Completed draft - with bib

Andrew Ferguson 1084815193
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How did the Irish people react to the Government of
Ireland Act, 1912-1914?
Andrew Ferguson - 1084815193
BA History (Hons) - University of Sunderland
April 2015
Supervisor: Simon Henig
Word Count:13,729
Sir EdwardCarson signingthe Ulster Covenant - PRONI INF/7A/2/48)

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Contents
Chapter 1 - Introduction Page 4
Chapter 2 - Overview Page 7
Chapter 3 - Unionist Reaction Page 12
Chapter 4 - Nationalist Interpretation Page 25
Chapter 5 - Prospect of Civil War and Page 33
Partition
Chapter 6 - The Great War on Home Page 43
Rule
Chapter 7 – Conclusion Page 52

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Illustrations
 Visual Map of Ireland showcasing election- Page 23
result of Dec. 1910
 Male and Female version of the Ulster - Page 24
Covenant
 Graph showcasing use of Civil War by - Page 24
Nationalist Politicians in Westminster
during 1914
 Copy of Statement by Eoin MacNeill to - Page 50-51
The Irish Volunteers

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Chapter 1 - Introduction
Last year was the centenary since the passing of the Home Rule (H.R.) Bill and the encompassing
debate. Eventssuchas the markingthe Great War overshadowedthe great debate,settotear down
“the wallsof Jericho”1
whichthe 1801 Act of Union created.Itshould not be easily forgotten, as the
crisis is one of the most defining aspects of British and Irish history. Despite its longevity, the
collective consciousness has been overshadowed by the Easter Rising, which inspired a greater
amount to individuals.
The H.R. crisiswas broughtaboutby the introductionof the bill on the 11th
April 1912. Undoubtedly
the Easter Rising is fondly remembered and attributed to the rise of the Irish Republic. The crisis
shiftedIrelandfrom, whatwas,agenerallyunited Ireland, albeit with religious difference, to a dis-
unitedIrelandonthe verge of civil war. Though to even the most historically minded Irish people,
the eventhasebbed,unsurprisingly,into obscurity.2
While it seems that the Ulster Crisis has fallen
off the collective publicmemory,itis undeniably significant to the creation of Ireland’s Nationalism
and Unionism parties, the major groups during this crisis.
For those withanyincline intothe crisis,the simple narrative is clear. The Unionists dominated the
majority of the North-East, however, did not dominate other areas of Ulster such as Donegal, and
favoured keeping all ties with Westminster. The Nationalist preferred some form of Political
independence.Republicanism,at least in the mainstream, was never discussed as potential policy;
the H.R. bill was to be an early form of devolution. Whilst at the same time, we must not draw too
much into modern devolved Parliaments, as the current ass embled powers are not comparable.
We mustavoid taking too much into account of the violent aspect which followed the crisis. As for
the H.R. crisis, this was a largely peaceful affair, even with the prospect of civil war, which
consequently did not occur.
1 A.T.Q Stewart, The Ulster Crisis: Resistance to Home Rule, 1912-14,(London, 1969),p. 23
2 G. Doherty, The Home Rule Crisis: 1912-14,(Cork, 2014), p.13

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Despite the narrative,the reasonfortheirreactiontothe H.R. bill is undefined and not as simple as
Unionism and Nationalisms. For the Unionist, much is made of the religious aspects surrounding
theirloyalty,althoughincreasinglyrevisionisthistorians manifestthe economicimpact. According to
these historians, Ulstermenfearedthe lossof economic prosperity with the new Parliament “being
economicallyretrogressive.”3
Canthe religiousaspect be trulydismissed though,especiallysince the
religious aspectcontinuestobe retold innewsstoriesrelatingtoNorthernIreland? Consequently an
area of concern,as furthereconomicreasonscreatedaunifiedeffortagainstthe H.R. bill or religion.
Thismatter isof greatimportance owing to the fact that these issues amalgamated Ulster allowing
for a clear reaction against.
We shall alsoexaminehowthe crisisevolvedfromaNationalistperspective,while clearly the initial
passing of the bill largely existed due to the political situation in Great Britain. The political
manoeuvring by the Irish Parliament Party (IPP) represented a political goal, stretching back since
the creation of the new United Kingdom. We shall assess the effort which this crisis impacted the
Irishresolve inthe politicalprocessfrompassingthe bill to partition to suspension at the beginning
of World War 1 (WW1). From the beginning of the crisis, all effort focused upon Constitutional
Nationalism, defined by Stanbridge as, “those committed to attaining Irish autonomy through
constitutional means rather than by armed violence,”4
to revolt four years after the crisis began.
There is a clear shift in which the revolutionary aspect increases as the H.R. bill debate drifts on.
Much has beenmade of whetherthe crisiscouldhave sparkedthe first British civil war in centuries,
that or the firstrevoltsince the Glorious Revolution.However,the situation was apparently striving
towardsa monumental breakdownof orderneverseeninliving memory. Without the interference
of the WW1, wouldhave all the rhetoric, mainly for the Unionists protestors and politicians, would
they really rebel? Could they have really “threatened rebellion for the sake of loyalty and plotted
3 P. Bew & H. Patterson, The British State & The Ulster Crisis: From Wilson to Thatcher, (London, 1985),p. 4
4 K. Stanbridge, ‘Nationalism,international factors and the‘Irish Question’in the era of the FirstWorld War’,
Nations and Nationalism II, Vol. 11, Issue1,2005, p.22

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treason in the name of the king”5
Similarly, could they have truly fought their countryman? When
explainedinthisform,itseemsaclearno,however, the amountof preparationindicatesotherwise.
Finally, the last course open to interpretation was the reaction to WW1 in relation to H.R.
Consequently, the debatehadlastovertwoyearswithmomentumfading,Ireland was requested to
prove her loyalty and to fight for, whom some seemed by now, their overlord, England. The Bill
having been suspended, the focus for Politicians changed to ensure that the fighting men, many
participatedintraininginanticipationcombatinIreland,joinedthe common cause. There was in an
increase of revolutionarybehaviour, coming from the disillusionment in the system which had not
delivered autonomy.
The H.R. Crisis, and the Irish reaction, may appear obvious where loyalties lie; however,
controversies remainedandvoicesleftunheard.The general narrative,whichisbelieved not greatly
false,butneedsto be rectifiedtoensure thesevoicesanddifferingviews were notlostandconfined
to history. The crisis cannot be over simplified to fit the modern day narrative of Northern Ireland
and the Republic, debate ensues surrounding the reasoning for Ireland’s reaction and how this
crisis/debate would come to affect the future course of Ireland.
5 P. Brendon, The Decline and Fall of the British Empire: 1781-1997,(London, 2008), p.299

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Chapter 2 - Overview
Priorto examiningthe 3rd
H.R. bill,we musthave anunderstandingof events preceding 1912. These
play a direct and pivotal role in ensuring introduction of the bill. It is vitally important to examine
the concept on the religious impact in Ireland before the turn of the century. Religion was a
dominant factor in Irish politics both before and during the crisis.
Returningtothe beginning,Irelandwasabsorbed into the UK upon the Act of Union 1800, enforced
in1801. Intendedtomodernise Irelandandsecure Britishdominance,owingtothe attemptedrevolt
lead by Wolfe Tone in 1798. The Act of Union removed the Irish Parliament, having a large amount
of legislative independence, occupied solely by Protestants, and combined it with the Imperial
Parliament. Significantly the decision to combine the Parliament was not endorsed by the Irish
Parliamentorconsentedbythe Irishpeople. Unsurprisingly, due to voting rights being determined
on propertyownership,restricteddue to the Protestant Ascendancy limiting non-conformists, was
enforced owing to the fear caused by the attempted revolt and the ruminant fear emanating from
the French Revolution.6
Ireland was given her place in the Imperial Parliament which is the
subsequent cause of the whole events surrounding H.R. The Union was naturally unpopular as
detailed in this magazine in which a meeting by freeman and freeholders, “Resolve unanimously,
that the petition to the King’s most excellent Majesty, praying for a repeal of the union law, be
adopted.”7
The bill provedtobe unpopular throughout the 19th
century, as we shall further review,
ultimately resulted in the 3rd
H.R. bill. Ireland and Irishmen, in the 1910 election, had greater
enfranchisement, wished to see the return of a Parliament which governed Ireland that could
respond to the nation’s will accordingly.
6 E. Porritt,‘Ireland's Representation in Parliament’, The North American Review, Vol. 181, No. 585,1905, p.
264
7 F. W. Conway, ‘Repeal of the Union’, The Belfast Monthly Magazine, Vol. 5, No. 27, 1810,p. 310

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Clearly, this was not the first attempt at the recreation of a Parliament in Dublin. The first in 1886,
ledby the renowned,Liberal PrimeMinister,WilliamGladstone.Gladstone initiated Irish reforms in
attempts to quell the rising Fenianism evident throughout Ireland. H.C.G.Matthew believed the
reason for the creation of H.R. was a result of “the United Kingdom created by the Act of Union of
1800 was becoming seriously overburdened”8
, with Ireland being the main headache. Gladstone
intendedtopacifyIreland,inthe boldestof all possible attempts to save Ireland from Fenianism. In
the 1st
Government of Ireland Act, Ireland would receive its own Parliament, albeit no
representationin Westminsterwhichstill couldoverrule it.The 1st
Home Rule bill, whilst Gladstone
or the Government would admit would have effectively repealed the Act of Union and “re-
established the status existing in the eighteenth century.”9
However, the attempted devolution
failed due to Gladstone’s overestimation. Gladstone’s party proved unwilling to agree with their
leader. Liberals, such as Joseph Chamberlin, resigned from Gladstone’s government, with the
proposal eventuallybeingrejectedto 341, with91 Liberal votingagainst, to 311 voting for.10
The Bill
fragmented the Liberal Party into two factions, Gladstone Liberals and Liberal Unionist, after its
defeatanelectionwascalledgivingpower toConservatives,removing H.R. from the discussion. The
firstGovernmentof Ireland Acthadmany flawsandGladstone’sunderestimationof hispartyproved
to be the downfall rather than any reaction.
Gladstone and H.R. returned in 1893. The Bills difference allowed MPs to remain at Westminster,
consequently, more areform than a return to the system which predated the Union, although only
voting on matters relating to Ireland or Imperial issues.11
Despite the changes, the act remained
doomed to fail despite the Liberal party not fragmenting. Instead a different threat, the House of
Lords (HoLs),demonstrated thatthe Bill could pass the Commons but not the Lords; peers rejected
8 H. C. G. Matthew, Gladstone: 1809- 1898,(Oxford, 1999), p.467
9 W. J Shepard, ‘The Government of Ireland (Home Rule) Bill’,The American Political Science Review,
Vol. 6, No. 4, 1912, p. 564
10 Matthew, Gladstone: 1809- 1898,p. 506
11 Ibid.,p. 588

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the proposal 419 votes to 41.12
The Lords, predominantly Unionists, with vested interests, had the
notionthatH.R. was notin England,the ‘predominant party’ in the union, interests and as such the
majorityopposedanysuch Bill.13
Subsequently the defeatof the 2nd
H.R. Bill went down in England,
“almost without protest or murmur from the greater part of the country.”14
The HoLs proved to be
the biggest hurdle, they would never approve destruction of the Union, therefore, vetoing power
remained, H.R. would never come into being.
After the 2nd
attempt, Gladstone was forced to resign, never truly recovering from defeat.
Gladstone’s enthusiasmtothe Irishquestion,notsharedbyothers,pushedthe ideaof devolution to
the forefrontof national thinking.His‘obsession’ with the Irish question showed his willingness to
attemptto repayIrelandforthe famine and other events surrounding England in Ireland. Upon his
departure, the loss of Gladstone’s “apostolic zeal and tremendous reputation”15
was the greatest
defeat to the Irish. This is the main reason that H.R. disappeared for nearly 20 years, there was no
great leader and the creation of H.R. was borne out of another political need.
Movingforwardto the 20th
century,Liberalsreturnedtopower,implementingradical social reforms
aimedat creatingthe beginningof awelfare state.SimilartoGladstone in1893, they discovered that
the HoLs prevented reforms. The Lords remained a bastion of conservatism, with significant
legislative empowermentevenif they“sufferedinanelectiondefeat,”16
as was the case in the early
1900s. Significantly, the HoLs were drastic enough to destroy most of the Liberal’s reforms.
Consequently, the Governmentcalledanelectionresultingin appointingasmall majorityof Liberals,
allowing for the IPP to be in a position to sustain any government of their choosing. Resulting in a
deal with the Liberal’s in which support for reform of the HoLs in return for the passage of H.R.
owing to the clear fact that Conservatism was effectively Unionism.
12 Ibid.,p. 591
13 E. A. Smith, The House of Lords In British Politics and Society 1815-1911,(London, 1992), p. 168
14 Ibid,p.168
15 E. D. Steele, ‘Gladstone and Ireland’, Irish Historical Studies, Vol. 17,No. 65, 1970, p. 62
16 H. W. Horwill,‘The Problemwith the House of Lords’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1908,p. 96

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The alliance, brought by needs of reform to the HoLs; hence the 3rd H.R. Bill was brought to
Parliament. Thissuggested thatif the December 1910 election was fought solely on the grounds of
H.R. the Conservatives and the Unionist stance would have won over the majority of the English
electorate.A.V.Dicey,writingin1915, outlinesthisexactproblem, that despite the large number of
electorate opposing the bill, they received no attention from the majority in the House of
Commons.17
Therefore if the debate was circled around that one issue, it would have been
impossible to predict that the Liberal’s would regain power, being the majority party in 1910 by a
margin of one seat in comparison to the conservatives. Thus the 1911 Parliament Act not only
allowedforthe passing of a H.R. Bill, but also the agreement that the Bill would be introduced and
passedbythe Liberal party in this term, through political manoeuvring by the IPP. The Liberal P.M.
Asquith was not a vivid supporter of H.R., in 1902 he spoke out against any intention to introduce
H.R. inhisgovernment.“Isitto be part of the policyandprogramme of our party that, if returned to
power, it will introduce into the House of Commons a bill for Irish Home Rule? The answer, in my
judgment,isno.”18
Notwithstandinghe became asteadfast enthusiast upon its introduction in 1912
and he “neverabandonedthe principle of anall-Irelandparliament,evenif he neverunderstood the
extent to which his own gradualist approach undermined it.”19
Whilst borne out of political
necessity, bound partly to a constitutional crisis, it became part of the Liberals agenda for their
whole term.
Finally,before approachingthe mainaspectof the question, itisquintessentialtoexamine what the
3rd
H.R. bill hadto offerthe Irishpeople.Similartothe 2nd
bill,itensuresthat the Irish people would
be represented in Westminster. Although reduced from 103 to 42 MPs, influence remained over
matters that would not be covered by H.R., i.e. defence. Also a clause in the Act the Parliament
wouldhave control ‘overall persons,matters,andthingsin Ireland,’ however, ‘the supreme power
and authority of the Parliament of the United Kingdom shall remain unaffected and undiminished
17 A. V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, (London, 1915),p. liii
18 H. H. Asqutih, House of Commons Debate, 12 April 1905,Vol. 144,cc 1496
19 N. Mansergh, The Irish Question: 1840-1921,(London, 1968), p. 177

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overall persons,matters,andthingsinIrelandandeverypartthereof,’therefore the remaining MPs
would be crucial for Ireland’s future.
The Parliament itself would consist of two Houses, an Upper Senate with 40 members and an Irish
House of Commons with164 members.BothHouseswouldbe overseenbyaLord Lieutenant,whom
carried a veto. Whilst many Irish would prefer further devolution or rather independence, it
represented a compromise in which the Act of Union would remain in effect, hopefully, favouring
moderate Unionist,alongwitharecreationof anIrishParliament which the Irish people could have
pride in.
The 3rd
H.R. Bill or the Governmentof Ireland Act of 1912 represented an ongoing effort to recreate
an Irish Parliament for Ireland. Whilst subsequent attempts fell afoul of political situations, both
foreseen and unforeseen, the ensuing removal of the HoLs veto and the coalition removed the
shackles that preventing the passage. The Unionists efforts against the earlier acts were silent in
comparison to future annotations, with adherence to “pressure politics adopted in contemporary
Britain,”20
this was to change dramatically. Therefore the stage was set for the introduction of the
bill whichwould tackle the biggestreactionbythe Irishpeopletoa proposal inParliamentsince they
joined the UK 111 years ago.
20 A. Jackson,The Ulster Party: Irish Unionists in the House of Commons, 1884-1911,(Oxford,1989), p.322

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Chapter 3 - Unionist Reaction
The Crisis between 1912 and 1914 is renowned for the Unionist reaction against the H.R. bill,
although the simple reaction by Unionist, mainly in Ulster, undoubtedly defied this bill,
underestimated by most of their Nationalist opponents. Asquith, upon bringing the bill to
Parliament referred to Unionists as only “an irreconcilable minority.”21
However the minority that
Asquithreferstoprove louderthanthe majorityof Ireland.Asquith,bystating this, underestimated
the resolve of the opposingUnionists.The Unionistreactiondefinedthe crisis, going from the grand
scale protestto potential militarymeans,indisputablydetestingthe bill. How didtheyprotest and in
whatway didthey target to influencing the bill? The cause of the reaction must also be examined.
Why didUnionistsreactionpreventaclearpassage of the bill?Asquith’s‘irreconcilable minority’was
to shock Ireland in a unique protest resolve.
Firstly,we shall examine the reasoningforUnionistsreactionpriorto their response. The debate on
this amounts to sectarian fears which made Ulster discontent over the bill, or economic concerns,
owing to the possible loss of links to the Empire’s shipbuilding contracts. The importance of why
theydistendedthe bill isthatthe Unionists needed unity to overcome the bill, generally gained by
focusing on one of these issues.
For P.Bew,lookingfromarevisionistperspective, states Unionism was incumbent of the economic
situation in Ulster:
“Unionism was built round the contrast between bustling progressive industrial Ulster and
‘backward’, ‘stagnant’ peasant southern Ireland. The political argument was that rule from Dublin
would be economically and socially retrogressive; this wasof particular importancein integrating the
Protestant working class into the Union movement.” 22
21 R. Rees, Ireland: 1905-25:Volume 1 Text and Historiography, (Newtownards, 1998), p. 155
22 Bew & Patterson, The British State & The Ulster Crisis: From Wilson to Thatcher, p. 4

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Ireland was diversely economic, with the North-East benefiting from ties to the Empire through
shipbuilding(maritime andmilitary) contracts,whereas the South predominantly consisted of rural
farming. Fear resided that the new Parliament would have control over taxation, placing heavy
economic burdens on Ulster.
This feeling was unmistakable in Ulster, illustrated in the book, Perlis of Homer Rule, by P.Kerr-
Smiley:
“Even if Ireland was not asked to contribute any part of the Imperial charges, she would have to
increase her taxes, and as a result would be that heavy additional burdens would fall on the
industriesof the country, which are mainly owned by Protestants. Businessmen in Ireland are under
no doubt as to the evil that would follow Home Rule.” 23
Clearly,if menof capital,naturallyhavingsignificantinfluence, had reservations, there are grounds
to see that revisionistshave aclearcase over religion. Businessmen were in no doubt endangered,
destinedtolose muchof the lazier-fairbusiness in a country where Parliament was geared to more
rural aspect of life, hence safer to keep the status quo.
Returningtoshipbuilding, duringthisperiod,itwouldbe justified to describe Belfast’s shipbuilding
industry as a ‘golden age,’ launching the Titanic in May 1911 and employing approximately 30,000
people.Similartothe Scottish case of Independence, would shipbuilding contracts remain under a
differentParliament? D.M.Jacksonillustrated,“Shipbuildingtowns,withtheirreliance onuponnaval
contracts, were often distinguished by their distinctly Tory leanings”24
consequently, there was
plentyof other,safershipbuilding yards on the mainland thus threatening job security. W.Crawley
states that there was sense of despair:
23 P. Kerr-Smiley, The Peril of Home Rule, (London, 1911),p.4
24 D. M. Jackson, Popular Opposition to Irish Home Rule in Edwardian Britain, (Liverpool,2009),p. 51

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“On Friday the 12th
of April the Home Rule Bill wasintroduced into Parliament. The following Sunday
the titanic struck an iceberg. Amongst Unionists the sense of depression and an air of impending
defeat, was palpable.” 25
It was perceivedthatthe ‘goldenage’of Belfast’sshipbuildingwas drawing to a close, their greatest
ship was lost, pride damage, and future industry was unclear.
Finally,the economicargumentwasnota new phenomenon;itexistedinpreviousdebatesover H.R.
and Gladstone cautionedthat“the Irishlegislature wouldactina spiritof hostile tothe Protestantof
the North, and even attempt to block their trade.”26
Thus the economic argument stands great
ground.
Unionismwasa surroundingforce,incumbentnotonlytothe dockworkersandbusinessleaders but
the majority of Ulster, therefore, was it not religious fears creating a unified movement?
Before entering the religious argument Monypenny notes a clear distinction within Unionism:
“In Ireland men are nearly always Unionist or Nationalists, because they were born into one or the
othercamp;there are a fewprotestanthomerulersand perhaps a larger number of Roman Catholic
Unionists, but practically the political line is also the religious.”27
The fact that the differingsidesboth,NationalistandUnionist,undertookthese positions cannot be
ignored;there are examples,suchasthe ProtestantC.S.Parnell favouredH.R., exception aside there
is undoubtedly a religious line. By defining your allegiance by right of religion allows bigotry to
flourish,noexceptioninIreland. Bigotryallowedthe spreading of fears relating to the possibility of
Papacy interest in Ireland (Rome Rule).
Many fearedthe nationwouldbecome more inline withCatholicvalues/intereststhancurrently.An
interesting source, which played into Protestant fears, is by Reverend O’Nolan in The Spectator:
25 W.Crawley, The Ulster Covenant, Television program,BBC Two Northern Ireland,Belfast,30th September
2012
26 Mansergh, The Irish Question: 1840-1921,p. 188
27 W. F. Monypenny, The Two Irish Nations: An Essay on Home Rule, (London, 1913),p. 16

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“We shallhavea free hand in the future.Let us use it well. This is a catholic country, and if we do not
govern it on catholic lines, according to Catholic ideals, and to safeguard Catholic interests, it will be
all the worse for the country and all the worse for us. Here it is that religion and nationality meet,
and may, and should, go hand-in-hand.”28
While we canquestionthe influence of O’Nolan,he continuedtoreiterate Protestants greatest fear
for the future of Ireland. Was Ireland to become such a nation where the rights of Protestants
wouldbe hindered,similartothe ascendancy?With hindsight the Republic was certainly guided by
Catholic interests resulting in a legitimate fear.
O’Nolanwascertainly not the only one preaching for a Catholic orientated Ireland; D.P.Moran, the
editor of The Leader, echoes the sentiment of a Catholic state. “Ireland was above all a Catholic
country in which Protestants would be made welcome, but only on Catholics’ terms.”29
Whilst his
language is softer, his context remains clear, that Parliament should follow the main religious
following. Continuing later, he stated that “We have full tolerance for a Pagan or non-Catholic
Irishmen,buthe must recognise that, and have respect for the potent facts that are bound up with
Irish Nationality.”30
Though we cannot believe that they dreaded repercussion amounting to fears of the lives as
J.H.Stirling wrote:
“We arenot stupid bigotswho fearthatthe tragedy of Scullabogue barn- where, in 1798, Protestant
women and children were penned in and burned alive- may be re-enacted. Even in Catholic Ireland
the world hasmoved too far since then. But we know that the same result- the extermination of the
loyal Protestantminority- can beaffected justassurely by the taxation of their property and the ruin
of their industries.”31
28 The Spectator, 5th July 1913
29 D. W. Miller,‘The Roman Catholic Church in Ireland:1898-1918’,in A. O’Day, Reactions to Irish Nationalism,
1865-1914,(London, 1987),p. 196
30 The Leader, 27th July 1901
31 Ballymoney Free Press,14th March 1912

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Returningtoindustry,he explicitly states that Catholics would target Protestant livelihoods, which
theyhad workedtirelesslytoachieve,inasimilarmanner to remove them. It is therefore clear that
the Protestants feared that they would be targeted and industry was a clear target.
To Unioniststhe Catholicperson,inthe case of H.R., is more akin to the Devil who has come to take
away their livelihoods. For J.J.Lee this approach to making Catholics appear in this way ensured a
unifiedfrontagainst H.R. and a common enemy, therefore imperative “to sustain Protestantism as
the symbol of racial superiority”32
overCatholicism. IncontrastA.T.Q.Stewartstates“He did not fear
his fellow Ulsterman, but the powerful and world-wide organization behind him.”33
The extent of
Papacy’s influence is clearly over played, borne out of fear/ignorance of the Ulster people,
nonetheless,averysuccessfulclaim.By concentrating on Catholic, allowed Protestants to visualise
their enemy, though I disagree to an extent that it was racially motivated, rather a fear of the
organisation that Catholics followed. Protestants dreaded losing their prosperity with de facto
segregating religious areas further heightened tensions.
To R.Ress, “The introduction of the 3rd
Home Rule Bill had raised the sectarian tension in Ulster,”34
clearlyillustratedwhythe amountof circulatedpropagandathatCatholicswere attempting to seize
from Ireland through a Papacy plot was paramount. While individuals did not help the nationalist
cause, the fact that “industrialisation wore a Protestant face”35
combined the fear of Unionists, in
whichCatholics aimed to hurt their livelihoods. This Rome Rule fear was to be the greatest reason
for the overwhelming rejection of H.R., it posed a threat to rich and poor alike, the sense that the
Pope wished to control all of Ireland presented the greater threat.
Economicfearswere undoubtedlyfrightening,the greater fear of sectarian prejudice against them,
which included their jobs, was the upmost reason for Ulster/Unionist’s reaction. Together with
32 J.J. Lee, Ireland 1912-1985:Politics and Society, (Cambridge, 1989),p. 3
33 Stewart, The Ulster Crisis: Resistance to Home Rule, 1912-14,p. 43
34 Rees, Ireland: 1905-25:Volume 1 Text and Historiography, p. 159
35 L. Kennedy, K. A Miller,B. Gurrin, ‘Ulster: Communal Conflictand Demographic Change, 1600-2010’,
International Journal of Diversity in Organisations, Communities & Nations, Vol. 10,Issue2, 2010,p. 321

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existing prejudice and use of propaganda, it galvanised all aspects of Ulster life in a single bloc
against H.R.
It isnow,if not before,clearwhyUlsteremphaticallydisapprovedboth the principle and the nature
of the Bill in Parliament. We shall now explore several Unionists responses.
We have concentratedonUlster,the crisisitself isgenerallyknown as the Ulster crisis, owing to the
fact that Unionistgenerallyconcentrated inthe North East. However this does not mean that it was
confined to the North, as Buckland states southern Unionists were,
“Small, scattered, though wealthy, minority in the south of Ireland so that they made little impact
upon the generality of British politicians and electors. They never threatened to resist home rule by
armed force, or even to do violence to nationalist politician.” 36
In the south there was no real community/culture of Unionism and the vast majority of Irishmen
were Home Rulers with IPP having a nigh clean sweep of Irish MPs (see illustration on Page 23).
Unionist only numbered around 250,000 amongst 2.55million in the South.37
This is the reason for
the concentrationon Ulster;representedaminority,surroundedbythe hostility of Home Rulers. To
engage in protests, would be a marginal increase in Irish hostility to H.R. Sir Edward Carson, the
Unionist talisman, originated from the South, was becoming an honorary Ulsterman owing to the
scatterednature of Unionisminthe South. This is the reasoning for concentration on Ulster; simply
they were a minority in a hostile land.
The grandest protest came about on 28th
September 1912, in creation of Ulster Day. Ulster Day was
the biggest propaganda event organised by Unionists in clear protest of the H.R. What makes the
first Ulster Day so paramount in the crisis was the Covenant, signed by both Ulster’s men and
women in rejection of the Bill.
36 P. J. Buckland,‘The Southern Irish Unionists,the Irish Question,and British Politics,1906-1914’,Irish
Historical Studies, Vol. 15, No. 59, 1967,p. 233
37 Lee, Ireland 1912-1985:Politics and Society, p .1

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A copyof bothcontracts, signedonthe day,is illustrated onPage 24.Ulster’s people were clear and
absolute in defence of Ulster opposing the bill, stating clearly that, males ‘solemnly and mutually
pledge ourselvestorefuse torecogniseitsauthority’andtoresistby‘all means which may be found
necessary,’ of the new Parliament.
What makes the Covenant significant, including the 471,414 signatures, 234,046 women, was the
sense of togethernessitbroughtwithinthe community.Evenwiththe domination of Protestantism
there remainedslight differences, “There were religious, social and regional tensions within Ulster
Protestantism, especiallybetweenthe twomaindenominations,PresbyteriansandEpiscopalians.”38
These differences existedsince the Plantation manycenturiesago.However,duringUlsterDaythese
groups came together with “368 Ulster Day services were advertised, of which half were
Episcopaliananda thirdPresbyterian”39
Probably a smaller number than what took place as it only
represented those advised, however it does show the unifying affect, stressed by the Covenant.
Once again,we return to religionasamajor player, while this crisis had much to fear economically,
the fear of Catholicism unified all Protestants.
The eventwas a cleardemonstrationtoBritishpeople withevents marring the Covenant signing on
the mainland. In Manchester, citing a ‘Romish Conspiracy,’40
all Manchurian Orangemen were
invited to sign the covenant, while the article does not specify a precise number it highlights the
religiousdistaste towards the Catholics as Mrs Ward states, “It is, a conspiracy of the devil, there is
no question about that, working through the Church of Rome.”41
Other such events convened in
Glasgow and Liverpool, by the end of the year, 24,217 people had signed outside of Ulster.42
38 Ibid.,p.3
39 D. Fitzpatrick,Descendancy: Irish Protestant Histories since 1795, (Cambridge, 2014), p. 113
40 Manchester Guardian,7th October,1912
41 Ibid.

19 | P a g e
“The Solemnsigningof the UlsterCovenantinBelfastCityHall on 28th
September is one of the most
famousepisode inmodernIrishhistory”43
accordingtoJackson.It was clearly a propaganda success,
it exemplifiedtoEnglandandthe restof Ireland,thatUlsterwasto vigorously fightmore than before
and with the carefully use of the words ‘using all means which may be found necessary’ leaving
resistance open to interpretation.
Women, as with much of history, are largely ignored, as a result of focussing on men and their
influence. InUlster,similartothe restof the UK duringthe early20th
century,women begantaking a
greaterrole inthe political sphere.As previouslyoutlined, womenhadparticipatedin the Ulster Day
insigningtheirownversionof the Covenant,howeverinthisdebate we see amore involvedversion
of participating women attempting to influence events.
The main political organisation having the most influence by women was the Ulster Women‘s
UnionistCouncil (UWUC) formed on23rd
January1911, the sisterorganisation to the Ulster Unionist
Council (UCC) both aimed at defying H.R. Whilst women would adopt a new effort in unity against
H.R., it is important to understand that women still accepted the traditional roles despite the new
political focus. The UWUC quickly became the main female political group with the single aim
mentioned; “within a year of its establishment the organisation was easily the largest female
political group Ireland had ever seen, with an estimated membership of 115,000-200,000
members.”44
This amounts to a greater number than the Ulster militia group and certainly the
largest female political group Ireland has ever seen.
The aim of the groupwas simple,to“co-operate withmen’s UUC in promoting religious, economic,
constitutional andimperial argumentsopposedtoHome Rule,”45
although more in the background.
This is why I have concentrated on the UWUC rather than the male counterpart, to prevent them
from falling into the depths of history despite their role and importance. The dissemination of
43 Jackson,Popular Opposition to Irish Home Rule in Edwardian Britain, p. 71
44 Ulster Women’s UnionistCouncil Papers,PRONI:D1098
45 M. Sheane, Ulster Women: A Short History, 1840-1940,(Devon, 2010), p. 69

20 | P a g e
propaganda was the forte for the ladies organisation focusing on public relations in England and
Scotland.
Ensuring that Britain was informed of their situation was paramount, such as informing people of
Motu Proprio,whichcondemnedmarriage betweenCatholicsandProtestantsasinvalided, to which
Mrs Sinclairstated“the more itis known in England and Scotland the better for our cause.”46
Along
with scare mongering such as Lady Londonderry’s speech in January 1914,
“We have always recognised that the question of the separation of Ireland from Great Britain is a
question of concerns Great Britain as much as it concerns Ireland. Is England prepared to have a
hostile Ireland on her flanks?”47
The aim was to show Britain that they both had things to fear as a result of H.R. in the aim of
convincingthe electorate against H.R.,alongwiththe constantreligious fears which hoped to strike
a religious link with fellow Britons.
Utilising women was critical to the Unionist agenda, aiding to create a solitary Ulster, with a single
goal. Having women play their part in their own organisation was preached in the Covenant, with
UWUC’s aim to targetthe Britishelectorate,clearly demonstrates unity.While men, such as Carson,
naturally, took up more of the spotlight in history than the UWUC, the unison and support women
gave to the cause is vastly understated.
The final response we shall examine is the creation of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), a
paramilitary force, aimed at opposing H.R. Although evaluated later, it is important to understand
theircreation.The creation was a failsafe of the last regard, to prevent the enforcement of H.R. by
force if it came to be.
The UVF came intoexistenceinJanuary1913, made of signatoriesof the Covenantbowingtodefend
Ulster from the dreaded H.R. The creations importance of a militia to defend against H.R. was
46 Letter from Mrs Sinclairto the Marchioness of Londonderry, 7th March 1911,DRO: D/Lo/C/686(33)
47 The Irish Times,21st January 1914

21 | P a g e
movingof the goal-posts.Itmarksthe combinationof traditional political protestswithfearof direct
action,perhapsbeingthe firstparamilitaryforce in Europe. Unlike later groups it was in reaction to
events not to physically push their agenda. The force was legal due to British law, ironically, that
allowed militiastomaintainthe UK’sconstitutionand protecting rights and liberties,48
which Ulster
cited.
Ulster,inmakinga unifiedforce,trainedtoastandardsetby a professional army.Evenwiththe help
of Britishofficers,towhichmanyhadsympathy.49
Itwouldprovide extra security at Unionist events
across the countryand an emergency Ulsterpolice force,occupying a greater role than a traditional
army.
The debate surroundingwhetherthe UVFwouldactuallyfightisdiscusseddeeper in a later chapter,
served to be Ulster’s influential depth, a threat in itself, spawning a Nationalist counterpart, with
opposing aims. The UVF created another aspect of unity, by May 1914, nearly a third of Ulster’s
adult male Protestants were known members of the UVF.”50
The volunteers were an unwavering
force highlightingthatUlsterwasnot goingto be subjectedagainstherwill. L.Amery,uponreflection
noted,the anti-H.R. campaignwouldhave “amount to very little unless there was something more
than political demonstration,”51
which the UVF proved to be. The large protests would have likely
come to naught if the UVF had not existed in any form with a clear agenda to fight H.R. The action
was a direct and clear response knowing that the HoLs could not protect them.
The reaction of Ulster illustrated unity while aiming to influence the British people towards their
cause. The unity of Protestantism validated that their plight and shared problem as M.Sheane
stated:
49 T. Bowman, ‘The Ulster Volunteer Force, 1913-1914’,in G. Doherty, The Home Rule Crisis: 1912-14,(Cork,
2014),p. 315
50 Stanbridge, ‘Nationalism,international factorsand the ‘Irish Question’in the era of the FirstWorld Wa r’, p.
24
51 L. Amery, My Political Life, (London, 1953) p. 440

22 | P a g e
“Unionist leaders were aware of the importance of maintaining unity and discipline within their
ranks; it was important to present a favourable public image of Ulster Unionism to the English
electorate. Many attempts were made to show that Unionists were respectable and had valid
reasons for resisting Home Rule.”52
Sheane agreesthatthe overwhelminggoal of the Unionists was to demonstrate the real threat and
all attempts were legitimate and not rebellious individuals.
The H.R. Bill to Unionists was a combination of their worst fears. Their unique economic position
withinthe Empire,allowedthemtoreapcommercial benefitsunavailable inrural Ireland. Unionists’
mainfearwas losingtheirreligiousliberties. Propaganda revolved around the issue, striking a tone
greater than any loss of economic prosperity. Both fears had the same impact, it galvanised the
Unionists,unifyinginwidercondemnationof the bill. Emphasising religion allowed the enemy and
supportersof the bill to visualise andcreate aProtestantcommunity. Havingthe communityaround
it, encompassing all sexes, Protestant connotations, and social status allowed for a joint effort in
which propaganda, mainly aimed at the British, to have maximum effect.
Clearly UlsterDayand otherprotestsworkedinaneffortto protestthe bill in traditional means, the
creation of the UVF was a political move, different to the reactions to other bills. It was to be a
combinationof these effortsanda failsafe shouldthe bill be implemented. It was to be more than a
pressure group,thoughitsexistence meantthatUlstercouldnot be easilyignored,makingthisissue
not as simple aspassinglegislationthroughParliament.Ulster was to fight by any means necessary.
52 Sheane, Ulster Women: A Short History, 1840-1940,p. 72

23 | P a g e
United Kingdom Parliamentary election in Ireland, December, 1910
Showcasesthe cleardominationof IrishParliamentary Party in the South and Unionism/Conservativism in the North of Ireland.

24 | P a g e
Ulster Covenant- Male (Right), Female (Left)
PRONI Reference: D627/429/67

25 | P a g e
Chapter 4 - Nationalist Interpretation
The resultsof the December1910 General Election,gave the Nationalistpower,otherwisepolitically
unobtainable. They held balance in a hung Parliament where power could be given to either the
Liberalsorthe Conservatives.The Conservatives, being steadfast opponents to the IPP’s main goal,
and the Liberalsgoal of removing the HoLs veto. This was the greatest blockade for H.R. thus there
was onlyone decisionforthe PartyledbyJ.Redmond. Asaconsequence of IPPsbacking,the Liberals
People’s Budget passed, alongside the Parliament Act, leaving the 3rd
H.R. Bill being presented to
Parliamentayearlater.The Constitutional Nationalismwasproving to be the course of Nationalism
satisfyingthe Irish’s craving since the Act of Union. This was to be a legislative body answerable to
the Irishpeople inaccordance to their requirementsand the potential prospect of additional future
powers.
To observersitappearedthe long fight for devolution was finally complete with the battle already
won.W.T.Laprade,inthe American Political Science Review 1912, firmlybelieved that Ireland would
see a new Parliament.
“The fight is already won, for no discriminating observer affects to believe that a majority of the
British people are any longer hostile to the policy of Home Rule. Its adoption in some form seems to
be only a matter of time.”53
From bothan inside andoutside prospective,itwouldseemclearthat H.R. would pass by the end of
the Parliament,1915, at the verylatest.Clearlynoman would uphold themselves to H.R. as did the
late Gladstone,howeverthe zeal of Asquithtoputtobedthe Irishissue forgoodwas enoughfor the
Irish people.
53 WilliamT.Laprade, ‘The Present Status of the Home Rule Question’, The American Political Science Review,
Vol. 6, No. 4, 1912, p. 545

26 | P a g e
Whilst not examining too much into the celebrations held by the Nationalist, I will depict some
events, such as Asquith’s visiting the island to obtain a brief understanding how greatly it was
celebrated.
Asquith visited Ireland on 20th
July 1912, speaking at the Dublin Royal Theatre Hall, the scene was,
according to the Irish Times, ‘remarkable’ the “entire audience rose to their feet and waved hats,
handkerchiefs,and papers, cheering enthusiastically”54
Though the contents of his speech relayed
how confident the Irish and the government were over the passage of the bill:
“The Bill will, I venture to predict, be sent to the House of Lords before Christmas – (cheers) – and
whatever may be its immediate fortunes there – (laughter) – the House of Lords, thanks to the
legislation of last year – (cheers) – no longer possesses the power to override the considerable
judgement to the elected representation of the people (cheers).” 55
The crowd resembled a carnival atmosphere, celebrating what they had slaved away at for over 25
years, although there was a clear underestimation of Ulster’s resolve. By determining that the bill
was virtuallypast, demonstrated how deep the misunderstanding and the only opponents were in
the HoLs. This is critical, the rallies of support and the clear belief that democracy had produced
legislation, creating devolution despite the bill being in its infancy.
Although we have had a taster of the monumental greeting of the bill, it is also important to
examine why the bill was favourably reviewed despite its blatant misgivings.
The financial problems, an outcome from this limited devolution, while largely ignored were still
discussed. Ireland would retain some control with taxation and expenditure. The Westminster
Governmentwouldcontinue to levy certain taxes, oversee trade and domestic matters such as the
everproblematiclandissues andNational Insurance56
,althoughnotexhaustive;the Irish Parliament
would need to find the funding for such issues; consequently, Ireland could not be completely
54 The Irish Times,20th July 1912
55 Ibid.
56 Annie G. Porritt, ‘The Irish Home Rule Bill’,Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 2, 1913,p. 319

27 | P a g e
financially independent. Finally the Lord Lieutenant represents a clear preventive of democratic
processesowingtohisun-electednature andvetoing power. For journalist Erskine Childers, during
the debate denounced the plan of Ireland’s limited pecuniary capabilities:
“It is not Home Rule. It annihilates the responsibility of Ireland for her own fortunes, and is indeed
altogether incompatible with what we know as responsible government… Nothing could be more
cruel to Ireland than to give her a financial freedom, and then to complain that she did not use it
well.” 57
KnownIrishNationalist,Childers,afuture President of Ireland, whom favoured full independence,
knewthe limitationsof the Parliament;clearly itisnot,byany stretchof the imagination,apowerful
economicbeing. Childersview was due to additional £6million revenue transferred annually from
the British Exchequer, crucially paid in proportion to the receipts from the various Land Act of the
previous century. This condition implied that if the farmers failed to pay, the cash for Parliament
wouldcease.Childers’ reiteratedthe actfailed to give Ireland financial freedom. Redmond himself
stated, abet only in his book, that the British condition was a safeguard ensuring “that the whole
revenue of Ireland is thus held in pawn.”58
Clearly, with its financial power, combined with its limited powers and its Lord Lieutenant, it is a
mockery of a devolved Government not fit for purpose. Nationalist Ireland, previously outlined,
reacted with upmost positivity, despite Bartlett calling it a “legislative mouse.”59
It is difficult to
comprehend why this deplorable legislation created such fervour not seen in Ireland for an
insurmountable time.
Anothertheorycould be the ideathatthe Parliament,gave dignity to the Irish people, absent since
the dissolving of the Dublin Parliament. The Parliament would represent more than its current
57 E. Childers,The Framework of Home Rule, (London, 1912), p.304
58 J. Redmond, The Home Rule Bill, (London, 1912),p. 23
59 T. Bartlett, ‘When histories collide:the third Home Rule Bill for Ireland’,in G. Doherty, The Home Rule Crisis:
1912-14,(Cork, 2014), p.24

28 | P a g e
powers it would allow Irish people to govern themselves, a romantic vision, reminiscent in Irish
society.
The H.R. Bill offeredareturnto a national parliament,representing the interest of those in Ireland.
The last Parliament,inDublin,gave dignitytothe Irishpeople andrepresentedeveryone’sinterests.
Howeverthe lastParliament,despite the romanticised idea, was far from a representative body to
whichHome Rulers gave itcredit. The Parliamentwasdominated by the greatly resented Landlords
whom provided the biggest headache during the 19th
century, and also dominated by Protestants,
proves its nature of being unrepresentative to Ireland’s predominant Catholic population.
Despite the clear and obvious failings of the previous Parliament for those Home Rulers it was a
mark of Irish dignity, to rule them. Romanticism has always been a feature of Irish Politics,
“National sentiment in Ireland had long found a romantic refuge. The unhappiness of the present
counterbalanced by legends of a golden age long ago or by dreams of the happiness that would be
realized once national independence were regained.” 60
For the Irishpeople the oldParliamentwasa rallying call for an improved future, using past failings
to source supportfor H.R. To romanticise the past was a form of escapism from the evils/plights on
Ireland;those causedbyEnglandandallowedto happen likewise. It is unequivocal that an Irish led
Ireland would have reacted differently during the Famine; consequently, the H.R. presented a
greater focus on Ireland’s plight regardless of troubles.
The economicsituationwasoverlookedas reiteratedby Bartlettwhen examining the powers of the
new Parliament;
“In short, nationalist Ireland, led by John Redmond, was prepared to settle for a cash-strapped
assembly with little powers because it appeared to offer the recreation of the glories of Grattan’s
Parliament” 61
61 Bartlett, ‘When histories collide:the third Home Rule Bill for Ireland’, The Home Rule Crisis: 1912-14,p.31

29 | P a g e
Clear upon examination, the old Parliament, the new Parliament would be incomparable. The
economic problems would leave Unionists concerned, and it is extremely unlikely that it could
recreate the ‘glory days’. Ireland’s former glories were a hot issue, participation in traditional Irish
past times through the Gaelic Athletic Association and the Gaelic League were revitalised, albeit
artificially.Withthe playingof ‘Britishsports’heavily despised by these organisations representing
cultural revival.62
The resurgence of the Irish language and culture created a distinct nation which
could be easily diminished from England. As D.Hyde stated, “it took all kinds of people to make a
nation;and,in sofar as theyhad intheirranks some of all kinds,they were really building up inside
the GaelicLeague a little Irishnation.”63
These organisationswere unifying to create a nation, which
could be significantly different and earn its place as a European nation not a sister of England. The
glory emanating from the Parliament was certainly endorsing their own nation.
The romantic ideaof the Parliamentissimilartothose who sought H.R. as a stepping stone towards
full independence. The approachthe Parliamentgave alongsideNationalist’scultural groups wasthe
aimof recreatingan Irish past. Despite the obvious gaps in the H.R. bill the fact that it resembled a
part of Irishhistorypriorto19th
centuryproblems,wasalegitimatereasonforthe great response to
the act. Ireland had the beginning of a nation state again.
Evaluating the affects upon the revolutionary members of Irish society; the charge towards
independence had become entranced into the H.R. process. The revolutionary groups of the
previouscenturyresultedincoerciontechniquesbythe British,and the Land war further weakened
revolution positions.64
Upon introduction of the Bill, Asquith hinted at the possibility of greater
future powers and the possibility of dominion status65
, therefore unsurprising for the
revolutionaries, this was a stepping stone of a long but worthwhile process. Without doubt the
62 M. Mullan,‘Opposition,Social Closure,and Sport: The Gaelic Athletic Association in the 19th Century’,
Sociology of Sport Journal, Vol. 12 Issue3, 1995 p. 268
63 D. Hyde, The Gaelic League and Politics, (Dublin,1914),p. 8
64 T. Garvin,The Evolution of Irish Nationalist Politics, (Dublin,1981),p. 69
65 Rees, Ireland: 1905-25:Volume 1 Text and Historiography, p. 155

30 | P a g e
revolutionaryactivitywascurtailedasa result of the seemingly imminent passage of the H.R., with
effortsrefocusedonIrishCulture.66
The Gaelicleague allowedthose to “let loose a lot of energy for
the good of Irelandwhichwouldotherwise have beenlost.”67
Unsurprisingly the league would come
to produce many leaders of the New Ireland at the turn of the decade.
The H.R. debate was a catalyst for the continuation of the re-emergence of Irish Culture. Unifying
moderate andnationalistfactions toworkinharmonytowardsa better,culturallysignificantIreland.
Revolutionaryactivitywouldonly counteract to the debate allowing Ulster to gain more sympathy,
by adhering to the Constitutional process to benefit Ireland.
Finallywe examine the Nationalistmilitiacreatedin the crisis. Similar to the Unionists, the creation
of the National Volunteersis engrossed inthe Nationalistsideof the debate.Therefore ensuringthat
irrespectiveof negativereaction,H.R. wouldbe implemented. This came into being at a meeting in
Dublin on 25th
November 1913, as a clear response to the UVF influence.
Thoughfrom a constitutionallystandpointthe formationrepresented a headache, both from a self-
determination standpoint and an escalation of the situation.
“Redmond had resisted their formation foratleast onevery powerfulreason.He knew that unionists
would claim thatthe formation of a force which it could be said wasdesigned to coerce a community
into accepting home rule made a mockery in their eyes both of profession of moderation and the
rhetoric of self-determination.” 68
Indeed the situation appeared that the Nationalist wanted to impose H.R. against the population,
similartothe Britishimposingtheirwill. The importance of the forming Volunteers outweighed the
potential effectsof swaying a few Britons against them, but to influence Government focus on the
passage of H.R. over the attempts of Ulster. While in the North American Review, F.P.Jones states
66 Garvin,The Evolution of Irish Nationalist Politics, p. 65
67 A. E. Clery, ‘The Gaelic League, 1893-1919’,Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review, Vol. 8, No. 31, 1919,p. 401
68 P. Bew, Ideology and the Irish Question: Ulster Unionism and Irish Nationalism 1912-1916,(Oxford,1994), p.
25

31 | P a g e
the Volunteersduty was to enforce the Parliament by the “bullet and bayonet,”69
consequently, it
was to be usednotas meansfor enforcementbutrathera ‘threatin being’ensuring that democracy
“was notundone bythe ‘woodenguns’of Ulster”70
Though it is unlikely upon their conception that
they desired to be pitted against the UVF in a civil war, merely a threat.
Whilst the Volunteers demonstrated an escalation, clearly to some the Protestant UVF was
attempting to salvage their privileged position illustrated in a respondent in the Leinster Leader:
“They are nowunderHomeRule aboutto lose that and it is all for their own material selfish interests
that they are fighting at the present time and it is not for the benefit for Ireland or the glory of the
empire, of which they sometimes profess to be loyal subjects”71
The UVF to thischaracter was notthe body to prevent the horror coming to Ireland but Protestants
vyingto keepcontrol overprevious gainsatthe Catholic’sexpense, however,such comments would
not help the situation but clearly divide Ireland.
The National Volunteerswerethe counter-parttothe UVF,theywere to train, drill and even import
arms. Whilsttheywere distinctlyinfluencedby the opposinggroup,and an unwarranted escalation,
for the Nationalisttheywerepurposeful force remindingthe Government that failure of H.R. would
result in Ireland being ungovernable.
For Nationalist, this was the moment they had visualised this moment for a long time, Redmond
remarked that “I personally thank God that I have lived to see this Day,”72
although he clearly had
reservations. Emphasising the problems that this Act held were blatantly clear to the world and
Ireland. Howeverforall of NationalistIrelanditwasthe revival of Ireland of the past, culturally and
legislatively, consequently, willing to ignore the failings to gain a sense of the better past. Whilst
National Volunteersrepresentedadarkerside of the movement,itwaslargelyunifiedand lacking in
69 F. P. Jones, ‘Home Rule: And After’, The North American Review, Vol. 200, No. 704, 1914,p. 55
70 M. Wheatly, ‘Ireland is Outfor Blood and Murder’: NationalistOpinion and the Ulster Crisisin Provincial
Ireland,1913-1914’in D. G. Boyce & A. O’Day, The Ulster Crisis, (Hampshire,2006), p. 188
71 Leinster Leader, 26th July 1913
72 Bartlett, ‘When histories collide:the third Home Rule Bill for Ireland’, The Home Rule Crisis: 1912-14,p. 24

32 | P a g e
revolutionary, the volunteers acted as more of a safe guard rather than a violent militia. Overall,
Nationalistsinterpretedthe bill fondly as it was governance for themselves, with the potentially of
recreating the ‘golden days’.

33 | P a g e
Chapter 5 - Prospect of Civil War and
Partition
We have seenhoweachdebating party reacted to the initial proposal to the bill, however, moving
forwardinthe crisis,the ideaof partitioningbecamearealisticideasolvingthe differences. Although
the extent and length of partition proved, once again, to be an issue with seemingly unworkable
conditions,despite the Governments belief that partition would prove to be the best compromise
viable for the island.73
Hintsand rumoursof partitionwere clearlyevidentinthe latter part of 1913. The Irish Independent
desistedthe ideathatthe Governmentmightraise, “an Offa’s Dyke between the North-East corner
and thiscountry.”74
Therefore,thispotential compromisewas detested from conception, however,
in principle both sides preached the concept of self-determination in which this represented.
Consequently, The Independent gives an indication of how it was abhorred, but in a speech by
W.O’Brien was clearer:
“We warned you …as to the AmendmentBill forthe mutilation of Ireland. We warned you the Liberal
Government were pledged, and are pledge up to the lips, to an Amending Bill that will partition and
mutilate Ireland;wewarned you thatthe majority of Ireland’sown representatives publicly assented
to that enormous crime against the integrity of Ireland.” 75
O’Brien definespartitionasmutilation, for good reason. Ireland did not have separate identities to
such an extent before this crisis, while Ulster may have been slightly different, it was always
consideredpartof Ireland.The Parliamentwasnolongerone thatrepresentedthe Irishpeople buta
split nation broken apart from sectarian fears. Also the economic prosperity, mainly confined to
73 P. Maume, ‘The Irish Independent and the Ulster Crisis,1912-21’,in D.G. Boyce & A. O’Day, The Ulster Crisis,
(Hampshire,2006), p. 210
74 Irish Independent, 9th October 1913
75 Speech of Mr. WilliamO’Brien,MP delivered at a great open-air demonstration on the Grand Parade,Cork,
10th May 1914

34 | P a g e
Ulster presented a problem towards the economics of the Parliament, without Ulster’s
financial/industrial power, the remainder of Ireland would inevitably struggle.
The unnatural barrierthat seemedto emerge across Ireland was further proof that this bill was not
the anticipated romantic dream. Rather more of a shadow of its former self, all to appease the
Unionistwhorepresented aminority,threatenedtotearapart Irelandforselfishgains.Howeverthis
does not, by any means, determine that Ulster was happy at the prospect of partition.
Partition,accordingtoL.Ameryamountedto,“acceptingHome Rule forthe restof Ireland, has been
absolutely detested by the rank and file of the Party,”76
so on this ground the Unionists and
Nationalists could agree. But no longer could Ulster could kill H.R., they could only compromise.
Howeverpartitionwasadmittance thattheycouldnolongerprotectthose Unionistsinthe south.To
Stewart, in partition,
“If they support it, they would seem to be abandoning the loyalists in the other parts of Ireland; on
the other hand, if they opposed it, they might well be accused later of turning down the offer of the
peaceful exclusion of ‘those districts they could control.’” 77
The prospect of peace, and the assurance that they could protect their own counties, proved to be
the greatest possibility of fighting H.R., therefore, concentrating their efforts.
Whichwere the districtstheycontrolled?Inaletterby M.McCarthy, he outlined reservation against
the prospectof segregatingIrelandinadifferentway.Ratherthana mutilation,he believedit would
be abandoning loyalist, through negations by Bonar-Law.
“I fear very much that he is negotiating with Asquith about a partition of Ulster by which Donegal,
Cavan and Monaghan are to be handed over to the Dublin Parliament as well as part of Fermanagh
and Tyrone… It is not good enough for them to be cut off from the rest of Ireland.”78
76 Letter from Leopold Amery to Andrew Bonar-Law, 25th July 1914,HLRO BL/33/1/46
78 Letter from Michael J. F. McCarthy to Major Crawford from, 20th July 1914,PRONI: D1700/5/17/1/33

35 | P a g e
Fermanagh and Tyrone were the major issues, owing to the clear population differences, with
Protestants amounting to 44.6% and 43.8% respectively.79
It would become apparent that Donegal
etc. were all to be included in H.R., simply because the majority of the counties were too full of
Nationalist hence exclusion, despite any misgivings by Unionist.
Now,the prospectof betrayingthe othertwocounties, excludingonly fourcounties,Unionists were
uncompromisableonthisissue.The Nationalists,naturally,demandedthesecountiesbe includedon
the grounds of a majority. We must remember by this point, the UVF was an organised force
operating in these areas, therefore how could they realistically abandon them, especially if we
considerthe existingfearasa resultof Unionist’spropaganda?Ulster could no concede further as it
would mean abandoning too much.
Even though partition was the only course of action, an anonymous letter detailed the extent of
betrayal felt by some of the more radical Ulstermen:
“You [Carson] and Redmond have long made up to give Home Rule, two damnable lawyers whose
very business is selling passes, but when you are in Hell along with Judas you will pay for every time
you havesold the Orangemen,for don't you mistake that there is a God who repays the people who
sell his holy religion…You are known nowasJudasCarson butwhen theUnionistcome to reckon with
you, you will feel the smart.” 80
This illustrated extreme language to the man who had, undoubtedly done his best to prevent a
seeminglyunstoppableprocess of H.R. creation. However, this source indicated that Ulster wished
to see H.R. eradicated from Ireland. Though the work of a more radicalised Unionists, it still
showcased the hatred this crisis caused along with the unfavourable compromises.
To resolve the seemingly increasing hostile reaction, the King, in an unusual constitutional
manoeuver, called, what was to be known, the Buckingham Palace conference. The King stated in
79 Rees, Ireland 1905-25:Volume 1, Text & Historiography, p.152
80 Anonymous letter from Ireland to Carson,4th May 1914,PRONI: D1507/A/6/1

36 | P a g e
the opening of the conference that, “the cry of civil war is on the lips of the most responsible and
sober-minded of my people,” thus the settlement of partition must be drawn up in these talks.
Notall Unionistshadgiven up hope of complete abandonment of H.R. In letters to the King “urged
him to live up to his role as defender of the faith, and not to handover Ulster to the Pope of
Rome,”81
as theirProtestantleader,itisnodoubtthat bynow partition was the only solution to the
crisis.
At the Conference, Unionist allowing no further concessions insisted that exclusion would be
permanent. WithitFermanaghandTyrone groups, predominately vocal Unionist,thisissue was the
main snagging point. On the grounds of the idea of self-determination, Redmond’s adherence to
ensure only the counties with a majority of Unionists would be exempt, hence included the two
counties. Reasonable to many, the Unionists had already abandoned so much and any attempts to
abandon more were to be rejected. The Buckingham Palace conference failed by the 24th
, over as
Churchill described, “The muddy byways of Fermanagh and Tyrone,”82
where neither side would
relinquish these counties, while the settlement on exclusion time remained undecided.
The BuckinghamPalace conference,achievinglittle,playedanimportantrole.Forthe Unionistitwas
concludedthattheycouldno longerkill H.R.,itwouldhappen, all that was to remain was to protect
Ulster. The Nationalists leadership also accepted Partition and understood the Ulster would not
accept imminent H.R., but maintained a possible belief to ensure that the Nationalist/Catholic
majoritycountieswere adoptedunder H.R.,withUlsterjoiningeventually. Lord Lansdowne defined
partition:“Ulsterdoesnotlike it,the Southandthe Westdo notlike it,Mr. Redmondand Mr. Devlin
do not like it, the government itself does not like it.”83
While written prior to the conference, it
demonstratedmanycompromises,nopartyendorsed,althoughitwastobe accepted,irrespectiveif
they felt it was mutilating Ireland. Nationalist view was that Ulster continued demanding an
81 H. Nicholson,King George V: His Life and Reign, (London, 1952), p. 297
82 M. Gilbert,Churchill: A Life, (London, 1991), p. 264
83 The Irish Times,2nd May 1914

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unreasonable amount,whileRedmondwasseemingly willing to bend to their whim. Though Ulster
had compromised significantly and was not the hardliners that some Nationalist saw. Carson,
initially, wished to eradicate H.R., but conceded for Partition when he put forward a resolution in
January 1913; next giving up Donegal, in the north, and Cavan, in the south, however he would
ensure that the six counties remained permanently excluded.
In reality the two sides were not so far apart, however the unwillingness to compromise further
made the gap looklike fjordsratherthana near conciliation.The complex and varying Ulster border
regioncommunities,aswell asthe exclusiontime zone,made it nigh impossible for a settlement in
which both sides could find acceptable.84
It is clear that partition was not loved by any one, but how far was it detested, enough to warrant
war? The conference was no détente; as Carson stated that he saw nothing but “darkness and
shadows”85
however did this truly mean that he had accepted war? Was it now time, seeing as the
hope of a feasiblesolutionforUlster had past, to engage in the first armed resistance of the British
government in centuries?
It is clear that the IPP did not see such threats as seriously as others. P.Collombier-Lakeman notes
that “for the leader of the Irish Party, threats of civil war were dismissed because they could not
represent a genuine form of democratic opposition; a civil war could be nothing else than a
rebellion.”86
This is the main impasse raising an army to fight for the status quo. Though this does
not meanthat War didnot appearon the mindsof NationalistPoliticians,thereisanotable increase
in the use of the words civil war in 1914, when the crisis built up (see below).87
The context of the
speeches, inwhichthe wordscivil warvaries,some used itmockingly, it still empathised that it was
expressed in the Commons.
84 Brendon, The Decline and Fall of the British Empire 1781-1997, p. 177
86 P. Collombier-Lakeman, ‘Myopia or utopia? The discourseof Irish nationalistMPs and the Ulster question
duringthe parliamentary debates of 1912-14’,in G. Doherty, The Home Rule Crisis: 1912-14,(Cork, 2014),
p.127
87 Ibid.,p.123

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Redmondhimself often“scoffedat the Unionist appeal to force as ‘playing at rebellion.’”88
Though
we can say that all Home Rulers thought this was the case. P.Pearse thought differently to the
mockingtone,“I think the Orangeman with a rifle a much less ridiculous figure that the nationalist
withouta rifle.”89
Inacontext describe by Pearse it is rather surprising to think that the Nationalist
had such a laughable tone over Ulster’s intent. McConnel believes that,
“The availableevidence certainly doesnotsuggestthat in 1914 Irish Members seriously believed that
they were preparing forwar.In part,this may be because Nationalists did not conceive of civil war in
terms of two standing armies confronting one another on the field of battle. Rather, many MPs
expected any conflict to resemble the Belfast rioting of 1912” 90
McConnel’s belief, based on the fact that they saw UVF as a political tool, similar to their own
organisation,notasa real force intentonseizingUlstertoprotectit. As a consequence for a passive
ideaonthe issue,theycouldnotbelieve the hypocrisy that Ulster was intending to fight. However,
88 Lee, Ireland 1912-1985:Politics and Society, p. 18
89 P. Pearse, Collected Works of Padraic H. Pearse; Political writings and speeches, (Dublin,1916),p. 185
90 J. McConnel, The View from the backbench: The Irish Nationalist MPs and their work, 1910-1914,(Durham,
2002),p. 139
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Relative frequencies for 'civil war' (per 10,000 words) in Parliament

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Nationalist had so far underestimated their resolve to resist, this would be another
underestimation?
Contrastingthe evidenceavailable, asnegotiationsstalled, Ulsterwas preparing their resources and
morals to engage in conflict. The rhetoric was clear that H.R. could mean war; from the Covenant,
which stated that they would defy H.R., by any means necessary to speeches such as Bonar-Law’s:
“In ouropposition to themwe shall notbe guided by the consideration, we shall not be restrained by
the bonds, which would influence our actions in any ordinary political struggle. We shall use
whatever means seem more likely to be effective.” 91
Ulster was clear in their intention; they could fight which became indistinct through other events.
The Curragh incident,where soldiers in March, 1914, anticipating military involvement imminently
resigned rather than facing their, loyal, countrymen. The legacy of this event was that Ulster
understood H.R. couldbe resistedif theywere fullydeterminedinacombinedeffort.Now itwasnot
when,but “if England was sufficiently determined to enforce it.”92
This was the Unionists greatest
fear, in the event of a civil war between Nationalist and Unionists, having the Crown forces
intervening was, without doubt, the worst outcome for all Ireland93
as the UVF would quickly be
overwhelmed. The event gave hope to the Unionist and the UVF; it appeared the army would not
have the moral capability to engage. The armed forces hesitation served as a valuable recruiting
exercise forthe UVF,bothinthe understandingthatEnglandwaslookingatpotentiallyengaging and
the fact that theywould not be fighting the army. Bowman details, the Unionist were struggling to
recruit in the minority of Ulster to join the UVF “in any significate number, until after the Curragh
incident.”94
Undoubtedly this event aided Ulster’s efforts to reject H.R. by military means.
91 A. Bonar-Law, Speech at Blenheim, 27th July, 1912
92 M. Kelly,‘The Irish Volunteers: A Machiavellian Movement?’, in D. G. Boyce & A. O’Day, The Ulster Crisis,
(Hampshire,2006), p. 71
93 Stewart, The Ulster Crisis: Resistance to Home Rule, 1912-14,(London, 1969),p. 166
94 Bowman, ‘The Ulster Volunteer Force, 1910-1920:New Perspective’, The Ulster Crisis, (Hampshire, 2006),p.
253

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WhenreviewingwhetherUlsterwouldhave hadthe stomachtoengage inthisrebellion it’s prudent
to lookat the strengthand trainingof theirrecruits. Ina commentarycompiled by F.MacNeice, post
event, he in depthly describes the moral of the UVF,
“In Ulsterit wasindeed a wonderfultime.Every country had its organisation: every town and district
had its own corps.The young manhood of Ulsterenlisted and wentinto training.Men of all ranksand
occupations met together, in the evenings, for drill. There resulted a great comradeship. Barriers of
class were broken down or forgotten. Protestant Ulster became a following” 95
Inevitably the underlined importance unity had in affecting moral, the togetherness of the
community,aidedgreatlyshouldtheyseize Ulster. The ‘force’ numbered 100,000 men presenting a
competentforce,willingtotrainwithsticks to ensure training.After the various gun running events
and weapon purchases, especially at Larne with an additional 25,000 rifles and 5million rounds of
ammunition96
,Ulstercommandedanequippedforced.Althoughdifficulttoobtainexactnumbers of
riflespossessed, Stewardquantified 37,048 rifles97
,however his number represents those returned
for use in WW1, clearly not all rifles were returned. Therefore Ulster could immediately equip
themselves and to seize their territory.
Finally, examining a rather different source from the UWUC in a letter to Carson, this illustrates a
different approach, members requesting visibility of how funds are apportioned. Representing a
shift in the UWUC from normal campaigning to funding the UVF.
“Some of the committee urge that constitutional methods of resisting Home Rule have proved
useless, that force alone can decide the issue and that therefore all funds should be applied to
equipment of the Ulster Volunteer Force... These members would therefore either use all funds
collected in future for the equipment of hospitals or hand them over to the UVF.” 98
95 J. F. MacNeice, Carrickfergus and Its Contacts: Some Chapters in the History of Ulster, (Belfast, 1928),p. 76
96 S. J. Connolly,Oxford Companion to Irish History, (Oxford,2002), p. 317
98 Ulster Women's UnionistCouncil,letter to Carson,'Memorandum for submission to Sir Edward Carson,KC,
MP.’, 10th June, 1914,PRONI: D1507/A/6/6

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For the Council to have an opinion that their funds would be more useful in the hands of the UVF,
highlights that Ulster would have been willing to fight, although not all members agreed. Many
believedthatanelectionshouldbe theirmain goal, and proposed funding “in order to rouse public
opinioninEnglandandScotland.”99
Irrespective,the possibility that council funds applied to direct
militaryspending,thus‘associatethemselveswiththe menof Ulster’tofight H.R.,demonstratedthe
willingness for the majority of Ulster, while rather unwillingly in truth, to fight.
Therefore, with the evidence given, there is no indecisiveness that the crisis, without the
interruption of WW1, that Civil War would have unfolded on the island, beginning with the UVF
securingUlster.Understandablewithatopic of study,there are differingopinions,inP.Hartopinion:
“I do not think the Home Rule Crisis of 1912-14 was even potentially revolutionary. Ulster’s unionists
did raise an army and contemplated a local provisional government but neither intended it
overthrowtheexisting state.Quite the opposite.Even if fighting had broken out…it would have been
little more revolutionary than the standard Belfast riot.”100
Hart viewed these attempts, the drilling and rhetoric directly influenced the political system to
achieve Parliamentagreement.ThoughImustdisagree withHart, itwouldbe highlyunlikely thatthe
rhetoricresultedinariot and not limitedtoBelfast.The Unionist belie, which MacNeice alludes to,
encapsulatedeveryone initsumbrella.A tindersetof anywhere in Ulsterwouldmostly likely set off
the rest of Ulster, similar to the assassination of Franz Ferdinand set off WW1.
1914 was a pivotal year for Ireland; the enthusiasm from the initial announcement had undulated
furtherdepressingrealisation.Irelandwastobe separated,despisedbyeveryone,even those in the
Southwhose resolve had remaineduntil 1914 afterotherH.R. attempts.101
Itwas universalityhated,
althoughnowacceptedasthe onlycompromisingsolution,nevertheless this remained an impasse.
In February 1914, a letter to Carson from C.D'Arcy, summarises the situation: “if it really be
99 Ibid.
100 P. Hart, ‘Defining the Irish Revolution’,in J. Augusteijn, The Irish Revolution 1913-1923,(London, 2002), p.
18
101 Matthew, Gladstone: 1809- 1898,p. 642

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inevitable, then any reasonable compromise which would avert civil war and give Ulster
independence would be far preferable.”102
It no longer seemed viable, Ulster was prepared and
willing to go to war, despite the disbelief of the Nationalist, it would seem that only the events in
Europe saved Ireland from the maelstrom of death which surely would come about otherwise.
102 Letter from Charles F. D'Arcy, Bishop of Down, Connor and Dromore, Culloden, to Carson,12th February
1914,PRONI: D1507/A/5/9

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Chapter 6 - The Great War on Home
Rule
The evening of the 4th
August represents the time when the UK, were at war with Germany. The
implication on the Ulster crisis would be huge, the government could no longer spend time and
effort on an issue, which in the grand scheme would mean nothing, if the war was to go
unfavourably. Foreign Secretary, Edward Grey, stated:
“The one bright spot in the very dreadful situation is Ireland. The position in Ireland – and this I
should like to be clearly understood abroad – is not a consideration among the things we have to
take into account now.” 103
While the war in Europe presented much greater loss of life, with approximately 1million deaths
from the UK, with Irish deaths totalling 27,504 according to D.Fitzgerald,104
it would ensure that
immediate bloodshed would not occur in Ireland. However, the declaration of War did not entail
that the crisis,hadceased,insteaditenteredanew phase,where expectantly the two sides were to
prove their loyalty to the Empire on a battlefield, with promises of concessions after the ‘short’
conflict.
Before we examine the response to WW1, we must understand where the Government of Ireland
Act commenced throughParliament. The outbreakof warsaw Asquithremove the Amendmentbill,
whichperusedpartition,infavourof aSuspensionbill. The Governmentof IrelandAct,alongsidethe
Welsh Church Act 1914, were both placed on hiatus initially until September 1915, but to be
suspended further if hostilities continued. The bills received Royal Assent on the 18th
September
1914, thus in principal H.R. had passed Parliament. The bill also left special provisions for Ulster,
partition of Ireland, to be resolved after conclusion of the war despite the full agreement on
partition not being absolute.
103 T. P. Coogan, Ireland in the 20th Century, (London, 2009), p. 40
104 D. Fitzpatrick,‘Militarismin Ireland,1900–1922’,in T.Bartlet, K. Jeffreys, A Military History of Ireland
(Cambridge, 1996) p. 392

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Upon the passage of the Act the situationwasleftinlimbo.The Unionistswere leftin disarray at the
use of the war as a meansto force the passage of H.R. againsttheirwishes. Although it was passed,
it wasuncertainwhenitwould come into being, even after the war. Ulsterman perceived that H.R.
wouldbe forced upon them, despite the protests of the last two years. The situation was similarly
unpopularforthe nationalists,albeitnotonthe same level. So close was the devolution and now it
was to be put onhold. The war meantfor bothsides,thata new strategy must be adopted ensuring
that the bill adoption, probably after an election, or special provisions remained favouring Ulster.
Apparently both leaders, Carson and Redmond, saw the best approach was to press their claims of
loyaltyandnotuse the war as a bargainingchip.While the Unionist were certainly the quicker, and
the more determined,of the two parties to flock to the battlefield, they had the most to lose from
H.R., thus they had to ensure the Government post war would not forget about their efforts both
pre and post 1914.
The willingness by Carson to show that Ulster was to be loyal and not use the war for political goal
was demonstrated inhisspeechatthe UUC: “England’sdifficultyisnotUlsteropportunity. However
we are treated, and however others act, let us act rightly. We do not seek to purchases terms by
sellingourpatriotism.”105
ToCarson,Ulstermust prove unwavering,nomatter where the bill was in
Parliament.Forexample,torefuse tofightonthe groundsthatthe bill couldbe forceduponthemor
if the Nationalistprovedunwillingtofightwouldonlyhamper their efforts to showcase themselves
as unquestionably loyalty. To do so would undermine the very concept of their argument for a
maintained union, requiring them to fight alongside their British brothers, regardless of any Irish
brother’s refusal.
Returning to the religious aspect D.G.Boyce notes that the war, and to a lesser extent the debate,
was to “construct an English, British, Nationalist, and Protestant parotic alliance”106
binding the
105 Edward Carson, Speech to delegates of the Ulster UnionistCouncil in Belfast,3rd September 1914
106 D. G. Boyce, The Irish Question and British Politics, 1868-1986,(Basingstoke,1988),p. 32

45 | P a g e
Unionisttogetherwith the Protestant Briton in a struggle against the oppressor, being Germany or
the Liberal Home Rulers. Therefore the strategy of unwavering support was the product of
continued attempts proving to politicians and the average Briton that they were the loyalist
members of the Union, sacrificing political goals to serve their country.
While the public face demonstrated unequivocal resolve towards WW1, this does not mean that
suspicion did not exist. Carson promised that they would not use the crisis for political means,
however,the bill wasonlysuspended, meaningthatitremained apossibilityof beingimplemented.
The feelingof distrustwaspalpable,verifiedby W.Spender’slettertoCarson. “If the governmentuse
the mobilisation as a means of advancing Home Rule, I shall have no hesitation in returning to
Belfastwithorwithoutleave.”107
Eventhough itwasEmpire first,andSpenderbeingaCaptain inthe
36th
UlsterDivision, hispositionas QuartermasterGeneral inthe UVF, he would be vital should H.R.
be implemented. Thus Carson could easily call upon allies to resist if absolutely necessary.
Redmond, similarly preachedIrishinvolvement,hisspeechatWoodenbridge outlined the reasoning
for the Irishpeople’sinvolvement. ForJ.J.Lee hisinterpretation andreasoningforenteringthe Great
War wasto recreate a united Ireland. His book illustrates “The logical conclusion of supporting the
war was inthe hope of forginga unionof hearts betweenthe nationalistandUnionist.”108
The grand
struggle wouldhopefully rekindle the brotherlyfeelinglostthroughthe insultingnature of the Ulster
Crisis. In his speech he preaches that Ireland must fight for the, “defence of right, of freedom and
religioninthiswar.”109
He speaks clearly about religion and its impact, attempting to highlight that
the rest of Ireland is in favouring of keeping the liberty of free religion safe. This is part of Lee’s
argument used during the war, and Woodenbridge speech to unify the country. However I am
inclinedtodisagree withLee’sviewonthisissue,forRedmondwasfindingit increasingly difficult to
107 Letter from Wilfrid B.Spender, en route to Chatham Barracks,Chatham,to Carson,1st August 1914,PRONI:
D1507/A/7/1-21
108 Lee, Ireland 1912-1985:Politics and Society, p.23
109 J. Redmond, Speech at Woodenbridge, 20th September 1914

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unify the nationalist cause towards ‘England’s fight’ rather than the Unionist and Nationalists
combined.
Redmond’sattemptsseemedtounderline a unified effort with the Unionist to more of an attempt
keepingthe NationalistgroupstogetherthroughfightingforIrelandinastruggle fornation creation.
Anticipating a short war, he needed to ensure the more radical aspects did not rise up and those
that fought would gain military expertise, undoubtedly useful in blackmailing the British into
upholding their promise. In the very same speech he uses words such as “young Ireland” and in
“reproach to her manhood”110
depicting that H.R. remained a certainty, although Irish people
believed was sinking into the abysses. This was a bold strategy by Redmond, to remain loyal to
England in her hour of need. As The Unionist flocked to volunteer, it remained essential that they
must do the same to save whatever sympathy they could.
We cannotforgetthat at the last election,the Liberalshadamajorityof one,a further election after
the war wouldundoubtedly see H.R. as a primary issue. Therefore committing to fight for Britain in
orderto satisfyandsalvage anysympathyleftbythe Britishpublic,“fordefence of right,of freedom
and of religion.”111
All of whichRedmondwashopingtobringtoIreland.It demonstrated Redmond,
and the majorityof Ireland’s indication of loyalty to the empire, similar to Unionists, was genuine.
Redmondwasgambling on the shortness of the war and the quickness to pass the legislation after
the war. If thisfailed, as it would, the growing sense of discontent would spread like a toxic weed.
Redmond’sunbendingsupportforwar, resulted in many Irish people becoming disillusioned, they
believed he wasbecominganative of Westminsterorworse a puppet,having sold them for a piece
of unguaranteed legislation , even if not doing so would lose all the support/sympathy he had
gained. He was embracing the system which had promised much and given little, therefore it is
110 Ibid.
111 D. Gwynn, The life of John Redmond, (London, 1932), p. 392

47 | P a g e
unsurprising that by the beginning of the war, there was clear opposition against Redmond. WW1
and the betrayal by Redmond was the biggest shift of Ireland’s political change until the grand
change, undertaken after the Easter Rising.
It iswithoutdoubtthat priorto WW1, the imminent passage of the act, despite its misgiving, more
revolutionaryactivityfromfringe groupswascertainlycurtailed. It would be counterproductive, for
groups, in their efforts to gain additional power to Ireland if they engaged on more revolutionary
activities. The conflict and Redmond’s willingness to sacrifice their lives for Britain, without
representation compelled them to detest the wave of volunteers and Redmond.
A clear example of such rising change is E.MacNeill, in a statement shortly after Redmond’s
Woodenbridge speech.The fullstatement, Pages50/51,showcasedhis position and his attempts to
use the National Volunteers,notasa Britishfighting force, instead using them to ensure a National
Government which could declare war itself and not England.
In the statement MacNeill is clear on his, and Ireland’s, position of the war. In point five of six he
states:
“To declare that Ireland cannot, with honour or safety, take part in foreign quarrels otherwise than
through thefree action of a NationalGovernmentof herown;and repudiate the claim of any man to
offer up the blood and lives of the sons of Irishmen and Irish women to the service of the British
Empire.”112
Highlightingthispoint,amongstothers,whyshould Irelandfightforsomeone whom had clearly not
representedtheirwishes?Isthis dissimilartoUlster’scall to resistbeinggovernedfromDublin?They
did not wish to be governed from Westminster and put into wars, in which Ireland had declared
herself. He is also extremely clear to denounce Redmond, for him to side with the British, despite
112 E. MacNeill,Statement to the Irish Volunteers, 24th September, 1914

48 | P a g e
the clear political reasoning, and to use volunteer groups aimed at achieving H.R. for the Empire,
which had not given them concessions, a blatant disregard for the Irish people.
Whilst rare, there is evidence that some Irishmen went to Germany to aid them against their
commonenemy.The source inquestionisastatementbyM.J.Kehoe inhisinvolvement in Germany
in WW1. In his statement he compares his work to Wolfe Tone in attempting to achieve a hostile
landinginIreland.113
Whilstthe reply that no German force would land in ‘neutral Ireland’ he gains
permission to attempt for the “formation of an Irish armed contingent for the sole purpose of
attaining the Independence of Ireland”114
through using captured troops, though with limited
success. As already mentioned, although a small group of individuals when you compared with
MacNeill, whom managed to convince a greater number, it demonstrates a developing situation
which could, and would, shatter Ireland’s peace.
WW1 showed the first real thaw in Ireland’s tensions since the coalition between the IPP and the
Liberals.The warsees the two parties fighting for favour over Britain in a show of loyalty similar to
twosiblingsfightingoveraparent’sattention,althoughthe successfulnessof the twoleaders varied.
The Unionisthad a greatercall of dutytowardsthe empire and her cause, the underlining suspicion
that H.R. would be disingenuously inaugurated whilst they were distracted, never truly left their
minds. NonethelessUlstercontinuedtoshow thattheydeservedtobe a part of the UK, even if that
meant their ‘brothers’ refused.
In contrast,despite Redmond’s best efforts at galvanising the Catholic-Irish people to the cause of
Britain, and to a lesser extent the cause of the Unionists, the growing senses of discontent at the
ConstitutionalNationalism, wasbecomingobvious. While there was no doubt that the vast majority
of Irishmen,in1914, supportedRedmond,orsaw thatWW1 was Ireland’sstruggle, with only 13,000
113 M. J. Kehoe, ‘Witness statement by Lieutenant M. J. Kehoe, The Irish Brigadeof Germany, 1914-1918’,
Bureau of Military History, Document number: 741, p. 3
114 Ibid.,p. 3

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of the 188,000 joining MacNeill from the Redmond115
, the journey towards a more revolutionary
agenda began at WW1.
It was becomingeasiertoconvince people, as was published in the Irish Freedom, that Germany is
not Ireland’s enemy or that Redmond’s “kiss is the kiss of Judas”116
for selling the Volunteers to
England. Redmond initially attempted for the bill to be implemented regardless of the war, his
willingobedience wasarisk,anda risk resultinginhisdownfall.Hiswillingness to be the more loyal
one,against Carson, was against many Irishmen whom he represented. Cracks had appeared since
the willingnesstostrive towardspartition,where it appeared Irelandwas “being treated as a corpse
on a dissectingtable”117
through“legislative dismemberment.”118
Hadthe ‘accident’of the WW1 not
intervened, itislikelythatthe revolutionaryfever,existed after and during the war would remain a
niche part of Irish society not the main stream which engulfed Ireland in 1916 onwards.
115 Lee, Ireland 1912-1985:Politics and Society, p. 22
116 Irish Freedom, September 1914, p. 4 PRONI Reference : D1507/A/8/24
117 The Irish Times, 1st August 1914
118 MacNeill,Statement to the Irish Volunteers, 1914

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Statement to the Irish Volunteers – 24th September 1914 – Eoin MacNeill

51 | P a g e

52 | P a g e
Chapter 7 - Conclusion
Over100 yearsago, Irelandwasgreetedbythe realisticprospectof H.R. and a National government,
which would have control over certain matters, relating to Ireland. This could be the step towards
greaterdevolutionandperhaps dominion status. Obviously the island was not united on this issue
and accordingto the P.M. there existedthose who wished “to thwart and defeat the constitutional
demands of the great majority of their fellow-countrymen.”119
Certainly there were those who
wished nothing less than to thwart this bill and cast it into the realms of history by any means.
Stewartdescribedthe crisisas“the mostbitterpolitical crisisexperiencedinBritainsince the daysof
the Long Parliament”120
itiseasyto understandwhyhe believedthat. The H.R. crisisrepresentedthe
biggestthreatto peace since the English Civil War. Plans for rejection of the bill, even if it meant a
declarationof waragainsta constitutionalgovernment,wastothe extentof the reactionagainst the
bill; the loyalist men in the Empire were willing to fight it.
This crisis is undoubtedly borne out of the Parliament Act, as without this act the Irish reaction to
H.R. wouldbe significantlydifferent.Withoutthe change inlegislative law, it is doubtable that H.R.,
in any form, would have passed. As during the crisis, the stance by the HoLs was unwavering; with
the bill beingrejectedbyanamazing257 majority,121
alsovetoingittwice.Whilstthe HoLsexercised
their power in any way possible, they were ultimately restricted to denying the inevitable. The
evolved state of the HoLs meant that “Unionists could no longer rely on the Upper House to block
the way,”122
therefore Unionistconcluded they must adopt this approach and respond accordingly.
Thus the removal of the HoLs gave the situation a new edge to the controversy enforcing the
Unionist and Ulster to act more aggressively.
119 Asquith, ‘Speech in Dublin’,14th July 1912
120 Stewart, The Ulster Crisis: Resistance to Home Rule, 1912-14,p. 18.
122 Ibid.,p. 197

53 | P a g e
The impact of the H.R. crisis remains remnant today with Unionism still existing, mainly down
religiouslines,inNorthernIreland.Withoutthe galvanisingnature,borne outof this crisis,Unionism
todaywouldpresentadifferentface;andcertainlystruggle to cross class lines prior to the crisis. An
example of this was the Land crisis which pitted Landlords against the peasantry in the previous
century, thus it was unthinkable, in Britain, that rich and poor alike would join forces. Therefore
mergingforcesincondemnationof the proposal,inline with standard political protests, and armed
men, could easily be considered treasonous, created a new Ulster culture. To this day, in the
Republic,there isnoLeinsterorMunsteridentities; the debate created a different culture; it made
Ulsterrecognise theirown identity, different to the south. Unionists had to ensure that their voice
would not be ignored by protests or otherwise.
Protestantism, the main factor in ensuring the movement’s dynamics; naturally it was not
completely split perfectly down Protestantism and Catholicism. In the vast majority of cases, it
defended aperson’sstance greaterthansocial-economicstatus,allowingthe enemyto be visualised
easier. Revisionist pointed towards the economic impact which H.R. would have affected, a major
worryfor the Unionist,especiallyasaresultof the Parliament’seconomicsituation.However,Ulster
Catholics did not fear this in the same way as the Protestants. Also religious fears portrayed in the
UnionistPressaboutRome Rule andthe restrictionof theirbeliefs,hit a greater cord than any other
argument.Thusthe reactionagainst,was amplifiedbythe religiousdifference which existed on the
island.
The Nationalistcrisis,farfrombeing a unified effort on the level of Unionism, was the opportunity
that the island had been waiting for since 1801, the creation of a Parliament leading to greater
future freedom. However, the enthusiasm quickly receded through dissatisfaction and Britain’s
willingnesstosupportUlsterratherthan the majorityof Ireland.Thiswascertainlyinfluencedby the
underestimationof Ulsterresolve;the longerthe crisisdragged on, the more it seemed Ireland was
being torn apart. This resulted in an increase in disillusionment of the system, which had brought

54 | P a g e
H.R. so close butinthe endfailed,causingan increase of revolutionaries, bringing about the Easter
Rising.
The accidentthat WW1 was,saw the greatest cooling of tension for Ireland, no doubt Ulster would
have fought or at least taken control of the Ulster domain. The fighting in Europe was the only
reasonthat this crisisneverevolvedintoa civil war. Instead of fighting each other, Irishmen united
and fought together against the German Empire. While both sides preached togetherness it was
becoming painfully apparent, on the nationalist side, that cracks were appearing.
Overall,the reactionof the Irishpeople canbe splitintotwoparts.The beginning demonstrated the
euphoriaonthe Nationalistsanddetestforthe Unionistsinthe north.The secondhalf of the debate
sees it become increasingly dangerous, both sides unwilling to concede any further, the biggest
consequence beingthe clearandblatantroad tocivil war.We have WW1 to thankfor the avoidance
of bloodshed, however, the crisis brought about the re-emergence of violent nationalism which
would, in turn, bring the largest headache for the British Government, on UK soil, for almost the
entire 20th
century.

55 | P a g e
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