This document defines dumping and outlines the key aspects of anti-dumping measures under WTO rules. It defines dumping as exporting a product at a lower price than in the domestic market. The WTO determines whether dumping is unfair competition. Anti-dumping measures like tariffs can be imposed if dumping causes injury to domestic industry. The document discusses types of dumping, reasons for dumping, consequences of dumping, and provides examples of WTO disputes related to anti-dumping measures.

2. Dumping - Definition
•The export by a country or company of a product at
a price that is lower in the foreign market than the
price charged in the domestic market.
• Predatory pricing at domestic level
•Dumping - in International trade

3. Dumping occurs when
Normal Value in Export market >
Export Price
WTO decides whether dumping is
unfair competition

4. Dumping margin
 Normal value – export price

5. Types of Dumping
 Persistent Dumping : The monopolist sells the remaining
production in foreign market at low price continuously.
 Predatory Dumping: : The monopolist sells the product in
a foreign market at low price to drive away competitors
and increase the price once they leave the market.
 Intermittent Dumping : When production of a product is
more than demand in home country , the stocks are piled
up even after sales. In such situation, the producer sells the
remaining stock in foreign countries at a lower price than
in home country

6. Reasons for Dumping
 Producers in one country are trying to eliminate the producers in
another country and gain a larger share of the world market
 Producers are trying to get rid of excess stuff that they can't sell in
their own country,
 Producers in one country are trying to stay competitive with
producers in another country.
 Producers can make more profit by dividing sales into domestic and
foreign markets, then charging each market whatever price the
buyers are willing to pay.

7. Consequences of Dumping
 Affects trade relations between countries
 Affects the financial viability of the domestic
manufacturers
 Job losses and unemployment in the long run
 Anti-Dumping rules and imposition of tariffs an
quotas

8. Anti dumping measures
In view of negative effects of Dumping , the importing
country imposes Anti Dumping Measures
 Tariff Duty : High rates of import tariff on dumping
 Import Quota : Restricts the volume of imports
 Import Embargo : Bans the import of particular goods
or all goods from a country
 Voluntary Export Restraint : Exporting countries
realises the negative effects and voluntarily come for
Bilateral agreements.

9. Article VI Of GATT And The Anti-dumping
Agreement
• Explicitly authorizes the imposition of a specific anti-
dumping duty on imports from a particular source, in
excess of bound rates
• Members may challenge the imposition of anti-dumping
measures, in some cases may challenge the imposition of
preliminary anti-dumping measures, and can raise all
issues of compliance with the requirements of the
Agreement, before a panel established under the DSU
• Article 18.5 of the AD Agreement requires Members to
notify their domestic laws and/or regulations relating to
anti-dumping to the Committee.

10. In INDIA , anti-dumping actions are taken by ,
Directorate of Anti-Dumping and Allied Duties,
Ministry of Commerce, as per Customs tariff
Act,1975 as ammended in 1995,based on Article VI
of GATT 1994.

11. Anti-Dumping investigation process

12. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
 Based on Article VI of GATT 1994
 Customs Tariff Act, 1975 - Sec 9A, 9B (as amended in
 1995)
 Anti-Dumping Rules [Customs Tariff (Identification,
Assessment and Collection of Anti Dumping Duty on
 (Dumped Articles and for Determination of Injury) Rules,
 1995]
 Investigations and Recommendations by Designated
Authority, Ministry of Commerce Imposition and Collection
by Ministry of Finance

13. Notifications under the agreement on implementation
of Article VI
• WTO Members obliged to submit several types of
notification to the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices
• Except where a notifying Member specifically requests the
contrary, all notifications are issued as unrestricted
documents and are fully accessible to the public
• Members that have no anti-dumping laws or regulations
should notify that fact

14. WTO Safeguard Provisions
• Prohibits “grey-area” measures, and sets time limits (a “sunset
clause”) on all safeguard actions
• Authorities to announce publicly when hearings are to take place and
provide other appropriate means for interested parties to present
evidence.
• The evidence must include arguments on whether a measure is in the
public interest
• Quantitative restrictions (quotas) normally should not reduce the
quantities of imports below the annual average for the last three
representative years for which statistics are available, unless clear
justification is given that a different level is necessary to prevent or
remedy serious injury

15. GUATEMALA – CEMENT II
 Grey Portland cement from Mexico.
 Guatemala's anti-dumping investigation (both the
initiation and various decisions and conduct of the
Ministry.
 Panel found that Guatemala violated Art. 5.3
 Because the application for the initiation of anti-dumping
investigation did not have sufficient evidence of dumping,
threat of injury and causal link to justify the initiation of
the investigation

16.  The Panel found that Guatemala violated Art. 3.4
because Guatemala failed to evaluate some injury
 factors (i.e. return on investments and ability to raise
capital) listed in Art. 3.4.


17. THAILAND – H-BEAMS
 Thailand's definitive anti-dumping determination
 Product at issue: H-beams from Poland.
 The Panel rejected Poland's claim that the Thai
authorities' initiation of the investigation could not be
justified due to the insufficiency of evidence originally
contained in the application.
 The Panel considered that the application need not
contain analysis, but only information.

18.  The Panel also rejected Poland's claim that Thailand
violated Art. 5.5 by failing to provide a written
notification of the filing of application for initiation of
investigation.
 The Panel considered that a formal meeting could
satisfy the requirement.

19.  Having found that, (i) for the purpose of calculating a
dumping margin under Art. 2.2, Thailand used the
narrowest product category that included the like
product; and (ii) that no separate reasonability test
was required in choosing a profit figure for
constructed normal value,
 The Panel concluded that Thailand had not violated
Art. 2.2.

20. MEXICO – CORN SYRUP
 Mexico's redetermination on threat of injury in relation to
its definitive anti-dumping duties on high-fructose corn
syrup ("HFCS") imports from the United States.
 The Appellate Body upheld the Panel's finding that the
Mexican authority's redetermination on "likelihood of
increased imports" was inconsistent with Art. 3.7(i)
 as it did not provide a reasoned explanation for its
conclusion that there was a likelihood of substantially
increased imports.

21. EC – BED LINEN
 Measure at issue: Definitive anti-dumping duties
imposed by the European Communities, including the
European Communities' zeroing method used in
calculating the dumping margin.
 Product at issue: Cotton-type bed linen imports from
India.

22.  The Appellate Body upheld the Panel's finding that the
practice of "zeroing", as applied by the European
Communities in this case in establishing "the existence of
margins of dumping", was inconsistent with Art. 2.4.2.
 By "zeroing" the "negative dumping margins", the European
Communities had failed to take fully into account the
entirety of the prices of some export transactions.
 As a result, the European Communities did not establish
"the existence of margins of dumping" for cotton-type bed
linen on the basis of a comparison of the weighted average
normal value with the weighted average of prices of all
transactions involving all models or types of cotton-type bed
linen.