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Chapter 15: Security
The Security Problem

              Security must consider external environment of the system, and
                   protect the system resources
              Intruders (crackers) attempt to breach security
              Threat is potential security violation
              Attack is attempt to breach security
              Attack can be accidental or malicious
              Easier to protect against accidental than malicious misuse




Operating System Concepts – 7th Edition, Jan 10, 2005   15.2        Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2005
Security Violations

              Categories
                        Breach of confidentiality
                        Breach of integrity
                        Breach of availability
                        Theft of service
                        Denial of service
              Methods
                        Masquerading (breach authentication)
                        Replay attack
                              Message modification
                        Man-in-the-middle attack
                        Session hijacking




Operating System Concepts – 7th Edition, Jan 10, 2005   15.3       Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2005
Standard Security Attacks




Operating System Concepts – 7th Edition, Jan 10, 2005   15.4   Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2005
Security Measure Levels

              Security must occur at four levels to be effective:
                        Physical
                        Human
                              Avoid social engineering, phishing, dumpster diving
                        Operating System
                        Network
              Security is as week as the weakest chain




Operating System Concepts – 7th Edition, Jan 10, 2005   15.5             Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2005
Program Threats

                  Trojan Horse
                        Code segment that misuses its environment
                        Exploits mechanisms for allowing programs written by users to be
                         executed by other users
                        Spyware, pop-up browser windows, covert channels
                  Trap Door
                        Specific user identifier or password that circumvents normal security
                         procedures
                        Could be included in a compiler
                  Logic Bomb
                        Program that initiates a security incident under certain circumstances
                  Stack and Buffer Overflow
                        Exploits a bug in a program (overflow either the stack or memory
                         buffers)




Operating System Concepts – 7th Edition, Jan 10, 2005   15.6                     Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2005
Program Threats (Cont.)

              Viruses
                        Code fragment embedded in legitimate program
                        Very specific to CPU architecture, operating system,
                         applications
                        Usually borne via email or as a macro
                              Visual Basic Macro to reformat hard drive
                                Sub AutoOpen()
                                Dim oFS
                                    Set oFS =
                                    CreateObject(’’Scripting.FileSystemObject’’)
                                    vs = Shell(’’c:command.com /k format
                                       c:’’,vbHide)
                                End Sub




Operating System Concepts – 7th Edition, Jan 10, 2005   15.7               Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2005
Program Threats (Cont.)

              Virus dropper inserts virus onto the system
              Many categories of viruses, literally many thousands of viruses
                        File
                        Boot
                        Macro
                        Source code
                        Polymorphic
                        Encrypted
                        Stealth
                        Tunneling
                        Multipartite
                        Armored




Operating System Concepts – 7th Edition, Jan 10, 2005   15.8         Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2005
A Boot-sector Computer Virus




Operating System Concepts – 7th Edition, Jan 10, 2005   15.9   Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2005
System and Network Threats

              Worms – use spawn mechanism; standalone program
              Internet worm
                        Exploited UNIX networking features (remote access) and bugs
                         in finger and sendmail programs
                        Grappling hook program uploaded main worm program
              Port scanning
                        Automated attempt to connect to a range of ports on one or a
                         range of IP addresses
              Denial of Service
                        Overload the targeted computer preventing it from doing any
                         useful work
                        Distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) come from multiple sites
                         at once




Operating System Concepts – 7th Edition, Jan 10, 2005   15.10             Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2005
Cryptography as a Security Tool

              Broadest security tool available
                        Source and destination of messages cannot be trusted without
                         cryptography
                        Means to constrain potential senders (sources) and / or
                         receivers (destinations) of messages
              Based on secrets (keys)




Operating System Concepts – 7th Edition, Jan 10, 2005   15.11             Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2005
Encryption
                  Encryption algorithm consists of
                     Set of K keys
                     Set of M Messages
                     Set of C ciphertexts (encrypted messages)
                        A function E : K → (M→C). That is, for each k K, E(k) is a function for
                         generating ciphertexts from messages.
                           Both E and E(k) for any k should be efficiently computable functions.

                        A function D : K → (C → M). That is, for each k K, D(k) is a function for
                         generating messages from ciphertexts.
                           Both D and D(k) for any k should be efficiently computable functions.

                  An encryption algorithm must provide this essential property: Given a ciphertext c C,
                   a computer can compute m such that E(k)(m) = c only if it possesses D(k).
                     Thus, a computer holding D(k) can decrypt ciphertexts to the plaintexts used to
                       produce them, but a computer not holding D(k) cannot decrypt ciphertexts.
                     Since ciphertexts are generally exposed (for example, sent on the network), it is
                       important that it be infeasible to derive D(k) from the ciphertexts




Operating System Concepts – 7th Edition, Jan 10, 2005      15.12                         Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2005
Symmetric Encryption

              Same key used to encrypt and decrypt
                        E(k) can be derived from D(k), and vice versa
              DES is most commonly used symmetric block-encryption algorithm
                   (created by US Govt)
                        Encrypts a block of data at a time
              Triple-DES considered more secure
              Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), twofish up and coming
              RC4 is most common symmetric stream cipher, but known to have
                   vulnerabilities
                        Encrypts/decrypts a stream of bytes (i.e wireless transmission)
                        Key is a input to psuedo-random-bit generator
                              Generates an infinite keystream




Operating System Concepts – 7th Edition, Jan 10, 2005   15.13              Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2005
Asymmetric Encryption

              Public-key encryption based on each user having two keys:
                        public key – published key used to encrypt data
                        private key – key known only to individual user used to decrypt
                         data
              Must be an encryption scheme that can be made public without
                   making it easy to figure out the decryption scheme
                        Most common is RSA block cipher
                        Efficient algorithm for testing whether or not a number is prime
                        No efficient algorithm is know for finding the prime factors of a
                         number




Operating System Concepts – 7th Edition, Jan 10, 2005   15.14                Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2005
Cryptography (Cont.)

              Note symmetric cryptography based on transformations,
                   asymmetric based on mathematical functions
                        Asymmetric much more compute intensive
                        Typically not used for bulk data encryption




Operating System Concepts – 7th Edition, Jan 10, 2005   15.15          Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2005
Authentication

                  Constraining set of potential senders of a message
                        Complementary and sometimes redundant to encryption
                        Also can prove message unmodified
                  Algorithm components
                        A set K of keys
                        A set M of messages
                        A set A of authenticators
                        A function S : K → (M→ A)
                              That is, for each k K, S(k) is a function for generating
                               authenticators from messages
                              Both S and S(k) for any k should be efficiently computable
                               functions
                        A function V : K → (M× A→ {true, false}). That is, for each k       K, V(k)
                         is a function for verifying authenticators on messages
                              Both V and V(k) for any k should be efficiently computable
                               functions


Operating System Concepts – 7th Edition, Jan 10, 2005    15.16                      Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2005
Digital Certificates

              Proof of who or what owns a public key
              Public key digitally signed a trusted party
              Trusted party receives proof of identification from entity and
                   certifies that public key belongs to entity
              Certificate authority are trusted party – their public keys included
                   with web browser distributions
                        They vouch for other authorities via digitally signing their keys,
                         and so on




Operating System Concepts – 7th Edition, Jan 10, 2005   15.17                Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2005
User Authentication

              Crucial to identify user correctly, as protection systems depend on
                   user ID
              User identity most often established through passwords, can be
                   considered a special case of either keys or capabilities
                        Also can include something user has and /or a user attribute
              Passwords must be kept secret
                        Frequent change of passwords
                        Use of “non-guessable” passwords
                        Log all invalid access attempts


              Passwords may also either be encrypted or allowed to be used
                   only once




Operating System Concepts – 7th Edition, Jan 10, 2005   15.18             Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2005

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Ch15,secu..

  • 2. The Security Problem  Security must consider external environment of the system, and protect the system resources  Intruders (crackers) attempt to breach security  Threat is potential security violation  Attack is attempt to breach security  Attack can be accidental or malicious  Easier to protect against accidental than malicious misuse Operating System Concepts – 7th Edition, Jan 10, 2005 15.2 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2005
  • 3. Security Violations  Categories  Breach of confidentiality  Breach of integrity  Breach of availability  Theft of service  Denial of service  Methods  Masquerading (breach authentication)  Replay attack  Message modification  Man-in-the-middle attack  Session hijacking Operating System Concepts – 7th Edition, Jan 10, 2005 15.3 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2005
  • 4. Standard Security Attacks Operating System Concepts – 7th Edition, Jan 10, 2005 15.4 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2005
  • 5. Security Measure Levels  Security must occur at four levels to be effective:  Physical  Human  Avoid social engineering, phishing, dumpster diving  Operating System  Network  Security is as week as the weakest chain Operating System Concepts – 7th Edition, Jan 10, 2005 15.5 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2005
  • 6. Program Threats  Trojan Horse  Code segment that misuses its environment  Exploits mechanisms for allowing programs written by users to be executed by other users  Spyware, pop-up browser windows, covert channels  Trap Door  Specific user identifier or password that circumvents normal security procedures  Could be included in a compiler  Logic Bomb  Program that initiates a security incident under certain circumstances  Stack and Buffer Overflow  Exploits a bug in a program (overflow either the stack or memory buffers) Operating System Concepts – 7th Edition, Jan 10, 2005 15.6 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2005
  • 7. Program Threats (Cont.)  Viruses  Code fragment embedded in legitimate program  Very specific to CPU architecture, operating system, applications  Usually borne via email or as a macro  Visual Basic Macro to reformat hard drive Sub AutoOpen() Dim oFS Set oFS = CreateObject(’’Scripting.FileSystemObject’’) vs = Shell(’’c:command.com /k format c:’’,vbHide) End Sub Operating System Concepts – 7th Edition, Jan 10, 2005 15.7 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2005
  • 8. Program Threats (Cont.)  Virus dropper inserts virus onto the system  Many categories of viruses, literally many thousands of viruses  File  Boot  Macro  Source code  Polymorphic  Encrypted  Stealth  Tunneling  Multipartite  Armored Operating System Concepts – 7th Edition, Jan 10, 2005 15.8 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2005
  • 9. A Boot-sector Computer Virus Operating System Concepts – 7th Edition, Jan 10, 2005 15.9 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2005
  • 10. System and Network Threats  Worms – use spawn mechanism; standalone program  Internet worm  Exploited UNIX networking features (remote access) and bugs in finger and sendmail programs  Grappling hook program uploaded main worm program  Port scanning  Automated attempt to connect to a range of ports on one or a range of IP addresses  Denial of Service  Overload the targeted computer preventing it from doing any useful work  Distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) come from multiple sites at once Operating System Concepts – 7th Edition, Jan 10, 2005 15.10 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2005
  • 11. Cryptography as a Security Tool  Broadest security tool available  Source and destination of messages cannot be trusted without cryptography  Means to constrain potential senders (sources) and / or receivers (destinations) of messages  Based on secrets (keys) Operating System Concepts – 7th Edition, Jan 10, 2005 15.11 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2005
  • 12. Encryption  Encryption algorithm consists of  Set of K keys  Set of M Messages  Set of C ciphertexts (encrypted messages)  A function E : K → (M→C). That is, for each k K, E(k) is a function for generating ciphertexts from messages.  Both E and E(k) for any k should be efficiently computable functions.  A function D : K → (C → M). That is, for each k K, D(k) is a function for generating messages from ciphertexts.  Both D and D(k) for any k should be efficiently computable functions.  An encryption algorithm must provide this essential property: Given a ciphertext c C, a computer can compute m such that E(k)(m) = c only if it possesses D(k).  Thus, a computer holding D(k) can decrypt ciphertexts to the plaintexts used to produce them, but a computer not holding D(k) cannot decrypt ciphertexts.  Since ciphertexts are generally exposed (for example, sent on the network), it is important that it be infeasible to derive D(k) from the ciphertexts Operating System Concepts – 7th Edition, Jan 10, 2005 15.12 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2005
  • 13. Symmetric Encryption  Same key used to encrypt and decrypt  E(k) can be derived from D(k), and vice versa  DES is most commonly used symmetric block-encryption algorithm (created by US Govt)  Encrypts a block of data at a time  Triple-DES considered more secure  Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), twofish up and coming  RC4 is most common symmetric stream cipher, but known to have vulnerabilities  Encrypts/decrypts a stream of bytes (i.e wireless transmission)  Key is a input to psuedo-random-bit generator  Generates an infinite keystream Operating System Concepts – 7th Edition, Jan 10, 2005 15.13 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2005
  • 14. Asymmetric Encryption  Public-key encryption based on each user having two keys:  public key – published key used to encrypt data  private key – key known only to individual user used to decrypt data  Must be an encryption scheme that can be made public without making it easy to figure out the decryption scheme  Most common is RSA block cipher  Efficient algorithm for testing whether or not a number is prime  No efficient algorithm is know for finding the prime factors of a number Operating System Concepts – 7th Edition, Jan 10, 2005 15.14 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2005
  • 15. Cryptography (Cont.)  Note symmetric cryptography based on transformations, asymmetric based on mathematical functions  Asymmetric much more compute intensive  Typically not used for bulk data encryption Operating System Concepts – 7th Edition, Jan 10, 2005 15.15 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2005
  • 16. Authentication  Constraining set of potential senders of a message  Complementary and sometimes redundant to encryption  Also can prove message unmodified  Algorithm components  A set K of keys  A set M of messages  A set A of authenticators  A function S : K → (M→ A)  That is, for each k K, S(k) is a function for generating authenticators from messages  Both S and S(k) for any k should be efficiently computable functions  A function V : K → (M× A→ {true, false}). That is, for each k K, V(k) is a function for verifying authenticators on messages  Both V and V(k) for any k should be efficiently computable functions Operating System Concepts – 7th Edition, Jan 10, 2005 15.16 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2005
  • 17. Digital Certificates  Proof of who or what owns a public key  Public key digitally signed a trusted party  Trusted party receives proof of identification from entity and certifies that public key belongs to entity  Certificate authority are trusted party – their public keys included with web browser distributions  They vouch for other authorities via digitally signing their keys, and so on Operating System Concepts – 7th Edition, Jan 10, 2005 15.17 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2005
  • 18. User Authentication  Crucial to identify user correctly, as protection systems depend on user ID  User identity most often established through passwords, can be considered a special case of either keys or capabilities  Also can include something user has and /or a user attribute  Passwords must be kept secret  Frequent change of passwords  Use of “non-guessable” passwords  Log all invalid access attempts  Passwords may also either be encrypted or allowed to be used only once Operating System Concepts – 7th Edition, Jan 10, 2005 15.18 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2005