SlideShare a Scribd company logo
1 of 9
Theory and Strategies for
Takeover Attacks

Presented by Eric Goldman – http://www.ericgoldman.name
This is an excerpt from a larger presentation
which covered numerous AP exploit strategies
and specified attacks. You can find more of my
presentations on SlideShare and at my main
website, http://www.ericgoldman.name.

Please feel free to post questions or comments
about this presentation. A full academic paper
on this topic is available on my website.



                        More papers & presentations at http://www.ericgoldman.name   2
   AP is a gateway between wireless and wired
    networks; all wireless traffic passes through
   As a result it is usually the most valuable
    target on the WLAN for Snooping or DoS
   Wireless hardware is more vulnerable than
    wired equivalents because it must support
    more protocols and features, which are
    relatively young and/or under development
   Fun target because there are so many
    different ways to attack an AP

                         More papers & presentations at http://www.ericgoldman.name   3
   Gain unauthorized access to the network
    ◦ Attacker wants to get the rest of the network, but
      too timely to break all security procedures
   Monitor traffic and steal user data
    ◦ Steal valuable information about users or company
   Make money
    ◦ By controlling AP you can insert your own ads on
      every page and replace other adds with your own
    ◦ Examples: dd-wrt + NoCatSplash or a web proxy




                              More papers & presentations at http://www.ericgoldman.name   4
   Multiple management interfaces may exist,
    with different security (console, web, ssh, etc)
   Setting misconfigurations, groups of settings,
    or improper implementation of settings
   Steal login information by cracking or finding
    in-the-clear authentication (web, telnet)
   Physical access- administration allowed w/o
    password when direct connected, reset device




                           More papers & presentations at http://www.ericgoldman.name   5
   Effects 8 different devices, 3 versions of IOS
   Vulnerability is in Web Management Interface
   When you switch from global password
    control to local user list with individual
    passwords in the web interface all login
    security is disabled
   As a result, anyone can easily access the
    admin interface without having any login
    information or credentials



                          More papers & presentations at http://www.ericgoldman.name   6
   Router allows admin password to be
    modified, but there is a undocumented
    hardcoded account there as well
   Hardcoded accounts: U= super, P=5777364
   Accessible from both LAN/WLAN
   Traced back to hardware developer in Taiwan,
    5777364 is their phone number
    ◦ May affect other vendors who use their hardware
    ◦ Was still in later firmware upgrades for Netgear
    ◦ Vendor solution: make a new hardcoded account


                             More papers & presentations at http://www.ericgoldman.name   7
   APs are a more valuable target than a single
    client node; attack more users and resources
   Wireless network equipment, especially
    budget consumer products often are poorly
    designed and coded
   Attacking AP can cut off many users from
    access, can make any connectivity difficult
   Taking over an AP can allow the attacker to
    accomplish many different objectives



                         More papers & presentations at http://www.ericgoldman.name   8
   Cisco. (2006, September 20). Cisco Security Advisory: Access Point Web-browser
    Interface Vulnerability. Retrieved April 6, 2009, from Cisco:
    http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20060628-ap.shtml
   Hackers come up with new methods to hack Wi-Fi networks. (2008, March 21).
    Retrieved April 6, 2009, from Internet Security: http://www.internet-
    security.ca/internet-security-news-010/hackers-coming-up-with-new-ways-to-
    hack-wi-fi-networks.html
   Knienieder, T. (2004, June 3). Netgear WG602 Wireless Access Point Default
    Backdoor Account Vulnerability. Retrieved April 6, 2009, from Secuirty Focus:
    http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/10459/info
   Mateti, P. (2005). Hacking Techniques in Wireless Networks. Retrieved April 6,
    2009, from Wright State University:
    http://www.cs.wright.edu/~pmateti/InternetSecurity/Lectures/WirelessHacks/Mat
    eti-WirelessHacks.htm#_Toc77524669
   Megidish, G. (2008, August 17). Getting Paid For Others’ Work. Retrieved April 6,
    2009, from SecuriTeam: http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1128
   Bellardo, J., & Savage, S. (2003). 802.11 Denial-of-Service Attacks:vulnerabilities
    and practical solutions. San Diego, California: Department of Computer Science
    and Engineering, University of California at San Diego.




                                             More papers & presentations at http://www.ericgoldman.name   9

More Related Content

Viewers also liked

Peak IT: why digital may stop delivering value
Peak IT:  why digital may stop delivering valuePeak IT:  why digital may stop delivering value
Peak IT: why digital may stop delivering valueJonas Söderström
 
Social engineering-Attack of the Human Behavior
Social engineering-Attack of the Human BehaviorSocial engineering-Attack of the Human Behavior
Social engineering-Attack of the Human BehaviorJames Krusic
 
Social engineering presentation
Social engineering presentationSocial engineering presentation
Social engineering presentationpooja_doshi
 
Social Engineering - Strategy, Tactics, & Case Studies
Social Engineering - Strategy, Tactics, & Case StudiesSocial Engineering - Strategy, Tactics, & Case Studies
Social Engineering - Strategy, Tactics, & Case StudiesPraetorian
 
Presentation of Social Engineering - The Art of Human Hacking
Presentation of Social Engineering - The Art of Human HackingPresentation of Social Engineering - The Art of Human Hacking
Presentation of Social Engineering - The Art of Human Hackingmsaksida
 
Social Engineering
Social EngineeringSocial Engineering
Social EngineeringCyber Agency
 
Network Security Presentation
Network Security PresentationNetwork Security Presentation
Network Security PresentationAllan Pratt MBA
 
Network Security Threats and Solutions
Network Security Threats and SolutionsNetwork Security Threats and Solutions
Network Security Threats and SolutionsColin058
 
Cyber crime and security ppt
Cyber crime and security pptCyber crime and security ppt
Cyber crime and security pptLipsita Behera
 

Viewers also liked (12)

Peak IT: why digital may stop delivering value
Peak IT:  why digital may stop delivering valuePeak IT:  why digital may stop delivering value
Peak IT: why digital may stop delivering value
 
Evil Twin
Evil TwinEvil Twin
Evil Twin
 
Social engineering-Attack of the Human Behavior
Social engineering-Attack of the Human BehaviorSocial engineering-Attack of the Human Behavior
Social engineering-Attack of the Human Behavior
 
Social engineering
Social engineering Social engineering
Social engineering
 
Social engineering presentation
Social engineering presentationSocial engineering presentation
Social engineering presentation
 
Social Engineering - Strategy, Tactics, & Case Studies
Social Engineering - Strategy, Tactics, & Case StudiesSocial Engineering - Strategy, Tactics, & Case Studies
Social Engineering - Strategy, Tactics, & Case Studies
 
Presentation of Social Engineering - The Art of Human Hacking
Presentation of Social Engineering - The Art of Human HackingPresentation of Social Engineering - The Art of Human Hacking
Presentation of Social Engineering - The Art of Human Hacking
 
Social Engineering
Social EngineeringSocial Engineering
Social Engineering
 
Network Security Presentation
Network Security PresentationNetwork Security Presentation
Network Security Presentation
 
Network security
Network securityNetwork security
Network security
 
Network Security Threats and Solutions
Network Security Threats and SolutionsNetwork Security Threats and Solutions
Network Security Threats and Solutions
 
Cyber crime and security ppt
Cyber crime and security pptCyber crime and security ppt
Cyber crime and security ppt
 

Similar to AP Takeover Attacks

Penetration Testing as an auditing tool
Penetration Testing as an auditing toolPenetration Testing as an auditing tool
Penetration Testing as an auditing toolsyrinxtech
 
Ssl Vpn presentation at CoolTech club
Ssl Vpn presentation at CoolTech clubSsl Vpn presentation at CoolTech club
Ssl Vpn presentation at CoolTech clubiplotnikov
 
wifi-y3dips-stmik_mdp_slides
wifi-y3dips-stmik_mdp_slideswifi-y3dips-stmik_mdp_slides
wifi-y3dips-stmik_mdp_slidesguest1c1a9a
 
How Security can be stronger than a Firewall: 13 different ways breaking thro...
How Security can be stronger than a Firewall: 13 different ways breaking thro...How Security can be stronger than a Firewall: 13 different ways breaking thro...
How Security can be stronger than a Firewall: 13 different ways breaking thro...Community Protection Forum
 
Secure coding presentation Oct 3 2020
Secure coding presentation Oct 3 2020Secure coding presentation Oct 3 2020
Secure coding presentation Oct 3 2020Moataz Kamel
 
Presentation, Firewalls
Presentation, FirewallsPresentation, Firewalls
Presentation, Firewallskkkseld
 
IT Essentials (Version 7.0) - ITE Chapter 13 Exam Answers
IT Essentials (Version 7.0) - ITE Chapter 13 Exam AnswersIT Essentials (Version 7.0) - ITE Chapter 13 Exam Answers
IT Essentials (Version 7.0) - ITE Chapter 13 Exam AnswersITExamAnswers.net
 
Presentation, Firewalls
Presentation, FirewallsPresentation, Firewalls
Presentation, Firewallskkkseld
 
SkypeShield - Securing Skype for Business
SkypeShield - Securing Skype for BusinessSkypeShield - Securing Skype for Business
SkypeShield - Securing Skype for BusinessYoav Crombie
 
Debunking the Myths of SSL VPN Security
Debunking the Myths of SSL VPN SecurityDebunking the Myths of SSL VPN Security
Debunking the Myths of SSL VPN Securityinside-BigData.com
 
Computer Networks 4
Computer Networks 4Computer Networks 4
Computer Networks 4Mr Smith
 
Web Application Security
Web Application SecurityWeb Application Security
Web Application SecurityAbdul Wahid
 
Finding the source of Ransomware - Wire data analytics
Finding the source of Ransomware - Wire data analyticsFinding the source of Ransomware - Wire data analytics
Finding the source of Ransomware - Wire data analyticsNetFort
 
Jan 2008 Allup
Jan 2008 AllupJan 2008 Allup
Jan 2008 Allupllangit
 
Securing your WordPress Website - Vlad Lasky - WordCamp Sydney 2012
Securing your WordPress Website - Vlad Lasky - WordCamp Sydney 2012Securing your WordPress Website - Vlad Lasky - WordCamp Sydney 2012
Securing your WordPress Website - Vlad Lasky - WordCamp Sydney 2012WordCamp Sydney
 
Securing Your WordPress Website - WordCamp Sydney 2012
Securing Your WordPress Website - WordCamp Sydney 2012Securing Your WordPress Website - WordCamp Sydney 2012
Securing Your WordPress Website - WordCamp Sydney 2012Vlad Lasky
 
6 - Web Application Security.pptx
6 - Web Application Security.pptx6 - Web Application Security.pptx
6 - Web Application Security.pptxAlmaOraevi
 
Web Application Hacking 2004
Web Application Hacking 2004Web Application Hacking 2004
Web Application Hacking 2004Mike Spaulding
 

Similar to AP Takeover Attacks (20)

Penetration Testing as an auditing tool
Penetration Testing as an auditing toolPenetration Testing as an auditing tool
Penetration Testing as an auditing tool
 
Owasp top 10 2013
Owasp top 10 2013Owasp top 10 2013
Owasp top 10 2013
 
Ssl Vpn presentation at CoolTech club
Ssl Vpn presentation at CoolTech clubSsl Vpn presentation at CoolTech club
Ssl Vpn presentation at CoolTech club
 
wifi-y3dips-stmik_mdp_slides
wifi-y3dips-stmik_mdp_slideswifi-y3dips-stmik_mdp_slides
wifi-y3dips-stmik_mdp_slides
 
wifi
wifiwifi
wifi
 
How Security can be stronger than a Firewall: 13 different ways breaking thro...
How Security can be stronger than a Firewall: 13 different ways breaking thro...How Security can be stronger than a Firewall: 13 different ways breaking thro...
How Security can be stronger than a Firewall: 13 different ways breaking thro...
 
Secure coding presentation Oct 3 2020
Secure coding presentation Oct 3 2020Secure coding presentation Oct 3 2020
Secure coding presentation Oct 3 2020
 
Presentation, Firewalls
Presentation, FirewallsPresentation, Firewalls
Presentation, Firewalls
 
IT Essentials (Version 7.0) - ITE Chapter 13 Exam Answers
IT Essentials (Version 7.0) - ITE Chapter 13 Exam AnswersIT Essentials (Version 7.0) - ITE Chapter 13 Exam Answers
IT Essentials (Version 7.0) - ITE Chapter 13 Exam Answers
 
Presentation, Firewalls
Presentation, FirewallsPresentation, Firewalls
Presentation, Firewalls
 
SkypeShield - Securing Skype for Business
SkypeShield - Securing Skype for BusinessSkypeShield - Securing Skype for Business
SkypeShield - Securing Skype for Business
 
Debunking the Myths of SSL VPN Security
Debunking the Myths of SSL VPN SecurityDebunking the Myths of SSL VPN Security
Debunking the Myths of SSL VPN Security
 
Computer Networks 4
Computer Networks 4Computer Networks 4
Computer Networks 4
 
Web Application Security
Web Application SecurityWeb Application Security
Web Application Security
 
Finding the source of Ransomware - Wire data analytics
Finding the source of Ransomware - Wire data analyticsFinding the source of Ransomware - Wire data analytics
Finding the source of Ransomware - Wire data analytics
 
Jan 2008 Allup
Jan 2008 AllupJan 2008 Allup
Jan 2008 Allup
 
Securing your WordPress Website - Vlad Lasky - WordCamp Sydney 2012
Securing your WordPress Website - Vlad Lasky - WordCamp Sydney 2012Securing your WordPress Website - Vlad Lasky - WordCamp Sydney 2012
Securing your WordPress Website - Vlad Lasky - WordCamp Sydney 2012
 
Securing Your WordPress Website - WordCamp Sydney 2012
Securing Your WordPress Website - WordCamp Sydney 2012Securing Your WordPress Website - WordCamp Sydney 2012
Securing Your WordPress Website - WordCamp Sydney 2012
 
6 - Web Application Security.pptx
6 - Web Application Security.pptx6 - Web Application Security.pptx
6 - Web Application Security.pptx
 
Web Application Hacking 2004
Web Application Hacking 2004Web Application Hacking 2004
Web Application Hacking 2004
 

Recently uploaded

FULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | Delhi
FULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | DelhiFULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | Delhi
FULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | Delhisoniya singh
 
WhatsApp 9892124323 ✓Call Girls In Kalyan ( Mumbai ) secure service
WhatsApp 9892124323 ✓Call Girls In Kalyan ( Mumbai ) secure serviceWhatsApp 9892124323 ✓Call Girls In Kalyan ( Mumbai ) secure service
WhatsApp 9892124323 ✓Call Girls In Kalyan ( Mumbai ) secure servicePooja Nehwal
 
GenCyber Cyber Security Day Presentation
GenCyber Cyber Security Day PresentationGenCyber Cyber Security Day Presentation
GenCyber Cyber Security Day PresentationMichael W. Hawkins
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking MenDelhi Call girls
 
Mastering MySQL Database Architecture: Deep Dive into MySQL Shell and MySQL R...
Mastering MySQL Database Architecture: Deep Dive into MySQL Shell and MySQL R...Mastering MySQL Database Architecture: Deep Dive into MySQL Shell and MySQL R...
Mastering MySQL Database Architecture: Deep Dive into MySQL Shell and MySQL R...Miguel Araújo
 
Raspberry Pi 5: Challenges and Solutions in Bringing up an OpenGL/Vulkan Driv...
Raspberry Pi 5: Challenges and Solutions in Bringing up an OpenGL/Vulkan Driv...Raspberry Pi 5: Challenges and Solutions in Bringing up an OpenGL/Vulkan Driv...
Raspberry Pi 5: Challenges and Solutions in Bringing up an OpenGL/Vulkan Driv...Igalia
 
Injustice - Developers Among Us (SciFiDevCon 2024)
Injustice - Developers Among Us (SciFiDevCon 2024)Injustice - Developers Among Us (SciFiDevCon 2024)
Injustice - Developers Among Us (SciFiDevCon 2024)Allon Mureinik
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking MenDelhi Call girls
 
A Call to Action for Generative AI in 2024
A Call to Action for Generative AI in 2024A Call to Action for Generative AI in 2024
A Call to Action for Generative AI in 2024Results
 
[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf
[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf
[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdfhans926745
 
Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024The Digital Insurer
 
Salesforce Community Group Quito, Salesforce 101
Salesforce Community Group Quito, Salesforce 101Salesforce Community Group Quito, Salesforce 101
Salesforce Community Group Quito, Salesforce 101Paola De la Torre
 
04-2024-HHUG-Sales-and-Marketing-Alignment.pptx
04-2024-HHUG-Sales-and-Marketing-Alignment.pptx04-2024-HHUG-Sales-and-Marketing-Alignment.pptx
04-2024-HHUG-Sales-and-Marketing-Alignment.pptxHampshireHUG
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking MenDelhi Call girls
 
The Codex of Business Writing Software for Real-World Solutions 2.pptx
The Codex of Business Writing Software for Real-World Solutions 2.pptxThe Codex of Business Writing Software for Real-World Solutions 2.pptx
The Codex of Business Writing Software for Real-World Solutions 2.pptxMalak Abu Hammad
 
Google AI Hackathon: LLM based Evaluator for RAG
Google AI Hackathon: LLM based Evaluator for RAGGoogle AI Hackathon: LLM based Evaluator for RAG
Google AI Hackathon: LLM based Evaluator for RAGSujit Pal
 
Transforming Data Streams with Kafka Connect: An Introduction to Single Messa...
Transforming Data Streams with Kafka Connect: An Introduction to Single Messa...Transforming Data Streams with Kafka Connect: An Introduction to Single Messa...
Transforming Data Streams with Kafka Connect: An Introduction to Single Messa...HostedbyConfluent
 
Presentation on how to chat with PDF using ChatGPT code interpreter
Presentation on how to chat with PDF using ChatGPT code interpreterPresentation on how to chat with PDF using ChatGPT code interpreter
Presentation on how to chat with PDF using ChatGPT code interpreternaman860154
 
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slideHistor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slidevu2urc
 
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected WorkerHow to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected WorkerThousandEyes
 

Recently uploaded (20)

FULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | Delhi
FULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | DelhiFULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | Delhi
FULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | Delhi
 
WhatsApp 9892124323 ✓Call Girls In Kalyan ( Mumbai ) secure service
WhatsApp 9892124323 ✓Call Girls In Kalyan ( Mumbai ) secure serviceWhatsApp 9892124323 ✓Call Girls In Kalyan ( Mumbai ) secure service
WhatsApp 9892124323 ✓Call Girls In Kalyan ( Mumbai ) secure service
 
GenCyber Cyber Security Day Presentation
GenCyber Cyber Security Day PresentationGenCyber Cyber Security Day Presentation
GenCyber Cyber Security Day Presentation
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men
 
Mastering MySQL Database Architecture: Deep Dive into MySQL Shell and MySQL R...
Mastering MySQL Database Architecture: Deep Dive into MySQL Shell and MySQL R...Mastering MySQL Database Architecture: Deep Dive into MySQL Shell and MySQL R...
Mastering MySQL Database Architecture: Deep Dive into MySQL Shell and MySQL R...
 
Raspberry Pi 5: Challenges and Solutions in Bringing up an OpenGL/Vulkan Driv...
Raspberry Pi 5: Challenges and Solutions in Bringing up an OpenGL/Vulkan Driv...Raspberry Pi 5: Challenges and Solutions in Bringing up an OpenGL/Vulkan Driv...
Raspberry Pi 5: Challenges and Solutions in Bringing up an OpenGL/Vulkan Driv...
 
Injustice - Developers Among Us (SciFiDevCon 2024)
Injustice - Developers Among Us (SciFiDevCon 2024)Injustice - Developers Among Us (SciFiDevCon 2024)
Injustice - Developers Among Us (SciFiDevCon 2024)
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men
 
A Call to Action for Generative AI in 2024
A Call to Action for Generative AI in 2024A Call to Action for Generative AI in 2024
A Call to Action for Generative AI in 2024
 
[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf
[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf
[2024]Digital Global Overview Report 2024 Meltwater.pdf
 
Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
 
Salesforce Community Group Quito, Salesforce 101
Salesforce Community Group Quito, Salesforce 101Salesforce Community Group Quito, Salesforce 101
Salesforce Community Group Quito, Salesforce 101
 
04-2024-HHUG-Sales-and-Marketing-Alignment.pptx
04-2024-HHUG-Sales-and-Marketing-Alignment.pptx04-2024-HHUG-Sales-and-Marketing-Alignment.pptx
04-2024-HHUG-Sales-and-Marketing-Alignment.pptx
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men
 
The Codex of Business Writing Software for Real-World Solutions 2.pptx
The Codex of Business Writing Software for Real-World Solutions 2.pptxThe Codex of Business Writing Software for Real-World Solutions 2.pptx
The Codex of Business Writing Software for Real-World Solutions 2.pptx
 
Google AI Hackathon: LLM based Evaluator for RAG
Google AI Hackathon: LLM based Evaluator for RAGGoogle AI Hackathon: LLM based Evaluator for RAG
Google AI Hackathon: LLM based Evaluator for RAG
 
Transforming Data Streams with Kafka Connect: An Introduction to Single Messa...
Transforming Data Streams with Kafka Connect: An Introduction to Single Messa...Transforming Data Streams with Kafka Connect: An Introduction to Single Messa...
Transforming Data Streams with Kafka Connect: An Introduction to Single Messa...
 
Presentation on how to chat with PDF using ChatGPT code interpreter
Presentation on how to chat with PDF using ChatGPT code interpreterPresentation on how to chat with PDF using ChatGPT code interpreter
Presentation on how to chat with PDF using ChatGPT code interpreter
 
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slideHistor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
 
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected WorkerHow to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
 

AP Takeover Attacks

  • 1. Theory and Strategies for Takeover Attacks Presented by Eric Goldman – http://www.ericgoldman.name
  • 2. This is an excerpt from a larger presentation which covered numerous AP exploit strategies and specified attacks. You can find more of my presentations on SlideShare and at my main website, http://www.ericgoldman.name. Please feel free to post questions or comments about this presentation. A full academic paper on this topic is available on my website. More papers & presentations at http://www.ericgoldman.name 2
  • 3. AP is a gateway between wireless and wired networks; all wireless traffic passes through  As a result it is usually the most valuable target on the WLAN for Snooping or DoS  Wireless hardware is more vulnerable than wired equivalents because it must support more protocols and features, which are relatively young and/or under development  Fun target because there are so many different ways to attack an AP More papers & presentations at http://www.ericgoldman.name 3
  • 4. Gain unauthorized access to the network ◦ Attacker wants to get the rest of the network, but too timely to break all security procedures  Monitor traffic and steal user data ◦ Steal valuable information about users or company  Make money ◦ By controlling AP you can insert your own ads on every page and replace other adds with your own ◦ Examples: dd-wrt + NoCatSplash or a web proxy More papers & presentations at http://www.ericgoldman.name 4
  • 5. Multiple management interfaces may exist, with different security (console, web, ssh, etc)  Setting misconfigurations, groups of settings, or improper implementation of settings  Steal login information by cracking or finding in-the-clear authentication (web, telnet)  Physical access- administration allowed w/o password when direct connected, reset device More papers & presentations at http://www.ericgoldman.name 5
  • 6. Effects 8 different devices, 3 versions of IOS  Vulnerability is in Web Management Interface  When you switch from global password control to local user list with individual passwords in the web interface all login security is disabled  As a result, anyone can easily access the admin interface without having any login information or credentials More papers & presentations at http://www.ericgoldman.name 6
  • 7. Router allows admin password to be modified, but there is a undocumented hardcoded account there as well  Hardcoded accounts: U= super, P=5777364  Accessible from both LAN/WLAN  Traced back to hardware developer in Taiwan, 5777364 is their phone number ◦ May affect other vendors who use their hardware ◦ Was still in later firmware upgrades for Netgear ◦ Vendor solution: make a new hardcoded account More papers & presentations at http://www.ericgoldman.name 7
  • 8. APs are a more valuable target than a single client node; attack more users and resources  Wireless network equipment, especially budget consumer products often are poorly designed and coded  Attacking AP can cut off many users from access, can make any connectivity difficult  Taking over an AP can allow the attacker to accomplish many different objectives More papers & presentations at http://www.ericgoldman.name 8
  • 9. Cisco. (2006, September 20). Cisco Security Advisory: Access Point Web-browser Interface Vulnerability. Retrieved April 6, 2009, from Cisco: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20060628-ap.shtml  Hackers come up with new methods to hack Wi-Fi networks. (2008, March 21). Retrieved April 6, 2009, from Internet Security: http://www.internet- security.ca/internet-security-news-010/hackers-coming-up-with-new-ways-to- hack-wi-fi-networks.html  Knienieder, T. (2004, June 3). Netgear WG602 Wireless Access Point Default Backdoor Account Vulnerability. Retrieved April 6, 2009, from Secuirty Focus: http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/10459/info  Mateti, P. (2005). Hacking Techniques in Wireless Networks. Retrieved April 6, 2009, from Wright State University: http://www.cs.wright.edu/~pmateti/InternetSecurity/Lectures/WirelessHacks/Mat eti-WirelessHacks.htm#_Toc77524669  Megidish, G. (2008, August 17). Getting Paid For Others’ Work. Retrieved April 6, 2009, from SecuriTeam: http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/1128  Bellardo, J., & Savage, S. (2003). 802.11 Denial-of-Service Attacks:vulnerabilities and practical solutions. San Diego, California: Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University of California at San Diego. More papers & presentations at http://www.ericgoldman.name 9