shameful perception; albeit that is changing in recent
years with Erdogan‟s harder stance against the Israeli expansionist and brutal policies
against the Palestinians. The modern-day perpetually-tensed regional relations can be
traced back to certain pivotal moments circa the 19th
– 20th
century. The overarching
point is that Turkey and its Arab and Muslim majority neighbors alike continue to be
haunted by the historic events that in large part shape perceptions between all the parties
that are analyzed in this paper. Turkey‟s role vis-à-vis the Arab Spring and the
subsequent Syrian civil war continue to be controversial to say the least. Turkey is quite
possibly the most important player in the region in terms of the Western interests and
security concerns. Turkey, through its at times ambiguous foreign policy, has had some
positive impact in the region in the recent decades; nonetheless, by sitting on a virtual
fence in terms of its policies regarding the Arab world, Israel and the European Union -
in addition to its unresolved historic tensions, rivalries and quasi-wars with the Kurds and
the Armenians – Turkey‟s “zero problems with neighbors” policy has fallen apart.
The Islamic conquests, led by the Arab Muslims, stretched beyond the Fertile
Crescent and North Africa. Nonetheless, in a lot of these newly-conquered Muslim areas,

the indigenous people retained their languages and refused to accept a full Arab identity,
such as in certain regions of Algeria, Morocco and to a larger extent in Turkey; despite
the fact that Arabic was the main language of the Islamic teachings, as well as of other
dealings like commerce. Discrimination and division started the unraveling of the early
stages of the Islamic empire when the Umayyad rulers favored an Arab elite class. This
favoritism, together with changing the Caliph selection process from a collective
agreement - whereby the best candidate was agreed upon by the general Muslim
population based on their merits in leadership, piety and knowledge of Islam (Ijmaa’) - to
a monarchy system in which the Caliph passes on the crown to his son and or his chosen
heir, gave birth to a feeling of discontent among the Muslim population at large. The
Umayyad Caliphate was subsequently overthrown by another Arab dynasty-clan, the
Abbasids. The non-Arab population particularly, however, experienced a more harsh
exclusion and discrimination under the Umayyad Caliphate, which festered a feeling of
hate and hostility. Despite the Abbasid endorsement of the „shuubiya‟ movement which
aimed to de-Arabize Islam, the non-Arab population labeled as „mawali‟ revolted against
the later on fragmented Abbasid Empire and took control of the Caliphate. Most of these
„mawalis‟ were the Ottoman-Turks who consolidated their power in Constantinople
(modern day Turkey) and dominated the region for about 800 years (Shaw, 1976).
Following a classic cycle of the oppressed becoming the oppressor, the Ottomans
discriminated against the Arabs, instilled different classes of citizenship, imposed the
Turkish language and culture on their Arab subjects and ruled with an iron fist. These
prejudiced practices led the Arabs to unite, temporarily, under a common goal of
deposing the Turks and establishing an Arab homeland independent of the Ottomans.
The timeline of events of the modern history are relevant in understanding the
fragility of the Arab-Turkic relations, as well as other regional cross-relations. 1916-
1923: With the support of the British, the Arabs revolted against the Ottomans and
defeated them. However, the British made contradicting promises to the Arabs, the
French and the Jews, which resulted in the Arabs, as well as other ethnic groups, not
receiving their promised homeland (Toffolo, 2008). An Anglo-French accord signed in
1916, known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement, betrayed the Arabs – while not accounting

for the Kurds and other distinct groups such as the Armenians and the Greeks - and
carved up their lands based on the Anglo-French interests.
The subsequent infamous Balfour Declaration, which guaranteed the Jewish
people a home in Palestine, gave birth to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which became
the most pressing foreign policy issue for the larger Muslim world. The foreign policy of
any nation-state with a Muslim majority population that is seeking a hegemonic role in
the region naturally folded the Palestinian cause into its main agenda. For the following
decades countries like Turkey, Egypt, Iran and Saudi Arabia all used the Palestinian
cause in one form or the other to justify most of their foreign, and at times, domestic
policies. Turkey continues to have tensed relations with Israel albeit having an informal
connection through certain mutual interests that can be best viewed in both countries‟
western-oriented alliances. This vague Turkish-Israeli relationship continues to serve as a
great example of how Turkey has an extremely confused and fluctuating role in the
Middle East. In 1920, following World War I, the victorious Allied powers and
representatives of the defeated government of Ottoman Turkey reached a pact of the
Treaty of Sèvres. The pact obliged Turkey to renounce all rights over Arab Asia and
North Africa. The pact also accounted for an independent state of Armenia, for an
autonomous Kurdistan, and for a Greek controlled region in eastern Thrace and on the
Anatolian west coast, as well as Greek control over the Aegean islands (Encyclopædia
Britannica, 2014). Unsurprisingly, the new Turkish nationalist regime, led by Mustafa
Ataturk, rejected the Treaty of Sèvres and replaced it by the Treaty of Lausanne, in 1923.
The new treaty was signed by representatives of Turkey on one side and by Britain,
France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania, and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes
(Yugoslavia) on the other. After a seven-month conference, the treaty recognized the
boundaries of the modern state of Turkey, which did not include former Arab provinces –
in compliance with the Sykes-Picot agreement - nor the British and Italian controlled
Cyprus and Dodecanese respectively. The victors of World War I gave up their demands
for an autonomous region of a Turkish Kurdistan, and for a Turkish cession of territory to
Armenia. In an extreme bout of shortsightedness, the Allies were more concerned with
keeping all shipping routes open via the Turkish straits between the Aegean Sea and the
Black Sea than the autonomy of the indigenous groups in the region. Subsequently,

Ataturk allied with the Russians to split the Armenian Territories, engaged in a bloody
war to push the Greeks completely out of Anatolia, and for the following decades treated
the Kurds as „mountain Turks‟ while not granting the indigenous group any autonomy
whatsoever. The United States at the time, following its non-interventionist policy, did
not respond to the Armenian appeal for recognition of its territories which was a major
blow to any chances of a resolution to the Turkish-Armenian conflict.
New NATO, New Turkey
With a better understanding of Turkish relations with the Middle East, we can
now move past the fall of the USSR and into NATO‟s unleashing from the bonds of the
Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union signalled the imminent shuttering of NATO
in the minds of many throughout the world, but it was feared nowhere more deeply than
in Turkey. Despite the often fraught relations between Turkey and its Western allies and
the tenuous uncertainty still emanating from Cyprus and the Aegean, Turkey‟s leadership
recognized the great security advantage that the NATO umbrella bestowed upon it
(Athanassopoulou, 2014). And with the USSR‟s demise, NATO‟s continuing security
guarantee was no longer a certainty.
Luckily for Turkey (at least seemingly at first) Saddam Hussein‟s Iraq decided to
invade Kuwait, which engendered the American response resulting in the Gulf War. This
was the start of NATO‟s reconception of the strategic value of Turkey‟s place in the
alliance. With its steadily increasing footprint in the Middle East, NATO viewed Turkey
as an invaluable bridge to the Muslim world, acting at once as a democratic model for
other Muslim-majority countries to follow and a country whose participation in NATO
missions would enhance the alliance‟s legitimacy in the eyes of the Muslim world
(Lesser, 1992). However, as we‟ve shown and as should have been apparent to Western
policymakers at the time, Turkey‟s relationship with the Middle East is much more
complicated and fraught than a simplistic notion of co-religionist solidarity could predict.
The Gulf War was a perfect chance for Turkey to prove its worth to the US and
NATO, and the then-Turkish PM Turgut Özal threw his full support behind the US effort,
providing everything the coalition asked for and more. For this reason, the Gulf War is
remembered by many in the US as the golden age of US-Turkish relations (Larrabee,

2010). And for the Turks it seemed to be as well – but for only a fleeting moment. In
retrospect, the Gulf War is viewed by the Turks as a false hope, a time when the US took
advantage of Turkish goodwill by the US‟ subsequent decisions regarding Iraq, most
specifically the Iraqi Kurds. When Saddam began his campaign of gassing the Kurds in
retaliation for their taking up arms against him, the US got Turkey to allow it to use their
air base in Incirlik to enforce a no-fly zone protecting Iraqi Kurds from Saddam‟s air
forces. The result was the establishment of a de facto autonomous Kurdish region in Iraq
that became a safe haven for PKK militants to plan and stage attacks on Turkey. In
addition, the US-imposed economic blockade of Iraq deprived Turkey of a major trading
partner, which not only harmed Turkey‟s economy in general but in particular
detrimentally impacted the economy of its predominantly Kurdish southeast, which only
made these Kurds more sympathetic to the PKK and other smaller Kurdish militant
factions due to economic dislocation. It‟s no mere coincidence that conflict between the
Turkish armed forces and the PKK escalated in the aftermath of the Gulf War (Barkey &
Fuller, 1997).
The Turkish leadership made these decisions even though they were likely to be
costly to them because of the firm belief that the US was indispensable for ensuring
Turkish security. But that was not enough of a reason for many Turks, with popular and
governmental opinion of the US was damaged in response. The pain was only
exacerbated as time passed and the US continually failed to adequately thank and
compensate Turkey for assistance that went against short-term Turkish national interest.
But the lowest point in US-Turkish relations was yet to come. Shortly after
coming to power, the AKP with Recep Tayyip Erdogan at its head was confronted with
the decision of whether to allow the US to stage troops in and route supplies through SE
Turkey to facilitate its invasion of Iraq. In a hurried and confused parliamentary session,
the Turkish parliament narrowly voted against providing the US with its requested
assistance. The Erdogan government then attempted to use the vote as leverage to extract
concessions from the US, but the Bush administration felt the demands were too costly
and went ahead with the invasion without a Turkish staging ground (Larrabee, 2010). The
US government felt blindsided and betrayed, which was only exacerbated by Turkey‟s
attempt to get on good terms with the Syrian government over the next few years despite

the Bush administration‟s attempts to isolate and censure Bashar al-Assad‟s government
for its role in facilitating the movement of foreign fighters and weapons into Iraq during
the height of the insurgency.
This outreach to a former implacable foe of Turkey was part of then-Foreign
Minister Ahmet Davutoglu‟s “zero problems with neighbors” approach to foreign policy
that saw Turkey branch out to its neighbors in an attempt to exert a stabilizing influence
on the region through positive cooperation and problem-solving. This strategy saw
Turkey reach out to former foes and relative strangers alike. The AKP‟s strategic
diversification is not unprecedented within NATO. In fact, its stalwart frenemy Greece
conducted a similar strategy in the early 1980s upon Andreas Papandreou‟s Panhellenic
Socialist Movement (PASOK)‟s victory in the 1981 elections. His father, Georgios
Papandreou, had been poised to prevail in elections in 1967 when a group of Greek
colonels conducted a coup d‟etat and established a junta that ruled Greece for the next
seven years. The colonels as well as the then-King of Greece Constantine II were wary of
the left-wing leanings of PASOK, in particular the statements coming from Andreas
Papandreou himself as a prominent member of his father‟s party. Because of the close
relationship of the CIA station officers in Greece with the colonels, as well as the US and
NATO‟s eventual recognition of the junta as the legitimate government of Greece,
Andreas Papandreou held a deep antipathy toward the US and NATO, holding them
directly responsible for the coup.2
The Greek people as well regarded the US as having a
direct hand in the junta‟s seizure of power, seeing the colonels‟ regime as virtual slaves to
US interests (Lampe, 2014).
Upon Andreas Papandreou‟s ascension to prime minister in 1981, he therefore
sought to diversify Greece‟s international relations by reaching out to communist regimes
from Albania to Poland. He was frequently openly antagonistic toward the US while
speaking approvingly of the USSR, praising it as a bastion of anti-imperialism due its
being anti-capitalist, whereas he considered the US to be inherently imperialistic due to
its embrace of capitalism (Loulis, 1984). Despite his bandying about the notion of leaving
2
However, available evidence indicates that the CIA and the US were caught unprepared by the colonels‟
coup, which in addition denunciations by the American ambassador to Greece of the coup and the fact that
the US waited until the failure of an attempted counter-coup later in 1967 to recognize the junta as the
legitimate government of Greece indicates that despite the approving sentiments of some CIA officers, the
US was not involved in instigating or supporting the coup (Lampe, 2014).

NATO, even he could not take that fateful step and risk the security of Greece (Lampe,
2014).
It‟s easy to draw a parallel between the AKP‟s gap between rhetoric and action
regarding the US and NATO. Despite frequent denunciations of Western imperialism
along with the diversification of its security relations Turkey and the AKP still clung to
the security of NATO and simultaneously strengthened cooperation with NATO in areas
such as radar and missile battery deployments, not to mention Erdoğan‟s general ignoring
of the Turkish parliament‟s vote against providing support to the US-led invasion of Iraq
in 2003 (Kardas, 2012). The AKP‟s strategic diversification was not so explicitly
predicated on denunciations of NATO and the US, but rather the academic analysis of
Davutoglu being put into practice, an analysis that placed Turkey at the fulcrum of
regional power for various reasons of geographic, cultural, and political centrality
(Murinson, 2006).
At the same time it was defying US efforts to isolate the Assad regime in Syria,
Turkey was in the midst of pitched battles against the PKK in SE Turkey. Turkey
repeatedly requested US military assistance in these battles, and felt the US should have
had a real interest in doing so given the potential destabilization of the Iraq-Turkey
border (Larrabee, 2010). The US, however, as it had done throughout the entire history of
its alliance with Turkey, refused to provide direct military assistance against the PKK.
One could blame this reluctance on Turkey‟s non-compliance with the US diplomatic
agenda or the lingering mistrust over the Turkish parliament‟s rejection of US troop
staging, or even on the US‟ desire not to upset the Iraqi Kurds in the Kurdish Regional
Government who were the US‟ most fervent supporters within Iraq during the invasion.
At the end of the day, the result was the same as it had always been, with Turkey not
receiving much of anything in the way of US military support against the PKK.
Complicating this refusal to provide support was the fact that the strongly pro-US
KRG was allowing the PKK to use its territory to avoid the Turkish armed forces and
stage attacks into SE Turkey. Turkey threatened the KRG with invasion if it were to
persist in allowing this state of affairs, even massing thousands of troops on the border in
2006. This scenario was only averted by intensive negotiations with the US that resulted
in the appointment of a former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe to head PKK

policy coordination. Ankara quickly became disillusioned, however, as PKK attacks
gained intensity in 2007. At the height of the violence, PM Erdogan received approval
from the Turkish parliament to conduct cross-border strikes into Iraq. Yet, before he
carried them out, he tried one more time get US approval and assistance. Faced with the
prospect of Turkish military operations in the KRG, the US approved limited airstrikes
while providing for the first time actionable intelligence on PKK troop and materiel
movements (Larrabee, 2010).
The US has taken a largely disinterested and hands-off approach to Turkey over
the course of its alliance, which has often resulted in festering issues liable to explode
going unrecognized by the one player with the power the resolve them. However, as can
be demonstrated through the US‟ more robust engagement with Turkey over the PKK
over the course of the Iraq War, when US national security interests are perceived to be
directly at risk over Turkish-centered issues it suddenly finds the will and resources to
concertedly solve tackle the problem. The resources have always been there in the form
of US diplomats and expert analysts on the US payroll in the State Department as well as
independent experts who are readily available should the US call on their expertise. What
the US has lacked for most of its engagement with Turkey is the will and wherewithal to
coordinate and exploit these resources to the fullest except for brief junctures of the most
pressing crises. Given Turkey‟s central role in current Western security priorities, the US
can no longer afford to employ such a short-sighted strategy. In fact, it could never afford
it in the first place, and is currently reaping the rewards for its history of failures.
Turkey’s Present Circumstances
Trade/Economics
Since the 1990s, Turkey has continuously made strides in opening up to
international trade. By transforming its economy to cater to foreign trade (namely by
focusing resources heavily in the manufacturing sector), Turkey has expanded its amount
of trade greatly, and is now considered a “trading state”. Between 1985 and 2014, overall
foreign trade expanded from 19 billion dollars to 400 billion dollars, and the ratio of trade
to GDP increased from 11 percent to 59 percent, between 1970 to 2014 (Kirisci and
Ekim, 2015).

While Turkey has been able to greatly expand its participation on global trade, it
faces major challenges due to the volatility of its Middle Eastern neighbors in recent
years. As the situation within the Middle East worsens and exports to its neighboring
states continue to fall, Turkey will need to rely more and more on its trade relations with
the west to ensure economic stability. However, trade relations with the west seem to
have stagnated, as there has not been any major trade agreement made with the west since
the Customs Union agreement made between Turkey and the European Union in 1995,
and it has been left out of negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership, much to the dismay of the Turkish Government.
Trade relations with the United States
Given that Turkey and the United States have a very close political, diplomatic,
and military relationship, one would assume that their economic relationship would be
just as close. However, this is not the case, with the two nations trade relations heavily
lacking when compared to the other key players within NATO, with bilateral trade
between the two nations only reaching 15 billion dollars in 2010 (Albright, Hadley, &
Cook, 2012). Bilateral trade between the two nations has improved in recent years, as
dialogues regarding liberalizing trade between the two allies have begun to increase, and
bilateral trade increasing to 20 billion dollars in 2012 (Zanotti, 2015). The trade
relationship between Turkey and the United States is heavily reliant on United States
Defense exports to Turkey.
While there is no official free trade agreement between United States and Turkey,
the United States, under President Obama, has started to bring the trade relationship
closer, with the establishment of the Framework for Strategic Economic and Commercial
Cooperation in 2009. Along with this dialogue between the two nations, President
Obama and President Erdogan have established another avenue for trade negotiations
called the High Level Committee, which was created created after the announcement of
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations, between the United
States and the European Union. President Erdogan has raised the idea of a free trade
agreement with the United States within the forum of the High Level committee.
However, no official free trade agreement negotiations have occurred (Boyraz, 2015).

Trade Relations with the European Union
The trade relationship between Turkey and European Union is much more
developed than that of the United States. Current trade relations are predominantly built
around the Customs Union signed in 1995. The Customs Union allows for manufactured
goods to be traded between member states of the European Union and Turkey, without
tariffs or quotas. A condition of this free trade for manufactured goods is that Turkey
must institute the same regulatory standards in its manufacturing sector that European
Governments must institute (Kirisci and Ekim, 2015).
The Customs Union with the European Union has allowed for trade to flourish
between the two nations, and it is one of the key factors that has allowed Turkey to
transition into a trade state. Between the years of 1995 and 2014, bilateral trade between
Turkey and the European Union expanded from 28 billion dollars to 158 billion dollars,
with the growth predominantly in the manufacturing sector, a direct result of the Customs
Union (Boyraz, 2015). However, Turkey‟s trade relationship with the European Union
still has great strides that it has yet to make, as the Customs Union is missing key
economic sectors, such as agriculture and services. Given that the original Customs
Union agreement was made with the understanding that it was a stepping stone for
Turkey officially joining the European Union, further economic integration would be
logical, if we are to assume that Turkey joining the EU is still on the table.
Turkish Foreign Policy Evolution
There is often a reference to Turkey‟s foreign policy as a “shift of axis” from its
more recent Western orientation to a more Eastern focus (Őniş, 2011). Turkey adopted a
policy of “zero problems with neighbors” in its relations with neighboring countries, and
views its role as an active regional and global power. To support this shift, critics point to
the Davos incident at the World Economic Forum, in which Turkey favored the
Palestinian cause at the expense of Israel, the “Mavi Marmara” flotilla crisis, in which 8
Turkish citizens were killed by Israeli soldiers while attempting to provide humanitarian
aid to Gaza. The third incident regarded the attempt by Turkey to negotiate a solution to
the Iranian nuclear dispute, one that did not result in sanctions on Iran (Őniş, 2011).

Another concern of turkey was the 2007-2008 global financial crisis and its
impact upon globalization. The “East” and “South” weathered the crisis much better than
the “West,” with the EU losing much of its attractiveness to Turkey, as those countries in
the periphery suffered greatly responding to the financial crisis (Őniş, 2011). With the
financial crisis, the G-8 was replaced by the G-20, of which Turkey was a member, and
allowed it greater voice in the creation of legislation and institutions in response to the
crisis. Turkey had reinforced its banking sector in response to the 2001 crisis, and now
had a stronger banking system than the West.
There are those in Turkey, the Eurasianists (among whom includes Ahmet
Davutoğlu, Turkey‟s Foreign Minister), who have advised “Turkey to de-emphasize its
ties with the European Union in favor of establishing closer ties with Central Asia, the
Caucasus, and Russia.” Opponents argue of the coming accession of Turkey into the
European Union (Bilgin, 2011). The Eurasianists discuss civilizational geopolitics, “an
understanding of culture and civilization as preordained determinants of international
behavior” (Bilgin, 2011). This worldview defined the world as civilized and less than
civilized. Only the civilized possessed the capacity for self-determination and sovereign
statehood, and Turkey, thus, adopted a Western perspective.
Turkey resumed relations with Russia during the period 1989 – 1991, and
envisioned a “Turkish World” stretching from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China. To
accomplish this goal, 1992 saw the creation of the Turkish International Cooperation and
Development Agency (TİKA). Contrary to the stated purpose of TİKA, its primary
purpose was to assist Central Asian republics and Azerbaijan as the Soviet Union was
disintegrating (Bilgin, 2011). Also created was the Black Sea Economic Cooperation
(BSEC) organization, which included Russia.
During this period, and to some degree in response to Turkey‟s efforts, Russia
created the “Near Abroad” doctrine, which referred to newly independent states
emanating from the old Soviet Union. Relations between Turkey and Russia declined,
primarily over the issues of Georgia and Chechnya, but still the two were able to form
agreements on “economics, scientific, and technical cooperation and exchange of military
personnel” (Bilgin, 2011).

In the early 1990‟s, energy assumed the primary issue in relations between
Turkey and Russia. Under the Tansu Çiller government (1993-1995), Turkey announced
its intention to become an energy hub. November, 1999, saw the signing of the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline agreement. And in March, 2001, Turkey signed a protocol
“agreement to purchase natural gas from Phase I of Shah Deniz Project in Azerbaijan”
(Bilgin, 2011).
Under the first JDP government, led by Abdullah Gül (2002-2003), the
government announced: “We will pursue cooperative relations that do not harm either
party‟s interests in line with good-neighborly practices with the Russian Federation, and
in line with our cultural affinities with the Central Asian and Caucasian Republics”
(Bilgin, 2011).
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (2003-present) continued the policy of making Turkey an
energy hub. Projects that had been started at this time, with the exception of those
involving Russia, were completed, and the Blue Stream natural gas pipeline project
(2005) was announced (Bilgin, 2011, p. 188). Turkey also sought to strengthen relations
with Russia by signing the 2004-2005 Consultations Program addressing areas of
“counterterrorism, security, economy and consular work.” Vladimir Putin, while in
Turkey, signed The Joint Declaration on the Intensification of friendship and
Multidimensional Partnership (2004). In 2010, President Dmitriy Medvedev and Turkey
created The Council of High Level of Cooperation. Agreements for reciprocal visa-free
travel and for Russia to construct a nuclear power station in Akkuyu were signed. Turkey
also walked a tightrope by managing “good neighborliness” relations with Russia,
Georgia, and Armenia (Bilgin, 2011).
Turkey envisioned creating a “Turkish work from the Adriatic to the great Wall of
China,” while renewing relations with the Russian Federation and the Soviet Union
(Bilgin, 2011). A possible demonstration of a shift away from Europe and NATO was
Turkey‟s October, 2010 joint military maneuvers with China (Cornell, 2012). The retired
general, Tuncir Kilic, argues that Western security links should be severed, and Turkey
should pursue new strategic relations with Russia, China, and Iran. General Kircik and
others of similar mindset believe inclusion in NATO and pursuing accession to the
European Union is very limiting (Oğuzlu, 2010).

Yet, some would argue that China and the other Eastern Powers, Japan and India,
are more interested in securing and legitimizing their position of power in the region
rather than contributing to issues of global governance (Acharya, 2012). And still others,
such as Edward Burke of the Centre for European Reform believe that the West has
overlooked the role Turkey can play in its neighborhood in working with Iran, Russia,
and China to find a resolution to the problems in Syria (Nicolescu, 2012).
Turkey had been an early proponent of Armenian independence, recognizing
Armenia, as well as Georgia and Azerbaijan. Humanitarian aid and facilitating the
Western flow of assistance was provided by Turkey. But difficulties with the Nagorno-
Barakakh conflict caused Turkey to close its border with Armenia to trade. Diplomatic
relations with Armenia were never established. All parties involved in the South
Caucasus region have been harmed by the limitations placed on barriers to trade.
Georgia has become a vocal supporter of normalized relations between Turkey and
Armenia (Emerson, 2004).
Turkish accession is also dependent upon resolving the issues with Armenia with
the EU calling for “good neighborly relations” between member states. Resolution of the
Turkish/Armenian dispute would be accelerated should the EU choose to begin accession
talks with Armenia. Until that time, the EU‟s influence over Armenia is minimal.
Reconciliation between the two countries could/would take the following form: as
the foreign ministers from both countries have resumed their contacts with one another, a
roadmap for reestablishing relations has already begun to be developed. This roadmap
would have a “set of simultaneous and sequential confidence measures,“ for example
reestablishing air routes between the two countries (Emerson, 2004). A proposal by
Emerson and Tocci suggest another route, in three steps:
1. Turkey could re-open its eastern border with Armenia for trade, and allow aid and
supplies to flow in the airspace above the Turkish border. Armenia would amend
its constitution by dropping any references to pre-1915 Armenia. This would
suggest a Turkish claim for territorial and border integrity. Armenia would be
required to recognize Turkey‟s disputed borders. Establish a Truth and
Reconciliation Committee be created by the two countries to explore and
investigate the events of 1915. To populate this committee, eminent historians

from both countries would be appointed, as well as any unbiased third-parties to
lend balance and credibility.
2. Resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Contested territory occupied by
Armenia would be returned to Azerbaijan. Internationally guaranteed trade
corridors would be established between Karabakh and Armenia, and a second
corridor between Erzerum and Azerbaijan. Turkey could/would reestablish
relations with Armenia.
3. Resolve the status of Karabakh. There are two proposals that have been
suggested. One, Azerbaijan retains the Karabakh territory, allowing for quasi-
independence of the area, or, two, perform a land swap between Armenia and
Azerbaijan. Guaranteed access to Nakhichevan by Azerbaijan would also be
required (Emerson, 2004).
Turkey would not be viewed as an impartial mediator, but could work with
Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) and EU representatives to overcome
the deadlock that exists between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This impression is reinforced
in that the Autonomous Region of Abkhazia in Georgia, which is pursuing a secessionist
campaign, has a smaller population than in corresponding Turkish Abkhazian diaspora.
Resolving this issue would lead to further development in the eastern Black Sea region,
with access to rail lines that would be reopened, as well as a proposed oil pipeline
running from Novorossick (Russia‟s main port on the Black Sea) to Supsa, in eastern
Georgia. This pipeline would link to the BTC pipeline, and could reinvigorate Russia‟s
interest in the South Caucasus region. Establishing relations with Armenia would allow
Turkey to exert more influence on Armenia (Emerson, 2004).
Europeanization
Europeanization not only affects those nations in the EU but also those candidates
for accession. The accession process itself for inclusion in the EU contains strict
economic and political guidelines which in effect, cause europeanization and
democratization. This occurred when the eastern european nations went through the
accession process. Countries such as those in the Central and Eastern region of Europe
saw such effects. Turkey‟s accession process, however, is taking a significantly longer

time. This is primarily due to the prominent differences between European and Turkish
political structure as well as culture. These differences have made the democratic changes
necessary for accession far more difficult. Democratization has been a long, and rather
tumultuous road for Turkey.
A significant part of Turkey‟s democratization efforts has been the reigning in of
the military, placing it more firmly under civilian control. The military‟s sidelining is no
panacea for democratic progress, however. Turkey and its people‟s complicated
relationship with the military defies a cookie-cutter interpretation in which the military‟s
intervention in politics is always a power play to preserve elite privileges. This is
certainly one motivation, but just as important to recognize is the widespread faith in the
military as an institution amongst the Turkish electorate. This faith derives from the
military‟s inextricable role in the founding and nurturing of the Turkish nation-state, not
only due to the success of Atatürk‟s campaign to liberate Anatolia but more importantly
the role the Turkish military played in counteracting authoritarian trends in
democratically-elected governments. It may seem a contradiction to associate military
coups followed by years of military rule with the preservation of democracy and social
order, and it is. But like so much else to do with Turkey, the relationship between
military and civilian government and the Turkish public‟s conception of this dynamic is
not so cut-and-dry as it is in the West.
The public has throughout Turkey‟s history conceived of the military as a force
for keeping in check distrusted politicians (Aydinli, 2009).3
The Turkish military has not
intervened for simple reasons of power gambits. Rather, it has always tried to read the
mood of the public and act when it appears politicians either overreach in a way the
public disapproves or prove incompetent in promoting social cohesion, safety, and
prosperity.
It is not impossible that the military could step in once again should Erdogan
continue to act increasingly erratically in foreign affairs while simultaneously pushing
more obviously and forcefully than ever to consolidate his personal power and in the
process severely alter Turkey‟s system of government. The Turkish military is still the
3
Perhaps stemming from the belief that the Ottoman Empire‟s collapse was brought about due to bungling
politicians and reinforced after multiple instances of political dysfunction after the Ottomans.

most trusted element of Turkish society (Poushter, 2015). However, Erdogan has had the
time in office necessary to bring the military under unprecedented civilian control by
establishing more robust oversight and appointing new generals loyal to him and his
cause, enabled by the overwhelming popularity of Erdogan‟s government both at home
and abroad during its first decade. The most important foreign pressure in bringing the
Turkish military to heel was the EU‟s accession offer. The EU was a goal easily grasped
and desired by the Turkish public, and the clear requirement of bringing the military
firmly under civilian control provided no leverage for the Turkish military to resist such
changes.
Turkish opinion of NATO in 1990’s
In 1996, a study was conducted by Dr. Atila Eralp of Middle East Technical
University in Turkey analysed the Turkish perception of NATO in the mid 1990‟s. His
study included two groups designated Senior Opinion Leaders and Junior Opinion
Leaders. Interviewees designated Senior held occupations that of academics, journalists,
staff of ministry of foreign affairs, and military circles. Junior interviewees held positions
in the prime-ministry institute of Middle East and Public administration, Academy of
ministry of foreign affairs as well as in departments of international relations or political
sciences. These two groups showed little interest at the time of the survey towards any
NATO security arrangements between Turkey and any other nation. The table below
shows the results.
Given the Condition that Turkey Remains as a NATO Member, Which of the
Following Security Arrangements May Be Contemplated.

4
Of all the proposed agreements listed, the most favorable security arrangement was that
between Turkey and the Western European Union (WEU), an organization that ceased to
exist in 2011. Even these numbers were in the minority. Both Senior and Junior
interviewees against the arrangements were in the majority.
Arab Spring
The Turkish confused stance vis-à-vis the Arab Spring is reflected in how the Arab
masses are divided about how the Turkish role is perceived. The Turkish position is not
only different for each state involved in the Arab Spring but it also changed for each state
since 2011. For instance, the Turkish regime was a supporter of the Egyptian Supreme
Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) when it assumed control upon the fall of Mubarak;
however that changed completely when the SCAF performed a coup d‟état against the
Muslim Brotherhood‟s Morsi. Turkey continues to harbor Muslim Brotherhood (MB)
members who face charges in Egypt and refuses to extradite them based on the strong
connections between the MB and Turkey‟s ruling party. This particular Turkish stance
places it up against the arguably strongest Arab coalition in the region - i.e. Egypt
(represented by the military general El Sisi, Saudi Arabia and the GCC members -with
4
The final report written by Dr. Erlap was submitted to NATO as a survey of the “upper-level” individuals
of Turkey.

the exception of Qatar and Jordan) - who declared the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist
organization that should be banned indefinitely. Turkey is also one of the main supporters
of the Syrian opposition groups who are more or less complicit in exacerbating Syria‟s
bloody civil war; this further complicates Turkey‟s position in the Arab World.
Additionally, Turkey‟s backtracking from its open door policy towards Syrian refugees
and its unscrupulous deal with the EU is just another monkey wrench in its pursuit of a
„zero problems with neighbors‟ utopian policy.
The Turkish position towards the Arab Spring has been ambiguous at best. Over
the past decade-plus Turkey has followed a foreign policy that in the words of its former
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davutoğlu, draws on a “holistic understanding of
historical trends and a sense of active agency, its progress in establishing a stable and
peaceful domestic order, and its reintegration with neighbors” (2012). These attempts to
„redefine‟ relations with the Arab world were coupled with efforts to contribute toward
the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Arab Spring presented the opportunity to
show that Turkey‟s tangible relative development is desperately needed in the Arab
world, which is still reminiscent of the old Turkey (Özhan, 2011).
The Arab Spring cannot be interpreted as a single isolated event; each country in fact had
a different experience despite some overlapping trends. It stems from the US abrogation
of the „Camp David‟ order that the region had largely operated under for the preceding
few decades. The order was first broken post the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the deposing
of Saddam Hussein in 2003. The implications of the invasion coupled with the crusade
against terrorism pushed a region that had been barely able to stand on the edge directly
into a bottomless dark pit. The Turkish position was a largely pro-Western one that, to a
large extent, played along with American efforts in the region. The Sunni Iraqis, who
were the most disenfranchised as a result of the invasion, do not consider Turkey as an
ally or even a good neighbor for that matter (Masoud et al., 2015). The Arab Spring,
despite all the early signs of the region‟s economic and political shambles, was a black
swan event that further challenged the status quo. Subsequently, Turkey was at a
crossroads of whether to advocate for the popular demands of democratization in the
Arab World, which would entail fundamentally changing the „Camp David‟ order, or to
proceed cautiously in accordance to Western foreign policies. Turkey benefited briefly

from its post 2002 “zero problems with neighbors” which encompassed diplomatic,
economic and civil society dimensions. Turkey took an active role in being a partner in
the major Arab-Arab and Arab-Israeli conflicts, especially in terms of the Palestinian
cause in the form of Turkey‟s outspoken reaction to Israel‟s attack on Gaza - in addition
to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan‟s theatrical outburst at Davos - all of which
boosted Turkey‟s image within the Arab and Muslim world (Özhan, 2011). Turkey was,
and still is to an extent, viewed as a success story among the Arab populace mainly due to
its economic stature. In terms of the Arab Spring‟s implications on Turkey; “there has
been an intensive interaction between public officials, NGOs, universities, businessmen,
and ordinary people. As a result, while the Middle East was not at all included in the
agenda of the old Turkey, it began to be treated as a quasi „domestic issue‟ for the New
Turkey” (Özhan, 2011).
The Turkish position in regards to the Syrian case was the most clear from the
beginning; Assad must go. In this sense the Turkish, U.S. and European demands are
seemingly aligned. The Syrian opposition – almost entirely based out of Turkey – and its
media, as well as the different political groups, NGOs, activists all benefit from Turkey‟s
anti-Assad stance. Turkey houses more Syrian refugees than any other country in the
world, and while its deal with the European Union was supposed to portray further
commitment to the Syrian crisis, the unscrupulous fashion in which it was conducted,
together with questionable policies that involves denying asylum to „illegal‟ migrants, is
the beginning of the end of Turkey‟s heroic image. Turkey is internally conducting a
cost-benefit analysis of its position. Most recently, the resignation of Davutoğlu “raises
questions about the visa deal and opens up the prospect that the EU-Turkey refugee pact
could fall apart. The softly-spoken former diplomat had been the main architect on the
Turkish side of the controversial deal under which migrants arriving on the Greek islands
are sent back to Turkey” (Letsch & Rankin, 2016).
Conclusion
Turkey‟s situation is inherently precarious, and is likely to remain so for the
foreseeable future. Its security situation both internally and externally is fraught with
tension. It continues to face the unresolved disputes it has accrued over the course of

history regarding in particular the Armenian genocide, the Kurds, and Cyprus. It faces
new threats emanating from changing global circumstances, among them the changing
rhetoric and protocol around human rights issues facilitated by instant and constant
information communication coupled with both the spread of democracy worldwide and
the increasing salience of holding countries to account on the basis of their adherence to
liberal democratic values and the human rights associated therewith. This places Turkey
in a qualitatively different situation than during the Cold War, when it would receive
little to no reproach for shuttering four newspapers as it did in the 1950s (Stearns, 1992).
Turkey‟s relations with Russia have spiralled somewhat independently of the US
and EU‟s fallout with Russia, yet the two are inextricably tied together via NATO. In a
situation intensely reminiscent of NATO‟s preoccupation with the German front at the
start of the Cold War to the detriment of its southeastern front. Despite NATO‟s focus on
the Baltics as the next likely target of Russian aggression, Turkey is involved more
heavily in conflicts in which it and Russia occupy starkly opposing positions. Given the
active military measures being deployed in these conflicts, it would be prudent for NATO
to devote its attention more robustly to these conflicts.
Syria is the most obvious and immediate of these. Turkey is the most adamant
opponent of Bashar al-Assad‟s regime, and Moscow‟s intervention in favor of Assad has
brought active Russian military operations right to Turkey‟s doorstep, as the downing of
a Russian jet straying into Turkish airspace demonstrated. But perhaps even more
worrying is Turkey‟s full-blooded support for Azerbaijan in the dispute with Armenia
over Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey‟s antagonistic relationship with Armenia – stemming
largely from the refusal of the Turkish government to recognize the Ottoman genocide
against Armenians during World War I – places it in direct opposition to Russia,
Armenia‟s major ally, over a persistently unstable “frozen conflict” with a tendency to
periodically burst into flames. Escalating tensions between the two main backers of each
side only increase the possibility of a renewal of fighting over Nagorno-Karabakh to
quickly escalate into a war between Turkey and Russia, with all the attendant
consequences for NATO and the world.
Further complicating Turkey‟s involvement in the Syrian civil war is the Kurdish
presence along the Syrian-Turkish border. As the border town of Kobane faced imminent

seizure by IS in 2015, the Turkish government‟s hands-off approach prompted mass
protests by Turkish Kurds and presaged a resurgence of violence between the PKK and
the Turkish military in the months to follow. The US, initially describing Kobane as
being of “little strategic value,” eventually intervened in favor of the Kurdish YPG,
preventing Kobane from falling and beginning the YPG‟s drive to take back all of the
territory along the Syrian border with Turkey east of the Euphrates. This event turned the
YPG into the West‟s closest ally against the Islamic State in Syria, and as they recovered
territory from IS at a breakneck pace, the YPG became indispensable to the fight against
IS. The only problem is that YPG is intimately tied to the PKK, a US-designated terrorist
organization, with the two groups sharing significant organizational and operational
overlap. It doesn‟t take an expert to recognize the damage Western hypocrisy on the PKK
does to its relations with Turkey, no matter the merits of supporting the YPG.
As the ramifications of the Syrian civil war spill across Turkey and into Europe in
the form of mass flows of refugees, a problem already of high-level importance to Europe
has taken on an even more pressing dimension. And as the EU-Turkey deal on refugees
showed, negotiations have inevitably spilled over into Turkey‟s contentious EU accession
negotiations with the inclusion of visa liberalization as a bargaining chip. The EU appears
to have misread the power dynamics at play in Turkey, however, as it negotiated the deal
with PM Davutoglu, who was promptly shown the door just weeks after the deal was
agreed to. Perhaps Angela Merkel felt she could strengthen Davutoglu‟s hand in
stymying Erdogan‟s bid for power to be formally shifted from the prime ministry to the
president through a constitutional referendum. If so, they failed to grasp the lack of
support for such a move within a firmly Erdogan-controlled AKP. In fact, despite his lack
of formal powers, President Erdogan was already firmly established as Turkey‟s center of
power. The EU-Turkey refugee deal may in fact turn into a pyrrhic victory for the EU,
and especially the driving force behind it Kanzlerin Angela Merkel, as conventions on
EU consensus-driven decision-making were subverted in order to secure the deal, not to
mention the wasted time and energy spent. However, considering the number of Turks
and Turkish Kurds living within the EU as well as the persistently positive view of the
Turkish population toward eventual EU membership, this will certainly not be the end of
Turkey and the EU‟s fraught relationship, despite President Erdogan‟s recent comments

seemingly forswearing any further moves to comply with EU accession protocols (BBC,
2016).
As if the EU and Turkey didn‟t have enough problems, Cyprus still persists as a
thorn in the side of their relations. Not only does it stymie Turkey‟s accession to the EU
(when it pursues it) but it also stymies EU-NATO cooperation. The EU only allows
discussions with NATO to take place when all members of the EU are present and
Turkey refuses to allow NATO to share any information. At the same time, under the
terms of the EU-NATO accord only Partnership for Peace (PfP) members can participate
in EU-NATO dialogues. Because Turkey continues to block Cyprus‟ acceptance into the
PfP, EU-NATO relations have been relegated to informal person-to-person discussions
insufficient to achieving a robust level of cooperation (Drent, 2015).
The key to navigating the immense complexity of Turkey‟s current strategic
predicament is to identify and tackle those problems that have readily available solutions
and can through their solving unlock new avenues of cooperation that can provide the key
to solving more fraught issues. Key to solving any of these issues, however, is concerted
and sustainable US engagement with each. As has been demonstrated, when the US
ignores its unique role at the center of global geopolitics, especially in those issues
directly involving its allies, problems remain unresolved and fester into crises. The West
in particular must be cognizant of Turkey‟s past and the way it has shaped its present
views. They must make this understanding clear to Turkey‟s leadership in an effort to
facilitate Turkey‟s understanding of Western perspectives. Though the drive toward
majoritarian authoritarianism presents immense difficulties to democratically-accountable
leaders in dealing with Turkey, that does not mean all cooperation is impossible. Rather,
leaders must be careful not to exacerbate these tensions by continuing to focus on issues
concerning Turkey in which there is little room for compromise, such as the refugee
crisis. Blatant capitulations to Erdogan‟s grasping for power and subversion of liberal
democratic strictures in exchange for tenuously paltry progress cannot but sour relations
when these efforts fail to move the needle. With the Kurdish issue only likely to become
increasingly salient in the years to come as Iraqi Kurds face a referendum on
independence and Syrian Kurds establish themselves as a power broker with autonomy,
the West must be cognizant of Turkey‟s intense concerns regarding these developments

and provide a more sympathetic ear along with tangible support in its fight against the
PKK, a fight that will almost certainly continue regardless of who takes the helm in
Turkey. While simple fixes are not readily available, the only path forward is concerted
and sustained effort on the part of those capable.

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