Citadel Foundation Before & After Net Community

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This two page document discusses Blackbaud's transition from its original Nationals' BBNC sites to a new system called NetCommunity. It describes Blackbaud's early sites circa 1996 and 2007 before moving to improve its platform with NetCommunity circa 2009, which provided enhanced features for its users after the transition was complete.

Nationals’ BBNC Tour of Sites

foundation.citadel.edu
Before NetCommunity;
Circa 2007

After NetCommunity;
Circa 2009

David Beebe | Page #1 © 2009 Blackbaud

Nationals’ BBNC Tour of Sites

Blackbaud (circa 1996)

(after; circa 2009)

David Beebe | Page #2 © 2009 Blackbaud

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1. Nationals’ BBNC Tour of Sites foundation.citadel.edu Before NetCommunity; Circa 2007 After NetCommunity; Circa 2009 David Beebe | Page #1 © 2009 Blackbaud

2. Nationals’ BBNC Tour of Sites Blackbaud (circa 1996) (after; circa 2009) David Beebe | Page #2 © 2009 Blackbaud