APCO Geopolitical Risk Radar: Q2 2023

GEOPOLITICAL
APCO
RISK RADAR
THE GLOBAL OPERATING ENVIRONMENT IN Q2 2023

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Welcome to the APCO Geopolitical Risk Radar
(AGRR), an overview of geopolitical risks posed to
global corporations in critical operating regions.
AGRR reflects our understanding of the regional risks facing
businesses and how these risks come together at a global level.
It is intended as a baseline from which to develop strategies that
navigate and mitigate these risks. This report looks at emerging
trends for Q2 2023 and was published in March 2023.
The regional insights represent the best thinking of APCO
corporate advisory practitioners. With nearly 1,000 people across
more than 30 global locations, our analysis draws on decades of
experience and insights serving corporations that operate globally.
The final part of AGRR features our Geopolitical Conversation
Risk Index, which illustrates the attention global media gives each
risk and the degree to which Fortune 500 companies are already
acting or are likely to take action.
HEADLINE GLOBAL RISKS
TOP-LINE TRENDS
Q2 SPOTLIGHT RISK: GLOBAL FOOD SECURITY
REGIONAL INSIGHTS
Asia Pacific
China
South Asia
Middle East & North Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Russia & Eastern Europe
Western Europe
Latin America & Caribbean
United States & Canada
MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS & FORUMS
GEOPOLITICAL RISK TRAJECTORY
UPCOMING GLOBAL EVENTS
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HEADLINE GLOBAL RISKS
Acute Transitory Enduring
China
• U.S. and China are seeking to reengage
despite the hawkish attitudes of the
U.S. Congress.
• U.S. export controls will mount on China’s
tech ambitions.
• Forced labor legislation in the West
will prompt supply-chain compliance
challenges and spur reconfiguration.
• Dynamics of post-(Zero) COVID recovery
are set to color evolving policy priorities.
Asia Pacific
• The regional economic outlook has
improved but is tempered by persistent
inflation and a global slowdown.
• U.S.-China power struggle polarizes the
region and drives new alliances.
• Regional technology regulations are
proliferating as national policies diverge
from a once-uniform set of rules.
• Upcoming elections will shape domestic
and foreign policy landscapes across the
region in 2023 and beyond.
• North Korean provocations are further
extending into cyberspace, compounding
security tensions in the region.
South Asia
• India is looking to expand regional
influence after taking over the
presidencies of the G20 and the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO).
• Political and economic instability
continue to roil Pakistan as negotiations
with the IMF progress.
• Sri Lanka is pursuing fiscal reforms in an
effort to stabilize its economy.
• Bangladesh faces a deteriorating
economic outlook ahead of key election.
United States & Canada
• The North American economic outlook
remains uncertain despite growth
and employment outpacing other
advanced economies.
• U.S.-China tensions simmer as public
opinion hardens and Congress looks to
set tone on relationship.
• U.S. industrial policies aimed at China
spur friction with Western allies.
• Foreign investment in farmland
could be limited as the U.S. launches
bipartisan efforts against Chinese
ownership of agricultural land.
Latin America & Caribbean
• Leftist governments face intensifying
challenges.
• Slow growth threatens economic
recovery in Latin America.
• The region braces for a surge in U.S.-
bound migration as a pandemic-era
rule expires.
• President Lula is looking to reassert
Brazil’s leadership amid domestic
challenges and shifting global dynamics.
Western Europe
• EU electricity prices fall despite
market volatility as a long-term energy
crisis looms.
• The EU responds to the Biden
Administration’s Inflation Reduction
Act (IRA) with concern and a push for
green initiatives.
• Uncertainty persists as Russia’s war with
Ukraine strains relationships, policies
and the supply chain.
Middle East & North Africa
• Fuel-importing countries in the
region continue to face weakening
economies amidst a slow and
unsteady economic rebound.
• Opportunity lies ahead for the
COP28 meeting.
• Alliances evolve ahead of restoration
of diplomatic relations with Saudi
Arabia and Iran.
• Regional cooperation will deepen
in efforts to solve global supply
chain challenges resulting from the
war in Ukraine.
Sub-Saharan Africa
• Africa is struggling to absorb the
impact of extreme droughts and the
war in Ukraine.
• Elections across Africa have been
hampered by delays, corruption and
disinformation.
• African nations are leaning on
international financial institutions as
the debt crisis worsens.
• Violence and corruption remain top
concerns as regional tensions and
terrorist threats evolve.
Russia & Eastern Europe
• The Russia-Ukraine war persists.
• Western sanctions and Russian
countermeasures disrupt—and potentially
decouple—global business structures.
• Russian commercial and diplomatic
overtures to India, Turkey and the
Global South continue.
• Breakdown of nonproliferation norms
raises the risk of a nuclear escalation.
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TOP-LINE TRENDS
Anemic global economy
Inflation remains a persistent
challenge in advanced economies—
impeding growth, reducing private
investment, and pushing some
nations to the brink of recession
in 2023. At the same time, rising
interest rates and a strong U.S.
dollar are eroding foreign reserves
and escalating the risk of default
for an increasing number of
developing nations. Policymakers
are facing the difficult task of
balancing the need for economic
stimulus with the imperative
to rein in inflation and prevent
financial instability. While the
global outlook has shown signs of
improvement—thanks to China's
sudden reopening and signs that
inflation is slowing in the Eurozone
amid decline energy costs—overall
growth will continue to be sluggish.
Moreover, current projections
suggest that inflation will remain
above pre-pandemic levels
through 2024. Businesses will
likely face a faltering of consumer
confidence and constrained
spending as a result.
Hot competition; cold war
Competition for private investment
continues to heat up with the
rollout of U.S. industrial polices
and unprecedented investments,
subsidies and tax breaks for
semiconductors, advanced
R&D, infrastructure and green
technologies. This is prompting
proposals for counter-subsidies
among European and Asian allies.
At the same time, trade between
China and its key trading partners
continues to grow despite sanctions
and export controls. The Chinese
government has committed to
supporting foreign investors and is
increasingly active in projecting its
financial and political influence in
non-aligned jurisdictions, including
Latin America, Southeast Asia, the
Gulf and Sub-Saharan Africa.
Focus on supply
chain transparency
The implementation of the Uyghur
Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA)
in the U.S. has forced companies
importing to the U.S. to take a deeper
look at their supply chains and
understand, to an unprecedented
level of detail, the origin and
chain of custody of their products.
Simultaneously the EU is finalizing
a proposal to regulate the import
of products produced with forced
labor, and guidance on how that will
be implemented should come later
this year. The EU is looking to the
U.S. after several months of UFLPA
implementation. The bloc is seeking
to place a greater emphasis on the
environment and human rights in
supply chains of importers through
the proposed EU supply chain
directive, which we expect to move in
the European Parliament in May.
Arrival of generative AI
Generative AI through platforms like
OpenAI / ChatGPT and Google’s Bard
are set to accelerate new opportunities,
risks and disruptions for businesses and
societies at large. The opportunities
are clear—generative AI represents
an accessible way for workers across
sectors to jettison repetitive and tedious
tasks and become more productive.
However, the regulatory environment
for AI is nonexistent in most countries.
Artificial intelligence applications for
everyday use and routine tasks will spark
a realignment of labor practices, de-
stabilizing and rewriting social contracts
between workers, employers and
citizens across much of the world.
These platforms pose significant
legal and ethical issues, including
discrimination and bias, disinformation
campaigns, threats to white collar
jobs, consumer privacy breaches and
biased programming. These concerns
are top-of-mind for corporate entities
and policymakers alike. Despite
considerable risks, these platforms
can also be useful tools. ChatGPT or
Google’s Bard may not replace human
labor, but someone working with AI may.
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Q2 SPOTLIGHT RISK: GLOBAL FOOD SECURITY
While the price of staple grains has stabilized since the spike after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, prices remain high relative to pre-pandemic levels. Consequently, the
World Food Program projects that over 345 million people will be food insecure in 2023—double the number recorded in 2020.
Three main factors could further undermine global food security in 2023:
It is becoming increasingly apparent that more systematic and comprehensive discussions among private and public stakeholders are needed to build a resilient and
sustainable agricultural system that can withstand future shocks and sustainably meet the growing demand for food.
Soaring fertilizer prices
could turn an affordability crisis
into an availability crisis:
Fertilizer shortages stemming from Russia's
invasion of Ukraine have forced many farmers
to reduce fertilizer consumption, which could
result in lower crop yields and diminished food
production in 2023.
Climate change-driven
disasters spur crop failures:
The prospect of severe weather events
overshadows an already fragile global food
system. For instance, Argentina—a top exporter
of corn, soy, and wheat—is currently experiencing
its worst drought in over 60 years. This has forced
the country to lower its harvest forecast, further
tightening global grain stocks.
Pivotal Black Sea grain
deal could collapse:
The United Nations brokered deal between Ukraine,
Turkey and Russia has enabled the export of
Ukrainian grains ffrom Black Sea Ports. This remains
intrumental in helping safeguard food supplies.
While Russia has continued to sign on to temporary
extensions of the agreement, a protracted war could
lead Moscow to reassess its position as it looks for
ways to further undermine Ukraine’s economy and
political clout.
“The problems involved in global food security are easy to talk about. The solutions are much more difficult.”
—Former Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman
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2023

ASIA PACIFIC
HEADLINE RISKS IMPACT TO BUSINESSES RISK HORIZON
The regional economic
outlook has improved
but is tempered by
persistent inflation and
a global slowdown.
• The Asian Development Bank increased its regional inflation forecast to 4.2%—up from 4% in October 2022.
While headline inflation appears to be moderating in certain subregions, overall inflation remains elevated due to
ongoing price pressures, including high food and energy prices.
• Slowing interest rate hikes in the U.S. and China’s reopening have improved the region’s overall economic outlook,
with growth projected to increase from 3.8% in 2022 to 4.7% in 2023.
• Regional businesses are likely to continue implementing strategies
to hedge against a global slowdown. Strategies include stockpiling
cash, limiting hiring, upgrading technology and divesting non-core
and non-productive assets.
• Economic downturns in the U.S. and Europe will undermine
consumer spending, negatively impacting Asia Pacific regional
manufacturing activity.
U.S.-China power
struggle polarizes
the region and drives
new alliances.
• The tug-of-war between the U.S. and China within ASEAN is causing tension and increasing friction among
ASEAN members.
• In March, China announced it intends to increase spending on “diplomacy endeavors” by 12.2%. With this fresh
spending, it intends to advance Belt and Road Initiative-led ventures in ASEAN and elsewhere, as well as to take
part in overseas financial and economic exchanges and global economic governance.
• China’s renewed focus on the region comes as the U.S. advances its Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. This
effort includes diversifying supply chains, while enhancing security arrangements through pacts such as AUKUS,
between Australia, the UK and the U.S.
• Separately, China and North Korea concerns are credited with driving South Korea to restore preferential trade
relations with Japan in March 2023.
• Businesses should be prepared for further disruptions to trade,
despite some efforts by the U.S. and China to ease tensions
following the incident involving the destruction of a Chinese
balloon in February.
• Multilateral arrangements such as RCEP and other regional and
global trade agreements will ensure that openness and cross-
border trade remain viable.
Regional technology
regulations are
proliferating as
national policies
diverge from a once-
uniform set of rules.
• Spates of high-profile data breaches last year, such as the Optus and Medibank incidents in Australia, are leading
governments across the region to scrutinize their cybersecurity capabilities and work towards developing digital
sovereignty.
• While many policymakers take reference from Europe’s technological standards, countries like South Korea
and Japan are attempting to assert regional leadership in regulating emerging technologies, including artificial
intelligence and the metaverse.
• In the near term, tech-related industries can expect a tougher
regulatory environment as governments look to promote
competition and establish footholds in emerging technologies.
• There could be an increase in divergent standards among
countries and political groups, resulting in higher compliance
expenses and a more unpredictable operating environment.
Upcoming elections
will shape domestic
and foreign policy
landscapes across
the region in 2023
and beyond.
• Cambodia’s upcoming general election in July is likely to uphold one-party rule. Long-ruling Prime Minister Hun
Sen signaled in March that he intends to hand power to his son, Hun Manet, who is likely to preserve his country’s
close alignment with China.
• Upcoming elections in Thailand and Indonesia, scheduled for May 2023 and 2024 respectively, are poised to play
a crucial role in shaping their positioning within the wider U.S.-China power struggle.
• Indonesia will lose a respected statesman as incumbent President Jokowi Widodo steps down after two terms. The
election outcome could have far-reaching implications for the country's political direction, business climate and
regional alliances.
• The persistence of protectionist policies in Indonesia, irrespective
of the election results, could result in sustained trade barriers and
regulatory uncertainty for foreign firms seeking to establish their
presence in the market.
North Korean
provocations are
further extending
into cyberspace,
compounding security
tensions in the region.
• For the first time, on February 10, South Korea implemented unilateral sanctions against North Korea to combat
illicit cyber activities including cyberattacks, crypto laundering and ransomware.
• In March, the U.S. unveiled its National Cybersecurity Strategy, which specifically called out North Korea and
elevated ransomware attacks to an issue of national security.
• North Korea is also continuing to ramp up missile testing, launching over 40 ballistic and cruise missiles and
renewing ICBM testing after a five-year hiatus in 2022.
• Establishing robust cybersecurity systems and developing
effective response protocols to mitigate the risk of data breaches
and cyber-attacks will be imperative for businesses operating in
South Korea.
• The proximity of recent missile tests to territories claimed by
Japan and Korea heightens concerns about the stability of two of
the world’s largest economies.
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CHINA
U.S. and China
are seeking to
reengage despite
the hawkish attitudes
of the U.S. Congress.
• Efforts by China and the U.S. to resume military-to-military communications stalled after a suspected Chinese
spy balloon was shot down over U.S. airspace in February, prompting U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to
suspend his planned visit to China.
• During China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) in March, Chinese President Xi Jinping directly accused
the U.S. of trying to contain China. U.S. Congress members are viewing competition between the powers as
zero-sum. Long-standing tensions over Taiwan also continue to loom, with the prospect of high-level bilateral
meetings on the horizon. President Xi’s state visit to Moscow and the prospect of China selling arms to Russia
has garnered rebuke in many Western capitals.
• Newly appointed Chinese Premier Li Qiang noted at the NPC that China welcomes foreign investment and that
it is continuing to reform its opening-up policy. U.S. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo is considering visiting
China this year in a bid to deescalate tensions, for which her Chinese counterparts have expressed support.
• Foreign businesses can expect a more welcoming climate in China
as the country works to meet its 5% annual GDP growth target.
• Multinational companies are witnessing a shift from globalization
to trade weaponization in the world’s most significant trade
relationships, particularly between the U.S. and China. Whereas
companies were previously viewed as bridges between nations,
they are now increasingly considered points of leverage in
strategic competition.
U.S. export controls
will mount on China’s
tech ambitions.
• In October 2022, the U.S. implemented sweeping controls on exports of advanced semiconductors and
semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China as part of a new strategy to extend its technological edge,
protect its competitiveness and safeguard its national security interests.
• President Biden is poised to expand those restrictions. He is expected to sign an executive order in the first half
of 2023 that will empower the federal government to scrutinize outbound U.S. investments to China in strategic
sectors, such as quantum information systems and artificial intelligence. The administration is also likely to
pursue a forced sale or ban of TikTok in the name of national security.
• The Chinese government’s strategy on semiconductors is likely to remain focused on building self-sufficiency.
So far China has made minimal use of its Unreliable Entities List to counter U.S. trade and investment restrictions
but could decide to implement export restrictions on solar panel technology.
• Semiconductor restrictions represent a paradigm shift in
U.S. export control policy toward explicit containment of
China’s technological advancement, forcing the Chinese chip
industry to localize design and production. Companies should
expect similar measures to be applied to other advanced and
emerging technologies in 2023.
Forced labor
legislation in the
West will prompt
compliance
challenges and
spur supply chain
reconfiguration.
• U.S. lawmakers are pushing Customs and Border Protection to broaden the scope of Uyghur Forced Labor
Protection Act enforcement beyond the current target areas of cotton, polysilicon, tomatoes and PVC, with
aluminum automotive components likely to be the next category for future enforcement action.
• The U.S. is working with its allies to implement similar prohibitions on forced labor abroad. In February 2023, as
part of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, Mexico introduced a ban on the importation of goods produced
wholly or in part with forced labor. The U.S. has also established partnerships with the EU and Japan to combat
forced labor in international supply chains.
• Companies’ supplier due diligence and labor policies will come
under increased scrutiny in Europe and North America this year as
existing and proposed anti-forced labor legislation gathers steam.
• Supply chain traceability will become ever more important for
companies seeking to stay ahead of intensified regulation and
enforcement action.
Dynamics of
post-(Zero) COVID
recovery are set to
color evolving
policy priorities.
• The Chinese government has not signaled substantial future stimulus, opting to rely on an organic bounce-back
in demand to drive growth in 2023.
• Continued weakness in property markets and job creation, among other issues, will undermine consumer
confidence. With the pandemic hitting low-income consumers and small businesses hardest, demand may shift
among different categories and geographies.
• Broader social and political risks could materialize if spending by Chinese consumers fails to rebound and the
pandemic-era shift away from services-led economic growth is slow to reverse.
• Despite general optimism about consumer-driven growth,
businesses should pay attention to the finer details of China’s
economic recovery.
• Risks associated with the property and financial sectors may
have spillover effects for Chinese state-owned and private
companies. Investments should be vetted and reviewed
carefully to avoid fallout from companies with high exposure to
the real estate market.
• Government restructuring in Q2 will affect the oversight of
technology and finance industries. Responsibilities shifting among
old and new entities may improve regulatory coordination.
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2023

SOUTH ASIA Acute Transitory Enduring
India is looking to
expand regional
influence after taking
over the presidencies
of the G20 and
the Shanghai
Cooperation
Organization (SCO).
• India assumed the presidencies of the G20 and SCO at the end of 2022 and is hosting associated events
throughout the year, culminating in two leaders' summits this fall. This presents India with a unique—and
challenging—opportunity to assert its global leadership, bridge geopolitical divides, and forge consensus on
pressing transnational issues, such as climate change.
• India’s economy is expected to grow by 6% in 2023, making it one of the fastest-growing economies amid an
overall dim global outlook.
• Diversification and decoupling from China will also continue to be key themes as India looks to attract foreign
direct investment.
• Businesses should look for opportunities to engage around the
G20 convenings that will take place throughout the year.
Political and
economic instability
continue to
roil Pakistan as
negotiations with the
IMF progress.
• Former Prime Minister Imran Kahn continues to push for early elections as Pakistan’s ruling coalition government
grapples with record-high inflation, a depreciating rupee, terrorism and recovery efforts following catastrophic
flooding in 2022 that destroyed large swaths of farmland and infrastructure.
• The country’s foreign exchange reserves fell below $3 billion in February, threatening its ability to import
essential goods and raising the risk of default.
• Pakistan is moving closer to securing a $6.5 billion IMF bailout after the government took steps to raise taxes,
cut subsidies and devalue its currency to meet the terms of the relief loan.
• Persistent economic and political turmoil in Pakistan continue
to undermine business confidence and harm foreign direct
investment.
Sri Lanka is
pursuing fiscal
reforms in an
effort to stabilize
its economy.
• Sri Lanka is working to dig itself out of its worst economic crisis in decades, driven by crippling debt, surging
inflation, a depreciating rupee and diminishing currency reserves that left the country struggling to import
essential goods like food and fuel in 2022.
• Despite pulling back from its 70% peak, inflation remains stubbornly high at 54% as of February 2023, with
energy prices and food insecurity continuing to rise.
• Sri Lanka secured a $2.9 billion IMF relief loan after China—one of the country’s largest creditors—agreed to
a debt restructuring plan in March. Sri Lanka’s government also committed to a series of reform measures,
including raising personal and corporate taxes and reducing government spending, as part of its negotiations
with the IMF.
• High inflation and other economic challenges have hit exports
and domestic consumption. A revival of the country’s tourism
industry, one of its largest sources of foreign exchange
reserves, is likely by the end of 2023.
• Sri Lanka’s economic recovery will largely depend on the
government’s ability to institute meaningful fiscal reforms,
though higher taxes and reduced public spending could trigger
social unrest amid high inflation and increasing food insecurity.
Bangladesh faces
a deteriorating
economic
outlook ahead of
key election.
• Following several years of high growth, Bangladesh’s economy is struggling to regain its footing in the wake of
the pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—both of which have driven up inflation, undermined the country’s
foreign exchange reserves and raised the prospect of a future debt crisis.
• Bangladesh is set to hold general elections in January 2024, raising fears of political violence and suppression
of the opposition as support for the ruling Awami League deteriorates.
• The persistent threat of social unrest undermines investor
confidence by creating an environment of uncertainty and risk.
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2023

MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA
Fuel-importing
countries in the
region continue
to face weakening
economies amidst a
slow and unsteady
economic rebound.
• Oil prices have stabilized after the February earthquake in Turkey threatened a global oil shortage. As crude oil
stocks rise and China re-enters the market, demand is expected to increase.
• The Lebanese government is coping with fluctuating exchange rates as the economy spirals—the Lebanese
pound has lost as much as 98% of its value in the last five years, and local businesses are demanding to be paid
in U.S. dollars. The government relies on “dollarization” to ease inflation and stabilize the economy.
• Despite expressing concerns about having to reduce its monthly oil output, The UAE does not plan to leave the
OPEC alliance.
• Businesses can expect to see an increase in selling of stakes in
foreign exchange cash transactions to stabilize currencies.
Opportunity lies
ahead for the
COP28 meeting.
• The United Arab Emirates is set to host COP28 beginning in November under the leadership of Dr. Sultan Al
Jabar, who has served as CEO of the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company and the Chairman of Masdar.
• Climate activists have voiced opposition given the UAE’s role as the third largest oil producer of the OPEC
alliance.
• Many see Dr. Sultan Al Jabar’s leadership as an opportunity for realistic, solutions-driven dialogue. He is
expected to convene cross-sector stakeholders to advance climate action through tangible outcomes.
• Global businesses can expect a range of opportunities for
engagement and leadership during COP28.
• Local policies will likely include incentives for companies
to collaborate, focus on sustainability and pursue new
business models.
Alliances shift
ahead of restoration
of diplomatic
relations with Saudi
Arabia and Iran.
• Iran and Russia have strengthened strategic relations and aligned over shared energy and geopolitical interests,
especially opposition to the U.S., and are now seeking a mutually beneficial partnership. As part of that effort,
Russia purchased Iranian drones and used them to target Ukrainian cities and infrastructure.
• Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to restore diplomatic relations amid years of ideological rivalry and hostility that
have defined regional power dynamics. The agreement, brokered by China, includes resuming diplomatic
relations, re-opening of both embassies and refraining from interfering in internal affairs.
• Adding to the complexity of the situation is that many regional observers believe that the restoration of ties is a
win for China’s effort to grow its influence in the Middle East. But the deal falls short in addressing Saudi Arabia
and Iran’s differences, especially in Yemen.
• Israel opposes this rapprochement. It is concerned it impedes Israel’s efforts to fully normalize ties with Saudi
Arabia and other Arab states, and that it bolsters Iran’s regional influence and nuclear aspirations. In parallel,
Israel’s internal tension over a controversial judicial reform plan has diverted attention from efforts aimed at
regional integration and counterbalancing Iran's power.
• Defense companies should consider how the shifting dynamic
between Saudi and Iran will affect long-term contracts and
national security requirements.
• Israel’s domestic turbulence and concerns over Iran’s posture
risk conflicts that could affect the Israeli economy.
Regional cooperation
will deepen in efforts
to solve global supply
chain challenges
resulting from the
war in Ukraine.
• Many countries and corporations are ramping up investments in economic diversification programs that
prioritize nearshoring and increase the stability of global supply chains.
• The region relies heavily on grain imports from Russia and Ukraine and is home to 20% of the world’s food-
insecure population. Food and energy prices continue to surge as a result of this conflict, and despite a multiyear
effort to stabilize the economy, Egypt is particularly vulnerable to inflated food costs. Egypt’s food-security crisis
threatens the economy, as the agricultural sector struggles to meet half of the country’s domestic demand.
• As governments stabilize their economies, the region remains
vulnerable to supply-chain challenges exacerbated by the war
in Ukraine.
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2023

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Africa is struggling
to absorb the
impact of extreme
droughts and the war
in Ukraine.
• The Horn of Africa is entering its sixth consecutive rainy season with poor rainfall, raising concerns that climate
change is creating a new normal for the region.
• More than 180,000 climate refugees from Somalia and South Sudan have crossed into drought-stricken Kenya
and Ethiopia. Meanwhile, thousands of refugees from Angola have crossed into Namibia due to food shortages
and inflation. Humanitarian efforts are increasing, but food and water shortages remain a significant challenge.
• The war in Ukraine has compounded the food-security crisis in Africa, as many African countries rely on Ukraine
for wheat, fertilizer and vegetable oil imports.
• Political conflict, coupled with the ongoing effects of climate
change, directly impact food systems, crops and livelihoods,
resulting in malnutrition and migration. These challenges will
continue to impact the labor force in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Elections across
Africa have been
hampered by delays,
corruption and
disinformation.
• Armed groups in eastern Congo have displaced nearly 7 million people, raising tensions in the region and
leading to fears that general elections scheduled for December could be delayed.
• The election cycle was delayed in Nigeria, Africa’s largest economy, which is experiencing record
unemployment and inflation, poor security conditions and a looming debt crisis.
• Nigeria's opposition parties filed lawsuits alleging corruption after Bola Tinubu, a candidate from the All
Progressive Congress Party, was elected President in February. Tinubu, a former state governor and one of the
most powerful political figures in Nigeria, will face the challenge of uniting young people who are increasingly
speaking out against the country’s establishment.
• Endemic corruption and political uncertainty will
continue to undermine business confidence and deter
foreign direct investment.
African nations
are leaning on
international financial
institutions as the
debt crisis worsens.
• A combination of low tax revenues, high-interest loans and disorganized debt-relief programs have contributed
to the growing debt crisis in Africa. Zambia holds the largest sum of foreign debt in the region, estimated at
about $17 billion, with China as its largest creditor.
• Western institutions including the International Monetary Fund are working with the Chinese government on
restructuring Zambia’s debt, with the goal of paving a path for critical relief loans.
• This situation is expected to worsen throughout the year, straining Africa’s ability to deliver social services,
respond to extreme weather events and address food insecurity.
• Instability and increased debt in the region will pose a challenge
for major and long-term corporate investments. However,
support from international institutions may lead to policies and
reforms that favor investments from the private sector.
Violence and
corruption remain
a top concerns as
regional tensions
and terrorist
threats evolve.
• Tensions between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo have increased due to accusations that
Rwanda is backing M23, an armed group committing executions and forced recruitment across the Congo.
More than 520,000 people have been displaced as a result of violence from armed groups in the region.
• Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea are forging ties in production, trade, infrastructure and defense as a hedge
against instability in the broader region. Côte d'Ivoire, another neighboring country, has the largest economy in
the West African Economic and Monetary Union and is emerging as a model of stability in the region.
• As African nations look to diversify their business partnerships, Russia is playing a larger role in African business
than ever before, especially starting with grain and fertilizer. The Russian security presence has also become
more significant.
• Businesses should consider opportunities that may arise as
Africa seeks to diversify its business dealings across the globe
due to the debt crisis and instability in the region.
10
APCO
Geopolitical
Risk
Radar
|
Q2
2023

RUSSIA & EASTERN EUROPE
The Russia-Ukraine
war persists.
• The Russia-Ukraine war has entered its second year, with Russian forces pushing to secure a narrow set of
victories in eastern Ukraine as they run low on ammunition and troops.
• Ukraine and Russia are preparing for the possibility of a long, shifting conflict that could last years at the
expense their economies and their social welfare.
• U.S. intelligence officials suggest that Russia may soon pivot to a “hold-and-defend” approach due to difficulties
in maintaining their current level of offensive operations.
• Further battlefield setbacks could prompt Putin to escalate the war in an effort to show strength and sustain
public support.
• Escalation poses greater risks for businesses due to continued
supply chain disruptions, unstable energy prices, an ever-
changing sanctions landscape and Russian countermeasures
restricting foreign companies’ operations.
Western sanctions
and Russian
countermeasures
disrupt—and
potentially
decouple—global
business structures.
• Russia has adopted legal and procedural hurdles to slow or halt the exit of companies from “unfriendly”
Western countries and is selectively expropriating foreign assets in industries the Kremlin deems “strategic,”
such as energy.
• Major battlefield setbacks increase the likelihood that the Kremlin will adopt more aggressive countermeasures,
including broadening the expropriation of foreign assets to other industries.
• Given the resiliency of the Russian economy, Western officials will continue to increase measures on Russian
companies circumventing sanctions by using partnerships and supply chains of unsanctioned, non-Russian
entities. This will include increasing sanctions on sectors of the Russian economy that are underregulated and
not under scrutiny.
• Many Western companies are proceeding with their already-
announced exits from the Russian market.
• Companies that remain should expect continued reputational
risk and a potentially more hostile Russian regulatory
environment as the war continues.
• Companies that maintain a footprint in Russia will have
significantly less maneuverability, and opportunities to extract
value from their Russian assets will decrease. Maneuverability
will depend on geopolitical and military outcomes, and
consistent with the nature of the conflict over the past year,
they will be difficult to predict.
Russian commercial
and diplomatic
overtures to
India, Turkey
and the Global
South continue.
• Russia will continue leveraging its role as a key global supplier of grain, fertilizer and energy to win influence
among poor countries and those hit hardest by high commodity prices and a strong U.S. dollar.
• India has been buying Russian energy at fire-sale prices, while Turkish banks are thought to be helping Russian
individuals and entities evade sanctions. However, governments in Turkey and India are unlikely to publicly align
with Russia and will maintain their balanced position with the West.
• Russia has aggressively reduced the use of the U.S. dollar in trade, prompting other countries that import
Russian commodities—such as India, China, MENA, and Turkey—to follow suit.
• So-called “nonaligned” markets will be increasingly
competitive, with Russian and Russia-aligned companies
looking for trading partners, customers and vendors to soak up
excess stock and fulfill supply needs.
Breakdown of
nonproliferation
norms raises
the risk of a
nuclear escalation.
• In February, Russia announced it was suspending its participation in New START, the last remaining agreement
between the U.S. and Russia to reduce nuclear armaments.
• While Russia has threatened to use nuclear weapons to “defend” annexed Ukrainian territory, pressure from
global leaders, including President Xi of China and Prime Minister Modi of India, may reduce this risk.
• President Putin’s nuclear threats are raising fears that the Ukraine conflict could expand into a direct military
confrontation between Russia and NATO members, with the U.S. warning Moscow of unspecified “catastrophic
consequences” should it escalate the war beyond conventional theaters of battle.
• Any widening war even without a nuclear mishap would
destabilize the status quo and would likely shock global
markets and wider global economy.
11
APCO
Geopolitical
Risk
Radar
|
Q2
2023

WESTERN EUROPE
EU electricity
prices fall despite
market volatility as
a long-term energy
crisis looms.
• EU nations are looking for reforms as energy prices fall after reaching historic highs, driving inflation down to its
lowest level since February 2022. European countries are focusing on mitigating risk through diversification, price
controls and policy implementation that protects the consumer.
• As Chinese energy demand is poised to surge, EU countries are anticipating heightened competition. China’s efforts
to use more coal and increase domestic gas production will likely result in more volatile prices for EU consumers.
• France is promoting nuclear power as Paris unites ten countries under a “nuclear alliance,” with the mission of
meeting climate goals and encouraging the EU’s energy independence. France’s alliance may cause friction as it
impacts the EU’s efforts for energy reform to combat market instability.
• Businesses should remain agile throughout this period of market
volatility and expect governments to diversify energy supplies.
• There may be new market opportunities arising from the
buildout of new nuclear capacity.
The EU responds
to the Biden
Administration’s
Inflation Reduction
Act (IRA) with
concern and a push
for green initiatives.
• EU countries are concerned that a push for nearshoring U.S. manufacturing will negatively impact European
businesses. Countries are divided on how to respond to $369 billion in U.S. subsidies for electric vehicles and
other clean technologies.
• The IRA is directly impacting the European automotive and battery industries, and EU companies are searching
for countermeasures to uplift the local industry. EU countries argue that tax breaks for U.S. consumers on electric
vehicles are not aligned with the World Trade Organization’s principle of non-discrimination.
• Smaller EU economies fear that larger economies, like Germany, may leverage their bigger markets to wage a
subsidy war with the U.S.
• Businesses should look for opportunities as governments
incentivize lower-carbon technologies.
• Businesses should prepare for escalating tensions between
the U.S. and EU regardless of whether European economies
pursues countermeasures to the U.S. subsidies.
Uncertainty persists
as Russia’s war with
Ukraine strains
relationships,
policies and
supply chains.
• The EU continues to adopt additional sanctions, including against Belarus in response to its involvement in the
invasion of Ukraine and against Iran for manufacturing and supplying drones used in the war.
• The EU remains vigilant after U.S. intelligence claimed that China is seriously considering providing weapons
to Russia. The EU has warned it will respond with sanctions against China if Beijing agrees to supply Russia with
arms.
• Some EU governments are pushing back on the Single Market Emergency Instrument, a crisis-management
framework designed to protect supply chains during emergencies. Countries with small- to medium-sized
economies, such as Luxembourg and Ireland, believe the framework overreaches and discourages competition.
• Any escalation or de-escalation in Russia’s war with Ukraine will
impact policy and supply-chain decision-making. Businesses
should remain abreast of the scope and obligations of supply-
chain mandates.
12
APCO
Geopolitical
Risk
Radar
|
Q2
2023

LATIN AMERICA & CARIBBEAN
Leftist governments
face intensifying
challenges.
• Latin American countries, including Peru, continue to face a stream of protests and social unrest over corruption,
inequality and poverty.
• In December, former leftist Peruvian President Pedro Castillo was ousted amid corruption allegations, which
sparked wide-scale protests against President Dina Boluarte and the country's Congress. These protests have
particularly resonated with working-class, rural, and indigenous supporters of Castillo, highlighting long-
standing issues of inequality and discrimination in the country.
• Recent surveys show that voters’ approval of current leaders have fallen between 10% and 20%, with public
opinion shifting to the right or center.
• As newly elected left-leaning governments settle in, including
in Brazil and Colombia, calls will grow for candidates to
deliver on their promises to significantly boost social-welfare
spending and deliver reforms, raising the risk of further unrest
if expectations are not met.
• Critical sectors such as mining, agriculture and tourism
are vulnerable to local resistance. Businesses that focus
on environmental and social issues have an opportunity to
contribute to social and environmental agendas aligned with
progressive leaders.
Slow growth
threatens economic
recovery in
Latin America.
• Early measures taken by central banks in Latin America to address inflation played a crucial role in mitigating the
impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with growth reaching nearly 4% in 2022.
• Costly foreign debt, falling commodity prices, high interest rates and a sluggish economic climate in North
America and Europe are expected to contribute to a reduced growth rate of 2% in the region in 2023. This could
negatively affect consumer and business confidence and limit job creation.
• A reversal or slowdown in the region’s post-pandemic recovery could fuel civil unrest in countries where poverty,
inequality and food insecurity continue to rise.
• A potential derailment of newly established governments’
transition plans would cause a drop in foreign and local
investments, triggering political and economic instability.
The region braces
for a surge in U.S.-
bound migration
as a pandemic-era
rule expires.
• In February, the number of migrants who encountered authorities at the U.S.’s southern border surpassed 1
million since October 2022—a 20% increase from the year before.
• A surge in migration is expected to follow the May expiration of Title 42, a pandemic-era rule that allows U.S.
border agents to rapidly expel unauthorized migrants on public-health grounds. The Biden Administration
announced a plan in February to deny asylum to migrants at the U.S.-Mexico border who have not applied for
asylum in a third country they entered before arriving in the U.S.
• New restriction on migrants’ ability to travel to the U.S. could lead to new patterns of intraregional migration,
including to countries such as Costa Rica, Colombia and Chile.
• The Biden administration’s new asylum plan risks stoking
social tensions and overburdening public services in Mexican
border regions.
• Businesses should take advantage of government incentives
to nearshore parts of their supply chain to Mexico and Central
America, a key priority for governments looking to address the
root causes of migration.
President Lula is
looking to reassert
Brazil’s leadership
amid domestic
challenges and
shifting global
dynamics.
• Brazilian President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva is seeking to restore Brazil’s stature in key regional organizations
following a multiyear retreat by his predecessor, Jair Bolsonaro, as well as domestic polarization caused by the
country’s insurrection in January.
• Brazil has taken a leadership role in some regional institutions. Brazilian nationals were recently appointed to
lead the Pan-American Health Organization and the Inter-American Development Bank, affirming the unifying
power the nation holds in the region.
• The region is in demand for investment in startups, technology, sustainability and tourism. Additionally, ongoing
global supply chain disruptions provide businesses with an opportunity to expand and diversify their presence
and capabilities in Latin America.
• As President Lula is working to increase regional cooperation in
key sectors such as trade, food and sustainable development,
businesses should capitalize on the opportunity to strengthen
their presence in these fields.
• The region is in demand for investment in startups, technology,
sustainability and tourism. Additionally, ongoing global supply
chain disruptions provide businesses with an opportunity
to expand and diversify their presence and capabilities in
Latin America.
13
APCO
Geopolitical
Risk
Radar
|
Q2
2023

UNITED STATES & CANADA
The North American
economic outlook
remains uncertain
despite growth
and employment
outpacing
other advanced
economies.
• The U.S. economy has rebounded strongly, with real GDP expanding by 5.1% above its pre-pandemic level
thanks to a robust recovery in domestic consumption. Canada also demonstrated a strong start to the year after
adding 150,000 jobs in January.
• At the same time, the “Tech Winter” is leading major U.S. technology companies to cut their workforces and
hiring, with over 125,000 layoffs reported so far this year. At the current rate, the industry could shed 900,000
jobs in 2023.
• Turbulence in financial markets continues in the wake of the government takeover of Silicon Valley Bank, which
faced insolvency due to rising interest rates and customer withdrawals.
• While consumer spending and employment remain relatively
robust, businesses should prepare for a potential recession.
Further interest rate hikes by the U.S. Federal Reserve could
push the economy into a shallow recession later in 2023.
U.S.-China tensions
simmer as public
opinion hardens and
Congress looks to set
tone on relationship.
• Efforts to ease bilateral tensions were set back after an alleged Chinese spy balloon traversed the continental
U.S. between late January and early February, prompting President Biden to have it shot down off the coast of
South Carolina.
• This comes as the newly formed House China Select Committee kicks off hearings to examine issues in the
bilateral relationship, including Taiwan, human rights, supply chain and data security. Furthermore, a March 2023
Gallup poll shows that just 15% percent of Americans view China favorably.
• Businesses should be aware of increasing tensions between
the U.S. and China, as the U.S. solidifies ties with allies and
pushes for other countries to adopt measures to curtail China,
including sanctions and export controls.
• Supply chain diversification will be an important protection to
offset U.S. enforcement risk against Chinese companies.
U.S. industrial
policies aimed at
China spur friction
with Western allies.
• Two major pieces of legislation—the CHIPS and Science Act and Inflation Reduction Act—commit hundreds of
billions of dollars in federal subsidies to re-shore semiconductor manufacturing and accelerate the transition to
renewable energy in the U.S.
• U.S. allies, including European nations, Japan and South Korea, are concerned that renewable energy subsidies
and localization requirements provide U.S. companies with an unfair advantage, threatening retaliation and the
potential for transatlantic trade disruption.
• The EU is now working on its own subsidies to counter the IRA, prompting warnings that companies could soon
be enticed to subsidy shop between governments.
• The lack of an agreement or carveout for European companies
could lead the EU to retaliate against American business and
trade through subsidies and tariffs, igniting a “green trade war.”
Foreign investment
in farmland could be
limited as the U.S.
launches bipartisan
efforts against
Chinese ownership
of agricultural land.
• The U.S. Congress is seeking to limit or ban Chinese investments in U.S. farmland. Several bipartisan proposals
would expand reporting requirements in the Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act, prohibit certain
foreign investors from participating in USDA-administered farm programs, or direct the President to prevent the
purchase of public or private agricultural land by foreign nationals associated with China’s government.
• The notion that “food security is national security” is a new dimension of the broader “tough on China” stance
and was popularized during the 2022 midterm election cycle.
• The United States is looking to protect the domestic food and
agriculture sector, as this industry makes up over 10 percent
of U.S. employment. Businesses should prepare for the
prospect that many countries could realign on outsourcing
their food supplies and enact policies designed to stabilize
imports and exports.
14
APCO
Geopolitical
Risk
Radar
|
Q2
2023

MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS & FORUMS
United Nations
Secretary General:
Priorities for 2023
• The United Nations Secretary-General outlined the following priorities for 2023:
• Peace: New Agenda for Peace
• Development: Bridgetown Agenda and the SDG Summit
• Clean environment: Climate Action Summit, High-Level Expert Group on Net Zero recommendations, COP27
pledges, Global Stock Take, and UN Water Conference
• Full gender equality: 67th
Commission on the Status of Women (CSW)
• Civil and political rights: Call to Action for Human Rights
• Diversity and cultural rights: Code of Conduct for information integrity on digital platforms and prevention
of hate speech and mis- and disinformation through social media
• Companies should consider where they can leverage existing
corporate responsibility and ESG activities to partner with
civil society, government agencies and other stakeholders to
help achieve the goals of the UN Secretary General and the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
Growing distrust in
the private sector
is weakening
the credibility of
companies within
the UN system.
• There is a growing push by civil society organizations and some UN Member States for UN agencies to keep
some distance from the private sector to avoid potential conflicts of interest.
• After expressing concern that social media companies lack accountability for content regulation and have
responsibility for the proliferation of hate speech online, the UN is likely to take a stronger role in advocating for
digital cooperation and inclusion and countering mis- and disinformation.
• While companies are still able to interact productively with
the UN, the space available for companies to engage with UN
organizations may narrow and the standards for engagement
may heighten.
Leadership and
governance
of multilateral
institutions is
increasingly
contested.
• Security Council reform continues to be a priority for many world leaders, including Japanese Prime Minister
Fumio Kishida, German Chancellor Olaf Schultz, and Ukranian president Volodymyr Zelensky.
• The World Bank is becoming a new front in the battle over the leadership and control of multinational
institutions. After the resignation of World Bank president David Malpass, the U.S. nominated former Mastercard
CEO Ajay Banga for the position. Some leaders from the developing world however are calling for a break with
convention and for a non-American to assume the role.
• While the U.S. and European nations continue to coordinate harsh responses to the war in Ukraine, the global
South is not on the same page. At the UN Security Council, Russia’s veto and abstentions from non-aligned
countries weaken efforts to call for a halt to Russian hostilities in Ukraine.
• The UN Security Council is also extending its purview from traditional issues such as peacekeeping, gun
trafficking, and nuclear arms control to an increasing array of global concerns, including climate security and
cyber security.
• As multilateral institutions come under increased pressure
to diversify their leadership, increase the share of voice for
the least developed countries, and work with a diverse set of
stakeholders, companies have an opportunity to increase their
participation in key global convenings.
Tensions are
growing between
developing and
developed nations as
the gaps increases.
• The war in Ukraine and the lasting implications of the pandemic have exacerbated pre-existing inequities as
developing countries pulled their resources closer and instituted more protectionist trade policies. At the Least
Developed Countries Conference in Doha this year, Pakistan Prime Minister Mian Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif
said unequal access to vaccines, technology, finance and opportunities has directly hampered their ability to
economically progress.
• Developing countries want international financial institutions to support solutions to indebted countries and
help to respond to the food security crisis in some countries, most acutely in Africa.
• While multilateral institutions are slow to respond, there is an
opportunity for companies to examine where in their supply
chain they can use their resources to fill a global gap that has
been left by developed countries.
15
APCO
Geopolitical
Risk
Radar
|
Q2
2023

Global Energy Supply Issues
GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDEX
APCO’s Geopolitical Risk Index (GPRI) is
calculated by measuring Attention and Action:
Media Attention measures the volume,
sentiment, engagement and rate of growth for
each issue in traditional and social media.
Corporate Action measures mention of
or response to each risk in the external
communications by leading corporations.
APCO Insight uses publicly available data
from media coverage, online conversation,
company websites, and annual reports. It also
leverages natural language processing and
predictive analytics to calculate scores that are
reflected in the Index.
Q4 2022 Q1 2023 Q2 2023 GPRI (predicted)
Tariff/Non-Tariff Barriers Energy Security Issues
Mass Migration/Displacement*
Climate Change/Environmental Degradation
Inflation and Wages*
Political Polarization Food Security Issues
Overall
GPRI
Geo-strategic Decoupling*
During the next three months our
analysis predicts increasing volume of
conversations around:
• Inflation and wages
• Climate and environmental issues
• Mass migration and human displacement
• Geo-strategic decoupling
We anticipate steady and significant levels
of conversation around:
• Global energy supply shortages
• Energy security issues
• Food security issues
ANTICIPATING THE TRAJECTORY OF CONVERSATIONS GLOBALLY
*Topic added in Q2 2023
16
APCO
Geopolitical
Risk
Radar
|
Q2
2023

GPRI
Economic
Risk
Inflation and Wages*
Effects of rising prices on food, energy, real estate, and automobiles
as wages stall globally.
Supply Chain Shortages
Threats of Russia/China alliance will pose interruptions in
production across tech, automotive, and apparel.
Socioeconomic Inequality*
Effects of wealth and education disparities on access to health care
and critical social services.
Tariff/Non-Tariff Barriers
Bank solvency risks due to rising interest rates, loan defaults and
economic headwinds.
Talent Shortages
Government tariffs and trade restriction on commodities (aluminum,
copper, lead and steel) and strategic technologies.
Energy &
Environment
Global Energy Supply Issues
Talent availability, cost and capacity in the wake of post-pandemic
economic reconfiguration.
Climate Change/Environmental
Degradation
Effect of war in Ukraine on supply of energy and its impact on
renewable energy market.
Energy Security Issues
Link between economies and the risks posed by warming climates
and access to clean water.
Renewable Energy Adoption
National moves to protect against future energy price spikes by
accelerating investment in alternative sources.
Environmental Justice
Corporate action to promote environmental causes that support
underserved populations.
Technology &
Information
Security
Generative AI and Decision-Making*
Debate over the reliability and uses of generative AI
across industries.
Societal Stability (Trust)* Declining trust in media, corporate and government institutions.
Cybersecurity
Cyber risks to energy, banking, and other online and cloud-based
systems.
Technology Access* Access to Internet connectivity, 5G mobile and other technology.
Data Privacy Cloud-based data security and privacy.
Human
Rights
Mass Migration/Displacement*
Political unrest, war, and asylum-seeking will increase migration to
the U.S. and democratic nations in Europe.
Maternal Health
Maternal health issues, including pre-eclampsia, maternal death,
and pregnancy risks, especially across Africa.
Reproductive Health U.S. debate over reproductive choice and access to abortion.
Food Security Issues
Hunger and malnutrition affected by the pandemic and the war in
Ukraine.
Political
Risk
Political Polarization Threat of hardening geopolitical and political alliances.
Government Interference*
Concern about government and state actor interference in
elections.
Geo-strategic Decoupling*
Decoupling between the democratic Western nations and
nondemocratic states.
Terrorism and Extremism*
Attention to global and domestic terrorism, extremism and societal
threats.
Q2 2023
TREND LINES
= Strong Growth in Conversation
= Moderate Growth in Conversation
= Moderate Decline in Conversation
= Strong Decline in Conversation
PROJECTION THROUGH Q2 2023
APCO Global Conversation Radar Q2 2023
THE ANTICIPATED RISE AND
FALL OF ISSUES OVER THE
NEXT THREE MONTHS
APCO’s Geopolitical Risk Conversation
Index measures conversational
engagement on key risks covered in
this report in global English language
media. We leverage natural language
processing and predictive analytics to
synthesize publicly available data from
English language media coverage,
social media, company websites and
annual reports.
*Topic added in Q2 2023
17
APCO
Geopolitical
Risk
Radar
|
Q2
2023

UPCOMING GLOBAL EVENTS IN Q2
APRIL
April 10–16, 2023
2023 Spring Meetings of the
World Bank Group (WBG) and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
April 30, 2023
Paraguay General Election
MAY
(TBD) 2023
Quad Leaders’ Sydney Summit 2023
May 2–5, 2023
Asian Development Bank Annual
Meeting
May 7, 2023
Thailand General Elections
May 14, 2023
Turkey General Election
May 19–21, 2023
G7 Hiroshima Summit
May 22–26, 2023
Annual Meeting of the
African Development Bank,
Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt
JUNE
June 4, 2023
Guinea Bissau Legislative Election
June 24, 2023
Sierra Leone General Election
June 25, 2023
Guatemala General Election
18
APCO
Geopolitical
Risk
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Q2
2023

ABOUT APCO
APCO Worldwide is an advisory and advocacy communications consultancy. We partner with
organizations to help them catalyze progress, act with agility and build reputations, relationships
and solutions that enable success. APCO is an independent and majority women-owned business
and has helped clients to grow, sustain, and protect their interests for more than 35 years. Clients
typically come to APCO with complex and unconventional problems that cut across jurisdictions
and do not neatly match the competencies of traditional law firms, lobbyists, PR agencies,
management consultancies or other legacy professional services firms.
ABOUT GEO-COMMERCE
APCO’s Geo-Commerce team advises clients whose interests intersect geopolitics, commerce and
diverse stakeholder interests. The global team works across APCO’s 30+ offices, combining cross-
market insights and connectivity with knowledge of local networks and executional capabilities.
Contact us to discuss what's next:
James W. Robinson
jrobinson@apcoworldwide.com
+1 212.300.1803
apcoworldwide.com

APCO Geopolitical Risk Radar: Q2 2023

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