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![16 Chapter 1
variability and human-caused climate change. If there is no human-
caused climate change, the models cannot explain the temperature
record; in fact, they show that the likely natural causes of climate vari-
ability over recent periods would have produced a slight cooling rather
than warming.16
Moreover, an alternative explanation would have to
address why the basic science, that carbon dioxide produces a green-
house effect, is wrong. As David Archer, a climate scientist at the Uni-
versity of Chicago, observes, to have an alternative explanation of the
temperature record, we would need not one but two entirely novel
scientific discoveries: one to explain what is causing the temperature
increase and another to explain why the carbon dioxide is not trap-
ping heat as expected.17
By analogy, if we find the butler standing in
front of a victim with smoke coming out of his gun, it is possible that
someone else is the criminal, but we would have to be able to find that
someone else and explain the gun and the smoke. This is a tall order.
The IPCC therefore concludes that “it is extremely unlikely that global
climate change of the past 50 years can be explained without external
forcing [i.e., emissions of greenhouse gases].”18
We will take significant
human-caused climate change as entirely beyond debate.
Figure 1.1 Global Land-Ocean Temperature Anomaly (ºC).
1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
–0.4
–0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Annual mean
5-year mean
Temperature
Index
(°C)](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/25978614-250514133606-c8f5ae14/75/Climate-Change-Justice-Course-Book-Eric-A-Posner-David-Weisbach-30-2048.jpg)
![The blood feud
and therefore
blood fine
between kindreds.
The slayer flees to
a church with his
cattle.
Six cows for the
saraad or insult.
120 cows by
fortnightly
instalments for
galanas.
But if a tribesman of one kindred were killed by a
tribesman of another kindred, then it was a serious
matter of blood feud between the kindreds, or of
the payment of the blood fine. The tribal
conscience demanded vengeance or composition.
It sometimes happened that the murderer had
fled to a church for safety, taking his cattle with
him. For the clergy or monks at the place of refuge
had a herd of cattle of their own, and with them
the murderer’s cattle were allowed to wander and graze so long as
they returned nightly to the refuge.[45]
There he remained presumably till the kindred of
the murdered tribesman, through negotiation and
arrangement of the chiefs of the kindreds, had
agreed to accept the payment of the galanas, if it were the case of
an uchelwr or full tribesman, of 126 cows. Six cows, as we shall see
hereafter, were saraad for the insult, and 120 cows galanas for the
murder. The saraad was paid first—six cows or other cattle to the
same value belonging to the murderer were driven from the herd in
payment.
The murderer’s life was then safe, and presumably he might
return with his cattle to his place.
Within a fortnight, the tribesmen of the murderer’s kindred met to
apportion the payment of the rest. They came from trefgordds far
and near, from the territories sometimes of various higher territorial
chieftains within whose districts they had grazing rights.
The collected tribesmen having apportioned the
payment, fortnight after fortnight instalments must
be paid till the whole number in value of 120 cows
was completed.[46]
But by whom was the payment to be made?[47]](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/25978614-250514133606-c8f5ae14/75/Climate-Change-Justice-Course-Book-Eric-A-Posner-David-Weisbach-58-2048.jpg)
![The slayer’s near
family pay 40
cows.
The other 80 fall
on the kindred.
The slayer’s right
of ‘spear penny.’
Forty cows must first be found by the murderer,
his father, mother, brothers, and sisters with him.
They doubtless helped one another, but
theoretically, in one or other of the common herds,
there must have been cattle belonging to the murderer, his father,
mother, brothers, and sisters, or how could they have paid their
shares? There was nothing unreal in this liability of each to pay a
share, for had the murderer been slain each one of them would have
received, instead of having to pay, a share in 40 cows.
The murderer himself had to pay a third of the 40 cows if he had
them. His father and mother between them paid the next third, and
the brothers and sisters the remaining third, the sisters paying half
what the brothers did.[48] The herds of many a trefgordd must be
thinned before this could be done.
The remainder of the galanas, viz. 80 cows, fell
on the kindred, to the seventh degree or fifth
cousins. The paternal relations had to find two
thirds of it and the maternal one third, and these kindreds embraced
the descendants from the great-grandparents of the great-
grandparents on both sides.
In the first fortnight the kindred on the father’s side had to find
half what was due from them. In the second fortnight they had to
find the other half, and in the third fortnight the maternal kindred
had to find their share, till so at last the full tale of the 120 cows was
paid. The oath of peace from the kindreds of the murdered man
could then be given, and the murderer and his kinsmen, be at
peace.[49]
But what happened if the murderer could not
find the cattle for his third of the 40 cows which he
and his immediate family had to find? He had yet a
right, as a member of the greater kindred, to claim in aid a ‘spear
penny’ from all those male kinsmen descended from a common
ancestor on his father’s side two steps further back, i.e. still more](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/25978614-250514133606-c8f5ae14/75/Climate-Change-Justice-Course-Book-Eric-A-Posner-David-Weisbach-59-2048.jpg)
![The solidarity of
the kindred and
individual liability
within it.
Each had his da
or cattle for
maintenance and
so could
contribute to the
payment.
The galanas and
the saraad distinct
things.
distantly related to him than those included in the kindred to the
seventh degree who had already paid their share. Even if the slayer
were a woman, she had the same right of spear penny from the
men of her kindred to help her to make her payment.[50]
So this attempt to realise what was involved in
the payment of an ordinary case of galanas brings
us back to the recognition of the double aspect of
the kindred in the structure of tribal society—its
solidarity and joint responsibility, on the one hand,
as against outsiders, the whole kindred being responsible in the last
resort; on the other hand the individual responsibility of its
members, graduated according to nearness of relationship, for the
crimes of their relative.
In Cymric tribal society this was made possible
by the broad fact that both males and females in
the group of kindred, on both paternal and
maternal sides, liable to pay, had cattle of their
own in the common herd, each having received his
or her da for maintenance by right of kin and
descent from the common ancestor or chieftain of the kindred. The
two things surely hang together. And therefore, if we find in the laws
of other tribes somewhat similar rules regarding the payment of
wergelds, it probably will be worth while to inquire further whether
the corresponding structure of tribal society, or something more or
less equivalent to it, may not be present also.
VI. THE AMOUNT OF THE CYMRIC GALANAS.
In all the Welsh Codes the galanas, as already
mentioned, is described in a peculiar form. It is a
combination of two items, viz. the saraad, or
payment for insult, and the galanas proper.
Thus the galanas of the innate boneddig, or young tribesman,
accepted by the kindred as a tribesman of nine descents of Cymric](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/25978614-250514133606-c8f5ae14/75/Climate-Change-Justice-Course-Book-Eric-A-Posner-David-Weisbach-60-2048.jpg)
![The wife shared
in the saraad of
her husband, not
in the galanas.
blood, is described as ‘three kine and three score kine,’ that of the
uchelwr or breyr as ‘six kine and six score kine.’
The explanation of this is obtained from the following passage:—
What is the galanas of the breyr without office? Six kine and six
score kine. The six score kine is the galanas and the six kine is for
saraad of the corpse.[51]
So also in the Gwentian Code:—
When a married man shall be murdered his saraad is first paid and
then his galanas, for the wife has the third of the saraad, and she
has no part of the galanas.[52]
So also in the Venedotian Code:—
No one is killed without being first subjected to saraad. If a man
be married, let a third of the man’s saraad be given to his wife and
let the two shares be placed with the galanas, and after that let the
galanas be divided into three shares and let the third share go to the
lord as exacting third.[53]
The reason why the wife has a share in the
saraad and not in the galanas has already been
explained. She suffers from the personal affront or
insult to her slain husband and shares in the
saraad. But she has no blood relationship with her
husband, and only the husband’s kindred are therefore entitled to
share in the galanas, as her husband’s kindred alone would have
been concerned in the feud.
The saraad and the galanas were therefore separate things and
subject to separate rules, though both payable on the murder of a](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/25978614-250514133606-c8f5ae14/75/Climate-Change-Justice-Course-Book-Eric-A-Posner-David-Weisbach-61-2048.jpg)
![That of the
‘uchelwr’ 120
cows; of the
young tribesman
60 cows.
Description of the
normal cow.
tribesman. The galanas proper is what must be regarded in any
comparison with Continental wergelds.
The real galanas of the uchelwr or breyr, apart
from the saraad, was 120 cows, and that of the
young innate boneddig who had received his da
but had no family was 60 cows. In one of the
Codes his galanas when married is said to be 80
cows.
Now in what currency was the galanas paid? Formerly, according
to the Codes, all payments were made in cattle, and the galanas
proper was reckoned in scores of cows.
But of what cow? How was the normal cow for practical purposes
to be defined? It is a question worth answering, because we may
probably take the Cymric method, of valuing the cow as a unit of
currency in cattle, as at any rate suggestive of the methods
generally adopted by other tribes.
According to the Venedotian Code the cow was
of full normal value when in full milk and until her
fifth calf.
And if there be any dispute concerning her milk, she is to be taken
on the 9th day of May to a luxuriant place wherein no animal has
been before her, and the owner is to milk her without leaving any for
the calf, and put the milk in the measure vessel, and if it be full
twice a day that is sufficient; and if it be not, the deficiency is to be
compensated by oatmeal until the feast of St. Curic, thence until the
feast of St. Michael by barley meal, and from thence until the
calendar of winter by rye meal.
Others say that the worth of the milk deficient in the measure is to
be returned to the possessor of the cow; if half the milk be deficient,
half the worth; if a third of the milk, a third of the worth; and that is
the best mode.[54]](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/25978614-250514133606-c8f5ae14/75/Climate-Change-Justice-Course-Book-Eric-A-Posner-David-Weisbach-62-2048.jpg)
![The cow reckoned
as three ‘scores’
or ounces of
silver.
Then the milk measure is described thus:—
The measure for her milk is, three thumbs at the bottom, six in
the middle of the vessel, and nine at the top, and nine in its height
diagonally (enyhyd en amrescoeu), and the thumb whereby the
vessel is to be measured (in case of dispute) is the breadth of the
judge’s thumb.
In the Dimetian Code substantially the same rules are given,
except that the measure of the cow’s milking is smaller.
The measure of a vessel for a cow’s milk is nine thumbs at its
edge, and three at the bottom, and seven diagonally from the off-
side groove to the near-side edge in height.[55]
The only difference is between the seven and the nine thumbs of
diagonal measurement. Possibly there may be some error in the
figures, and the measure may have been the same in both Codes.
Returning to the galanas; although it was reckoned in the Codes in
scores of cows, a fixed equation had already been made between
cows and silver.
The normal cow was equated in the Codes with
‘three scores of silver.’ And in the Latin version of
the Dimetian Code the ‘score of silver’ is translated
by ‘uncia argenti.’ The score of silver at the date of
the Code was therefore an ounce of silver. So that
the reckoning is the Frankish or Anglo-Saxon one of twenty pence to
the ounce.
The score of pence of 32 wheat-grains would make the ounce of
640 wheat-grains: that is, the ounce of the pound of 240d., or 7680
wheat-grains—the pound in use in England after the time of Kings
Offa and Alfred, and at the date of the Codes.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/25978614-250514133606-c8f5ae14/75/Climate-Change-Justice-Course-Book-Eric-A-Posner-David-Weisbach-63-2048.jpg)
![After four
generations on
the land they
become adscripti
glebæ and obtain
recognition of
kindred.
Their rights
increase with
growth of
kindred.
once the Roman provinces of Gaul and the two Germanies, and even
also in Britain.[56] But I think that in Cymric tribal custom we may
find a fresh clue worth following in the attempt to gather from
Continental evidence the methods likely to be used by conquering
German or Anglo-Saxon tribes in the treatment of strangers in blood.
[57]
In Welsh tribal custom alltuds or strangers and
their descendants (not necessarily otherwise unfree
persons) having some special circumstances in
their favour, being allowed to settle within the
district of a greater or lesser chieftain upon land
which, in a sense, may have been his demesne
land, were free to remove and settle under another
chieftain, unless and until they had remained on the same land or
under the same lordship for four generations. But thereafter the
great-grandchildren of the original settlers became adscripti glebæ.
And this fixture to the land, or rather to the lordship, was apparently
not looked upon as in any way a degradation in rank, but on the
contrary a step in advance towards the recognition of tribal rights.
The great-grandson of the stranger did not indeed become a Cymric
tribesman, but he gained the recognition of his status as the founder
of a kindred of his own, the members of which in after-generations
would, as kinsmen, be able to swear for and defend one another.
This being so in the case of free strangers coming into the
country, the next question is what was the position of the semi-
servile class, the aillts and taeogs of the Codes, who and whose
ancestors for many generations had been born upon the land in a
semi-servile condition?
The fixture to the land of the aillt or taeog was
not the special mark so much of a semi-servile
condition as of his want of recognised kindred, and
under the local custom of South Wales it seems
that he too, like the alltud, could sometimes arrive
at the recognition of kindred, without indeed becoming a Cymric](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/25978614-250514133606-c8f5ae14/75/Climate-Change-Justice-Course-Book-Eric-A-Posner-David-Weisbach-65-2048.jpg)
![Want of kindred
the key to their
position.
tribesman, at the end of four generations of residence under the
chieftain of the land; and even to further recognition of it, involving
a still better position as to rights, at the ninth generation. The ninth
man in South Wales seems according to local custom in some
districts to have, at last, climbed the highest rung of the ladder, and
to have attained the right to claim the status of a Cymric tribesman.
This curious rise under Cymric custom, by steps of four
generations, up the ladder towards the recognition of tribal rights,
seems to have a suggestive correspondence with the reverse
process under manorial usage of proving the serfdom of a nativus by
showing that the great-grandfather was a nativus on the lord’s land,
the manorial rule being that settlement on servile land for four
generations made the posterity of an original settler into nativi.[58]
Once more let us try to realise what this meant,
and what was the position of these Cymric non-
tribesmen in regard to their settlement on land.
If under the guidance of the Codes we turn to
the extents and surveys, we find them living, in some cases, not
mixed up with the tribesmen, but in separate groups, or trefs, or
trefgordds. There may be here and there exceptional alltuds or
strangers of a higher class growing up, by the gradual process of
intermarriage for four generations with tribeswomen, into the status
of tribesmen. But the mass of the stranger class were aillts and
taeogs living in separate taeog trefs, though, according to the
surveys, sharing, often in common, certain rights of grazing over
certain districts with gwelys of tribesmen. Now these groups of
taeogs and aillts were, according to the Codes, as we have seen, of
two classes, and we recognise the same two classes when we find in
the surveys not only groups of taeogs in taeog-trefs but also gwelys
of non-tribesmen.
The normal group of the taeog-tref differed from the free tref in
the fact that in it no family rights were recognised. All the members
of it shared in its rights and payments equally per capita, and not
per stirpes. They were all liable as a body, few or many, for the](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/25978614-250514133606-c8f5ae14/75/Climate-Change-Justice-Course-Book-Eric-A-Posner-David-Weisbach-66-2048.jpg)
![What were the
laws of the blood
feud?
An 8th century
story of blood
feuds.
CHAPTER III.
THE EVIDENCE OF BEOWULF ON TRIBAL
CUSTOM REGULATING FEUDS c.
The object of the short study, in this chapter, of
Beowulf, is to learn what incidental information it
may give of tribal usage regarding the blood feud,
especially on points which, in the case of the
substituted wergeld, present doubt and difficulty.[59]
Allusion has already been made to some of these points. Did the
rule excluding galanas or blood-fine within the kindred extend
beyond the gwely to the greater kindred? What happened to a
tribesman in a feud between his paternal and maternal kindreds?
Did he abstain from taking sides, or did a marriage so far unite two
families or kindreds as to make them one for the purpose of blood-
fine or feud, so as to prevent the feud or blood-fine from arising?
These are questions upon which we want light from the point of
view of Welsh tribal custom, and upon which we approach Beowulf
for light, with eyes open also to other matters of tribal usage as they
may turn up.
Beowulf for the present purpose may be taken as
an Anglian or Northumbrian recension of a story
founded upon Scandinavian tradition, and designed
for use or recital at some 8th century royal court—
possibly, if Professor Earle’s suggestion be correct, that of King Offa.
The western horizon of the story extends to the Frisian shores, but
the scene seems chiefly to lie in the Baltic.
The plot involves tribal relations between a chieftain of the Danes
possibly of Zealand, and two Swedish chieftains. The two latter](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/25978614-250514133606-c8f5ae14/75/Climate-Change-Justice-Course-Book-Eric-A-Posner-David-Weisbach-70-2048.jpg)
![Beowulf as ‘sister’s
son’ becomes chief
of his maternal
kindred.
A long interval had elapsed between Beowulf’s accession to the
chieftainship of his maternal kindred and the final feat of daring which cost
him his life. And it was Wiglaf, his nearest paternal kinsman, who in the last
tragedy came to his aid bearing the sword of the outlawed Eanmund.
Beowulf’s dying words to Wiglaf were: ‘Thou art the last left of our kindred
(cynnes) the Wægmundings. Fate has swept into eternity all my kinsmen
(mâgas)—eorls among men! I must after them!’ As he comes to the rescue,
Wiglaf remembers the honour done to him by Beowulf, who had already
passed on to him the hereditary right of the chieftainship of the
Wægmundings (2608).
Why had he done this? If we might tentatively use the
clue given by ancient Greek tribal custom to elucidate a
Scandinavian case, we should say that on failure of male
succession the ‘sister’s son’ of Hygelac had been called
back into his mother’s kindred to become its chieftain,
leaving Wiglaf, his next of kin on his father’s side, to sustain the
chieftainship of his paternal kindred. The right of the maternal uncle, known
to have existed under early Greek law, to claim his ‘sister’s son’ if need
arose, to perpetuate the mother’s paternal kindred, suggests a similar
explanation in Beowulf’s case. Such a right, found as well in the Laws of
Manu, may possibly have been inherent in Scandinavian tribal custom also.
Such a suggestion would be at least consistent with the fact of Beowulf’s
having been brought up from seven years old in the household of his
maternal grandfather, and treated by him as a son. It would be in harmony,
too, with what Tacitus describes to have been the relation of the ‘sister’s
son’ to the avunculus amongst the German tribes, and the peculiar value of
the ‘sister’s son’ as a hostage.[60]
Some indirect confirmation of the probable truth of such a suggestion may
perhaps be also drawn from the fact that in Beowulf, when a man’s father is
no longer living, the poet sometimes seems to describe him as his maternal
uncle’s nephew instead of as his father’s son.
Heardred, the young son of Hygelac and Hygd his queen, after his father’s
death is spoken of no longer as Hygelac’s son, but as the nephew of Hereric,
‘nefan Hererices’ (2207). Now his paternal uncles were Herebeald and
Hæthcyn, and it becomes an almost necessary inference that Hereric was a
maternal uncle. Thus:
Hæreth (1929)](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/25978614-250514133606-c8f5ae14/75/Climate-Change-Justice-Course-Book-Eric-A-Posner-David-Weisbach-79-2048.jpg)
![Tribal custom as to
marriage.
Marriage a link
between kindreds.
father of Hygd
|
+------------+-----------+
| |
(Hereric?) Hygd, m. Hygelac
uncle of Heardred (2207) |
Heardred
nephew of Hereric[61]
(2207)
So also in the case of Hygelac himself. He was the son of Hrethel. The
poet calls him son of Hrethel (1486), and again Hygelac Hrethling (1924).
But after Hrethel’s death he calls him ‘Hygelac of the Geats, nephew of
Swerting’ (‘Hygelac Geáta nefa Swertinges’) (1204). Here again it seems
likely that Swerting was the maternal uncle, though the poet, as in the other
case, does not think it needful to explain that it was so. Otherwise, why the
change of epithet?
We are here recording tribal customs as revealed in Beowulf, and not
seeking for their origin in earlier stages of tribal life. We pass on, therefore,
to consider what light the story throws on the customs of the Northern
tribes as to marriage.
It is with the chieftains’ grade of rank that we have
mostly to do in Beowulf, and nothing is more strongly
emphasised by the poet than the important place of
marriage between two tribes or kindreds as a link, recognised, however, to
be a very brittle one, binding them together so as to end or prevent the
recurrence of a feud.
When Beowulf, after his first exploit in aid of Hrothgar against Grendel,
has returned to his maternal uncle and chief of kindred Hygelac, and is
recounting his adventures, the poet at the first mention of Hrothgar’s queen
makes him call her the ‘peace bond to the people.’ And in the same breath,
in telling how in Hrothgar’s hall the daughter Freaware bore the ale-flagon,
he stops to tell how that ‘she, the young, the gold dight, was promised to
the gay son of Froda; it having pleased the Friend of the Scylfings that he,
through that woman, should compose deadly enmities and feuds.’ And the
poet makes Beowulf moralise to the effect:—‘Often and not seldom
anywhere after deadly strife, it is but a little while that the baneful spear
reposes, good though the bride may be!’
It would seem that Hrothgar had been formerly at feud
with the Heathobeards, that Froda had been killed in the](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/25978614-250514133606-c8f5ae14/75/Climate-Change-Justice-Course-Book-Eric-A-Posner-David-Weisbach-80-2048.jpg)
![Goidelic tribal
custom differed
from Cymric.
CHAPTER IV.
TRIBAL CUSTOM OF THE IRISH TRIBES.
I. THE ERIC FINE OF THE BREHON LAWS.
Returning now once more to the examination of tribal
custom and the structure of tribal society in the case of
tribes belonging to the Celtic group, it might be expected
that Cymric customs would be likely most closely to
accord with those of the Celtic tribes of Ireland, Brittany, and Gaul. But it
must be remembered that the Cymry whose customs are contained in the
Codes, whatever their original Continental position may have been, are
supposed to have come into Wales from the North, with Cunedda and his
sons. The Codes therefore probably represent the customs of the Cymry of
ancient Cumbria north of the Solway Frith, rather than those of the Britons,
whether Goidels or Cymry, dwelling in South Wales and more or less subject
for generations to Roman rule.
If the theory of the emigration from Wales and Cornwall into Brittany, as
the consequence of the Saxon invasion, be correct, the Britons who
emigrated into Brittany may never have shared the peculiar customs of the
immigrants into Wales following upon the conquests of Cunedda and his
sons. They may have had more in common with the Goidelic tribes of South
Wales than with the Cymric newcomers into Wales.
These considerations may well prepare the way for the recognition of
differences as well as resemblances between Cymric and Irish tribal custom.
The system of payments for homicide amongst the ancient tribes of
Ireland as described in the Brehon Laws differed widely from that of the
Cymric Codes.[62]
In the first place, the Brehon laws describe no scale of galanas or
wergeld, directly varying with the social rank of the person killed. Gradations
of rank there were indeed, and numerous enough. But there appears to
have been only one coirp-dire, or body-fine, the same for all ranks, namely
seven cumhals or female slaves—the equivalent of twenty-one cows.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/25978614-250514133606-c8f5ae14/75/Climate-Change-Justice-Course-Book-Eric-A-Posner-David-Weisbach-83-2048.jpg)
![The Brehon coirp-
dire of all tribesmen
the same: six
cumhals and one
added.
The eneclann or
honour-price varied
with rank. The ‘eric’
fine included both.
And when this coirp-dire, or price of the body or life of
a man, is further examined, it is found to consist of two
parts: (1) one cumhal of compensation (aithgin); (2) the
six cumhals of the coirp-dire proper.
In the tract ‘Of every Crime’[63] it is stated:—
If the man who is dead has a son, he takes the cumhal of compensation
alone. If not alive, his father is to take it. If not alive, his brother; if he be
not alive, the nearest person to him is to take it. And then the coirp-dire is
divided:
3 cumhals to the son and the father;
1 cumhal to the brother;
1 cumhal to the son and father (sic);
1 to the geilfine from the lowest to the uppermost man;
—so making up the 6 cumhals of the coirp-dire.
And in the ‘Book of Aicill’ (p. 537) are these lines:
Three eric fines are counselled:
(1) There is paid full compensation;
(2) And fair honest coirp-dire;
(3) And honour-price is paid.
Besides this coirp-dire, therefore, was the eneclann,
honour-price or price of the face, i.e. payment for insult.
And this was the payment, by no means confined to
homicide, which varied according to rank.
These two things then—the coirp-dire of seven cumhals and the honour-
price—made up together (with, in some cases, exceptional additions) the
eric fine.
Next as to the persons liable for its payment.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/25978614-250514133606-c8f5ae14/75/Climate-Change-Justice-Course-Book-Eric-A-Posner-David-Weisbach-84-2048.jpg)
![The kindred of ‘near
hearths’ were liable
for the whole eric.
The ‘hearths’ liable
apparently to third
cousins.
In the Corus Bescna[64] the following statement is made relating to
homicide in cases where the homicide was one of necessity:—
The eric fine is to be paid by the slayer’s kindred (fine), as they divide his
property (cro). He (the slayer) shall pay a cumhal of restitution (aithgin) and
as much as a son or a father of the six cumhals of the dire-fine.
As to crimes of non-necessity:—[65]
he himself is to be given up for it, with his cattle and his land.
If he has not enough to pay the eric or is not to be
caught, then
it is to be paid by his son until his cattle and his land be
spent on it (or failing him) by his father in the same manner.
Lastly, failing both the son and the father,
it is to be paid by each nearest hearth (teallach) to him until all they have is
spent, or full payment of the crime is made up among them.
So that, in the absence or in default of the murderer, at the date of this
Brehon tract, his family and kindred were answerable for the whole of the
eric in the case of wilful murder.
The nearest hearths or ‘fine who bear the crimes of
each kinsman of their stock’ were, according to the
Senchus Mor (i. p. 261):—
1. Geil fine;
2. Derb fine;
3. Iar fine;
4. Ind fine.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/25978614-250514133606-c8f5ae14/75/Climate-Change-Justice-Course-Book-Eric-A-Posner-David-Weisbach-85-2048.jpg)
![I think M. D’Arbois de Jubainville[66] is probably right in explaining these
four hearths or fines to be groups or grades of kindred. He divides them
thus:—
The geil fine {
father;
son;
grandson;
brother.
derb fine {
grandfather;
paternal uncle;
nephew;
first cousin.
iar fine {
great-grandfather;
great-uncle;
great-nephew;
second cousin.
ind fine {
great-great-grandfather;
great-great-uncle;
great-great-nephew;
third cousin.
Whether this interpretation of the Brehon scheme of the divisions of the
Irish fine or kindred be correct in every detail I shall not venture to give an
opinion, further than to say that, viewed in the light of other tribal systems,
it seems to me to be nearer the mark than the various other attempts to
make intelligible what after all are very obscure passages in the Brehon
Laws. The seventeen persons making up the four divisions of the fine or
kindred must be taken, I think, as representing classes of relations and not
individuals; e.g. under the head ‘first cousin’ must be included all ‘first
cousins,’ and so on throughout.
So understood, the four hearths or groups of kindred liable for the eric
would include the sixteen grades nearest of kin to the criminal. He himself,
or the chieftain, would form the seventeenth person on the list.
The tract ‘Of every Crime’ seems to confirm the view above taken. It
states (iv. 241) that ‘for the crimes of every criminal’ he himself was first](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/25978614-250514133606-c8f5ae14/75/Climate-Change-Justice-Course-Book-Eric-A-Posner-David-Weisbach-86-2048.jpg)
![The four ‘fines’ or
‘hearths’ were
groups of kinsmen
in grades of
relationship.
The same groups
both received and
paid eric.
liable.
If he has absconded it goes upon his chattels; living chattels or dead
chattels.
The liability falls next upon his father and his brother,
but, according to the commentary, upon his son first, if
he have one. These seem to be the geilfine relations or
nearest hearth. And after them it falls, according to the
text, upon his ‘deirbhfine relations.’ And ‘if they have
absconded so that they cannot be caught, his crime goes
upon his chief.’ But before it goes upon the chief the iarfine and other fines
come in, according to the commentary, and the chief is said to be that of
the four fines.
The reason why the crime goes upon the deirbhfine division and the
iarfine division here before it goes upon the chief is because it is one chief
over them.… His chief—i.e. the chief of the four families (p. 243).
On the whole, therefore, according to whatever rules of kinship a fine may
have been divided into the ‘four nearest fines or hearths,’ we can hardly be
wrong in considering them not as four artificial groups including in all
seventeen individuals, but as four family groups arranged in the order in
which liability for a kinsman’s crime was to be shared.
The full liability for the eric would then, as in the
Cymric case, fall upon the four groups or hearths as a
whole. But, again as in the Cymric case, the amount
falling upon each of them was defined and divided
among the individuals composing it. The same family division held good
both as regards payment and receipt of eric.[67]
The general correspondence between the obligation to pay and the right
to receive a share in fines is shown by another passage from the Senchus
Mor:
The feini charge the liability of each kinsman [comfogius] upon the other
in the same way as he obtained his eric fine and his inheritance.[68]](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/25978614-250514133606-c8f5ae14/75/Climate-Change-Justice-Course-Book-Eric-A-Posner-David-Weisbach-87-2048.jpg)
![Hdr 20072008 Presentation[1]](https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/HDR20072008presentation1-123602819722-phpapp02-thumbnail.jpg?width=640&height=640&fit=bounds)
Climate Change Justice Course Book Eric A Posner David Weisbach
- 1. Climate Change JusticeCourse Book Eric A Posner David Weisbach download https://ebookbell.com/product/climate-change-justice-course-book- eric-a-posner-david-weisbach-51957228 Explore and download more ebooks at ebookbell.com
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- 7. Climate Change Justice Eric A. Posner DavidWeisbach Princeton University Press Princeton and Oxford
- 8. Copyright © 2010by Princeton University Press Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540 In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, 6 Oxford Street, Woodstock, Oxfordshire OX20 1TW All Rights Reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Posner, Eric A. Climate change justice / Eric A. Posner and David Weisbach. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-691-13775-9 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Climate change— Political aspects. 2. Climate change—Government policy. 3. Climate change—Law and legislation. I. Weisbach, David, 1963– II. Title. QC903.P78 2010 363.738'74526—dc22 2009045413 British Library Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available This book has been composed in Adobe Garamond Pro with Helvetica Neue display Printed on acid-free paper. ∞ press.princeton.edu Printed in the United States of America 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
- 9. Contents Acknowledgments vii Introduction 1 Chapter1: Ethically Relevant Facts and Predictions 10 Chapter 2: Policy Instruments 41 Chapter 3: Symbols, Not Substance 59 Chapter 4: Climate Change and Distributive Justice: Climate Change Blinders 73 Chapter 5: Punishing the Wrongdoers: A Climate Guilt Clause? 99 Chapter 6: Equality and the Case against Per Capita Permits 119 Chapter 7: Future Generations: The Debate over Discounting 144 Chapter 8: Global Welfare, Global Justice, and Climate Change 169 A Recapitulation 189 Afterword: The Copenhagen Accord 193 Notes 199 Index 219
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- 11. Acknowledgments In preparing thisbook, we extensively revised some articles that ini- tially appeared in the following places. Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 Georgetown Law Journal 1565 (2008); Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, Should Greenhouse Gas Permits Be Allocated on a Per Capita Basis? 97 California Law Review 51 (2009); and Cass Sunstein and David Weisbach, Climate Change and Discounting the Future: A Guide for the Perplexed, 27 Yale Law and Policy Review (2010). We thank these journals for per- mission to republish our articles. Many people, too numerous to name, have helped us develop the ideas that we advance in this book. Most of them we have thanked in previously published articles. But we should mention David Ar- cher and Ray Pierrehumbert, both of the geophysics department at the University of Chicago. While both David and Ray disagree with much of what we say here, they were kind enough to provide us with advice on the science of climate change as well as criti- cisms of our arguments. Also thanks to Richard Stewart, Michael Vandenbergh, and anonymous referees for comments on the entire manuscript. We also thank Kathryn Burger, Lena Cohen, and Katie Reaves for research assistance and our dean, Saul Levmore, for fi- nancial support. Cass Sunstein was a coauthor of the three papers mentioned above, and the original plan was for him to coauthor this book as well. Indeed, he was extensively involved in the early stages of the preparation of the manuscript. However, because of his position in the Obama administration—he is currently the Administrator of the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs—he
- 12. viii Acknowledgments was unableto participate in later revisions. We can only express to him our deepest appreciation for his involvement in this project. He bears no responsibility for any claims in the final version.
- 13.
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- 15. Introduction Climate change ranksamong the most serious problems facing the world today. There is now a strong scientific consensus that emis- sions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases into the atmo- sphere have changed, and will continue to change, the world climate, increasing average temperatures more rapidly than has been seen since long before humans existed. The main source of carbon diox- ide emissions is the production and consumption of fossil fuels, but there are many other contributing factors associated with industrial activity and agriculture. In addition, land use changes, including the destruction of forests for farmland, have reduced natural sources of carbon dioxide absorption, further increasing the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. The most optimistic forecast is that climate change will be mild and the changes will happen slowly. Even in this case, local variations in the climate will disrupt traditional economic activities such as ag- riculture, resulting in the wasting of capital investments, significant migration, and so forth. Even if the sea level rises very little, the dan- gers from storms will increase, and people will need to build seawalls, to move farther from the coast, and to face other burdens and incur other costs. Warm-weather diseases such as malaria will spread, kill many people, and consequently will need to be seriously addressed. The median forecast is that under business-as-usual scenarios, global temperature changes will be substantial and the effects of cli- mate change will include severe disruption, with millions of other- wise avoidable deaths caused by flooding, disease, and other hazards, and trillions of dollars in costs. As we shall emphasize, the impacts will probably be worst in the most vulnerable places—poor nations like India and countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. There is also a gen- uine risk of a truly catastrophic outcome—for example, significant
- 16. 2 Introduction increases inglobal temperatures and massive sea level rises that would change human life in terrible ways that are difficult to imagine. What is to be done? A great deal remains unclear, but a few points are straightforward. First, the governments of the leading contribu- tors, now and in the future, should adopt policies that reduce green- house gas emissions. These policies will need to make it more costly for people to burn fossil fuels, clear forests, and engage in other activities that contribute to global warming. Voluntary emission reductions by green-minded citizens are a start but are simply not enough. Ideally, governments would set a tax that equals the harm to the climate that results from the use or consumption of a given product. What this means in practice is a complicated issue to which we will return. There are alternative policies such as a cap-and-trade system, where emis- sions permits are sold and traded. These alternative measures are prob- ably less effective than a tax, but they may be politically more feasible. Second, whichever policies are chosen—taxes, cap and trade, or something else—governments around the world (or at least all major contributors to the problem) will need to coordinate these policies, most likely through a treaty. The importance of an international treaty can scarcely be exaggerated. Climate change is a global prob- lem. Global warming results from the erosion of a global commons, the capacity of the atmosphere (and the oceans and forests) to store carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. If one nation-state heav- ily regulates emissions within its territory, but no other state does, then the first state will incur heavy costs while producing few benefits for itself or the world. The reason is that emissions continue as be- fore in other countries; those emissions will continue to cause climate change that harms the first state. Worse, industry may migrate from the first state to other states, where it will continue to emit green- house gases as before; this is the problem of “leakage.” And because of variations in the physical location, geographical features, and level of economic development of different states, it makes good sense to concentrate serious abatement measures in some places—those places where abatement measures are cheaper—rather than others, and to compensate the states that bear the brunt of the abatement costs. This step cannot be undertaken unilaterally. A treaty is necessary.
- 17. Introduction 3 Many governmentshave already come round to this view. In the 1990s, nations agreed to the United Nations Framework Conven- tion on Climate Change, which provided some general principles to structure negotiations about a climate treaty. These negotiations yielded the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, which went into force in 2005. The Kyoto Protocol had serious, even fatal problems. It imposed no restrictions on developing nations such as China and India, where emissions are increasing dramatically; for this reason, it could not reduce greenhouse gases to tolerable levels. Further, the Kyoto Proto- col imposed an extremely severe burden on the United States, which therefore refused to join the treaty regime. At a climate conference in Bali in December 2008, some progress was made on these issues. The United States committed itself to enter some kind of climate treaty, and developing nations seemed somewhat more willing than in the past to acknowledge that they will have to contribute to green- house gas reductions as well. Meanwhile, diplomats, academics, journalists, and various other commentators have tried to develop principles for the design of the climate treaty. The technical difficulties in designing such a treaty are immense. Nations must agree on the acceptable level of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere despite enormous scientific and economic uncertainties about the future. They will have to agree on abatement measures and methods for monitoring compliance. And they will have to agree on how the burdens of the abatement measures are distributed. This last question may be the most difficult. Invoking arguments about justice, poor states argue that rich states should bear the bulk of the cost of abatement. China, India, and Brazil urge that the United States and the wealthy nations of Europe should have to undertake aggressive emissions reductions, and should also provide significant financial assistance for any emissions reductions in the developing world. Rich states strenuously object, with some arguing that the biggest emitters (including poor states) should have the strict- est obligations and others advancing different principles of equity. Nations not only argue that different principles of justice apply; they perceive the risks from climate change differently. And even when they agree on the principles of justice, they would apply them
- 18. 4 Introduction differently. Somepoor nations perceive themselves as facing grave risks from climate change, and they want rich nations to act im- mediately to reduce their emissions. Some rich nations believe that they are not gravely threatened by climate change, and they wonder why they should pay a significant cost to solve what is, for them, a speculative problem in the distant future. Some poor nations believe that climate change is far from the most serious threat that they face; they believe that the real threats are connected with poverty, and that economic growth, reducing poverty but increasing greenhouse gas emissions, is highly desirable. Invoking considerations of fairness, they are deeply skeptical about the idea that they should pay a great deal to reduce their own emissions. In the debate over climate change, questions of fairness and jus- tice play a crucial role. Commentators argue strenuously that a cli- mate treaty should place greater burdens on rich countries than on poor countries, or should punish countries that have contributed the largest amounts of greenhouse gases, or should place equal bur- dens on people around the world.1 We contend that the central ar- guments about justice encounter serious objections. Taken on their own terms—that is, in terms of ideal theory, ignoring pragmatic considerations—they often confuse means and ends. A climate change treaty is not the only method of redistributing wealth and is unlikely to be the best way. If there are better ways of redistributing wealth, we should not use a climate treaty to do so. There are similar problems with other arguments from ideal theory, such as those fo- cusing on corrective justice and past wrongs. Moreover, even if the arguments were right on their own terms, they fail to consider basic pragmatic or feasibility constraints. By doing so, they threaten to derail a climate change agreement, thus hurting most the nations and people who are pressing those very arguments. There is a tension between ethical claims and pragmatic constraints. To say that nations will refuse to do what they are ethically required to do is not to excuse the violation of ethical requirements. An ethical argu- ment that ignores the interests of states is a fantasy; but a treaty that simply advances the interests of the most powerful states would not have an ethical basis. The challenge is to balance these considerations
- 19. Introduction 5 and constructa treaty that is both ethical and feasible. As we shall see, the two are in some tension, but the tension need not be as destruc- tive as it might seem. We aim to show how a treaty might be feasible, and promote the welfare of people all over the world, while also being consistent with the requirements of justice. Our argument is unusual. We strongly favor a climate change agreement, especially because it would help poor people in poor na- tions, and we also favor redistribution from the rich to the poor. At the same time, we reject the claim that certain intuitive ideas about justice should play a major role in the design of a climate agreement. More particularly, we develop four central themes. Looking Forward, Not Backward Nations should approach the climate problem from a forward- looking, pragmatic perspective. Many people argue that the climate treaty should reflect principles of corrective and distributive justice. They treat climate negotiations as an opportunity to solve some of the world’s most serious problems—the admittedly unfair distribu- tion of wealth across northern and southern countries, the lingering harms of the legacy of colonialism, and so forth. We reject this ap- proach. These arguments run into serious objections of principle. They also threaten to make a climate change agreement far less fea- sible; any effort to solve all the world’s ills, or even some of them, will founder on the diverse values and interests of the various states. Those who make such arguments, including representatives of poor countries but also academics and others in the developed world, are likely in the end to hurt poor countries. If they demand too much from the rich world, the rich world will drag its feet. Moral Arguments That Make Sense for Individuals Do Not Always Make Sense for States Governments and commentators who argue about climate change frequently treat states as though they were independent agents that can cause harm and be harmed, that can be culpable, and that have
- 20. 6 Introduction moral obligationsto other states. Although this language is an im- portant part of international law and the rhetoric of international relations, it obscures the underlying moral issues. Climate change is a problem because it hurts people, not because it hurts countries. People are often not morally responsible for the harm that results from the policies of states, and care must be taken when moral prin- ciples that govern the behavior of individuals—such as principles of corrective and distributive justice—are applied to states. International Paretianism and the Question of Feasibility Any treaty must satisfy what we shall call the principle of Interna- tional Paretianism: all states must believe themselves better off by their lights as a result of the climate treaty.2 International Paretian- ism is not an ethical principle but a pragmatic constraint: in the state system, treaties are not possible unless they have the consent of all states, and states only enter treaties that serve their interests. To be sure, states may be influenced by moral arguments, but history sup- plies very few cases where states act against their own perceived inter- ests in order to satisfy the moral claims of other states. What is true, however, is that states usually define their interests in terms of the well-being of their populations. Thus, the pragmatic constraint of International Paretianism is consistent with a limited but important moral vision—states cooperatively advancing the well-being of their populations, and hence the global population, by agreeing to limits on greenhouse gas emissions. Feasibility rules out the vast redistribu- tions of wealth that many believe are morally required on grounds of corrective and distributive justice, but it does not rule out improve- ments in global welfare. Feasibility and welfarism are the two pillars of a successful climate treaty. Globally Optimal Emissions Reductions and the Problem of Local Variation The optimal climate treaty will provide for a level of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere that is globally optimal,
- 21. Introduction 7 considering allthe effects, good and bad, of emissions reductions. It will set the level of emissions so that the costs of reducing emissions more closely equal the avoided harm, fully taking into account the unknown risks from emissions. Because of variations in the adverse impact of climate change on different countries, the globally optimal level will be higher than what is optimal for some countries, and lower than what is optimal for other countries. It will be necessary to make side payments to the first group of countries in order to secure their cooperation in abatement programs; the second group of countries might have to pay. We suspect that the allocation of burdens will turn in part on the relative bargaining power of the countries, but we believe that ethical considerations will also play a role. A treaty that satisfies International Paretianism will gener- ate a surplus—the climatic benefits minus the costs of abatement— that can be distributed in the form of credits or monetary payments among countries on the basis of ethical postulates. For example, countries that have most aggressively engaged in abatement mea- sures or invested in abatement technologies ought to be rewarded for their efforts. We also agree that wealthy countries should help poor ones with emissions reductions and adaptation, though our claims on this count are qualified. But even if bargaining power ends up determining the division of the surplus, it is important to see that if states are made better off by a treaty, then so will the people living in those states, and that is ethical reason enough for supporting a climate change treaty. Chapters 1–3 provide the background for our argument. Chapter 1 discusses the scientific and economic facts that bear on the design of a climate treaty, emphasizing an insufficiently appreciated point: the costs and benefits of emissions reductions vary greatly across na- tions. We show that some nations and regions are far more vulner- able than others; in particular, poor nations are at grave risk, in a way that bears directly on questions of justice. We also emphasize here that a genuinely global treaty is indispensable. Chapter 2 describes the various policy options that are available and considers whether ethical considerations affect the choice of policy options. Chapter 3 describes the local, national, and international efforts that have so
- 22. 8 Introduction far beenmade and argues that they have been mainly symbolic—no doubt because, however strongly people feel about the problem of climate change, unilateral actions can have little impact on the prob- lem, and so it makes sense to await a treaty rather than put in place expensive but unhelpful regulations. The core of the book’s argument extends from chapter 4 to chap- ter 7. Chapter 4 criticizes the argument that a climate treaty should reflect the principles of distributive justice—roughly, the view that rich countries should bear the burden of abatement and poor coun- tries either should not have to abate or should be compensated for their abatement efforts. Chapter 5 challenges the argument that the climate treaty should reflect the principles of corrective justice— roughly, the view that countries that industrialized earlier have caused the most harm and should therefore bear the main burden of abatement. Chapter 6 brings these critiques together in order to cast doubt on the popular idea that emissions permits should be distributed on a per capita basis; it also addresses yet another prin- ciple—the principle that global resources should be divided equally among the world’s inhabitants. Chapter 7 addresses duties to future generations. It insists on a principle of intergenerational neutrality, but offers a qualified endorsement of the view that discounting the future costs and benefits is ethically proper. In chapter 8, we sketch the implications of our arguments for the optimal design of a cli- mate treaty. At the outset, we should describe some of our ethical and empiri- cal postulates. It is conventional to distinguish between two different approaches to ethical issues: deontological approaches and welfarist approaches. Deontological approaches focus on the rightness or wrongness of particular acts independent of their consequences: for example, certain acts such as lying or harming others are wrong or presumptively wrong, regardless of their consequences. The welfarist approach approves of acts that increase the welfare of relevant people (and possibly animals). For example, an act that increases the welfare of one person without reducing the welfare of anyone else is a good act, and an act that increases the welfare of many people is a very good act.3
- 23. Introduction 9 Our preferredapproach to climate change is, as we noted above, broadly welfarist. We find welfarism more congenial and more apt for addressing a phenomenon that is a matter of concern mainly because of its impact on people’s well-being. We acknowledge, however, that deontological claims have considerable force, and we shall show that, in many settings, the welfarist and deontological approaches lead to identical conclusions. Finally, we will argue that in certain other settings deontological thinking leads to perverse and intuitively im- plausible outcomes. It is not, however, our goal to settle the ancient debate between deontologists and welfarists. A further point is that we will assume, as most welfarists do, cer- tain principles of human equality. We will assume that the welfare of all individuals around the world has equal weight; people in India do not count more or less than people in the United States. We will also assume that people in future generations have equal weight; people born in 2090 do not count more or less than people born in 1990. These assumptions often lead to rather severe prescriptions in favor of the redistribution of wealth: Because poor people would gain more, in welfare terms, from a given unit of money than rich people do, welfarism implies that rich people in rich nations should be transferring a great deal of money to poor people in poor nations. But we also take seriously the state system in which we live, and the practical limits on what ordinary people are willing to sacrifice for the sake of the well-being of others. International Paretianism en- sures that we will be discussing only those treaties that have a realistic chance of being ratified.
- 24. Chapter 1 Ethically RelevantFacts and Predictions To study the ethics of climate change, we need to understand how climate change will affect people around the world, now and in the future. That understanding requires knowledge of scientific predic- tions about the effects of greenhouse gases in various regions of the world and over time, of how people will be affected by these changes, and the extent to which they will adapt. For example, scientific pre- dictions may tell us that a certain region is expected to suffer from a decline in rainfall over the next one hundred years. We need to under stand how this change might affect activities in the region, such as agriculture, and the extent to which the people living there will be able to find other sources of food. It is an understatement to say that there is a vast literature on these issues.1 Our goal here is to distill this literature into its basic elements so that we have a set of facts and predictions to use in thinking about our ethical obligations with respect to climate change. We rely heav- ily on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (the IPCC), the Nobel Prize–winning international agency that was set up to report the scientific consensus on climate-related issues in periodic reports.2 While there is agreement that climate change is occurring and that it is caused by humans, it is extremely difficult to predict the impact of carbon emissions on people living one hundred or two hundred years in the future. Predictions combine substantial uncer- tainty on the science of climate change with guesses of how society will evolve over the next several hundred years. Imagine someone liv- ing in 1909 or 1809 predicting what life would be like today. We will
- 25. Facts and Predictions11 emphasize here both the central predictions of the effects of climate change and the range of potential outcomes. Many believe that the uncertain possibility of a catastrophe should be the central consider- ation, and we discuss this as well. There are five central lessons to be learned from this chapter. • Poor nations are likely to suffer most from climate change. The re- gions of the world where the climate effects are likely to be the largest are also poor. Poor countries tend to be located in warm regions of the world, and climate change will hurt warm countries more than cool countries. A modest increase in temperature from a relatively cool climate can increase agricultural productivity and reduce the need for heating. A modest increase in temperature from a warm climate, however, reduces agricultural productivity and increases the need for cooling. In addition, the poor are less able to adapt to climate change. Their economies are more dependent on agriculture (which will be hurt by climate change far more than other activities), and they have fewer resources available to mitigate the effects. Nevertheless, most studies of climate change conclude that almost all nations, not just poor countries, are likely to lose from climate change, particularly as the global temperature change rises above minimum amounts. • The effects of emissions today will be felt far into the future. Poor people living in the future, not those living today, are the ones who will be hurt the most. There is a great deal of uncertainty about these effects, because we need to foresee the distant future in order to measure them, and the distant future involves far more uncertainty than anyone can resolve with even a modest degree of accuracy. Un- certainty affects every choice with respect to climate change. How much should we be willing to pay for an “insurance policy” against very bad outcomes? Where, exactly, should we invest resources? In new technologies, in conservation efforts, in ensuring the installa- tion of the best of current technologies? A choice to spend resources today to reduce climate change involves a balancing of the interests of people living today and in the future. We address this issue in detail in chapter 7. • People living in poor countries in the future are most likely to ben- efit from reducing emissions now and in the future. This conclusion
- 26. 12 Chapter 1 seemsunsurprising in light of the fact that poor countries will be most hurt by climate change, but as we will discuss, the issue is more subtle than it first appears. In particular, the data show that if the climate is very sensitive to carbon concentrations, wealthy nations may have the most to gain from reducing emissions. The reason is that if the harm from climate change is sufficiently severe, reducing concentrations somewhat is not sufficient to help poor nations but may make a huge difference for wealthy nations. • It is not easy to say how much different countries are responsible for emissions to date because any judgment on that count depends on complex measurement issues. The standard view, held by the vast ma- jority of analysts, is that wealthy countries are responsible for most emissions to date.3 The standard view is probably wrong. Developing countries, such as Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, and China, have contrib- uted as much to the stock of greenhouse gases as wealthy countries such as the United States and the countries in the European Union have, at least if we include land use changes and all greenhouse gases as well as carbon dioxide from burning fossil fuels. A similar conclu- sion follows if we use comprehensive measures of emissions on a per capita basis. With those measures, the top group of emitters includes both developed and developing nations; several small and relatively poor countries, such Belize and Guyana, are at the top of the list; the United States is thirteenth.4 Even if we limit the list of top per capita emitters to modest and large emitters, the list of top emitters in- cludes a mix of poor and wealthy countries. There are measures un- der which wealthy countries are primarily responsible for emissions, such as those that include only energy use or that combine countries in various regions. The IPCC, for example, uses a measure that puts responsibility squarely on wealthy countries. Moreover, by any mea- sure, many poor countries, particular those in Africa, emit very little, and almost all rich countries have high or very high emissions. • Effective climate action must involve most or all nations with sig- nificant emissions. Any international treaty must include the devel- oped countries who agreed to restrictions on emissions under the Kyoto Protocol (and the United States). But it must also include such countries as China, Brazil, India, and Indonesia. Much of the
- 27. Facts and Predictions13 growth in emissions is in the developing world. Without reductions in emissions in these countries, actions by developed countries will have relatively little effect. As a result, climate treaties that do not include the developing world are unlikely to be effective. Although some of these conclusions can be disputed, we will take them to be correct for purposes of our discussion. We begin with a very brief overview of the science behind climate change, and then turn to emissions and their likely effects. The Science The basic science behind climate change has been understood for more than one hundred years.5 It is the same science that is used to explain why the Moon is cold, the Earth is the right temperature to support life, and Venus is too hot. The Earth’s temperature is de- termined by the relationship between the energy the Earth absorbs from the Sun and the energy it emits back. These two have to be in balance for the temperature to remain stable. Because the Sun is hot, most of its energy is in the form of visible and near-infrared light. The Earth is much cooler, so the energy it emits back into space has lon- ger wavelengths; it is mostly in the infrared region of the spectrum. Without an atmosphere, the resulting balance of incoming and out- going energy would mean that the average temperature of the Earth’s surface would be about –20°C (which is –4°F)—too cold to support life. The reason the Earth is not this cold is that it is blanketed by the atmosphere. The atmosphere is nearly transparent to incoming solar radiation, but it absorbs the infrared radiation coming from the Earth. It acts like planetary insulation. The effect is to warm the Earth by nearly 35°C, to an average temperature of around 15°C. The absorption of infrared radiation is due to only minor ele- ments in the atmosphere—the greenhouse gases. The major compo- nents of the atmosphere, nitrogen and oxygen, are as transparent to infrared radiation as they are to visible light. The most abundant and significant human-caused greenhouse gas is carbon dioxide.6 It is only a trace element in the atmosphere, comprising now only about 380 parts per million (ppm), but it has strong effects.
- 28. 14 Chapter 1 Carbondioxide occurs naturally in the atmosphere. Pre-industrial concentrations were about 280 ppm.7 Over the last century or so, however, humans significantly increased the concentration of carbon dioxide, largely through burning fossil fuels, land use change, and agriculture. When we burn fossil fuels, we emit the carbon in these fuels in the form of carbon dioxide. Roughly 60 percent of the an- nual emissions of greenhouse gases on a global basis come from fossil fuels (and 80 percent of U.S. emissions).8 Land use change alters the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere for many rea- sons. The most important reason is that trees absorb carbon dioxide through photosynthesis. When we cut down trees, we eliminate this carbon sink. In addition, if we burn the timber or it decomposes naturally, we release the carbon that it stored. A little more than 18 percent of global emissions come from forestry practices. Most of the remainder comes from agriculture (13.5 percent globally), which produces emissions from the use of fertilizer and the release of car- bon stored in the soil. Although carbon dioxide is the most important greenhouse gas, a number of other gases have similar greenhouse effects. Many of these have stronger effects, but they are present in lower quantities. Methane is a significant source of the greenhouse effect, estimated to be about twenty-one times as powerful as carbon dioxide. Nitrous oxide is about 310 times as powerful as carbon dioxide. Some gases, such as certain perfluorinated compounds, are almost 24,000 times as powerful as carbon dioxide. These estimates—how much more powerful a gas is than carbon dioxide in terms of the greenhouse effect—are known as “global warming potentials.” To measure to- tal emissions, scientists convert emissions of these gases into their equivalent amount of carbon dioxide and add up the total, denomi- nated as CO2 -eq. We will simply refer to carbon dioxide with the un- derstanding that this term includes all gases converted into carbon dioxide equivalents.9 All of this would not be a problem except that most greenhouse gases, once emitted into the atmosphere, remain there for a very long time—as far as climate policy is concerned, we can think of them as permanent.10 Once someone emits carbon dioxide or another
- 29. Facts and Predictions15 greenhouse gas, the effect on the climate is inevitable.11 In addi- tion, these gases mix evenly in the atmosphere, so the effect is global rather than local. This makes climate change policy different from other pollution policy, where the effects are usually local and often temporary. Global emissions are now about 50 gigatons of carbon dioxide each year.12 As a result of these emissions, the concentration of car- bon dioxide in the atmosphere (here, just CO2 , not CO2 -eq) has increased from pre-industrial levels of about 280 ppm to about 380 ppm, with average growth rates increasing in the last few years. Cur- rently, concentrations are increasing by about 2 parts per million annually, putting us on a track to double pre-industrial revolution concentrations before 2050 even if emissions stayed constant.13 If emissions increase with economic growth and if economic growth continues, this may be a floor, and doubling may occur much sooner. Moreover, if other gases are included, concentrations have increased even more, although there is significant uncertainty on the exact numbers when broad measures are used. And we won’t run out of fossil fuels when carbon dioxide concentrations double; as long as we keep using fossil fuels, concentrations will increase. If we continue business-as-usual emissions, we can easily quadruple the pre-industrial concentrations. Average global temperatures have increased over the last century and have been increasing by about 0.2°C each decade for the past thirty years.14 Figure 1.1 is an example of a commonly seen graph of global surface temperatures.15 A standard question is whether these temperature increases are due to natural causes rather than human-caused emissions of green- house gases. After all, temperatures have fluctuated dramatically in the past, causing warm periods and ice ages. And our understanding of how aerosols, clouds, and other natural phenomena affect the cli- mate is uncertain. How can we be sure this is not natural variation? Scientists have tried to determine the extent of human causation as opposed to natural variability in a number of ways. The central argument is that the temperature changes over the last century can only be explained by models that include estimates of both natural
- 30. 16 Chapter 1 variabilityand human-caused climate change. If there is no human- caused climate change, the models cannot explain the temperature record; in fact, they show that the likely natural causes of climate vari- ability over recent periods would have produced a slight cooling rather than warming.16 Moreover, an alternative explanation would have to address why the basic science, that carbon dioxide produces a green- house effect, is wrong. As David Archer, a climate scientist at the Uni- versity of Chicago, observes, to have an alternative explanation of the temperature record, we would need not one but two entirely novel scientific discoveries: one to explain what is causing the temperature increase and another to explain why the carbon dioxide is not trap- ping heat as expected.17 By analogy, if we find the butler standing in front of a victim with smoke coming out of his gun, it is possible that someone else is the criminal, but we would have to be able to find that someone else and explain the gun and the smoke. This is a tall order. The IPCC therefore concludes that “it is extremely unlikely that global climate change of the past 50 years can be explained without external forcing [i.e., emissions of greenhouse gases].”18 We will take significant human-caused climate change as entirely beyond debate. Figure 1.1 Global Land-Ocean Temperature Anomaly (ºC). 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 –0.4 –0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 Annual mean 5-year mean Temperature Index (°C)
- 31. Facts and Predictions17 All of what we have just reported is accepted by nearly every climate scientist, although some of the data, such as the extent of emissions of non-CO2 gases and some temperature data, are subject to measurement uncertainty. The hard problems in climate science involve nailing down the precise effects. A central variable is what is known as climate sensitivity. This term refers to the equilibrium global average surface temperature increase for a doubling of CO2 . One reason this is hard to predict is that temperature changes hap- pen slowly. There is, for example, significant temperature inertia in large masses, such as the oceans. We cannot observe immediate ef- fects of actions, which means that observations have to be combined with models to predict equilibrium changes. Moreover, the climate system is very complex. The simple description of the causes of cli- mate change given above ignored such factors as humidity, convec- tion, wind, and aerosols. Feedback effects, such as changes in how much light is reflected back into the sky due to melting ice, are diffi- cult to calculate. Cloud feedbacks are particularly difficult to predict and are the single largest source of uncertainty.19 Given these uncertainties, the most recent IPCC estimate for cli- mate sensitivity is 3°C, with a likely range of between 2°C and 4.5°C. This is a broad range; the differences in effects on human beings and the environment between 2°C and 4.5°C would likely be dramatic. Moreover, this range does not represent the full spread on the high end since the IPCC does not fully incorporate a variety of feedback mechanisms, such as cloud feedbacks and soil carbon release. Worse, this range does not reflect the full level of uncertainty because a key variable is how fast the changes occur. The effects of climate change will depend critically on speed: slow climate change gives humans and other species time to adapt, while rapid climate change does not. To get a better sense of the range of uncertainty about climate sensitivity, the UK government, in a major study of the economics of climate change, known as the Stern Review, collected a range of es- timates from various models the likelihood of a given global average temperature change for given carbon concentrations.20 In table 1.1, we reproduce the estimates for the Hadley Centre Ensemble of models.21 The numbers are highly uncertain and are best viewed as a
- 32. 18 Chapter 1 roughguide. The table indicates that there is a 99 percent chance of a 2°C temperature increase for a doubling of CO2 . Moreover, there is a 24 percent chance of a 4°C increase, which would be very harmful, and even a 1 percent chance of a 7°C increase, which would be truly catastrophic. As concentrations of CO2 rise, the chances of very large temperature increases correspondingly increase. Because of the risk of catastrophe, good arguments exist that the risks of large tempera- ture increases, not the expected increase, should drive policy.22 Finally, as noted, the timing of these changes is difficult to pre- dict, but we know that the changes will occur in the future, pos- sibly in one hundred or two hundred years. The climate system has significant inertia so that emissions today will continue to cause the climate to change over a long period of time. Even more important, carbon dioxide concentrations continue to increase because of new emissions. Our economy and its reliance on fossil fuel energy and modern forms of agriculture cannot be changed overnight. Future emissions are inevitable, and thus future temperature increases are inevitable. Given these factors, models predict temperature increases over long periods of time. Impacts All of this would be of little interest as a matter of social policy if it didn’t have impacts on humans and other living creatures. The central Table 1.1. Likelihood (in percentage) of Exceeding a Temperature Increase at Equilibrium Stabilization Level 2° 3° 4° 5° 6° 7° (ppm of CO2 e) 450 78 18 3 1 0 0 500 96 44 11 3 1 0 550 (doubling) 99 69 24 7 2 1 650 100 94 58 24 9 4 750 100 99 82 47 22 9
- 33. Facts and Predictions19 question, therefore, is what are the expected effects of climate change? What does business as usual mean for people living around the world? The first step in estimating the effects is determining what business- as-usual will be. This is no small task; it involves predicting emissions long into the future, which means predicting population changes, economic growth, and technologies far into the future. Making such predictions has been done through “emissions scenarios.” Scenarios are future histories of the world, storylines that present possible ways that the next one hundred years will unfold. The IPCC put together a series of these, which represent a range of possibilities, such as a convergence story in which the developing world rapidly joins the developed world, a divergence story, a regional development story, and so on.23 Each of these stories has implications for economic and population growth and, as a result, for emissions. If we can guess future emissions through the use of scenarios, we can then translate this into temperature increases through measures such as climate sensitivity. This, however, only gives us the global a verage surface temperature as a measure of the effect of carbon emissions. Temperature changes will not be uniform, which means that we need to translate global averages into local and seasonal ef- fects. These effects will vary widely. For example, northern latitudes are expected to face greater warming than those around the equator. Even disaggregating the world into regions does not reflect the true effects of climate change. Local averages are made up of sea- sonal weather patterns, cloudy and clear, hot and cold, wet and dry. At a given location, such as the southwestern United States or cen- tral China, it is misleading to think of climate change in terms of a single number, temperature change. Instead, we should think of temperature change as merely an index of the overall disruption in local weather patterns. Small changes in the index can lead to large local disruptions. We might, for example, see disruption of monsoon patterns in some parts of the world, with the resulting harms to agri- culture, increased rain elsewhere, changed growing seasons, sea level rise, and any number of other local effects. Local effects of this sort are extremely difficult to predict, and scientists are not yet at the point where they feel confident making
- 34. 20 Chapter 1 thesepredictions. Nevertheless, because of its importance, there is a large body of work estimating the likely effects in regions around the world—all of the IPCC Working Group II is devoted to this, and their Fourth Assessment Report is just under one thousand pages of dense prose.24 In the report, they detail local effects such as the loss of the Himalayan glaciers, which provide water to hundreds of millions of people. The Gangetic basin alone is home to 500 million people, who will all face severe water shortages with the loss of these glaciers. Similarly, the IPCC details the reduction in water availability and a shortened growing season in parts of Africa that already face signifi- cant food and water shortages. In the United States, water resources that are already over-allocated will face additional pressure, agricul- tural patterns may have to change, and sea level rise may threaten coastal communities. Southern Europe is likely to face significant droughts, resulting in lower agricultural productivity and increased risk of fires. Bangladesh may lose a substantial fraction of its land to the sea, resulting in a refugee crisis in the region. There is a risk of getting lost in detail; what would be most useful is a set of take-home facts that reflect the central, although uncer- tain, expectations of what is to come absent emissions reductions. We emphasize three. The first is that there will be an overall loss in global welfare. The loss increases with temperature increases and, at even modest levels, may be more than the costs of reducing emissions. Full cost-benefit analyses of climate change thus far have been limited in large part because of the complexity of the problem; the best analyses have been able to do is estimate market impacts of climate change and make best guesses about the costs of reducing emissions. They do not know what it will cost to reduce emissions, and examining only mar- ket impacts leaves out many of the most important impacts, such as those on migration and national security. Nevertheless, global emis- sions reductions at a fairly stringent level likely pass a cost-benefit test. This is important because it means that reducing emissions should lead to an overall increase in welfare; even if there are some nations or regions that are worse off because their costs of emissions reductions exceed their benefits, globally this will not be the case,
- 35. Facts and Predictions21 and these nations, if necessary, can be compensated. This is true even though many of the costs of abatement will be incurred today and the benefits realized in the future: reducing emissions passes a cost- benefit test on a present value basis. The extent of the necessary reductions and the speed of the reduc- tions are subject to significant disagreement. The problem is enor- mously complex, requiring modelers to estimate parameters such as local climate conditions, impacts on those living in local regions, possible adaptations, and technological progress in producing low carbon energy. These all have to be combined in a global general equilibrium model which estimates conditions for the indefinite future. Given these complexities, modelers have taken a variety of approaches. Central modeling assumptions, such as the cost of ad- aptation and the rate of technological progress, vary; different func- tional forms are used to represent economies; and basic structures of the models, such as how many regions they use, how they model uncertainty, and how they estimate damages from climate change (and even what types of damages are modeled) are not consistent. It is, therefore, not easy to compare one model to another and to understand the reasons for disagreement.25 Given the current state of knowledge, we do not take any posi- tion here on the extent of the necessary reductions. It appears as if almost all studies to date indicate that at least a modest reduction in emissions is cost beneficial, and a number of studies indicate that fast and deep emissions reductions are needed. Moreover, all of the existing studies, even those that are only a few years old, are now out of date; emissions have been rising faster than anticipated and the climate effects appear to be more severe than the central estimates. Unfortunately, we may need fast and deep cuts in emissions. Second, poor countries are likely to be hurt far more than rich countries. As we mentioned, one reason is bad luck: the regions of the world where the effects of emissions will be the worst also happen to be poor, and poor countries tend to be located in warm regions of the world, where the effects of these changes will be entirely negative. In addition, poor countries tend to be more dependent on agricul- ture than rich countries, which means that they are more vulnerable
- 36. 22 Chapter 1 toany given level of change. Finally, poor countries cannot adapt as easily as rich countries, simply because of lack of resources. Africa in particular appears to be the most vulnerable, although small islands and low-lying areas outside of Africa (such as Bangladesh) are also significantly at risk.26 South and Southeast Asia (especially India) are also at significant risk. OECD Europe may face serious problems, al- though it has a much greater ability to adapt than countries in Africa and Asia. The Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN) at Columbia University produced a set of graphical esti- mates of impacts by country.27 The Center calculated vulnerabili- ties to climate change by country based on preexisting indices of vulnerabilities to environmental stresses. The Center’s measure in- cludes both sensitivity to climate stresses and adaptability. Under the resulting index, the least vulnerable countries in the world are the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland, Austria, France, Belgium, Italy, Japan, Canada, and the United States. China is right in the middle, exhibiting about average vulnerability. Of the fifteen most vulnera- ble countries, fourteen are in Africa, with Bangladesh the only coun- try outside of that continent. Non-African countries in the bottom third are located largely in Central or South America.28 The authors combined this data with a climate model that gives regional impacts. This model allowed them to estimate vulnerability by country. The exact effect depends on future scenarios (i.e., what are future emis- sions, how sensitive is the climate to emissions, how fast do various economies around the world grow, etc.). They produced maps show- ing various possibilities. We reproduce two of their maps here. The first, figure 1.2, is a measure of vulnerability in the year 2100 under one of the IPCC scenarios (a scenario that they call A2) and where the climate turns out to be quite insensitive to carbon. As can be seen, many coun- tries have some vulnerability—but the worst problems are in Africa, followed by central and eastern Asia, central and southern South America, and parts of the Middle East and Eastern Europe. The second map, figure 1.3, is the same scenario but with a high climate sensitivity. As can be seen, vulnerabilities are much worse.
- 37. Figure 1.2 GlobalDistribution of Vulnerability to Climate Change. Combined National Indices of Exposure and Sensitivity. Scenario A2 in year 2100 with climate sensitivity equal to 1.5ºC annual mean temperature with aggre- gate impacts calibration. 10 Extreme vulnerability 9 Severe 8 Serious 7 Moderate 6 Moderate 5 Modest 4 Modest 3 Little no data Robinson Projection Subnational boundaries dissolved from countries for clarity of vision National Boundary
- 38. Figure 1.3 GlobalDistribution of Vulnerability to Climate Change. Combined National Indices of Exposure and Sensitivity. Scenario A2 in year 2100 with climate sensitivity equal to 5.5ºC annual mean temperature with aggre- gate impacts calibration and enhanced adaptive capacity. Subnational boundaries dissolved from countries for clarity of vision National Boundary Robinson Projection 10 Extreme vulnerability 9 Severe 8 Serious 7 Moderate 6 Moderate 5 Modest no data
- 39. Facts and Predictions25 Only a very few countries, including the United States, are moder- ately affected, with virtually all of Africa and Asia showing extreme vulnerability. One way of interpreting the two maps is that they illustrate both expectations (which countries are most likely to be hurt) and risks (how damages change with climate sensitivity). Some countries are extremely likely to be hurt regardless of climate sensi- tivity, while other countries have more variable outcomes. Very few analysts are willing to venture estimates of the changes in GDP from climate change in various regions of the world. The exer- cise is simply too speculative. As we noted, the IPCC, for example, reports only disaggregated data on particular harms. In an influential book,29 William Nordhaus and Joseph Boyer give an estimate, which we report here as a crude but potentially informative guess. Their numbers are presented in table 1.2. The numbers reflect somewhat different estimates from the Co- lumbia study. For example, the Columbia study puts China some- where near the middle in terms of climate vulnerability, while Nordhaus and Boyer claim that it is less vulnerable. The results for India and Africa, however, are similar. Our third and final take-home fact about impacts is that there is a huge amount of uncertainty about the expected effects of cli- mate change. This should be evident from the previous discussion, Table 1.2. Damages of a 2.5ºC Warming as a Percentage of GDP India 4.93 Africa 3.91 OECD Europe 2.83 High-income OPEC 1.95 Eastern Europe 0.71 Japan 0.50 United States 0.45 China 0.22 Russia –0.65
- 40. 26 Chapter 1 butit has independent importance. Even if we thought that the cen- tral estimates of the impact of climate change were acceptable costs for having cheap energy, for example, we might still want to reduce emissions as insurance against the possibility of very bad outcomes. The uncertainty about the likely impacts of climate change is skewed: the best-case scenarios (the climate is relatively insensitive to carbon dioxide, the changes happen slowly, and adaptation is less expensive than anticipated) will mean that there are only modest costs, but the worst-case scenarios are very bad. The last time the temperature was six degrees warmer than today was somewhere around 55 million years ago, long before humans existed. To get a sense of what six de- grees means, the last great ice age, in which substantial parts of North American and Europe were covered by ice sheets, had global average surface temperatures that were six degrees cooler than today—six de- grees difference in temperatures can produce a very different world.30 This means that in the unfortunate event that outcomes are worse than expected, they may be very much worse, and all nations will suffer. That is, even nations that might estimate that they do not expect to suffer severe consequences from climate change must also calculate a risk that they might, and these nations might be willing to enter into a climate treaty as an insurance policy in the event of a catastrophe. Uncertainty also obscures the regional distribution of harms. The data above gave the expected harms by country or region, but various countries or regions around the world will have different attitudes toward risk. They will therefore evaluate the overall set of payoffs dif- ferently. If poor nations are less tolerant of risk than wealthy nations, uncertainty is likely to magnify the disparities illustrated above. Benefits from Abatement As a general matter, the same nations that are likely to be most hurt by climate change are the mostly likely to benefit from abatement. Because climate change is expected to hurt the poor the most, cli- mate change abatement will also help the poor. Because most of the harms from climate change will be in the future, emissions abatement
- 41. Facts and Predictions27 should be thought of as helping the future poor. Reducing carbon emissions is not a way to help today’s poor. In fact, the opposite is true: to the extent that resources are devoted to reducing carbon emissions, these resources are not available to help today’s poor. Even though on average emissions abatement is expected to help future poor people, the analysis is actually more complicated than that. In scenarios in which the damage from climate change is very severe, developed countries, including the United States, will ben- efit most from abatement. The reason is that if harms from climate change are very severe, rich nations will face an impact akin to that expected for poor nations. Abatement may make it possible for richer nations to mitigate the harm while not significantly helping poorer nations. To illustrate, consider figure 1.3 above. This figure shows the vulnerability to harm from climate change in the year 2100 under the same scenario used previously (A2) with the assumption that the climate is very sensitive to carbon dioxide concentrations (sensitivity of 5.5°C). The authors of that study then consider the effects of limiting concentrations to 550 ppm. The results are shown in figure 1.4. The countries that are helped are those whose color changes to lighter shades. As can be seen, in this scenario, it is largely the wealthier countries that benefit. Much of Africa, for example, remains severely harmed. One way to understand this effect is to imagine a set of balls lined up in a vertical tube, with water at some level below the balls. If we push the balls down the tube just a bit, the balls at the bottom are the first to go into the water, and are also the ones to rise above the water if we let them rise. If we push down a lot, however, the first ones to rise above the water if we let up a bit are the ones that reach it later. A little bit of help is not sufficient for the balls that are at or near the bottom. Similarly, if the effects of climate change are likely to be severe, remedial action will benefit the nations that are moderately hurt more than the nations that are severely hurt. This result does not hold if climate change results in less severe harm. We should also emphasize that poor nations that are likely to be hurt by climate change are not necessarily best helped by climate change abatement. They may be better off if the resources that could
- 42. Figure 1.4 GlobalDistribution of Vulnerability to Climate Change. Combined National Indices of Exposure and Sensitivity. Scenario A2-550 in year 2100 with climate sensitivity equal to 1.5ºC annual mean temperature with ag- gregate impacts calibration. 10 Extreme vulnerability 9 Severe 8 Serious 7 Moderate 6 Moderate 5 Modest 4 Modest no data Subnational boundaries dissolved from countries for clarity of vision National Boundary Robinson Projection
- 43. Facts and Predictions29 be dedicated toward abatement are used in other ways. Consider the case of malaria.31 Increased temperatures have the potential to in- crease the incidence of malaria, which occurs only in warm climates. If carbon emissions do not decline, malaria ranges are predicted to spread into the southeastern United States as well as much of China by 2050.32 Malaria, however, is a disease of the poor. According to the World Health Organization, those with an annual income of $3,000 or more do not die of malaria. In the IPCC scenarios used to predict the effects of climate change, income in all regions of the world will be growing. According to one standard scenario used by the IPCC, all regions of the world will have sufficient per capita in- come to surpass the $3,000 threshold by 2085. Under this scenario, therefore, deaths from malaria (although not other harms from the disease) will be eliminated in 2085. If resources are diverted to re- duce climate change, incomes will be systematically lower, delaying the time when all regions surpass this threshold. It follows that there is a trade-off between reducing malaria by re- ducing temperature changes and reducing malaria deaths by increas- ing incomes. On the basis of this reasoning and a computer model of the world economy, two authors predict that malaria deaths are minimized with relatively small reductions in emissions.33 In fact, the Kyoto Protocol could cause an increase in malaria deaths—if it slows development and hence prevents people from reaching the $3,000 level while having no effect on climate change. If one merely looked at the predictions of the spread of malaria due to climate change, one would get a very misleading picture of the problem. Malaria may be more complex than these models. Scientists do not know with certainty whether using resources to reduce emissions will increase or reduce its incidence, but the basic point remains: so long as resources are limited, we face complex trade-offs. International Agreement Necessary To achieve climate change abatement, all major emitting nations, including developing nations, will have to reduce their emissions. As we will discuss in chapter 3, the Framework Convention on Climate
- 44. 30 Chapter 1 Changeenvisioned “common but differentiated responsibilities.”34 The Kyoto Protocol, however, left out developing nations.35 This was a mistake. We will explore the reasons for favoring developing na- tions later, but it is plain that all nations need to reduce emissions. We can see this through simple back-of-the-envelope calculations. The current carbon dioxide concentration is about 380 ppm and is growing at roughly 2 ppm per year. If this rate stays the same, the carbon dioxide concentration would reach about 460 ppm by mid- century. The world economy, however, is expected to be around three times larger by mid-century than it is today. If the economy is three times larger, emissions will have to be three times lower per unit of GDP, just to keep concentrations at 460 ppm by 2050, not to stabilize them. Agriculture and land use together make up about 34 percent of emissions and these emissions, particularly those from agriculture, are likely to be difficult to cut. If emissions reductions come from the energy sector and not agriculture and land use, however, we would need to be able to produce sufficient energy to support the world at three times current GDP with zero emissions. Even if land use emis- sions can be cut or if agriculture and land use emissions do not grow with GDP (unlike energy), we would still need close to zero emis- sions from energy to achieve this goal. Stabilization of concentrations would be even more difficult, almost certainly requiring zero or close to zero emissions from energy and a complete stop to deforestation.36 The developed countries cannot achieve these goals by them- selves. China is now the world’s largest emitter. After the United States, which is second, Indonesia, Brazil, Russia, and India are next. Without deep cuts by these countries from current levels, it is impos- sible to achieve reasonable stabilization goals. Moreover, much of the predicted growth in emissions over the next few decades is expected to come from developing countries. Consider figures 1.5 and 1.6. Figure 1.5 is the International Energy Agency projection for emissions (from energy) for the United States from 2006 until 2030. It shows an increase in emissions over the next twenty years.37 Figure 1.6 shows the same projection for the United States, but also includes the rest of the world, broken into six additional
- 45. Facts and Predictions31 regions. As can be seen, the increases in U.S. emissions are swamped by increases elsewhere—the U.S. projections look flat. Moreover, even if the United States and the other OECD countries reduced their emissions dramatically, the increases in the rest of the world would swamp these reductions. The increases in emissions in China, Figure 1.5 IEA Projections for U.S. Emissions to 2030. 2006 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 5,550 5,650 5,600 5,700 5,750 5,800 5,850 Gtons CO 2 2006 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 Billion Tons of CO 2 Russia and Eastern Europe Other OECD China US India + Developing Nations Figure 1.6 IEA Global Emissions Projections to 2030.
- 46. 32 Chapter 1 Russia,India, and other non-OECD countries are larger than the total OECD emissions in 2006; even if OECD countries had zero emissions in 2030, emissions would be higher in 2030 than they are today if other countries continue on their business-as-usual path. Note also that these projections do not include land use change— they are International Energy Agency projections of emission from energy use. Including land use change would make the chart even more skewed because almost all emissions from land use change are outside the OECD. Even if this were not true—say that emissions in developing coun- tries were at levels consistent with stabilization goals and were not growing rapidly—it would be important to include developing coun- tries in a climate treaty. The reason is that reductions in energy use by only a few countries will simply lower the price of energy for other countries, allowing them to consume more. Imagine, for example, that oil exporting nations continue to pump oil as fast as they can regardless of the world price (at least within reason). This is roughly consistent with experience with oil production and oil prices over the last several years—as prices have changed dramatically, production has not significantly increased. In these circumstances, any reduction by one country is offset by increased consumption by other coun- tries.38 In effect, costly efforts to reduce demand by the United States act simply as a transfer to other countries through a reduction in the price at which they must purchase energy. With certain assumptions about how oil exporting nations react to reduced demand, the effect might be more modest. But the point remains: the only way to reduce the use of fossil fuels is for all major users to agree to reductions. To be sure, many people argue for conservation notwithstand- ing this problem. They contend that only by showing leadership on the issue can developed countries convince developing countries to agree to conversation measures.39 This may be true, but it is essential to keep in mind that the goal of any action must, in the end, be to reduce the worldwide supply of fossil fuels, not the demand for fossil fuels in a few countries. Finally, we will discuss how much the United States and other rich nations should pay relative to other nations for abating carbon
- 47. Facts and Predictions33 emissions. Regardless of the answer to this question, we should not attempt to concentrate abatement in rich countries. Even if rich na- tions should pay most of the cost of reducing emissions, the decisions about where around the globe to abate should be based on finding the lowest-cost opportunities to reduce emissions. The reason is straight- forward: reducing carbon emissions and preventing the harms from climate change is likely to be expensive. It is important, in order to minimize these costs, to identify the lowest cost abatement opportu- nities regardless of where they are.40 Imposing additional abatement requirements on one nation or set of nations while exempting others risks significantly increasing the costs, to the detriment of all. Economists have estimated the cost of pursuing climate change using a subset of countries. One study, for example, considered the costs of meeting the Kyoto targets with and without trading across countries, in various permutations (i.e., no trading, only trading within Annex I, trading across all countries, etc.).41 The costs de- crease dramatically as more nations are included in the trading re- gime, dropping by more than 93 percent from the “no-trading” case to the “trading across all countries” case. When considering the size of the global restructuring needed to reduce carbon emissions, these savings are large indeed. Other studies have found similar results.42 A central question of justice will be how to pay for emissions reduc- tions—we address this in detail throughout the rest of the book—but as a simple matter of mathematics, the world cannot achieve stabiliza- tion at reasonable levels, such as 450–500 ppm, without substantial cuts in emissions by all nations. There may be some headroom in which developing countries can increase emissions in the very short run, but all nations will have to reduce emissions soon. Emissions and Emitters We close with a look backward at who has emitted in the past. Un- der some theories of justice, this matters. The standard view is that wealthy nations are the source of most greenhouse gas emissions. Ac- cording to the IPCC, “industrialized nations are the source of most past and current GHG emissions.”43 The data, however, tell a more
- 48. 34 Chapter 1 complicatedstory, and under many, if not most, good measures of emissions, a broad range of countries, including both developed and developing countries, share responsibility for most past emissions. Moreover, under almost any measure, much of the growth will take place in developing countries.44 We begin with a broad measure of annual emissions including the six most important greenhouse gases and emissions from land- use change and forestry. The most recent data using this measure of emission are from 2000, measuring emissions in millions of metric tons of CO2 equivalents (MtCO2 e). Table 1.3 lists the top ten emit- ters in 2000. The World Bank defines high-income countries as countries hav- ing per capita income of more than around $11,500.45 Under this standard, the wealthy countries on the top ten list (the United States, Japan, Germany, and Canada)46 are responsible for about 23 percent of current emissions and others are responsible for 35 percent. The analysis does not change if we expand the list: the top forty countries Table 1.3. Greenhouse Gas Emissions in 2000 CO2 , CH4 , N2 O, PFC’s, HFC’s, SF6 , and Land Use Change % of Tons Per $ Per Rank Country MtCO2 Total Person Rank Person 1 United States 6,443 15.5 22.8 13 36,451 of America 2 China 4,771 11.5 3.8 120 5,490 3 Indonesia 3,066 7.4 14.9 24 3,282 4 Brazil 2,314 5.6 13.3 33 7,406 5 Russian Federation 1,960 4.7 13.4 32 9,021 6 India 1,553 3.7 1.5 168 2,851 7 Japan 1,317 3.2 10.4 51 27,114 8 Germany 1,006 2.4 12.2 37 25,945 9 Malaysia 852 2.0 36.6 5 9,374 10 Canada 766 1.8 24.9 12 29,136
- 49. Facts and Predictions35 ranked by GDP per capita emit about 34 percent of greenhouse gases under a broad measure of emissions. Moreover, although these data are fairly recent, they do not reflect the rapid changes in emis- sions from China and other fast-growing developing nations. China became the top emitter as of 2005, emitting 7.2 billion tons of car- bon dioxide or equivalents (excluding land use change), compared to U.S. emissions of 6.9 billion in 2005. Russia’s emissions remained relatively constant between 2000 and 2005, but India’s grew to 1.9 billion tons, putting it in a virtual tie with Russia as the third largest emitter in the world. Most discussions of emissions focus only on carbon dioxide emis- sions from energy use. Based on this measure, the list of top emitters changes. Table 1.4 shows the 2005 list when land use is excluded. Narrowing the measurement by excluding land use change removes many less wealthy or relatively poor countries such as Brazil, Indo- nesia, and Malaysia from the list of top emitters. But it is hard to Table 1.4. Share of Global Carbon Dioxide Emissions (not including land use), 2005 CO2 , CH4 , N2 O, PFC’s, HFC’s, SF6 , without Land Use Change % of Tons CO2 Rank Country MtCO2 World Total Per Person Rank 1 China 7,219 19.1 5.5 71 2 United States 6,964 18.4 28.5 7 of America 3 Russian Federation 1,960 5.2 14 18 4 India 1,853 4.9 1.7 119 5 Japan 1,343 3.6 10.5 37 6 Brazil 1,014 2.7 5.4 73 7 Germany 977 2.6 11.9 25 8 Canada 732 1.9 22.6 8 9 United Kingdom 640 1.7 10.6 36 10 Mexico 630 1.7 6.1 64
- 50. 36 Chapter 1 seeany justification for using this narrow measure; an emission of a ton of carbon dioxide or its equivalent affects the climate the same regardless of its source. The numbers given above refer to flows: how much a given na- tion emits on an annual basis. Climate change, however, is caused by the stock of emissions: the total concentration of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Because most green- house gases have very long lifetimes in the atmosphere, we have to look at emissions over time to determine contributions to the stock of greenhouse gases.47 Once again, broad measures of emissions, in- cluding land use change, are available only for 2000. In addition, broad measures only go back to 1950 and do not include greenhouse gases other than carbon dioxide. Table 1.5 presents the data. The group of wealthy countries on this list, the United States, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Canada, makes up about 29 percent of cumulative emissions.48 The poor countries in this list make up about 33 percent of cumulative emissions. The basic result for stocks of emissions is the same as for flows: both wealthy and poor countries are major contributors. If we narrowed our focus to Table 1.5. Cumulative Emissions: CO2 from Energy and Land Use Change, 1950–2000 % of Tons CO2 Rank Country MtCO2 World Total Per Person Rank 1 United States of America 184,827 16.9 623.3 11 2 China 108,117 9.9 82.9 111 3 Russian Federation 90,068 8.3 629.2 10 4 Indonesia 79,996 7.3 362.7 35 5 Brazil 68,029 6.2 364.1 34 6 Germany 46,382 4.3 562.4 13 7 Japan 41,603 3.8 325.6 41 8 United Kingdom 29,164 2.7 484.2 18 9 Canada 22,642 2.1 700.7 7 10 Malaysia 22,228 2.0 866.5 4
- 51. Facts and Predictions37 exclude land use changes, the wealthy countries would look like a larger source of emissions, just as with flows. There are a variety of alternative measures of relative emissions. The two most common additional measures are emissions per capita and emissions intensity (i.e., the emissions from a given country nec- essary to produce a dollar of output). Table 1.6 lists the top ten na- tions by per capita contributions to stocks of emissions.49 The standard view that wealthy countries are responsible for most emissions often uses per capita data, but the data are aggregated across large groups of countries. For example, in the year 2000, the top twenty countries in terms of income had about one-eighth of the world population (800 million people out of 6.3 billion total world population), but emitted about 40 percent of the total emis- sions (all gases including land use change). If we look only at carbon Table 1.6. Cumulative Emissions of CO2 (including land use change) Per Capita, 1950–2000 Rank Country Per Capita Emissions (stock) 1 Belize 3,390 2 Guyana 2,146 3 Luxembourg 1,310 4 Malaysia 900 5 Papua New Guinea 759 6 Panama 709 7 Canada 708 8 Czech Republic 665 9 Estonia 664 10 The United States 636 11 Russia 634 . . . 20 UK 497 33 EU-25 385 111 China 85 165 India 16
- 52. 38 Chapter 1 dioxidefrom burning fossil fuels and aggregate back to 1850, these same countries are responsible for about 58 percent of the total stock of carbon dioxide. The bottom billion people (grouped by country GDP per capita, not the actual individual incomes) emitted less than 2 percent of the stock of carbon dioxide from energy use. The dif- ference in results arises because of the narrow focus on emissions from fossil fuels (which correlates highly with wealth) and because of aggregation: poor countries that are very high per capita emitters go into the very large pool of poor countries, so their high emissions get averaged with poor countries that are low emitters.50 A final way that emissions are commonly measured is by intensity. Table 1.7 lists the top ten countries by the number of carbon or other greenhouse gases emitted (measured in equivalent tons of carbon) per million dollars of GDP, measured using purchasing power parity Table 1.7. Greenhouse Gas Intensity of Economy, 2000 (CO2 , CH4 , N2 O, PFCs, HFCs, SF6 , land use change) Rank Country tCO2 -e/Million $ Index 1 Zambia 31,292 100 2 Belize 16,524 52.6 3 Liberia 14,932 47.5 4 Congo, Dem. Republic 13,560 43.1 5 Guyana 13,390 42.5 6 Papua New Guinea 12,491 39.7 7 Sierra Leone 8,998 28.5 8 Myanmar 8,764 27.7 9 Central African Republic 7,487 23.6 10 Mongolia 7,420 23.4 . . . 98 Australia 1,018 2.8 100 China 972 2.7 123 South Korea 693 1.8 126 United States 662 1.7 158 EU 25 455 1
- 53. Facts and Predictions39 adjustments. Many of these countries are in Africa, unlike other measures of emissions. We also include other major emitters. We produce one final graph (figure 1.7), which measures per capita emissions as a function of per capita GDP. Per capita GDP is on the x-axis and per capita annual carbon dioxide emissions from energy are on the y-axis. The line represents the line of best fit: coun- tries above the line use more fossil fuel energy to produce GDP than countries below it. There is a clear relationship between emissions (or energy use) and income. Rich countries emit more than poor countries. There are also some countries that are off the line of best fit: Norway has a high income and relatively low emissions, while Qatar has a middle level of income but very high emissions. The United States is just about on the line of best fit, while the European Union is somewhat below it. Conclusion We have covered a great deal of material in a short space, and it will be useful to summarize our main conclusions. The harm from Figure 1.7 Per Capita Emissions of CO2 as a Function of Income. 0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 0 20 10 30 40 50 60 Per Capita CO 2 Emissions Per Capita GDP US Lux Norway EU
- 54. 40 Chapter 1 climatechange is expected to be much worse in poor regions, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, India and Southeast Asia, and small islands. The benefits from stabilization correspondingly help these countries the most, at least under most (but not all) scenarios. Both the harms and benefits are mostly in the future. It follows that future poor people, not present poor people, would gain the most from emis- sions reductions. Rich countries have high per capita emissions; they also have con- tributed a great deal to the current stock of emissions, and they con- tinue to contribute a great deal to the annual flow. But by the best measures, developing countries already contribute approximately the same to the flow and have not contributed much less to the stock, although they have a much lower per capita contribution to both the flow and the stock. Moreover, growth rates in emissions are much higher in developing countries than in developed countries. China is now the world’s largest emitter in terms of flows of carbon dioxide. If growth patterns continue, China will overtake the United States as the largest contributor to the stock of carbon in the atmosphere. Reducing emissions will be expensive. There are many low-cost reductions available using current technology, but long-term goals, such as zero emissions from the transportation and power sectors, will require large-scale technological improvements. Given the scope of the harms and the cost of abatement, there is a clear case for significantly reducing emissions, because the total ben- efits of such reductions far outweigh the costs. To be sure, the precise nature of the reductions—their magnitude and timing—is disputed (and we will explore the reasons for the dispute). Nonetheless, there should be room for an agreement. Why, then, is such an agreement not yet in place? A large part of the answer lies in the perceived costs and benefits for particular na- tions, including the United States and China. Another part of the answer involves competing claims about justice. Before turning to these points, it will be useful to see what methods have been consid- ered for reducing emissions, and what exactly has happened to date.
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- 56. The trefgordd the unitfor food rents. The tribesmen could be shifted about. The firma unius noctis. Afterwards commuted into money payments. in doing so. The rules as to the divisions of the tyddyns probably referred to these winter homesteads so held in quasi-severalty. We need not dwell upon the common oven. Every hamlet in Brittany possesses its common oven to this day, often in the middle of the village green. Nor need we more than mention the common plough, to the team of which the tribesmen contributed oxen for the cyvar or common ploughing of the portion of the waste agreed upon for each year’s corn crop. The attempt to realise what this practical unit— the trefgordd—was, will not be thrown away if it should help us to understand how easily it lent itself to the arrangement of the chieftain’s food- rents or tribute in after-times of taxation. Granted that some such system of trefgordds or clusters of trefgordds pretty generally prevailed, having grown up as a matter of convenience in a grazing community, it is obvious how easily it might become the unit of tribute or taxation. Just as in the Domesday Survey the number of ploughs affords such a unit, so in a tribal community a district might easily be fiscally estimated at so many herds, or so many churns, or so many ploughs. All these would mean so many trefgordds. And whatever the relations of the trefgordd to the villata of the surveys might be, and however much or often the actual residents, with their herds, might be shifted from one district to another, the district, as in the Denbigh Extent, would remain the permanent unit for payments. In the early stages of tribal life, when the chieftain of the tribe moved from one district to another and received his food-rents in the actual form of ‘the night’s entertainment,’ each customary place of encampment in his annual progress would become the centre at which the food-rents would be paid and services rendered for as many nights’ entertainment as his accustomed stay in the place. In later stages, when the chieftain’s dues were commuted into money, the ‘tunc pound’ in lieu of food-
- 57. No galanas for murderwithin the kindred. rents easily became, as we find it in the surveys, a charge on the district rather than on the shifting tribesmen and their herds. And when the power of the chieftain had grown with time, and instead of ‘nights’ entertainments’ obtained in the primitive way by the actual movement of himself and his retinue from place to place, the food-rents or the tunc pounds in lieu of them were delivered at his palace, he would become the recipient of a regular revenue. And out of this revenue it would become easy for him to reward a follower or endow a church by the transfer of so many food-rents or tunc pounds in lieu of them, or the revenue from such and such a district, or of so many of its trefgordds, without disturbing the internal working of the system or the daily life of the tribesmen and their herds. When Beowulf returns to his chieftain after his exploit and is rewarded by the gift of a palace and so many ‘thousands,’ we naturally ask of what, and how it could be done. We may not be able to say off-hand what the unit was, but we get from the Welsh example some rough idea of what tribal tribute and income were, and how these could be readily gathered and transferred. V. THE METHOD OF PAYMENT OF GALANAS BETWEEN KINDREDS. Postponing for a while the consideration of the position of the various classes of non-tribesmen, but still keeping in view the fact that in considerable numbers they were practically sharers with the tribesmen in the rights of grazing and occupation of land, we are now in the position to realise to some extent what happened when a murder had taken place. If it was of some one within the kindred, there was, as we have said, no slaying of the murderer. Whether it were a parricide or a fratricide, or the murder of a near kinsman, under Cymric custom there was no galanas, nothing but execration and ignominious exile.
- 58. The blood feud andtherefore blood fine between kindreds. The slayer flees to a church with his cattle. Six cows for the saraad or insult. 120 cows by fortnightly instalments for galanas. But if a tribesman of one kindred were killed by a tribesman of another kindred, then it was a serious matter of blood feud between the kindreds, or of the payment of the blood fine. The tribal conscience demanded vengeance or composition. It sometimes happened that the murderer had fled to a church for safety, taking his cattle with him. For the clergy or monks at the place of refuge had a herd of cattle of their own, and with them the murderer’s cattle were allowed to wander and graze so long as they returned nightly to the refuge.[45] There he remained presumably till the kindred of the murdered tribesman, through negotiation and arrangement of the chiefs of the kindreds, had agreed to accept the payment of the galanas, if it were the case of an uchelwr or full tribesman, of 126 cows. Six cows, as we shall see hereafter, were saraad for the insult, and 120 cows galanas for the murder. The saraad was paid first—six cows or other cattle to the same value belonging to the murderer were driven from the herd in payment. The murderer’s life was then safe, and presumably he might return with his cattle to his place. Within a fortnight, the tribesmen of the murderer’s kindred met to apportion the payment of the rest. They came from trefgordds far and near, from the territories sometimes of various higher territorial chieftains within whose districts they had grazing rights. The collected tribesmen having apportioned the payment, fortnight after fortnight instalments must be paid till the whole number in value of 120 cows was completed.[46] But by whom was the payment to be made?[47]
- 59. The slayer’s near familypay 40 cows. The other 80 fall on the kindred. The slayer’s right of ‘spear penny.’ Forty cows must first be found by the murderer, his father, mother, brothers, and sisters with him. They doubtless helped one another, but theoretically, in one or other of the common herds, there must have been cattle belonging to the murderer, his father, mother, brothers, and sisters, or how could they have paid their shares? There was nothing unreal in this liability of each to pay a share, for had the murderer been slain each one of them would have received, instead of having to pay, a share in 40 cows. The murderer himself had to pay a third of the 40 cows if he had them. His father and mother between them paid the next third, and the brothers and sisters the remaining third, the sisters paying half what the brothers did.[48] The herds of many a trefgordd must be thinned before this could be done. The remainder of the galanas, viz. 80 cows, fell on the kindred, to the seventh degree or fifth cousins. The paternal relations had to find two thirds of it and the maternal one third, and these kindreds embraced the descendants from the great-grandparents of the great- grandparents on both sides. In the first fortnight the kindred on the father’s side had to find half what was due from them. In the second fortnight they had to find the other half, and in the third fortnight the maternal kindred had to find their share, till so at last the full tale of the 120 cows was paid. The oath of peace from the kindreds of the murdered man could then be given, and the murderer and his kinsmen, be at peace.[49] But what happened if the murderer could not find the cattle for his third of the 40 cows which he and his immediate family had to find? He had yet a right, as a member of the greater kindred, to claim in aid a ‘spear penny’ from all those male kinsmen descended from a common ancestor on his father’s side two steps further back, i.e. still more
- 60. The solidarity of thekindred and individual liability within it. Each had his da or cattle for maintenance and so could contribute to the payment. The galanas and the saraad distinct things. distantly related to him than those included in the kindred to the seventh degree who had already paid their share. Even if the slayer were a woman, she had the same right of spear penny from the men of her kindred to help her to make her payment.[50] So this attempt to realise what was involved in the payment of an ordinary case of galanas brings us back to the recognition of the double aspect of the kindred in the structure of tribal society—its solidarity and joint responsibility, on the one hand, as against outsiders, the whole kindred being responsible in the last resort; on the other hand the individual responsibility of its members, graduated according to nearness of relationship, for the crimes of their relative. In Cymric tribal society this was made possible by the broad fact that both males and females in the group of kindred, on both paternal and maternal sides, liable to pay, had cattle of their own in the common herd, each having received his or her da for maintenance by right of kin and descent from the common ancestor or chieftain of the kindred. The two things surely hang together. And therefore, if we find in the laws of other tribes somewhat similar rules regarding the payment of wergelds, it probably will be worth while to inquire further whether the corresponding structure of tribal society, or something more or less equivalent to it, may not be present also. VI. THE AMOUNT OF THE CYMRIC GALANAS. In all the Welsh Codes the galanas, as already mentioned, is described in a peculiar form. It is a combination of two items, viz. the saraad, or payment for insult, and the galanas proper. Thus the galanas of the innate boneddig, or young tribesman, accepted by the kindred as a tribesman of nine descents of Cymric
- 61. The wife shared inthe saraad of her husband, not in the galanas. blood, is described as ‘three kine and three score kine,’ that of the uchelwr or breyr as ‘six kine and six score kine.’ The explanation of this is obtained from the following passage:— What is the galanas of the breyr without office? Six kine and six score kine. The six score kine is the galanas and the six kine is for saraad of the corpse.[51] So also in the Gwentian Code:— When a married man shall be murdered his saraad is first paid and then his galanas, for the wife has the third of the saraad, and she has no part of the galanas.[52] So also in the Venedotian Code:— No one is killed without being first subjected to saraad. If a man be married, let a third of the man’s saraad be given to his wife and let the two shares be placed with the galanas, and after that let the galanas be divided into three shares and let the third share go to the lord as exacting third.[53] The reason why the wife has a share in the saraad and not in the galanas has already been explained. She suffers from the personal affront or insult to her slain husband and shares in the saraad. But she has no blood relationship with her husband, and only the husband’s kindred are therefore entitled to share in the galanas, as her husband’s kindred alone would have been concerned in the feud. The saraad and the galanas were therefore separate things and subject to separate rules, though both payable on the murder of a
- 62. That of the ‘uchelwr’120 cows; of the young tribesman 60 cows. Description of the normal cow. tribesman. The galanas proper is what must be regarded in any comparison with Continental wergelds. The real galanas of the uchelwr or breyr, apart from the saraad, was 120 cows, and that of the young innate boneddig who had received his da but had no family was 60 cows. In one of the Codes his galanas when married is said to be 80 cows. Now in what currency was the galanas paid? Formerly, according to the Codes, all payments were made in cattle, and the galanas proper was reckoned in scores of cows. But of what cow? How was the normal cow for practical purposes to be defined? It is a question worth answering, because we may probably take the Cymric method, of valuing the cow as a unit of currency in cattle, as at any rate suggestive of the methods generally adopted by other tribes. According to the Venedotian Code the cow was of full normal value when in full milk and until her fifth calf. And if there be any dispute concerning her milk, she is to be taken on the 9th day of May to a luxuriant place wherein no animal has been before her, and the owner is to milk her without leaving any for the calf, and put the milk in the measure vessel, and if it be full twice a day that is sufficient; and if it be not, the deficiency is to be compensated by oatmeal until the feast of St. Curic, thence until the feast of St. Michael by barley meal, and from thence until the calendar of winter by rye meal. Others say that the worth of the milk deficient in the measure is to be returned to the possessor of the cow; if half the milk be deficient, half the worth; if a third of the milk, a third of the worth; and that is the best mode.[54]
- 63. The cow reckoned asthree ‘scores’ or ounces of silver. Then the milk measure is described thus:— The measure for her milk is, three thumbs at the bottom, six in the middle of the vessel, and nine at the top, and nine in its height diagonally (enyhyd en amrescoeu), and the thumb whereby the vessel is to be measured (in case of dispute) is the breadth of the judge’s thumb. In the Dimetian Code substantially the same rules are given, except that the measure of the cow’s milking is smaller. The measure of a vessel for a cow’s milk is nine thumbs at its edge, and three at the bottom, and seven diagonally from the off- side groove to the near-side edge in height.[55] The only difference is between the seven and the nine thumbs of diagonal measurement. Possibly there may be some error in the figures, and the measure may have been the same in both Codes. Returning to the galanas; although it was reckoned in the Codes in scores of cows, a fixed equation had already been made between cows and silver. The normal cow was equated in the Codes with ‘three scores of silver.’ And in the Latin version of the Dimetian Code the ‘score of silver’ is translated by ‘uncia argenti.’ The score of silver at the date of the Code was therefore an ounce of silver. So that the reckoning is the Frankish or Anglo-Saxon one of twenty pence to the ounce. The score of pence of 32 wheat-grains would make the ounce of 640 wheat-grains: that is, the ounce of the pound of 240d., or 7680 wheat-grains—the pound in use in England after the time of Kings Offa and Alfred, and at the date of the Codes.
- 64. The galanas of the‘uchelwr’ 30 lbs. of silver. At a ratio of 1:12 equal to the gold mina of 200 solidi. Strangers in blood how treated. The galanas of the uchelwr or breyr being 120 cows, and the cow being reckoned at three scores or ounces of silver, the galanas would equal 360 scores or ounces, or thirty pounds of silver. The ratio of gold to silver after the temporary disturbance under Charlemagne had, as we have seen, settled down again to the Imperial ratio of 1:12. Now thirty pounds of 7680 wheat-grains equal 230,400 wheat- grains, and this number of silver wheat-grains divided by twelve equalled exactly 19,200 wheat-grains of gold. So that this Celtic galanas of the Cymric uchelwr or breyr of 120 cows, like so many Continental wergelds, was apparently exactly equal to 200 gold solidi of ninety-six wheat-grains, i.e. the heavy gold mina of Imperial standard. VII. THE METHODS OF TREATMENT OF STRANGERS OR NON-TRIBESMEN. Another point upon which special inquiry is made in this volume regards tribal methods of treating strangers in blood and slaves. There is no subject requiring more careful investigation than the combination of circumstances out of which arose what is roughly called serfdom, i.e. the attachment of tenants to the land rendering services to a lord. I shall not be suspected of suggesting that tribal customs and methods were the sole factors which produced serfdom and of ignoring the influences which came from Roman methods of managing landed estates, and from Roman law modified by ecclesiastical usage. Indeed, I have insisted from the first that while, in the ‘Germania’ of Tacitus, the germs may be found of an ‘embryo manor,’ both Roman and German elements probably combined in producing the later manorial system and serfdom which grew up in what were
- 65. After four generations on theland they become adscripti glebæ and obtain recognition of kindred. Their rights increase with growth of kindred. once the Roman provinces of Gaul and the two Germanies, and even also in Britain.[56] But I think that in Cymric tribal custom we may find a fresh clue worth following in the attempt to gather from Continental evidence the methods likely to be used by conquering German or Anglo-Saxon tribes in the treatment of strangers in blood. [57] In Welsh tribal custom alltuds or strangers and their descendants (not necessarily otherwise unfree persons) having some special circumstances in their favour, being allowed to settle within the district of a greater or lesser chieftain upon land which, in a sense, may have been his demesne land, were free to remove and settle under another chieftain, unless and until they had remained on the same land or under the same lordship for four generations. But thereafter the great-grandchildren of the original settlers became adscripti glebæ. And this fixture to the land, or rather to the lordship, was apparently not looked upon as in any way a degradation in rank, but on the contrary a step in advance towards the recognition of tribal rights. The great-grandson of the stranger did not indeed become a Cymric tribesman, but he gained the recognition of his status as the founder of a kindred of his own, the members of which in after-generations would, as kinsmen, be able to swear for and defend one another. This being so in the case of free strangers coming into the country, the next question is what was the position of the semi- servile class, the aillts and taeogs of the Codes, who and whose ancestors for many generations had been born upon the land in a semi-servile condition? The fixture to the land of the aillt or taeog was not the special mark so much of a semi-servile condition as of his want of recognised kindred, and under the local custom of South Wales it seems that he too, like the alltud, could sometimes arrive at the recognition of kindred, without indeed becoming a Cymric
- 66. Want of kindred thekey to their position. tribesman, at the end of four generations of residence under the chieftain of the land; and even to further recognition of it, involving a still better position as to rights, at the ninth generation. The ninth man in South Wales seems according to local custom in some districts to have, at last, climbed the highest rung of the ladder, and to have attained the right to claim the status of a Cymric tribesman. This curious rise under Cymric custom, by steps of four generations, up the ladder towards the recognition of tribal rights, seems to have a suggestive correspondence with the reverse process under manorial usage of proving the serfdom of a nativus by showing that the great-grandfather was a nativus on the lord’s land, the manorial rule being that settlement on servile land for four generations made the posterity of an original settler into nativi.[58] Once more let us try to realise what this meant, and what was the position of these Cymric non- tribesmen in regard to their settlement on land. If under the guidance of the Codes we turn to the extents and surveys, we find them living, in some cases, not mixed up with the tribesmen, but in separate groups, or trefs, or trefgordds. There may be here and there exceptional alltuds or strangers of a higher class growing up, by the gradual process of intermarriage for four generations with tribeswomen, into the status of tribesmen. But the mass of the stranger class were aillts and taeogs living in separate taeog trefs, though, according to the surveys, sharing, often in common, certain rights of grazing over certain districts with gwelys of tribesmen. Now these groups of taeogs and aillts were, according to the Codes, as we have seen, of two classes, and we recognise the same two classes when we find in the surveys not only groups of taeogs in taeog-trefs but also gwelys of non-tribesmen. The normal group of the taeog-tref differed from the free tref in the fact that in it no family rights were recognised. All the members of it shared in its rights and payments equally per capita, and not per stirpes. They were all liable as a body, few or many, for the
- 67. The stranger a kinlessman who has no protection but from his lord whole amount of the dues to the chieftains. During their fathers’ lifetime sons shared pari passu and equally with their parents, and other members of the group, in the pasture and common ploughing, except youngest sons, who remained with their fathers. In the gwelys, on the other hand, as in the gwelys of tribesmen, there was recognition of family or blood relationships, and a patriarchal element. There were thus under Cymric tribal custom various subordinate grades or classes. Beginning at the bottom of the ladder were:— (1) The slaves who could be bought and sold, and who were reckoned as worth one pound of silver. (2) The taeogs and aillts or permanent nativi, born non-tribesmen, without recognised family rights. (3) Non-tribesmen growing or having grown in four generations into gwelys of non-tribesmen with recognised family rights. (4) Strangers of exceptional position who, having married into the tribe, had become tribesmen in the fourth generation by repeated intermarriage. And once more the fact should never be lost sight of, that the gradual growth into tribal or quasi-tribal rights was not a growth into exactly what in a modern sense would be called individual freedom. It was accompanied by the growth of ties which bound the family to the chieftain, till at the moment that at the fourth generation the recognition of rights of kindred was attained, the family found itself, as we have seen, so closely tied to the chieftain and the land that the newly recognised gwely had become adscriptus glebæ. Finally, the tribal logic of the case was probably something like this:— The free tribesman is the man who belongs to a kindred who can protect him by oath and by sword. Until a stranger has kinsmen who can do this he is an odd or kinless man, protected only by
- 68. till a kindredhas grown up around him. his lord. If he be killed his galanas goes to his lord; he has no recognised kin to receive it. If, on the other hand, he is charged with slaying another, he has no kin to swear to his innocence, the oath of a non-tribesman not being held good as against a tribesman. If guilty, he has no kin bound to fight in the feud for him, or to help him to pay a galanas for his crime. So that even when at the fourth generation the descendant of the alltud becomes the founder of a gwely he has gained only half the status of a tribesman. It is not till the fourth generation of descendants in the gwely, i.e. the seventh generation from the original settler, that a complete kindred has grown up. It is not till then that the descendant of the original alltud is surrounded by a full group of relatives, born in his great-grandfather’s gwely, whose oaths can be taken and who can protect him by oath and sword or in payment of galanas. All this time the alltud family have been more or less dependent on the protection of the chieftain, and rights and obligations are apt to be correlative. The object of this essay is to inquire how far, in the case of other tribes, evidence may be found of the working of somewhat similar tribal instincts, resulting in customary rules more or less like those of the Cymry, so that at last, turning attention to the Anglo-Saxon laws, we may be able all the more fully to recognise and appreciate in them the traits of tribal custom, which among other factors went to the making of Anglo-Saxon England. In the meantime, for future reference, the following list of the galanas of various classes will be found convenient:— The chief of kindred 180 cows In Gwent and Dimetia 540, and his family 180 The uchelwr 120 ” Man with family without office 80 ” The innate boneddig unmarried 60 ”
- 69. The alltud ofthe brenhin or chief 60 ” The alltud of uchelwrs 30 ” Bondman 1lb. of silver or 4 ” Bondman from beyond sea 6 ”
- 70. What were the lawsof the blood feud? An 8th century story of blood feuds. CHAPTER III. THE EVIDENCE OF BEOWULF ON TRIBAL CUSTOM REGULATING FEUDS c. The object of the short study, in this chapter, of Beowulf, is to learn what incidental information it may give of tribal usage regarding the blood feud, especially on points which, in the case of the substituted wergeld, present doubt and difficulty.[59] Allusion has already been made to some of these points. Did the rule excluding galanas or blood-fine within the kindred extend beyond the gwely to the greater kindred? What happened to a tribesman in a feud between his paternal and maternal kindreds? Did he abstain from taking sides, or did a marriage so far unite two families or kindreds as to make them one for the purpose of blood- fine or feud, so as to prevent the feud or blood-fine from arising? These are questions upon which we want light from the point of view of Welsh tribal custom, and upon which we approach Beowulf for light, with eyes open also to other matters of tribal usage as they may turn up. Beowulf for the present purpose may be taken as an Anglian or Northumbrian recension of a story founded upon Scandinavian tradition, and designed for use or recital at some 8th century royal court— possibly, if Professor Earle’s suggestion be correct, that of King Offa. The western horizon of the story extends to the Frisian shores, but the scene seems chiefly to lie in the Baltic. The plot involves tribal relations between a chieftain of the Danes possibly of Zealand, and two Swedish chieftains. The two latter
- 71. concern us most,and they seem to be the chiefs of two kindreds— Geats and Swedes—Beowulf himself being the link between them, his mother having married from one into the other kindred. This marriage at any rate was one between two kindreds. There is no apparent effort on the part of the poet to enlighten the reader or those who heard him either upon the pedigrees of the persons mentioned in his story or upon the rules of Scandinavian tribal custom. But it happens that, by incidental hints dropped in the telling of the tale, the pedigree of each of the kindreds involved can be fairly made out, and has already been made out by translators and critics.
- 72. involving blood feuds between Beowulf’spaternal and maternal kindred. The Scyldings. The burial of Scyld by his ‘gesiths.’ And as the story involves a homicide within Beowulf’s maternal kindred, and fighting and bloodshed between the kindreds in spite of the marriage link, and as it deals also with outside feuds, it happens to present remarkable opportunities for studying the action of tribal custom in various cases. The evidence it gives is made all the more valuable by its being an Anglian version of Scandinavian traditions, inasmuch as the poet, or his Anglian interpreter, assumes throughout that the laws of the game, under Scandinavian tribal custom, were too well known to need explanation to his Anglian audience. So that by inference it would seem that the customs of Baltic chieftains were familiar at the court of Offa, and not very far removed from those of Anglian tradition. The poet introduces us first to a tribe of Gar-Danes and the clan or kindred of Scyldings. Scyld the son of Scef is the ancestor of the Scyldings. He is an Adeling who has torn their meadthrones from many tribes (mægdum) and in true tribal fashion compelled them to pay tribute. Surrounded in his old age by numerous descendants and other gesiths who have resorted to him, the chieftain has become a great hero in his tribe (mægdh). A graphic description of the burial of Scyld in his ships by his gesiths is a fitting introduction to the poem. Let us mark in passing that the word mægd evidently may mean a much wider kindred than the near family of a great-grandfather’s descendants (the Welsh gwely). One mægd conquers another and makes it pay tribute. Again the word gesith evidently includes, with members of the near kin, such others, not necessarily blood relations, as may have joined the warrior band of the hero. They may or may not have been adopted into his kindred in becoming his men, but this extension of comradeship or kinship, as the case may be, to these gesiths adds to the greatness and power of his mægd. Scyld | Beowulf | Healfdene | Heorogar { Heoroweard The great- | (not of | The father | (61 and { (2162) grandfather | the story) | | 467) { | The great- | | | grandfather | +-Hrothgar { Hrethric | The { (1190,
- 73. Hrothgar the great- grandsonof Scyld. | Scylding { 1837) | m. { | Wealtheow { Hrothmund | (61 and { | 613) { Freaware | { (2023) +-Halga | (youngest { Hrodulf | son) (61) { (1018, 1165, | { 1182) | +-Elan { Onela | daughter { | presumably { | married to { | Ongentheow { Othere | the { ‘sister’s { Eanmund | Scylfing { sons’ to { 2929 | (62-63) { Hrothgar { | { 2929 { Eadgil | { { 239 The opening episode of the burial of Scyld is followed by a few lines which reveal something of the pedigree of his descendant Hrothgar the Scylding. The pedigree of Hrothgar, in true tribal fashion, makes Scyld his great-grandfather. He is ‘Hrothgar the Scylding,’ may we not say, because Scyld was his great- grandfather, just as Hengist and Horsa were Oiscings according to Bede, who in stating their pedigree makes Oisc their great-grandfather, and just as in the Welsh surveys the gwelys still bear the great-grandfather’s name though he be long dead, because the gwely hangs together till the fourth generation. So far as it goes here is at least an indication that the nearer kindred (or gwely) might be much the same thing both in Celtic and Teutonic tribes. But Hrothgar is not described only as chieftain of his nearer kindred. Success in arms had made him head of many winemâgas (blood friends) and he was surrounded by a mighty mago-dright (band of kin). He had built himself a famous folk-stede, or hall, called ‘Heort,’ and all had gone well with him till the monster Grendel came upon the scene. The deliverer from the monster was Beowulf, the hero of the story. He comes from another kindred, that of the Scylfings, whose pedigree, not fully given, seems to have been something like the following. Scylf was the common ancestor of the Swedes or Scylfings. The tribe was divided into two families in the elder of which descended the chieftainship of
- 74. Beowulf a great- grandsonof Wægmund and so a Wægmunding. Beowulf a thane of his maternal uncle Hygelac. the Scylfings (2382). { Ongentheow { who presumably (1) Links not stated { married Elan, { Onela { sister of Hrothgar { { Eanmund { the Scylding (62) { Ohthere { { Eadgils Second family of Wægmundings. { . . . . { Ecgtheow-----------Beowulf (2) Wægmund { { who fled to { { Hrothgar { Wihstan-----------Wiglaf At any rate the Scylfings seem to be divided into two families whose common ancestor was Scylf. But both Beowulf and Wiglaf are spoken of as Wægmundings (2608 and 2815). The headship of the Scylfings had passed into the older of the two families (2384), and this probably is the reason why Beowulf is never called Beowulf the Scylfing. The reason why Beowulf appeared as the natural helper of Hrothgar from the monster Grendel was that his father Ecgtheow owed a debt of gratitude to Hrothgar. ‘Fighting out a mighty feud,’ Ecgtheow had killed Heatholaf the Wylfing (460), thereby raising another feud. Wherefore his own people (463) fearing invasion, had caused him to flee over sea, thereby seemingly wiping their hands of him. He seems to have fled to Hrothgar just as the latter had become chieftain of the Scyldings on his brother Heorogar’s death. Hrothgar compounded the feud with money (470), sending to the Wylfings over sea ‘ancient treasures.’ Whereupon Ecgtheow swore oath to Hrothgar and presumably became his ‘man.’ And Beowulf now, ‘at honour’s call,’ had come to fight the monster, thereby confirming the friendship between Geats and Gar-Danes, requiting what Hrothgar had done for his father (459). The details of the fight need not detain us. But the fact is important that Beowulf comes to the rescue not as a Scylfing or as representing his paternal kindred, but as the thane of his maternal uncle Hygelac, the chieftain of his mother’s kindred. He approaches Hrothgar with a band of fifteen chosen warriors. When asked from whence they came they said they were Geats, Hygelac’s
- 75. Homicide within the familyunavenged. hearthgeneats (260). And the meaning of the word is illustrated further when the warriors accustomed to sleep in Hrothgar’s hall are spoken of as Hrothgar’s hearthgeneats (1581, and see 260 and 2419). When brought into the hall Beowulf himself calls his band Hygelac’s beod-geneats (344) (table geneats), and to Hrothgar he calls himself ‘mæg and mago-thegn,’ literally ‘kin and son thane’ of Hygelac (408). The daring deed accomplished, Beowulf’s success is rewarded by many golden and other gifts from Hrothgar, and it is significant that on his return he lays all these at the feet of his maternal uncle Hygelac, his heofodmagus —chief of kin—whose man and kin he owns himself to be. His position in Hygelac’s kindred thus demands careful study. This seems to be the pedigree. {(1) Herebeald { killed by Hæthcyn { {(2) Hæthcyn Hrethel { who had three sons {(3) Hygelac {(1) A daughter and one daughter { { who married Eofor thus: { { { m. Hygd. {(2) Heardred { { Hygelac’s only son. {(4) A sister { Beowulf’s Beowulf { mother Hygelac’s sister’s son. Beowulf is made to say that, when seven winters old, Hrethel had received him from his father Ecgtheow and had kept him as his own child (2420). ‘Remembering kinship’ (sippe gemunde), the old chieftain held him in no less regard than his own three sons, Herebeald, Hæthcyn, and Hygelac. But Hrethel’s old age was full of trouble. The worst tragedy that came upon him was the death of his eldest son Herebeald, killed by his second son apparently by accident. Hæthcyn by arrow from hornbow brought him (Herebeald) down, his near kinsman. He missed the target and shot his brother. (2440) Here, then, was an apparently accidental homicide within the family. How was it regarded?
- 76. Quarrel between Beowulf’s paternal andmaternal kindred. He takes no part in it. One brother killed the other with bloody dart. That was a wrong past compensation.… Any way and every way it was inevitable that the Etheling must quit life unavenged. (2445). The poet likens the father’s grief to that of ‘an old ceorle’ who should see his young son ride on the gallows-tree and can do nothing but wait while his son thus hangs, food for the ravens, as he cannot bring him help (2450). So did the crowned chief of the Stormfolk, in memory of Herebeald, carry about a tumult of heart-sorrow. He could not possibly requite the feud upon the man-slayer, neverthemore could he pursue the warrior with hostile deeds though not beloved by him. He then, with the sorrow wherewith that wound had stricken him, let go life’s joys and chose the light of God. (2464.) Thus incidentally is revealed by the poet the depth of the tribal feeling that homicide can only be atoned for by avengement and feud, making it a hard struggle against nature for a father to withhold revenge upon a son for even accidental fratricide. As with the Cymry, it seems that there could be no feud or composition within the family. Nor in the case of accidental homicide was there apparently in the poet’s mind the necessity of flight or outlawry, however great the craving for avengement. It is also significant that Hæthcyn, the slayer, is made to join with his brother Hygelac in the next warfare after Hrethel’s death (2474). The accidental slayer remains a tribesman. This next warfare was a quarrel—‘provocation and reprisal’—between Swedes and Geats, i.e. between the paternal and maternal kindreds of Beowulf. He himself, it is worth noting, did not engage in it. Onela and Ohthere, the sons of Ongentheow (Beowulf’s paternal relation and chief of the Scylfings or Swedes), apparently began the quarrel. They recklessly broke the peace between the two families—Swedes and Geats. Hrethel was no longer living. Beowulf’s maternal uncles, Hæthcyn and Hygelac, fought on one side, and Ongentheow and his two sons on the other (2485). Hæthcyn fell on one side and Ongentheow on the other: the latter by the hand of Eofor—a comrade rather than kinsman of Hygelac, for he was rewarded by the bestowal of Hygelac’s daughter. The quarrel seems to have been open fighting, possibly from the revival of the old enmities and in breach of tribal custom. Be this as it may, Beowulf
- 77. But in feudwith Frisians Beowulf fights for Hygelac, who is killed. Homicide within the kindred again is unavenged, though Beowulf is guardian of the slain. himself took no part in the quarrel between his maternal and paternal kindreds. This disastrous and unnatural quarrel left Hygelac the only surviving son of Hrethel, and so the chieftain of Beowulf’s maternal kindred. All this irregular fighting, incidentally mentioned by the poet, was past before Beowulf’s great enterprise against the monster Grendel. And, as we have seen, it was as the ‘man and kin’ of Hygelac that Beowulf appeared at Hrothgar’s court. And it was at the feet of Hygelac as his chief of kin, and at the feet of Hygd his queen, that Beowulf laid down his treasures on his return in safety. This exploit ended, Hrothgar thenceforth disappears from the poem, and the poet confines himself to Beowulf’s nearer belongings. The next event in order of date is a quarrel between Hygelac and the Frisians. This time Beowulf fights for his chieftain. But Hygelac is killed (2357), and again the result reveals interesting traits of tribal custom. Beowulf returns from Friesland to Hygd the widowed queen of Hygelac. She ‘offers him rings and throne, not daring to trust that her young son Heardred would be able to maintain the chieftainship against all stranger folk.’ Beowulf, however, declines to become hlaford over Heardred, but supports him in his chieftainship till he should be older (2370). Young Heardred, however, is not chieftain long (2380). The old lawless quarrel between Beowulf’s maternal and paternal relations rises up again. The facts, when unravelled, seem to be these:—Within Beowulf’s paternal kindred trouble had arisen. For some cause not told, the grandsons of Ongentheow (sons of Ohthere) had been outlawed. They are described as wräc-mäegas (2380) and as having cast off allegiance to the chieftain of the Scylfings. These outlawed kinsmen of Beowulf’s paternal family came to young Heardred’s court, and whilst his guests (‘on feorme’) the young chieftain fell by the sword of one of them (2388). It was Eanmund by whom this outrage was committed, and once more the crime remained apparently unavenged. The slayer was allowed to withdraw in safety, leaving Beowulf to succeed to the chieftainship of his maternal kindred (2390). Again we ask why? Here was a crime committed by an outlawed paternal kinsman of Beowulf against the chieftain of his maternal kindred, of whom he was himself the guardian, and yet Beowulf did not avenge it! Was it because of
- 78. An outlawed tribesman not protectedby his kindred. the kinship, or because of the outlawry? Whilst nursing the remembrance of his chieftain’s death, Beowulf is made to act with kindness to the other outlawed brother in his desolation, waiting for such avengement as might come at last in the course of things—as it did, according to the poet, when ‘with a band of warriors over sea Eadgils died in cold and painful marches’ (2396). Avengement is made to follow too in the same way upon Eanmund the murderer. It came from Beowulf’s paternal uncle, Weohstan. But here again the poet is careful to record that it came not in a blood feud, but ‘in fair fight’ with weapon’s edge (2612). And, as if to emphasise the fact that the outlawed kinsman had forfeited all tribal rights, the poet adds that ‘Weohstan from his kindred carried off the armour and sword of Eanmund, Onela (Eanmund’s uncle) yielding them up to him without a word about a feud, although he (Weohstan) had slain his brother’s son’ (2620). Evidently the poet means to make it clear that Onela’s passive attitude was due to the fact that his nephew was a lawless exile, and so no longer entitled to protection from his kin (2612 and 2380). The old sword known among men as the relic of Eanmund (son of Ohthere), whom, when a lawless exile, Weohstan had slain in fair fight with weapon’s edge; and from his kindred (magum) had carried off the brown mottled helmet, ringed byrnie, and old mysterious sword; which Onela yielded up to him, his nephew’s war-harness, accoutrement complete. Not a word spake he (Onela) about the feud, although he (Weohstan) had killed his brother’s son. He (Weohstan) retained the spoils for many a year, bill and byrnie, until when his own boy (Wiglaf) was able to claim Eorlscip rank, like his father before him, then gave he to him, before the Geats, armour untold of every sort, after which he gave up life, ripe for the parting journey. Thus the restrained desire of avengement incidentally is made to find satisfaction at last as regards both the outlawed sons of Ohthere. After these events the elder branch of the Scyldings passes out of the poet’s interest. The only remaining heroes of the tale are the two Wægmundings—Beowulf and Wiglaf.
- 79. Beowulf as ‘sister’s son’becomes chief of his maternal kindred. A long interval had elapsed between Beowulf’s accession to the chieftainship of his maternal kindred and the final feat of daring which cost him his life. And it was Wiglaf, his nearest paternal kinsman, who in the last tragedy came to his aid bearing the sword of the outlawed Eanmund. Beowulf’s dying words to Wiglaf were: ‘Thou art the last left of our kindred (cynnes) the Wægmundings. Fate has swept into eternity all my kinsmen (mâgas)—eorls among men! I must after them!’ As he comes to the rescue, Wiglaf remembers the honour done to him by Beowulf, who had already passed on to him the hereditary right of the chieftainship of the Wægmundings (2608). Why had he done this? If we might tentatively use the clue given by ancient Greek tribal custom to elucidate a Scandinavian case, we should say that on failure of male succession the ‘sister’s son’ of Hygelac had been called back into his mother’s kindred to become its chieftain, leaving Wiglaf, his next of kin on his father’s side, to sustain the chieftainship of his paternal kindred. The right of the maternal uncle, known to have existed under early Greek law, to claim his ‘sister’s son’ if need arose, to perpetuate the mother’s paternal kindred, suggests a similar explanation in Beowulf’s case. Such a right, found as well in the Laws of Manu, may possibly have been inherent in Scandinavian tribal custom also. Such a suggestion would be at least consistent with the fact of Beowulf’s having been brought up from seven years old in the household of his maternal grandfather, and treated by him as a son. It would be in harmony, too, with what Tacitus describes to have been the relation of the ‘sister’s son’ to the avunculus amongst the German tribes, and the peculiar value of the ‘sister’s son’ as a hostage.[60] Some indirect confirmation of the probable truth of such a suggestion may perhaps be also drawn from the fact that in Beowulf, when a man’s father is no longer living, the poet sometimes seems to describe him as his maternal uncle’s nephew instead of as his father’s son. Heardred, the young son of Hygelac and Hygd his queen, after his father’s death is spoken of no longer as Hygelac’s son, but as the nephew of Hereric, ‘nefan Hererices’ (2207). Now his paternal uncles were Herebeald and Hæthcyn, and it becomes an almost necessary inference that Hereric was a maternal uncle. Thus: Hæreth (1929)
- 80. Tribal custom asto marriage. Marriage a link between kindreds. father of Hygd | +------------+-----------+ | | (Hereric?) Hygd, m. Hygelac uncle of Heardred (2207) | Heardred nephew of Hereric[61] (2207) So also in the case of Hygelac himself. He was the son of Hrethel. The poet calls him son of Hrethel (1486), and again Hygelac Hrethling (1924). But after Hrethel’s death he calls him ‘Hygelac of the Geats, nephew of Swerting’ (‘Hygelac Geáta nefa Swertinges’) (1204). Here again it seems likely that Swerting was the maternal uncle, though the poet, as in the other case, does not think it needful to explain that it was so. Otherwise, why the change of epithet? We are here recording tribal customs as revealed in Beowulf, and not seeking for their origin in earlier stages of tribal life. We pass on, therefore, to consider what light the story throws on the customs of the Northern tribes as to marriage. It is with the chieftains’ grade of rank that we have mostly to do in Beowulf, and nothing is more strongly emphasised by the poet than the important place of marriage between two tribes or kindreds as a link, recognised, however, to be a very brittle one, binding them together so as to end or prevent the recurrence of a feud. When Beowulf, after his first exploit in aid of Hrothgar against Grendel, has returned to his maternal uncle and chief of kindred Hygelac, and is recounting his adventures, the poet at the first mention of Hrothgar’s queen makes him call her the ‘peace bond to the people.’ And in the same breath, in telling how in Hrothgar’s hall the daughter Freaware bore the ale-flagon, he stops to tell how that ‘she, the young, the gold dight, was promised to the gay son of Froda; it having pleased the Friend of the Scylfings that he, through that woman, should compose deadly enmities and feuds.’ And the poet makes Beowulf moralise to the effect:—‘Often and not seldom anywhere after deadly strife, it is but a little while that the baneful spear reposes, good though the bride may be!’ It would seem that Hrothgar had been formerly at feud with the Heathobeards, that Froda had been killed in the
- 81. Summary of the evidenceof feud, and that the marriage of Freaware to Froda’s son, Ingeld, was to close the feud. But Beowulf repeats aside to Hygelac that he does not think much of the chances of a long continuance of peace between Scyldings and Heathobeards (2030). Well may it mislike the ruler of the Heathobeards and every thane of that people when the lady goeth into hall with a prince born of Danes, amidst the high company; upon him do glisten heirlooms of their ancestors, ringed harness, once Heathobeardic treasure, while they could keep the mastery of those weapons and until they in an unlucky moment led to that buckler play their dear comrades and their own lives. Then saith one over the beer, one who observes them both, an old lance fighter.… ‘Canst thou, my friend, recognise the blade, the precious steel, which thy father carried into battle, wearing his helmet for the last time, where the Danes slew him? … and the masters of the battlefield were the fiery Scyldings! Now here a boy of one of those banesmen walketh our hall … wearing the treasure which by right should have been thine!’ So urged and egged on at every turn with galling words, at last the moment comes that for his father’s deeds the lady’s thane sleepeth bloodspattered after the falchion’s bite, life-doomed! The other escapes alive! By-and-by the sworn oaths of the warriors on either side will be broken, when in Ingeld’s mind rankle war purposes, and care has lessened his domestic sorrow! Therefore I deem not the loyalty of the Heathobeards nor the alliance with the Danes secure, or the friendship firm! (2033-2069, slightly abridged.) What a consistent light this passage throws incidentally on the quarrels which, in spite of the Geats and Swedes being bound together in friendship by the marriage of Beowulf’s mother, broke out again and again, according to the poem, between the two kindreds—quarrels in which Beowulf himself is represented as taking no part, presumably because, according to tribal custom, his blood relationship to both kindreds was a bar to his taking up the feud or assuming the part of the avenger! And how the whole story of Beowulf’s paternal kindred reveals the melancholy fact that, however great the force of tribal custom in controlling feuds, the wild human nature of hot- blooded tribesmen was wont to break through restraints and often ended in the outlawry of tribesmen and the breaking up of kindreds! To sum up the results obtained from the study of tribal custom as incidentally revealed in Beowulf:—
- 82. Beowulf. (1) There isno feud within the kindred when one kinsman slays another. However strong the natural instinct for avengement, it must be left to fate and natural causes. Accidental homicide does not seem to be followed even by exile. But murder within the kindred breaks the tribal tie and is followed by outlawry. (2) Marriage between two kindreds is a common though precarious means of closing feuds between them. The son of such a marriage takes no part in a quarrel between his paternal and maternal relations. (3) When a marriage takes place, the wife does not pass entirely out of her own kindred into her husband’s. Her own kindred, her father and brothers, maintain a sort of guardianship over her, and the son in some sense belongs to both kindreds. He may have to join in his maternal kindred’s feuds, and he may become the chieftain of his maternal kindred on failure of direct male succession, even though by so doing he may have to relinquish the right of chieftainship in his paternal kindred to another kinsman. Finally, in passing from the blood feuds to the composition substituted for them, after what we have learned from Beowulf of tribal custom, there need be no surprise that maternal as well as paternal relations are found to be interested in them. We may fairly judge that tribal custom, in the stage in which we find it in Beowulf and later in the laws of various tribes, would not have been true to itself, had this been otherwise.
- 83. Goidelic tribal custom differed fromCymric. CHAPTER IV. TRIBAL CUSTOM OF THE IRISH TRIBES. I. THE ERIC FINE OF THE BREHON LAWS. Returning now once more to the examination of tribal custom and the structure of tribal society in the case of tribes belonging to the Celtic group, it might be expected that Cymric customs would be likely most closely to accord with those of the Celtic tribes of Ireland, Brittany, and Gaul. But it must be remembered that the Cymry whose customs are contained in the Codes, whatever their original Continental position may have been, are supposed to have come into Wales from the North, with Cunedda and his sons. The Codes therefore probably represent the customs of the Cymry of ancient Cumbria north of the Solway Frith, rather than those of the Britons, whether Goidels or Cymry, dwelling in South Wales and more or less subject for generations to Roman rule. If the theory of the emigration from Wales and Cornwall into Brittany, as the consequence of the Saxon invasion, be correct, the Britons who emigrated into Brittany may never have shared the peculiar customs of the immigrants into Wales following upon the conquests of Cunedda and his sons. They may have had more in common with the Goidelic tribes of South Wales than with the Cymric newcomers into Wales. These considerations may well prepare the way for the recognition of differences as well as resemblances between Cymric and Irish tribal custom. The system of payments for homicide amongst the ancient tribes of Ireland as described in the Brehon Laws differed widely from that of the Cymric Codes.[62] In the first place, the Brehon laws describe no scale of galanas or wergeld, directly varying with the social rank of the person killed. Gradations of rank there were indeed, and numerous enough. But there appears to have been only one coirp-dire, or body-fine, the same for all ranks, namely seven cumhals or female slaves—the equivalent of twenty-one cows.
- 84. The Brehon coirp- direof all tribesmen the same: six cumhals and one added. The eneclann or honour-price varied with rank. The ‘eric’ fine included both. And when this coirp-dire, or price of the body or life of a man, is further examined, it is found to consist of two parts: (1) one cumhal of compensation (aithgin); (2) the six cumhals of the coirp-dire proper. In the tract ‘Of every Crime’[63] it is stated:— If the man who is dead has a son, he takes the cumhal of compensation alone. If not alive, his father is to take it. If not alive, his brother; if he be not alive, the nearest person to him is to take it. And then the coirp-dire is divided: 3 cumhals to the son and the father; 1 cumhal to the brother; 1 cumhal to the son and father (sic); 1 to the geilfine from the lowest to the uppermost man; —so making up the 6 cumhals of the coirp-dire. And in the ‘Book of Aicill’ (p. 537) are these lines: Three eric fines are counselled: (1) There is paid full compensation; (2) And fair honest coirp-dire; (3) And honour-price is paid. Besides this coirp-dire, therefore, was the eneclann, honour-price or price of the face, i.e. payment for insult. And this was the payment, by no means confined to homicide, which varied according to rank. These two things then—the coirp-dire of seven cumhals and the honour- price—made up together (with, in some cases, exceptional additions) the eric fine. Next as to the persons liable for its payment.
- 85. The kindred of‘near hearths’ were liable for the whole eric. The ‘hearths’ liable apparently to third cousins. In the Corus Bescna[64] the following statement is made relating to homicide in cases where the homicide was one of necessity:— The eric fine is to be paid by the slayer’s kindred (fine), as they divide his property (cro). He (the slayer) shall pay a cumhal of restitution (aithgin) and as much as a son or a father of the six cumhals of the dire-fine. As to crimes of non-necessity:—[65] he himself is to be given up for it, with his cattle and his land. If he has not enough to pay the eric or is not to be caught, then it is to be paid by his son until his cattle and his land be spent on it (or failing him) by his father in the same manner. Lastly, failing both the son and the father, it is to be paid by each nearest hearth (teallach) to him until all they have is spent, or full payment of the crime is made up among them. So that, in the absence or in default of the murderer, at the date of this Brehon tract, his family and kindred were answerable for the whole of the eric in the case of wilful murder. The nearest hearths or ‘fine who bear the crimes of each kinsman of their stock’ were, according to the Senchus Mor (i. p. 261):— 1. Geil fine; 2. Derb fine; 3. Iar fine; 4. Ind fine.
- 86. I think M.D’Arbois de Jubainville[66] is probably right in explaining these four hearths or fines to be groups or grades of kindred. He divides them thus:— The geil fine { father; son; grandson; brother. derb fine { grandfather; paternal uncle; nephew; first cousin. iar fine { great-grandfather; great-uncle; great-nephew; second cousin. ind fine { great-great-grandfather; great-great-uncle; great-great-nephew; third cousin. Whether this interpretation of the Brehon scheme of the divisions of the Irish fine or kindred be correct in every detail I shall not venture to give an opinion, further than to say that, viewed in the light of other tribal systems, it seems to me to be nearer the mark than the various other attempts to make intelligible what after all are very obscure passages in the Brehon Laws. The seventeen persons making up the four divisions of the fine or kindred must be taken, I think, as representing classes of relations and not individuals; e.g. under the head ‘first cousin’ must be included all ‘first cousins,’ and so on throughout. So understood, the four hearths or groups of kindred liable for the eric would include the sixteen grades nearest of kin to the criminal. He himself, or the chieftain, would form the seventeenth person on the list. The tract ‘Of every Crime’ seems to confirm the view above taken. It states (iv. 241) that ‘for the crimes of every criminal’ he himself was first
- 87. The four ‘fines’or ‘hearths’ were groups of kinsmen in grades of relationship. The same groups both received and paid eric. liable. If he has absconded it goes upon his chattels; living chattels or dead chattels. The liability falls next upon his father and his brother, but, according to the commentary, upon his son first, if he have one. These seem to be the geilfine relations or nearest hearth. And after them it falls, according to the text, upon his ‘deirbhfine relations.’ And ‘if they have absconded so that they cannot be caught, his crime goes upon his chief.’ But before it goes upon the chief the iarfine and other fines come in, according to the commentary, and the chief is said to be that of the four fines. The reason why the crime goes upon the deirbhfine division and the iarfine division here before it goes upon the chief is because it is one chief over them.… His chief—i.e. the chief of the four families (p. 243). On the whole, therefore, according to whatever rules of kinship a fine may have been divided into the ‘four nearest fines or hearths,’ we can hardly be wrong in considering them not as four artificial groups including in all seventeen individuals, but as four family groups arranged in the order in which liability for a kinsman’s crime was to be shared. The full liability for the eric would then, as in the Cymric case, fall upon the four groups or hearths as a whole. But, again as in the Cymric case, the amount falling upon each of them was defined and divided among the individuals composing it. The same family division held good both as regards payment and receipt of eric.[67] The general correspondence between the obligation to pay and the right to receive a share in fines is shown by another passage from the Senchus Mor: The feini charge the liability of each kinsman [comfogius] upon the other in the same way as he obtained his eric fine and his inheritance.[68]
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