Common in Durban but Differentiated in Paris - ANZSIL
1. COMMON IN DURBAN BUT
DIFFERENTIATED IN PARIS?
Equity under the Durban Platform of climate negotiations
2. OUTLINE
1. Common but differentiated responsibilities
2. Common but differentiated responsibilities 1992-2009
3. The Durban reset: ‘applicable to all’
4. Five options for differentiation in Paris
3. COMMON BUT DIFFERENTIATED
RESPONSIBILITIES
The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and
future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance
with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead
in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.
- UNFCCC, art 3(1)
[…] taking into account [the UNFCCC Parties’] common but differentiated
responsibilities and their specific national and regional development
priorities, objectives and circumstances […]
- UNFCCC, art 4
4. DIFFERENTIATION UNDER THE
KYOTO PROTOCOL
‘In the developed world only two people ride in a car, and yet
you want us to give up riding on a bus.’
- Lead Chinese negotiator, COP 3 in Kyoto, 1997
• Berlin mandate imposed strict firewall of differentiation
• Carried over into Kyoto Protocol
5. DIFFERENTIATION UNDER THE
BALI ACTION PLAN
1. Quantified emissions limitation and reduction objectives
(QELROS) for Annex I Parties
2. Nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAS) for
Non-Annex Parties
6. AN EMERGING GENERAL
PRINCIPLE?
‘14. The obligations of States are common but differentiated.’
- Oslo Principles, 2015
‘In my view, the [common but differentiated responsibilities]
principle is not necessary, and it is not helpful. […] To me, this
notion is nowhere close to being either hard or soft law […]’
- Susan Biniaz, US Department of State, 2002
7. TWO ARCHITECTURES FOR
MITIGATION COMMITMENTS
1. Top down
• Idealised model of Kyoto Protocol
• Protocol sets out each Parties’ commitment
2. Bottom up
• Each Party sets their own target
• Copenhagen Accord and Cancun Agreements
8. THE DURBAN RESET:
APPLICABLE TO ALL
• New process launched.
• Three key points:
1. an agreement ‘with legal force’
2. ‘under the Convention applicable to all Parties’
3. to be agreed in 2015 and implemented from 2020
9. FROM DOHA TO LIMA
• Repeated debates about equity and differentiation
• Without prejudice ‘Intended Nationally Determined
Contribution’ process
• Lima Call for Climate Action confirms Parties’ will be
differentiated – but how?
10. FIVE MODELS IN THE GENEVA
DRAFT TEXT
1. Retain the current Annexes
2. Draft new Annexes
3. Emissions budget and equity reference framework
4. Pledge and formal review
5. Pledge and ‘chat’
11. RETAINING CURRENT
ANNEXES
• Superficially reflects historical responsibility and respective
capabilities
• Eight of the top ten per capita emitters are Non-Annex I
• Grubb: ‘[t]he world has changed much faster than the
UNFCCC’
12. DRAFTING NEW ANNEXES
• Devil would be in the detail
• Proposed by the US in Geneva in February
• Politically impossible
• LMDCs and BASIC oppose
• Russian proposal to amend Annexes stuck in filibuster
13. EMISSIONS BUDGET AND EQUITY
REFERENCE FRAMEWORK
• Proposed by AOSIS
• Ecologically sound in theory
• Diplomatically infeasible
14. PLEDGE AND REVIEW PLUS
• May encourage participation
• Will require compromises, but is a likely landing point
• Blends bottom-up and top-down elements
• Review could be ex ante or ex post
• Can build on existing review models
15. PLEDGE AND ‘CHAT’
‘Parties know best their specific circumstances,
responsibilities, capacities and needs’
- Switzerland, February 2015
• Winkler: ‘very unlikely’ to achieve ultimate objective
• Parties self-assessments unlikely to have ethical basis
• Opposed by G77+China in Geneva,
16. FORECAST FOR PARIS
• One of two pledge and review models
• Need for formalised top down elements
• If Parties cannot agree on review, may collapse into pledge
and chat
17. SUBJECTIVE
DIFFERENTIATION
• Parties’ self assessments unlikely to accord with empirical
evidence
• Likely to lack ambition without review or ratchet up
• So, undercuts both limbs of principle