1. Syracuse University
College of Arts & Sciences/ Maxwell School of Citizenship & Public Affairs
International Relations Program
The European Union & UN Security Council
Peace Enforcement Missions: Does Europe Concur?
Federico T. Vicente
IRP/PSC 412 Global Governance: The UN System
Spring 2014
Dr. D’Amico
March 19, 2014
2. 2
Introduction
Throughout the past two decades international and domestic conflicts have
reached an unexpected level of violence, an issue that has been drastically
acknowledged by the global community. This concern has allowed the UN Security
Council (UNSC) to invoke Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to create
coalitions to intervene militarily through peace enforcement invoking the “Responsibility
to Protect” (R2P) of those individuals in need. The main objective for the United Nations
Security Council is to prevent conflict and to keep peace in hostile areas by the use of
diplomacy and peacekeeping operations while keeping military action (peace
enforcement) as the last resource. Although the UNSC works for diplomatic procedures
to ensure peace, there have been some cases when they had to resort towards peace
enforcement to assure peace and security. “When peacemaking efforts fail, stronger
action by member states may be authorized under Chapter VII of the Charter” (The UN
Today, 83). Even though, Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations (Article 42)
acknowledges the use of military operations to sustain or to restore international peace
and security; sanctioned missions are usually under the control of coalitions.
Peace enforcement missions have been led by UN members, especially from
those who seat in the UNSC. It strives to end violence either in humanitarian operations,
as in Albania 1997 or to restore peace and security as in Mali 2012. Peace enforcement
distinguishes itself from peacekeeping operations in several ways. The main difference
is that peacekeeping is run by the UNSC and directed by the Secretary General making
the missions UN based and operated, while peace enforcement is sanctioned by the UN
but directed by participating states. Peace enforcement allows the United Nations to
permit jurisdiction of military forces and strategy to the participating states isolating itself
from dictating military strategy that can harm the image of peace through diplomacy that
the organization promotes.
The UNSC is an organized branch of the United Nations; it consists of a total of
fifteen member states, five of them permanent (USA, China, United Kingdom, France,
and The Russian Federation) with the power to veto any proposed resolution, and ten
elected by the General Assembly for a two year term (un.org). Of the permanent five
states three are European (France, Russia, and United Kingdom). The other ten are
elected states; an average of two to three states are part of the European continent
consisting of members of both Western European and Others Group and Eastern
European Group while the other seven or eight are from the rest of the world. This
dynamic has allowed European states to dominate UN policy especially when
considering that one third of the votes for any resolution comes from the same
continent.
Europe has moved from isolationist policies and broken alliances to the
formation of a unified European community. Today, this community is known as the
European Union (EU). For the past years, the EU has been enforcing as one of their
main objectives the establishment of a common foreign and security policy. The
formation of a common foreign and security policy has allowed me to question EU
3. 3
states that hold a seat in the UNSC votes, as it appears they favor peace enforcement
resolutions only when it is on their best interest.
In 1992 the Maastricht Treaty, renamed the European Community into the
European Union, established a monetary union where all national currencies were
eradicated and substituted with a single currency (EUR €). In addition, commits its
members to work and adopt a common foreign and security policy. The Maastricht
Treaty established the first effort for a common foreign and security policy among the
diverse European states and a call for the unification of Europe.
Does Europe speak as a whole in the UN Security Council? I have analyzed the
first ten years of the European Union since the conception of the Maastricht Treaty in
respects to voting patterns on peace enforcement resolutions in the UNSC. After
analyzing the Maastricht period from 1992 to 2002, I examined a second ten year period
(2003 to 2012), as it was marked by the reforms of the Lisbon Treaty (2007) which
changed the overall structure of the European Union.
The Lisbon Treaty amends the Maastricht Treaty to include the creation of a
long-term President of the European Council and a High Representative of the Union for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (europa.eu). For the first time in history a common
foreign and security policy was established for an intergovernmental organization.
After researching voting records on UN Security Council resolutions and
analyzing the foreign policy of each state who sat during the resolution’s votes I can
conclude that when presented with the option of military action to hostile areas, EU
member states on the UNSC favor military action when the conflict partakes in one of
their former territories. However, each state pursues their own interest as their policies
in certain international conflicts greatly differ. That is why one may say that Europe does
have vote convergence and “speaks with one voice” but when put into practice each
state’s national ambition crumbles the same union they invoke as they diverge when it
comes to practice.
Peace Enforcement & the Security Council
When resolutions are presented to the UNSC, only a few asks authorization to
place troops in those hostile areas. From my research (1992- 2012), I have found four
cases were the UN Security Council confirmed peace enforcement as its option to retain
peace and security. The incidents or conflicts are: Somalia (1992); Rwanda (1994);
Albania (1997) and Mali (2012).
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When analyzing the UNSC sponsored operations from the chart (figure 1) above
it was found that not all of them were caused by mass genocide (Chad & Central African
Republic, Rwanda, and Bosnia-Herzegovina) instead because the concern of the
population safety as war crimes, violations of human rights or when humanitarian relief
was in danger. These campaigns were sanctioned by UNSC but were not administered
by the United Nations or the Secretary General. Instead, these campaigns were led by a
coalition of UN participants.
Somalia (1992)
During the Somali Civil War, the UN Security Council sanctioned the creation of
the United Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia. UNITAF was a US-led coalition charged
under S/RES/794 (1992) to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief
operations (un.org). According to UN documentation, the reason for the creation of the
military coalition was invoked in resolution 837 (1992), “After the death of a number of
Pakistani peacekeepers, general personnel of UNOSOM II, S/RES/837 (1992) was
issued where the Secretary-General is authorized under resolution 814 (1993) to take
all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks referred to
in paragraph 1 above, including against those responsible for publicly inciting such
attacks, to establish the effective authority of UNOSOM II throughout Somalia, including
to secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest and detention for prosecution,
trial and punishment;” (S/RES/837 2). In this case, the United States of America took
the chance of leading the coalition to ensure a safe environment for humanitarian relief
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and prevent the conception of any organized threat; as failed states are a breeding
place for terrorist organizations. Although Somalia was not a former US colony,
American forces led the intervention as their allies, Great Britain and Italy, were involved
in other conflicts (Balkans, Rwanda, and Albania). Out of all the resolutions passed
during the period of two years, none has been considered to be as significant as that of
S/RES/794 (1992) which approves peace enforcement in Somalia. As resolution 837
(1992) first established the concept of “taking all necessary measures” allowing, through
the vocation of Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to act as the situation was
getting out of control. On December 12, 1992, resolution 794 was voted by the UN
Security Council because of the horrific situation that was presented in Somalia. The
approval of peace enforcement went unanimously in favor as violence drastically
escalated in the state. However, the coalition came to be a disappointment as large
numbers of military personnel were either killed or injured failing to assure peace in
Somalia.
Only three EU members held seats in the UNSC at that time: Belgium, the United
Kingdom, and France. All three are founding members of the European Union. As
designated in the Maastricht Treaty, they all concurred in their voting on the resolution
and participated, although limited, in the coalition, indicating Europe’s determination to
achieve a common foreign and security policy. However, the three main theoretical
perspectives (liberalists, constructivists, and realists) would have diverging opinions on
the matter of a US led intervention as well as the absence of major European
involvement in the coalition. The actions that have been described above that led to the
creation of United Task Force in Somalia exemplify the liberalist perspective. It
demonstrates the core principals of liberalism as there was global cooperation to allow a
safe environment for humanitarian relief and the prevention of the conception of any
terrorist organizations. Although it was a US led coalition, the response of major
western states to protect those who have been subject to violence, in this case
Pakistani peacekeepers, exhibits the acceptance of peace and security through global
cooperation. The constructivist theoretical perspective wouldn’t be as content with the
creation of UNITAF and the overall outcome of the mission. Constructivists see UNITAF
as the outcome of global cooperation to protect those subject to violence in Somalia but
would have preferred a higher involvement of states of the category that of Pakistan and
Bangladesh. The involvement of these states would have demonstrated true
international cooperation through the constructivist approach. Another constructivist
critic on the matter of UNITAF is that it would be in the best interest of the mission to
have a joint leadership in the operation instead of only one state (US). Countering the
beliefs of constructivists and liberals, realists find the formation of UNITAF as a breach
of Somalia’s sovereignty by the United States of America as they led the operation
without any real motive other than national gain. Realists would argue that the UNITAF
coalition’s formation and leadership was established to assure the stability of Somalia
through western occupation to prevent the conception of any organized terrorist
organization with the capacity to become a threat to their own state security.
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Rwanda UNAMIR (1994)
Unlike the clear acceptance of the use of military force in Somalia, Rwanda
presented a challenge in the use of military force as an even more violent environment
caused by the Hutu’s which threatened not just the Rwandan society but those working
to establish peace and security. In an escalating conflict between the Hutu-led
government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) a genocide took place. RPF
consisted of Tutsi refugees who fled to Uganda because of earlier waves of violence
against the Tutsi. The Rwandan genocide claimed between 500,000 and one million
victims, primarily members of the Tutsi tribe and those considered "moderate" Hutus
(UN UNAMIR background profile). According to the United Nations UNAMIR
background profile, “Throughout the country, men, women, and children were shot,
blown up by rockets or grenades, hacked to death by machete or buried or burned alive.
Many were attacked in the churches in which they had sought refuge. Tens of
thousands of bodies were hurled into the rivers and carried downstream”. The events
mentioned above were point out by eyewitnesses who belonged to various agencies as
well as the global media. International pressure on the Hutu-led government of Juvénal
Habyarimana caused a cease-fire in 1993 with a plan to implement the Arusha Accords
that would ultimately form a power-sharing government with the RPF. The Arusha
Accords were signed in Arusha, Tanzania, on August 4, 1993 by the government of
Rwanda and the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (UN UNAMIR background profile). The
accords were organized by the United States of America, France, and the Organization
of African Unity to institute peace and security in the region.
The Arusha Accord brought grievances between the Hutu and Tutsi population.
The RPF military campaign had support from the international community which as a
byproduct developed the so-called ideology "Hutu Power", which portrayed the
Rwandan Patriotic Front as an alien force intent on reinstating the Tutsi to power; a
prospect which most of the Hutu populous agreed that it must be resisted. Although the
Arusha Accords were a step forward toward peace, ideologies like “Hutu Power” stirred
grievances and intensified the conflict. The Arusha Accords severely failed and led to
the deaths of thousands of Tutsi people. Such failure allowed the UNSC to pass a
number of resolutions which establishes peacekeeping operations under the acronym of
UNAMIR. It was established by UN Security Council resolution 872 (1993) for a period
of six months with the proviso that it would be extended beyond the initial 90 days only
upon a review by the Council (un.org). UNAMIR's purpose was to create an
environment for the secure installation of a transitional government. An average of
2,548 military personnel were involved in the operation. Unlike Somalia, where a
coalition was made to establish control through peace enforcement, in Rwanda military
forces were sent as observers which included personnel from EU members such as
France and Belgium.
The various theoretical perspectives would have different opinions of progress
between the creations of the Arusha Accords to the establishment of UNAMIR. Those of
the liberal perspective would observe the Arusha Accords as a step forward towards
peace through the use of diplomacy. Although the accords were a complete failure, the
7. 7
involvement of an international organization such as the UN in solving the issue of
peace represents the bases of the liberalist theoretical perspective. Realist would
clearly disagree with this train of thought due to the failure of the Arusha Accords and
the need to establish an observance force. The failure of both initiatives demonstrates
the inefficiency of international organizations as it could be seen as a breach in
sovereignty.
When S/RES/965 (1994), S/RES/929 (1994), was voted by the UNSC, all three
European Union states voted in favor of such action. Spain, France, and the United
Kingdom all agreed on the creation of UNAMIR and the involvement of military
personnel but their contributions were drastically different as only limited support was
provided compared to the former colonizer Belgium who provided troops. Although it
supports the notion that during the decade of the nineties EU members actually “spoke
with one voice”, it exhibits the strain in resources by western states as numerous
operations occurred simultaneously and each country was backing their own interests.
Rwanda presented a practice that is considered to be unorthodox to the United
Nations peacekeeping operations. Belgium, the former ruler of Rwanda, was allowed to
send a battalion of around 400 military personnel, eventually reaching a total of 2,548 to
establish peace and security. The UN tried to avoid such instances so past historical
tensions or hidden agendas from past colonizers were not in the original plan of the UN
when authorizing peacekeeping or enforcement operation. The 1990s were defined for
the large amount of peacekeeping operations that occurred during the decade. The
large number of operations deployed throughout the world spread thin the resources of
states that could participate in Rwanda. As the violence in Rwanda appeared to be
never ending hesitance of participating in the operation by international players grew.
The fear of losing their personnel in the conflict increased as ten Belgium military
personnel were murdered. In this incident UNAMIR sent an escort of ten Belgian
soldiers to the home of Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana, with the intention of escorting her
to the Radio Rwanda offices to address to the nation. It had to be cancelled because
the Presidential Guard overtook the radio station and would not permit the Prime
Minister to speak on air. Later a number of “soldiers” and a crowd of civilians
overwhelmed the Belgians guarding Uwilingiyimana, forcing them to surrender. The
Prime Minister and her husband were then killed and the ten Belgians were taken to the
Camp Kigali military base where they were tortured and killed (Ponthus). Such actions
brought alarm forcing Belgium to withdraw all of its troops making the international
community hesitant of sending personnel into Rwanda. This situation shifted the
contribution from European members in the UN from military personnel to monetary
contribution unless major assets from the EU members were at risks.
Albania (1997)
EU states again supported/ voted in favor of peace enforcement by a
multinational force in its’ own continent in 1997. Albania was considered a potential
candidate to join the EU in the future, but political instability escalated into
8. 8
unprecedented violence. The Albanian Unrest came about as the citizens of Albania lost
an average of $1.5 billion because of the collapse of a pyramid saving scheme which
left the state deteriorated, resulting in mass emigration, and civil disorder toppling the
government and leaving at least 2,000 people killed (Kreutz). UN Security Council
Resolution 1101 and 1114 (1997) calls for the immediate formation of a multinational
protection force which consisted of Greek, French, Spanish, Turkish, Romanian,
Danish, Austrian, Slovenian, Belgians, and Italian forces to restore order. Despite the
danger of how it could spread to neighboring Kosovo and Macedonia, which
demonstrated signs of eventually having the same fate as Albania, the United States,
Germany, and Britain, who were actively involved in missions in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, did not deploy any troops. Although such force was created, the UN has
traditionally been reluctant to use forces from neighboring states or from states with
special interests in the conflict for its peacekeeping or enforcement operations as they
may have hidden national interest.
A force consisting of 7,000 soldiers was sent to Albania to deliver humanitarian
aid, prevent civil war, and seek a possible settlement of the Albanian political crisis. For
instance, Italy was considered for the operation as in 1991-1993 they had previously
conducted a successful humanitarian operation in Albania called "Pellicano Operation"
which allowed them to gather experience and knowledge related to the country from
both the military and political point of view. These forces were led by the Italian 3rd
Army
corps, with 3,000 out of the 7,000 military forces sent, and this operation was
nicknamed “Operation Alba”. According to the Italian Department of Interior (Ministero
dell’Interno), over 10,500 Albanian citizens had moved illegally to Italy because of the
crisis, making the stabilization of Albania a priority to the Italian government. Italy as
well is, the principal trading partner of Albania and its primary investor with at least 400
Italian companies employing more than 30,000 Albanians. Once again proving the
hypothesis of who led peacekeeping or enforcement operations, in this case Italy in
Albania. Out of the five UNSC members who were from the European continent only
four were members of the EU. EU members who held a seat at the UN Security Council
during the crisis were France, United Kingdom, Portugal, and Sweden. All European
Union members voted in favor of military action to maintain peace in Europe after the
horrific incidents in the Balkan Peninsula with the dissolution of Yugoslavia. What made
“Operation Alba” so successful unlike the peace enforcement operations in Somalia was
that the factions did not perceive the peace enforcement military forces as “impartial”
evading the outcome of becoming embroiled in the conflict. Being classified as impartial
avoids the creation of a domino effect, which would threaten the main objectives of the
mission.
As other peace operations before it, the success of acquiring peace and security
has been given to the ability of a coalition of neighboring states to accept the
”Responsibility to Protect” those in danger. The liberalists have developed such theory
as Europe concurred that the security of Albania was essential to keep peace in the
European continent. They would be delighted with the actions of Italy in leading the
operation as its relationship with Albania is vital for the survival of the Albanian state as
well as the support of the EU states in the UNSC towards the approval of the operation
9. 9
as it exhibits their determination for peace and prosperity in Europe by avoiding the
dreadful events that occurred during Yugoslavia’s dissolution.
Constructivist on the other hand would agree with the line of thought established
by the liberalist but they would disagree on the leadership of the coalition as it was not a
European Union led coalition with the purpose of integration of the Balkan Peninsula
with the dominant western European states. It is crucial for constructivist that the peace
enforcement missions which took place in the Balkan Peninsula were established to
have peace in the region and have a unified continent.
As seen in the past peace enforcement operations, realists find the formation of
the coalition as a breach of Albania’s sovereignty and Italy’s leadership in the coalition
as neo- imperialism. On the other hand, Italian realists see the operation essential for
the protection of Italian assets and the establishment of a presence in the region and
the overall security of the state in a troubling era in Eastern Europe.
Although major changes occurred on European foreign and security policy, with
the reforms implemented by the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, voting patterns by European
states did not changed when the matter of peace enforcement was brought to the
UNSC. Nevertheless, the horrific events that transcribed throughout the 1990s have
shifted overall military personnel contribution to each peace operation during the early
21st
century to monetary contributions when possible.
Mali (2012)
In 2012 insurgent groups began fighting a campaign against the Malian
government for independence of northern Mali, also known as Azawad. Even before the
outbreak of the conflict, northern Mali was a safe haven for various groups of jihadists
and Islamist militants. Such groups not only exploited the local population against the
Malian government and its military forces, but also organized a criminal enterprise that
involved drugs, human trafficking, arms smuggling, and the kidnapping for ransom. By
April 2012 the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), had taken
control of the region. After requests from both the Malian government and ECOWAS for
a foreign military intervention, the UN Security Council unanimously under Chapter VII
of the United Nations Charter pass a French sponsored resolution approving a force to
assist the army of Mali in combating the militants. Resolution 2085 called for the
authorized deployment of the African led International Support Mission to Mali
(AFISMA). Because of its neighbors, the volatile region where it is located, as well as
the major French national interests triggered a successful French led intervention in
Mali on January 2013. The French military force in Mali consisted of a well-equipped
ground force of 4,000 soldiers and air force personnel who struck the MNLA rebels into
full retreat. They were supported by well trained and heavily armed Malian soldiers, as
well as 6,000 ECOWAS/ AFISMA troops. Other key Western states such as Britain,
Belgium, Canada and the United Sates provided military intelligence, training, and
logistical support. The intervention, supported by all these forces concluded
successfully in less than three weeks, ended the MNLA and recaptured all the major
10. 10
cities in northern Mali. The dispersed Islamist insurgents fused into the civilian
population and retreated into the mountains, caves, and inhospitable desert terrain that
they are familiar with.
Mali is a perfect example of modern day military intervention as well as the
European Union’s neighbor policy. The successful coalition of France and African
regional organizations demonstrates how counterinsurgency can be effective for the
betterment. Although it demonstrates cooperation, realists argue that the threat on
French assets in Mali who which was a former colony and a main trading partner
inspired intervention. However, constructivist would find the overall upbringing of the
operation as a successful way to enrich regional security by the cooperation between
European and African forces. It is essential for constructivist to find the wellbeing of the
region, with that said they prefer the operation to be fully led by African forces and have
European forces limited to training and funding. Liberalist on the other hand would find
the creation of a UN sanctioned coalition between France and African forces as an
example of regional cooperation and the progress between the relationships of colonies
with their formal rulers. Although all theoretical perspectives touch on the positives and
negatives of the operation it still brings up the issue on how EU states may have
concurring votes but when essential contributions are needed they take various
courses. Such behavior was demonstrated while voting for UN Security Council
Resolution 2085 as the EU member states which held seat at the UNSC were Germany,
United Kingdom, Portugal, and the leader of the operation France all voting in favor of
French led intervention.
EU states vote in concurrence when resolutions on peace enforcement are
presented but the question of who provides resources to reinstate peace and security in
the regions is another question. The four cases detailed here reveal pattern that EU
contribute troops if state assets or material interests are in danger.
Year
Peace Enforcement and
Peacekeeping Operation
Coalition and Peacekeeping
Operation Leader
Troops Percentage
62%
15%
43%
40%
Leader Contribution
28,000
400
3,000
4,000
Major Peace Operations from 1992 to 2012
USA
1994 Rwanda UNAMIR Belgium
1992 Somalia
1997 Albania Italy
2012 Mali France
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For example, Mali imports a 9.75% of goods from France gaining an average
amount of $129,334,291.16 (Observatory of Economic Complexity) making it the largest
European trade partner for the African state. Relationships like this demonstrate that
there is more than just peace for the common good; some may even say that it is a form
of neo-imperialism. Military intervention while following the Responsibility to Protect
generates the question if one’s responsibility to establish peace and security is just to
keep world peace or to defend national interest.
The following table (figure 3) demonstrates the official voting of each of the
European Union members which held a seat at the UN Security Council during each
major resolution which invokes peace enforcement.
From the table (figure 3) above it is clear that EU member states actually concur
in voting when presented resolutions on peace enforcement supporting the established
ideology of a common foreign and security policy as stated in the Maastricht Treaty
(1992) and the Lisbon Treaty (2007).
The Complexity of Peace Enforcement
Alex J. Bellamy brings up in his work, The Responsibility to Protect and the
Problem of Military Intervention, a concern about the practice of R2P as a method of
nonconsensual military intervention. Although the United Nations do not partake in
peace enforcement, Bellamy fears that sanctioned or not resolutions under R2P will
legitimize unilateral intervention. “For instance, since 2005 it has been widely suggested
that R2P “legalizes” or “legitimizes” nonconsensual intervention potentially without the
sanction of the UN Security Council” (Diehl & Frederking 162). Such fear comes from
past military campaigns, such as those by the United States of America in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Governments share the belief that Responsibility to Protect legitimizes
Year UNSC Resolution Description
State Belgium France United Kingdom
Voting Summary Yes Yes Yes
State Spain France United Kingdom
Voting Summary Yes Yes Yes
State Spain France United Kingdom
Voting Summary Yes Yes Yes
State Sweden France United Kingdom Portugal
Voting Summary Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Sweden France United Kingdom Portugal
Voting Summary Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Germany France United Kingdom Portugal
Voting Summary Yes Yes Yes Yes
S/RES/1114
S/RES/20852012
EU Member State Holding UNSC Seat
1992 S/RES/794
S/RES/965
S/RES/929
1994
S/RES/1101
1997
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humanitarian intervention and helps in the progress of acquiring peace and security.
Skeptics argue on the true reasons behind peace enforcement involving European
states in areas such as Africa. They have claimed that behind the purpose of
humanitarian aid there are hidden agendas for intervention. Although the good of the
intervened community is always a priority for those states that participate in peace
enforcement, those who actually send military personnel to the ground basically have a
history with the state in conflict or have assets threatened by the current conflict. These
practices steer up the complexity of peace enforcement.
Although scholars like Alex J. Bellamy warn us on how Responsibility to Protect
is a nonconsensual method of military intervention, Hon. Gareth Evans describes R2P
as a new international norm to be simplified as a new standard of behavior, and a new
guide to behavior, for every state. His more liberalist theoretical approach to R2P brings
to light how this theory is crucial for the ending of mass atrocities such as crimes of
genocide, ethnic cleansing, other crimes against humanity and war crimes. Apart from
emphasizing on the principle’s role in the elimination of mass atrocities, Evans explains
how it is just a small step for world peace. With great detail he emphasizes on the core
principle of Responsibility to Protect which he explains as follows, “The issue is not the
‘right’ of big states to do anything, including throwing their weight around militarily, but
the ‘responsibility’ of all states to protect their own people from atrocity crimes, and to
assist others to do so by all appropriate means. The core responsibility is that of the
individual sovereign state itself, and it is only if it is unable or unwilling to do so that the
question arises of other states’ responsibility to assist or engage in some way. The core
theme is not intervention but protection: look at each issue as it arises from the
perspective of the victims, the men being killed or about to be killed, the women being
or being about to be raped, the children dying or about to die of starvation; and look at
the responsibility in question as being above all a responsibility to prevent”. According to
Hon. Gareth Evans explanation of the core principle of R2P, states must take the
perspective of the victims and act accordingly if and only if the state where such
atrocities are taken place is unable or unwilling to do so as a matter of preventing future
conflicts of similar nature. Philosophies such as this raise the question of the extent of
state sovereignty and if military intervention or peace enforcement is the only measure
of “prevention” which the doctrine enforces. Surprisingly Evans believes that there is
more to just military deployment when reacting to the atrocities committed by a party
instead he emphasizes on how it should be considered as an absolute last resort and
actions such as sanctions and international criminal prosecutions should be used
ahead. This statement concurs to the philosophy of the UNSC and the United Nations
as a whole when tackling situations of this magnitude. Evans belief on the existence of
an specific criteria for the enforcement of R2P clashes with my belief that R2P allows
leeway to western states to dictate conflict resolution. He argues that the change of
literature during the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document from “humanitarian
intervention” to “responsibility to protect” has changed the mindset of troop deployment
for peace enforcement. Not allowing states to have the “right” to intervening military
comes from the change of “serious harm to populations” to “crimes against international
law”. Evan emphasizes on the importance of cooperation between the Global North and
the South during the editing of such phrases as he says “it was not a matter of the North
13. 13
pushing something down the throats of the South” instead he states that because of the
antecedents which occurred in the Balkans there was a consensus as to it being a
universal issue which has occurred in the Global North and in the Global South. Hon.
Gareth Evans may see this compromise as step towards mutual understanding on
subjects of peace enforcement but scholars such as Alex J. Bellamy have proved that
policies such as Responsibility to Protect still demonstrate the level of fault in
international norms as seen in campaigns such as those of the United States of
America in Afghanistan and Iraq.
It comes to my attention that policies such as R2P are made to ensure peace
and security around the world but it allows leeway to western states, in this case EU
members, to dictate conflict resolution without the consent of the parties involved.
Policies, like R2P, have been created to help bring in a more efficient way for peace and
security but the broad foundations of such policies make certain people in the
international community skeptical of each state pursuing for military use.
Ramesh Thakur touches on various points when explaining the significance of
the peace keeping operations in Somalia during the early 1990s. Thakur illustrates the
skepticism behind peace operations in Somalia and the different point of views between
the western and eastern states in the UN when referring to human rights. Similar to the
line of thought behind R2P, Thakur stresses on the importance of collective security to
respond promptly to any aggression by any power. According to Thakur, “Collective
security requires multilateralism, and successful military operations require centralized
command and control” (392). Many of the peace enforcement operations partake
between multilateral campaigns but with one state taking the command; in Albania it
was Italy, in Somalia it was the USA, and in Mali it was France. The creation of
multilateral forces supports my findings as the role of centralized command during
peace enforcement operations has been done by former empires whose historical
connection with the conflicting state comes from being a former colony. This practice
establishes a "dangerous" precedent for future peace operations in Europe, Africa, and
anywhere else in the world. Intervention left to multilateral coalitions of neighboring
countries usually affects the outcome of the crisis as they often intervene with vital
national interests in mind.
The European Union’s engagement in African and global affairs has been
repeatedly illuminated in terms of the interests of each member state. Malte Brosig’s
article The Emerging Peace and Security Regime in Africa: The Role of the EU gives us
clear description of the notion of single state interest when taking part in peace
enforcement and keeping operations. Through the use of the most recent and
prominent cases he examines four peacekeeping missions in Africa which have major
EU engagement. These missions share a common factor of modern day peacekeeping
which is the cooperation between intergovernmental organizations such as the
European Union and the African Union (AU). According to Brosig, intergovernmentalism
builds upon individual actor preferences that find application through the mechanism of
rational choice. He criticizes the use of intergovernmentalism as an elitist and rational
institutionalized approach as it assumes that state leaders follow a cost-benefit
calculation indicated by their own preferences. These preferences give form to the
14. 14
modern day institutional design of international organizations and their policies. The
design of International Organizations (IO) makes it a channel for member states to exert
their interests rather than being a significant actor in obtaining peace. Undoubtedly,
foreign policy remains one of the policy areas in which member states still exert a high
degree of leverage and maintain the ability to shape institutional policies. However, a
selected focus on the intergovernmental aspects of EU peacekeeping and enforcement
predetermines the analysis towards member states’ preferences to the extent in which
peacekeeping and enforcement in Africa has become an organizational interaction
between international organizations. The European Union’s involvement in
peacekeeping and enforcement operations consists of a broader context than the
United Nations, the African Union (AU) and what themselves can provide. EU military
missions must consist of not only the EU’s own preferences but as well as the support
and consent of its member states. Although EU missions must reach the above criteria,
the formation of patterns of functional conjunction between the EU, the UN, and the AU
in peacekeeping and enforcement challenges the notion of intergovernmentalism to
EU’s foreign and security policy. The European Union’s foreign policy does not only
depend on the consensus of its member states but on the peacekeeping capacities of
partner organizations in each mission. According to Brosig, “While operational needs for
peacekeeping missions are always external conditions for each organization reacting to
the specific circumstances in which missions operate, especially EU missions, because
of their short-term and supportive character, are aligned to UN and AU peacekeeping
capacities and varying needs for EU assistance”. Brosig’s statement refers to the EU’s
role in missions across Africa as interplay of international organizations within the region
as the involvement in peacekeeping and enforcement operations depends on the
necessities missing in the operation.
Recently, Great Britain and France have been identified as the leading states
using the European Union to multilateralize their foreign policy towards Africa and the
world. Brosig exalts on how both states are key actors not only in African peace
operations but also in developing the EU’s profile as an international actor through
economic and personnel contribution. In the figures presented below that includes
recent economic and personnel contribution it can be seen how their influence as
European powers influence in peacekeeping and enforcement affairs. Their involvement
depends heavily on the support of each EU member state and the EU established
framework for peacekeeping and enforcement operations. Although not mentioned by
Malte Brosig, Italy has demonstrated its capacity to influence missions through
economic and personnel contribution. It is a key founding member of the EU giving
great importance to its support when developing missions. Taking the responsibility to
successfully lead “Operation Alba” in Albania has allowed Italy to spearhead military
personnel contribution as well as to become a major voice in EU foreign policy
development. The figures below exhibit the recent economic and personnel
contributions of the three major EU contributors: Great Britain (figure 4), France (figure
5), and Italy (figure 6). The primary reason Great Britain has a small number of
peacekeepers in UN led operations is that Britain’s top security priorities do not
converge with current UN peacekeeping concerns. Even though the numbers go
against the theory of influence through contribution of personnel, those individuals who
15. 15
partake in UN led operations consists of high military and police officials as well its large
economic contribution and historical significance as a founder of the EU and UN makes
Great Britain a leader in European foreign policy and international peacekeeping and
enforcement operations.
16. 16
EU missions assist within the confinements of EU preferences for short term and
specific operations supporting the fact that all European states who are involved in such
operations have a specific agenda as to why participate in them. As a result, there is a
surge of European Union member states involvement in peacekeeping and enforcement
missions from 19 in 1992 to 36 at the end of 2013 (IPI and The Elliot School at GWU). It
correlates with European expansion as more member states want to fortify their
domestic agendas by getting involved in EU foreign and security policy. Although more
member states participate in peacekeeping and enforcement missions, from the
information provided by the International Peace Institute and the Elliot School at GWU
most of the EU member states involvement has been in unilateral and multilateral non
UN led missions.
This rises up the question of how can European states successfully yield their
agendas when personnel contribution to conflicts in former colonies is so low. Is it a
matter of the history between them and the state which the mission is taking place? Or
is it the economic and structural power that many EU member states have in the UN
Security Council? This goes back to the question on the levels of involvement in peace
keeping and enforcement operations of high power European states.
In peace enforcement resolutions we see a large concurrence in voting as the
EU demonstrates their clear support of each other but the question of who leads and
occupies the conflicting state brings up the skeptical notion of the true reasons why
those former colonial empires do actually give resources to the operation.
17. 17
A Shift in Contributions to the UN
The burden of supporting peace operations has been shared among UN member
states in various ways as the great expansion and size of the mission’s forces
collaboration. According to 2013 IPI data the United States of America and Japan join a
number of European Union member states in funding approximately 80 percent of the
UN peacekeeping budget, while African and Asian member states have become the
largest contributors of uniformed personnel providing a total of 71 percent (IPI 2013).
The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations manages today at least sixteen
missions around the world, consisting of more than 80,000 troops, 13,000 police, and
almost 2,000 military observers, in addition to approximately 20,000 civilian personnel.
Today, it is not an issue of finding adequate numbers of troops, police, and observers to
staff each mission. Instead, the problem is the capability of the personnel involved in
each mission due to a number of factors such as training, leadership, and the right
equipment. Many of the largest and most challenging operations are in areas such as
Sub-Saharan Africa, this peace mission’s lacks of personnel support from major
Western European and Others Group (WEOG). This lack of involvement in contributing
personnel limits the capabilities and implementation of mission mandate. Furthermore,
personnel from African and Asian states may lack of the particular skills required to
effectively implement the UN mandates. As argued by Malte Brosig, WEOG states,
since the mid-1990s, tend to only contribute with critical resources rather than troops.
This behavior has dictated modern personnel and economic contributions by UN
member states when it comes to peace operations. WEOG states have taken more of a
step back in their contributions of personnel to peace missions, as from seen in past
operations like UNAMIR, because the cost of life has been high for those states who
have send personnel to this conflicted areas of the world. In UNAMIR a total of ten
Belgium military personnel were brutally murder by the Rwandan insurgents when
carrying out the operation. Somalia’s internal conflict led to the creation of a UN
sanctioned multinational force to restore order in the state. The American led operation
named UNITAF which became costly for the United States as 43 military personnel
were killed and 153 were wounded carrying out the operation. Events such as these
have marked a drastic shift in UN contributions by WEOG states.
Today, high casualties in past peace operations has made WEOG states take a
completely different route when contributing to UN operations around the world. WEOG
states have decided to contribute large sums of funds to UN peacekeeping operations
as an alternative to sending personnel on the ground. Out of the top ten financial
contributors to UN peacekeeping operations, seven are members of WEOG.
Interchanging personnel contributions with financial contributions allows these states to
have leeway and avoid full mobilization of military personnel to hostile environments
where their own personnel’s lives are at risk without any national political gain. As seen
throughout my research, states have participated in peace operations when domestic
interests are at stake. Although such practice was relatively hidden from the global
community during the operations throughout the 1990s, in more recent operations, like
Mali, WEOG states are evaluating their assets in the conflicted state to see if it is really
worth the trouble of contributing large sums of military personnel. The shift has created
18. 18
a practice of only contributing awfully small quantities of personnel to UN peace
operations which suffice the precise necessities of the operation. These necessities are
characterized as of the short- term and supportive character such as military officials
specialized in strategic operations and training as well as equipment supply.
This overall shift has given African and Asian states the responsibility to
contribute large quantities of personnel for each mission. Today, the top ten contributors
of personnel to United Nations mission consist of five African and five Asian states led
by Bangladesh with 10,549 and ending with Ghana with 2,952 (Year in Review UN
Peace Operations 2011).
Such a shift has come because of the large numbers of casualties of the WEOG
member states who participated in such missions, the ability by the UN standards to
exchange monetary contribution for personnel, and the hesitance of conflicted states to
19. 19
allow a former colonial ruler to “put boots” on the ground. The reluctance of WEOG
members to contribute large sums of troops has created an opportunity for African and
Asian states to dictate the operations occurring in their continent. While WEOG
members limit their participation in peace operations, Africa and Asia-Pacific Groups
states take the opportunity to send personnel to missions as WEOG members
personnel contributions are primarily consisted of high military officials. The ability for
African and Asian states to train under top military officials gives a clear incentive to
contribute even more personnel. However, from what I have seen from my research the
main reason for Africa and Asia-Pacific Groups large sums of personnel contribution
has to do with their reluctance to let former colonizers to send personnel which may
have hidden political agendas as seen in Mali. In 2006 President Omar Hassan Ahmed
Bashir of Sudan called for caution as the United Nations tried to persuade the
Sudanese government to allow the establishment of a peacekeeping force in their state
to assure the safety of refugees coming home. According to Maggie Farley of Los
Angeles Times, Bashir was “wary that opening the door to more peacekeepers and aid
workers was an invitation to occupation of his country. He declared that he didn't want
Sudan to become another Iraq at the mercy of foreign troops he couldn't dismiss”.
President Bashir’s statement allows us to see how states with internal conflicts fear that
the involvement of foreign uniformed personnel, especially those from Europe, may end
up as an occupation enforcing their agendas under the title of peacekeeping or
enforcement. The hesitance of government officials to allow foreign personnel in their
country comes about as International Criminal Court member states may want to take
the opportunity to arrest those responsible for war crimes or crimes against humanity.
This was the case for President Bashir in Sudan as said by Sudanese diplomats and
opposition leaders according to the Los Angeles Times, “The fear that the U.N. troops
might act as an arm of the ICC and arrest government officials may be an underlying
factor in the resistance to new peacekeepers”. The issue of sovereignty and diplomatic
immunity has relatively held WEOG members on taking such measures.
Many states share the same fears of President Bashir which has forced
European states to take part of peace operations in the limited ways expressed
previously. Today European states have taken the supporting role in joint missions with
regional organizations such as the African Union when enforcing peace operations.
European Union member states have diverged themselves from the Western European
and Others Group by working with the UN in peace operations by individual state or
regional force. Although there is a level of concurrence in EU members being top
contributors in the financial aspect of peace operations, they differ when contributing
personnel as argued by Malte Brosig.
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
The research demonstrates that European Union states do “speak with one
voice” in respects with voting in UN Security Council resolutions regarding peace
enforcement. European states didn’t defy each other on whether military personnel
20. 20
must be sent to hostile areas for the purpose of maintaining peace and security.
However, while voting in the UNSC reflects the theory of a common foreign and security
policy of the EU, the decision on who would contribute troops and other essential
resources depended on individual state’s interest. A pattern was perceived as the
region or state where the conflict resided dictated which EU state would contribute
resources for peace enforcement. For example, the cooperation between France and
Malian forces may only be a mirror to the threat on French assets in Mali which inspired
the intervention as it was a former colony were France had gradually invested. The
volatile region, its’ neighbors which gave ongoing support, and national interests, led to
the successful French led military operation. Another example of a major historical
relationship between the European state intervening and the area of conflict was the
Albanian Unrest as according to the Italian Department of the Interior (Ministero
dell’Interno), over 10,500 Albanian citizens had moved illegally to Italy because of the
crisis making the stabilization of Albania a necessity for the Italian government. Italy like
contained large amounts of assets in Albania as it was the principal trading partner of
and its primary investor with at least 400 Italian companies employing more than 30,000
Albanians. This statistics prove the heavy involvement of European Union member
states in the colonies were they “volunteer” or find “responsible” to protect and restore
peace.
Such actions have to do as well with the promotion of the international
community to encourage states that have a historical or cultural experience to intervene
as it would be easier for the population to assimilate with the personnel. In this case
Italy is a perfect example. Italy was considered to the leader of the peace enforcement
operation in Albania as it had previously operated there. From 1991-1993 Italy had
conducted a successful humanitarian operation in Albania called "Pellicano Operation"
which allowed them to gather experience and knowledge related to the country from
both the military and political point of view. These types of coincidences have been fairly
popular in the recent years when peace enforcement resolutions are passed in the
UNSC.
I am skeptical of this practice as most of European states have not ended their
relationship with former colonies on a positive note. It is to my understanding that
European military intervention of any kind in former colonies, such as Belgium in
Rwanda, is a form of neo-imperialism and may result in even more violence in the
future. The practice of sending former empires to the aid of former colonial possessions
establishes a "dangerous" precedent for peace enforcement operations in the future.
As mentioned earlier if intervention is left to multilateral coalitions of neighboring states,
as it happened in Mali and Albania, it almost constantly affect the outcome of the crisis
as they often intervene with vital national interests in mind. This is a risky practice as
when dealing with peace enforcement operations, the tumbling of regimes, and
implementation of new economic policies can disrupt the well-established nature of the
state only to gain maximum profit of the intervener after the conflict is “resolved”.
The behavior expressed by the European Union member states in the United
Nations Security Council can best be explained through the realist theoretical
perspective. Although there are demonstrations of regional congruence in voting on
21. 21
resolutions which invoke peace enforcement operations, the overall verdict on who gets
to contribute troops and other essential resources depends on each individual state’s
national interest. The divergence of EU states practicing to the fullest extent for a
common foreign and security policy reveals the disbelief of an individual surrender of
sovereignty to the EU as a whole. As previously mentioned, a pattern was perceived as
the region or state where the conflict resided dictated which EU state would contribute
resources for peace enforcement. The ability to act by its own national interest allows
states to command their troops to assure that all of the state’s assets are secured. This
behavior is criticized by scholars like Alex J. Bellamy as in his terms the nature of
Responsibility to Protect “legalizes” European intervention in volatile regions when their
national interest are at stake. The hesitance of the rest of EU member states to fully
participate on the operations exhibits the true nature of realism as if state’s national
interests aren’t threatened; there is no need to intervene. While the safety and peace
assurance of the intervened has always been an ethical priority for the UN when
deciding for a peace keeping or peace enforcement operation, those who actually send
military personnel mainly have a history with the state in conflict or have critical assets
threatened by the conflict.
I concur with the use of regional organizations as actors when peace
enforcement is called upon as they have greater assimilation with the people of the
conflicted region than Europeans have. The UN should establish a system where each
regional organization, such as the Organization of American States, and African Union,
take the responsibility to ensure peace and security through peacekeeping or
enforcement if needed. This concept prevents misunderstandings by the populations
which may end up in greater turmoil as seen in Rwanda. When referring to the
European Union’s foreign and security policy dilemma I recommend that decisions on
military action must not just be taken the domestic level but must pass through the
various branches of the European Union such as the parliament in which military or any
other action for that matter that a EU state would take on large matters of foreign policy
will be from a consensus of all European Union member states establishing one true
voice in Europe.
The Lisbon Treaty gives the European Parliament new lawmaking powers which
now decide on the majority of EU legislation. Parliament being the only directly elected
EU institution should demonstrate the overall consensus on foreign and security policy
of each European citizen legitimizing the outcome of sending troops for UN peace
enforcement operations.
To summarize, I truly believe that the involvement of the EU parliament and the
other EU branches will be the only counter force to balance the true responsibility to
protect versus the national interest of any state when influencing other states of the EU
to vote as one voice when referring to peacekeeping and enforcement operations.
22. 22
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