The document is a proposal for a professional development program focused on emotional intelligence (EI) aimed at improving teamwork, communication, and overall performance within an organization. It outlines several components including motivation and reinforcement strategies, social skills enhancement, effective team attributes, and the development of reward systems, all grounded in EI principles. The proposal requires adherence to specific formatting and citation standards and is evaluated based on detailed grading criteria.

1. ASSIGNMENT 2
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAM PROPOSAL
Due Week 6: 240 points
As you continue your consulting role, the next task is to deliver
a
professional development program to the CEO of your chosen
organization.
It is important that your program’s proposal be based on your
research of
emotional intelligence (EI) and specifically detail how a new
incentive
program, based on an EI management approach, will:
▪ foster teamwork,
▪ strengthen interpersonal relationships,
▪ enhance communication,
▪ increase overall performance, and
▪ benefit not only managers but the bottom-line.

2. INSTRUCTIONS
Create a double-spaced 5 to 7 page proposal that includes the
following components:
1) EI and Motivation
• Which of the EI building blocks would impact management’s
ability to
enhance employee performance and job satisfaction?
• Based on your research on motivational theory, describe how
you
would utilize positive or negative reinforcement to influence the
members of the organization and resolve the issue. Provide
examples
to support your solution.
2) EI and Social Skills and Decision Making
• Explain how the core concepts of emotional intelligence would
enhance the social skills and the decision-making efficacy of
the
management team.
3) Effective Teams
• Describe the core attributes of an effective team and the

3. strategies
you would implement to develop team dynamics that will
benefit the
organization.
4) Reward Systems
• Create an effective reward system for this organization.
Determine
the strategies you would incorporate to motivate employees and
influence behavior.
5) References and Citations
• Provide at least 2 quality resources.
• In-text citations are required when paraphrasing or quoting
another
source.
6) Formatting and Writing Standards
• Formatting and writing standards are part of your grade. Align
your
formatting to the Strayer Writing Standards.
https://blackboard.strayer.edu/bbcswebdav/institution/STANDA
RDIZED/StrayerWritingStandards/Strayer_Writing_Standards.p

4. df
*Grading for this assignment will be based on the following
criteria and evaluation standards:
POINTS: 240 ASSIGNMENT 2: PROFESSIONAL
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM PROPOSAL
Criteria
Exemplary
100% - A
Proficient
85% - B
Fair
75% - C
Unacceptable
0% - F
1. EI and
Motivation
Weight: 20%
Fully describes how

5. motivation and
reinforcement would be
used to influence members
of the organization to
resolve the issue. Draws
compelling, logical
connections between theory
and solution. Examples are
strong and support solution.
Satisfactorily describes
how motivation and
reinforcement would be
used to influence members
of the organization to
resolve the issue. Makes
logical connections
between theory and
solution. Examples support

6. solution.
Partially describes how
motivation and
reinforcement would be
used to influence members
of the organization to
resolve the issue. Makes
loose connections between
theory and solution.
Examples do not fully
support solution.
The description does not
address how motivation
and reinforcement would
be used to influence
members of the
organization to resolve the
issue. Examples are not

7. provided.
2. EI and Social
Skills and
Decision Making
Weight: 20%
Fully describes how
motivation and
reinforcement would be
used to influence members
of the organization to
resolve the issue. Draws
compelling, logical
connections between theory
and solution. Examples are
strong and support solution.
Satisfactorily describes
how motivation and
reinforcement would be

8. used to influence
members of the
organization to resolve
the issue. Makes logical
connections between
theory and solution.
Examples support
solution.
Partially explains how core
concepts of emotional
intelligence would enhance
the social skills and the
decision-making efficacy of
the management team.
Loose connections are
made to support the
relationship between EI and
management’s skills.

9. Application of research is
minimal.
The description does not
explain how the core
concepts of emotional
intelligence would
enhance the social skills
and the decision-making
efficacy of the
management team.
3. Effective
Teams
Weight 25%
Completely describes the
core attributes of an
effective team. Strategies to
develop team dynamics are

10. strongly articulated and
detailed. Benefits to the
organization are logical and
well supported.
Satisfactorily describes
the core attributes of an
effective team.
Strategies to develop
team dynamics are
articulated. Benefits to
the organization are
stated. Additional details
and source support
would improve the
description.
Partially describes the core
attributes of an effective
team. Strategies to develop

11. team dynamics lack details
and source support or are
not fully articulated. Benefits
to the organization are
unclear.
Does not describe the core
attributes of an effective
team or strategies to
develop team dynamics.
Benefits to organization
are not presented.
4. Reward
Systems
Weight 20%
Creates an effective reward
system and articulates well-
thoughtout strategies to
motivate employees to

12. influence behavior. The
connection between strategy
and influence is strong and
supported by source
material.
Creates an effective
reward system and
provides motivational
strategies. Details and
source material support
how behavior would be
influenced.
Partially creates an effective
reward system and
articulates some
motivational strategies.
Supporting details are given
but could be expanded to

13. describe how behavior
would be influenced.
Application of research is
minimal.
Did not create an effective
reward system or
determine strategies to
motivate employees to
influence behavior.
5. Reference
minimums;
Reference quality
Weight 5%
Meets or exceeds number of
required references; all
references high quality
choices.
Meets number of

14. required references;
some references may be
poor quality choices.
Does not meet the required
number of references; some
references may be poor
quality choices.
No references provided or
all references poor quality
choices.
6. Follows writing
standards;
Meets page
minimums
Weight 10%
Followed all writing
standards.

15. Met page minimums.
Followed most writing
standards.
Met page minimums.
Followed few writing
standards.
May not have met page
minimums.
Followed few to no writing
standards.
Did not meet page
minimums.
1) EI and Motivation2) EI and Social Skills and Decision
Making3) Effective Teams4) Reward Systems5) References and
Citations6) Formatting and Writing Standards
Maximizing versus satisficing: Happiness is a matter of choice.
Authors:
Schwartz, Barry. Swarthmore Coll, Dept of Psychology,
Swarthmore, PA, US, [email protected]Ward, Andrew.
Swarthmore Coll, Dept of Psychology, Swarthmore, PA, US
Monterosso, John. U pennsylvania, Dept of Psychology, PA, US
Lyubomirsky, Sonja. U California, Dept of Psychology,

16. Riverside, CA, US
White, Katherine. U British Columbia, Dept of Psychology,
Vancouver, BC, Canada
Lehman, Darrin R.. U British Columbia, Dept of Psychology,
Vancouver, BC, Canada
Address:
Schwartz, Barry, Swarthmore Coll, Dept of Psychology, 500
College Avenue, Swarthmore, PA, US, 19081, [email protected]
Source:
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol 83(5), Nov,
2002. pp. 1178-1197.
NLM Title Abbreviation:
J Pers Soc Psychol
Publisher:
US : American Psychological Association
ISSN:
0022-3514 (Print)
1939-1315 (Electronic)
Language:
English
Keywords:
maximizers, individual differences, desire to maximize,
happiness, optimism, self-esteem, life satisfaction, depression,
perfectionism, regret, satisficers, personality measures
Abstract:
Can people feel worse off as the options they face increase? The
present studies suggest that some people--maximizers--can.
Study 1 reported a Maximization Scale, which measures
individual differences in desire to maximize. Seven samples
revealed negative correlations between maximization and
happiness, optimism, self-esteem, and life satisfaction, and
positive correlations between maximization and depression,
perfectionism, and regret. Study 2 found maximizers less
satisfied than nonmaximizers (satisficers) with consumer
decisions, and more likely to engage in social comparison.
Study 3 found maximizers more adversely affected by upward

17. social comparison. Study 4 found maximizers more sensitive to
regret and less satisfied in an ultimatum bargaining game. The
interaction between maximizing and choice is discussed in
terms of regret, adaptation, and self-blame. (PsycINFO
Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)
Document Type:
Journal Article
Subjects:
*Happiness; *Individual Differences; *Personality
Measures; *Personality Traits; *Satisfaction; Depression
(Emotion); Major Depression; Self-Esteem
Medical Subject Headings (MeSH):
Adaptation, Psychological; Choice Behavior; Decision Making;
Factor Analysis, Statistical; Female; Happiness; Humans; Male;
Middle Aged; Personal Satisfaction; Self Concept; Sex Factors;
Surveys and Questionnaires
PsycINFO Classification:
Personality Scales & Inventories (2223)
Personality Traits & Processes (3120)
Population:
Human
Male
Female
Location:
US
Methodology:
Empirical Study
Format Covered:
Print
Publication Type:
Journal; Peer Reviewed Journal
Publication History:
Accepted: May 2, 2002; Revised: May 1, 2002; First Submitted:
May 23, 2001
Release Date:
20060710

18. Copyright:
American Psychological Association. 2002
Digital Object Identifier:
http://dx.doi.org.library.capella.edu/10.1037/0022-
3514.83.5.1178
PMID:
12416921
PsycARTICLES Identifier:
psp-83-5-1178
Accession Number:
2002-18731-012
Number of Citations in Source:
96
Library Chat
Maximizing Versus Satisficing: Happiness Is a Matter of Choice
Contents
1. Can There Be Too Much Choice?
2. Maximizing, Satisficing, and Choice
3. Study 1. Maximizing, Satisficing, and Regret: Scale
Development
4. Method
5. Results
6. Discussion
7. Study 2. Maximizing, Satisficing, Social Comparison, and
Consumer Behavior
8. Method
9. Results
10. Discussion
11. Study 3. Maximizing, Satisficing, and Social Comparison
12. Method
13. Results
14. Discussion
15. Study 4. Maximizing, Satisficing, and Regret
16. Method

19. 17. Results and Discussion
18. General Discussion
19. Caveats and Questions
20. Footnotes
21. References
By: Barry SchwartzDepartment of Psychology, Swarthmore
College;
Andrew WardDepartment of Psychology, Swarthmore
CollegeJohn MonterossoDepartment of Psychology, University
of PennsylvaniaSonja LyubomirskyDepartment of Psychology,
University of California,RiversideKatherine WhiteDepartment
of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver,
British Columbia, CanadaDarrin R. LehmanDepartment of
Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British
Columbia, Canada
Acknowledgement: This research was facilitated by support
from the Positive Psychology Network (M. Seligman, Director),
an intramural grant from Swarthmore College to Barry
Schwartz, a sabbatical grant from the Solomon Asch Center for
Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict to Andrew Ward, an intramural
grant from the University of California to Sonja Lyubomirsky, a
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC)
doctoral fellowship to Katherine White, and grants from SSHRC
and the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council to
Darrin R. Lehman.
Rational choice theory has tried to explain preference and
choice by assuming that people are rational choosers (von
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). According to the rational
choice framework, human beings have well-ordered
preferences—preferences that are essentially impervious to
variations in the way the alternatives they face are described or
the way in which they are packaged or bundled. The idea is that
people go through life with all their options arrayed before
them, as if on a buffet table. They have complete information
about the costs and benefits associated with each option. They
compare the options with one another on a single scale of

20. preference, or value, or utility. And after making the
comparisons, people choose so as to maximize their preferences,
or values, or utilities.
Although the science of economics has historically depended on
the tenets of rational choice theory, it is now well established
that many of the psychological assumptions underlying rational
choice theory are unrealistic and that human beings routinely
violate the principles of rational choice (e.g., J. Baron, 2000;
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 1984; Tversky, 1969; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1981; for a discussion, see Schwartz, 1986, 1994).
In particular, modern behavioral economics has acknowledged
that the assumption of complete information that characterizes
rational choice theory is implausible. Rather than assuming that
people possess all the relevant information for making choices,
choice theorists treat information itself as a “commodity,”
something that has a price (in time or money), and is thus a
candidate for consumption along with more traditional goods
(e.g., Payne, 1982; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993).
Almost a half century ago, Simon (1955, 1956, 1957) suggested
an approach to explaining choice that was more cognizant of
human cognitive limitations than rational choice theory. Simon
argued that the presumed goal of maximization (or
optimization) is virtually always unrealizable in real life, owing
both to the complexity of the human environment and the
limitations of human information processing. He suggested that
in choice situations, people actually have the goal of
“satisficing” rather than maximizing. To satisfice, people need
only to be able to place goods on some scale in terms of the
degree of satisfaction they will afford, and to have a threshold
of acceptability. A satisficer simply encounters and evaluates
goods until one is encountered that exceeds the acceptability
threshold. That good is chosen. In subsequent, accidental
encounters with other goods in the relevant domain, the scale of
acceptability enables one to reject a formerly chosen good for a
higher ranked one should that one turn up. A satisficer thus
often moves in the direction of maximization without ever

21. having it as a deliberate goal. Simon's alternative to rational
choice theory questions not only the processes by which options
are assessed and choices made, but also the motives that
underlie choice. To satisfice is to pursue not the best option, but
a good enough option.
Can There Be Too Much Choice?
There is no question that greater choice can provide benefits for
the chooser. Indeed it is axiomatic in rational choice theory that
people cannot have too many options. If, for example, one is
trying to decide between two models of a CD player, and then
discovers that a third model also is available, the third model
may be just the thing one is after. If not, one can simply go
back to deliberating between the first two. And one can always
ignore the new, third option altogether. So it seems irrational to
perceive oneself as worse off as a result of added possibilities
for choice. Nonetheless, there is now a small body of evidence
suggesting that added options are a mixed blessing (e.g.,
Simenson & Tversky, 1992; Tversky & Shafir, 1992). Results
have begun to appear in the decision-making literature
indicating that adding options can make a choice situation less
rather than more attractive for people—that indeed, sometimes
people prefer it if others make the choices for them (Beattie,
Baron, Hershey, & Spranca, 1994).
In one series of studies (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; see also
Iyengar & Lepper, 1999), participants were more likely to
purchase exotic jams or gourmet chocolates when they had 6
options from which to choose than when they had 24 or 30,
respectively. And perhaps more importantly, those with fewer
options expressed greater satisfaction with the choices they
made. Similarly, university students were more likely to write
an extracredit essay, and wrote better essays, when they had 6
topics to choose from than when they had 30. Iyengar and
Lepper suggested several possible factors that may underlie this
effect. One is the avoidance of potential regret. The more
options there are, the more likely one will make a nonoptimal
choice, and this prospect may undermine whatever pleasure one

22. gets from one's actual choice. There is ample evidence that
regret aversion is a potent force in decision making—perhaps
even more potent than the loss aversion that has been a
significant feature of Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) prospect
theory of decision making (Beattie et al., 1994; Bell, 1982,
1985; Larrick & Boles, 1995; Loomes & Sugden, 1982; Ritov,
1996; Simenson, 1992; Zeelenberg, 1999; Zeelenberg & Beattie,
1997; Zeelenberg, Beattie, van der Pligt, & de Vries, 1996;
Zeelenberg et al., 1998).
A second factor that may make increased choice unattractive is
that it creates a seemingly intractable information problem. It is
hard enough to gather information and go through the
deliberations needed to make the best choice among 6 options.
To choose the best among 30 options is truly daunting. So
rather than even try, people may disengage, choosing almost
arbitrarily to complete the process. As a result of this
disengagement, many of the psychological processes that
normally are recruited to enhance the attractiveness of the
choices one makes may not be operative (see Gilovich &
Medvec, 1995, for an account of some of these processes, in the
context of their theory of regret).
Maximizing, Satisficing, and Choice
Schwartz (2000) recently argued that the proliferation of
options can have a variety of negative effects on well-being. He
suggested that as options are added within a domain of choice,
three problems materialize. First, there is the problem of
gaining adequate information about the options to make a
choice. Second, there is the problem that as options expand,
people's standards for what is an acceptable outcome rise. And
third, there is the problem that as options expand, people may
come to believe that any unacceptable result is their fault,
because with so many options, they should be able to find a
satisfactory one. Similar problems arise as choice becomes
available in domains in which previously there was no choice.
No matter how dissatisfied one is with one's telephone service,
if phone service is provided by a regulated monopoly, one

23. cannot do better, and inadequate service is not one's fault.
However, when choice of phone service becomes available,
there is no longer any reason to tolerate inadequate service, and
failure to obtain adequate service is one's responsibility.
Schwartz (2000) suggested that people might in general be
better off with constrained and limited choice than with
unconstrained choice.
However, expanded opportunities for choice need not have these
negative psychological effects. Consider the different effects
that an expanding array of options might have on two people,
one of whom aims to maximize his or her outcomes in that
domain and one of whom aims to satisfice. For the maximizer,
added options pose problems. One cannot be sure that one is
making the maximizing choice without examining all the
alternatives. And if it is impossible or impractical to examine
all the alternatives, then when the maximizer gives up the
search and chooses, there will be a lingering doubt that he or
she could have done better by searching a bit more. Thus, as
options proliferate, the likelihood of achieving the goal of
maximization goes down. Further, the potential for regret is
ever present, because the question the maximizer is asking him-
or herself is not “is this a good outcome?” but “is this the best
outcome?”.
Expanded opportunities for choice may have different effects on
the satisficer. The satisficer is looking for something that
crosses the threshold of acceptability—something that is good
enough. Adding options in a domain in which the satisficer has
already encountered something good enough need have no
effect; the new options may simply be ignored. With “good
enough” rather than the “best” as a criterion, the satisficer will
be less inclined to experience regret if it turns out that an option
better than the chosen one was available. And if no satisfactory
option has been encountered in a domain, added options will
provide new possibilities for finding something that crosses the
“good enough” threshold. Thus, the risk of being made worse
off by added options may be minimal for satisficers.

24. Are some people maximizers and others satisficers? Do people
differ in the nature of the goals they pursue in choice
situations? And if so, do people also differ in their sensitivity to
potential regret? Is it concern about potential regret that
influences some people to be maximizers? We addressed these
questions in the present series of studies by creating survey
instruments designed to distinguish maximizers from satisficers
and to measure sensitivity to regret. And if people do differ in
these respects, does it make a difference? We addressed this
question in the present studies in several ways. Study 1
examined the relations between one's scores on a Maximization
Scale and a Regret Scale and scores on measures of happiness,
life satisfaction, optimism, depression, neuroticism, and
perfectionism. In subsequent studies we attempted to validate
some of these putative relations and to identify possible
mediators. Study 2, guided by the notion that maximizers might
seek more information than satisficers when making decisions,
used a questionnaire to examine relations between maximization
and the amount of social comparison that goes into making
purchasing decisions, as well as the satisfaction people derive
from those decisions. Study 3, inspired by findings reported by
Lyubomirsky and Ross (1997) that unhappy people are more
affected by upward social comparison than happy people,
further explored the relation between maximizing and social
comparison processes by examining whether maximizers and
satisficers respond differentially to social comparison
manipulations. Finally, Study 4 examined the possible causal
role of regret in mediating between maximizing and
dissatisfaction by exposing participants to a computer game
designed to manipulate the potential for regret. We anticipated
that maximizers would be more sensitive to regret than
satisficers, and would derive less satisfaction from their results
in games in which the opportunity for regret was salient.
Study 1. Maximizing, Satisficing, and Regret: Scale
Development
This study involved the creation and evaluation of two new

25. measuring instruments—one designed to assess the tendency to
satisfice or maximize and one designed to assess the tendency
to experience regret. Materials were administered to seven
samples of participants, four of them university students and
three of them community adults. In total, 1,747 participants
completed the maximizing and regret questionnaires.
Method
Overview
Packets of questionnaires were administered to seven samples
(total N = 1,747). Participants completed the questionnaires
either in small groups of 3 to 7 (Samples 1 and 3), during one
large, group session (Samples 2, 4, 5, and 7), or individually
(Sample 6). Completing the questionnaires required less than 45
min (in the case of Sample 6, less than 15 min). For each
administration, the content of the questionnaires varied, as
described below.
Participants
Each of the first four samples comprised students in
introductory psychology courses, who received course credit for
their participation. The first two samples (n = 82 and n = 72)
were recruited at Swarthmore College, the third sample (n =
100) at the University of California, Riverside, and the fourth
sample (n = 401) at the University of British Columbia,
Vancouver, Canada. The fifth sample (n = 752) consisted of
participants at a 1-day seminar for allied health care
professionals (mean age = 47 years), the majority of whom were
nurses. The sixth sample (n = 220) was composed of individuals
recruited at a large train station in an urban setting (mean age =
41 years), and the seventh (n = 120) comprised individuals in an
urban courthouse approached while waiting to be informed if
they would serve on a jury (mean age = 40 years). There were
approximately equal numbers of males and females in the first
three samples, along with the sixth sample (i.e., individuals at
the train station), but the fourth sample (i.e., students at the
University of British Columbia) included 258 females and 141
males (2 participants failed to identify their gender), the fifth

26. sample (i.e., health care providers) included 684 females and 60
males (8 participants failed to identify their gender), and the
final sample (members of a jury pool) included 87 females, 28
males, and 5 individuals who failed to identify their gender. The
third, fourth, and seventh samples also were quite diverse
ethnically. The third sample was 39% Asian, 24% Caucasian,
10% Chicano(a)/Latino(a), 8% African American, and 10%
other, and the fourth sample (classified using slightly different
categories) was 51% of East Asian descent (e.g., Chinese,
Taiwanese), 25% of Western European descent (e.g., British,
French), 9% of East Indian descent (e.g., Indian, Pakistani), and
15% other. The seventh sample was 48% Caucasian, 45%
African American, and 7% other.
Materials
Sample 1
Our aim with the first sample was to create maximization and
regret scales and to investigate correlations between responses
to those scales and well-established measures of well-being.
Participants completed a preliminary 42-item questionnaire
designed to measure maximization (33 items) and regret (9
items). Participants responded to each item using a 7-point,
Likert-type scale (1 = completely disagree, 7 = completely
agree). In addition, they completed a four-item Subjective
Happiness Scale (SHS) designed to assess dispositional
happiness (Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999), a depression survey
(the 13-item short form of the Beck Depression Inventory [BDI-
SF; Beck & Beck, 1972]), and a measure of dispositional
optimism (the Life Orientation Test [LOT; Scheier & Carver,
1985]).
On the basis of item reliability and face validity, the measure
was reduced to 22 items, 17 assessing maximization and 5
assessing regret. These 22 items were then presented to 11
judges (advanced undergraduate students majoring either in
psychology or economics) who were unaware of either the
purpose of our studies or the specific hypotheses under
investigation. The judges were asked to examine each item and

27. indicate whether, on the one hand, it probed an individual's
inclination to “get the best out of any situation” or “settle for
good enough,” or, on the other hand, it probed a person's
sensitivity to “the possibility that he or she might regret a
decision once made.” Of the 5 “regret” items, 4 were judged by
10 of our 11 informants to be about regret and the 5th was
judged by 9 informants to be about regret. Of the 17
“maximization” items, 10 were judged by 10 of 11 informants to
be about maximization, 3 were so judged by 9 informants, and 4
were so judged by 7 informants. Thus, we were reasonably
confident that our measures had face validity—that our
understanding of what the questions were asking would be
matched by that of the participants. We then submitted the 5
regret items and 17 maximization items to a principal-
components factor analysis (PCA), which is reported below.
Sample 2
Participants in the second sample received these 22 items,
unidentified and intermixed. In an independent test of the
putative associations investigated in Sample 1, they were also
asked to complete the SHS and the BDI-SF.
Sample 3
Participants in the third sample completed the same 22-item
questionnaire assessing maximization and regret, along with the
SHS, BDI-SF, and LOT. In addition, they completed a
questionnaire probing life satisfaction (the Satisfaction With
Life Scale [Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985]) and a
scale assessing dispositional Neuroticism (John, Donahue, &
Kentle, 1991), a Big Five trait that we thought might be
correlated with maximization.
Sample 4
The fourth sample of participants completed the 22-item
questionnaire along with the SHS. In addition, these
participants were asked a series of questions regarding
tendencies to engage in social comparison and patterns of
purchasing behavior. These materials comprise the substance of
Study 2 and thus discussion of them appears later in the article.

28. Sample 5
The fifth sample completed the same 22-item questionnaire in
addition to the aforementioned measures of happiness and
depression (i.e., the SHS and BDI).
Sample 6
The sixth sample also completed the 22-item questionnaire and
the SHS, along with a 15-item perfectionism subscale composed
of the Self-Oriented Perfectionism items of the
Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (Hewitt & Flett, 1990,
1991). The addition of this scale was intended to investigate
participants' tendencies to hold exceedingly high standards for
themselves in a variety of domains. The scale included items
such as, “One of my goals is to be perfect in everything I do,”
and “I demand nothing less than perfection of myself” (1 =
disagree, 7 = agree). In addition, a subset of participants (n =
146) completed the 10-item measure of self-esteem developed
by Rosenberg (1965).
Sample 7
The only measures relevant to this article that were completed
by members of the prospective jury pool were the 22-item
maximization/regret survey and the same 10-item measure of
self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965).
Results
Factor Analysis
We conducted a PCA on the combined samples (n = 1,747) to
determine the factor structure of the regret and maximizing
items. We sought the solution that best approximated a simple
structure—that is, the one in which most of the items loaded on
at least one factor, and each item loaded on only one factor.
What emerged, on the basis of a varimax rotation, was a six-
factor solution. However, two of the factors contained only two
items each, and one item failed to load on any of the factors. In
addition, the item-total correlations for all but one of these five
items were quite low. We thus eliminated the four items with
low item-total correlations, resulting in a 13-item Maximization
Scale and a five-item Regret Scale. We conducted another PCA

29. on these 18 items. The resulting four-factor solution is
presented in Table 1. The first factor, on which all five regret
items loaded, references “regret,” and makes up the Regret
Scale. The other factors are subcategories of
maximizing/satisficing and make up the Maximization Scale.
The second and third factors are largely behavioral examples of
maximizing. The second factor includes being open to better
jobs, songs on the radio, television shows, and relationships,
liking lists that rank things, and fantasizing about alternatives
to reality (which also loaded on the “regret” factor, though its
loading was lower than that of the other “regret” items; in
addition, this item was judged by 9 of our 11 informants to be
more about maximizing and satisficing than about regret). The
third factor, which concerns primarily shopping behaviors,
includes shopping for a friend, renting videos, and shopping for
clothing. Writing several drafts of letters so as to word things
just right also loads on this factor. The fourth factor represents
having high standards, both for oneself and for things in
general. One of the items that loaded on this factor also loaded
on the “regret” factor. Its loading on the “regret” factor was
substantially lower than all the other regret items, and also
lower than its loading on this “maximizing” factor. Moreover,
this item was judged by 10 of our 11 informants to be about
maximizing. All further analyses, in this and subsequent
studies, used responses to the modified, 13-item Maximization
Scale rather than the 17-item scale participants actually saw.
The correlation (across all participants) between scores on the
13- and the 17-item scales was.99 (p <.001). Cronbach's alpha
was.71 for the Maximization Scale and.67 for the Regret Scale.
Factor Analysis of the Regret and Maximization Scales Using
PCA With Varimax Rotation
Correlations With Standard Personality Measures
Sample 1
Table 2 presents the Pearson's zero-order correlations between
the variables investigated in Study 1. As can be seen in the

30. table, a tendency for participants to be maximizers rather than
satisficers (α =.70) was significantly correlated with a tendency
to experience more regret and depression, as well as to be less
optimistic, and less happy (p <.06). By way of further
illustration, of the 18 people who scored 8 or above on the BDI-
SF, qualifying for a diagnosis of at least mild depressive
symptoms (Beck & Beck, 1972), 8 (44%; Mean BDI score =
13.25) also scored in the top quartile for maximization, whereas
only 1 (6%; BDI score = 8) scored in the bottom quartile. By
contrast, of the 19 people scoring in the top quartile for
happiness, 8 (42%; Mean SHS score = 16.88) were in the
bottom quartile for maximization, whereas only 3 (16%; Mean
SHS score = 16.33) were in the top quartile.
Pearson's Zero-Order Correlations Among Variables in Six
Samples
Sample 2
Table 2 also presents the correlations between the 13-item
maximization composite (α =.60) and the five-item regret
composite (α =.78) for Sample 2, along with the BDI-SF and the
SHS—the only other measures administered to this sample.
Once again, we observed strong associations between
maximization and a tendency to experience regret and
depression, and lower levels of happiness.
Sample 3
Our third sample provided a further opportunity to investigate
relations between maximization and various personality
constructs. Table 2 presents the intercorrelations between the
maximization composite (α =.70), the regret composite (α =.70),
and measures of optimism, happiness, depression, neuroticism,
and satisfaction with life. Correlations between maximizing and
the constructs of regret, depression, and satisfaction with life
were significant beyond the p <.01 range. In addition,
maximizing was negatively correlated with optimism (p <.05)
and happiness (p <.10). However, the relation between
maximizing and neuroticism was not significant (p >.10). In

31. sum, in addition to replicating the results found with Sample 1,
this sample provided evidence for a strong relation between
maximization and diminished life satisfaction, as well as a
nonsignificant relation with neuroticism.
Sample 4
Table 2 presents data from our fourth sample on the relations
between the maximization composite (α =.63), the regret
composite (α =.73), and the SHS. Once again, the correlation
between maximizing and regret was significant, although the
relation between maximizing and happiness was modest (r =.10,
p <.05).
Sample 5
The fifth section of Table 2 displays the correlations between
maximizing (α =.70), regret (α =.74), happiness, and depression
for the sample of health care providers who completed the
relevant measures. As seen with the previous samples, a
tendency to score highly on the Maximization Scale was
predictive of greater regret and depression, as well as lower
levels of self-reported happiness.
Sample 6
The sixth section of Table 2 presents correlations for
participants approached at the urban train station. Once again,
maximizing (α =.72) was positively correlated with regret (α
=.67), and negatively correlated with happiness. In addition,
maximizing was significantly correlated with perfectionism (r
=.25, p <.001). And for the subsample who completed the
relevant measure, maximizing and self-esteem were negatively
correlated (r = −.30, p <.001). Interestingly, however, whereas
maximizing and perfectionism were significantly correlated,
neither happiness (r =.12, p <.08) nor self-esteem (r =.02, ns)
correlated significantly with perfectionism. Indeed, if anything,
the relation between perfectionism and happiness was positive
rather than negative.
Sample 7
The final sample, taken from prospective jury members,
replicated the significant association between maximizing (α

32. =.73) and self-esteem exhibited by the subsample in Sample 6,
(r = −.26, p <.01).
Across the seven samples, maximization scores ranged from
1.15 to 6.62, with a mean of 3.88 and a median of 3.85. Also,
across all samples, the correlation between maximizing and
regret was.52 (p <.001), and in the samples in which it was
assessed, happiness and maximizing were significantly
correlated (r = −.25, p <.001)—as were maximizing and
depression (r =.34, p <.001).
Gender Differences
No gender differences were found in Samples 1–3 or 5 in
participants' scores on the Maximization Scale, the Regret
Scale, or in the association between maximizing and measures
of well-being and regret. In Samples 4, 6, and 7, a significant
gender difference emerged—that is, males were more likely
than females to be maximizers in all three of these samples:
Sample 4 (Ms = 4.46 vs. 4.27), t(395) = 2.41, p <.02; Sample 6
(Ms = 4.08 vs. 3.79), t(209) = 2.26, p <.05; and Sample 7 (Ms =
4.33 vs. 3.91), t(107) = 2.03, p <.05.
Partial Mediation by Regret
Because questionnaires from Samples 1–3 and 5 included a
common measure of depression and Samples 1–6 included a
common measure of happiness as well as our maximization and
regret scales, we were able to investigate a putative mechanism
underlying the observed effects, namely, that the relations
observed between maximization and both depression and
happiness were mediated by a tendency to experience regret.
According to R. M. Baron and Kenny (1986; see also Martin,
Tesser, & McIntosh, 1993), four criteria must be met to
establish mediation: (1) the predictor variable (i.e.,
maximization) must be related to the criterion variable (e.g.,
depression); (2) the mediator (i.e., regret) must be related to the
predictor; (3) the mediator must be related to the criterion
(controlling for the influence of the predictor); and (4) the
relation between the predictor and the criterion must be
eliminated or significantly reduced when the criterion is

33. regressed simultaneously on the predictor and the mediator.
Turning first to depression, across the four samples, we
observed a significant relation between maximization and scores
on the BDI (r =.34, p <.001), meeting the first of the
aforementioned criteria. In addition, regret and maximization
were strongly correlated (r =.52, p <.001), meeting Criterion 2,
and the relation between regret and depression (r =.39)
remained significant in a regression equation that controlled for
the influence of maximization, F(2, 983) = 105.45, p <.001,
regret β =.29; maximizing β =.19 (meeting Criterion 3). Finally,
as this last multiple regression equation (which regressed
depression simultaneously on regret and maximization) makes
clear, although the relation between maximization and
depression remained significant after controlling for regret,
consistent with the dictates of Criterion 4, the relation was
significantly weaker than it had been in the absence of regret
(i.e., a change in beta from.34 to.19), an effect confirmed by a
test based on Sobel's (1982) method for determining the
existence of a mediational relation (z = 7.87, p <.001; see also
MacKinnon & Dwyer, 1993; Preacher & Leonardelli, 2001).
Similar analyses confirmed a mediational role played by regret
in the relation between maximization and happiness, which were
significantly negatively correlated across the six samples (r =
−.25, p <.001). In brief, when regret, which was also negatively
correlated with happiness (r = −.37), was entered into a
regression equation along with maximization as predictors of
happiness, the aforementioned relation between maximization
and happiness was significantly reduced (i.e., a change in beta
from −.25 to −.08), as confirmed by a Sobel test of mediation (z
= 10.91, p <.001). In sum, regret appeared to play a partial
mediational role between maximization and depression and
between maximization and happiness. However, because of high
correlations between regret and other constructs investigated in
one or more samples—constructs such as depression, happiness,
and subjective well-being—any mediational role ascribed to
regret should be viewed with caution. And, of course, regret

34. was not manipulated in any of these samples, permitting no
causal conclusions to be drawn.
Discussion
Study 1 provided evidence for individual differences in what
people aspire to when they make decisions in various domains
of their lives. Maximizers desire the best possible result;
satisficers desire a result that is good enough to meet some
criterion. When we correlated scores on our Maximization Scale
with well-established measures of well-being, we found that
maximizers reported significantly less life satisfaction,
happiness, optimism, and self-esteem, and significantly more
regret and depression, than did satisficers. Though Study 1 tells
us nothing about the direction of causality, it is possible that
whereas a maximizing decision strategy might, as a matter of
logic, yield better objective outcomes than a satisficing
strategy, it is likely to yield worse subjective outcomes. Study 1
also revealed that although maximizing was significantly
correlated with perfectionism (Sample 6), the correlations of
each of these measures with happiness and self-esteem in the
study were quite different (happiness was negatively correlated
with maximizing and positively correlated with perfectionism;
self-esteem was negatively correlated with maximizing and
uncorrelated with perfectionism), suggesting that maximizing
and perfectionism are distinct.
Study 1 also tells us nothing about the stability over time of
scores on the Maximization Scale. If a maximizing orientation
is something like a trait, we would expect response patterns to
be stable over time. Although a good deal more research is
needed, Gillham, Ward, and Schwartz (2001) have collected
repeated measures from 102 undergraduates, who were given the
Maximization Scale four times over a period of 9 months.
Scores at Time 1 correlated with scores at Time 2 (r =.81), with
scores at Time 3 (r =.82), and with scores at Time 4 (r =.73).
Though larger samples and longer interevaluation intervals are
essential before any firm conclusions can be drawn, these
results suggest that a maximizing orientation enjoys some

35. degree of stability.
How is a maximizer to judge whether a given outcome is the
best possible outcome? In many cases, there is not a finite and
transparent set of possibilities to allow for complete and
unambiguous judgment. For example, what does it mean to have
the best possible salary, meal at a restaurant, wardrobe, or even
the best possible spouse? Although imagination could provide a
standard, a more probable basis for the maximizer's assessment
in these domains is social comparison (perhaps only with those
seen as belonging to an appropriate comparison group). What
does it mean to have ordered the best possible meal at a
restaurant other than that it is better than anyone else's meal?
Thus, whereas “good enough” usually can be judged in absolute
terms, “the best possible” may often require social comparison.
Being a maximizer may require one to be concerned with one's
relative position.
Festinger (1954) and Frank (1985, 1999; see also Hirsch, 1976)
have argued persuasively that people do seem to be guided
largely by how they are doing relative to relevant others, and
several studies that compared the effects of absolute and
relative position on satisfaction have observed that good
relative position produces greater satisfaction than good
absolute position (Bazerman, Loewenstein, & White, 1992;
Bazerman, Moore, Tenbrunsel, Wade-Benzoni, & Blount, 1999;
Blount & Bazerman, 1996; Hsee, Blount, Loewenstein, &
Bazerman, 1999; Solnick & Hemenway, 1998). Poor relative
position, however, appears to affect some people more than
others. For example, Lyubomirsky and Ross (1997) reported
that unhappy people are more affected by upward social
comparison than happy people. More specifically, in their first
study, Lyubomirsky and Ross found that whereas both happy
and unhappy people derived satisfaction from information that
their performance was better than that of a peer, only unhappy
people seemed to suffer from information that their performance
was worse than that of a peer.
Especially relevant are the findings from Study 2 of the

36. Lyubomirsky and Ross (1997) article. In that study, happy and
unhappy students received positive or negative feedback from
the experimenter on a novel teaching task, and then witnessed a
same-sex peer receive even more positive or even more negative
feedback than themselves. The most striking finding from this
study was that unhappy students reported feeling happier and
more self-confident when they had received a poor evaluation
on their performance (2 out of 7), but heard their peer receive
an even worse one (1 out of 7), than when they had received an
excellent evaluation (6 out of 7), but heard their peer receive an
even better one (7 out of 7). Happy students, by contrast, did
not show this pattern of “sensitive” responding to comparisons
with peers. These findings lend some credibility to our
hypothesis that maximizers may be more concerned with
relative position, and thus with social comparison, than
satisficers, especially in light of the findings from Study 1 that
maximizers are generally less happy than satisficers.
Studies 2 and 3 were designed to explore directly the relative
importance of social comparison to maximizers and satisficers.
Study 2 inquired about social comparison in the context of
purchasing decisions. Study 3 replicated Lyubomirsky and
Ross's (1997) first study with groups of participants identified
as maximizers or satisficers.
Study 2. Maximizing, Satisficing, Social Comparison, and
Consumer Behavior
Because many of the choices that people make in their daily
lives concern the purchase and consumption of goods, Study 2
explored maximizing and satisficing with respect to consumer
purchasing decisions. As indicated in the introduction, a
proliferation of options can pose significant problems for a
maximizer. One cannot be sure that one is making the best
choice without examining all the alternatives. And if
examination of all the alternatives is not feasible, then when the
maximizer finally chooses, there may be a lingering doubt that
he or she could have done better with more searching. Thus, as
options increase, the likelihood of successful maximization goes

37. down. Further, the potential for regret is ever present because
the maximizer is asking “is this the best outcome?” and “could I
have done better?” And in attempting to answer these questions,
given the time and information-processing constraints that
everyone faces, maximizers may be inclined to rely on
information about how others are doing as a way of assessing
whether their chosen outcomes were indeed the best. Thus, in
Study 2, we were particularly interested in the relation between
maximizing tendencies and social comparison, regret, and
happiness with consumer purchasing decisions. We anticipated
that maximizing would predict reports of engaging in more
social comparison and experiencing greater regret in general. In
addition, we expected that maximizing would predict reports of
more product comparison, social comparison, and counterfactual
thinking regarding purchases, and that these consumer
comparisons would lead to heightened consumer regret and
decreased happiness regarding purchases.
Method
Participants, Materials, and Procedure
Participants were the 401 undergraduates described earlier as
Sample 4 in Study 1. The materials comprised a questionnaire
that included the Maximization Scale, the Regret Scale, and the
SHS from Study 1. In addition, we created a scale to measure
frequency of social comparison in general, beliefs about the
appropriateness of upward social comparison, and beliefs about
the appropriateness of downward social comparison. In a pretest
of this scale (n = 76), the subscales measuring frequency of
social comparison (α =.69), upward social comparison (α =.74),
and downward social comparison (α =.70) demonstrated
adequate reliability. In addition, this pretest demonstrated that
the frequency of social comparison subscale correlated with a
validated measure of social comparison tendencies (r =.50, p
<.001; Gibbons & Buunk, 1999).
Consumer behavior items were created regarding people's
general tendencies toward consumer-related social comparison,
product comparison, counterfactual thinking, and consumer

38. regret. After completing these items, participants were asked to
recall either an expensive or an inexpensive recent purchase.
Participants in the inexpensive condition were asked to “recall
the most recent item you have purchased that was relatively
inexpensive, say around $5.00. For example, the item might be a
movie rental, a book, or a magazine.” Those in the expensive
condition were asked to “recall the most recent item you have
purchased that was relatively expensive, say around $500.00.
For example, the item might be sporting equipment, electronic
equipment, etc.”
All participants then answered specific consumer behavior
questions regarding their purchase, such as product price,
product comparison, time to decide on the product, prepurchase
and postpurchase social comparison, counterfactual thinking,
happiness with the product, and regret regarding the recalled
purchase. The order of presentation of the Maximizing and
Regret Scales and the consumer behavior items was
counterbalanced. Because counterbalancing did not predict
significant variance in any of the dependent variables, the
results are collapsed across this variable. Participants completed
the questionnaire packet in class, and were debriefed at the end
of the study.
Results
Construction of Indexes
Composites of social comparison frequency (α =.68), downward
social comparison (α =.68), and upward social comparison (α
=.71) were created. Composites also were constructed for
general product comparison (α =.72), general social comparison
(α =.72), and general consumer regret (α =.82). Finally, an
index of consumer maximizing tendencies for a specific
purchase was created by combining the measures of product
comparison, time to decide, prepurchase social comparison,
postpurchase social comparison, and counterfactual thinking (α
=.81).
Happiness, Regret, and Social Comparison Tendencies
As reported in Study 1, maximizing was associated with being

39. less happy (though this relation was modest) and experiencing
more regret. We anticipated that maximizing also would predict
reports of engaging in social comparison. A linear regression
analysis with maximizing as the predictor on the overall index
of social comparison frequency supported this prediction, F(1,
393) = 39.07, p <.001, β =.30. Regression analyses on the
upward and downward social comparison indexes indicated that
maximizing was also predictive of interest in upward, F(1, 397)
= 8.99, p <.01, β =.15, and downward, F(1, 397) = 21.14, p
<.001, β =.23, social comparisons. In addition, maximizing
predicted reports of engaging in upward, F(1, 394) = 33.63, p
<.001, β =.28, and downward, F(1, 395) = 15.09, p <.001, β
=.19, social comparisons more frequently.
Regression analyses indicated that both frequency of downward
social comparison (when statistically controlling for frequency
of upward social comparison), F(2, 392) = 15.23, p <.001, β
=.18, and frequency of upward social comparison (when
statistically controlling for frequency of downward social
comparison), F(2, 392) = 42.19, p <.001, β =.31, were
predictive of reports of regret. In addition, although frequency
of downward social comparison (when statistically controlling
for frequency of upward social comparison) was not predictive
of subjective happiness, F(2, 392) = 0.47, ns, β =.04, upward
social comparison frequency (controlling for downward social
comparison) was, F(2, 392) = 10.09, p <.01, β = −.16.
Of interest, maximizers seemed to be oriented toward both
upward and downward social comparisons. Past research and
theorizing suggest that upward comparisons may trigger
negative affective states, lead to low ratings of subjective well-
being, and result in negative consequences for the self (e.g.,
Diener, 1984; Morse & Gergen, 1970; Salovey & Rodin, 1984),
whereas downward comparisons often have the opposite effect,
allowing the individual to feel better in comparison to a worse
off other (e.g., Morse & Gergen, 1970; Wills, 1981). The puzzle
here is that although maximizing was predictive of engaging in
more downward social comparison, it was also predictive of

40. regret. Is it the case that maximizers are susceptible to the
negative consequences of upward social comparison, but unable
to reap the benefits of downward social comparison? This is not
implausible in light of suggestive evidence that social
comparison in general is not compatible with happiness
(Lyubomirsky & Ross, 1997; Lyubomirsky, Tucker, & Kasri,
2001).
To address this possibility, we examined whether upward social
comparison and downward social comparison were related to
regret among those high in maximization. We performed a
median split on the maximizing scale, and examined the relation
between regret and social comparison among those scoring high
on the maximizing scale. The results revealed that, among those
high on maximizing, frequency of upward social comparison
(controlling for downward social comparison) was predictive of
regret, F(2, 197) = 7.08, p <.01, β =.19, whereas frequency of
downward social comparison (controlling for upward social
comparison) was not, F(2, 197) = 2.50, p <.12, β =.11. We also
found that, among those high on maximizing, frequency of
upward social comparison (controlling for downward social
comparison) was predictive of decreased happiness, F(2, 198) =
6.57, p <.02, β = −.18, whereas frequency of downward social
comparison (controlling for upward social comparison) was not
positively related to happiness, F(2, 198) =.25, ns, β =.04. This
provides some support for the notion that whereas maximizers
tend to experience the negative consequences of upward social
comparisons, they are unable to benefit from downward social
comparisons.
General Consumer Behaviors
Linear regression analyses on the general consumer behavior
items revealed that maximizing predicted the tendency to
engage in product comparison, F(1, 397) = 42.49, p <.001, β
=.31, social comparison, F(1, 396) = 12.27, p <.01, β =.17, and
counterfactual thinking, F(1, 397) = 29.40, p <.001, β =.26,
regarding purchases. Further, maximizing was predictive of
reports of consumer regret, F(1, 397) = 19.16, p <.001, β =.22.

41. Consumer Behaviors for Recalled Purchases
Participants were asked to report on either an inexpensive or an
expensive purchase. The average amount spent on inexpensive
purchases was $6.57, and maximizing was not predictive of the
amount spent on inexpensive purchases (F < 1, ns). The
majority of inexpensive purchases were magazines (22.4%),
movie rentals (22.0%), food (15.1%), and books (10.7%). Other
inexpensive purchases included such things as cosmetics, school
supplies, and CDs. The average amount spent on expensive
purchases was $538.00, and, once again, maximizing was not
predictive of the amount spent (F < 1, ns). The majority of
expensive purchases were stereo equipment (16.8%), computers
(15.8%), and clothing (15.3%). Other expensive items included
sporting equipment and other electronic items (e.g., TVs, cell
phones).
Regression analyses indicated that, when recalling a specific
purchase, maximizing predicted the consideration of more
products, F(1, 389) = 5.23, p <.01, β =.12, and taking longer to
decide, F(1, 390) = 13.13, p <.001, β =.18. Maximizing
predicted reports of engaging in social comparison both before,
F(1, 390) = 4.51, p <.04, β =.11, and after, F(1, 390) = 5.52, p
<.02, β =.12, making purchases. Furthermore, maximizing was
associated with engaging in more counterfactual thinking
regarding purchases, F(1, 390) = 34.12, p <.001, β =.28.
Finally, maximizing was predictive of reports of diminished
positive feelings toward purchases (i.e., an index of happiness
and regret, with regret reverse scored), F(1, 389) = 9.68, p <.01,
β = −.16. Thus, it appears that maximizers not only report
engaging in more comparisons (i.e., product comparisons, social
comparisons, and counterfactual comparisons) regarding their
consumer decisions, they also report experiencing heightened
regret and decreased happiness.
Given the relation between maximizing and happiness observed
in these studies, it is possible that findings that we have
attributed to individual differences in maximizing may really be
due to differences in dispositional happiness, a plausible

42. hypothesis given Lyubomirsky and Ross's (1997) finding that
unhappy people are more affected by upward social comparison
information than happy people. To examine this possibility, we
conducted partial correlation analyses between maximizing and
regret, frequency of social comparison, maximizing tendencies
(i.e., an index of time to decide on the purchase, product
comparison, prepurchase social comparison, postpurchase social
comparison, and counterfactual thinking), and consumer
feelings (i.e., an index of consumer happiness and regret),
controlling for dispositional happiness. The partial correlations
between maximizing and regret (r =.39, p <.001), frequency of
social comparison (r =.27, p <.001), maximizing tendencies (r
=.19, p <.001), and consumer feelings (r = −.13, p <.02) all
remained significant when levels of happiness were statistically
controlled. Thus, it appears that maximizing makes a
contribution to regret, to social comparison, to consumer
behaviors, and to consumer satisfaction over and above that of
dispositional happiness.
Discussion
As anticipated, maximizing was predictive of reports of
engaging in social comparison, being concerned with what
others were doing, and finding upward and downward social
comparison more appropriate. Maximizing also predicted
product comparison, social comparison, and counterfactual
thinking with regard to purchases. Moreover, maximizing
predicted consumer feelings, such that those high on
maximizing ultimately experienced more regret and less
happiness regarding their purchases. These patterns held after
controlling for dispositional happiness. Furthermore, our
findings regarding consumer behavior suggest that social
comparisons and product comparisons stimulated counterfactual
thoughts, which then engendered regret (see, e.g., Roese, 1997).
Although a measure of general counterfactual thinking was not
included in this study, recent research indicates that maximizers
ruminate more than satisficers (White, Lehman, & Schwartz,
2002). It may be the case that counterfactual thinking and

43. ruminative thoughts are related to the general regret reported by
maximizers, as well as to consumption-related regret. Thus, it
appears that striving for the best things in life may have
paradoxical consequences.
Intuition, along with previous research (e.g., Morse & Gergen,
1970), suggests that whereas upward social comparison might
yield regret and unhappiness, downward social comparison
might yield elation. Study 2 found no such mood enhancing
effects of downward social comparison. However, a close look
at the recent literature on social comparison suggests that
consistent positive effects of downward social comparison are
reliably reported only for individuals who have low self-esteem
or experience physical or psychological threat (e.g., Affleck &
Tennen, 1991; Aspinwall & Taylor, 1993; Gibbons & Gerrard,
1989; Taylor, 1983; see Wills, 1991, for a review). In the
general population, the mood effects of social comparison are
much less predictable. Recent findings suggest that the affective
consequences of social comparison are not intrinsic to its
direction (e.g., Buunk, Collins, van Yperen, Taylor, & Dakof,
1990). That is, both upward and downward comparisons can
have positive or negative implications for the self (e.g., Brewer
& Weber, 1994; Brown, Novick, Lord, & Richards, 1992; Buunk
et al., 1990; Hemphill & Lehman, 1991; Lockwood & Kunda,
1997; Taylor, Buunk, & Aspinwall, 1990; Tesser, 1988; Wood
& VanderZee, 1997).
A limitation of Study 2 is that although it relied on reports of
real-life experiences, these were merely recalled by
participants. Because participants' recollections of the
purchasing situation could be biased or incomplete, it is
important to assess social comparison, happiness, and regret
among maximizers and satisficers in other settings as well.
Thus, Study 3 attempted to examine reactions to social
comparison information in a controlled laboratory setting.
Study 3. Maximizing, Satisficing, and Social Comparison
Because maximizers are continually chasing the best possible
option when making a decision, they try to gather and analyze

44. all of the information available to them. Information about one's
relative standing with one's peers—that is, social comparison
information—is likely to be an important source of information
in their decision-making process. Thus, maximizers are
expected to be more interested in social comparison feedback
and more sensitive to such feedback than satisficers.
Accordingly, the primary hypothesis tested in Study 3 was that
the moods and self-evaluations of maximizers would be more
vulnerable or sensitive to unsolicited social comparison
information than would those of satisficers. This study asked
participants to solve anagrams at whatever rate they were
capable, but manipulated the ostensible performance of an
undergraduate peer so that participants experienced relative
“success” (i.e., their peer performed worse than themselves) or
relative “failure” (i.e., their peer performed better than
themselves). This paradigm was developed by Lyubomirsky and
Ross (1997, Study 1), who found support for a parallel
prediction regarding chronically unhappy and happy
individuals. That is, in their study, self-rated unhappy students
who solved puzzles in the presence of a faster peer showed
smaller increases in mood and self-confidence and expressed
greater doubts about their own ability than those exposed to a
slower peer. Happy individuals, by contrast, did not exhibit this
pattern of sensitive responding to social comparison feedback.
Study 3 was characterized by several notable features. First, to
minimize possible experimental demand characteristics and
suspicion on the part of participants, and to simulate typical
“real-world” peer comparison contexts, social comparison
information was provided indirectly. That is, the experimenter
never explicitly offered any comparison of performances,
although such information was made highly salient to the
participants. Second, the relevant task and dimension of
evaluation (i.e., anagram-solving ability) was one about which
participants were unlikely to have objective standards for
evaluating their performance. Finally, participants enjoyed wide
latitude in managing the social comparison information they

45. faced. That is, they were free to minimize or maximize the
relevance, importance, and controllability of the evaluation
dimension; they were free to compete with, identify with, or
simply ignore their more or less successful peer; and they were
free to attribute their own performance and/or that of their peer
to whatever factors they wished.
To summarize, whereas in Study 2, participants only responded
to questions regarding their social comparison tendencies in
connection with consumer choices, Study 3 used a more
powerful and more direct manipulation of social comparison
information, one involving a real-life peer performing alongside
the participant in the laboratory. And in Study 3, rather than
measuring participants' interest in and seeking of such
comparison information, we examined the actual effects of
social comparison information provided by the context.
Method
Overview
In the context of a purported study of cognitive performance,
maximizers and satisficers (as categorized by their earlier
responses to the Maximization Scale) solved anagram puzzles
while a supposed peer (who was actually an experimental
confederate) ostensibly completed the same set of anagrams
much faster or much slower than themselves. Participants rated
themselves with respect to their current mood and anagram-
solving ability both before and after completion of the anagram-
solving task.
Participants
Fifty-four students enrolled in an introductory psychology
course at the University of California, Riverside received course
credit for their participation in this study. Participants were
selected on the basis of their responses to the 13-item
Maximization Scale, which was presented in the context of a
mass-administered questionnaire (n = 82). Responses to the 13
items, which displayed good internal consistency (α =.79), were
combined and averaged to provide a single composite score,
ranging from 2.6 to 6.7, with a median of 4.2 on the 7-point

46. scale.
A sample of 26 maximizers and 28 satisficers, that is, those
whose composite scores were respectively either in the top or
bottom third of the distribution, were recruited for the study by
telephone. The maximizers' group mean on the Maximization
Scale was 5.26 (SD = 0.50), whereas the satisficers' group mean
was 3.49 (SD = 0.43). We should note that the omnibus
questionnaire used in selecting these participants also included
the SHS and BDI (Beck, 1967). The correlations between
participants' scores on the Maximization Scale and their scores
on the SHS and BDI were moderate to high (r = −.27 and r =.46,
respectively). The inclusion of these scales, although not
specifically intended for this purpose, allowed us to pursue
issues of discriminant validity.
Procedure and Materials
In each experimental session, two individuals—a participant and
a same-gender confederate pretending to be another
participant—completed the relevant questionnaires and
experimental tasks together. The experimenter, who was
unaware of participants' maximization status, explained that
participants were being paired simply to “save time.”
The experiment was introduced as a study of “cognitive
performance”—that is, one in which “we hoped to learn how
personality and various situational variables affect performance
on a problem-solving task.” Accordingly, participants were told
they would be asked to solve a series of anagram puzzles during
the experimental session. To bolster this cover story, a number
of filler items, including questions about how often participants
solved puzzles and how much they enjoyed them, as well as
their quantitative and verbal Scholastic Assessment Test (SAT)
scores, were embedded in the various questionnaires
administered throughout the study.
Before undertaking the primary experimental task, participants
completed a preliminary questionnaire assessing their
premanipulation or “baseline” mood. Mood was assessed with
the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson,

47. Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), with 10 items measuring positive
affect (PA; α =.87) and 10 items measuring negative affect (NA;
α =.79) on 5-point Likert-type scales. Participants also provided
a baseline measure assessing how good they initially thought
they were at solving anagrams (1 = very poor, 7 = excellent).
Anagram-solving task and social comparison manipulation
After the participants had completed the preliminary
questionnaire, a female experimenter gave instructions for the
15-min anagram-solving task, which closely followed a
procedure developed by Lyubomirsky and Ross (1997, Study 1).
She began by handing each of them a “sample” puzzle card
containing three anagrams—that is, Y-O-W-N-S (SNOWY), N-
O-T-I-X (TOXIN), and A-S-S-I-B (BASIS)—and indicating that
such cards would be used throughout the anagram task. She
further explained that upon unscrambling any two of the three
anagrams on a given card, they were to write their solutions and
the card number on their answer sheet, then hand the card back
to the experimenter and receive a new card containing new
anagrams. Participants were also given a notebook to use as
scratch paper (one page per card). At that point, the
experimenter instructed them to begin solving anagrams and
handing in their cards. What the participants did not know was
that their coparticipant was an experimental confederate who
had been instructed to monitor their partner's pace and solve
either approximately twice as many or half as many anagrams as
he or she did—a task that they accomplished successfully. The
back-and-forth handing of the anagram cards as the participant
and confederate worked side-by-side throughout the 15-min
period, along with the consecutive numbering of the cards and
the turning of notebook pages, served to make it highly salient
to participants that their peer was performing at a much faster
or much slower pace.
Postperformance questionnaires
Immediately following the 15-min anagram task, the participant
and confederate were led to separate rooms, and the participant
was asked by the experimenter to complete a second set of self-

48. assessments. To assess participants' changes in mood as a
function of their own performance in the two social comparison
conditions, participants were asked to complete the PANAS for
a second time (α =.92 and α =.83 for the PA and NA scales,
respectively). To assess changes in participants' perceptions of
their own ability in light of their performance and the
apparently superior or inferior performance of their peer,
participants were asked to rate again how good they thought
they were at solving anagrams (1 = very poor, 7 = excellent). As
a manipulation check, participants were next asked to rate their
own just-completed task performance and that of the
confederate using 7-point scales (1 = very poor, 7 = excellent).
Finally, when all dependent variables had been collected,
participants completed a debriefing questionnaire and engaged
in an oral debriefing, in which they were given an opportunity
to share their hunches about the hypothesis of the study and to
report any other suspicions. No guesses or notable suspicions
were reported. The entire session, including a process
debriefing (Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975), lasted
approximately 1 hr.
Results
Premanipulation Measures
Measures completed prior to the anagram-solving task
suggested no between-group differences in ability or
experience. That is, maximizers and satisficers did not differ
significantly in their quantitative and verbal SAT scores, in
their initial self-ratings of ability at solving anagrams, in their
reports of how often they solved anagrams, or in how much they
enjoyed solving them (all ts < 1). Notably, the two groups also
did not differ significantly in their baseline moods (ts for both
PA and NA < 1).
Manipulation Check
Overall, participants solved a mean of 12.7 anagrams (SD =
7.84) during the allotted 15-min test period. Analyses revealed
no significant performance differences between satisficers and
maximizers overall, t(53) = 1, or in either the “faster peer” (t <

49. 2) or “slower peer” (t < 1) conditions. Nor was any main effect
found for peer performance on the participants' own
performance, t(43) = 0.74, ns. As instructed, the confederate,
depending on experimental condition, “solved” either
considerably more anagrams (M = 27.29; SD = 8.53) or
considerably fewer anagrams (M = 8.01; SD = 5.90) than the
participant. The participants, moreover, showed themselves to
be well aware of these performance differences. Those in the
“faster peer” condition rated their peer as significantly better at
solving anagrams (M = 6.07, SD = 0.94) than did those in the
“slower peer” condition (M = 3.08, SD = 0.93), t(51) = 11.73, p
<.001. Finally, participants who witnessed a faster peer rated
themselves as significantly worse at solving anagrams (M =
2.29, SD = 1.15) than did those who witnessed a slower peer (M
= 3.81, SD = 1.52), t(46) = 4.12, p <.001.
Strategies for Statistical Analyses
We hypothesized that maximizers' moods and self-assessments
of ability would depend heavily on the quality of their peer's
performance—that is, whether it was inferior or superior to
their own. Satisficers' moods and self-assessments, by contrast,
were expected to be less influenced by the performance of their
peer. We conducted planned pairwise comparisons of the faster
peer and slower peer conditions within the two groups
(Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1985; see also Rosnow & Rosenthal,
1989, 1995). Additionally, we compared maximizers who had
witnessed a faster peer with those in the three remaining
conditions. Simple change scores reflecting differences between
premanipulation and postmanipulation ratings provided the
primary dependent variables for both types of analyses. Other
types of statistical analyses, such as analyses of covariance
(ANCOVAs) and repeated measures analyses, were also
performed and yielded results very similar to those obtained in
the analyses reported in this article. For brevity, these results
are not discussed.
Changes in Self-Assessments of Ability
We expected maximizers to offer ratings of their own ability

50. that gave considerable weight to social comparison information.
Supporting this prediction, a planned contrast revealed that
maximizers gave lower assessments of ability on the anagram
task after working alongside a faster peer (M = −1.71, SD =
1.27) than after working alongside a slower peer (M = 0.17, SD
= 1.11), F(1, 50) = 10.34, p <.003. Self-assessments of
satisficers, by contrast, did not differ significantly between the
two social comparison conditions (Ms = −0.79 vs. 0.14), F(1,
50) = 2.63. The top panel of Figure 1, as well as the top of
Table 3, shows the mean changes in self-assessments of ability,
based on 7-point rating scales, for all four groups.
Figure 1. Changes in assessments of ability (top) and negative
affect (bottom) after working alongside a slower versus faster
peer (Study 3)Maximization Versus Happiness and Dysphoria in
Determining Changes in Participants' Self-Assessments of
Ability in Response to a Faster Versus Slower Peer
As expected, maximizing participants in the “faster peer”
condition not only exhibited the largest relative decline in self-
assessments of the four groups, F(1, 50) = 11.33, r =.43, p
<.002, but their mean decline was the only one of the four that
was significantly different from zero (M = −1.71), t(14) = 5.06,
p <.001. However, differences between the responses of
maximizers and satisficers in this condition—at least in terms of
changes in their self-assessments of ability—did not reach
conventional levels of statistical significance, F(1, 50) = 2.73, p
<.10.
Changes in Self-Reported Affect
Examination of changes in participants' self-reported negative
mood (NA) produced a similar pattern of results (see the bottom
panel of Figure 1 and the top of Table 4). Once again,
supporting our predictions, maximizers displayed significantly
more elevated NA after witnessing a faster peer (M = 0.54, SD
= 0.82) than after witnessing a slower peer (M = −0.03, SD =
0.50), F(1, 50) = 6.31, p <.02. Satisficers, by contrast, showed
more similar affect in response to their superior versus inferior

51. peer's performance (Ms = 0.12 vs. −0.06), F < 1.
Maximization Versus Happiness and Dysphoria in Determining
Changes in Participants' Self-Reported Negative Affect in
Response to a Faster Versus Slower Peer
Following the pattern of results for self-assessments,
maximizers in the “faster peer” condition not only exhibited the
biggest increase in NA of the four groups, F(1, 50) = 8.70, p
<.005, but, once again, their mean increase was the only one of
the four groups that was significantly different from zero (M =
0.54), t(14) = 2.43, p <.03. Furthermore, differences between
the responses of maximizers and satisficers in this condition
were marginally statistically significant, F(1, 50) = 3.62, p
<.07. None of the analyses examining group differences in
changes in participants' positive mood (PA) reached
conventional levels of statistical significance.
Subjective Happiness and Dysphoria as Possible Moderator
Variables
Readers might question whether the effects reported thus far
really reflect the role of a maximization orientation rather than
that of chronic happiness or dysphoria. Indeed, similar effects
have been reported in an analysis of dispositionally happy and
unhappy individuals (Lyubomirsky & Ross, 1997, Study 1).
Given the moderately high correlations in this study between
participants' scores on the Maximization Scale and their scores
on the SHS and the BDI, it was deemed prudent to address this
question through covariance analyses.
With respect to both happiness (as measured by the SHS) and
dysphoria (as measured by the BDI), the results of our analyses
were simple and conclusive. When either happiness or
dysphoria was introduced as a covariate, neither variable
accounted for our between-group differences. That is, both for
changes in self-assessment of ability and for changes in NA,
ANCOVAs left our “adjusted” means for both ability change
(see Table 3) and NA change (see Table 4), as well as the
relevant contrasts, virtually unaltered in magnitude.

52. Discussion
The results of Study 3 supported our hypothesis that maximizers
would be more affected by social comparison information than
would satisficers. Maximizers who saw their peer solve
anagrams faster than themselves expressed greater doubts about
their own ability at the task and displayed a greater increase in
negative mood than maximizers who saw their peer solve fewer
anagrams. Satisficers, by contrast, showed little or no such
response to the social comparison information provided by their
peer. Subsequent analyses, moreover, suggested that it was
differences in maximization per se, rather than the association
of maximization with happiness or dysphoria, that predicted the
relevant differences in response.
Although the focus of this study was on the ways that students
use self-relevant social comparison feedback when evaluating
themselves, the relevant social comparison processes are likely
to mirror those recruited in decision-making contexts of the sort
investigated in Study 2. We suspect that many decisions faced
by students—for example, which major to choose, to which
graduate school to apply, which job to select—involve self-
evaluations, and comparisons with peers can provide feedback
about whether one can “cut it” in a particular major, school, or
job. We speculate that because satisficers are satisfied with a
major, school, or job that is simply “good enough,” they may
not require as much information in general—and social
comparison information in particular—as do maximizers in
order to make decisions.
Several issues raised by Study 3 deserve comment. First, given
that changes in participants' PA did not show the expected
pattern of results, further research could test the possibility that
it is on NA that social comparison has its major influence.
Second, because the current study examined differences in
maximizers' and satisficers' responses to social comparison
information and not their interest in or seeking of such
information, the latter topics remain worthy of investigation
(though the questionnaire responses in Study 2 suggest that

53. maximizers seek more social comparison information than
satisficers). And, finally, because Study 3 was conducted in the
laboratory, the question remains how maximizers and satisficers
respond to social comparison feedback during the course of
decisions in their everyday life.
Taken together, our findings in Studies 2 and 3 provide support
for the notion that maximizers are more likely than satisficers to
seek out and respond to social comparison information each
time they try to make the “perfect choice.”
Study 4. Maximizing, Satisficing, and Regret
The first three studies have provided evidence of individual
differences in the disposition to maximize that correlate with
other important variables and are reflected in self-reports about
purchasing decisions. Further, there is evidence, both from self-
report and experimental data, that maximizers are more inclined
to engage in social comparisons and to be more sensitive to
their contents than are satisficers. The final study reported here
tested whether a disposition to maximize relates to actual
decision-making behavior. We created a game that required
participants to make decisions, and investigated whether
maximizers made different decisions, and experienced different
degrees of satisfaction from those decisions, than did
satisficers.
The second aim of Study 4 was to explore experimentally the
relation between maximizing and regret. We reported in Study 1
consistent and substantial correlations between scores on our
Maximization Scale and scores on our Regret Scale. We also
reported evidence that partially supported the hypothesis that
regret mediates the relations between maximization and various
measures of well-being. On the basis of this evidence, we
suggested that one of the factors that may lead maximizers to
experience less happiness and satisfaction with life than
satisficers is maximizers' increased sensitivity to regret—both
experienced and anticipated. If that is true, then it should be the
case that experimental manipulations designed to enhance the
possibility of experiencing regret should have a larger impact

54. on maximizers. The game used in Study 4 was designed to
manipulate the potential to experience regret.
We used a variant of the ultimatum game (Camerer & Thaler,
1995; Guth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982). In the
ultimatum game, one player has control of a resource (typically
a sum of money) and offers some part of that resource to
another player. That player may either accept the offer, in
which case the resource is divided in keeping with the offer, or
reject it, in which case neither player gets anything. This game
has been of interest to experimental economists because an
analysis of optimal strategy by a rational maximizer of gain
would seem to dictate that the proposer make the smallest legal
offer, secure in the knowledge that the recipient of that offer
will accept it (a little of something is better than nothing). This
pattern is virtually never observed among actual participants.
First, recipients of offers routinely reject them if they are too
low (e.g., less than 30% of the resource). Second, proposers
rarely make such low offers.
With respect to regret, there is an interesting asymmetry to the
ultimatum game. The proposer will always know if he or she has
made an offer that is too low, because the recipient of that offer
will have rejected it. However, the proposer will not know if the
offer was too high because there is no information about the
minimum acceptable offer—the reservation price. When the
recipient accepts the offer, it could be that the offer was at
exactly the price necessary for acceptance or that it was higher
than necessary. Thus, one would expect proposers who are
worried about regretting their decisions to make unnecessarily
high offers. That way, they will avoid the only source of regret
that the situation permits—an offer that is rejected. Suppose,
however, that the game were altered so that proposers would be
told what the minimum acceptable offer was on trials of the
game in which their offers were accepted. Thus, they might
offer $5 of a $10 stake, have their offer accepted, and then find
out that an offer of $3 also would have been accepted. Under
these conditions, it is possible to regret offers that are too high

55. just as it is possible to regret offers that are too low. Zeelenberg
and Beattie (1997) found that offers in this modified ultimatum
game tended to be lower than offers under the standard
procedure. Our question, based on the hypothesis that
maximizers are more sensitive to regret than satisficers, was
whether the effect observed by Zeelenberg and Beattie would be
larger for maximizers than for satisficers.
Method
Participants
The participants were 84 students (48 female and 36 male)
enrolled in an introductory psychology course at Swarthmore
College who received course credit.
Procedure
All participants had previously completed a packet of
questionnaire materials including the Maximization Scale and
the Regret Scale. Approximately 7 weeks later, participants
were directed to a Web site for participation in another study.
They were given 2 weeks in which to do the tasks on the Web
site at a time and place that was convenient to them. About 75%
of the participants completed the tasks within the allotted time.
The others were sent follow-up reminders by e-mail until all but
7 had complied. No mention was made of the connection
between this study and the questionnaire materials they had
completed earlier.
Each participant played two versions of the ultimatum game, in
counterbalanced order: a “standard” version and a modified
version (they differed in only one respect, described below).
Each version included 10 rounds. In the standard version,
participants first encountered a screen that told them that they
were “Player 1,” that the computer would be “Player 2,” and
that the computer would be making decisions based on the
performance of real people playing the identical game.
Participants were also told that on each round, they would be
given a sum of money (between $8 and $15). They were to make
a whole dollar offer to Player 2 (the computer), who would
know what amount of money was being divided on each round,

56. and could accept or reject the offer. Participants were further
informed that the computer would simulate Player 2's responses
on the basis of past behavior of people who have played this
game. Moreover, it was explained, on each round, a different
past player would be used for the simulation, so participants
were to treat each round as playing with a different Player 2.
For each round, if the participant's offer was accepted, Player 2
(the computer) would “get” the amount offered, while Player 1
(the participant) would get the difference between the total
amount and the amount offered. Thus, for example, if a round
started with $12 available, and Player 1 made an offer of $5 that
was accepted, Player 2 would get the $5, and Player 1 would get
$7. If the offer was rejected, neither player would get anything.
Participants were also told that there was a chance that they
would actually get to keep whatever amount resulted from a
given round of the game. At the end of each round, participants
were asked to click the mouse along an unmarked line that was
anchored on the left with very unsatisfied and on the right with
very satisfied to indicate their satisfaction with that round of
the game.
In the modified version, to which all participants also were
exposed, at the end of a round, in addition to being told whether
their offer was accepted or rejected, they were also told what
the smallest offer was that Player 2 would have accepted—
Player 2's “reservation price.” The reservation price of Player 2
was programmed to vary pseudorandomly, with a low of 13% of
the initial sum and a high of 57% of the initial sum. The idea
behind this manipulation was that in the standard game, players
never know that they have offered more than was necessary, and
thus will not experience regret over offers that are too high. In
this variant of the game, participants would know when they
had made offers that were more generous than necessary.
Results and Discussion
Participants offered their counterpart half of the initial sum of
money (rounded to the nearest dollar) on 53.4% of trials, less
than half on 37.3% of trials, and more than half on 9.3% of

57. trials. Given the low rates of offers above half, the data were
collapsed into offers of less than half (37.3%) and offers of at
least half (62.7%). No significant difference in rates of offering
less than half was found between males and females (42.2% vs.
33.4% for males vs. females, respectively; t < 1.5).
Maximization score was not correlated with the percentage of
offers made below half (r =.15, n = 82, ns). However, an
ANCOVA (with maximization score as a continuous variable)
revealed that there was a significant interaction between gender
and maximization score on the number of offers made of less
than half, F(1, 82) = 6.80, p <.01. The relation between
maximization score and offers made was thus analyzed
separately for males and females. Among males, participants
higher in maximization exhibited a significantly higher
percentage of offers below half (r = −.40, n = 35, p <.02).
Among female participants, no significant association was
found between maximization score and the percentage of offers
below half (r =.14, n = 47, ns).
Within-participant t tests comparing offers made on trials in
which the reservation price of opponents was shown versus
those in which it was not shown did not indicate any difference
in the percentage of offers of less than half (38.4% vs. 36.0%; t
< 1). Thus, we failed to replicate the findings of Zeelenberg and
Beattie (1997) for the participants as a group. However,
experimental condition did interact with maximization scores in
predicting the number of offers made of less than half by each
participant. Using a repeated measures analysis of variance
(ANOVA), with experimental condition (i.e., whether or not
reservation prices were shown) as the repeated factor, there was
a significant Condition × Maximization interaction in the
percentage of offers made below half, F(1, 80) = 8.90, p <.004.
That is to say, satisficers and maximizers tended to adjust their
offers differently on the basis of whether reservation prices
were shown.
To determine the basis of the interaction between experimental
condition and maximization score on offers made, participants

58. were divided into satisficers and maximizers on the basis of a
median split. Among satisficers, participants exhibited lower
rates of offers of less than half on rounds in which reservation
prices were seen as compared with those in which reservation
prices were not seen (32.2% vs. 39.4%, respectively), t(40) =
2.42, p <.02—a surprising result given what Zeelenberg and
Beattie (1997) found. Maximizers, however, did the opposite,
confirming our expectations. They revealed higher rates of
offering less than half on trials in which reservation prices were
seen as compared with those in which reservation prices were
not seen (48.1% vs. 35.9%, respectively), t(40) = 3.42, p <.001.
As would be expected, mean ratings of satisfaction were
considerably higher on rounds in which the participants' offer
was accepted (M = 7.02) than on those in which it was rejected
(M = 3.18), t(80) = 13.40, p <.001. Controlling for whether
offers were accepted, higher maximization scores predicted
lower judgments of satisfaction, F(1, 81) = 7.60, p <.01. Thus,
being a maximizer seemed to mean being less satisfied with the
results of an episode, independent of what those results were.
Judgments of satisfaction did not differ by condition (5.88 vs.
5.97, for standard vs. modified version, respectively; t < 1).
Further, no interaction was present between condition and
maximization scores in predicting judgments of satisfaction (F
< 1).
On the basis of a repeated measure ANOVA, there was a trend
suggesting an interaction between maximization score and the
acceptance of offers as predictors of judgments of satisfaction,
F(1, 74) = 2.60, p <.11. To explore this trend, the associations
between maximization score and ratings of satisfaction were
assessed separately for those rounds in which offers were
rejected and those in which offers were accepted. No significant
correlation was found between maximization score and
judgments on those trials in which offers were rejected (r =
−.07, n = 77, ns), but participants higher in maximization were
relatively less satisfied during rounds in which offers were
accepted (r = −.31, n = 82, p <.005). This negative correlation

59. was present both on rounds in which reservation prices were
shown (r = −.30, n = 82, p <.006), and those in which
reservation prices were not shown (r = −.28, n = 81, p <.02).
To summarize, the results of Study 4 were consistent with
many, but not all, of our predictions. In the ultimatum game,
male (but not female) maximizers made smaller offers than male
satisficers. Maximizers of both genders offered less when the
recipient's reservation price was going to be revealed (as we
expected), but unexpectedly, satisficers offered more when the
recipient's reservation price was going to be revealed. Finally,
as hypothesized, maximizers were less satisfied than satisficers
with outcomes generally. However, they were not especially
dissatisfied in the condition in which reservation price was
revealed, as had been expected.
The observed interaction on offers made between Maximization
scores and gender may reflect the presence of implicit social
payoffs present in the task. The presumed incentive to make
lower offers when reservation prices are revealed rests on the
expectation that finding out that larger gains could have been
made will invite regret. To the extent that participants
experience the game as a social interaction, however, this may
not be the case. Most obviously, motivations of cooperation and
fairness may result in the experience of maximal utility with an
even split as opposed to one in which the participant gets more
than half the money. However, the social motive of
competitiveness might result in higher utility for the more
financially favorable split. So it is possible that the fact that
males, but not females, tended to make lower offers when
reservation prices were revealed may reflect a greater display of
social motivation toward cooperation and fairness among
females and/or greater social motivation toward competitiveness
among males. Indeed, it is further possible that, particularly in a
situation with little truly at stake, the presence of feedback
indicating that the possibility to exploit was present but not
taken (the condition with known reservation prices) could make
the choice of an equitable split even more rewarding to

60. participants with social motives favoring equity. If so, this
might explain the tendency of satisficers to offer more 50–50
splits in the condition in which reservation prices were revealed
than when they were hidden.
Finally, the fact that maximizers were not particularly
dissatisfied with the condition in which reservation prices were
revealed (thus inviting more regret) might have been due to the
above reported interaction between condition and maximizing
score on offers made. Maximizers tended to make lower offers
in the condition in which reservation prices were shown, which
may have effectively offset the hypothesized increased tendency
of this condition to invite regret. Consistent with this
interpretation, maximizers' lower offers led to obtaining more
than half the available money on 20.0% of trials in the
condition in which the reservation prices were shown as
compared with 12.0% of trials when reservation prices were
hidden. Satisficers' rates for such gains were 10.1% and 13.2%,
respectively.
General Discussion
The present studies provide evidence for individual differences
in the orientation to seek to maximize one's outcomes in choice
situations. Study 1 reported data with two new scales, a
Maximization Scale and a Regret Scale, designed to measure
individual differences in maximization as a goal and in
sensitivity to regret. With seven independent samples, we found
significant positive correlations between maximization and
regret, perfectionism, and depression, and significant negative
correlations between maximization and happiness, optimism,
satisfaction with life, and self-esteem. We suggested that
maximizers may be more concerned with relative position, and
thus more inclined to engage in social comparison, than
satisficers.
We explored this possible relation between maximizing and
social comparison in Studies 2 and 3. In Study 2, we found that
maximizers were more likely than satisficers to report engaging
in social comparison, both in general and in connection with

61. consumer decisions. We also found that maximizers were more
regretful and less happy with their consumer decisions than
satisficers. In Study 3, we found a tendency for maximizers to
be affected by social comparison, this time in an experimental
setting in which the opportunities to compare oneself with
others had effects on assessments of task ability and on mood
for maximizers but not for satisficers. Finally, in Study 4, we
found that maximizers were less satisfied than satisficers with
their results in an ultimatum bargaining game, and we obtained
partial support for the hypothesis that maximizers are more
sensitive to regret than satisficers.
Wieczorkowska and Burnstein (1999) recently reported
evidence for an individual difference variable related to our
distinction between maximizing and satisficing. They
distinguished between individuals who have “point” search
strategies and those who have “interval” strategies in making
decisions. For the former group, the set of acceptable options is
narrow, whereas for the latter it is broad. The broad “interval”
strategy is adaptive when search costs are high or environmental
opportunities are scarce. The “point” strategy is adaptive when
search costs are low or opportunities are plentiful. Adaptive
choosers are those who can adjust their search strategies in
keeping with what the environment makes available. This
distinction between point and interval strategies is somewhat
similar to the distinction between maximizing and satisficing,
but there is at least one important difference. The point
strategist differs from the interval strategist in having more
stringent standards of acceptability. However, those standards
are clear and explicit. The maximizer, in contrast, aspires to the
(more amorphous) “best.” Even in an abundant environment
(indeed, perhaps, especially in an abundant environment),
finding the “best” will always be difficult.
Taken together, our studies suggest that although maximizers
may in general achieve better objective outcomes than
satisficers (as a result of their high standards and exhaustive
search and decision procedures), they are likely to experience

62. these outcomes as worse subjectively. In what follows, we
explore some of the reasons why this may be so.
First, to be a maximizer is to want the best option. That, in turn,
requires an exhaustive search of the possibilities. Such a search
is hardly possible in any particular domain, and certainly
impossible in all domains. What this may mean to a maximizer
is that when practical constraints make exhaustive search
impossible, there will be anticipated regret about options
foregone that might have been better than the chosen option.
There may also be experienced regret at the chosen option
because the chosen option, though the best of all considered,
was not necessarily the best in all respects. That is, other
options that may have been inferior overall may have been
better than the chosen option on one or more dimensions. Such
regret, whether caused by experienced or imagined alternatives,
is sure to reduce the satisfaction derived from one's choice. In
this connection, we wonder whether maximizers would be less
likely than satisficers to engage in dissonance reduction, for
example, in a forced-choice paradigm.
Second, the process of adaptation will make virtually every
consumption experience less satisfying than one expects it to be
(e.g., Brickman & Campbell, 1971; Frederick & Loewenstein,
1999; Kahneman, 1999). What makes the adaptation process
even worse is that people tend not to anticipate it and thus
mispredict their future feelings about all sorts of experiences
(Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998;
Loewenstein & Schkade, 1999). When the experiences are
positive, failure to make allowances for adaptation will make
these experiences disappointing, especially to maximizers,
because their expectations will be higher than those of
satisficers (see below).
A particularly relevant example of people's misprediction of
future subjective states was recently reported by Gilbert and
Ebert (2002), who conducted a series of studies in which
participants made a choice that was either reversible or not.
Though they never actually did reverse their choices,

63. participants greatly preferred being able to do so to having their
decisions be final. Tellingly, participants who had this decision-
reversal option were actually less satisfied with the outcomes of
their decisions than those whose decisions were irreversible.
Gilbert and Ebert argued that when a decision is final, various
psychological processes get recruited (e.g., dissonance
reduction, rationalization) that subjectively improve the chosen
alternative and denigrate the rejected one. As a result of these
processes, people experience enhanced satisfaction with their
decision. When people keep the option of decision reversal,
however, these psychological processes are not recruited.
Though the research has yet to be done, we anticipate that
maximizers would be much more inclined to desire to keep
options open than would satisficers.
The effects of adaptation may be worse for maximizers than
satisficers for two reasons. In all likelihood, maximizers have
higher standards of acceptability than satisficers, so that
adaptation is more likely to be disappointing. Also, it seems
likely that the decisions of maximizers entail far greater search
costs than the decisions of satisficers. If we imagine that these
search costs get “amortized” over the period of time in which
the consequences of the decision are positive, maximizers have
a bigger “debt” to amortize than satisficers.
Third, a maximizer is more likely to depend on social
comparison than a satisficer. The truth of this claim seems
inherent in the logic of the matter. How does a maximizer
decide that he or she has attained the best possible outcome?
Surely, in part, this decision is shaped by observing the
outcomes of others. This logic is buttressed by the evidence
from Studies 2 and 3 that indicates that maximizers do in fact
engage more in social comparison, and are more affected by it,
than satisficers.
Fourth, it is plausible that maximizers have higher expectations
than satisficers. Given the practical constraints on search and
the adaptation processes already mentioned, excessively high
expectations are more likely to be met with disappointment. To

64. the extent that subjective well-being is in significant part a
function of the relation between expectations and reality, as
seems likely, maximizers will often find that relation
unsatisfying and unsatisfactory.
The foregoing discussion helps explain why being a maximizer
may make one less happy, but what about the relation between
maximizing and depression? Schwartz (2000), in discussing the
choice problem, offered a speculative account of the increase in
clinical depression over the course of the last century. Such an
increase is surprising, because evidence suggests that having
control over what happens is a key to avoiding depression (e.g.,
Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Peterson & Seligman,
1984; Peterson, Maier, & Seligman, 1993; Seligman, 1975), and
it appears self-evident that adding options enhances one's
potential control. The data reported in Study 1 seem to support
Schwartz's speculation, at least for maximizers. But why? We
believe that if there is a causal link between being a maximizer
and depression, there is a key mediating factor—the presence of
an overwhelming array of options.
Our argument is as follows: the theory of depression based upon
the phenomenon of learned helplessness suggests that
depression results from a lack of control over significant events,
coupled with a particular attributional style for explanations of
this lack of control (Abramson et al., 1978). Consider the kinds
of attributions people might make when decisions lead to
disappointing results. Who is to blame? Is it the decision maker
or the world? In a world in which the options are few, it is
reasonable to think that people will blame the world for
disappointing results. But in a world in which the options are
many, people will blame themselves. Thus, we imagine that
maximizing (in triggering disappointment) and a proliferation of
options (in triggering self-blame for disappointment) will
interact to produce internal causal attributions for failure on the
part of maximizers. The proliferation of options has two
consequences related to this theory of depression. First, it raises
people's standards for determining what counts as a success.

65. From breakfast cereals to automobiles to colleges to careers, it
makes sense for people to expect more when the options are
plentiful than when they are scarce. Second, failure to meet
those standards in a domain containing multiple options
encourages one to treat failures as the result of personal
shortcomings rather than situational limitations, thus
encouraging a causal attribution for failure that we might call
“depressogenic.” So, in a world of limited options, a maximizer
might be more disappointed than a satisficer with the results of
his or her decisions without taking personal responsibility for
the disappointing results. But in a world of limitless options,
there is simply no excuse for failure.
What the above argument suggests is that it is a mistake to
equate choice with a sense of control, so that the more one has
of the former, the more one has of the latter. The relation
between choice and perceived control may, for various reasons
already discussed, be nonmonotonic (see Iyengar & Lepper,
2000). It may be that what is often critical about control in
preventing or alleviating depression is having a choice, not
having many choices. For example, a woman may be depressed
because she feels she cannot get out of a bad relationship. Or
she may be depressed because she cannot control her own
depression from coming and going. The “cure” in cases like
these is not an array of choices but a choice.
Is maximizing always bad for people's well-being? This seems
highly unlikely. Although relying on a maximizing strategy
might produce adverse consequences in some contexts, it is
conceivable that in others, maximizing will be an adaptive
strategy. For example, an individual who responds to a health
threat by searching for information, asking questions, and
striving to attain the best treatment available may get better
results than someone who simply selects a treatment that is
sufficient. Maximizers may engage in more active coping
strategies such as planful problem solving and seeking social
support, whereas satisficers may cope by accepting the situation
and engaging in positive reappraisal. Some of these coping

66. responses may be more adaptive, others may be less adaptive.
Thus, it seems that there are real advantages to adopting a
maximizing strategy. Presumably, not being satisfied with
“good enough” spurs one on to achievements that less ambitious
people will not attain, though there is as yet no evidence on this
point. Perhaps in the domain of action, greater achievements by
maximizers compensate for lower satisfaction with those
achievements, whatever they are. But in the domain of
consumption, the point of which, after all, is subjective
satisfaction, this compensatory feature of maximization is much
less clear.
Caveats and Questions
Throughout this discussion, we have been treating maximizers
and satisficers as if there is a clear and distinct line that
separates them, measurable by some instrument such as our
Maximization Scale. But it is surely more accurate to say that
people differ in the extent to which they are maximizers, rather
than falling on one or the other side of a maximization line.
That said, interesting research questions abound. There must be
some variation from one domain of choice to another in the
extent to which one maximizes. No one maximizes in all
domains. For example, we doubt that anyone searches for the
prettiest postage stamp to affix to a federal tax return. We have
presented no data on the possible domain specificity of a
maximization orientation. Indeed, several of the items on the
Maximization Scale were written quite deliberately to be vague
as to domain. It is possible that where on the
maximizing/satisficing continuum one falls will be a reflection
not of how high one's standards of acceptability are in general,
but of how many different domains of choice are dominated by
a maximizing orientation. Research into the possible domain
specificity of the maximization orientation, and into whether
maximizers and satisficers differ in the standards they apply to
decisions in general or in the number of domains in which they
apply maximizing standards is in order. And beyond the matter
of standards, it is important to note whether maximizers and

67. satisficers differ in their scaling of the objective results of their
decisions. It would be interesting to know whether maximizers
and satisficers respond differently to measures of “objective
happiness” recently pioneered by Kahneman (1999).
A second issue to be investigated is whether social comparison
is not the only kind of comparison to which maximizers are
more sensitive than satisficers. Michalos (1980, 1986), in his
“multiple discrepancies theory,” suggests that in assessing well-
being, people evaluate not only what they have in relation to
others, but also what they have in relation to what they expected
to have, what they have had in the past, what they expect to
have in the future, what they need, and what they deserve. Each
of these assessments is a possible source of systematic
differences between satisficers and maximizers, with
maximizers consistently experiencing larger “gaps” between
hopes and expectations on the one hand, and reality on the
other, than satisficers do.
Another possibility worth exploring is whether maximizers and
satisficers differ in what they perceive to be at stake when they
make decisions. For the satisficer, all that may be at stake is the
actual result of the decision—the quality of the good or the
experience that is chosen. For the maximizer, the results of
choices may, in addition, convey information about the self.
That is, maximizers may take the outcomes of decisions as
evidence about how smart, shrewd, or discerning they are as
choosers. Each choice a maximizer makes may say something
important about the maximizer as a person. If it is true that
maximizers have so much riding on the outcomes of decisions,
and if it is true, on the basis of arguments made above, that the
outcomes of decisions will usually be disappointing to
maximizers, it becomes unsurprising that maximizers are more
depressed, more unhappy, and less optimistic than satisficers.
Related to this possibility is another. If maximizers care more
than satisficers about choices and their outcomes in general,
they may be vulnerable not only to choices presented by the
world, but to choices that they conjure up themselves. For

68. example, the maximizing university student might imagine that
there must be some way to combine a double major in finance
and biology (to keep both Master of Business Administration
and medical school futures open) with a minor in art, while
spending a semester in Thailand and a semester in Mexico, even
though all university rules indicate that this is impossible. The
satisficer is less likely to be plagued by opportunities that exist
only in one's imagination.
Further, future research should examine process differences
between maximizers and satisficers when it comes to actual
choice behavior. That is, when actually making a choice, do
maximizers examine more options before selecting? Do they
seek more information about alternatives? Do they desire more
opportunities to reverse decisions? Do they engage in more
postdecision counterfactual thinking and experience more
postdecision regret? Are they more adversely affected by
multiple as opposed to few choice options? The present article
presents what we think are powerful data on the relation
between maximization and subjective experience. It remains to
be determined whether maximizers also consistently act
differently than satisficers.
Finally, we should note that in discussing the relation between
maximizing and dispositional happiness, we have been assuming
throughout the article that the causal arrow runs from
maximizing to unhappiness. Although this direction seems
plausible to us, we must acknowledge that alternative
conceptualizations are possible. For example, people who are
dispositionally unhappy are likely to be disappointed with the
outcomes of many of their choices and decisions. This
disappointment may be (mis)attributed to the decisions
themselves, rather than their own fundamental unhappiness,
leading such individuals continually to strive to make “better”
choices and judgments, in an ultimately fruitless effort to
enhance their happiness. Of course, such a process could also
produce a cyclical relationship, whereby unhappy individuals
attempt to maximize (in a misguided effort to raise their affect),

69. leading to more unhappiness. It is critical for future research to
clarify whether being maximizers makes people unhappy or
being unhappy makes people maximizers. At this point,
however, we simply acknowledge that just as happiness may be
a matter of choice (i.e., how—and even whether—we make
choices influences whether we are happy or not), choice may
also be a matter of happiness.
Footnotes
1 In the interest of brevity, the items measuring social
comparison frequency (e.g., “How frequently do you compare
yourself to other people in general?”), appropriateness of
upward social comparison (e.g., “Comparing oneself to those
who are better off can be useful”), appropriateness of downward
social comparison (e.g., “It is inappropriate to compare one's
own standing to those who are not doing as well” [reverse
scored]), general consumer behavior (e.g., for product
comparison: “When I am planning to purchase an item of
clothing, I like to look at all the stores first to make certain I
get the perfect item”), and specific consumer behaviors (e.g.,
for product comparison: “How many products did you consider
before choosing this particular one?”) can be obtained from
authors Katherine White ([email protected]) or Darrin R.
Lehman ([email protected]).
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Submitted: May 23, 2001 Revised: May 1, 2002 Accepted: May
2, 2002
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Source: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. Vol. 83.
(5), Nov, 2002 pp. 1178-1197)
Accession Number: 2002-18731-012
Digital Object Identifier: 10.1037/0022-3514.83.5.1178
Subjective well-being: The science of happiness and a proposal
for a national index.
Authors:
Diener, Ed. U Illinois, Dept of Psychology, Champaign, IL, US
Source:
American Psychologist, Vol 55(1), Jan, 2000. Special Issue:
Positive Psychology. pp. 34-43.
NLM Title Abbreviation:
Am Psychol
Publisher:
US : American Psychological Association
ISSN:
0003-066X (Print)
1935-990X (Electronic)
ISBN:
1-55798-704-1
Language:
English
Keywords:
findings on & study of subjective well-being, implications for
development of national indicators of happiness
Abstract:
One area of positive psychology analyzes subjective well-being
(SWB), people's cognitive and affective evaluations of their
lives. Progress has been made in understanding the components
of SWB, the importance of adaptation and goals to feelings of
well-being, the temperament underpinnings of SWB, and the

79. cultural influences on well-being. Representative selection of
respondents, naturalistic experience sampling measures, and
other methodological refinements are now used to study SWB
and could be used to produce national indicators of happiness.
(PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)
Document Type:
Journal Article
Subjects:
*Happiness; *Life Satisfaction; *Self-Perception; *Well
Being; Measurement
Medical Subject Headings (MeSH):
Adaptation, Psychological; Cross-Cultural Comparison; Cultural
Characteristics; Happiness; Humans; Quality of Life; Sampling
Studies; Temperament
PsycINFO Classification:
Personality Traits & Processes (3120)
Population:
Human
Format Covered:
Print
Publication Type:
Journal; Peer Reviewed Journal
Release Date:
20060710
Correction Date:
20130923
Copyright:
American Psychological Association. 2000
Digital Object Identifier:
http://dx.doi.org.library.capella.edu/10.1037/0003-066X.55.1.34
PMID:
11392863
PsycARTICLES Identifier:
amp-55-1-34
Accession Number:
2000-13324-004

80. Number of Citations in Source:
71
Library Chat
Subjective Well-Being : The Science of Happiness and a
Proposal for a National Index
Contents
1. Defining and Measuring SWB
2. Processes Underlying SWB: Adaptation, Goals, and
Temperament
3. National and Cultural Patterns of SWB
4. Summary
5. A National Index of SWB
6. Conclusion
7. References
By: Ed DienerDepartment of Psychology, University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign;
Acknowledgement: My sincere thanks are extended to the
following individuals for their perceptive comments: Frederick
Kanfer, Eva Pomerantz, Harry C. Triandis, Alexander Grob,
Larry Seidlitz, Andrew Clark, M. Joseph Sirgy, Howard
Berenbaum, Ulrich Schimmack, Robert Biswas-Diener, Carol
Diener, Eunkook Suh, Jonathan Lavav, and Daniel Kahneman.
For millennia thinkers have pondered the question, what is the
good life? They have focused on criteria such as loving others,
pleasure, or self-insight as the defining characteristics of
quality of life. Another idea of what constitutes a good life,
however, is that it is desirable for people themselves to think
that they are living good lives. This subjective definition of
quality of life is democratic in that it grants to each individual
the right to decide whether his or her life is worthwhile. It is
this approach to defining the good life that has come to be
called “subjective well-being” (SWB) and in colloquial terms is
sometimes labeled “happiness.” SWB refers to people’s
evaluations of their lives—evaluations that are both affective

81. and cognitive. People experience abundant SWB when they feel
many pleasant and few unpleasant emotions, when they are
engaged in interesting activities, when they experience many
pleasures and few pains, and when they are satisfied with their
lives. There are additional features of a valuable life and of
mental health, but the field of SWB focuses on people’s own
evaluations of their lives.
Throughout the world, people are granting increasing
importance to SWB. Inglehart (1990) proposed that as basic
material needs are met, individuals move to a postmaterialistic
phase in which they are concerned with self-fulfillment. Table 1
presents means from an international college sample of 7,204
respondents in 42 countries, signifying how students in diverse
countries view happiness (see Suh, Diener, Oishi, & Triandis,
1998, for more information about this sample). Mean values are
presented for how frequently the respondents reported thinking
about SWB and for how important they believed SWB is. As can
be seen, even in societies that are not fully westernized,
students reported that happiness and life satisfaction were very
important, and they thought about them often. Although there
was a trend for respondents in the most westernized nations to
grant SWB greater importance, mean levels of concern about
happiness were high in all of the countries surveyed. Among the
total sample, only 6% of respondents rated money as more
important than happiness. Furthermore, fully 69% rated
happiness at the top of the importance scale, and only 1%
claimed to have never thought about it. Of the respondents, 62%
rated life satisfaction at the top of the importance scale, and
only 2% reported never having thought about it. As people
throughout the world fulfill more of their basic material needs,
it is likely that SWB will become an even more valued goal.
Thus, although SWB is not sufficient for the good life (e.g.,
Diener, Sapyta, & Suh, 1998), it appears to be increasingly
necessary for it.
Importance of Subjective Well-Being to College Students

82. I briefly describe selected findings on SWB. Because this
article can present only a broad overview, readers are referred
to other reviews of the field (e.g., Diener, 1984; Diener, Suh,
Lucas, & Smith, 1999; Myers, 1992). Myers (2000, this issue)
discusses several correlates of SWB. Readers interested in the
connections of SWB to psychological phenomena such as
emotion, the biology of pleasure, and self-report judgment
processes are referred to Kahneman, Diener, and Schwarz
(1999), Parducci (1995), and Strack, Argyle, and Schwarz
(1991).
Defining and Measuring SWB
People’s moods and emotions reflect on-line reactions to events
happening to them. Each individual also makes broader
judgments about his or her life as a whole, as well as about
domains such as marriage and work. Thus, there are a number of
separable components of SWB: life satisfaction (global
judgments of one’s life), satisfaction with important domains
(e.g., work satisfaction), positive affect (experiencing many
pleasant emotions and moods), and low levels of negative affect
(experiencing few unpleasant emotions and moods). In the early
research on SWB, researchers studying the facets of happiness
usually relied on only a single self-report item to measure each
construct. For example, Andrews and Withey (1976) asked
respondents, “How do you feel about your life as a whole?”
Respondents were provided with a 7-point response scale
ranging from delighted to terrible. Recent measures of SWB,
however, contain multiple items. For example, the PANAS
(Positive and Negative Affect Scale; Watson, Clark, &
Tellegen, 1988) measures both positive and negative affect,
each with 10 affect items, and the Satisfaction With Life Scale
assesses life satisfaction with items such as “In most ways my
life is close to my ideal” and “So far I have gotten the important
things I want in life” (Pavot & Diener, 1993). Although the
psychometric properties of these scales tend to be strong, they
provide only one approach to assessing SWB.
In the past decade, researchers have used additional types of

83. assessment to obtain a better gauge of long-term feelings. In the
naturalistic experience-sampling method (ESM), for example,
researchers assess respondents’ SWB at random moments in
their everyday lives, usually over a period of one to four weeks.
Sandvik, Diener, and Seidlitz (1993) found that one-time self-
reported life satisfaction, ESM measures of life satisfaction,
reports by friends and relatives, and people’s memories of
positive versus negative life events intercorrelate at moderate-
to-strong levels. Moum (1996) found that low life-satisfaction
reports predicted suicide over the following five years. Lucas,
Diener, and Suh (1996) found that SWB measures showed
discriminant validity from other related constructs, such as
optimism. Thus, there is reason to believe that the existing
measures of SWB have some degree of validity (see Diener,
1994, for a review). Nevertheless, when and how the various
measures differ have not been explored systematically. For
example, Thomas and Diener (1990) found only a modest
relation between global and on-line mood reports, but
researchers do not yet understand what different factors
influence the two types of measures.
Despite the encouraging findings, SWB measures can be
contaminated by biases. For example, Schwarz and Strack
(1999) demonstrated in a series of studies that global measures
of life satisfaction can be influenced by mood at the moment of
responding to the scale and by other situational factors. They
also found that the ordering of items and other artifacts can
influence reports of SWB. Eid and Diener (1999) found,
however, that situational factors usually pale in comparison
with long-term influences on well-being measures. Another
potential problem is that people may respond to SWB scales in
socially desirable ways. If they believe that happiness is
normatively appropriate, they may report that they are happier
than other types of assessments may indicate.
Although single-occasion self-reports of SWB have a degree of
validity, and interesting conclusions have emerged from studies
using them, the artifacts mentioned above suggest caution. For

84. this reason, in the future researchers should more frequently
combine other types of measures with one-time scales. Although
based on self-report, the naturalistic ESM can circumvent some
memory and other biases that occur in more global reports.
Because people are randomly signaled at many points in time
and their moods in their natural life settings are recorded, a
more fine-grained record of their experience of well-being is
obtained. ESM yields information on how SWB varies across
situations and time. Kahneman (1999) argued that ESM ought to
be the primary measure of SWB, and Stone, Schiffman,
DeVries, and Frijters (1999) reviewed work in this area.
Additional methods, such as physiological measures, reports by
informants, and memory and reaction-time measures, also
should be included in complete assessments of SWB. Although
SWB is by definition subjective, experience can manifest itself
in physiology and other channels; self-report is not the only
way to assess experience. Because different methods of
measuring SWB can produce different scores, a battery of
diverse measures will produce the most informative composite.
Although each of the alternative measures has its own
limitations, the strengths of the different types of measures are
often complementary to each other. For example, in the memory
measure developed by Sandvik et al. (1993), respondents are
asked to generate as many positive and as many negative events
from their lives as they can during a short timed period. Thus,
with this method researchers can assess individual differences
in the relative accessibility of memories for good and bad
events and thereby can determine the valence-related structure
of how respondents recall their lives.
In addition to using diverse assessment methods, researchers
need to use measures of both pleasant and unpleasant affect,
because both are major components of SWB. Bradburn and
Caplovitz (1965) discovered that these two types of emotions,
formerly believed to be polar opposites, form two separable
factors that often correlate with different variables. Indeed,
their findings provided a major impetus to study positive well-

85. being, rather than assuming that it is only the absence of ill-
being. Good life events and extraversion tend to correlate with
pleasant emotions, whereas neuroticism and negative life events
covary more strongly with negative emotions. Cacioppo,
Gardner, and Berntson (1999) reviewed evidence indicating that
separate biological systems subserve pleasant and unpleasant
affect. Thus, it is desirable to measure them separately because
different conclusions often emerge about the antecedents and
consequences of these two types of affect. Although researchers
can combine positive and negative affect into an “affect
balance” or global “happiness” score, they may lose valuable
information about the two types of affect.
In defining happiness, it is common sense to combine the
frequency and intensity of pleasant emotions. That is, the
people considered to be the happiest are those who are intensely
happy more of the time. The findings of my colleagues and I
contradict this commonsense notion, however. How much of the
time a person experiences pleasant emotions is a better
predictor than positive emotional intensity of how happy the
person reports being (Diener, Sandvik, & Pavot, 1991). Further,
emotional intensity forms a factor that is independent of SWB
(Larsen & Diener, 1985). Thus, feeling pleasant emotions most
of the time and infrequently experiencing unpleasant emotions,
even if the pleasant emotions are only mild, is sufficient for
high reports of happiness.
Although most people report being above neutral in mood the
majority of the time (Diener & Diener, 1996), intense positive
moments are rare even among the happiest individuals (Diener
et al., 1991). Instead, happy people report mild-to-moderate
pleasant emotions most of the time when alone or with others
and when working or at leisure. One lesson from these findings
is that if people seek ecstasy much of the time, whether it be in
a career or a love relationship, they are likely to be
disappointed. Even worse, they may move to the next
relationship or job, seeking intense levels of happiness, which
in fact are rarely long-lasting and are not necessary for

86. happiness. People need to understand that intense experiences
are not the cornerstone of a happy life. Furthermore, according
to some theories of adaptation, such as that of Parducci (1995),
highly pleasurable experiences may have the disadvantage of
serving as a contrast point against which to compare other
positive experiences, thus making the mild events less
pleasurable.
Processes Underlying SWB: Adaptation, Goals, and
Temperament
In a classic 1971 article, Brickman and Campbell suggested that
all people labor on a “hedonic treadmill.” As they rise in their
accomplishments and possessions, their expectations also rise.
Soon they habituate to the new level, and it no longer makes
them happy. On the negative side, people are unhappy when
they first encounter misfortune, but they soon adapt and it no
longer makes them unhappy. On the basis of this reasoning,
Brickman and Campbell proposed that people are destined to
hedonic neutrality in the long run. Although an early study by
Brickman, Coates, and Janoff-Bulman (1978) on lottery winners
and people with spinal cord injuries produced equivocal support
for the notion of a hedonic treadmill, later data have
accumulated to support adaptation. For example, Silver (1982)
found that persons with spinal cord injuries were extremely
unhappy immediately after the accident that produced their
disability but quickly began to adapt. She found that within a
matter of only eight weeks, positive emotions predominated
over negative emotions in her respondents. During this period,
respondents experienced a downward trend in unpleasant
emotions and an upward trend in pleasant emotions, suggesting
a return toward the baseline conditions of mood experienced by
most people.
Researchers have also accumulated evidence that many life
circumstances correlate with SWB at only modest levels, again
supporting the idea of adaptation. For example, Campbell,
Converse, and Rodgers (1976) estimated that 10 resources,
including income, number of friends, religious faith,

87. intelligence, and education, together accounted for only 15% of
the variance in happiness. Campbell et al. and later
investigators (e.g., Diener, Sandvik, Seidlitz, & Diener, 1993)
have found small positive correlations within countries between
income and SWB—rich people on average are slightly happier
than poor people (Diener, Horwitz, & Emmons, 1985). In a
similar vein, Diener, Wolsic, and Fujita (1995) found that a
highly prized possession among college students, physical
attractiveness, predicted only small amounts of variance in
respondents’ reports of pleasant affect, unpleasant affect, and
life satisfaction. Perhaps even more striking, a number of
studies showed that objective physical health, even among the
elderly, is barely correlated with SWB (e.g., Okun & George,
1984).
Further studies revealed that people adapt to most conditions
very quickly. For example, Suh, Diener, and Fujita (1996) found
that in less than three months, the effects of many major life
events (e.g., being fired or promoted) lost their impact on SWB.
Stone and Neale (1984) examined the effects of a negative life
event. They identified 17 men who experienced a severe,
negative life event during participation in a daily mood study.
The authors reported that “same-day associations were
observed, but there was no strong evidence of changes in next-
day mood. The results offer no support for 2-day or longer
effects of daily, negative events” (Stone & Neale, 1984, p. 137).
A concrete instance of this phenomenon from the laboratory of
Randy Larsen (personal communication, 1990) is noteworthy.
One of Larsen’s participants in a study of mood suffered from
cancer and was receiving chemotherapy treatments. During the
study, physicians informed the participant that his cancer was in
remission, and his mood skyrocketed. In two days, however, his
affect returned to its former baseline! However, Winter,
Lawton, Casten, and Sando (1999) found that marriage and
widowhood were still producing heightened and lowered SWB,
respectively, six to eight months after the event.
Brickman and Campbell’s (1971) basic idea has stuck: People

88. do react strongly to good and bad events, but they then tend to
adapt over time and return to their original level of happiness.
A societal manifestation of adaptation is contained in Myers’s
(2000) discussion of income and SWB over the past five
decades. Income has risen dramatically in many nations since
World War II, and yet SWB has been virtually flat in the United
States and other highly developed countries (Oswald, 1997).
Apparently, people’s desires increase as their incomes rise, and
they therefore adapt to higher levels of income, with no net
increase in SWB. This interpretation is supported by Clark’s
(1998) finding that recent changes in pay predicted job
satisfaction, whereas mean levels of pay did not.
Brickman and Campbell’s (1971) theory has been refined in
several ways. First, people may not adapt back to neutrality but
may instead return to a positive set point. Diener and Diener
(1995) noted that most SWB reports are in the positive range,
above the neutral points of the scales. The means in Table 2
indicate this pattern—most nations average above 5.5, the
midpoint of the scale. Cacioppo et al. (1999) suggested that
there is a “positivity offset,” meaning that there is a weak
approach tendency in the absence of stimulation. Thus, the set
point first postulated by Brickman and Campbell actually might
be in the positive range because humans are predisposed to feel
predominantly pleasant affect if nothing bad is happening.
Mean Life Satisfaction and Income Across Nations
Another refinement of the hedonic treadmill idea is that the
baseline level of happiness to which people return is influenced
by their temperament. One reason to integrate personality with
the concept of adaptation is that personality predispositions
appear to be one of the strongest factors influencing long-term
levels of SWB. As noted by La Rochefoucauld (1940),
“happiness and misery depend as much on temperament as on
fortune” (p. 23). Studies on adopted-away separated twins show
that about half of the variance in current SWB in American
society is due to heritability (Tellegen et al., 1988). The partial

89. heritability of happiness is supported by research on early
temperament that suggests that emotional reactivity emerges
early in life and is moderately stable over time (e.g., Goldsmith,
1996). Further, in an ESM study in which respondents’ moods
were recorded in various naturally occurring situations, Diener
and Larsen (1984) found that participants’ average moods
showed a substantial amount of consistency across both
situations and time, suggesting that SWB is not a result only of
situational factors. Although people’s moods fluctuate from
moment to moment, there is a strong degree of stability in mean
levels of mood experienced, even over a period of years (e.g.,
Magnus & Diener, 1991) and across varying life circumstances
(Costa, McCrae, & Zonderman, 1987). Laboratory studies also
demonstrate that happy and unhappy people react differently to
the same stimuli. For example, Rusting and Larsen (1997)
demonstrated that extraverted individuals (those who appear to
react more strongly to rewards) responded more intensely to
positive than to negative pictures in a laboratory situation,
whereas neurotic individuals reacted more strongly to negative
photos.
The dynamic equilibrium model of Headey and Wearing (1992)
combines adaptation with personality. They proposed that
people maintain levels of pleasant affect and unpleasant affect
that are determined by their personalities. Advantageous and
disadvantageous events move individuals temporarily away
from their personal baselines, but over time they return to them.
For example, Winter et al. (1999) found that recent marriage
affected positive affect (but not negative affect) and that recent
widowhood affected negative affect (but not positive affect). In
support of the idea of adaptation, however, they found that
long-term marriage and widowhood did not influence levels of
positive and negative effect. Headey and Wearing maintained
that the separate baselines for positive affect and negative
affect are determined by personality predispositions to
extraversion and neuroticism, respectively. For example, Lucas,
Diener, Grob, Suh, and Shao (1998) found that extraversion

90. correlated with positive affect in virtually all of the 40 nations
they examined. Headey and Wearing argued that events and
circumstances do influence happiness, but in the long-term, the
impact of personality will also exert itself.
Scientists are exploring why people adapt to conditions.
Parducci (1995) offered a judgment theory of adaptation based
on the fact that people’s satisfaction with events depends on the
distribution of events in this domain that they have experienced
in the past. Parducci maintained that people react favorably to
events that are better than the comparison point provided by the
context of their past outcomes in this area, and they react
negatively to events that are lower than this comparison point.
Another interpretation of adaptation is offered by Kahneman
(1999), who argued that people in good circumstances may be
objectively happier than people in bad circumstances, but they
may require greater levels of pleasure to declare themselves
happy. Thus, people do not so much totally habituate to their
conditions, according to Kahneman’s view, as they adapt their
expectations to the amount of pleasure they desire and the
relative amount of happiness they report.
Another reason that people may adapt to new circumstances is
that they change their expectancies and goals. Emmons (1986),
Cantor and Sanderson (1999), and others have shown that
making progress toward goals is related to SWB. Diener and
Fujita (1999) found that having resources (e.g., money, physical
attractiveness, or social skills) in areas related to one’s goals is
a more accurate predictor of happiness than having resources
that are less related to one’s important goals. My colleagues and
I have also found that people feel better on days when they
make progress toward ends that they value highly than they do
on days when they are successful at achieving ends that they
value less (Oishi, Diener, Suh, & Lucas, 1999). In another
study, Oishi, Schimmack, and Diener (1999) found that high
sensation seekers were more satisfied with days when they
experienced pleasure and high arousal emotions, whereas low
sensation seekers preferred contentment. Although some goals,

91. such as seeking excitement, may be influenced by one’s
temperament, other goals are likely to be much more flexible.
Thus, one determinant of people’s adaptation to conditions
often might be the extent to which they alter their goals when
new circumstances prevail. Thus, goal flexibility may be a key
to SWB in adverse circumstances.
Although the reasons for adaptation are not fully understood, it
is clear that people do not habituate completely to all
conditions. Frederick and Loewenstein (1999) concluded that
people adapt rapidly to some circumstances (e.g.,
imprisonment), adapt slowly to other conditions (e.g., the death
of a loved one), and adapt little or not at all to other conditions
(e.g., noise and sex). Diener, Diener, and Diener (1995)
reported substantial differences between nations in SWB, even
though there has been ample time for people to adapt to the
circumstances in these societies. Mehnert, Kraus, Nadler, and
Boyd (1990) found that individuals who were born with
disabilities reported somewhat lower levels of SWB than did
persons without physical disabilities, and this differential was
especially large for those with multiple handicaps. This
indicates that people do not necessarily completely adapt to all
circumstances, even after many years. Although personality is
undoubtedly an important contributor to long-term levels of
well-being, it is an exaggeration to conclude that circumstances
have no influence. People’s set points appear to move up or
down, depending on the favorability of long-term circumstances
in their lives.
National and Cultural Patterns of SWB
A discussion of how societal variables influence SWB is
available in Diener and Suh (in press). Table 2 presents the
mean levels of life satisfaction for selected nations from the
World Values Survey (World Values Study Group, 1994),
conducted with representative samples of approximately 1,000
respondents per nation between 1990 and 1993. The purchasing
power parity figure is the percentage of purchasing power
(based on a standard “basket” of goods) that the average person

92. in each country can buy with his or her yearly income,
compared with the average purchasing power of individuals in
the United States. The correlation between mean purchasing
power income and mean life satisfaction was .62 across all
nations in the survey. The finding that wealthier nations have
higher levels of reported well-being has been replicated several
times (see Diener & Suh, 1999). One reason that wealthy
nations may be happier is that they are more likely to fulfill
basic human needs for food, shelter, and health, as well as to
have better human-rights records (Diener et al., 1995).
There were countries that were unexpectedly high or low in life
satisfaction even after income was controlled. For example,
mean levels of SWB in Brazil, Chile, and Argentina were higher
than predicted by their wealth, and life-satisfaction rates in
Eastern European nations and Russia were low, even after
controlling for the incomes there. The higher-than-expected
scores in Latin American nations may have been due to cultural
factors, whereas the lower-than-expected scores in former
communist countries may have been due to the political and
economic turmoil occurring in these nations during the years of
the survey. Japan appeared as an outlier, with high income and
relatively low SWB. This is perhaps because Japan is a highly
regulated society with strong conformity pressures and very
high expectations.
The poorest nations in the survey—China, India, and Nigeria—
did not show the extremely low SWB responses that
characterized earlier studies of the poorest societies. Perhaps
this is because levels of income are rising in these nations, and
at the same time people there have lower expectations than in
the West. The same general patterns in the World Values Survey
were found in earlier surveys (see Diener et al., 1995, for
analysis of the earlier surveys)—much variance in SWB is
accounted for by the wealth of nations, but culture and political
turmoil also have an influence.
In accord with the U.S. findings reported by Myers (2000),
Diener and Oishi (in press) found that happiness has not

93. increased regularly over the years in the nations where repeated
surveys have been conducted, even though income has increased
dramatically in most of these countries. Why does the wealth of
nations correlate with mean levels of life satisfaction, whereas
changes in income in the wealthiest nations produce no
increases in happiness? A likely explanation is that there is a
common set of economic desires around the world, and national
income is highly correlated with whether these desires can be
met. Because of global communication, it appears that the
standard is set now by the wealthiest nations. People in China,
India, and Nigeria want cars, refrigerators, VCRs, and the other
possessions that they see on television. In other words, it may
be that most people around the world now want many of the
things that people in the West possess, and their life satisfaction
is influenced to some degree by whether they are making
progress toward obtaining these goods. Overall, increases in
income in the wealthiest nations, however, do not raise levels of
SWB because it is the rising living standard in these nations
that influences people’s level of desires. As income increases in
the wealthiest nations, so does the evaluative standard.
One noteworthy finding is that variables often correlate
differently with life satisfaction in dissimilar cultures.
Individualistic cultures are those that stress the importance of
the individual and his or her thoughts, choices, and feelings. In
contrast, in collectivist cultures, people are more willing to
sacrifice their desires to the will of the group. Diener and
Diener (1995) found that self-esteem correlated more strongly
with life satisfaction in individualistic than in collectivist
societies. Thus, even a variable that seems intrinsically of great
importance to westerners, self-respect, is not highly correlated
with life satisfaction in some cultures. Another interesting
national difference in the correlates of mental health was
discovered by Eunkook Suh (1999). He found substantial
differences in whether “congruence”—acting consistently across
situations and in accord with one’s “self”—predicts life
satisfaction in South Korea versus in the United States. Suh

94. discovered that congruence was much less important to SWB in
Korea. Again, a variable that many western psychologists have
viewed as crucial to mental health may be more culture bound
than than they have believed.
Suh et al. (1998) also found large differences in whether people
in different cultures rely on their feelings when making life-
satisfaction judgments. When deciding how satisfied they are,
people in individualistic nations find it natural to consult their
affect, and feeling pleasant emotions frequently is a reasonable
predictor of life satisfaction in these societies. In contrast,
people in collectivist cultures tend to more often consult norms
for whether they should be satisfied and to consider the social
appraisals of family and friends in evaluating their lives. Thus,
people differ markedly across societies in the factors they
consider to be relevant to life satisfaction, perhaps because
culture can have a pervasive influence on people’s values and
goals.
An interesting pattern reveals itself when individualistic and
collectivistic nations are compared in terms of different
indicators of well-being. In individualistic nations, there are
reports of higher life satisfaction, and yet suicide rates also tend
to be higher (Diener, 1996). Similarly, there are elevated rates
of marital satisfaction in individualistic nations, and at the same
time the divorce rates are high. It seems that people in
individualistic societies say they are happy with their
circumstances, yet they more often change them. How can these
seemingly contradictory findings be explained? It may be that
when people in societies with more freedom are satisfied with
their marriages or jobs, they stay with them, but individualists
are more likely to change their circumstances when they are
dissatisfied. People in collectivist societies are more likely to
remain in bad marriages or bad jobs for the sake of others and
because of norms, and marriage and job satisfaction thus are on
average lower in these cultures even though divorce rates and
job turnover are also low. Thus, people in a collectivist society
may be more likely to sacrifice their personal happiness to do

95. their duty. The sense of satisfaction from doing the right thing,
however, may feel more rewarding when doing the right thing is
congruent with a person’s own desires and does not require
explicit sacrifices.
The pattern of SWB findings across cultures may also be
explained in part by levels of social support. The extended
families in collectivist societies are more likely to interfere
with people “following their bliss” but may also provide greater
social support in troubled times. Fewer people in collectivist
societies “do their own thing,” but fewer individuals are left to
fend for themselves. Although researchers cannot explain the
paradoxical cultural findings with certainty, these findings do
present a challenge to both individualistic and collectivist
cultures. How can a society allow individuals the freedom to
choose lives that are rewarding and spouses that are to their
liking, and nevertheless ensure that families are cohesive
enough to offer stable support? How can a society encourage
people to attribute successes internally and still not feel failures
too sharply? And how can a society permit individuals to do
what they want and yet convince them to act in ways that are
responsible to their families, friends, and communities?
Summary
SWB researchers formerly focused on who is happy (see Diener
et al., 1999)—whether it be the married, the wealthy, spiritual
individuals, or other demographic groups. The recent focus,
however, has been on when and why people are happy and on
what the processes are that influence SWB. Temperament and
personality appear to be powerful factors influencing people’s
SWB, in part because individuals usually adapt to some degree
to good and bad conditions. People do not seem to completely
adapt to all conditions, but as of yet researchers have only a
rudimentary understanding of when and why adaptation is more
or less complete. People’s values and goals seem intimately tied
to what events are perceived as good and bad, and therefore a
plausible hypothesis is that goal change is an inherent
component of adaptation.

96. Cultural and societal factors influence SWB in several ways.
First, some countries are better able to meet people’s basic
needs, such as for food, clean water, and health, and these
nations evidence higher levels of SWB. Another effect of
culture is to alter the correlates of SWB by influencing people’s
goals and values. Finally, variations in cultural influences on
mean levels of SWB appear to result from variations in
optimism and positivity, social support, coping patterns, and the
degree of regulation of individual desires. The pervasiveness of
societal influences on mean levels of SWB raises the question
of how American culture is faring.
A National Index of SWB
I propose that the United States needs indicators of SWB that
can be used to track happiness over time. Ideally, these
indicators would include ESMs of nationally representative
samples of respondents. National ESM surveys could provide
valuable information on how frequently and intensely people
feel satisfied and happy in various life circumstances and across
types of situations. The SWB of individuals from various age
groups, regions, occupational categories, and income levels
could be compared, and policymakers and corporate leaders
would therefore be more likely to consider SWB in their
decisions. As long as national indicators focus on the
production of goods and services, it is those factors that leaders
are likely to consider. If a national indicator of SWB were
available, policies could be judged partly by how they
influenced happiness. Ideally, the national SWB indicators
would include various components of SWB, such as pleasant
affect, unpleasant affect, life satisfaction, fulfillment, and more
specific states such as stress, affection, trust, and joy. The
“Eurobarometer” surveys conducted in European nations could
serve as a model for an index that could be implemented in the
United States and conducted by either the federal government or
a private survey agency such as Gallup. One value of national
indicators is that researchers could determine which segments
of society are least happy and perhaps fashion policies to aid

97. them.
An important basic question to ask before specific policies
aimed at improving SWB are considered is whether SWB is so
dependent on temperament that policies cannot affect it. Despite
the effects of adaptation, life circumstances do matter to SWB;
happiness is not completely based on inborn temperament. The
data for the least satisfied nation in the World Values Survey,
Bulgaria, show that fully 60% of respondents were below the
midpoint of the scale on life satisfaction, and 40% were below
neutral for affect balance, meaning that they reported more
negative than positive emotions. Further, findings on people
with multiple disabilities, young widows, and people
chronically exposed to noise indicate that humans do not
completely adapt to all conditions. Conditions do matter to
SWB, and some nations are superior to others when it comes to
happiness. Furthermore, measures focused on specific domains,
such as work or health, are more likely to be sensitive to
changes in circumstances than are measures of life satisfaction,
which is dependent on so many factors that any single area is
likely to have a small impact. Thus, it is not a fruitless endeavor
to monitor and enhance SWB—conditions in a society can
influence it.
A fundamental question related to monitoring SWB is whether it
is desirable to increase SWB; is it really a good thing? For
example, some might worry that too much satisfaction will
leave people unmotivated or that pleasant emotions will cause a
shallow form of hedonism. All the evidence to date, however,
suggests that these concerns are unfounded—people high in
SWB on average have a number of desirable qualities. There is
some evidence that happy people participate more in community
organizations, are more liked by others, are less likely to get
divorced, tend to live slightly longer, perform better at work
(e.g., Staw, Sutton, & Pelled, 1994; Veenhoven, 1988), and earn
higher incomes (Diener, Nickerson, Lucas, & Sandvik, 2000).
These findings are correlational, and psychologists have little
understanding of why happy people might on average exhibit

98. more desirable behaviors. Nevertheless, happy individuals seem
on average to be more productive and sociable. Thus, high
levels of SWB might be beneficial for a society, and no
evidence indicates they would be harmful.
A national index of SWB would help inform postmaterialist
Amerian society about the desirable balance of work,
relationships, recreation, and spirituality. Although wealthy
nations are on average happier, it is important to recognize that
recent increases in income in the richest nations have not
benefited SWB. Furthermore, only small advantages in SWB
accrue to the most affluent members of wealthy societies. Thus,
it may be that little can be gained in terms of SWB by
individuals making more money. Another implication of the
static levels of SWB in the United States is that people’s
expectations must remain at realistic levels. At the individual
level, people must realize that feelings of wealth depend as
much on the level of one’s desires as on objective income.
Lasting happiness may come, in part, from activities such as
working for one’s goals (e.g., Emmons, 1986), participating in
close social relationships (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Myers,
2000), experiencing renewable physical pleasures (Scitovsky,
1982), experiencing mental pleasures (Kubovy, 1999), and
being involved in “flow” activities (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997).
According to this view, further economic growth in the
wealthiest societies may provide SWB to the extent that it
enhances rewarding work activities in pursuit of meaningful
goals. Quality of work life is likely to be at least as important to
SWB as is income. Similarly, policies that foster close
relationships and meaningful activities are likely to be more
successful at enhancing SWB than policies designed exclusively
to improve efficiency. To the extent that higher incomes allow
people to engage in more rewarding activities, they will
improve SWB. However, higher productivity could decrease
levels of SWB if it requires long hours of boring work, high
levels of stress, and little leisure time.
If national indicators of SWB were available on an annual basis,

99. it would provide fascinating information that potentially could
enlighten policy making, as well as individual choices. A host
of interesting questions could be answered, such as the
following: Are religious people happier? Are the effects of
poverty on SWB moderated by the level of basic services, such
as health and education, that are available? Do children of
divorce suffer lower levels of SWB on a long-term basis? How
is the rate at which people are able to save money related to
SWB? Do ethnic minorities in some places have higher SWB
than others? Does the relation of income to SWB depend on
consumption, on how people spend their incomes? The above
questions are meant to convey that a national SWB index might
be used to answer questions from a broad spectrum of political
viewpoints, not only queries raised by the political left or right.
Ideally, a national index would include a panel component that
followed the same individuals over time. An advantage of a
national indicator of SWB would be that it would make clear in
which domains people are more and less satisfied, thus
suggesting where interventions might be most needed. Further, a
national index would provide an educational function, alerting
people to the factors that influence their SWB.
Conclusion
Psychologists’ knowledge of SWB is rudimentary; a stronger
scientific base is necessary to make unequivocal
recommendations to societies and individuals about how to
increase happiness. I hope, however, that the above review
makes it clear that scientific knowledge about SWB is possible
and desirable. Societies need to afford the same importance to
SWB as they do now to economics: tracking the phenomenon,
supporting research to understand it, and educating people about
it. To create a better society where happiness is ubiquitous, a
major scientific effort to understand quality of life is needed. If
psychologists’ institute a national survey to track SWB, it is
more likely that it will become an outcome variable that is
considered in policy decisions.
Nobody would claim that SWB is a sufficient condition for

100. mental health, nor would psychologists choose to evaluate
people’s lives solely on the basis of whether they are happy;
psychologists value additional characteristics. Nevertheless, in
this democratic nation where the opinions of individuals are
granted respect, people’s own evaluations of their lives must
figure prominently in assessing the success of American
society.
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