This document discusses the issues of global justice related to climate change. It covers three key areas: intergenerational justice regarding obligations to past and future generations; international justice in allocating costs between developed and developing countries; and challenges of global governance in coordinating an international response to climate change. On global governance, it notes the failures of past climate summits and frameworks. It argues that climate change requires a new paradigm conceptualizing it as a problem of sustainable development and community, rather than just between states.

1. GLOBAL JUSTICE & CLIMATE
CHANGE

2. WE CREATED A WEBSITE WHERE
YOU CAN WRITE YOUR QUESTIONS
AND COMMENTS.
!
WWW.GLOBAL-JUSTICE.WIX.COM/LUISS
AT THE END OF THE PRESENTATION WE
WILL ANSWER TO YOUR QUESTIONS

3. OUR ASSUMPTIONS
• CLIMATE CHANGE IS A PROBLEM
IS IT A GLOBAL ISSUE?
• ANTHROPOGENIC EMISSIONS
• RICH vs POOR
CAUSES - EFFECTS - RISK OF A CATASTROPHE

4. WHO’S IN CHARGE?
THE AGENTS:
!
!
• NATION STATES
!
• GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS
!
• INDIVIDUALS

5. CAN CC BE CONSIDERED AS A
PROBLEM OF GLOBAL JUSTICE?
THREE FEATURES:
!
•INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE
!
•INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
!
•GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
!

6. HOW TO DEAL WITH CC?
•OLD PARADIGMS HAVE FAILED
• CLIMATE CHANGE: WE NEED A NEW OUTLOOK

7. INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE
PAST GENERATIONS

8. THE QUESTION OF
INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE
INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE IS ABOUT THE MORAL OBLIGATIONS
PRESENTLY EXISTING MORAL AGENTS OWE TO PAST AND FUTURE
GENERATIONS
!
• PAST GENERATIONS: SHOULD WE PAY FOR PAST GENERATIONS’
EMISSIONS?AND IF YES, WHO SHOULD PAY?
!
• FUTURE GENERATIONS: SHOULD THE CLIMATE SYSTEM BE
PROTECTED FOR THEIR BENEFIT?

9. PAST GENERATIONS
TWO ISSUES:
!
• DO WE HAVE TO PAY FOR HARM CAUSED BY PAST
GENERATIONS?
!
•WHO PAYS WHEN THE POLLUTERS ARE NO LONGER ALIVE?

10. DO WE HAVE TO PAY?
YESNO
EXCUSABLE
IGNORANCE
BENEFICIARY
PAYS PRINCIPLE
(BPP)
HYBRID
ACCOUNT

11. WHO PAYS?
• BPP, INDIVIDUALS MUST PAY
!
•CANEY’S OBJECTION: THE NON-IDENTITY PROBLEM
!
!
• COLLECTIVE APPROACH IS MORE COHERENT BUT IT IS
UNFAIR
!
!

12. INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE
FUTURE GENERATIONS

13. WHY DO WE TAKE INTO ACCOUNT
FUTURE GENERATIONS?
• DEFINITION OF S. D. , BRUNTLAND COMMISSION, 1987
• WE HAVE TO DECIDE TODAY WHO PAYS FOR THE HARM
CAUSED BY CC
• IT IS DIFFICULT TO DECIDE TO PAY TODAY BECAUSE COSTS
ARE TOO HIGH AND THE RESULTS ARE IN THE FUTURE

14. WHY WE HAVE TO PAY FOR
FUTURE GENERATIONS?
SOME APPROACHES
!
!
•INDIRECT RECIPROCITY
!
• MUTUAL ADVANTAGE
!

15. DUTY OF JUSTICE
• THE DUTY NOT TO HARM OTHER PEOPLE. IT IS
DUE TO INDIVIDUALS
• THE INTUITION OF NEUTRALITY IS FALSE
• EXISTENTIAL RISK AND RISK OF A CATASTROPHE

16. PROBLEMS IN EVALUATING THE
FUTURE
•EVALUATION OF FUTURE
(DISCOUNT RATE)
•INCOMMENSURABILITY
!
•AGGREGATION

17. INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
CLIMATE CHANGE & GLOBAL JUSTICE

18. UNEQUAL BURDENS
IF SOMEONE IMPOSES COST UPON OTHER PEOPLE WE ARE
JUSTIFIED IN REVERSING THE INEQUALITY BY IMPOSING EXTRA
BURDENS UPON THE PRODUCER OF THE INEQUALITY
!
• EXTRA BURDENS
!
• THE MINIMUM EXTENT OF THE COMPENSATORY BURDEN IS
ENOUGH TO CORRECT THE INEQUALITY PREVIOUSLY UNILATERALLY
IMPOSED

19. 1st PRINCIPLE OF EQUITY
WHEN A PARTY HAS IN THE PAST TAKEN AN UNFAIR ADVANTAGE OF
OTHERS BY IMPOSING COSTS UPON THEM WITHOUT THEIR CONSENT,
THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN UNILATERALLY PUT AT A DISADVANTAGE ARE
ENTITLED TO DEMAND THAT IN THE FUTURE THE OFFENDING PARTY
SHOULDER BURDENS THAT ARE UNEQUAL AT LEAST TO THE EXTENT OF
THE UNFAIR ADVANTAGE PREVIOUSLY TAKEN, IN ORDER TO RESTORE
EQUALITY.
(Shue, 1999)

20. COUNTER-ARGUMENTS OF DCs
1. THE LDCs HAVE ALSO BENEFITED FROM THE ENRICHMENT OF
THE DCs
!
2. WHATEVER ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE HAS BEEN DONE
WAS UNINTENTIONAL
!
3. IT IS NOT FAIR TO HOLD THE PERSON RESPONSIBLE DAMAGE
HE DID NOT DO HIMSELF

21. 2nd PRINCIPLE OF EQUITY
AMONG A NUMBER OF PARTIES, ALL OF WHOM ARE BOUND
TO CONTRIBUTE TO SOME COMMON ENDEAVOR, THE PARTIES
WHO HAVE THE MOST RESOURCES NORMALLY SHOULD
CONTRIBUTE THE MOST TO THE ENDEAVOR.
(Shue, 1999)

22. RADICAL INEQUALITY
SUCH AN INEQUALITY IS RADICAL BECAUSE THE TOTAL OF
AVAILABLE RESOURCES IS SO GREAT THAT THERE IS NO NEED
TO REDUCE THE BEST-OFF PEOPLE TO ANYWHERE NEAR THE
MINIMUM LEVEL IN ORDER TO BRING THE WORST-OFF
PEOPLE UP TO THE MINIMUM.
(Nagel, 1977)

23. 3rd PRINCIPLE OF EQUITY
WHEN SOME PEOPLE HAVE LESS THAN ENOUGH FOR A DECENT
HUMAN LIFE, OTHER PEOPLE HAVE FAR MORE THAN ENOUGH,
AND THE TOTAL RESOURCES AVAILABLE ARE SO GREAT THAT
EVERYONE COULD HAVE AT LEAST ENOUGH WITHOUT
PREVENTING SOME PEOPLE FROM STILL RETAINING
CONSIDERABLY MORE THAT OTHERS HAVE, IT IS UNFAIR NOT TO
GUARANTEE EVERYONE AT LEAST AN ADEQUATE MINIMUM.
(Shue, 1999)

24. OBJECTIONS
1. OVER-POPULATION
!
2. IT IS NOT FAIR TO EXPECT MEMBERS OF ONE SOCIETY
TO HELP TO MAINTAIN A GUARANTEE OF A MINIMUM FOR
MEMBERS OF ANOTHER SOCIETY

25. CONCLUSION
WHATEVER NEEDS TO BE DONE BY WEALTHY INDUSTRIALIZED
STATES OR BY POOR NON-INDUSTRIALIZED STATES ABOUT
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS LIKE OZONE
DESTRUCTION AND GLOBAL WARMING, THE COSTS SHOULD
INITIALLY BE BORNE BY THE WEALTHY INDUSTRIALIZED STATES.
(Shue, 1999)

26. COSTS ALLOCATION
CLIMATE CHANGE & GLOBAL JUSTICE

27. ALLOCATING THE COSTS OF
PREVENTION
• IS IT FAIR TO REQUIRE SACRIFICE TO THE POOREST COUNTRIES?
TWO CHALLENGES:
!
• LDC MUST DEVELOP THROUGH CLEAN ENERGY
• CO2 EMISSIONS OF THE WEALTHY SHOULD BE REDUCED
OF A HIGHER AMOUNT THAN THE INCREASE OF LDC

28. ALLOCATING THE COSTS
OF COPING
TWO MISLEADING PRINCIPLES:
• TO EACH HIS OWN: EVERY NATION STATES DEALS WITH ITS
OWN PROBLEMS
• WAIT AND SEE: DISCUSSING THE ALLOCATION OF
RESPONSIBILITY FOR POTENTIAL PROBLEMS AFTER THEY
ACTUALLY ARISE

29. PROVING “TO EACH HIS OWN” WRONG
• THE EFFECTS OF CC DO NOT FALL INSIDE ONE NATION
STATE
• ACTUAL RESPONSIBILITY IS HARD TO DETECT
• DO NATION STATES REALLY HAVE THE CONTROL OVER THEIR
OWN RESOURCES?

30. CONFUTING THE
“WAIT AND SEE” PRINCIPLE
• PREVENTION COSTS AND COPING COSTS INFLUENCE
EACH OTHER
• WOULD IT BE FAIR TO ADOPT DIFFERENT PRINCIPLES RO
DEAL WITH DIFFERENT SETS OF TERMS AND EXPECTING
EVERY COUNTRY TO AGREE ON THE TWO IN ADVANCE?

31. BACKGROUND ALLOCATION OF
RESOURCES AND FAIR BARGAINING
• NEGOTIATING BOTH SETS OF TERMS IN A COMPLEMENTARY
WAY PREVENTS UNFAIR TERMS OF COPING
MORALLY ACCEPTABLE BARGAINS DEPEND UPON INITIAL
HOLDINGS THAT ARE NOT MORALLY UNACCEPTABLE- NOT, FOR
ONE THING, SO OUTRAGEOUSLY UNEQUAL THAT SOME
PARTIES ARE AT THE MERCY OF OTHERS.
(Shue, 1993)

32. ALLOCATING EMISSIONS :
TRANSITION AND GOAL
• PROGRESSIVELY DECLINING CEILING SHOULD BE PLACED
UPON TOTAL EMISSIONS
• IF THE PREVIOUS ISSUES CONCERNED MONEY, THE LAST ONE
CONCERNS CO2 ITSELF

33. WHO SHOULD BEAR THE
BURDENS OF GLOBAL CC?
THE HYBRID SOLUTION OF CANEY

34. METHODOLOGY 1/2
THEORIES OF JUSTICE USUALLY TEND TO FOCUS ON HOW
INCOME AND WEALTH ARE DISTRIBUTED

35. METHODOLOGY 2/2
BUT:
!
•IT IS HARD TO VALUE ENVIRONMENT (INCOMMENSURABILITY)
•GLOBAL DISTRIBUTION VS INTRASTATE DISTRIBUTION
•INTERGENERATIONAL PROBLEM

36. RESPONSIBILITY 1/2
• TYPICAL JUSTICE: WHO CAUSES THE HARM PAYS THE BILL
!
• POLLUTER PAYS PRINCIPLE

37. WHO IS WHO?
• SHUE: STATES
!
!
• CANEY: MIX OF INDIVIDUALS, ECONOMIC CORPORATIONS,
STATES, INTERNATIONAL REGIMES AND INSTITUTIONS

38. RESPONSIBILITY 2/2
PPP CANNOT COPE WITH THREE KINDS OF GHGS, THOSE
CAUSED BY:
!
• EARLIER GENERATIONS (CANNOT PAY)
!
• THOSE WHO ARE EXCUSABLY IGNORANT (SHOULD NOT BE
EXPECTED TO PAY)
!
• THOSE WHO DO NOT COMPLY WITH THEIR DUTY NOT TO
EMIT EXCESSIVE AMOUNTS OF GHGS (WILL NOT PAY)

39. HYBRID SOLUTION-ASSUMPTIONS 1/3
A PERSON HAS A RIGHT TO X WHEN X IS A FUNDAMENTAL
INTEREST THAT IS WEIGHTY ENOUGH TO GENERATE
OBLIGATION ON OTHERS.
(Caney, 2005)

40. HYBRID SOLUTION-ASSUMPTIONS 2/3
PERSONS HAVE FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS IN NOT SUFFERING
FROM:
!
• DROUGHT AND CROP FAILURE
• HEATSTROKE
• INFECTIOUS DISEASES
• FLOODING
• ENFORCED RELOCATION
• RAPID, UNPREDICTABLE AND DRAMATIC CHANGES TO THEIR
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC WORLD*
!
*THIRD ASSESSMENT REPORT OF IPCC CLAIMS THAT THESE EFFECTS ARE GENERATED BY
CLIMATE CHANGE.

41. HYBRID SOLUTION-ASSUMPTIONS 2/3
• THIS ARGUMENT IS NOT NECESSARILY BASED ON THE
ASSUMPTION THAT CLIMATE CHANGE IS HUMAN-INDUCED.
!
!
• THE DUTIES THAT FOLLOWS THE RIGHT OF NOT SUFFERING
FROM THE EFFECTS OF CC ARE NOT MITIGATION RELATED BUT
ADAPTATION RELATED.

42. SOLUTION
WE ASSIGN THE COSTS NO MATTER WHO HOLDS THE
RESPONSIBILITY BUT ACCORDING TO TWO INDEPENDENT
PRINCIPLES:
• THOSE WHO EXCEED THEIR QUOTA (SINCE 1990) HAVE
TO COMPENSATE OTHERS (VERSION OF PPP)
!
• THE MOST ADVANTAGED HAVE TO REDUCE THEIR
EMISSION OR PAY ADAPTATION COSTS TO
COMPENSATE THE INCOMPLETENESS OF PPP.
ACCORDING TO AN ABILITY TO PAY PRINCIPLE AND
MAKING AN EFFORT TO ENHACT INSTITUTIONS WHICH
GRANT COMPLIANCE

43. CRITICISM- WHY SHOULD THEY DO IT?
!
• CHARITY?
IF THE CHOICE IS EITHER ASCRIBING DUTIES TO THE
POOR OR ALLOWING SERIOUS HARM TO BEFALL PEOPLE
OR ASCRIBING DUTIES TO THE MOST ADVANTAGED, IT
WOULD SEEM PLAUSIBLE TO GO FOR THAT THIRD
OPTION
!
(Caney, 2005)
EXCLUDENDO:

44. GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
CLIMATE CHANGE & GLOBAL JUSTICE

45. WHY GLOBAL?
• CLIMATE CHANGE IS A GLOBAL THREAT THAT REQUIRES A
COORDINATED GLOBAL SOLUTION (The Hartwell Paper, 2010)
• JUST GOVERNMENTS CAN FIX “CC” (Sinnot-Armstrong, 2010)

46. WHY GLOBAL?
CLIMATE CHANGE IS A PROBLEM WITH GLOBAL CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES. A COORDINATED INTERNATIONAL EFFORT IS
THEREFORE REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE COST EFFECTIVE AND
SUCCESSFUL MITIGATION POLICIES.
(Held - Hervey, 2009)

47. FROM RIO
TO COPENHAGEN
1992. THE “RIO EARTH SUMMIT”
1997. KYOTO’S PROTOCOL
2009. COPENHAGEN “CC” CONFERENCE

48. RESULTS?

49. “THE WRONG TROUSERS”
(Prins - Rayner, 2007)

50. WHY DID IT FAIL?
• THERE ARE VARIOUS WAYS OF CONCEPTUALIZING THE PROBLEM
• CLIMATE CHANGE IS A “WICKED” PROBLEM
(Jamieson - Di Paola, 2014)
(Prins - Rayner, 2007)

51. WHY DID IT FAIL?in addition..
• CLIMATE CHANGE IS SUBORDINATED TO NATIONAL INTERESTS
AND OTHER POWERFUL INSTITUTIONS
•MORE ACTORS INVOLVED
(Jamieson - Di Paola, 2014)
(Held - Hervey, 2009)

52. OUTCOME
• AFTER 20y OF CLIMATE DIPLOMACY, THE UNDENIABLE FACT IS
THAT THE MAIN FACTORS THAT HAVE REDUCED GHGs EMISSIONS
ARE NOT TRACEABLE TO ANY FEAT OF GLOBAL COOPERATION (...)
(Jamieson - Di Paola, 2014)

53. WHAT’S NEXT?
• COLLECTION OF POLICIES AND PRACTICES ADOPTED BY
PARTICULAR COUNTRIES
(Jamieson - Di Paola, 2014)
THESE POLICIES WILL REFLECT A MIX OF SELF-INTEREST AND
ETHICAL IDEALS CONSTRUCTED IN DIFFERENT WAYS BY DIFFERENT
PEOPLES

54. OUR THESIS
GLOBAL JUSTICE INTO SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT

55. OLD PARADIGM
• TRADITIONALLY CC WAS SEEN ESSENTIALLY AS A PROBLEM OF
JUSTICE BETWEEN STATES
• INJUSTICE FROM RICH TO POOR
• THE AGENTS ARE THE GOVERNMENT AND THE NATIONS
STATES

56. CC IS NOT A CLASSICAL
PROBLEM OF GLOBAL JUSTICE
FOUR FEATURES:
!
• IGNORANCE
!
• UNINTENTIONAL
!
• DISPERSION
!
• URGENCY & CATASTROPHE
!

57. COMMUNITY RATHER THAN
STATES
GLOBAL JUSTICE INTO THE WIDER PERSPECTIVE OF
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
!
COMMUNITY (NAGEL)
!
FROM LOCALISM TO GLOCALISM
!
!

58. CRITICS
•ECONOMIC SYSTEM - MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND
GROUP OF INTERESTS
•LONG-TERM EFFECTS
• NEED OF DEMOCRACY AND AWARENESS

59. WE START FROM NOW,
LET’S FIGHT CLIMATE CHANGE!

60. WE START FROM NOW,
LET’S FIGHT CLIMATE CHANGE!

61. NOW, IT’S YOUR TURN
LET’S GO TO
!
WWW.GLOBAL-JUSTICE.WIX.COM/LUISS
!
AND JOIN THE CHALLENGE!!

62. THANK YOU!