Art of InfoJacking, Source Conference Seattle, 2011

Art of InfoJacking
Detecting/Testing Web Network Devices – Hidden Patterns

Source Security Conference
15th-16th June 2011, Seattle
Software Confidence. Achieved.
Aditya K Sood
Security Researcher
adi_ks [at] secniche.org | asood@cigital.com

Friday, June 17, 2011 1

About Me
 Aditya K Sood
─ Founder , SecNiche Security (Research Arena)
● Independent Security Consultant, Researcher and Practitioner
● Worked previously for Armorize, Coseinc and KPMG
● Active Speaker at Security conferences
● Written Content for – ISSA/ISACA/Virus Bulletin/
CrossTalk/HITB/Hakin9/Elsevier NESE|CFS
● LinkedIn : http://www.linkedin.com/in/adityaks
● Website: http://www.secniche.org | Blog: http://secniche.blogspot.com
─ PhD Candidate at Michigan State University

© 2011 Cigital Inc. Friday, June 17, 2011 2

Words
Disclaimer
 All vulnerabilities and attacks presented in this presentation were discovered during my
professional avocation with web application penetration testing and research.
 This research is different from my ongoing routine work.
 All contents of this presentation represent my own beliefs and views and do not, unless
explicitly stated otherwise, represent the beliefs of my current, or any of my previous in that
effect, employers.
 All for Education and Development Purposes

Sincere Thanks
 Sammy Migues ( Principal Consultant , Cigital)
 Joel Scambray (Managing Principal, Cigital)
 Robert Hines ( Managing Consultant, Cigital)
 Richard J Enbody ( A. Professor, Michigan State University)


Agenda
Disclaimer
 Information Gathering Facets
 Information Truth
 Web Network Devices
 HTTP Cloaking
 Inside Layer 7 (HTTP) Policy Metrics
 Custom HTTP Response Headers
 Cookie and IP Session Management

 Proxy Protocols
 Web Proxy Auto Detection (WPAD)
 Proxy Auto Configuration (PAC)

 Anonymous Services
 Art of Information Gathering
 Vulnerable and Bad Design Practices in Network Devices
 Conclusion


Information Gathering – Perspectives !


Information Gathering – Truth !


Web Network Devices

Pictures Courtesy – Google Search


HTTP Cloaking
 Inside Server Cloaking
─ Bait and switch paradigm
─ General working
– To serve different pages to search engines and generic requests
– Web server is scripted to return original pages to search engines by
fingerprinting search spider requests
– Basically, a stealth process of hiding the reality of web servers
– Thought- cloaking is necessary to protect the meta data. Is it ethical?
─ Is it true server cloaking technique is used by web based security
devices?
– Yes, Web Application Firewalls (WAF’s) use this technique effectively
– Zero visibility
» Internal web servers
» Internal application servers
» Operating systems in use
» Applied patch levels
– Target – to conceal all sensitive information that may result in potential
attack

HTTP Cloaking (Cont..)
 Considered as an implicit technique to thwart web attacks
– Combining HTTP Cloaking with web net work security devices provides
additional layer of security
– It is required to protect the URL space of the internal web servers
– Looks quite robust from security point of view
─ Applied Techniques
● HTTP response header manipulation and rewriting
– Rewriting the sensitive data information from the headers
– Manipulating the layout of HTTP response headers
– Adding custom headers for traffic management based on user information
● URL translations
– Web Address Translation (WAT) proposed in 2007 by Net continuum
– URL address translation from exterior to interior networks
– Typically, based on DNS namespaces and implicit mapping
– Internal application changes does not impact the external URL scheme
– Web administrators have full access to the user requests and the resultant
URL’s


Facets of HTTP Cloaking

Pictures Courtesy – Google Search

Layer 7 – HTTP Policy Designing
 Layer 7 Policy Differentiators
 Defining the depth of HTTP request parsing
– Forcing the device to read the number of bytes in HTTP request

 POST classification input handling
– Forcing the device to scrutinize HTTP header or HTTP Body or both

 Persistent switching mode
– Defines behavior with multiple client requests over the same TCP connection.
– First request/ complete and overwrite /complete and maintain

 HTTP request normalization
– Enables or disables normalization of URLs in HTTP requests, before parsing
the HTTP request itself.

 Explicit farm naming
– Explicitly configure the name of the farm with the load that must be taken into
consideration during the DNS resolve phase

 Backend port encryption

Layer 7 Content Switching
 Effective process of switching traffic
– Heavily used by web based network security devices
– Content is switched based on the URL header information
– Sometimes used collaboratively with the WAF’s

 Content Switching – How?
● URL header matching criteria
– HTTP response header
– HTTP status codes
– Client IP address
– HTTP versions (HTTP1.0/ HTTP1.1)
– HTTP methods
– URL and URI pathinfo
– Header value
● Load balancing
– Appropriate HTTP handling and redirection
– Algorithms (Round Robin/ Weighted Round Robin / Least Requested)


HTTP Request Normalization
 Security Devices and Normalization
– WAF’s and IDS/IPS has to perform normalization to incoming HTTP
requests
– Normalization is required to manage the detection/prevention control
mechanism
– Depends on web server compliance in accordance to HTTP RFC

 Productivity
● HTTP Requests Fuzzing
– Analyzing HTTP responses by sending invalid HTTP verbs
– Return status code provides a lot of information
– Also depends on the configuration of web server that allows HTTP methods
– WAF’s and IDS/IPS – fuzzing may result in bypass and helps in designing
bypasses
– Examples
– Invalid verbs (POSTTT , GETTT, ROGUE, rnrnrn etc)
– Using encoded separators instead of white characters (%20  t)
– Encoding (Unicode, double encoding, %, //, %00, etc)


HTTP Cloaking (Example 1)
Response Check 1

HTTP/1.1 200 OKrn
Date: Tue, 05 Jul 2007 17:05:18 GMTrn
Server: Serverrn Citrix NetScaler
Vary: Accept-Encoding,User-Agentrn
Content-Type: text/html;
(WAF + Load Balancer)
charset=ISO-8859-1rn
nnCoection: closern
Transfer-Encoding: chunkedrn

Response Check 2

send: 'GET /?Action=DescribeImages&AWSAccessKeyId=0CZQCKRS3J69PZ6QQQR2&Owner.1
=084307701560&SignatureVersion=1&Version=2007-01- 03&Signature=<signature removed>
HTTP/1.1rnHost: ec2.amazonaws.com:443rnAccept- Encoding: identityrnrn' reply: 'HTTP/1.1 200
OKrn' header: Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1 header: Transfer-Encoding: chunked header: Date: Thu, 15
Feb 2007 17:30:13 GMT

 send: 'GET /?Action=ModifyImageAttribute&Attribute=launchPermission&AWSAccessKeyId
=0CZQCKRS3J6 9PZ6QQQR2&ImageId=ami-00b95c69&OperationType=add&SignatureVersion=1&
Timestamp=2007- 02-15T17%3A30%3A14&UserGroup.1=all&Signature=<signature removed>
HTTP/1.1rnHost: ec2.amazonaws.com:443rnAccept-Encoding: identityrnrn' reply: 'HTTP/1.1 400
Bad Requestrn' header: Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1 header: Transfer-Encoding: chunked header:
Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2007 17:30:14 GMT header: nnCoection: close


Request /Response Check
GET / HTTP/1.1
Hostexample.com
User-Agent Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.0; en-US; rv:1.9.2.12) Gecko/20101026 Firefox/3.6.12
Accept text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Keep-Alive 115
Connection keep-alive
(Status-Line) HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently Citrix NetScaler
DateMon, 08 Nov 2010 19:49:23 GMT (WAF + Load Balancer)
Cneonction close
Content-Type httpd/unix-directory
Set-Cookie
uu=9mjpm8rn90Duu4CQwFOZbQPyOCTl4V6yoHENgcCxLaHVsZ3h5dQ99JSlTTGlpO4Tw/IehNChD
cKgwZ4SkLD98SNSnGEggS3RM4FdkEVkaDIDUknUIRRI9fOEyYXz10uCA9bKIgdm+sIHNgpXl6Y
Lh+ChPhIREU2wQKD9obDCvgGQ0Y3BwNGN8eNSvhGz0h6ypaRIUuPyHvWQ8paioPEtkaDRnSGA
wr4RsLFNwcDRnSGDwr4Rs9IesqPUWCLgwh6yoME9ocDRnSGT4r4Rs9IesqPyHvLjom6Co=;expires
=Thu, 30 Dec 2037 00:00:00 GMT;path=/;domain=.imdb.com
Set-Cookie session-id=284-9245763-9527093;path=/;domain=.imdb.com
Set-Cookie session-id-time=1289332163;path=/;domain=.imdb.com
Vary Accept-Encoding,User-Agent
Content-Encoding gzip
P3P policyref="http://i.imdb.com/images/p3p.xml",CP="CAO DSP LAW CUR ADM IVAo IVDo CONo
OTPo OUR DELi PUBi OTRi BUS PHY ONL UNI PUR FIN COM NAV INT DEM CNT STA HEA
PRE LOC GOV OTC "
Content-Length 20


Response Check 1

HTTP/1.0 404 Not Foundrn
Xontent-Length: rn
Server: thttpd/2.25b 29dec2003rn Citrix NetScaler
Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1rn
Last-Modified: Tue, 05 Jul 2010 17:01:12 GMTrn (WAF + Load Balancer)
Accept-Ranges: bytesrn
Cache-Control: no-cache, no-storern
Date: Tue, 05 Jun 2010 17:01:12 GMTrn
Content-Length: 329rn
Connection: closern
HTTP/1.0 302 Moved Temporarily
Age: 0
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 2010 12:01:55 GMT
Xontent-Length:
Connection: Close
Via: NS-CACHE-7.0: 11
ETag: "KXIPDABNAPPNNTZS"
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.1.6
Location: http://216.99.132.20/smb/index.php
Content-type: text/html
Xontent-Length: rn:”


Custom HTTP Response Headers
 Custom HTTP Response Headers
─ Web security devices add its own custom response headers
─ General working
– WAF’s usually adds HTTP response headers
– All the HTTP traffic is routed through the intermediate security device
– Basically, VIA: and Cache: response headers are added
– Primarily, there is no need to request web server every time if an updated
copy of web site is present in the cache
– Via: header supports the fact that traffic is handled by another device in the
network which can make changes in the inbound and outbound HTTP traffic


Custom HRH (Example)

Response Headers
HTTP/1.0 200 OK
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 2010 08:45:45 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Connection: keep-alive
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Last-Modified: Wed, 25 Aug 2010 08:45:46 GMT
X-BinarySEC-Via: frontal2.re.saas.example.com

HTTP/1.0 301 Moved Permanently
Content-length: 0
BinarySec Device
Content-language: fr
X-binarysec-cache: saas.example.com
Location: http://www.binarysec.fr/cms/index.html
Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2009 22:49:01 GMT
Content-type: text/html

Vary: Accept-Encoding
Last-Modified: Wed, 25 Aug 2010 08:45:46 GMT
X-BinarySEC-Via: frontal2.re.saas.example.com


Cookie and IP Session Management
 Custom HTTP Response Header (Set-Cookie)
─ Web security devices add its own Set-Cookie response header
– Adding Security to existent cookie (Web Server)
– HTTP Web security devices manages sessions using self driven cookies
– Effective way to manage sessions with intermediate layer of working
– Use internal IP addresses to generate sessions (BIG IP Devices)

─ WAF’. Do they play around with cookie?
● Cookie Encryption (configuration specific)
– Encrypting cookies before sending it to client. Hard to interpret.
– Possible protecting the integrity of the cookies
● Cookie Signing (configuration specific)
– Adding digital signature as second line of defense to existent cookie
– If tampered, digital signature wont be verified in general
– Simple and direct detection mechanisms
– Example: Barracuda Web Application Firewalls does this.


CSM (Example 1)
Response Check (It uses Set_Cookie with “Barracuda” name parameter)
HTTP/1.0 500 Internal Server Error
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 2010 05:52:54 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Barracuda WAF
Cache-Control: private
Content-Length: 5145
Set-Cookie: BNI__BARRACUDA_LB_COOKIE=df0fa8c000005000; Path=/; Max-age=1020
HTTP/1.0 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: text/html
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 2010 05:02:23 GMT
Connection: close
Content-Length: 39
Set-Cookie: BARRACUDA_LB_COOKIE=192.168.155.11_80; path=/
HTTP/1.0 200 OK
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 2010 10:29:51 GMT
Server: BarracudaServer.com (Windows)
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: No-Cache
Set-Cookie: BarracudaDrive=3.2.1; expires=Wed, 07 Sep 2011 10:29:51 GMT


CSM (Example 2)
Request / Response (GEO Location Based Session Management)

(Request-Line) GET / HTTP/1.1
Host www.example.net
User-Agent Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.0; en-US; rv:1.9.2.12) Gecko/20101026 Firefox/3.6.12
Accept text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive 115
Connection keep-alive Juniper Sec Device

(Status-Line) HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Accept-Ranges bytes
Content-Type text/html; charset=UTF-8
Date Mon, 08 Nov 2010 18:48:02 GMT
Connection keep-alive
Set-Cookie rl-sticky-key=b159fd3052f1f60eea47e0dc56d57d62; path=/; expires=Mon, 08 Nov 2010
19:35:22 GMT
Set-Cookie
CT_Akamai=georegion=264,country_code=US,region_code=MI,city=EASTLANSING,dma=551,msa=4
040,areacode=517,county=INGHAM,fips=26065,lat=42.7369,long=-84.4838,timezone=EST,zip=48823-
48826,continent=NA,throughput=vhigh,bw=1000,asnum=237,location_id=0; path=/;
domain=example.net


CSM and IPSM ( Example 3)
Request / Response

E:audit>nc example.com 80
GET / HTTP/1.1
HOST:example.com

HTTP/1.1 302 Object moved
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0 Big IP Sec Device
Date: Mon, 08 Nov 2010 17:41:56 GMT
Location: http://www.example.com/us/index.asp
Content-Length: 159
Set-Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDCCCCSBAA=AHLDLDDANEKJOOPHGOHAAKBA; path=/
Cache-control: private
Set-Cookie: http.pool=167880896.20480.0000; path=/

<head><title>Object moved</title></head>
<body><h1>Object Moved</h1>This object may be found <a
HREF="http://www.example.com/us/index.asp">here</a>.</body>


CSM and IPSM ( Example 3 Cont…..)
Request / Response

E:audit>nc example.com 80
GET / HTTP/1.1
HOST:example.com
Big IP Sec Device

HTTP/1.1 302 Object moved
Set-Cookie: http.pool=167880896.20480.0000; path=/
Converting to Binary: Binary ( cookie ) Part == 00001010000000011010100011000000

Converting to blocks of 4
00001010
00000001
10101000
11000000

00001010  10
00000001 1
10101000  168
11000000 192

192.168.1.10


Web Proxy Auto Detection Protocol (WPAD)
 Inside WPAD
– To detect network proxy automatically
– Protocol based on DHCPINFORM query.
– DHCP based , No DNS. Query is sent through URL
– Configuration entries are present in wpad.dat file
– FindProxyForURL () function is used


 Information Driven
– Access to wpad.dat leverages lot of critical information
– Becomes easy to map proxy servers and internal network


– Beneficial in penetration testing


Proxy Auto Config (PAC)
 Inside PAC
– Indicates browser to find proxy t( manual implementation)
– FindProxyForURL () function is used


Proxy Auto Config (PAC)


Anonymous Access and Exploitation
 Anonymous Access
─ General working
– Some network based security devices allows anonymous access
– To what extent we can exploit the scenario?
– Tactical exploitation and robust techniques are required
– Typically protocol that falls under this is {FTP} as an example


 Is that all ?


 Is that all ? NO !


Case Study – Synology Diskstation Manager
 Is that all ? NO !
 FTP Console – Default Buffer Tactic
 Determining the number of characters that are acceptable
 FTP Protocol
 Username – Another generic input point
 Password – Another input point


 Is that all ? So what !
 FTP Console – Using it as an entry point to conduct XSS
 Exploiting the vulnerable log module at the backend
 Remote code execution using CRSF payload injected through FTP console

Advisory : http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2010-3684

 Pwned !

Advisory : http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2010-3684

HTTP Web Server – Network Devices
 HTTP Web Server Types and Usage
 Listed web servers are used effectively in network based devices
 Comparative study of the acceptable HTTP verbs


The Culprit – CGI Implementation
 Implementation of CGI enabled interfaces
─ Web security devices uses CGI interface for HTTP functionality
─ Point of command injection. Hidden services execution
─ Unauthorized access and implicit restriction bypasses
─ Examples ( never ending ………)
– /cgi-bin/filemanager/filemanager.cgi?folder=/home/httpd/cgi-
bin/filemanager/share&lang=eng [NAS Device]
– /cgi-bin/password.cgi
– /cgi/maker/unittest.cgi?action=
– /cgi/maker/tools.cgi?command=
– /control/click.cgi?list | /img/image.cgi?next_file=main_fs.htm
– /control/rotorcgi?help
– /en/help.cgi?ID=25 | /main_activex.cgi
– /cgi-bin/wg_login-act.cgi
– /CgiStart?page=Login&Language=0
– /cgi/b/users/usrpage/?nm=1
– /cgi-bin/csi_login-act.cgi

Bad Design or Ignorance !!


Binary Controls and Decompilation
 Binary Authentication Controls
─ Bad practice in authentication process
─ Usage of [0|1] and [Yes|No] in the authentication modules
─ Verifying authentication information in URL’s
─ http://www.example.com/auth.php?authenticated=YES|NO

 Decompiling Java Applets (JAR Files)
─ Very effective process in detecting and finding information
─ Devices using Java applets must be decompiled
─ Leverages lot of information
─ Hard coded passwords ; Reflected information about sessions
─ Understanding about the login algorithm and specific details


Encryption Issues in Binary Data


Information Patterns – Never Ending


Conclusion


Questions and Gratitude


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