ArticleInvisible Digital FrontCan Cyber Attacks Shape.docxfestockton
Article
Invisible Digital Front:
Can Cyber Attacks Shape
Battlefield Events?
Nadiya Kostyuk
1
, and Yuri M. Zhukov
1
Abstract
Recent years have seen growing concern over the use of cyber attacks in wartime,
but little evidence that these new tools of coercion can change battlefield events.
We present the first quantitative analysis of the relationship between cyber activities
and physical violence during war. Using new event data from the armed conflict in
Ukraine—and additional data from Syria’s civil war—we analyze the dynamics of
cyber attacks and find that such activities have had little or no impact on fighting. In
Ukraine—one of the first armed conflicts where both sides deployed such tools
extensively—cyber activities failed to compel discernible changes in battlefield
behavior. Indeed, hackers on both sides have had difficulty responding to battlefield
events, much less shaping them. An analysis of conflict dynamics in Syria produces
similar results: the timing of cyber actions is independent of fighting on the ground.
Our finding—that cyber attacks are not (yet) effective as tools of coercion in war—
has potentially significant implications for other armed conflicts with a digital front.
Keywords
compellence, coercion, physical violence, conflict, cyber attacks
On December 23, 2015, hackers attacked Ukraine’s power grid, disabling control
systems used to coordinate remote electrical substations, and leaving people in the
capital and western part of the country without power for several hours. The Security
1Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
Corresponding Author:
Nadiya Kostyuk, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, 505 S State Street, Ann Arbor,
MI 48109, USA.
Email: [email protected]
Journal of Conflict Resolution
2019, Vol. 63(2) 317-347
ª The Author(s) 2017
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/0022002717737138
journals.sagepub.com/home/jcr
https://sagepub.com/journals-permissions
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717737138
http://journals.sagepub.com/home/jcr
http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1177%2F0022002717737138&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2017-11-10
Service of Ukraine (SBU) blamed the Russian government for the cyber attack, an
accusation that later found support in malware analysis by a private computer
security firm. The Ukrainian hack was the first publicly acknowledged case of a
cyber attack successfully causing a power outage. It is also just one of thousands of
cyber activities, mostly diffuse and low level, that have occurred alongside physical
fighting in Ukraine. Attacks launched through the digital realm are playing an
increasingly visible role in civil and interstate conflict—in Ukraine, Syria, Israel,
Estonia, Georgia, and beyond. Yet it remains unknown whether such activities have
a real coercive impact on the battlefield.
1
Recent years have seen growing concern over the coercive potential ...
The document discusses the United States' current cyber strategy and whether it supports offensive cyber operations. It analyzes several scholarly articles on cyber warfare doctrine and strategy. While the articles provide examples of states conducting offensive cyber attacks, the document's hypothesis is that the US cyber strategy focuses on defense and does not explicitly support offensive computer network attacks to achieve national security objectives. The purpose is to examine US cyber strategy and determine if it should incorporate offensive operations to help achieve national goals.
Cyber Operation Planning and Operational Design_YayımlandıGovernment
This document discusses adapting cyber operations to operational design and planning processes. It proposes a "cyber operational design" model to help cyber and military planners comprehensively understand complex cyber incidents and plan preventative approaches. The document outlines operational planning and the military decision making process (MDMP), and provides samples of how cyber factor analysis and identification of a cyber center of gravity could fit into these processes. The goal is to help planners understand cyber operations complexity and leverage analytical planning tools to improve technical personnel's understanding of operational planning.
1Running head CYBERWARCYBER WAR9Outstanding title.docxfelicidaddinwoodie
1
Running head: CYBERWAR
CYBER WAR
9
Outstanding title page formatting
Cyber War
Name
University
Professor
04/28/2018
Introduction Cyber War
Cyber warfare refers to a computer or network-based conflict that disrupts the activities of a state or
organization by deliberate attacking critical infrastructures. Cyber attacks can also be described as an attack by hostile groups such as terrorist or hacker groups aimed, at furthering the goals of a given nation. To have a better understanding, cyber warfare can take different forms such as; viruses that can take down water supplies, military systems, transportation systems, hacking and theft of critical data from government and private institutions. This paper will focus on assessing various mechanism applied in different articles to counter cybersecurity and protect critical infrastructure. Further, by analyzing the results and experience in Xia, Becerra-Fernandez, Gudi, & Rocha-Mier (2011), the essay will also show how
the findings can be utilized in real life scenario.
1. What do the articles have in common?
According to Clemente (2011), the advancement of interconnection between different infrastructures sectors has boosted by the escalation of cyberspace. The author points out that the security
implications are inevitable especially in this era of cyberspace and infrastructure. The main idea in the article involves around the definition of ‘critical’ infrastructure to enable effective prioritization and protection of nodes and connection points. FEMA (2013
), points out that the United States well being relies upon secure critical infrastructure that forms American society. According to Saadawi, & Jordan
, (2011), there is need to establish an international cyber union that will help overcome cybersecurity challenges in securing cyberinfrastructure. This article considers the practical considerations that are associated with EINSTEIN 3 and how this can be used to ensure effective protection of critical infrastructure networks. Having evaluated the main argument of these articles, they all share the aspect of understanding cybersecurity and different ways ensuring infrastructure protection.
2. What are the differences in their assessment of cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection?
The above articles portray some distinction in their evaluation of cyber war and protection of vital infrastructure. The first article by Clemente (2011), tries to examine how cybersecurity challenges can be overcome by understanding various components in society. The article offers more theoretical approaches to counterattack cybersecurity and protection of critical infrastructures. The second article by FEMA (2013
) is more detailed and comprehensive on the issue of cybersecurity and protection of critical infrastructures in the society. For instance, it offers a plan that will require a federal agency (SSA) to lead a coordinated process for vital infrastructure security within criti ...
Why Great Powers Launch Destructive Cyber Operations and What to Do About It ...Snarky Security
Here we have the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), those paragons of geopolitical insight, serving up a dish of the obvious with a side of "tell me something I don't know" in their publication. It's a riveting tale of how big, bad countries flex their digital muscles to wreak havoc on the less fortunate. The whole DGAP article looks like a story about a midlife crisis: with the cybersecurity aspects of smart cities and the existential fear of technological addiction. To enhance the effect, they link cyberwarfare and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and here we learn that great powers launch cyberattacks for the same reasons they do anything else: power, money, other things everyone loves. And of course, the author decided to hype and remind about the role of machine learning in cyber operations.
The document discusses two articles related to cybercrime issues. The first article examines the possibility of establishing an international agreement or declaration for cyberspace to address cyber conflict and retaliation. The second article analyzes the legal and technical uncertainties surrounding strategic retaliatory countermeasures to cyber attacks for both nation-states and private entities. It discusses challenges in attributing attacks and risks of escalation, as well as limitations of applying international laws on use of force to the digital domain. The document also provides background on debates around active defense strategies following large-scale cyber attacks.
Is 2014 the year for Cyber Militias ?
Examination of the Congressional mandate for the Pentagon to address the use of cyber militias in responding to cyber warfare. Is a network breach and act of war?
Cybersecurity
Description: Protecting against damage to, unauthorized use of, and/or malicious exploitation of (and, if needed, the restoration of) electronic communications systems and services (and the information contained therein).
Cybersecurity activities ensure the security, reliability, integrity, and availability of critical information, records, and communications systems and services through collaborative cybersecurity initiatives and efforts. These activities also include procedures to detect malicious activity and to conduct technical and investigative-based countermeasures, mitigation activities, and operations against malicious actors to counter existing and emerging cyber-based threats, consistent with established protocols.
Russia is conducting information operations alongside its conventional military operations in the war with Ukraine. These operations include psychological operations, cyber warfare, and disinformation campaigns using social media, telecommunications, mass media, and the internet. Russia views cyberspace as part of the broader information environment that must be controlled to gain information superiority. It has reorganized its cyber units into information operations forces capable of supporting information activities through cyberspace, and incorporated hacktivist groups to augment its technical capabilities and conduct influence operations. Russia's operations involve initial network penetration, data-deleting malware attacks, DDoS attacks, website defacement, and disinformation targeting Russian, Ukrainian, European, and American audiences.
ArticleInvisible Digital FrontCan Cyber Attacks Shape.docxfestockton
Article
Invisible Digital Front:
Can Cyber Attacks Shape
Battlefield Events?
Nadiya Kostyuk
1
, and Yuri M. Zhukov
1
Abstract
Recent years have seen growing concern over the use of cyber attacks in wartime,
but little evidence that these new tools of coercion can change battlefield events.
We present the first quantitative analysis of the relationship between cyber activities
and physical violence during war. Using new event data from the armed conflict in
Ukraine—and additional data from Syria’s civil war—we analyze the dynamics of
cyber attacks and find that such activities have had little or no impact on fighting. In
Ukraine—one of the first armed conflicts where both sides deployed such tools
extensively—cyber activities failed to compel discernible changes in battlefield
behavior. Indeed, hackers on both sides have had difficulty responding to battlefield
events, much less shaping them. An analysis of conflict dynamics in Syria produces
similar results: the timing of cyber actions is independent of fighting on the ground.
Our finding—that cyber attacks are not (yet) effective as tools of coercion in war—
has potentially significant implications for other armed conflicts with a digital front.
Keywords
compellence, coercion, physical violence, conflict, cyber attacks
On December 23, 2015, hackers attacked Ukraine’s power grid, disabling control
systems used to coordinate remote electrical substations, and leaving people in the
capital and western part of the country without power for several hours. The Security
1Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
Corresponding Author:
Nadiya Kostyuk, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, 505 S State Street, Ann Arbor,
MI 48109, USA.
Email: [email protected]
Journal of Conflict Resolution
2019, Vol. 63(2) 317-347
ª The Author(s) 2017
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/0022002717737138
journals.sagepub.com/home/jcr
https://sagepub.com/journals-permissions
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717737138
http://journals.sagepub.com/home/jcr
http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1177%2F0022002717737138&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2017-11-10
Service of Ukraine (SBU) blamed the Russian government for the cyber attack, an
accusation that later found support in malware analysis by a private computer
security firm. The Ukrainian hack was the first publicly acknowledged case of a
cyber attack successfully causing a power outage. It is also just one of thousands of
cyber activities, mostly diffuse and low level, that have occurred alongside physical
fighting in Ukraine. Attacks launched through the digital realm are playing an
increasingly visible role in civil and interstate conflict—in Ukraine, Syria, Israel,
Estonia, Georgia, and beyond. Yet it remains unknown whether such activities have
a real coercive impact on the battlefield.
1
Recent years have seen growing concern over the coercive potential ...
The document discusses the United States' current cyber strategy and whether it supports offensive cyber operations. It analyzes several scholarly articles on cyber warfare doctrine and strategy. While the articles provide examples of states conducting offensive cyber attacks, the document's hypothesis is that the US cyber strategy focuses on defense and does not explicitly support offensive computer network attacks to achieve national security objectives. The purpose is to examine US cyber strategy and determine if it should incorporate offensive operations to help achieve national goals.
Cyber Operation Planning and Operational Design_YayımlandıGovernment
This document discusses adapting cyber operations to operational design and planning processes. It proposes a "cyber operational design" model to help cyber and military planners comprehensively understand complex cyber incidents and plan preventative approaches. The document outlines operational planning and the military decision making process (MDMP), and provides samples of how cyber factor analysis and identification of a cyber center of gravity could fit into these processes. The goal is to help planners understand cyber operations complexity and leverage analytical planning tools to improve technical personnel's understanding of operational planning.
1Running head CYBERWARCYBER WAR9Outstanding title.docxfelicidaddinwoodie
1
Running head: CYBERWAR
CYBER WAR
9
Outstanding title page formatting
Cyber War
Name
University
Professor
04/28/2018
Introduction Cyber War
Cyber warfare refers to a computer or network-based conflict that disrupts the activities of a state or
organization by deliberate attacking critical infrastructures. Cyber attacks can also be described as an attack by hostile groups such as terrorist or hacker groups aimed, at furthering the goals of a given nation. To have a better understanding, cyber warfare can take different forms such as; viruses that can take down water supplies, military systems, transportation systems, hacking and theft of critical data from government and private institutions. This paper will focus on assessing various mechanism applied in different articles to counter cybersecurity and protect critical infrastructure. Further, by analyzing the results and experience in Xia, Becerra-Fernandez, Gudi, & Rocha-Mier (2011), the essay will also show how
the findings can be utilized in real life scenario.
1. What do the articles have in common?
According to Clemente (2011), the advancement of interconnection between different infrastructures sectors has boosted by the escalation of cyberspace. The author points out that the security
implications are inevitable especially in this era of cyberspace and infrastructure. The main idea in the article involves around the definition of ‘critical’ infrastructure to enable effective prioritization and protection of nodes and connection points. FEMA (2013
), points out that the United States well being relies upon secure critical infrastructure that forms American society. According to Saadawi, & Jordan
, (2011), there is need to establish an international cyber union that will help overcome cybersecurity challenges in securing cyberinfrastructure. This article considers the practical considerations that are associated with EINSTEIN 3 and how this can be used to ensure effective protection of critical infrastructure networks. Having evaluated the main argument of these articles, they all share the aspect of understanding cybersecurity and different ways ensuring infrastructure protection.
2. What are the differences in their assessment of cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection?
The above articles portray some distinction in their evaluation of cyber war and protection of vital infrastructure. The first article by Clemente (2011), tries to examine how cybersecurity challenges can be overcome by understanding various components in society. The article offers more theoretical approaches to counterattack cybersecurity and protection of critical infrastructures. The second article by FEMA (2013
) is more detailed and comprehensive on the issue of cybersecurity and protection of critical infrastructures in the society. For instance, it offers a plan that will require a federal agency (SSA) to lead a coordinated process for vital infrastructure security within criti ...
Why Great Powers Launch Destructive Cyber Operations and What to Do About It ...Snarky Security
Here we have the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), those paragons of geopolitical insight, serving up a dish of the obvious with a side of "tell me something I don't know" in their publication. It's a riveting tale of how big, bad countries flex their digital muscles to wreak havoc on the less fortunate. The whole DGAP article looks like a story about a midlife crisis: with the cybersecurity aspects of smart cities and the existential fear of technological addiction. To enhance the effect, they link cyberwarfare and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and here we learn that great powers launch cyberattacks for the same reasons they do anything else: power, money, other things everyone loves. And of course, the author decided to hype and remind about the role of machine learning in cyber operations.
The document discusses two articles related to cybercrime issues. The first article examines the possibility of establishing an international agreement or declaration for cyberspace to address cyber conflict and retaliation. The second article analyzes the legal and technical uncertainties surrounding strategic retaliatory countermeasures to cyber attacks for both nation-states and private entities. It discusses challenges in attributing attacks and risks of escalation, as well as limitations of applying international laws on use of force to the digital domain. The document also provides background on debates around active defense strategies following large-scale cyber attacks.
Is 2014 the year for Cyber Militias ?
Examination of the Congressional mandate for the Pentagon to address the use of cyber militias in responding to cyber warfare. Is a network breach and act of war?
Cybersecurity
Description: Protecting against damage to, unauthorized use of, and/or malicious exploitation of (and, if needed, the restoration of) electronic communications systems and services (and the information contained therein).
Cybersecurity activities ensure the security, reliability, integrity, and availability of critical information, records, and communications systems and services through collaborative cybersecurity initiatives and efforts. These activities also include procedures to detect malicious activity and to conduct technical and investigative-based countermeasures, mitigation activities, and operations against malicious actors to counter existing and emerging cyber-based threats, consistent with established protocols.
Russia is conducting information operations alongside its conventional military operations in the war with Ukraine. These operations include psychological operations, cyber warfare, and disinformation campaigns using social media, telecommunications, mass media, and the internet. Russia views cyberspace as part of the broader information environment that must be controlled to gain information superiority. It has reorganized its cyber units into information operations forces capable of supporting information activities through cyberspace, and incorporated hacktivist groups to augment its technical capabilities and conduct influence operations. Russia's operations involve initial network penetration, data-deleting malware attacks, DDoS attacks, website defacement, and disinformation targeting Russian, Ukrainian, European, and American audiences.
International Standards to Regulate Aggressive Cyber-behavior from a Foreign ...Mansoor Faridi, CISA
This document discusses the need for international standards to regulate aggressive cyber behavior by foreign states. It provides background on how cyber warfare has become an effective new form of attack that lacks regulation. Current frameworks fail to fully address the issue as they focus on individuals rather than states. The document argues that comprehensive global standards are needed, but developing and implementing them faces challenges that require a collaborative effort between nations. It provides recommendations for a roadmap to establish centralized institutions to design, develop, enforce and prosecute violations of new international cyber standards.
The document summarizes a policy analysis paper that examines the nature of cyber conflict between states from 2000 to 2016. It finds that while cyber operations have not generally led to escalation, recent policy shifts in the US under the Trump administration increase the risk of inadvertent escalation. Specifically, the paper argues that adopting an offensive cyber strategy based on preemption is dangerous and counterproductive, as cyberspace has primarily involved covert operations for political signaling rather than direct attacks. The analysis recommends a more restrained defensive approach focused on intelligence sharing and hardening systems.
Running head METHODS USED IN CYBER WARFARE1METHODS USED IN CYB.docxglendar3
Running head: METHODS USED IN CYBER WARFARE 1
METHODS USED IN CYBER WARFARE 2
Salina Khadgi
Professor Creider
5th April , 2020
Methods used in cyber warfare and cyber attack
Thesis: There are diverse methods that various people or nations, for a set of diverse reasons, can damage computers or information networks.
I. Introduction
II. Types of cyber attacks Comment by R Daniel Creider: A, B, and C should not be part of the introduction.
A. Espionage
B. Sabotage
C. Propaganda
D. Economic disruption
E. Surprise Cyber Attack
III. Methods used in Cyber Attacks
F. Denial-of-service (DoS)
G. Phishing and spear phishing attacks
H. SQL injection attack
I. Drive-by attacks
J. Man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack
K. Password attacks
L. Malware attack
M. Eavesdropping attack
IV. Motivators for cyber attacks
N. Military
O. Civil
P. Private sector
Q. Non-profit Research
V. Preparedness
VI. Cyber counterintelligence
Methods used in Cyber warfare and cyber attacks
Just like other warfare, Cyber warfare is a digital war where computer viruses are sent instead of army and hacking into database with the aim to create damages and destruction. With the increasing use of computer and technology in almost every field obstruction of data can be a bigger war than an actual war. Acquiring sensitive data about a country, business, person or anything that relies in computational functions are in risk if the data is lost which can cause metamorphosis of a certain company that relies hugely on computer. There are diverse methods that various people or nations, for a set of diverse reasons, can damage computers or information network. Cyber-attack is a broad picture of cyber warfare, similar types of methods are used in cyber warfare and cyber-attack. When a nation’s database or the system of one of its branches is attacked for war reasons or for manipulation, the term cyber warfare is used. Comment by R Daniel Creider: Why is this text in bold?
You need both an abstract and an introduction.
You should have place holders in the draft to indicate that those sections of the paper have not been written.
Cyberwarfare is, therefore, a long period of cyberattacks carried out now and then, and at some point, it includes traditional military actions between countries. The fact, however, is that to date, the actual act hasn't taken place. But many states have had an eye for an eye military-cyber action, and a good example is the cyber-attack launched by the US against the Iranian Weapons as retaliation for US drone Iranian shot down. This paper looks at the primary methods used in cyber warfare and cyber-attacks.
The increasing technology is not causing mass destruction to business organizations, but to critical government agencies to. Cyberattacks and cyberwarfare are at the center of every threat that information technology possesses to the government agencies. Those running the ICT sector as experts still have several debates as per the actual meaning/definition of cyberwarf.
Running head METHODS USED IN CYBER WARFARE1METHODS USED IN CYB.docxtodd581
Running head: METHODS USED IN CYBER WARFARE 1
METHODS USED IN CYBER WARFARE 2
Salina Khadgi
Professor Creider
5th April , 2020
Methods used in cyber warfare and cyber attack
Thesis: There are diverse methods that various people or nations, for a set of diverse reasons, can damage computers or information networks.
I. Introduction
II. Types of cyber attacks Comment by R Daniel Creider: A, B, and C should not be part of the introduction.
A. Espionage
B. Sabotage
C. Propaganda
D. Economic disruption
E. Surprise Cyber Attack
III. Methods used in Cyber Attacks
F. Denial-of-service (DoS)
G. Phishing and spear phishing attacks
H. SQL injection attack
I. Drive-by attacks
J. Man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack
K. Password attacks
L. Malware attack
M. Eavesdropping attack
IV. Motivators for cyber attacks
N. Military
O. Civil
P. Private sector
Q. Non-profit Research
V. Preparedness
VI. Cyber counterintelligence
Methods used in Cyber warfare and cyber attacks
Just like other warfare, Cyber warfare is a digital war where computer viruses are sent instead of army and hacking into database with the aim to create damages and destruction. With the increasing use of computer and technology in almost every field obstruction of data can be a bigger war than an actual war. Acquiring sensitive data about a country, business, person or anything that relies in computational functions are in risk if the data is lost which can cause metamorphosis of a certain company that relies hugely on computer. There are diverse methods that various people or nations, for a set of diverse reasons, can damage computers or information network. Cyber-attack is a broad picture of cyber warfare, similar types of methods are used in cyber warfare and cyber-attack. When a nation’s database or the system of one of its branches is attacked for war reasons or for manipulation, the term cyber warfare is used. Comment by R Daniel Creider: Why is this text in bold?
You need both an abstract and an introduction.
You should have place holders in the draft to indicate that those sections of the paper have not been written.
Cyberwarfare is, therefore, a long period of cyberattacks carried out now and then, and at some point, it includes traditional military actions between countries. The fact, however, is that to date, the actual act hasn't taken place. But many states have had an eye for an eye military-cyber action, and a good example is the cyber-attack launched by the US against the Iranian Weapons as retaliation for US drone Iranian shot down. This paper looks at the primary methods used in cyber warfare and cyber-attacks.
The increasing technology is not causing mass destruction to business organizations, but to critical government agencies to. Cyberattacks and cyberwarfare are at the center of every threat that information technology possesses to the government agencies. Those running the ICT sector as experts still have several debates as per the actual meaning/definition of cyberwarf.
The document analyzes the 2001 cyber attacks between the United States and China following a collision between a U.S. plane and Chinese fighter jet. Chinese hackers began attacking U.S. websites in protest, and U.S. hackers retaliated, launching a 7-day cyber battle. The attacks involved web defacement, viruses, and DDoS attacks targeting government websites. Both sides were motivated by patriotism and tensions between the countries. The U.S. responded defensively while China took a more offensive approach. The attacks exposed vulnerabilities in how each country approached cyber defense and deterrence at the time.
HOW REVERSIBILITY DIFFERENTIATES CYBER FROM KINETIC WARFARE: A CASE STUDY IN ...ijsptm
A pair of attacks on energy sector assets offers a unique opportunity to better understand the differences in
impact from cyber and kinetic warfare. A review of the 2021 cyber attack on Colonial Pipeline and the
missile strike on the Syvash wind farm demonstrates the principle of reversibility in action, particularly in
regard to the short-lived nature of cyber attacks. Within the context of security and strategy, particularly at
the cyber/energy security nexus, this means that traditional state security thinking needs to evolve to
address threats in the cyber domain rather than try to retrofit dated strategies. The two cases compared
offer lessons that can be applied more broadly in the formation of state-level cyber and energy strategic
thinking, ultimately improving resilience and the appropriateness of protection.
6APPLYING GENEVA CONVENTION STRATEGIES TOWARDS ACCOMPL.docxalinainglis
6
APPLYING GENEVA CONVENTION STRATEGIES TOWARDS ACCOMPLISHING CYBER PEACE
December 17, 2017
INTRODUCTION
The emergence of technology and its steady advancement has greatly impacted aspects of individuals, business, and institutional activities. The discovery technology has been felt in different aspects of the economy one notable impact is cyberspace – "a notional environment under which communication occurs with the use of computer networks and systems." [footnoteRef:1] Cyberspace, which is as a result of the internet, an element of technology, has seen information sharing take place, millions of money being transacted over computer networks, business deals struck and much more. All these benefits of cyberspace have attracted criminal, known in the cyber world as cybercriminals, who have, and continue to negatively impact the use of the internet in a variety of creative and innovative ways. There also have been rising cases of cyber warfare between countries that have been causing major worries among global cybersecurity professionals. In an attempt to minimize and solve the issues cyber threats and cybercrimes, several studies have been conducted to discover and create ways of curbing the problem. However, a majority of these studies have failed to acknowledge that the problem has gone global.[footnoteRef:2] However, no studies have been conducted on how to settle for cyber peace by incorporating Geneva convention to creating a treaty specifically for cyberspace. Therefore, the paper will explore how to achieve peace in the cyberspace by exploring the possibilities of treaties on cyberspace by Geneva convention. [1: David Smahel and Kristian Daneback, "Editorial: Researching Bright And Dark Sides Of The Cyberspace," Cyberpsychology: Journal of Psychosocial Research on Cyberspace 7, no. 3 (2013).] [2: Filippo PARODI, "The Concept Of Cybercrime And Online Threats Analysis," International Journal of Information Security and Cybercrime 2, no. 1 (2013): 59-66.]
Statement of the Problem
The growth of cyberspace due to the effect of globalization has turned cybercrime and cyber attacks to one of the major talked about concerns across the globe. Cybercrimes has evolved to become a form of terrorism with major security agencies and institutions such as Homeland Security being victims of the attack. With such agencies with an immeasurable amount of security system and responsible for the safety of people and resources being non-immune to such attacks puts enterprises and individuals at a greater risk. Consequently, cyberspace has seen countries attack each other over computer networks. The severity of the problem has proven other measures such as confronting cyber attackers ineffective thus the need to change the strategies employed to solve the problem. The worst part is that close to 74% of global business expected to be hacked each year with estimations of economic losses amounting to cybercrimes totaling to $3 trillion by the year.
This document discusses key terms related to information security and their interpretations in English, Chinese, and Russian. While English terms like "information space", "cyberspace", "information warfare", and "cyber warfare" focus on the technological aspects, their Chinese and Russian equivalents place more emphasis on the human/mental dimensions. Specifically, Russia and China see the mind and information systems as essential components of information security, unlike the US which separates cybersecurity from the human element. This highlights fundamental differences in how these countries approach and understand information security.
1. Cyberspace is a new operational field of confrontation analogous to physical spaces like land, sea and air that was created by extensive use of technology and the internet.
2. In cyberspace, threats can arise from individuals, groups or states and allow for attacks on critical information infrastructures without heavy resources or risking human lives.
3. Cyberspace provides an environment for covert warfare where attacks can be conducted anonymously and attribution is difficult, making it a low-cost strategic weapon that is difficult to defend against.
CJ513Unit 3 DQTopic #1The Definition of CyberterrorismDiVinaOconner450
CJ513
Unit 3 DQ
Topic #1
The Definition of Cyberterrorism
Discuss the current debate surrounding the definition of cyberterrorism. Why is there no common definition? What are some of the challenges associated with establishing a common definition? Provide examples of two competing definitions of cyberterrorism from different sources and discuss the differences between the definitions. What are the implications of these differences? Be sure to properly cite and reference sources used
Topic #1: Student Response #1(Respond to Joe)
Joe Cacioppo
Good evening class,
This was an interesting topic to research and had not given much thought to the nuances in defining and making a distinction between cyberterrorism and cybercrime. I was also surprised to hear there was not a common definition of cyberterrorism. I reviewed the United States Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation website and found an article written by Tafoya (2011), who defined cyberterrorism as “the intimidation of civilian enterprise through the use of high technology to bring about political, religious, or ideological aims, actions that result in disabling or deleting critical infrastructure data or information.”
An alternate definition according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) defined cyberterrorism as, ““the use of computer network tools to shut down critical national infrastructures (e.g., energy, transportation, government operations) or to coerce or intimidate a government or civilian population.” (Tafoya, 2011.)
In comparing the two different definitions given, the similarities include the use of technology to coerce or intimidate to produce a change. The differences in the FBI definition have a better defined group of targeted populations for change, for example political, religious or ideological change. I have not seen an implication between the differences in the two given definitions. The end result, and the methods for cyberterrorism is similar.
Additional research on cyberterrorism described the activity as any premeditated, politically motivated attack against information systems, programs and data that results in violence against noncombatant targets by subnational groups of clandestine agents, (Hanna, et. al., nd.)
References:
Hanna, H.T., Ferguson, K, Rosencrance, L. (nd.) Techtarget network. Cyberterrorism. https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/cyberterrorism
Tafoya, W.L. 2011. The United States Department of Justice. Cyber Terror. https://leb.fbi.gov/articles/featured-articles/cyber-terror
Topic #1: Student Response #2(Respond to Elizabeth)
Elizabeth Stuart
Cyberterrorism, while understood by some on a basic level, remains an elusive concept to many. There is no agreed upon definition in academia or government for this term. Due to this, it can be difficult to pinpoint what exactly constitutes cyberterrorism. In their article, Klein (2018) utilized a definition by Denning (2000), who described cyber ...
61Shackelford & Bohm - Securing North American Critical Infrasimisterchristen
61Shackelford & Bohm - Securing North American Critical Infrastructure
Securing North American Critical
Infrastructure:
A Comparative Case Study in
Cybersecurity Regulation
Scott J. Shackelford, J.D., Ph.D. * & Zachery Bohm**
Abstract: The United States and Canada are interdependent along a number of
dimensions, such as their mutual reliance on shared critical infrastructure. As a result,
regulatory efforts aimed at securing critical infrastructure in one nation impact the other,
including in the cybersecurity context. This article explores one such innovation in the
form of the 2014 National Institute for Standards and Technology (“NIST”)
Cybersecurity Framework. It reviews the evolution of the NIST Framework, comparing
and contrasting it with ongoing Canadian efforts to secure vulnerable critical
infrastructure against cyber threats. Its purpose is to discover North American governance
trends that could impact wider debates about the appropriate role of the public and private
sectors in enhancing cybersecurity.
Ta b l e of C o n t e n t s
I. Introduction........................................................................................................... 61
II. Unpacking the Cyber Threat Affecting North American Critical
Infrastructure............................................................................................................ 63
III. U.S. Approaches to Securing Critical Infrastructure: Enter the NIST
Framework............................................................................................................... 65
IV. An Introduction to Canadian Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity Law
and Policy................................................................................................................. 66
V. Conclusion........................................................................................................... 69
I. In t r o d u c t io n
Neither the United States nor Canada is a stranger to cyber attacks. These
have increasingly targeted both the private and public sectors to steal valuable
intellectual property, such as state and trade secrets. In one instance, the
Canadian government reported a major cyber attack in 2011 that forced the
Finance Department and Treasury Board, Canada’s main economic agencies, to
disconnect from the Internet.1 Hundreds of systems within the United States
* Assistant Professor of Business Law and Ethics, Indiana University; Senior Fellow, Indiana
University Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research; W. Glenn Campbell and Rita Ricardo-
Campbell National Fellow, Stanford University Hoover Institution.
** Senior, Indiana University School of Public and Environmental Affairs.
62 CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40, 2016]
Department of Commerce have similarly been forced offline due to cyber attacks
in recent years.” In total, more than 40 million global cyber attacks were reported
in 2014, representing a nearly 50% increas ...
Microsoft Digital Defense Report 2022.pdfNirenj George
The document is Microsoft's 2022 Digital Defense Report which provides an overview of the cyber threat landscape based on Microsoft's data and insights from July 2021 through June 2022. It covers topics like the state of cybercrime, nation state threats, devices and infrastructure vulnerabilities, cyber influence operations, and cyber resilience. The introduction notes the significant increase in sophisticated cyberattacks by both cybercriminals and nation states, and the importance of cybersecurity best practices and partnerships to improve the security of the digital ecosystem.
This research report studies the economic impact that Cyber Security attacks have on society as a whole. The aim of this analysis is to examine the negative and positive impact of these compromises on multiple entities. Our descriptive analysis focuses on individuals, private and public organizations, costs, revenues, innovations, and jobs to determine if proliferation's of these attacks are either, negative or positive. Although this
paper draws upon the economic factors as result of cyber-attacks, it looks at the outlay in its historical context of capital expenditures to private and public organizations due to the increased number of compromises and factors of this paradigm helping to fuel the growth of innovations or spawn a new industry as a whole.
This document analyzes the economic impacts of cyber attacks on entities worldwide. It examines both the negative and positive impacts on individuals, organizations, costs, revenues, innovations, and jobs. While cyber attacks impose costs on targeted entities, they may also spur growth in cybersecurity and related industries. The paper aims to determine whether the overall economic effects of cyber attacks are more positive or negative. It reviews literature on defining cyber attacks and security, the history of attacks, and methods for analyzing economic impacts through cost-benefit analysis.
Research in Information Security and Information Warfare- The economics, warf...Quinnipiac University
These days, Information Security and Information Warfare are now looked upon as a very important and vital concept among various military organizations. Since the revolution of this concept in military science is viewed as a major reformation regarding the technology utilized; military leaders believe that this technology and more specifically, the information: gives an advantage in military training, strategy, tactics, and organization, leaving no reason to believe otherwise on how technology impacts a nation‟s army. In this research paper, we will examine a deeper understanding of Information Security and Information Warfare; the economics, warfare, features, policies, and even some common technical aspects on why Information Security is so vital to one, to an organization, to a nation.
This document provides background information on cyber security and examines the potential trade-off between cooperation on cyber security and the proliferation of cyber weapons. It discusses how states' increasing reliance on cyber infrastructure has created new vulnerabilities that can be exploited by cyber weapons. The document also explores the proliferation problem posed by cyber weapons as their code can easily spread and be reused by others. It argues there may be a fundamental choice between cooperating to improve cyber security, which requires disclosure of vulnerabilities, and developing cyber weapons, which relies on keeping vulnerabilities secret. The proliferation of cyber weapons could thus undermine prospects for international cooperation on cyber security.
MASINT (Measurement and Signature Intelligence) uses scientific and technical methods to collect strategic and tactical intelligence. It builds models to aid decision-making but can be complicated to apply quickly. In 2004, President Bush established the Commission on Intelligence Capabilities to review intelligence functions after 9/11. The commission found 74 areas needing reform, and 71 were addressed in the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. This act established a director of national intelligence and improved information sharing. MASINT now plays a role in countering global terrorism by tracking networks and using enemies' own technology against them.
Insurgents in motion: Counterinsurgency and insurgency relocation in IraqUNU-MERIT
http://youtu.be/zqcM1jE_BoY
Recent studies in general are positive regarding the effectiveness of US counterinsurgency programs in Iraq. The right mix of coercion, ethnic strategy, and public goods provision, it is argued, makes Iraqis less likely to rebel against the US army and the Iraqi government, thus reducing insurgent violence. In fact, the number of insurgent attacks dramatically declined shortly after the change in the counterinsurgency strategy in 2007. How robust is the positive finding? A common assumption behind previous analyses is that insurgent attacks have a strong local root and is unlikely to be reproduced in other areas. Violation of this spatial independence assumption, however, can potentially bias towards the positive result. Based on the novel spatial dynamic panel data (SDPD) model, my analysis shows that spatial dependence should be addressed and cannot be assumed away. Results based on the new model also reveal that, conditional upon other strategies, the effects of a counterinsurgency strategy vary considerably both in magnitude and direction, suggesting that some policy mixes could be counterproductive. Policy makers seeking to adopt similar strategies in Afghanistan should take the relocation into account in their policy evaluations.
Read Chapter 3. Answer the following questions1.Wha.docxShiraPrater50
Read Chapter 3
.
Answer the following questions:
1.
What can give a teacher insight into children’s language behavior?
2.
How many new words might a preschooler acquire each day?
3.
Define
receptive vocabulary and expressive vocabulary.
4.
Compare speech when a child is excited to speech when a child is embarrassed, sad, or shy.
5.
What is the focus of play for very young preschoolers?
6.
Define
regularization.
7.
What is the focus for questions during the toddler period?
8.
Define
overextension.
9.
Describe
running commentaries.
10.
List
eight (8)
possible developmental reasons and benefits of self-talk.
11.
Define
consonant and vowel.
12.
What advice should be given to families and early childhood educators?
13.
List
(four) 4
suggestions for books for younger preschoolers.
14.
List
ten (10)
expectations as preschoolers get older.
15.
Describe friendships of young preschoolers.
16. List
five (5)
areas of growth in children through group play.
17. How do children learn language?
18. Explain
relational words
and why these words are important.
19. Explain
impact words, sound words, created words
and
displaying creativity
.
20. Discuss the danger of assumptions about intelligence through language ability.
21. List
four (4)
speech and language characteristics of older preschoolers.
22. What may depress a child's vocabulary development?
23. Define
metalinguistic awareness.
24. How does physical growth affect children's perceptions of themselves?
25.
Define
mental image.
26.
Define
visual literacy.
27.
Explain the order in which motor skills are developed.
28.
Explain the
Montessori
approach to education for young children.
29. List
seventeen (17) objectives for refining perceptual-motor skills.
30.
Define
assimilation and accommodation.
31. What is a zone of proximal development?
32.
What is the teacher’s role in working with infants, toddlers and preschoolers?
33.
Define
metalinguistic skills.
34.
Define
social connectedness.
35. List
six (6)
social ability goals that serve as a strong foundation for future schooling.
.
Read Chapter 15 and answer the following questions 1. De.docxShiraPrater50
Read Chapter 15 and answer the following questions
:
1. Describe several characteristics of infants that make them different from other children.
2. What is the feeding challenge in meeting the nutritional needs of an infant?
3. Define
low-birthweight (LBW) infant
.
4. List
nine (9)
problems associated with low birth weight.
5. List
five (5)
reasons a mother may choose formula feeding instead of breast feeding.
6. List
four (4)
steps to safe handling of breast milk.
7. What
two (2)
factors determine safe preparation of formula? Briefly describe each factor.
8. Define
aseptic procedure.
9. Define
distention
and tell what causes distention.
10. Define
regurgitation, electrolytes,
and
developmental or physiological readiness.
11. Why should a bottle
NEVER
be propped and a baby left unattended while feeding?
12. When might an infant need supplemental water?
13. When should solid food be introduced to an infant? What is meant by the infant being developmentally ready?
14. Define
palmar grasp
and
pincer grip.
15. List
ten (10)
common feeding concerns. Pick
ONE
and explain why that is a concern.
Read Chapter 16 and answer the following questions:
1. Describe
toddlers and preschoolers
.
2. Define
neophobic.
3. List
three (3)
things a teacher is responsible for when feeding a toddler. List
two (2)
things for which the child is responsible.
4. Why should you
NOT
try to force a toddler to eat or be overly concerned if children are suddenly eating less?
5. Explain the results of spacing meals
too far apart
and
too close together
.
6. List a
good eating pattern
for toddlers.
7. Name several healthy snack choices for toddlers and young children.
8. List several suggestions for making eating time comfortable, pleasant and safe.
9. What changes about eating habits when a toddler develops into a preschooler?
10. Define
Down syndrome
and
Prader-Willi syndrome.
11. How can parents and teachers promote good eating habits for preschoolers?
12. When and where should rewards be offered?
13. Why should children
not
be encouraged to have a
“clean plate”?
14. List
five (5)
health conditions related to dietary patterns.
15. What is the Physical Activity Pyramid and for what is it designed?
16. List
eight (8)
common feeding concerns during toddler and preschool years. Pick
one and explain
it thoroughly.
https://books.google.com/books/about/Health_Safety_and_Nutrition_for_the_Youn.html?id=7zcaCgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read_button#v=onepage&q&f=false
.
Read Chapter 2 and answer the following questions1. List .docxShiraPrater50
Read Chapter 2 and answer the following questions:
1. List
five (5)
decisions a teacher must make about the curriculum.
2. List
three (3)
ways that all children are alike.
3. List
three (3)
similar needs of young children.
4. Describe the change in thought from age 2 through age 11 or 12.
5. List
four (4)
ways teachers can determine children’s background experiences.
6. List
three (3)
ways to find out children’s interests.
7. List
four (4)
ways to determine the developmental levels and abilities of children.
8. What is P.L. 94-142 and what does it state?
9. List
four (4)
things you need to do as a teacher of special children regarding P.L. 94-142.
10. List
eight (8)
categories of special needs children.
11. List the
eleven (11)
goals of an inclusion program.
12.
List
and
explain three (3)
methods to gain knowledge about the culture and values of a community.
13. Why must teachers of young children understand geography, history, economics and other social sciences?
14. List
six (6)
ways children can assist with planning.
15. List
five (5)
elements that should be included in lessons plans.
16. List
four (4)
main sections that every lesson plan should include regardless of format.
17. Define
behavioral objective.
What
three (3)
questions do behavioral objectives answer?
18. What are
four (4)
goals which can be accomplished through the use of units, projects, and thematic learning?
19. List
three (3)
considerations for selecting themes or topics.
20. After selecting a theme or topic, list
seven (7)
elements that should be included in planning for the theme or unit.
21. List
five (5)
uses for authentic assessment
.
22.
List
and
describe
four (4)
types of assessments.
23. List
five (5)
things you should look for when interviewing children.
24. What are
rubrics
, and how can rubrics be used?
25. What are standardized tests and why might they
not
be useful to teachers of young children?
book
Social Studies for the Preschool/Primary Child
Carol Seefeldt; Sharon D. Castle; Renee Falconer
also you may used any addition
.
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This document discusses the need for international standards to regulate aggressive cyber behavior by foreign states. It provides background on how cyber warfare has become an effective new form of attack that lacks regulation. Current frameworks fail to fully address the issue as they focus on individuals rather than states. The document argues that comprehensive global standards are needed, but developing and implementing them faces challenges that require a collaborative effort between nations. It provides recommendations for a roadmap to establish centralized institutions to design, develop, enforce and prosecute violations of new international cyber standards.
The document summarizes a policy analysis paper that examines the nature of cyber conflict between states from 2000 to 2016. It finds that while cyber operations have not generally led to escalation, recent policy shifts in the US under the Trump administration increase the risk of inadvertent escalation. Specifically, the paper argues that adopting an offensive cyber strategy based on preemption is dangerous and counterproductive, as cyberspace has primarily involved covert operations for political signaling rather than direct attacks. The analysis recommends a more restrained defensive approach focused on intelligence sharing and hardening systems.
Running head METHODS USED IN CYBER WARFARE1METHODS USED IN CYB.docxglendar3
Running head: METHODS USED IN CYBER WARFARE 1
METHODS USED IN CYBER WARFARE 2
Salina Khadgi
Professor Creider
5th April , 2020
Methods used in cyber warfare and cyber attack
Thesis: There are diverse methods that various people or nations, for a set of diverse reasons, can damage computers or information networks.
I. Introduction
II. Types of cyber attacks Comment by R Daniel Creider: A, B, and C should not be part of the introduction.
A. Espionage
B. Sabotage
C. Propaganda
D. Economic disruption
E. Surprise Cyber Attack
III. Methods used in Cyber Attacks
F. Denial-of-service (DoS)
G. Phishing and spear phishing attacks
H. SQL injection attack
I. Drive-by attacks
J. Man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack
K. Password attacks
L. Malware attack
M. Eavesdropping attack
IV. Motivators for cyber attacks
N. Military
O. Civil
P. Private sector
Q. Non-profit Research
V. Preparedness
VI. Cyber counterintelligence
Methods used in Cyber warfare and cyber attacks
Just like other warfare, Cyber warfare is a digital war where computer viruses are sent instead of army and hacking into database with the aim to create damages and destruction. With the increasing use of computer and technology in almost every field obstruction of data can be a bigger war than an actual war. Acquiring sensitive data about a country, business, person or anything that relies in computational functions are in risk if the data is lost which can cause metamorphosis of a certain company that relies hugely on computer. There are diverse methods that various people or nations, for a set of diverse reasons, can damage computers or information network. Cyber-attack is a broad picture of cyber warfare, similar types of methods are used in cyber warfare and cyber-attack. When a nation’s database or the system of one of its branches is attacked for war reasons or for manipulation, the term cyber warfare is used. Comment by R Daniel Creider: Why is this text in bold?
You need both an abstract and an introduction.
You should have place holders in the draft to indicate that those sections of the paper have not been written.
Cyberwarfare is, therefore, a long period of cyberattacks carried out now and then, and at some point, it includes traditional military actions between countries. The fact, however, is that to date, the actual act hasn't taken place. But many states have had an eye for an eye military-cyber action, and a good example is the cyber-attack launched by the US against the Iranian Weapons as retaliation for US drone Iranian shot down. This paper looks at the primary methods used in cyber warfare and cyber-attacks.
The increasing technology is not causing mass destruction to business organizations, but to critical government agencies to. Cyberattacks and cyberwarfare are at the center of every threat that information technology possesses to the government agencies. Those running the ICT sector as experts still have several debates as per the actual meaning/definition of cyberwarf.
Running head METHODS USED IN CYBER WARFARE1METHODS USED IN CYB.docxtodd581
Running head: METHODS USED IN CYBER WARFARE 1
METHODS USED IN CYBER WARFARE 2
Salina Khadgi
Professor Creider
5th April , 2020
Methods used in cyber warfare and cyber attack
Thesis: There are diverse methods that various people or nations, for a set of diverse reasons, can damage computers or information networks.
I. Introduction
II. Types of cyber attacks Comment by R Daniel Creider: A, B, and C should not be part of the introduction.
A. Espionage
B. Sabotage
C. Propaganda
D. Economic disruption
E. Surprise Cyber Attack
III. Methods used in Cyber Attacks
F. Denial-of-service (DoS)
G. Phishing and spear phishing attacks
H. SQL injection attack
I. Drive-by attacks
J. Man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack
K. Password attacks
L. Malware attack
M. Eavesdropping attack
IV. Motivators for cyber attacks
N. Military
O. Civil
P. Private sector
Q. Non-profit Research
V. Preparedness
VI. Cyber counterintelligence
Methods used in Cyber warfare and cyber attacks
Just like other warfare, Cyber warfare is a digital war where computer viruses are sent instead of army and hacking into database with the aim to create damages and destruction. With the increasing use of computer and technology in almost every field obstruction of data can be a bigger war than an actual war. Acquiring sensitive data about a country, business, person or anything that relies in computational functions are in risk if the data is lost which can cause metamorphosis of a certain company that relies hugely on computer. There are diverse methods that various people or nations, for a set of diverse reasons, can damage computers or information network. Cyber-attack is a broad picture of cyber warfare, similar types of methods are used in cyber warfare and cyber-attack. When a nation’s database or the system of one of its branches is attacked for war reasons or for manipulation, the term cyber warfare is used. Comment by R Daniel Creider: Why is this text in bold?
You need both an abstract and an introduction.
You should have place holders in the draft to indicate that those sections of the paper have not been written.
Cyberwarfare is, therefore, a long period of cyberattacks carried out now and then, and at some point, it includes traditional military actions between countries. The fact, however, is that to date, the actual act hasn't taken place. But many states have had an eye for an eye military-cyber action, and a good example is the cyber-attack launched by the US against the Iranian Weapons as retaliation for US drone Iranian shot down. This paper looks at the primary methods used in cyber warfare and cyber-attacks.
The increasing technology is not causing mass destruction to business organizations, but to critical government agencies to. Cyberattacks and cyberwarfare are at the center of every threat that information technology possesses to the government agencies. Those running the ICT sector as experts still have several debates as per the actual meaning/definition of cyberwarf.
The document analyzes the 2001 cyber attacks between the United States and China following a collision between a U.S. plane and Chinese fighter jet. Chinese hackers began attacking U.S. websites in protest, and U.S. hackers retaliated, launching a 7-day cyber battle. The attacks involved web defacement, viruses, and DDoS attacks targeting government websites. Both sides were motivated by patriotism and tensions between the countries. The U.S. responded defensively while China took a more offensive approach. The attacks exposed vulnerabilities in how each country approached cyber defense and deterrence at the time.
HOW REVERSIBILITY DIFFERENTIATES CYBER FROM KINETIC WARFARE: A CASE STUDY IN ...ijsptm
A pair of attacks on energy sector assets offers a unique opportunity to better understand the differences in
impact from cyber and kinetic warfare. A review of the 2021 cyber attack on Colonial Pipeline and the
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address threats in the cyber domain rather than try to retrofit dated strategies. The two cases compared
offer lessons that can be applied more broadly in the formation of state-level cyber and energy strategic
thinking, ultimately improving resilience and the appropriateness of protection.
6APPLYING GENEVA CONVENTION STRATEGIES TOWARDS ACCOMPL.docxalinainglis
6
APPLYING GENEVA CONVENTION STRATEGIES TOWARDS ACCOMPLISHING CYBER PEACE
December 17, 2017
INTRODUCTION
The emergence of technology and its steady advancement has greatly impacted aspects of individuals, business, and institutional activities. The discovery technology has been felt in different aspects of the economy one notable impact is cyberspace – "a notional environment under which communication occurs with the use of computer networks and systems." [footnoteRef:1] Cyberspace, which is as a result of the internet, an element of technology, has seen information sharing take place, millions of money being transacted over computer networks, business deals struck and much more. All these benefits of cyberspace have attracted criminal, known in the cyber world as cybercriminals, who have, and continue to negatively impact the use of the internet in a variety of creative and innovative ways. There also have been rising cases of cyber warfare between countries that have been causing major worries among global cybersecurity professionals. In an attempt to minimize and solve the issues cyber threats and cybercrimes, several studies have been conducted to discover and create ways of curbing the problem. However, a majority of these studies have failed to acknowledge that the problem has gone global.[footnoteRef:2] However, no studies have been conducted on how to settle for cyber peace by incorporating Geneva convention to creating a treaty specifically for cyberspace. Therefore, the paper will explore how to achieve peace in the cyberspace by exploring the possibilities of treaties on cyberspace by Geneva convention. [1: David Smahel and Kristian Daneback, "Editorial: Researching Bright And Dark Sides Of The Cyberspace," Cyberpsychology: Journal of Psychosocial Research on Cyberspace 7, no. 3 (2013).] [2: Filippo PARODI, "The Concept Of Cybercrime And Online Threats Analysis," International Journal of Information Security and Cybercrime 2, no. 1 (2013): 59-66.]
Statement of the Problem
The growth of cyberspace due to the effect of globalization has turned cybercrime and cyber attacks to one of the major talked about concerns across the globe. Cybercrimes has evolved to become a form of terrorism with major security agencies and institutions such as Homeland Security being victims of the attack. With such agencies with an immeasurable amount of security system and responsible for the safety of people and resources being non-immune to such attacks puts enterprises and individuals at a greater risk. Consequently, cyberspace has seen countries attack each other over computer networks. The severity of the problem has proven other measures such as confronting cyber attackers ineffective thus the need to change the strategies employed to solve the problem. The worst part is that close to 74% of global business expected to be hacked each year with estimations of economic losses amounting to cybercrimes totaling to $3 trillion by the year.
This document discusses key terms related to information security and their interpretations in English, Chinese, and Russian. While English terms like "information space", "cyberspace", "information warfare", and "cyber warfare" focus on the technological aspects, their Chinese and Russian equivalents place more emphasis on the human/mental dimensions. Specifically, Russia and China see the mind and information systems as essential components of information security, unlike the US which separates cybersecurity from the human element. This highlights fundamental differences in how these countries approach and understand information security.
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CJ513Unit 3 DQTopic #1The Definition of CyberterrorismDiVinaOconner450
CJ513
Unit 3 DQ
Topic #1
The Definition of Cyberterrorism
Discuss the current debate surrounding the definition of cyberterrorism. Why is there no common definition? What are some of the challenges associated with establishing a common definition? Provide examples of two competing definitions of cyberterrorism from different sources and discuss the differences between the definitions. What are the implications of these differences? Be sure to properly cite and reference sources used
Topic #1: Student Response #1(Respond to Joe)
Joe Cacioppo
Good evening class,
This was an interesting topic to research and had not given much thought to the nuances in defining and making a distinction between cyberterrorism and cybercrime. I was also surprised to hear there was not a common definition of cyberterrorism. I reviewed the United States Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation website and found an article written by Tafoya (2011), who defined cyberterrorism as “the intimidation of civilian enterprise through the use of high technology to bring about political, religious, or ideological aims, actions that result in disabling or deleting critical infrastructure data or information.”
An alternate definition according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) defined cyberterrorism as, ““the use of computer network tools to shut down critical national infrastructures (e.g., energy, transportation, government operations) or to coerce or intimidate a government or civilian population.” (Tafoya, 2011.)
In comparing the two different definitions given, the similarities include the use of technology to coerce or intimidate to produce a change. The differences in the FBI definition have a better defined group of targeted populations for change, for example political, religious or ideological change. I have not seen an implication between the differences in the two given definitions. The end result, and the methods for cyberterrorism is similar.
Additional research on cyberterrorism described the activity as any premeditated, politically motivated attack against information systems, programs and data that results in violence against noncombatant targets by subnational groups of clandestine agents, (Hanna, et. al., nd.)
References:
Hanna, H.T., Ferguson, K, Rosencrance, L. (nd.) Techtarget network. Cyberterrorism. https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/cyberterrorism
Tafoya, W.L. 2011. The United States Department of Justice. Cyber Terror. https://leb.fbi.gov/articles/featured-articles/cyber-terror
Topic #1: Student Response #2(Respond to Elizabeth)
Elizabeth Stuart
Cyberterrorism, while understood by some on a basic level, remains an elusive concept to many. There is no agreed upon definition in academia or government for this term. Due to this, it can be difficult to pinpoint what exactly constitutes cyberterrorism. In their article, Klein (2018) utilized a definition by Denning (2000), who described cyber ...
61Shackelford & Bohm - Securing North American Critical Infrasimisterchristen
61Shackelford & Bohm - Securing North American Critical Infrastructure
Securing North American Critical
Infrastructure:
A Comparative Case Study in
Cybersecurity Regulation
Scott J. Shackelford, J.D., Ph.D. * & Zachery Bohm**
Abstract: The United States and Canada are interdependent along a number of
dimensions, such as their mutual reliance on shared critical infrastructure. As a result,
regulatory efforts aimed at securing critical infrastructure in one nation impact the other,
including in the cybersecurity context. This article explores one such innovation in the
form of the 2014 National Institute for Standards and Technology (“NIST”)
Cybersecurity Framework. It reviews the evolution of the NIST Framework, comparing
and contrasting it with ongoing Canadian efforts to secure vulnerable critical
infrastructure against cyber threats. Its purpose is to discover North American governance
trends that could impact wider debates about the appropriate role of the public and private
sectors in enhancing cybersecurity.
Ta b l e of C o n t e n t s
I. Introduction........................................................................................................... 61
II. Unpacking the Cyber Threat Affecting North American Critical
Infrastructure............................................................................................................ 63
III. U.S. Approaches to Securing Critical Infrastructure: Enter the NIST
Framework............................................................................................................... 65
IV. An Introduction to Canadian Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity Law
and Policy................................................................................................................. 66
V. Conclusion........................................................................................................... 69
I. In t r o d u c t io n
Neither the United States nor Canada is a stranger to cyber attacks. These
have increasingly targeted both the private and public sectors to steal valuable
intellectual property, such as state and trade secrets. In one instance, the
Canadian government reported a major cyber attack in 2011 that forced the
Finance Department and Treasury Board, Canada’s main economic agencies, to
disconnect from the Internet.1 Hundreds of systems within the United States
* Assistant Professor of Business Law and Ethics, Indiana University; Senior Fellow, Indiana
University Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research; W. Glenn Campbell and Rita Ricardo-
Campbell National Fellow, Stanford University Hoover Institution.
** Senior, Indiana University School of Public and Environmental Affairs.
62 CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40, 2016]
Department of Commerce have similarly been forced offline due to cyber attacks
in recent years.” In total, more than 40 million global cyber attacks were reported
in 2014, representing a nearly 50% increas ...
Microsoft Digital Defense Report 2022.pdfNirenj George
The document is Microsoft's 2022 Digital Defense Report which provides an overview of the cyber threat landscape based on Microsoft's data and insights from July 2021 through June 2022. It covers topics like the state of cybercrime, nation state threats, devices and infrastructure vulnerabilities, cyber influence operations, and cyber resilience. The introduction notes the significant increase in sophisticated cyberattacks by both cybercriminals and nation states, and the importance of cybersecurity best practices and partnerships to improve the security of the digital ecosystem.
This research report studies the economic impact that Cyber Security attacks have on society as a whole. The aim of this analysis is to examine the negative and positive impact of these compromises on multiple entities. Our descriptive analysis focuses on individuals, private and public organizations, costs, revenues, innovations, and jobs to determine if proliferation's of these attacks are either, negative or positive. Although this
paper draws upon the economic factors as result of cyber-attacks, it looks at the outlay in its historical context of capital expenditures to private and public organizations due to the increased number of compromises and factors of this paradigm helping to fuel the growth of innovations or spawn a new industry as a whole.
This document analyzes the economic impacts of cyber attacks on entities worldwide. It examines both the negative and positive impacts on individuals, organizations, costs, revenues, innovations, and jobs. While cyber attacks impose costs on targeted entities, they may also spur growth in cybersecurity and related industries. The paper aims to determine whether the overall economic effects of cyber attacks are more positive or negative. It reviews literature on defining cyber attacks and security, the history of attacks, and methods for analyzing economic impacts through cost-benefit analysis.
Research in Information Security and Information Warfare- The economics, warf...Quinnipiac University
These days, Information Security and Information Warfare are now looked upon as a very important and vital concept among various military organizations. Since the revolution of this concept in military science is viewed as a major reformation regarding the technology utilized; military leaders believe that this technology and more specifically, the information: gives an advantage in military training, strategy, tactics, and organization, leaving no reason to believe otherwise on how technology impacts a nation‟s army. In this research paper, we will examine a deeper understanding of Information Security and Information Warfare; the economics, warfare, features, policies, and even some common technical aspects on why Information Security is so vital to one, to an organization, to a nation.
This document provides background information on cyber security and examines the potential trade-off between cooperation on cyber security and the proliferation of cyber weapons. It discusses how states' increasing reliance on cyber infrastructure has created new vulnerabilities that can be exploited by cyber weapons. The document also explores the proliferation problem posed by cyber weapons as their code can easily spread and be reused by others. It argues there may be a fundamental choice between cooperating to improve cyber security, which requires disclosure of vulnerabilities, and developing cyber weapons, which relies on keeping vulnerabilities secret. The proliferation of cyber weapons could thus undermine prospects for international cooperation on cyber security.
MASINT (Measurement and Signature Intelligence) uses scientific and technical methods to collect strategic and tactical intelligence. It builds models to aid decision-making but can be complicated to apply quickly. In 2004, President Bush established the Commission on Intelligence Capabilities to review intelligence functions after 9/11. The commission found 74 areas needing reform, and 71 were addressed in the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. This act established a director of national intelligence and improved information sharing. MASINT now plays a role in countering global terrorism by tracking networks and using enemies' own technology against them.
Insurgents in motion: Counterinsurgency and insurgency relocation in IraqUNU-MERIT
http://youtu.be/zqcM1jE_BoY
Recent studies in general are positive regarding the effectiveness of US counterinsurgency programs in Iraq. The right mix of coercion, ethnic strategy, and public goods provision, it is argued, makes Iraqis less likely to rebel against the US army and the Iraqi government, thus reducing insurgent violence. In fact, the number of insurgent attacks dramatically declined shortly after the change in the counterinsurgency strategy in 2007. How robust is the positive finding? A common assumption behind previous analyses is that insurgent attacks have a strong local root and is unlikely to be reproduced in other areas. Violation of this spatial independence assumption, however, can potentially bias towards the positive result. Based on the novel spatial dynamic panel data (SDPD) model, my analysis shows that spatial dependence should be addressed and cannot be assumed away. Results based on the new model also reveal that, conditional upon other strategies, the effects of a counterinsurgency strategy vary considerably both in magnitude and direction, suggesting that some policy mixes could be counterproductive. Policy makers seeking to adopt similar strategies in Afghanistan should take the relocation into account in their policy evaluations.
Similar to College of Doctoral StudiesRES-845 Module 2 Problem.docx (19)
Read Chapter 3. Answer the following questions1.Wha.docxShiraPrater50
Read Chapter 3
.
Answer the following questions:
1.
What can give a teacher insight into children’s language behavior?
2.
How many new words might a preschooler acquire each day?
3.
Define
receptive vocabulary and expressive vocabulary.
4.
Compare speech when a child is excited to speech when a child is embarrassed, sad, or shy.
5.
What is the focus of play for very young preschoolers?
6.
Define
regularization.
7.
What is the focus for questions during the toddler period?
8.
Define
overextension.
9.
Describe
running commentaries.
10.
List
eight (8)
possible developmental reasons and benefits of self-talk.
11.
Define
consonant and vowel.
12.
What advice should be given to families and early childhood educators?
13.
List
(four) 4
suggestions for books for younger preschoolers.
14.
List
ten (10)
expectations as preschoolers get older.
15.
Describe friendships of young preschoolers.
16. List
five (5)
areas of growth in children through group play.
17. How do children learn language?
18. Explain
relational words
and why these words are important.
19. Explain
impact words, sound words, created words
and
displaying creativity
.
20. Discuss the danger of assumptions about intelligence through language ability.
21. List
four (4)
speech and language characteristics of older preschoolers.
22. What may depress a child's vocabulary development?
23. Define
metalinguistic awareness.
24. How does physical growth affect children's perceptions of themselves?
25.
Define
mental image.
26.
Define
visual literacy.
27.
Explain the order in which motor skills are developed.
28.
Explain the
Montessori
approach to education for young children.
29. List
seventeen (17) objectives for refining perceptual-motor skills.
30.
Define
assimilation and accommodation.
31. What is a zone of proximal development?
32.
What is the teacher’s role in working with infants, toddlers and preschoolers?
33.
Define
metalinguistic skills.
34.
Define
social connectedness.
35. List
six (6)
social ability goals that serve as a strong foundation for future schooling.
.
Read Chapter 15 and answer the following questions 1. De.docxShiraPrater50
Read Chapter 15 and answer the following questions
:
1. Describe several characteristics of infants that make them different from other children.
2. What is the feeding challenge in meeting the nutritional needs of an infant?
3. Define
low-birthweight (LBW) infant
.
4. List
nine (9)
problems associated with low birth weight.
5. List
five (5)
reasons a mother may choose formula feeding instead of breast feeding.
6. List
four (4)
steps to safe handling of breast milk.
7. What
two (2)
factors determine safe preparation of formula? Briefly describe each factor.
8. Define
aseptic procedure.
9. Define
distention
and tell what causes distention.
10. Define
regurgitation, electrolytes,
and
developmental or physiological readiness.
11. Why should a bottle
NEVER
be propped and a baby left unattended while feeding?
12. When might an infant need supplemental water?
13. When should solid food be introduced to an infant? What is meant by the infant being developmentally ready?
14. Define
palmar grasp
and
pincer grip.
15. List
ten (10)
common feeding concerns. Pick
ONE
and explain why that is a concern.
Read Chapter 16 and answer the following questions:
1. Describe
toddlers and preschoolers
.
2. Define
neophobic.
3. List
three (3)
things a teacher is responsible for when feeding a toddler. List
two (2)
things for which the child is responsible.
4. Why should you
NOT
try to force a toddler to eat or be overly concerned if children are suddenly eating less?
5. Explain the results of spacing meals
too far apart
and
too close together
.
6. List a
good eating pattern
for toddlers.
7. Name several healthy snack choices for toddlers and young children.
8. List several suggestions for making eating time comfortable, pleasant and safe.
9. What changes about eating habits when a toddler develops into a preschooler?
10. Define
Down syndrome
and
Prader-Willi syndrome.
11. How can parents and teachers promote good eating habits for preschoolers?
12. When and where should rewards be offered?
13. Why should children
not
be encouraged to have a
“clean plate”?
14. List
five (5)
health conditions related to dietary patterns.
15. What is the Physical Activity Pyramid and for what is it designed?
16. List
eight (8)
common feeding concerns during toddler and preschool years. Pick
one and explain
it thoroughly.
https://books.google.com/books/about/Health_Safety_and_Nutrition_for_the_Youn.html?id=7zcaCgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read_button#v=onepage&q&f=false
.
Read Chapter 2 and answer the following questions1. List .docxShiraPrater50
Read Chapter 2 and answer the following questions:
1. List
five (5)
decisions a teacher must make about the curriculum.
2. List
three (3)
ways that all children are alike.
3. List
three (3)
similar needs of young children.
4. Describe the change in thought from age 2 through age 11 or 12.
5. List
four (4)
ways teachers can determine children’s background experiences.
6. List
three (3)
ways to find out children’s interests.
7. List
four (4)
ways to determine the developmental levels and abilities of children.
8. What is P.L. 94-142 and what does it state?
9. List
four (4)
things you need to do as a teacher of special children regarding P.L. 94-142.
10. List
eight (8)
categories of special needs children.
11. List the
eleven (11)
goals of an inclusion program.
12.
List
and
explain three (3)
methods to gain knowledge about the culture and values of a community.
13. Why must teachers of young children understand geography, history, economics and other social sciences?
14. List
six (6)
ways children can assist with planning.
15. List
five (5)
elements that should be included in lessons plans.
16. List
four (4)
main sections that every lesson plan should include regardless of format.
17. Define
behavioral objective.
What
three (3)
questions do behavioral objectives answer?
18. What are
four (4)
goals which can be accomplished through the use of units, projects, and thematic learning?
19. List
three (3)
considerations for selecting themes or topics.
20. After selecting a theme or topic, list
seven (7)
elements that should be included in planning for the theme or unit.
21. List
five (5)
uses for authentic assessment
.
22.
List
and
describe
four (4)
types of assessments.
23. List
five (5)
things you should look for when interviewing children.
24. What are
rubrics
, and how can rubrics be used?
25. What are standardized tests and why might they
not
be useful to teachers of young children?
book
Social Studies for the Preschool/Primary Child
Carol Seefeldt; Sharon D. Castle; Renee Falconer
also you may used any addition
.
Read chapter 7 and write the book report The paper should be .docxShiraPrater50
Read chapter 7 and write the book report
The paper should be single-spaced, 2-page (excluding cover page and references) long, and typed in Times New Roman 12 points. The paper should have a title, and consists of at least two sections: 1) A brief narrative of how an IS/IT is realized, initiated, designed, and implemented in terms of what/when/where/how this happened, and key character players involved in the series of events.
.
Read Chapter 7 and answer the following questions1. What a.docxShiraPrater50
Read Chapter 7 and answer the following questions:
1. What are preschoolers like?
2. Define
large motor, coordination, agility
and
conscience
.
3. What do preschoolers do?
4. What do preschoolers need?
5. Define
sense of initiative, socialized
and
norms
.
6. List the
seven (7)
dimensions of an environment advocated by Prescott.
7. Describe an environment that provides for initiative.
8. List
six (6)
opportunities for children provided through good storage of materials.
9. Define
pictograph
.
10. List
six (6)
environments that foster initiative
.
11. Describe an environment that helps to develop creativity.
12. List
eight (8)
factors for creativity.
13. Describe an environment for learning through play.
14. Where do you begin when deciding how to set up a room?
15. What should you know about pathways in the room?
16. How can you modify a classroom for children with special needs?
17. List
seven (7)
suggestions for welcoming children with special needs.
18. Describe an environment for outdoor play.
19. List
seven (7)
suggestions for an environment that fosters play.
20. How can you plan for safety?
21. Define
interest centers, indirect guidance, private space
and
antibiased
.
22. Describe an environment that fosters self-control.
23. Define
time blocks, child-initiated,
and
teacher-initiated
.
24. List
six (6)
features found in schedules that meet children's needs.
25. List
eight (8)
principles of developmentally appropriate transitions for preschoolers.
26. Define
kindergarten
. Describe kindergarten today.
27. Define
screening, readiness tests, transitional classes
and
retention
.
28. What is the kindergarten dilemma?
29. List
five (5)
inappropriate physical environments for preschoolers.
Read Chapter 8 and answer the following questions:
1. What are primary-age children like?
2. What do primary-age children like to do?
3. Define
peers, sense of industry, competence
and
concrete
.
4. What do primary-age children need?
5. How do primary-age children learn best?
6. What are some of the concerns about public education?
7. Describe an environment for a sense of industry.
8. What is a benefit of the learning-center approach for primary-age children?
9. What is a planning contract?
10. What is an advantage to providing a number of separate learning centers?
11. What is a planning board?
12. Define
portfolio
.
13. How do teachers of primary-age children use portfolios and work samples?
14. What are two large and important learning centers related to literacy?
15. What should a writing center contain?
16. List
four (4)
suggestions for an environment that fosters early literacy.
17. Describe an environment that fosters math understanding.
18. Describe a physical environment that fosters scientific awareness.
19. Describe an environment for relationships.
20. List
five (5)
suggestions for fostering peer- and te.
Read chapter 14, 15 and 18 of the class textbook.Saucier.docxShiraPrater50
Read chapter 14, 15 and 18 of the class textbook.
Saucier Lundy, K & Janes, S.. (2016). Community Health Nursing. Caring for the Public’s Health. (3rd
ed.)
ISBN: 978-1-4496-9149-3
Once done answer the following questions;
1. How the different topics/health issues can be addressed through both professional health promotion and personal health promotion. What is the difference in the approach? How does each approach contribute to the desired effect?
2. Should health insurance companies cover services that are purely for health promotion purposes? Why or why not? What about employers? What are the pros and cons of this type of coverage?
3. What do you think about the role integrating nursing with faith? Is this something you feel is appropriate? When is it appropriate? What types of settings do you feel this would work best in? Do you feel nurses should integrate faith in their nursing practice? Why or why not and how?
4. Have you been a part of a group in which corruption of leadership has occurred? Do you feel it is unavoidable? How did you feel in that particular group?
APA format word document Arial 12 font attached to the forum in the discussion board title "Week 4 discussion questions".
A minimum of 2 evidence based references no older than 5 years old are required besides the class textbook
A minimum of 500 words without count the first and last page are required.
.
Read Chapter 10 APA FORMAT1. In the last century, what historica.docxShiraPrater50
Read Chapter 10 APA FORMAT
1. In the last century, what historical, social, political, and economic trends and issues have influenced today’s health-care system?
2. What is the purpose and process of evaluating the three aspects of health care: structure, process, and outcome?
3. How does technology improve patient outcomes and the health-care system?
4. How can you intervene to improve quality of care and safety within the health-care system and at the bedside?
5. Select one nonprofit organization or one government agencies that influences and advocates for quality improvement in the health-care system. Explore the Web site for your selected organization/agency and answer the following questions: •
What does the organization/agency do that supports the hallmarks of quality? •
What have been the results of their efforts for patients, facilities, the health-care delivery system, or the nursing profession? •
How has the organization/agency affected facilities where you are practicing and your own professional practice?
.
Read chapter 7 and write the book report The paper should b.docxShiraPrater50
Read chapter 7 and write the book report
The paper should be single-spaced, 2-page (excluding cover page and references) long, and typed in Times New Roman 12 points. The paper should have a title, and consists of at least two sections: 1) A brief narrative of how an IS/IT is realized, initiated, designed, and implemented in terms of what/when/where/how this happened, and key character players involved in the series of events.
.
Read Chapter 14 and answer the following questions1. Explain t.docxShiraPrater50
Read Chapter 14 and answer the following questions:
1. Explain the importance of proteins.
2. Define
amino acids, non-essential amino acids, essential amino acids, complete protein,
and
incomplete proteins.
3. Define
complementary proteins
and
supplementary proteins.
4. Why are
vitamins
important?
5. Define
fat soluble
and
water soluble.
6. What is
DNA
?
RNA?
7. Which vitamins play essential roles in the formation of blood cells and hemoglobin?
8. Which vitamins regulate bone growth?
9. Define
collagen.
10. Which vitamins regulate energy metabolism?
11. Define
neuromuscular
and
spina bifida.
12. What are
megadoses
?
13. Define
minerals
and tell why they are important.
14. What minerals support growth?
15. What are the major minerals found in bones and teeth?
16. Why is fluoride added to water supplies of communities? Why is fluoride important?
17. What are the major food sources of
calcium
and
phosphorus
?
18. Define
hemoglobin
. Define
iron-deficiency
anemia
.
19. What are the major food sources of iron?
20. Why is water so important to children? How is water lost and replaced in children?
21. Name
three (3)
problems caused by children drinking too much fruit juice.
https://books.google.com/books/about/Health_Safety_and_Nutrition_for_the_Youn.html?id=7zcaCgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read_button#v=onepage&q&f=false
.
Read Chapter 2 first. Then come to this assignment.The first t.docxShiraPrater50
Read Chapter 2 first. Then come to this assignment.
The first theme of next week's class (Week 2) will be Chapter 2, Concepts of Infectious Disease. I will briefly go through the chapter to make sure that you understand it, and then we will have a discussion.
Since the chapter in the textbook is so full of important concepts, it would be difficult to narrow it down to a single topic for discussion. So I have posted this introduction and 3 separate subtopics. You can choose which one you want to write about. Each student should choose one of these subtopics for your major post. You should write well thought out primary comments on at least one of the points below (150-200 words).
BE SURE TO INCLUDE YOUR NAME AND SUBTOPIC IN THE HEADER FOR YOUR PAPER.
We will discuss each of the subtopics that were chosen by the students. Each of you should take an active role in presenting your topic to the other students. Explain the concept in your own words, or develop it further using a relevant example. As other students present their perspective on the same topic, hopefully an active discussion will take hold. I will jump in only as needed. This format will allow you to develop one subtopic in an active sense, but learn about the others by being drawn into them through other people's discussions.
Choose your subtopic:
Subtopic 1: Factors that affect the spread of epidemics
Question: Explain how the interaction between these factors are relevant to the transmission of AIDS. For example, which of these factors are most critical to the transmission of HIV. Which aren't.
1. Total number of hosts
2. Host’s birth rate
3. Rate at which new susceptible hosts migrate into population
4. Number of susceptible uninfected hosts
5. Rate at which disease can be transmitted from infected to uninfected hosts
6. Death rate of infected hosts
7. The number of infected hosts who survive and become immune or resistant to further infection
Subtopic 2: Acute versus Chronic Infections
Question: Compare the definitions of Acute Infections and Chronic Infections below. Based on what you know about HIV/AIDS at this point, which description most closely matches AIDS? Explain your answer, using evidence from the book to support your position.
What is an acute infection?
1. Produces symptoms and makes a person infectious soon after infection.
2. The infected person may: transmit the disease
die from the infection
recover and develop immunity
3. the acute microorganism
STRIKES QUICKLY
infects entire group (small group)
dies out
What is a chronic infection?
Person may never show symptoms
Person continues to carry infectious agent at a low level
Does NOT mount an effective immune response
Subtopic 3: Controlling infectious disease
Question: Explain what herd immunity is and how it works. Use an example from either the bo.
Journal of Public Affairs Education 515Teaching Grammar a.docxShiraPrater50
Journal of Public Affairs Education 515
Teaching Grammar and Editing in Public
Administration: Lessons Learned from
Early Offerings of an Undergraduate
Administrative Writing Course
Claire Connolly Knox
University of Central Florida School of Public Administration
ABSTRACT
College graduates need to possess strong writing skills before entering the work-
force. Although many public administration undergraduate programs primarily
focus on policy, finance, and management, we fall short of a larger goal if students
cannot communicate results to a variety of audiences. This article discusses the
results of a national survey, which concludes that few undergraduate public affairs
programs require an administrative/technical writing course. Based on pedagogical
theories, this article describes the design of a newly implemented, undergraduate,
administrative writing course. The article concludes with lessons learned, provides
recommendations for programs considering requiring an administrative writing
course, and discusses future research.
Keywords: administrative writing, Plain Language Movement, discourse community,
undergraduate course design
“Administrators not only need to know about communications, they need to
be able to communicate” (Denhardt, 2001, p. 529). Public administration under-
graduate students learn the importance of communication within organizations
in leadership, human resources, or organizational management courses; however,
practical instruction in communication skills, such as effective, audience-centered
writing, are lacking. Scholars (e.g., Cleary, 1990, 1997; Lee, 2000; Raphael &
Nesbary, 2005; Waugh & Manns, 1991) have noted this lack of required commun-
ication and writing courses in public administration curriculum. The majority of
administrative writing literature is from the late 1980s and early 1990s when
universities began implementing Writing Across the Curriculum programs (i.e.,
JPAE 19 (3), 515–536
516 Journal of Public Affairs Education
Londow, 1993; Stanford, 1992). The limited discussions and conclusions coincide
with private and public sector trends—newly hired students’ writing skills are
lacking (Hines & Basso, 2008; National Commission, 2005).
A survey by the National Commission on Writing for America’s Families,
Schools, and Colleges (2005) reported that approximately 80% of public sector
human resource directors seriously considered writing skills when hiring professional
employees and assumed new employees obtained these skills in college. Increasingly,
public managers require employees to attend writing and communication trainings,
which cost governments approximately $221 million annually (National Commis-
sion, 2005). In fact, the public sector (66%) is more likely to send professional/
salaried employees for writing training than the private sector (40%; National
Commission, 2005). Public, private, and nonprofit sector organizations certainly
should cont ...
This document provides guidance on managing suppliers for the TLIR5014 unit. It covers assessing suppliers and building relationships, evaluating delivery against agreements, negotiating with suppliers, resolving disagreements, and reviewing performance. Key areas discussed include developing criteria to evaluate suppliers; maintaining cooperative relationships; establishing performance indicators; developing evaluation methods; managing relationships; and continuously reviewing suppliers for quality, profitability and other metrics. The role of the supply/contract manager and importance of a contract management plan are also outlined.
MBA 6941, Managing Project Teams 1 Course Learning Ou.docxShiraPrater50
The document provides an overview of key concepts and processes related to project scope management and time management. It defines scope management as the processes used to define, control, and validate the work required to successfully deliver a project. It outlines six processes for scope management including planning scope management, collecting requirements, defining scope, creating a work breakdown structure, validating scope, and controlling scope. It also defines seven processes for time management including planning schedule management, defining activities, sequencing activities, estimating activity resources and durations, developing the schedule, and controlling the schedule. The critical path is described as the longest path through a project network diagram that determines the shortest project duration.
Inventory Decisions in Dells Supply ChainAuthor(s) Ro.docxShiraPrater50
Inventory Decisions in Dell's Supply Chain
Author(s): Roman Kapuscinski, Rachel Q. Zhang, Paul Carbonneau, Robert Moore and Bill
Reeves
Source: Interfaces, Vol. 34, No. 3 (May - Jun., 2004), pp. 191-205
Published by: INFORMS
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/25062900
Accessed: 13-02-2019 19:24 UTC
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This content downloaded from 141.217.20.120 on Wed, 13 Feb 2019 19:24:25 UTC
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Interfaces infjIML
Vol. 34, No. 3, May-June 2004, pp. 191-205 DOI i0.1287/inte.l030.0068
ISSN 0092-21021 eissn 1526-551X1041340310191 @ 2004 INFORMS
Inventory Decisions in Dell's Supply Chain
Roman Kapuscinski
University of Michigan Business School, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109, [email protected]
Rachel Q. Zhang
Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853, [email protected]
Paul Carbonneau
McKinsey & Company, 3 Landmark Square, Stamford, Connecticut 06901, [email protected]
Robert Moore, Bill Reeves
Dell Inc., Mail Stop 6363, Austin, Texas 78682 {[email protected], [email protected]}
The Tauber Manufacturing Institute (TMI) is a partnership between the engineering and business schools at
the University of Michigan. In the summer of 1999, a TMI team spent 14 weeks at Dell Inc. in Austin, Texas,
and developed an inventory model to identify inventory drivers and quantify target levels for inventory in the
final stage of Dell's supply chain, the revolvers or supplier logistics centers (SLC). With the information and
analysis provided by this model, Dell's regional materials organizations could tactically manage revolver inven
tory while Dell's worldwide commodity management could partner with suppliers in improvement projects to
identify inventory drivers and to reduce inventory. Dell also initiated a pilot program for procurement of XDX
(a disguised name for one of the major components of personal computers (PCs)) in the United States to insti
tutionalize the model and promote partnership with suppliers. Based on the model predictions, Dell launched
e-commerce and manufacturing initiatives with its suppliers to lower supply-chain-inventory costs by reducing
revolver inventory by 40 percent. This reduction would raise the corresponding inventory turns by 67 percent.
Net Present Value (NPV) calculations for XDX alone suggest $43 million in potential savings. To ensure project
longevity, Dell formed ...
It’s Your Choice 10 – Clear Values: 2nd Chain Link- Trade-offs - Best Chance of Getting the Most of What You Want.
Narrator: In today's episode, what do I really want? Roger and Nicole discussed the importance of being clear about your values when making a decision in order to give you the best chance of making the most of what you really want. When you understand what you care most about, you can determine which outcomes you prefer as a result of the decision. And, while we frequently can't get everything we want, making tradeoffs is easier when we are clear about our values. Roger: Nicole is something wrong? Nicole: Oh no, not really. I'm just kind of distracted today. See, I finally decided to bite the bullet and buy a car, but I'm having a lot of trouble deciding what to buy. I've been saving for years and I want to make sure I do this right. The problem is that I don't even know where to start. There are so many good cars out there. Roger: I know how tough it can be to try and figure out what you really want it, but you're in luck. On today's show, we're going to be talking about why being clear on your values is so important when making a decision. Nicole: A value is something you want as a result of the decision. Roger: Like when I was trying to decide which college to go to, some of my preferences were to go to a place with a good music program and a D-three basketball team. Nicole: It's funny because when I was looking for a school, I didn't care at all about the basketball team. I was much more interested in theater groups. Roger: and that's fine because values are completely up to the person making the decision. What I want will probably be different from what you want, but I use my values for my decisions and you will use yours for yours. Nicole: I was thinking about asking my friends for their opinions too. Roger: It can be very useful to get input from other people, especially when they're knowledgeable. Just be careful they don't try and talk you into what they want instead of what you wanted. Anyway, have you thought about the things you want the most from the car of your choice? Nicole: Oh sure. There are lots of things like I really want a car I can afford, that gets good gas mileage and is cute safe, a good size and comfortable for my friends. Roger: That's a good start. How about the things you don't want?
Nicole: Well, it has to be reliable. I'll be in a mess if it breaks down. I can't afford a lot of repair bills and I don't want a car that's too big. Roger: That's good. Identifying the things you don't want is just as important as the things you do want. Okay Nicole, now that we have your list, the next step is to ask yourself how important are these things?
Nicole: Well, they're all important.
Roger: Sure, but aren't some more important than others? Nicole: Of course, but I'm not really sure which or which? Roger: A good first step is to identify why something is important to you. For example, is getting good gas ...
MBA 5101, Strategic Management and Business Policy 1 .docxShiraPrater50
MBA 5101, Strategic Management and Business Policy 1
Course Learning Outcomes for Unit I
Upon completion of this unit, students should be able to:
2. Compare and contrast the integral functions of corporate governance.
2.1 Describe the roles and responsibilities of the board of directors in corporate governance.
2.2 Explain the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and its impact on corporate governance.
4. Analyze the processes for formulating corporate strategy.
4.1 Explain the benefits of strategic management.
5. Evaluate methods that impact strategy implementation, such as staffing, directing, and organizing.
5.1 Discuss the strategic audit as a method of analyzing corporate functions and activities.
Reading Assignment
In order to access the following resources, click the links below:
College of Business – CSU. (2016, January 12). MBA5101 Unit I lesson video [YouTube video].
Retrieved from
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p5axP8yAmFk&feature=youtu.be&list=PL08sf8iXqZn54RIuJs-
skgp4omxG-UOu5
Click here to access a transcript of the video.
Pomykalski, A. (2015). Global business networks and technology. Management, 19(1), 46-56. Retrieved from
https://libraryresources.columbiasouthern.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direc
t=true&db=bth&AN=103247112&site=ehost-live&scope=site
Silverstein, E. (2015). Years later, Sarbanes-Oxley is part of how companies do business. Insidecounsel,
26(286), 38-39. Retrieved from
https://libraryresources.columbiasouthern.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direc
t=true&db=bth&AN=111456112&site=ehost-live&scope=site
Wheelen, T. L., & Hunger, J. D. (1987). Using the strategic audit. SAM Advanced Management Journal,
52(1), 4. Retrieved from
https://libraryresources.columbiasouthern.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?
direct=true&db=bth&AN=4604880&site=ehost-live&scope=site
Unit Lesson
When founders form companies, they usually focus on the product and the customers they hope to generate.
The founders are usually of the same mindset and intention about what they want their company to do and
how they would like it to grow. What many companies fail to plan for is the inevitable death of one of the
founding members and what that might mean for the vision and purpose of the company. In other words, what
would the management structure resemble if one of the founding partners had to deal with the heir of the
deceased partner?
For example, once, two middle-aged founders focused on the same mission, creating and living by their
cultural values and vision, diligently reaching out to their target market, and productively engaging their
customers. One partner unexpectedly died. After the funeral, the surviving founder finds himself now working
side-by-side with the recently deceased founder’s 17-year-old son or daughter. Very quickly, the surviving
UNIT I STUDY GUIDE
Governance and the Value
of Planning
https:// ...
MAJOR WORLD RELIGIONSJudaismJudaism (began .docxShiraPrater50
MAJOR WORLD RELIGIONS
JudaismJudaism (began circa 1,800 BC)
This was the first monotheistic religion on earth
God is all-powerful with many prophets, Jesus among them
Followers are called Jews, 80% of 14 million total adherents live in U.S. or Israel
Christianity
(began around 30AD)Most followers of any religion: 2 billionMost geographically widespread religionCenters on Jesus Christ as the savior whose sacrificial death forgives/erases Christians’ sinsHalf of global Christians are Catholics (the Americas) and one-fourth are Protestant (Europe and U.S.)
Islam
(began around 615AD)2nd largest world religion: 1.5 billion followersOver 80% are “Sunnis”, 20% are “Shiite”(Iran)Based on the Prophet Muhammad’s teachings & revelations
Green = Sunni
Maroon = Shiite
Buddhism
(began ca. 450 B.C.)Centered in East and Southeast Asia, 400 million followersBased on the example and teachings of Siddhartha Gautama (the Buddha) who lived in eastern India around 500 B.C.Life’s core suffering can be ended by releasing attachment to desires and becoming “awakened”
Taoism
(began ca. 500B.C.)
Lao-Tzu (Laozi) founding spiritualist/philosopher Action through non-action, simplicity, compassion, humility, learning from/oneness with the “Tao” (the force/energy of nature/all things)Practiced mostly in China, but expressed in Western pop culture (Star Wars, yoga, etc.)
HinduismFocused on the enlightened being Krishna who lived 5,000 BPBhagavad Gita religious text composed by one authorPracticed by hundreds of millions, principally in India
Animism/“Primal Indigenous”PolytheisticPracticed largely among tribal groupsEverything in nature, even non-living entities, have a spiritPhysical and spiritual realms are one, which is opposite of Western thinking
Religious Perspectives on the Human/Environment Relationship
Questions
How do you feel about Evolution vs. Creation?
Do you feel that people are more important than animals, plants, and nature?
Do you think about the effects of your lifestyle on the natural world? (trash, CO2, etc)
Do you believe that nature is here to supply man’s needs or that we have a responsibility to tend and care for nature as well?
Your responses…Indicate a position relative to some very old questions!These questions concern the fundamental or essential nature of the world, and as such they affect geographical worldviewsReligious/philosophical worldviews affect how we treat the planet
Man and Nature are Connected
Man and Nature are Separate
Judaism/Christianity/IslamEverything in nature was created by a single supreme being with unlimited powers.Man’s relationship to nature is either dominion or stewardship (but separate from nature either way).Salvation depends on faith and belief (Christianity) so issues like treatment of animals or conservation of resources are of minor ethical importanceEastern religions don’t separate man from nature as much as Abrahamic religions.
Nature as God’s Handiwork“But ...
Exploiting Artificial Intelligence for Empowering Researchers and Faculty, In...Dr. Vinod Kumar Kanvaria
Exploiting Artificial Intelligence for Empowering Researchers and Faculty,
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at Integral University, Lucknow, 06.06.2024
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An import error occurs when a program fails to import a module or library, disrupting its execution. In languages like Python, this issue arises when the specified module cannot be found or accessed, hindering the program's functionality. Resolving import errors is crucial for maintaining smooth software operation and uninterrupted development processes.
ISO/IEC 27001, ISO/IEC 42001, and GDPR: Best Practices for Implementation and...PECB
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Certified as an ISO/IEC 27001: Information Security Management Systems (ISMS) Lead Implementer, Data Protection Officer, and Cyber Risks Analyst, Denis brings a heightened focus on data security, privacy, and cyber resilience to every endeavor.
His expertise extends across a diverse spectrum of reporting, database, and web development applications, underpinned by an exceptional grasp of data storage and virtualization technologies. His proficiency in application testing, database administration, and data cleansing ensures seamless execution of complex projects.
What sets Denis apart is his comprehensive understanding of Business and Systems Analysis technologies, honed through involvement in all phases of the Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC). From meticulous requirements gathering to precise analysis, innovative design, rigorous development, thorough testing, and successful implementation, he has consistently delivered exceptional results.
Throughout his career, he has taken on multifaceted roles, from leading technical project management teams to owning solutions that drive operational excellence. His conscientious and proactive approach is unwavering, whether he is working independently or collaboratively within a team. His ability to connect with colleagues on a personal level underscores his commitment to fostering a harmonious and productive workplace environment.
Date: May 29, 2024
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Main Java[All of the Base Concepts}.docxadhitya5119
This is part 1 of my Java Learning Journey. This Contains Custom methods, classes, constructors, packages, multithreading , try- catch block, finally block and more.
A workshop hosted by the South African Journal of Science aimed at postgraduate students and early career researchers with little or no experience in writing and publishing journal articles.
Physiology and chemistry of skin and pigmentation, hairs, scalp, lips and nail, Cleansing cream, Lotions, Face powders, Face packs, Lipsticks, Bath products, soaps and baby product,
Preparation and standardization of the following : Tonic, Bleaches, Dentifrices and Mouth washes & Tooth Pastes, Cosmetics for Nails.
2. Invisible Digital Front:
Can Cyber Attacks Shape
Battlefield Events?
Nadiya Kostyuk
1
, and Yuri M. Zhukov
1
Abstract
Recent years have seen growing concern over the use of cyber
attacks in wartime,
but little evidence that these new tools of coercion can change
battlefield events.
We present the first quantitative analysis of the relationship
between cyber activities
and physical violence during war. Using new event data from
the armed conflict in
Ukraine—and additional data from Syria’s civil war—we
analyze the dynamics of
cyber attacks and find that such activities have had little or no
impact on fighting. In
Ukraine—one of the first armed conflicts where both sides
deployed such tools
extensively—cyber activities failed to compel discernible
changes in battlefield
behavior. Indeed, hackers on both sides have had difficulty
responding to battlefield
events, much less shaping them. An analysis of conflict
dynamics in Syria produces
similar results: the timing of cyber actions is independent of
fighting on the ground.
Our finding—that cyber attacks are not (yet) effective as tools
of coercion in war—
has potentially significant implications for other armed
3. conflicts with a digital front.
Keywords
compellence, coercion, physical violence, conflict, cyber
attacks
On December 23, 2015, hackers attacked Ukraine’s power grid,
disabling control
systems used to coordinate remote electrical substations, and
leaving people in the
capital and western part of the country without power for
several hours. The Security
1Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, Ann
Arbor, MI, USA
Corresponding Author:
Nadiya Kostyuk, Department of Political Science, University of
Michigan, 505 S State Street, Ann Arbor,
MI 48109, USA.
Email: [email protected]
Journal of Conflict Resolution
2019, Vol. 63(2) 317-347
ª The Author(s) 2017
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/0022002717737138
journals.sagepub.com/home/jcr
4. https://sagepub.com/journals-permissions
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717737138
http://journals.sagepub.com/home/jcr
http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1177%2F00220027
17737138&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2017-11-10
Service of Ukraine (SBU) blamed the Russian government for
the cyber attack, an
accusation that later found support in malware analysis by a
private computer
security firm. The Ukrainian hack was the first publicly
acknowledged case of a
cyber attack successfully causing a power outage. It is also just
one of thousands of
cyber activities, mostly diffuse and low level, that have
occurred alongside physical
fighting in Ukraine. Attacks launched through the digital realm
are playing an
increasingly visible role in civil and interstate conflict—in
Ukraine, Syria, Israel,
Estonia, Georgia, and beyond. Yet it remains unknown whether
such activities have
a real coercive impact on the battlefield.
1
Recent years have seen growing concern over the coercive
5. potential of cyber
capabilities in war, but little evidence that these new tools are
yet making a differ-
ence. Theoretically, most research has focused on the
consequences of cyber attacks
for peacetime deterrence rather than wartime compellence
(Libicki 2009; Sharma
2010; Andres 2012).
2
Yet the logic of coercion entails distinct challenges in peace
and war, with potentially different implications for the cyber
domain. Empirically,
the literature has relied more on qualitative case studies than
quantitative data. The
few data sets that do exist (Valeriano and Maness 2014)
privilege massive cyber
catastrophes over less sophisticated low-intensity attacks, like
distributed denial of
service (DDoS). The latter category, however, is far more
common.
This article asks whether cyber attacks can compel short-term
changes in battle-
field behavior, using new event data on cyber and kinetic
operations from armed
6. conflicts in Ukraine and Syria. We use the Ukrainian conflict as
our primary test case
due to the extensive and sophisticated use of cyber attacks by
both sides (Geers
2015), and—uniquely—overt claims of responsibility, public
damage assessments,
and other releases of information that reduce uncertainty over
timing and attribution.
Since 2014, Ukraine has turned into “a training playground for
research and devel-
opment of novel attack techniques” (Zetter 2017). If cyber
attacks can yet make a
difference on the battlefield, Ukraine is one a few cases where
we are most likely to
observe such an effect. Our data include 1,841 unique cyber
attacks and 26,289
kinetic operations by government and prorebel forces between
2014 and 2016. We
supplement this quantitative analysis with fourteen primary
source interviews with
participants in the cyber campaign as well as Ukrainian,
Russian, and Western cyber
security experts with direct knowledge of these operations.
7. To evaluate the generalizability of the Ukrainian experience to
other conflicts, we
replicate our results with data from Syria’s civil war. Like
Ukraine, Syria has seen
the extensive use of low-level cyber attacks by factions fighting
for and against the
incumbent regime. Because this war has gone on significantly
longer than the
conflict in Ukraine—giving hackers more time to organize and
develop their cap-
abilities—Syria offers a glimpse at cyber activities in a more
protracted, higher
intensity context. If we uncover similar patterns in two conflicts
of such different
scale and complexity, we can have greater confidence that our
results are not arti-
facts of a single idiosyncratic case. Our data include 682 cyber
attacks and 9,282 acts
of violence by pro- and anti-Assad forces between 2011 and
2016.
318 Journal of Conflict Resolution 63(2)
Evidence from both conflicts suggests that cyber attacks have
not created forms
8. of harm and coercion that visibly affect their targets’ actions.
Short of mounting
synchronized, coordinated cyber campaigns, each group of
hackers has seemed to
operate in its own “bubble,” disengaged from unfolding events
in both cyberspace
and the physical world. The lack of discernible reciprocity
between cyber and kinetic
operations—and between the cyber actors themselves—
questions whether cyber
attacks can (yet) be successfully deployed in support of military
operations.
This disconnect may be temporary, as joint planning and
execution concepts
continue to evolve. Many countries, for instance, still struggle
in coordinating air-
power for ground combat support, a century after World War I.
Our study highlights
some of the difficulties that countries will need to overcome in
integrating and
synchronizing these new capabilities.
Our contribution is fourfold. We offer the first disaggregated
analysis of cyber
9. activities in war and take stock of the empirical relationship
between the cyber and
kinetic dimensions of modern battle. To do so, we collect the
first microlevel data on
wartime cyber attacks, using both open media sources and
anonymous attack traffic
data. Theoretically, our analysis addresses an important
question on the coercive
impact of low-level cyber attacks, advancing a literature that
has been heavy on
deductive argumentation, but light on evidence. Finally, from a
policy standpoint,
our findings should temper the popular tendency to overhype
the transformative
potential of cyber attacks. At present, interaction between cyber
and kinetic opera-
tions is similar to that between airpower and ground operations
in World War I—
when armies began to use aircraft for reconnaissance but had
not realized their full
potential to shape battlefield outcomes.
Varieties of Cyber Activity
The term “cyber activities” captures a diverse assortment of
tactics and procedures,
10. directed against different types of targets, in pursuit of
disparate objectives. Not all
of these activities seek to achieve battlefield effects in the same
way. Before pro-
ceeding further, we differentiate between two broad goals these
actions tend to
pursue: propaganda and disruption.
3
Cyber activities in the propaganda category seek to influence
public opinion
and indirectly undermine an opponent’s financing or
recruitment. Operations in
this group include leaks of compromising private information,
online publication
of partisan content (e.g., “trolling” on comments pages), and the
establishment of
dedicated websites and forums to promote an armed group’s
message. Unless it
openly incites or discourages violence, propaganda affects
kinetic operations only
indirectly by undermining an opponent’s support base or
obfuscating perceptions
of events.
11. In the Ukrainian conflict, the importance of both groups attach
to online propa-
ganda is evident from the time and resources pro-Kyiv fighters
spend updating
Wikipedia, and pro-Russia groups devote to creating and
running dedicated
Kostyuk and Zhukov 319
YouTube channels and social media accounts. Russian military
doctrine places a
heavy emphasis on the strategic use of information in warfare,
as does US cyber-
space joint planning doctrine.
The second category of cyber attacks—disruption—seeks to
directly sabotage
opponents’ ability to operate in the physical or electronic realm.
These mostly low-
intensity activities include denial of service attacks, which
make targeted resources
unavailable through a flood of requests from a single source,
and DDoS attacks,
where requests originate from multiple compromised systems.
Related efforts
12. include inundating communications systems with floods of text
messages or phone
calls and using fire walls and proxies to block access to
websites. At the extreme end
of the scale is the use of malicious code to inflict physical
damage or otherwise
compromise infrastructure and military objects. Examples
include interception of
drones, communications and surveillance systems, control of
Wi-Fi access points,
and collection of protected information via phishing.
The most sophisticated known attack of this type is the Stuxnet
worm,
which—before its discovery in 2010—targeted industrial control
systems critical
to uranium enrichment in Iran. In Ukraine, notable disruptive
activities have
included attacks on the Central Election Committee’s website
during the 2014
presidential elections and attacks on the country’s power grid in
2015 and 2016.
Other examples include the use of malware to collect
operational intelligence,
like X-Agent, which retrieved locational data from mobile
13. devices used by Ukrai-
nian artillery troops, and the hacking of closed-circuit
television (CCTV) cameras
behind enemy lines.
Propaganda and disruption are not mutually exclusive, and
many cyber activities
serve both purposes—shaping public opinion through disruption
or disrupting an
opponent’s operations by shaping public opinion. For example,
altering the visual
appearance of websites can have the dual effect of embarrassing
the target and
limiting its ability to communicate. Leaks of private
information also have dual
implications for targets’ public image and physical security.
Recent examples of hybrid activities include the defacement of
US Central
Command’s Twitter and Facebook pages by the Islamic State’s
(IS) Cyber Caliphate
and operations by US Cyber Command against IS beginning in
April 2016. In
Ukraine, the pro-rebel group CyberBerkut (CB) has leaked
private communications
14. from senior United States, European Union, and Ukrainian
officials and disclosed
identities of pro-Kyiv field commanders—simultaneously
creating a media scandal
and forcing targets to commit more resources to personal
security. Similarly, the
pro-Kyiv website Myrotvorets’ published names and addresses
of suspected “rebel
sympathizers”—information that allegedly facilitated several
assassinations
(Il’chenko 2016).
In the following, we limit the scope of our inquiry to cyber
actions that are either
purely disruptive (e.g., DDoS-style attacks) or are hybrids of
the two approaches
(e.g., web defacements). We do so for two reasons. First, most
purely propagandistic
operations, like comment-board trolling, do not aspire to
influence the course of
320 Journal of Conflict Resolution 63(2)
military operations in the short term. Second, it is hard to
separate the disruptive and
15. propaganda effects of hybrid cyber activities because they
depend on each other.
Cyber Coercion in Wartime
Over the last two decades, cyber attacks have become an
increasingly common tool
of coercion, used by state and nonstate actors, independently
and jointly with phys-
ical, kinetic operations. Like other instruments of coercion,
cyber actions inflict
costs on a target to compel a change in its behavior—either by
punishing past
misdeeds or by putting pressure on decision makers in real time.
The role of cyber compellence in wartime is not unlike that of
airpower or
terrorism (Pape 2003, 2014). Cyber attacks cannot take or hold
territory on their
own, but they can support operations on the ground by
disrupting opponents’ com-
mand and control, collecting operational intelligence, and
creating opportunities for
conventional forces to exploit. If combatants use the Internet
for coordination,
recruitment, or training, low-level cyber disruption may prevent
them from running
16. these vital functions smoothly.
4
Alternatively, cyber attacks can indirectly pressure
an opponent by targeting civilian economy and infrastructure,
similarly to strategic
bombing. Yet unlike airpower, an operational cyber capability
is relatively inexpen-
sive to develop. It does not require new massive infrastructure,
and many activities
can be delegated to third parties (Ottis 2010). Unlike terrorism,
the individual
attacker is rarely at risk of direct physical harm.
Despite the apparent promise of these “weapons of the future”
(Schmitt 1999;
Rios 2009; Clarke and Knake 2010; McGraw 2013; Eun and
Aßmann 2014), some
scholars are skeptical that low-level cyber attacks can be an
effective tool of coer-
cion (Liff 2012; Rid 2012; Gartzke 2013; Junio 2013). There is
little doubt that large
numbers of low-level attacks can cumulatively produce large-
scale damage, bring-
ing “death by a thousand cuts” (Lemay, Fernandeza, and Knight
17. 2010). Yet suc-
cessful coercion also requires punishment to be both anticipated
and avoidable
(Schelling 1966), and these criteria can be difficult to meet in
cyberspace.
Cyber attacks can be challenging for targets to anticipate
because attackers face
strong incentives to mount surprise “zero-day” exploits, before
targets recognize and
patch their vulnerabilities (Axelrod and Iliev 2014).
5
Since the destructiveness of
malicious code depreciates quickly after first use, cyber attacks
are often most
damaging when they are least anticipated.
Targets also have many reasons to doubt that cyber attacks are
avoidable by
accommodation. For the attacker, cyber actions present a trade-
off between plausi-
ble deniability—which helps prevent retaliation—and the
credibility of coercive
promises and threats.
6
18. Any uncertainty over the source of an attack will also create
uncertainty over the nature of compliance—what sort of actions
will prevent future
attacks and by whom.
Beyond attribution uncertainty, cyber attacks may not generate
sufficient costs to
elicit compliance from. Because administrators can quickly fix
or contain many
Kostyuk and Zhukov 321
exploited vulnerabilities, even successful attacks cause only
temporary disruption
(Axelrod and Iliev 2014). Unless the attacker continues to
develop new methods and
identify new vulnerabilities, a protracted campaign may quickly
lose its coercive
impact. As a result, targets may see compliance as insufficient
and unnecessary to
stop the damage (Hare 2012; Lynn 2010; Nye 2010).
Force synchronization challenges may also render the timing of
cyber attacks
suboptimal for compellence. Hackers—especially those not
integrated with military
19. forces—may not observe battlefield events on a tactically
relevant time line. Even if
they did, the lead time required to plan and implement a
successful attack—studying
the target system, collecting intelligence on its vulnerabilities,
and writing code that
exploits them—can make these efforts difficult to synchronize
with conventional
operations.
These challenges are not insurmountable. Lead time is a greater
barrier for high-
level attacks (e.g., targeting major infrastructure) than for more
routine, DDoS-style
attacks. Force synchronization difficulties are also not unique to
the cyber domain
and are well established in research on terrorism and airpower
(Atran 2003; Pape
2003, 2014). The ability of contemporary hackers to overcome
these difficulties,
however, remains unknown.
Previous Research
The question of whether low-level cyber attacks compel has
deep implications for
20. the theory and practice of national security. Yet the public and
academic debate on
this topic has unfolded largely in the absence of rigorous
empirical evidence in either
direction. Existing political science and policy literature on
cybersecurity could be
grouped into three broad areas: the “big picture” of cyber
warfare (Cha 2000;
Griniaiev 2004; Libicki 2007, 2011; Czosseck and Geers 2009;
Clarke and Knake
2010; Axelrod and Iliev 2014), the overlap between cyber and
kinetic capabilities
(Healey 2013; Kello 2013; Libicki 2015; Andress and
Winterfeld 2013; Axelrod
2014), and the effect of information and communication
technology on conflict
(Martin-Shields 2013; Pierskalla and Hollenbach 2013;
Crabtree, Darmofal, and
Kern 2014; Gohdes 2014; Bailard 2015).
Most research in the first category has focused on the
implications of cyber
activities for peacetime deterrence or the offense–defense
balance rather than war-
21. time compellence. While the second group focuses more
directly on cyber attacks
during conflict, its empirical approach has been mostly
qualitative, relying on evi-
dence from descriptive case studies, macrohistorical surveys,
and stylized facts.
Some large-n analyses do exist (Valeriano and Maness 2014),
but their scope has
remained on large-scale cyber attacks rather than the far more
numerous low-
intensity operations we consider here. While the third group
does employ the
statistical analysis of disaggregated data, its theoretical scope is
distinct from main-
stream literature on cyber attacks—evaluating, for instance,
how technology affects
collective action (Weidmann 2015) rather than military
compellence.
322 Journal of Conflict Resolution 63(2)
Our study bridges the gap between these areas of inquiry. Our
goal is to assess the
coercive potential of low-level cyber actions during an armed
conflict. We pursue
22. this goal by studying the magnitude and direction of the
relationship between cyber
attacks and physical violence, using microlevel data from
ongoing conflicts in
Ukraine and Syria.
Empirical Expectations
Cyber attacks by actor A can affect physical violence by B in
one of the three ways:
negatively, positively, or not at all. If cyber compellence is
successful, we should
expect a short-term decrease in violence after a spike in cyber
attacks. A positive
response would suggest failure, where cyber attacks actually
escalate violence by the
opponent. If no relationship exists, cyber actions are either
ineffective or irrelevant
to fighting in the physical world.
In addition to compellence across domains, cyber attacks by
actor A may impact
cyber attacks by actor B. As before, only a negative relationship
would imply
coercive success, while a null or positive response would
suggest that these actions
23. are either ineffective or counterproductive.
Data Analysis
To evaluate whether and how cyber actions affect physical
violence in war, we
analyze new micro-level data from Ukraine and Syria. We begin
with an in-depth
study of the Ukrainian case, as one of few conflicts where both
sides have used cyber
attacks as a means of coercion. Due to the sophistication of
hackers on both sides, the
public nature of many attacks, and an abundance of data, the
Ukrainian conflict
allows us to observe the short-term coercive impact of cyber
attacks.
7
We then use
analogous event data on Syria to evaluate the generalizability of
our results. While a
more systematic analysis of cross-national patterns lies beyond
the scope of our
article, micro-level evidence from these two conflicts might be
suggestive of general
patterns of modern warfare—particularly where combatants with
24. asymmetric cap-
abilities use cyberspace along with traditional tools of war.
In assembling our data, we follow two general guidelines. To
address systematic
differences in event reporting cross countries and media outlets
(Baum and Zhukov
2015; Davenport and Stam 2006; Woolley 2000), we draw data
from multiple open
sources—including press reports and anonymous attack traffic
data. To reduce
potential false positives, we include only those events that have
been reported by
more than one source.
8
Ukraine Cyber Attacks Data
Our cyber event data on Ukraine include 1,841 unique, mostly
low-level, cyber
attacks from August 27, 2013, to February 29, 2016, drawn from
two sets of sources.
Kostyuk and Zhukov 323
First are media reports of cyber attacks from rebel, Russian,
Ukrainian, and Western
25. news outlets, press releases and blogs along with social media
platforms used by the
involved nonstate actors.
9
Second is the private cyber security firm Arbor Networks’
Digital Attack Map (DAM; see
http://www.digitalattackmap.com/about/). Unlike
media sources—which include only cyber attacks publicly
reported by news orga-
nizations or claimed by governments and hacker groups
directly—DAM draws on
anonymous attack traffic data and network outage reports to
enumerate the top 2
percent of reported attacks that generate unusually high Internet
traffic for each
country. Including these “higher-visibility” attacks should make
it easier to find a
coercive effect.
We supplemented these data with fourteen primary source
interviews with parti-
cipants in the cyber campaign, as well as Russian, Ukrainian,
and Western cyber
security experts with direct knowledge of these operations, from
26. the private and
public sectors, academia, and journalism.
10
We conducted all interviews in person or
via e-mail or Skype in the summer and fall 2015 and provide
full transcripts in the
Online Appendix (Kostyuk and Zhukov 2017).
We grouped cyber attacks in our data set according to the
partisanship of alleged
perpetrators (pro-Ukrainian vs. prorebel) and the type of
operation they conducted
(propaganda vs. disruption). Table 1 list all actors conducting
cyber activitiess in the
Ukrainian conflict, their targets, and the reported frequency of
their activities.
Ukrainian cyber actions include specific attacks by pro-Kyiv
hackers like
Anonymous Ukraine and Ukrainian Cyber Forces (UCFs). The
latter is the most
active group on the pro-Ukrainian side. In an interview, UCF
leader Eugene
Dokukin claimed to have established the nonstate group in
March 2014, in
27. response to Russian cyber attacks. Due to the “secret nature” of
the organization,
Dokukin was reluctant to discuss its size but noted that the
number of volunteers
fluctuates depending on the state of kinetic operations in eastern
Ukraine (Kostyuk
and Zhukov 2017, # 1). Pro-Kyiv hackers’ most common targets
are the commu-
nications and finances of rebel units as well as media firms and
private companies
in rebel-held areas.
Prorebel cyber actions include specific attacks by proseparatist
or pro-Russian
cyber actors, like CB, Cyber Riot Novorossiya, Green Dragon,
and the Russian
government. The first of these takes its name from Ukraine’s
disbanded Berkut riot
police and claims to fight “neofascism” in Ukraine. Ukrainian
and Russian cyber
experts we interviewed offered contradictory assessments on
CB’s organizational
structure. One Russian expert said that CB consists of former
SBU employees who
lost their jobs after the Euromaidan revolution (Kostyuk and
28. Zhukov 2017, # 12).
Contrarily, Ukrainian interviewees viewed CB either as a virtual
group controlled by
the Federal Security Service (FSB) or as a unit within the FSB
(Kostyuk and Zhukov
2017, #7 & #8). These groups’ most popular targets include
Ukrainian government
officials, media, and private citizens.
We further disaggregated these events into the two categories
previously
defined—propaganda or disruption—as well as a third, hybrid,
category of incidents
324 Journal of Conflict Resolution 63(2)
http://www.digitalattackmap.com/about/
T
a
b
le
1
.
A
ct
o
61. cameras and other
communications. Website blockages have also proven popular,
as have spear-
phishing e-mails targeting specific individuals. Table 2 provides
a full breakdown.
To reduce false positives due to unconfirmed reports or dubious
claims of respon-
sibility, we only include attacks reported by more than one
source. To account for
uncertainty of attribution, we marked as “disputed” all cases
where no one claimed
responsibility and labeled as “nondisputed” those operations for
which actors
directly claimed responsibility in press releases, on social
media, or in interviews.
11
To focus on daily dynamics, we excluded activities whose
intensity did not vary over
time.
12
Figure 1a depicts the temporal dynamics of pro-Ukrainian
(Cyber U) and
pro-Russian rebel (Cyber R) cyber operations.
13
62. In early March 2014, about a
week after the revolution in Kyiv, Figure 1 shows a spike in
attacks by CB.
The same month saw the establishment of the pro-Kyiv
Ukrainian Cyber
Forces, partly in response to CB’s attacks. However, UCF
operations do not
become visible until May 2014, following an influx of
volunteers to the group.
May 2014 is also notable for a rise in activities by another pro-
Russian cyber
group, Cyber Riot Novorossiya—named after the czarist-era
term (“New
Russia”) for territories in southeastern Ukraine. After the first
Minsk cease-
fire agreement in September 2014, operations by pro-Ukrainian
hackers con-
verge to a steady rate of two to four per day, with occasional
flare-ups, as in
December 2014. Activities by pro-Russian hackers, by contrast,
declined after
the summer 2014.
Ukraine Violent Events Data
63. Our data on kinetic operations include 26,289 violent events
from Ukraine’s Donbas
region, recorded between February 28, 2014, and February 29,
2016. To offset
reporting biases in any one source, while guarding against
potential disruptions in
media coverage due to cyber attacks, these data draw on
seventeen Ukrainian,
Russian, rebel, and international sources.
14
As before, we include only events that
appeared in more than one source.
To extract information on dates, locations, participants, and
other event details,
we relied on a combination of supervised machine learning
(Support Vector
Machine) and dictionary-based coding. The Online Appendix
describes our mea-
surement strategy and provides summary statistics.
Figure 1b shows the temporal distribution of pro-Ukrainian
(Kinetic U) and pro-
Russian rebel (Kinetic R) physical violence. The plot shows
several notable flare-
64. ups of fighting—during a government offensive in late June
2014 and a rebel
offensive in January 2015—as well as lulls following cease-fire
agreements in
September 2014, February 2015, and September 2015.
Compared to the cyber
operations in Figure 1, this plot reveals a clear correlation
between kinetic operations
326 Journal of Conflict Resolution 63(2)
T
a
b
le
2
.
T
yp
e
s
o
f
C
yb
e
88. 0
0
)
327
by the two sides, with government and rebel attacks rising and
falling in tandem.
15
Although this interdependence is not surprising, the data
suggest that—with few
exceptions—physical violence in Ukraine has been a reciprocal
affair.
From a brief glance at the timing of cyber and physical
operations (Figure 1a
and b), there are relatively few signs of a compellence effect—
changes in the
former do not appear to drive changes in the latter. However, a
visual compar-
ison can be misleading. Some of the variation may be due to
fighting on the
ground or in cyberspace, but other changes may reflect secular
trends or shocks
due to elections and other events not directly related to conflict.
To account for
89. these potential confounding factors and to gauge whether there
is a stronger
cyber–kinetic relationship than we would expect by chance, we
conduct a series
of more rigorous tests.
Figure 1. Cyber and kinetic operations in Ukraine (March 2014–
February 2016). U (blue)
indicates operations by Ukrainian government forces; R (red)
indicates operations by pro-
Russian rebel groups.
328 Journal of Conflict Resolution 63(2)
Empirical Strategy
To evaluate the relationship between cyber and kinetic
operations in Ukraine, we
estimate a series of vector autoregressive models
16
Yt ¼
Xp
j
BjYt�j þ GXt þ m0 þ m1t þ �t; ð1Þ
where Yt ¼
h
y
90. KineticðUÞ
t ; y
KineticðRÞ
t ; y
CyberðUÞ
t ; y
CyberðRÞ
t
i0
is a matrix of endogenous
variables, and Xt ¼ ½x1t; . . . ; xkt�
0
is a matrix of k exogenous variables, which
includes indicators for key dates and events during the war, like
presidential and
parliamentary electoral campaigns in Ukraine and breakaway
territories; cease-fire
agreements; and Ukrainian, Russian, and Soviet holidays.
Deterministic components
include a constant term (m0) and trend (m1t). p is the lag order,
selected via Bayesian
information criterion, and �t is a vector of serially uncorrelated
errors.
We control for Ukrainian, Russian, and Soviet holidays because
91. anecdotal
accounts suggest significant increases in cyber activity during
such times. The UCF,
for instance, had an operation called “Happy New Year,” which
sought to print pro-
Ukrainian messages from hacked printers in Crimea, Russia, and
Donbas. National
election campaigns represent another time when such activities
may spike. Before
and during the presidential elections, for instance, hackers
bombarded Ukraine’s
Central Electoral Committee website with DDoS attacks.
Finally, we may expect
cease-fire agreements aimed at reducing physical violence to
also have an effect in
the cyber domain. For example, the cyber espionage operation
“Armageddon”—
directed against Ukrainian government websites—intensified
before the Minsk I
agreement went into force but then rapidly declined.
Because we are interested in the relationship between cyber
attacks and physical
violence during war, we limit our primary analysis to the active
phase of military
92. operations between May 11, 2014, and February 15, 2015—the
period following
independence referendums organized by the self-proclaimed
Donetsk and Luhansk
People’s Republics and the second Minsk cease-fire agreement.
In the Online Appen-
dix, we present additional analyses of the full data set, which
produced similar results.
Results
Data from Ukraine support the skeptical view of cyber coercion.
The impulse–
response curves in Figure 2 show a strong, escalatory dynamic
between kinetic
operations by the two sides (Kinetic U, Kinetic R), but no
tangible links in either
direction between kinetic and cyber operations, and no
reciprocity between cyber
actions (Cyber U, Cyber R).
Following a standard deviation increase in kinetic rebel attacks,
government
violence sees a delayed rise, peaking around two days after the
shock and gradually
Kostyuk and Zhukov 329
108. operations also rise after
shocks to government operations (second row, first column), but
the response here is
immediate, without the delay we observe in government
operations. This pattern
may reflect command and control inefficiencies in the Ukrainian
army, particularly
early in the conflict, when indecision and leadership turnover
lengthened decision
cycles.
The relationship between cyber and kinetic operations is far
weaker than that
between rebel and government violence on the ground. Cyber
attacks by pro-
Ukrainian forces see no increase after shocks in kinetic
government operations, and
a positive, but uncertain increase after shocks in kinetic rebel
operations (third row,
first and second columns).
There is even less evidence that cyber attacks drive kinetic
operations. The
impulse–response function (IRF) curve for pro-Ukrainian
government violence is,
109. in fact, negative after shocks to rebel cyber operations (top row,
two rightmost
columns). Although this negative response might otherwise
suggest that cyber
attacks compel a decline in violence—consistent with coercive
success—the esti-
mate is also highly uncertain. Following shocks to pro-
Ukrainian cyber activities,
meanwhile, the main change in rebel kinetic operations is a
short-term increase in
volatility (second row, third column). In sum, the data suggest
that cyber attacks may
make violence less predictable but do not systematically change
its intensity.
Perhaps most surprisingly, there is little or no apparent strategic
interaction
between “cyber-warriors” on each side of the conflict. A shock
in pro-Ukrainian
cyber attacks yields no discernible change in pro-rebel cyber
attacks (bottom row,
third column) and vice versa (third row, fourth column). The
two cyber campaigns,
the data suggest, have unfolded independently of each other and
independently of
110. events on the ground.
As the diagonal elements in Figure 2 suggest, there is strong
autocorrelation in
each series. For each of the four categories, past shocks in
operations yield a sig-
nificant spike in subsequent operations. To evaluate whether the
other categories of
events can help us predict future values of each series, after we
take this autocorre-
lation into account, Table 3 reports the results of Granger
causality tests. The tests
confirm that past levels of prorebel and pro-Kyiv kinetic
operations help predict
each other’s future values. Kinetic operations, however, do not
appear to “Granger
cause”—or be “Granger caused” by—cyber attacks on either
side.
Table 4 reports the forecasting error variance decomposition,
representing the
proportion of variation in each series (rows) due to shocks in
each endogenous
variable (columns). For most variables, their own time-series
account for almost
all variation at the outset, but this dependency gradually
111. decreases. As before,
there is far more dependence within kinetic operations than
between kinetic and
cyber or within cyber actions. By the thirty-day point in the
daily time series,
shocks in rebel attacks account for 7 percent of variation in
Ukrainian government
operations, while shocks in government operations explain 12
percent of variation
in rebel violence.
Kostyuk and Zhukov 331
Table 4. Variance Decomposition, Daily Time Series (Ukraine).
Operation type Kinetic (U) Kinetic (R) Cyber (U) Cyber (R)
Kinetic (U)
1 Day 1.000 .000 .000 .000
2 Days 0.920 .060 .002 .018
7 Days 0.906 .071 .002 .020
30 Days 0.906 .071 .002 .020
Kinetic (R)
1 Day 0.108 .892 .000 .000
2 Days 0.121 .873 .000 .006
7 Days 0.122 .870 .000 .008
30 Days 0.122 .870 .000 .008
112. Cyber (U)
1 Day 0.000 .002 .998 .000
2 Days 0.000 .002 .997 .000
7 Days 0.000 .003 .997 .000
30 Days 0.000 .003 .997 .000
Cyber (R)
1 Day 0.012 .023 .000 .964
2 Days 0.014 .023 .001 .962
7 Days 0.015 .023 .001 .961
30 Days 0.015 .023 .001 .961
Note: “U” indicates kinetic and cyber operations by pro-
Ukrainian government forces, and “R” indicates
operations by pro-Russian rebel forces.
Table 3. Granger Causality Test, Daily Time Series (Ukraine).
Effects F statistic p value
Kinetic (R) ! Kinetic (U) 40.26 .00
Cyber (U) ! Kinetic (U) 0.50 .48
Cyber (R) ! Kinetic (U) 0.09 .76
Kinetic (U) ! Kinetic (R) 12.29 .00
Cyber (U) ! Kinetic (R) 1.44 .23
Cyber (R) ! Kinetic (R) 2.70 .10
Kinetic (U) ! Cyber (U) 1.40 .24
Kinetic (R) ! Cyber (U) 1.88 .17
Cyber (R) ! Cyber (U) 0.00 .95
Kinetic (U) ! Cyber (R) 1.74 .19
Kinetic (R) ! Cyber (R) 0.14 .71
Cyber (U) ! Cyber (R) 0.89 .35
Note: “U” indicates reported kinetic and cyber operations by
Pro-Ukrainian government forces, and “R”
indicates operations by Pro-Russian rebel forces.
113. 332 Journal of Conflict Resolution 63(2)
By contrast, shocks to cyber activities account for very little
variation in kinetic
operations. The highest value is for pro-Russian rebel cyber
activities, which
account for 2 percent of short-term variation in government
violence. Cyber attacks
by each side also have a relatively small impact on each other.
Indeed, rebel kinetic
operations explain more of the variation in cyber attacks by
each actor than do cyber
attacks by the other side.
In sum, our analysis suggests that low-level cyber attacks in
Ukraine have had no
effect on the timing of physical violence. Not only is there no
evidence that cyber
attacks have compelled opponents to de-escalate fighting, there
is no discernible
reciprocity between the cyber actors themselves. Each group of
hackers seems to
operate in its own bubble, disengaged from unfolding events in
both cyberspace and
114. the physical world.
Robustness Checks
To gauge the sensitivity of our results to various modeling and
measurement
choices, we conducted extensive robustness checks. We
summarize their results
briefly here (Table 5) and more fully in the Online Appendix.
The first set of tests considers vector autoregression models
with alternative
orderings of the four endogenous variables, which affects
estimation of impulse
responses. We find no substantive differences across the
twenty-four permutations.
In a second set of robustness checks, we account for systematic
differences in the
kinds of conflict events that Ukrainian and Russian media
report, which may bias
statistical estimates—for example, by underreporting violence
by a given actor.
Using kinetic data from exclusively Russian or exclusively
Ukrainian sources does
not change the results.
115. A third set of robustness tests examines different subsets of
cyber attacks.
Because purely disruptive activities may impose greater
immediate costs than
quasi-propagandistic hybrid attacks, pooling these events may
dilute their coercive
effect. Our results are consistent for all three subsets.
The last set of robustness checks examines different time
periods of the conflict,
since some cyber attacks predated military activity. In
particular, we compare the
period of intense fighting previously analyzed (May 11, 2014–
February 15, 2015) to
the entire date range for which we have data (February 28,
2014–February 29, 2016).
Our results remain unchanged.
Evidence from Interviews
In interviews, Russian and Ukrainian cyber security experts
highlighted five poten-
tial explanations for the apparent failure of cyber coercion in
Ukraine: (1) lack of
resources, (2) lack of coordination, (3) lack of targets, (4) lack
of audience, and (5)
116. lack of effort.
Kostyuk and Zhukov 333
T
a
b
le
5
.
R
o
b
u
st
n
e
ss
C
h
e
ck
s
(U
k
ra
in
186. U
k
ra
in
ia
n
.
335
The first explanation for coercive failure emphasizes limited
resources and cap-
abilities, particularly for the Ukrainian government. Ten years
ago, the SBU briefly
had a cyber department but shut it down after a year (Kostyuk
and Zhukov 2017, #3).
This unit has recently reopened but continues to lack funding
and personnel (Kos-
tyuk and Zhukov 2017, #3, #9). It is possible that, with
adequate resources, cap-
abilities, and human capital, the Ukrainian cyber campaign
might have been more
effective. Resource constraints, however, do not explain
coercive failure on the pro-
187. Russian side, where investment in cyber capabilities is more
robust.
A second explanation is lack of government coordination with
hackers, especially
in Kyiv (Maurer and Geers 2015). UCF founder Eugene
Dokukin claims to regularly
provide the SBU with intelligence from hacked CCTV cameras
and has offered
cooperation in the past, with no success (Kostyuk and Zhukov
2017, #1). The SBU’s
lack of desire to cooperate with the UCF could be due to the
illegality of the latter’s
activities or the low priority the SBU assigns to cyber actions in
the first place
(Kostyuk and Zhukov 2017, #1, #3, #9). Yet again, this
explanation is less plausible
on the pro-Russian side, where the Kremlin has cultivated
extensive ties with non-
state hacktivists.
A third explanation is that—even with requisite capabilities and
coordination—
there are few opportune targets for disruption in Ukraine. Most
industrial control
systems that run Ukraine’s critical infrastructure—particularly
188. its Soviet-era com-
ponents—are off-line, making remote access difficult (Geers
2015; Kostyuk and
Zhukov 2017, #3, #13). Yet some experts disagreed, noting that
“weakness of
infrastructure [security] should have provoked a DDoS attack”
(Kostyuk and Zhu-
kov 2017, #11). The 2015 and 2016 hacks of Ukraine’s power
grid also seem to
challenge this explanation.
The peculiarities of Ukraine’s online population represent a
fourth explanation
for the indecisiveness of cyber attacks. Since only 44.1 percent
of Ukrainians have
Internet access—compared to 88.5 percent in the United States
and 71.3 percent in
Russia (see http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users-by-
country/)—and most
use it only for social media, a low-level cyber attack that blocks
or defaces govern-
ment websites is unlikely to influence the masses (Kostyuk and
Zhukov 2017, #3).
Some experts speculated that this online population pays more
attention to purely
189. propagandistic campaigns than disruptive ones (Kostyuk and
Zhukov 2017, #7,
#11). Our data suggest that, even if this were the case,
propagandistic attacks still
had no effect on violence.
The final explanation is that cyber compellence failed because it
was never seri-
ously attempted. At first, our interviews with individual hackers
revealed no shortage
of coercive intent. UCF leader Eugene Dokukin claimed to
conduct low-level attacks
daily and vowed to continue until pro-Russian rebels lay down
their arms. Dokukin
further insisted—contrary to our findings—that there is close
coordination between
Russia’s cyber and kinetic campaigns (Kostyuk and Zhukov
2017, #1).
While UCF and other nonstate groups have explicitly sought to
affect battlefield
outcomes, some interviewees questioned whether this intent
extended to the Russian
336 Journal of Conflict Resolution 63(2)
http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users-by-country/
190. government. Since Ukraine’s information and
telecommunication networks gener-
ally use Russian hardware and software, Moscow can monitor
its neighbor with
assets already in place (Kostyuk and Zhukov 2017, #5, #12).
17
This access, along
with vigorous cyber espionage—some of it ongoing since
2010—may create incen-
tives against more aggressive actions, which could compromise
valuable sources of
intelligence.
Consistent with the “lack of effort” explanation, some experts
noted a shift in
Russia’s broader cyber strategy, away from disruption and
toward propaganda (Kos-
tyuk and Zhukov 2017, #11). When in 2011 Vyacheslav Volodin
replaced Vladislav
Surkov as head of the Presidential Administration, he toughened
existing laws
against Russia’s opposition and promoted the use of mass media
and online plat-
191. forms—tools already mostly under state control—to conduct
information cam-
paigns. If Russia’s cyber activities have shifted toward
propaganda due to this
strategy change, weak short-term battlefield effects should not
be surprising (Kos-
tyuk and Zhukov 2017, #2, #14).
Evidence beyond Ukraine: Syria’s Digital Front
According to evidence from microlevel data and interviews,
cyber attacks did not
affect battlefield events in Ukraine. During one of the first
armed conflicts where
both sides used low-level cyber actions extensively, events in
the digital realm have
unfolded independently of—and have had no discernible effect
on—events on the
ground. Conditions in Ukraine were in many ways optimal to
observe the coercive
impact of cyber actions, for reasons we already discussed (i.e.,
visibility of major
attacks, regular claims of responsibility, less uncertainty over
attribution). Yet we
found no evidence that low-level cyber attacks affected physical
violence. Nor did
192. hackers on each side even affect each other’s activities.
While important, Ukraine is not the only contemporary conflict
with a significant
cyber dimension. In Syria, state and nonstate actors have
employed low-level cyber
actions extensively for propaganda and disruption,
complementing traditional tools
of warfare in the deadliest conflict ongoing today. Syria’s war
has also lasted three
years longer than Ukraine’s. Over this time, its digital front has
expanded in scope
and sophistication, offering a glimpse of cyber coercion in a
more protracted setting.
An in-depth study of Syria’s digital front lies beyond the scope
of this article. A
brief analysis of the data, however, suggests that our findings
from Ukraine may be
part of a broader pattern: cyber capabilities have not yet
evolved to the point of
having an impact on physical violence.
To evaluate the effectiveness of cyber compellence in this
second case, we
replicated the model in (equation 1), using an analogous daily
193. time series of cyber
attacks and violent events in Syria. Our data comprise 9,282
kinetic and 682 low-
level cyber attacks ranging from March 2011 until July 2016.
18
Table 2 provides a
breakdown of cyber techniques used in the Syrian conflict, their
brief description,
and frequency.
19
Our data on kinetic operations rely on human-assisted machine
Kostyuk and Zhukov 337
coding of event reports from the International Institute for
Strategic Studies Armed
Conflict Database (see Online Appendix for details).
Given the complex nature of the Syrian conflict and the
multiple parties involved,
we restrict our analysis only to operations by progovernment
forces (i.e., Syrian
Army, Hezbollah and pro-Assad militias) and the main rebel
opposition (i.e., Free
194. Syrian Army, Jaish al-Fatah, including Al Nusra Front). Table 1
provides a list of
cyber actors in the Syrian conflict, their targets, and frequency
of their activities.
The dynamics of cyber and kinetic operations in Syria exhibit
similar patterns to
what we saw in Ukraine. Raw data (Figure 3a and b) suggest
relatively little overlap
in timing, especially at the beginning of the conflict. The IRF
curves in Figure 4
show a rise in rebel operations following shocks to government
operations (second
row, first column), and mostly negligible (though negative)
links between cyber and
kinetic operations, and across cyber attacks by each actor. Links
between kinetic
Figure 3. Cyber and kinetic operations in Syria (March 2011–
July 2016). G (blue) indicates
operations by pro-Assad government forces; R (red) indicates
operations by anti-Assad rebel
groups.
338 Journal of Conflict Resolution 63(2)
R
es
209. an
ti
-A
ss
ad
re
b
e
l
fo
rc
e
s.
339
operations—and their disconnect from cyber attacks—are also
evident in variance
decomposition results, and Granger tests, provided in the Online
Appendix.
There are several reasons for caution in interpreting these
results. The Syrian
conflict involves a larger constellation of actors than Ukraine,
and our dyadic anal-
ysis may overlook significant interactions elsewhere,
particularly between actors
210. with more developed cyber capabilities (e.g., Russia, United
States). We also lack
interview evidence that might help contextualize the null effect.
However tentative,
these results do align with what we saw in Ukraine: low-level
cyber attacks have had
little or no impact on violence.
Conclusion
The evidence we presented in this article—based on analysis of
new data and expert
interviews—suggests that cyber attacks are ineffective as a tool
of coercion in war.
Although kinetic operations explain the timing of other kinetic
operations, low-level
cyber attacks have no discernible effect on violence in the
physical world. In
Ukraine and Syria, the “cyberwar” has unfolded in isolation
from the rest of the
conflict.
This finding has several implications for theory and policy.
First, by providing the
first statistical analysis of modern low-level cyber campaigns,
our study comple-
211. ments the qualitative focus of previous empirical work. Second,
our research sheds
light on a theoretical question about the strength and direction
of the cyber–kinetic
relationship and—in so doing—begins to fill an empirical gap in
political science
literature on this topic. Third, to the extent that policymakers
might overestimate the
importance of cyber actions due to a lack of empirical evidence
to the contrary, our
findings can potentially help correct this misperception. Finally,
and more worry-
ingly, our results suggest that—due to their disconnect from
physical violence—
low-level cyber attacks are very difficult to predict.
Further research is needed to understand the dynamics of low-
level cyber attacks.
One such area of research is cyber coercion in the context of
symmetric, conventional
war. While our study helps illuminate dynamics of cyber
compellence between parties
with asymmetric capabilities, we may well observe different
patterns when major
powers use cyberspace against peer competitors. Thankfully, no
212. armed conflict has
yet provided researchers with the data needed to evaluate this
possibility.
Second, our scope in this article has been exclusively on short-
term military
consequences rather than long-term political effects. The latter
are no less theore-
tically significant, but—unlike simple counts of violent
events—potentially more
difficult to measure and analyze. A study of long-term political
effects would also
need to more systematically incorporate purely propagandistic
cyber activities and
their impact on public opinion, which we omitted here due to
our focus on short-term
military compellence.
Although the secretive nature of many ongoing physical and
digital operations is
a challenge for this research, questions over the coercive
potential of cyber attacks
340 Journal of Conflict Resolution 63(2)
will become only more salient in the future. In June 2017, the
213. New York Times
reported that US cyber efforts against the IS—previously lauded
as “a [major] shift
in America’s war-fighting strategy and power projection”
(Sabah 2016)—have
yielded few tangible successes (Sanger and Schmitt 2017). Our
data from Ukraine
indicate that the US experience may be part of a broader
pattern.
At best, coordination between low-level cyber and kinetic
operations today is on
roughly the same level as that between airpower and ground
operations in World
War I. Back then, armies were increasingly using aircraft for
reconnaissance and
surveillance on the front but were not yet able to fully exploit
their potential for
ground combat support and strategic bombing. That revolution
appeared on the
battlefield twenty-five years later, with devastating effect. As
cyber capabilities
develop and synchronization challenges become less severe,
there will be a growing
need for assessments of how far we have come. We hope that
214. analyses of the sort we
provided in these pages can serve as an early benchmark.
Authors’ Note
A previous version of this article was presented at the 2015
Peace Science Society Interna-
tional annual meeting, Oxford, MS, and at the Association for
the Study of Nationalities
Convention at New York, NY.
Acknowledgments
We are grateful to Maura Drabik, Paulina Knoblock, Neil
Schwartz, and Alyssa Wallace for
excellent research assistance. Robert Axelrod, Myriam Dunn-
Cavelty, Eric Gartzke, Miguel
Gomez, Todd Lehmann, Jon Lindsay, Tim Maurer, Brandon
Valeriano, Christopher Whyte,
and workshop participants of the Conflict & Peace, Research &
Development workshop at the
University of Michigan, of the Bridging the Gap Workshop on
Cyber Conflict at Columbia
University, of the Cross-Domain Deterrence lab at the
University of California, San Diego,
and of the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich provided
helpful comments on the earlier
215. drafts of this article.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with
respect to the research, author-
ship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research,
authorship, and/or publication of
this article.
Supplemental Material
Supplemental material for this article is available online.
Notes
1. We define coercion as an attempt to influence a target’s
behavior by increasing the costs
associated with an unwanted action. Cyber activities apply these
costs through the
Kostyuk and Zhukov 341
disruption, destruction, malicious control, or surveillance of a
computing environment or
216. infrastructure (Kissel 2013). Kinetic or physical operations
apply costs through physical
force. Low-level cyber attacks cause minor disruptions and
include web-page deface-
ments, phishing, distributed denial of service attacks. High-
level cyber attacks include
serious disruption with loss of life and extensive infrastructure
disruption.
2. Deterrence seeks to convince a target to not start an
unwanted action. Compellence seeks
to convince the target to stop an ongoing unwanted action.
3. We use propaganda when referring to the propaganda
category, cyber attacks when
referring to disruption (Cartwright and James 2010), and hybrid
cyber operations when
referring to hybrids of the two.
4. For example, US Cyber Command has used low-level cyber
operations to “disrupt the
ability of the Islamic State to spread its message, attract new
adherents, circulate orders
from commanders and [pay] its fighters” (Sanger 2016).
5. A zero-day vulnerability is a security hole previously
unknown to the target.
217. 6. This trade-off is not unique to the cyber domain. In civil
conflict, for example, pro-
government militias pose a similar dilemma for state repression
(Gohdes and Carey
2017).
7. Another potentially illuminating case, which we are unable to
analyze here, is the Rus-
sian–Georgian War of 2008. This earlier conflict laid much of
the groundwork for the
crisis in Ukraine. For the first time in history, cyberspace
played a highly visible role in
armed conflict, facilitating strategic communication between
civilian and military lead-
ership, disabling or degrading key infrastructure, exploiting or
hijacking government
computer systems, while also serving as a tool for propaganda
(Deibert, Rohozinski, and
Crete-Nishihata 2012). While some of the lessons of the
Russian–Georgian War might
well run counter to our claims in this article, its short duration
(five days) complicates
analysis, for three reasons. First is a lack of sufficient variation
in cyber attacks over this
abbreviated period. Second is the difficulty of differentiating
218. the “cyber effect” from the
near-simultaneous effects of conventional military operations.
Third is the problem of
generalizability: its five-day duration is an extreme outlier
among interstate and civil
wars (interstate wars, on average, tend to last a few years; the
average civil war lasts
between seven and twelve years post-1945). For these reasons,
we are unable to quanti-
tatively establish whether synchronized usage of cyberspace,
along with traditional tools
of war, had a tangible coercive impact in Georgia.
8. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 along with the Online Appendix provide
an overview of these
sources.
9. Rebel sources include Donetsk News Agency. Russian
sources include RIA Novosti,
Sputnik, and Vesti.ru. Ukrainian sources include Interfax-
Ukraine, Segodnya, and
RBK-Ukraina. Western sources include technical (Arstechnica,
Digital Dao, Information
Week, F-Secure, Graham Cluley, and TechWeek Europe) and
mainstream news (Die
219. Welt, Newsweek, New York Times, Politico, Postimees
(Estonia), Security Affairs, and
The Christian Science Monitor).
10. Our Ukrainian interviewees included experts from the
Ukrainian Cyber Forces, Computer
Emergency Response Team of Ukraine, StopFake, InfoPulse,
Luxoft, Berezha Security,
342 Journal of Conflict Resolution 63(2)
Open Ukraine Foundation, and the Ukrainian Central Election
Committee. Western
experts’ affiliations include New York University, Chatham
House, the Center for Stra-
tegic and International Studies, RAND Corporation, The
Economist, Mashable, New
America Foundation, and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization Cyber Center of Excel-
lence. Due to the complicated political situation in Russia at the
time, many of our
contacts there refused to speak on record, with the exception of
a journalist from Agen-
tura.ru. However, many Western interviewees have lived in
Russia, speak the language,
220. and are knowledgeable on Russia’s information security issues.
11. This is a very conservative standard of attribution, since it
includes only direct claims of
responsibility and not accusations by others—even if the latter
are substantiated by
evidence. For instance, we marked as “disputed” the cyber
espionage operation Arma-
geddon—which multiple governments and private security firms
have attributed to the
Russian state—because Moscow never claimed responsibility.
12. Excluded operations included the malware Blackenergy,
first launched by Quedagh in
2010; Operation Potao Express, a targeted espionage campaign
launched in 2011 against
the Ukrainian government, military, and news agencies; and
Snake, a cyber espionage
campaign against Ukrainian computer systems.
13. We aggregated these data to daily time series because
geolocation is not possible.
Although some individual cyber attacks could, in theory, be
tracked to their targets, they
represent a small proportion of events. As a result, our cyber
data are national-level time
221. series. Even if we could geolocate all targets of cyber attacks,
the diffuse nature of the
target set makes spatial matching difficult—servers do not need
to be physically located
in the war zone for service disruptions to have an effect in the
war zone.
14. Ukrainian sources include Channel 5, Espresso.tv,
Information Resistance, 112 Ukraina,
and the newswire services Interfax-Ukraine and Ukrinform.
Russian sources include the
state-owned television news channel Russia-24; the independent
TV station Dozhd;
nongovernment news websites Gazeta.ru, Lenta.ru, and BFM.ru;
and the Interfax news-
wire service. Pro-rebel sources include Donetsk News Agency,
NewsFront, and Rus-
vesna.su. Also included are the Russian language edition of
Wikipedia and daily
briefings from the Organization for Security and Co-operation
in Europe Special Mon-
itoring Mission to Ukraine. Since these are mostly online
resources, cyber disruptions can
potentially cause underreporting of violence. Our approach
helps ensure that if, for
222. instance, a Ukrainian media firms’ servers went down,
information could still reach the
outside world through one of the sixteen other sources. While
unlikely, such endogenous
disruptions should increase our chances of finding a coercive
cyber effect.
15. Because geolocation is not possible for cyber attacks, we
aggregate the physical violence
data to daily time series to merge and analyze the data sets.
16. Vector autoregression is a common method to study
interdependence among multiple
time series in economics and political science. Previous
applications to conflict research
include studies of reciprocity in civil conflicts (Pevehouse and
Goldstein 1999) and the
dynamics of terrorism (Enders and Sandler 2000; Bejan and
Parkin 2015).
17. An example is Russia’s Sistema operativno-rozysknykh
meropriyatiy (system for opera-
tional investigative activities), which searches and monitors
electronic communications.
Kostyuk and Zhukov 343
223. 18. Sources of cyber operations include social media accounts
of anonymous or anonymous-
supported groups (e.g., New World Hacking); Syrian Electronic
Army’s social media
accounts; reports by tech companies (e.g., risk-based security,
Electronic Frontier Foun-
dation); computer-security news sources including Graham
Cluley, TechWeek Europe,
Arstechnica, Information Week, Digital Dao, Computer Weekly,
Tech News, Wired, and
Security Affairs; Middle Eastern mass media sources (e.g.,
Turkish News, Arabiya, Doha
News); Russian mass media and social media (e.g., RT.com,
Yahoo.com); and Western
news sources (e.g., Security Affairs, The Christian Science
Monitor, Politico, Die Welt,
Reuters, International Business Times, Mashable, Washington
Times, The Guardian,
British Broadcasting Corporation, etc.).
19. Since propaganda operations are not a major focus of our
article, we collected only a
small sample of such events during the Syrian conflict.
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>> setpagedevice
ITS 834 Emerging Threats and Countermeasures
Total points - 100
Midterm Research Paper- The paper is due on end of day
Sunday March 29, 2020
Write a research paper on the topic
Cyber warfare and its implications for the United States
Your research paper should be minimally 10 pages (double
spaced, Font - Georgia with
font size 12). The research paper needs to refer to the following
source
❑ Kostyuk, N., and Zhukov., M., Y. (2019). Invisible Digital
Front: Can Cyber
Attacks Shape Battlefield Events? Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 63(2)., 317-347.
(pfd version of paper is uploaded to module 4 in d2l).
❑ In addition you need to have at least 5 peer reviewed
journal/book references
244. The research needs to minimally discuss the following
❑ The relevance of cyber warfare for the United States
❑ What are some examples of possible cyber warfare scenarios
where critical
infrastructure could be affected
❑ Emerging technologies that can be used for cyber warfare
❑ What does Kostyuk and Zhukov (2019) address mainly in
their paper? Do you
agree with Kostyuk and Zhukov (2019) that cyber-attacks are
ineffective as a tool
of coercion in war? Ensure to explain why or why not.
❑ Future implications of cyber warfare for the United States
The bibliography should be included as a separate page and is
not part of the 10 page
requirement. Student assignments will be run through Safe
Assignment. Please ensure
to check the safe assignment result prior to submitting.
You will have the chance to submit your assignment up to two
times. So
please submit earlier than the due date so you can check your
245. safe assign
score. You need to check your safe assign report to ensure there
is no
instance of academic integrity violations.
Please refer to this link for information on the academic
integrity policy at
the university https://cumberland.smartcatalogiq.com/en/2017-
2018/2017-2018-Undergraduate-
Catalog/Academic-Affairs/Academic-Integrity-Policy
https://cumberland.smartcatalogiq.com/en/2017-2018/2017-
2018-Undergraduate-Catalog/Academic-Affairs/Academic-
Integrity-Policy
https://cumberland.smartcatalogiq.com/en/2017-2018/2017-
2018-Undergraduate-Catalog/Academic-Affairs/Academic-
Integrity-Policy
Please ensure to review the policy. If there are instances of
academic
integrity policy violations in your paper, you will not receive a
grade for the
assignment and will be referred to the department.
Please note the following consequences for instances of
academic integrity
violations
1. First Offense – 0 for the assignment
246. 2. Second Offense – 0 for the course
3. Third Offense – Dismissal from the University
The university of Cumberland library can be assessed at
https://www.ucumberlands.edu/library
The research paper should include the following components.
● Title Page (Not part of the minimum 10 page requirement)
● Abstract (quick overview in your own words of the entire
content of your paper,
limited to 200-350 words)
● Introduction (1-2 pages, relevance of cyber warfare for the
U.S, example, possible
scenarios_
● Literature Review (2-4 pages, describes the research papers
that you find in
reference to the topic of cyber warfare, emerging technologies
that can be used,
the impact of cyber warfare)
● Discussion (2-3 pages) – (Your perspective on the topic of
cyber warfare,
247. implications for the U.S, critical perspectives and/or
recommendations)
● Conclusion (1-2 paragraphs, This provides a final summary
of your research
paper)
● Bibliography in APA format
The following rubric will be used to grade your assessment
Evaluation Parameters Percentag
e Weight
Did the student respond to the research topic 20
Did the student conduct sufficient literature review of the topic
20
Did the student provide relevant examples to support viewpoints
20
https://www.ucumberlands.edu/library
Did the student meet the content requirements of the assignment
and
discuss the key points identified in the question
20
248. Did the student provide a critical perspective on the topic 10
Did the student create a professional, well-developed report
with proper
grammar, spelling, punctuation and APA formatting
10
Total 100%
Please refer to the following for APA guidelines
https://owl.purdue.edu/owl/research_and_citation/apa_style/apa
_formatting_and_st
yle_guide/general_format.html
https://owl.purdue.edu/owl/research_and_citation/apa_style/apa
_formatting_and_style_guide/general_format.html
https://owl.purdue.edu/owl/research_and_citation/apa_style/apa
_formatting_and_style_guide/general_format.html
Ch3BData.sav