Behavioral Finance and Self-control

Behavioral FinanceBehavioral Finance
and Self-controland Self-control
W. Fred van Raaij,W. Fred van Raaij,
Tilburg University, The NetherlandsTilburg University, The Netherlands
Tallinn, Estonia: Eesti Pank, May 8, 2019Tallinn, Estonia: Eesti Pank, May 8, 2019

Behavioral financeBehavioral finance
Behavioral finance is studying financial behavior (of consumers, entrepreneurs,
investors) from a psychological and/or sociological perspective, including
emotions, cognitive shortcomings, social influences, deviating from an
economic model of maximizing or optimizing objective or subjective utility.
If these deviations are systematic, financial behaviour can be explained and
predicted (Ariely: predictive irrationality).
In a similar way, health and educational behaviour can be studied.

Self-controlSelf-control
Self-control is resisting internal and external short-term temptations and being
persistent in order to reach long-term goals.
Internal temptations are ideas, thoughts, impulses becoming conscious in the
brain.
External temptations are attractive objects, situations and messages to be
followed for immediate gratification.
Self-control can be exerted through internal and external mechanisms.
Self-control may have a: prevention focus to avoid temptations and mistakes.
promotion focus to reach desirable outcomes.

Free will?Free will?
Experiments by Kornhuber & Deecke (1965) and Benjamin Libet (1985, 1989).
Freely voluntary motor acts (such as a flexion of the wrist) are preceded by a
specific electrical change in the brain (readiness potential, RP) 550 ms
before the act. Humans become aware of the intention to act 350-400 ms
after the RP. This is 150-200 ms before the motor act. The volitional process
is thus initiated unconsciously.
Does free will exist? An important philosophical and theological question. This
affects views on determinism (“we are our brain”), personal responsibility,
and guilt.
““Mind → brain” or “brain → mind”?Mind → brain” or “brain → mind”?

Readiness potential (RP I): -1020 ms. Readiness potential (RP II2): -530 ms.
Wish to move (W): -200 ms.
S: report of act (50 ms before the act). Electromyogram (EMG): act.

We are unaware of 90-95% of our brain activities, for instance the regulation of
blood circulation, breathing, digestion of food, homeostasis and movement. Only in
dangerous situations or disturbances of these processes, we become aware of them
(alarm).
Many observations, impulses, emotions, ideas and intentions remain nonconscious.
Only a few become strong enough to become aware of them (mind).
With awareness we can control the outcome; we can accept or reject the conscious
idea. Free will does not initiate a voluntary act, but we can accept/reject (control) the
performance of the act.

Three effects of internal stimulationThree effects of internal stimulation
A became conscious and is consciously further developed.
B became conscious and is rejected/veto-ed.
C remains nonconscious and may influence behaviour through priming.
Priming is increasing the salience of some ideas or behaviours at the nonconscious
level, and this may influence choice and movement. An earlier task/behaviour may
thus affect a later unrelated task/behaviour.
AA BB CC
X
conscious level
nonconscious level
Self-control

Systems 1 and 2Systems 1 and 2
Robert Zajonc: mere-exposure experiments (1968), in which
repeated exposure to external stimuli (Chinese characters)
without recognition leads to ‘liking’. Zajonc (1984) concludes
the ‘primacy of affect’, an independent emotional process.
Primary affective reaction (Van Raaij 1984, 1989) as a first
reaction to stimuli before a cognitive reaction. The emotional
process is (neurologically) faster than the cognitive process.
Daniel Kahneman (Nobel prize lecture, 2003; 2011): System 1
(nonconscious, fast, intuitive; less/no free will) and System 2
(conscious, slow, deliberate; free will).
The existence of two separate and independent systems is rather
unlikely. Both systems have functional specialisations and
there are interactions between both systems. Several levels of
consciousness exist (Van Raaij & Ye 2005).
Robert Zajonc
1923-2008
Daniel Kahneman
b. 1934

Nonconscious and conscious systemNonconscious and conscious system
System 1, nonconsciousSystem 1, nonconscious System 2, consciousSystem 2, conscious
•Early in evolutionEarly in evolution
•AutomaticAutomatic
•Online pattern recognitionOnline pattern recognition
•Here and nowHere and now
•Fast, ‘effortless’Fast, ‘effortless’
•Non-intentionalNon-intentional
•Parallel processesParallel processes
•Multiple systemsMultiple systems
•Many tasks at the same timeMany tasks at the same time
•‘‘No capacity constraints’No capacity constraints’
•RigidRigid
•Sensitive to negative informationSensitive to negative information
•Late in evolutionLate in evolution
•Deliberate, controlledDeliberate, controlled
•Checks & balances afterwardsChecks & balances afterwards
•Long termLong term
•Slow, effortfulSlow, effortful
•IntentionalIntentional
•Serial processesSerial processes
•Single systemSingle system
•One task at a timeOne task at a time
•Capacity constraintsCapacity constraints
•FlexibleFlexible
•Sensitive to positive informationSensitive to positive information

Nonconscious and conscious levelsNonconscious and conscious levels
Not strong enough for
awareness:
Priming.
Effect on saliency.
Not strong enough for
awareness:
Priming.
Effect on saliency.
Primary affective reaction.
Fast, automatic reaction.
like/dislike, bias.
Primary affective reaction.
Fast, automatic reaction.
like/dislike, bias.
Strong enough for
awareness:
accept/reject
(Illusion of) self-control.
Strong enough for
awareness:
accept/reject
Cognitive reaction.
Rationalization.
accept/reject
Cognitive reaction.
Rationalization.
accept/reject
Internal stimulation External stimulation
Nonconscious
Conscious
System 1System 1
System 2System 2

NumericalNumerical primingpriming 11
Numerical priming (Ekkehard Stephan, 2005) in a study for the Süddeutsche
Klassenloterie:
1. In a telephone conversation, people were asked whether a lottery ticket of the
Süddeutsche Klassenloterie is cheaper or more expensive than € 30 (in the
other condition: € 60).
2. Then the price of a lottery ticket was mentioned: € 45.
3. The willingness to buy a lottery ticket was higher in the € 60 condition than in
the € 30 condition.
An explanation is the order of the prices. The price of € 45 is more attractive/
acceptable, after a higher price has been mentioned.
Ekkehard Stephan

Numerical primingNumerical priming 22
Unconscious activation of a scheme/mindset of a low vs. high price. After activation
of a high price, the lower price will be perceived as a gain. The result is a
higher willingness to pay (WTP) than when first a lower price has been
activated.
The price is a relevant prime. Even an irrelevant prime (‘You are the 87th/7th
person we call today’, thus an irrelevant high/low number), activates a
scheme/mindset of high/low prices and thus a higher/lower WTP (willingness
to buy a lottery ticket).
Ekkehard Stephan

Internal self-controlInternal self-control
Internal self-control is often a dual-motive conflict between an easy response (short-
term benefits, temptation; System 1) and an effortful deliberate decision process
(long-term benefits; System 2). How to improve self-control?
 Associate the temptation with a loss and a negative label.
 Reconstruct the temptation in an abstract way (Moore et al 1976). An abstract
mindset facilitates self-control.
 Implementation intentions (Gollwitzer 1999). “In situation X, I will do Y.”
 Mental budgeting (De Groot & Van Raaij 2016).
 If your willpower and persistence are weak, try to externalize self-control.

External self-control by personExternal self-control by person
External self-control is a temporary restriction of personal freedom with a contract
or regulation in order to reach a long-term goal. External self-control may be
initiated by the person him/herself:
 Avoid contact with the temptation.
 Block effect of temptation: Odysseus and the Sirens.
 Automatic (pension) saving, Christmas club.
 Cut-off rule with investments.
 Automatic donations to charities.
 Keep regular and windfall income separate.
 Keep disposable income and consumption low.
 Contract with partner to stop smoking / drinking / gambling (social control).

External control by policy makerExternal control by policy maker
External control is a specific design of the environment in order to influence
behaviour, for the (assumed) benefit of persons being nudged (libertarian
paternalism). External control may be initiated by an outside organisation (policy
maker, marketer).
 Nudge, decision architecture.
 Defaults, opt-out (pension plan; donor system).
 Prompts, reminders.
 Attraction effect.
 Priming.

Attraction effectAttraction effect 11
The magazine The Economist offers three options for an annual subscription:
A. Online subscription for € 45.
B. Subscription print version for € 90.
C. Subsciption print + online version for € 90.
Which option do you prefer?
In a sample, 16% chooses option A and 84% chooses option C. No one chooses
option B (C > B; C dominates B).
If option B is deleted, 68% chooses option A and 32% chooses option C (preference
reversal). Deleting option B (a non-selected option) changes the choice between A
and C.
Option B is a decoy option, present to make option C more attractive. This is a
presentation bias, often present in the assortment of catalogs and supermarkets.
A. 16% 68%
B. 0%
C. 84% 32%

Attraction effectAttraction effect 22
A B
Price € 40 € 30
Coverage high low
A B C
Price € 40 € 30 € 40
Coverage high low medium
A B D
Price € 40 € 30 € 30
Coverage high low very low
Assortment of insurances A and B.
We add insurance C.
Which insurance becomes
more attractive?
We add insurance D.
Which insurance becomes
more attractive?
Addition of asymmetrically dominated alternatives.

Self-control of financial behaviorSelf-control of financial behavior
Internal control
Financial behavior
Money management
Financial decision making
Purchasing
Behavioral
outcomes
Environmental control
Pre-
commitment
devices
Decision architecture:
structure, comparison,
defaults, nudging
Social control
Requested
social
support/control
Social
reference/
influence
Feedback to upstream
Self-regulation
Dual-motive conflict
Mental budgetting

Co-holding puzzlesCo-holding puzzles
Co-holding puzzles:
1. Credit and savings (Gathergood & Weber 2014).
2. Car finance (loan) and savings.
3. Credit-card debt and liquid, retirement assets (Bertaut et al 2008).
Explanations
Mistake, lack of financial literacy.
Preference for holding a liquid financial buffer for emergencies.
Expected lack of willpower to restore savings.
Pre-commitment to paying off credit-card debt, loan/credit.
Control impulsive spending.
Self-control

Prospect theoryProspect theory
Fourfold pattern (Kahneman & Tversky)
A. 95% chance of winning
€ 10,000
or
sure gain of € 9,500
“bird in hand”
A. 95% chance of winning
€ 10,000
or
sure gain of € 9,500
“bird in hand”
B. 95% chance of losing
€ 10,000
or
sure loss of € 9,500
“gambling”
B. 95% chance of losing
€ 10,000
or
sure loss of € 9,500
“gambling”
C. 5% chance of winning
€ 10,000
or
sure gain of € 500
“lottery ticket”
C. 5% chance of winning
€ 10,000
or
sure gain of € 500
“lottery ticket”
D. 5% chance of losing
€ 10,000
or
sure loss of € 500
“insurance premium”
D. 5% chance of losing
€ 10,000
or
sure loss of € 500
“insurance premium”
winning losing
risk aversionrisk seeking
95%
5%

S-shaped value function of prospect theoryS-shaped value function of prospect theory
gains
losses
positive value
negative value
0 20
-20
100
-150
125
40
-40
-200
Gains and losses in relation
to reference point.
Value of loss is 1.5 to 2
times larger than the value of
gain (in absolute terms).
Loss aversion is stronger

Prospect theoryProspect theory
Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979):
1. Convex function in quadrant 1: diminishing marginal gains.
2. Concave function in quadrant 3: diminishing marginal losses.
3. Gains and losses are evaluated from a reference point (0).
4. Reference points are updated over time.
5. Losses loom larger than gains. A loss creates a larger negative value than a
gain creates a positive value.

Paying off debtPaying off debt
Suppose, a debtor has two credit-card debts to pay off (Amar 2011). Paying off the
small debt of card A removes more negative value than paying off a part of the large
debt of card B, if these credit cards are treated separately, even if card B has a
higher interest rate.
Card A: paying off a debt of 20, removes 150 units of negative value.
Card B: paying off a debt of 40 down to 20, removes 50 units of negative value.
credit -40 -20
-150
-200
negative value
0
Quadrant 3 Possible solution:
repartition total debt into
equal parts of 20 units, and
pay off the part with highest
interest rate first.

Framing, prospect theoryFraming, prospect theory 11
Suppose Estonia prepares for the Asian flu that probably will take the lives of 600
people.
There are two inoculation programs (A and B) available:
A. 200 out of 600 people will be saved.
B. A probability of 1/3 that all 600 people will be saved, and a probability of 2/3
that nobody will be saved.
Which program do you select, A or B?
There are two other inoculation programs (C and D) available:
C. 400 out of 600 people will die.
D. A probability of 1/3 that nobody will die, and a probability of 2/3 that all 600
people will die.
Which program do you select, C of D?

Framing, prospect theoryFraming, prospect theory 22
A. 200 of 600 people will be saved.
B. A probability of 1/3 that all 600 people will be saved, and
a probability of 2/3 that nobody will be saved.
Most frequent answer: A
C. 400 of 600 people will die.
D. A probability of 1/3 that nobody will die, and a probability
of 2/3 that all 600 people will die.
Most frequent answer: D
Note that A and C are identical: 200 people will be saved.
And B and D are identical: 0 or 600 people will be saved.
Positive/negative framing. Preference reversal?
Losses loom larger than gains.

SMarT programSMarT program
Thaler & Benartzi (2004): “Save More Tomorrow.”
How to get people to start pension saving?
•Loss aversion: saving may be seen as a loss (less spending).
•Procrastination: inertia, delaying to start saving.
•Present-time orientation: later pay-offs have a lower value than present pay-offs.
How to circumvent these inhibiting factors?
1.Get the consent to opt-in a pension saving program (procrastination, default option).
2.Start saving at a later moment in time (hyperbolic discounting).
3.Start saving at a pay-raise (loss aversion).
4.Increase saving at next pay-raise.
5.Opt-out is possible, but is not the default.

SMarT programSMarT program
Thaler & Benartzi (2004): Save More Tomorrow.
How to get people to start pension saving?
•Loss aversion: saving may be seen as a loss (less spending).
•Procrastination: inertia, delaying to start saving.
•Present-time orientation: later pay-offs have a lower value than present pay-offs.
How to circumvent these inhibiting factors?
1.Get the consent to opt-in a pension saving program (procrastination, default option).
2.Start saving at a later moment in time (hyperbolic discounting).
3.Start saving at a pay-raise (loss aversion).
4.Increase saving at the next pay-raise.
5.Opt-out is possible, but is not the default.

Time preferenceTime preference
Discounted utility model of Samuelson (1937) as an explanation of discounting
future income (with a constant discount factor).
How much compensation do you accept (WTA) to receive an amount of € 15 a
month, a year, or 10 years later?
Receiving an amount later is conceived as a loss.
The WTAs are higher than interest + inflation,
and can be best fitted by a hyperbole:
hyperbolic discounting.
The WTA becomes more realistic with a
longer time interval.
€ 15 A month later A year later 10 Years later
Compensation € 20 € 50 € 100
Discount factor 345% 120% 19%
hyperbolic
exponential

Reference points in timeReference points in time
How much you want to accept (WTA) to receive an amount later? How much are
you willing to pay (WTP) to receive an amount earlier? (Loewenstein, 1988,
Table 3).
WTA > WTP. More compensation desired (WTA) for a delay than people are willing
to pay (WTP) for an equal (same duration) speed-up (delay/speed-up
asymmetry).
How can this be explained by prospect theory?
Delay is a loss. Speed-up is a gain. More compensation required for a loss.
Delay (WTA,
receive later)
Speed-up (WTP,
receive earlier)
Sign.
1 versus 4 weeks $ 1.09 $ 0.25 .001
4 versus 8 weeks $ 0.84 $ 0.37 .005
1 versus 8 weeks $ 1.76 $ 0.52 .001

Constant and hyperbolic discountingConstant and hyperbolic discounting
Present-time versus future-time orientation.

Lump sum or annuity?Lump sum or annuity?
Choice between a lump sum or an annuity as a pension. An annuity includes a life
insurance and guarantees a monthly income up to death. Relevant aspects are:
 Present-time orientation.
 People overestimate what can be done with a lump sum, especially if they are
not accustomed to large amounts of money.
 People underestimate the real costs of an annuitized pension plan.
 People underestimate the value of life insurance.
Bütler & Teppa (2007): majority selects annuity; Swiss administrative data.
Brown (2007): aversion to annuities.
Cronqvist & Thaler (2004): design choice; portfolio actively chosen < default;
Swedish data.

ProcrastinationProcrastination
Procrastination: Starting too late with a task and running the risk of not completing the
task on time. For instance, studying for an exam, or starting too late with pension
saving. This is often an internal self-control issue.
What are the reasons of procrastination?
1. Task is unattractive.
2. Task is very important and needs careful attention.
3. Smaller tasks go first.
4. It is uncertain how much time the task will take.
5. Task is perceived in an abstract mindset. If the task is seen in a concrete mindset,
it is more clear what has to be done.

ProcrastinationProcrastination
Reasons for procrastination are:
1. Small and attractive tasks get priority.
2. Task aversiveness; unattractive task.
3. Task difficulty; task requires effort and mental resources.
4. Task importance; task should be done carefully.
5. Size of the task; many hours or many days to complete the task.
6. Task uncertainty; uncertain how long it will take to finish the task.
 Procrastination may lead to poor performance: stress, mistakes.
 Procrastination may lead to better performance (arousal).
 Procrastination improves mood in the short term.
 Delaying attractive tasks is a sign of self-control.
Recommendations: De-emphasize importance of the task.
Partition the task in a sequence of (small) parts/steps.
Facilitate starting the task (SMarT) (Zeigarnik effect).

PartitioningPartitioning
Dividing a ‘big’ task into smaller subtasks:
• Saving.
• Paying off loans.
• Stepwise procedures for entering a pension plan.
• Stepwise procedures for purchasing on the internet.
Saving or paying off € 3000 a year looks like an insurmountable task, but € 60 a
week is a manageable task.
Not taking a ‘latte’ of € 4,90 at Starbucks is an insignificant contribution to saving
€ 3000 a year, but is a realistic contribution to saving € 60 a week. 0,16%
versus 8,2%.

In economic theory, it is often assumed that people make decisions using one
comprehensive, wealth-based account.
Mental accounting/budgetting is the set of cognitive operations used by individuals to
organize, budget, evaluate and keep track of their expenses, in order not to overspend
(preventive goal), usually not about exact spending but about estimates of spending
(De Groot & Van Raaij 2016).
People may divide their monthly income into several ‘accounts’ (rent, school, groceries,
clothing, restaurants, etc.) to keep track of their expenses. An account constitutes of
the expenses in a specific category or domain.
1. Set a mental budget for each account.
2. If the budget has been spent, stop spending on this account in this period.
3. If the budget has been spent, postpone spending to the next period.
4. If the budget has been overspent, reduce spending in the next period.
5. If needed, adapt the budget for an account.
Mental AccountingMental Accounting

Types of biases/heuristicsTypes of biases/heuristics
Biases and heuristics in behavioral economics:
Mistakes, shortcomings: conjunction fallacy, planning fallacy, availability bias,
representativeness bias. Debiasing?
Subconscious effects: attraction effect, numerical priming, framing.
Default: opt-in versus opt-out, SMaRT.
Loss aversion: ‘free’ bias, endowment effect, SMarT, framing.
Self-control: co-holding debt-savings, procrastination, SMarT.
Time orientation: hyperbolic discounting, SMarT.
Which elements should be included in a new theory of behavioral economics?
 Gain versus loss.
 Promotion versus prevention.
 Present versus future.
 Concrete versus abstract mindset.
 Self-control.

ReferencesReferences
Dan Ariely. Predictably Irrational. London: HarperCollins, 2009 (revised and expanded edition).
Dan Ariely. The Upside of Irrationality. London: HarperCollins, 2010.
Daniel Kahneman. Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2011.
George F. Loewenstein. Frames of mind in intertemporal choice. Management Science, 34(2), 1988,
200-214.
Richard Thaler. The Winner’s Curse. Paradoxes and Anomalies of Economic Life. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1992.
Richard H. Thaler & Cass Sunstein. Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008.
Richard H. Thaler. Misbehaving. New York: W.W. Norton, 2015.
W. Fred van Raaij. Understanding Consumer Financial Behavior. Money Management in an Age of
Financial Illiteracy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.

Understanding Consumer FinancialUnderstanding Consumer Financial
BehaviorBehavior
Understanding Consumer Financial Behavior
in an Age of Financial Illiteracy
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.
ISBN: 978 11 37 54424 7.

‘‘Free’ biasFree’ bias
In an experiment by Shampanier, Mazar & Ariely (2007) two types of chocolate were
offered (Lindt truffels and Hershey kisses) for the following prices:
Lindt truffel , 15 ctLindt truffel , 15 ct 73%73%
Hershey kiss, 1 ctHershey kiss, 1 ct 27%27%
Lindt truffel, 14 ctLindt truffel, 14 ct 31%31%
Hershey kiss, freeHershey kiss, free 69%69%
‘Free’ has no downside. There is no trade-off between utility/preference and price.
There is no ‘loss’, no payment aversion. ‘Free’ is obviously always possible without
any risk or consequence. This is another example of preference reversal.
‘Third product free’ is more attractive than ’33% discount’.
Choosing between a free voucher of € 10 or a voucher of € 20 for the price of € 7,
most people choose the free voucher. Why?
People may not be sure to use the voucher in the future.

Endowment effectEndowment effect 11
Thaler (1980):
Removing a good from one’s endowment/possession (loss) is more painful than
that adding the same good (gain) to one’s endowment is pleasant.
Consequently, goods that are included in the endowment will be more highly
valued than those not in endowment.
WTA > WTP. The willingness to accept (WTA, compensation) to give up an item
in possession is higher than the willingness to pay (WTP) to obtain the same
item. Ratios vary from 2:1 to 6:1.
•WTA: minimum amount willing to accept a loss (sell).
•WTP: maximum amount willing to pay for a gain (buy).
Few transactions between sellers and buyers.

Knetsch (1989):
Product evaluation of three groups:
1.Received a coffee mug.
2.Received a chocolate bar.
3.Received nothing.
WTA > WTP.
Preference depends on current ownership.
Keep your belongings.
Low willingness to trade (10/11%).
Explanation of endowment effect:
1. Loss aversion; high WTA.
2. Owners/sellers a have different mindset
than buyers.
3. Evolutionary explanation: A loss has more
severe implications than a gain..
Group Preference (%)
1.
89 11
2. 10 90
3. No
product
56 44

Knetsch & Sinden (1984):
Lottery tickets more highly valued by owners than by non-owners.
Explanations: loss aversion, anticipated regret.
Endowment effect for goods (coffee mugs, chocolate bars), tokens (lottery tickets),
goods for resale?, services?, money?
Lottery tickets Yes No
WTP: buying for $ 2 50% 50%
WTA: selling for $ 2 24% 76%

Psychological distancePsychological distance
Construal-level theory (Trope & Liberman 2010): Psychological distance from a
personal reference point: proximal (now, here, self, fact) versus distant (future,
there, others, fiction).
Proximal has concrete and observable specific characteristics; direct experience.
Distant has abstract and general characteristics; must be inferred or imagined.

Psychological distancePsychological distance
Proximal
Concrete mindset
Observable
Less self-control
Distant
Abstract mindset
Unobservable
More self-control
Space Here There
Time Present (now) Past (then): memory.
Future (then): expectation,
prediction.
Social distance Self Other
Hypotheticality Fact Fiction: speculate about
about what might have
been.

Mindsets at three levelsMindsets at three levels
B. Planning mindset
Planning (tax) obligations.
Starting on time.
Keeping enough liquidity.
C. Abstract mindset
Values.
Personality.
Generalized characteristics.
A. Concrete mindset
Paying bills.
Downloading a file.
Filling out a form.
How?
How?
Why?
Why?
What?What?
Repetition of
behaviour
Repetition of
behaviour
Generalisation
of behaviour
Generalisation
of behaviour
abstract
concrete

Behavioral Finance and Self-control

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